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The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni

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Abstract

Melloni makes clear that primacy of EU law is not about citizens’ rights: even the core of their constitutional rights under national law has to be set aside in favour of the “primacy, unity and effectiveness” of EU law. Melloni extends the duty to set aside citizens’ constitutional rights also to EU law that is not directly effective. The court finds it acceptable that a framework decision that “harmonizes” fundamental rights and falls short of the constitutional standards of a Member State must override constitutional rights if that EU act lives up to the minimum standards of the ECtHR in abstract terms. This reopens a path to constitutional conflict in the area of fundamental rights protection that was expected to be closed since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The court’s reasoning shows few signs of authentic “constitutional dialogue”, by ignoring the fact that Melloni involved the core of a constitutional right affecting human dignity under Spanish constitutional law. Once again, Melloni also illustrates that constitutional conflict is not merely a matter between a Member State and the Court of Justice, but may exist also between Member State courts and executives, thus making the Court of Justice an arbiter of national constitutional conflict. The Spanish Constitutional Court, in its follow-up judgment, has refused to accept either the constitutional supremacy of EU law or, by implication, the Court of Justice unreserved position on art.53 of the Charter, but managed to avoid actual and overt constitutional conflict by an overall lowering of its autonomous fundamental rights standard. Such practical backing off can hardly be expected to occur with constitutional courts with nationally stronger positions of legitimacy in more general constitutional terms. Melloni can be understood in the context of competing paradigms of rights, power and the relations between constitutional orders.

Introduction

European integration was the way to overcome the devastation that sovereign powers had brought Europe over centuries. The rationale to overcome the habits of sovereignty largely coincided with that of post-war constitutionalism in the European state orders. The constitutional concerns with power arrangements for the exercise of authority that dominated the “long 19th century” was to be offset by the paradigm of citizens’ rights that came to dominate the post-war 20th century discourse, also that of EU law. The European Union is there primarily for its citizens and integration is realised through their rights. This is how the history of the Court of Justice’s case law, from Van Gend & Loos and Costa v ENEL to the enunciation of European citizenship as destined to be “the fundamental status of citizens (Grzelczyk) and its progeny), is usually read. If this were a correct reading, the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights would be of prime concern to the Court of Justice. We know, of course, that things are slightly more subtle, both historically and presently. And Melloni confirms this.

1 This article was first produced by Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited in European Law Review (2014) 39 [1] 532.
Fundamental rights protection was originally a matter on which national constitutional courts had the European Court of Justice to account: the Court of Justice lawfully provide fundamental rights protection that was either substantively, or at the level of judicial scrutiny, equivalent to that provided by the national courts or by the European Court of Human Rights. In as far as the Union would not provide such protection, EU law to some extent provides fundamental rights could not have legal effect domestically in modern post-war European constitutionalism, only law that respects fundamental rights can be valid and effective. The Bundesverfassungsgericht marked off this area of potential constitutional conflict, and Sweden codified it in its Constitution, while many Member States either implicitly or explicitly supported the view that EU law must also respect fundamental rights standards to which autonomous Member State acts are subject. Since the Court of Justice began protecting ECtHR in accordance with minimum Strasbourg standards,4 and now that the Charter of Fundamental Rights was granted primacy to the Charter, the Court could be said not to require that full respect to ECtHR in accordance with minimum Strasbourg standards, or to the negative Side that the Court of Justice has no more constitutional power than it has under the current version of the new constitutional power that the Court of Justice is subject to ECtHR.5 The Court of Justice holds national authorities, including courts, to account as to the protection they provide for EU fundamental rights in national jurisdictions.6 Whenever Member State authorities act within the scope of EU law, they must observe EU fundamental rights—this is the unambiguous message of Åkerberg Fransson.7

From the perspective of the protection of rights, this would appear to be a good thing: power is offset by rights—unless, of course, the standard of EU fundamental rights fails short of the national standard. In that case, we are back at the historical starting position: EU law does not guarantee rights as much as it is a Member State but, on the contrary, infringes fundamental rights—power exercised by Member State authorities is no longer offset by the rights that citizens enjoy in the national legal order. Theoretically, the conflict could be solved by taking the route of the substantive values of constitutionalism, that is, by allowing higher national standards, as is normally the case under international human rights.8 and as, in one reading of this provision, would follow from art.53 of the Charter. However, the Melloni judgment of the Court of Justice of February 26, 2013, rejects that reading and holds that art.53 cannot allow for higher levels of national protection if this interferes with the primary, unity and effectiveness of EU law, thus reducing art.53’s meaning to insignificance. Thus, also, the court reopens the field of constitutional conflict as concerns fundamental rights protection—unless, of course, constitutional courts are willing to reduce their standards of fundamental rights protection. In either case, leave power is said to have been turned: the Court of Justice holds national authorities, including courts, to account as to the protection they provide for EU fundamental rights in national jurisdictions.9 Whenever Member State authorities act within the scope of EU law, they must observe EU fundamental rights—this is the unambiguous message of Åkerberg Fransson.7

In this case comment, the ruling in Melloni is summarised, critically analysed and commented on from the perspective of relations between constitutional orders. To that purpose:

4. ECtHR art. 55 “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed or diluted from rights provided from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be enshrined under the laws of any High Contracting Party to the Convention or any other agreement to which it is a Party” ECtHR art.55(2) “There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be enshrined under the laws of any High Contracting Party to the Convention or any other agreement to which it is a Party” ECtHR art.55(2) “There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be enshrined under the laws of any High Contracting Party to the Convention or any other agreement to which it is a Party”.
5. ECHR art. 55 “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed or diluted from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be enshrined under the laws of any High Contracting Party to the Convention or any other agreement to which it is a Party”.
6. Article 53 (7). Sensible provision: L 190/19 2013/01 CMLR 43 at 538.

The EU Charter should be read in the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (London: Oxford University Press, Ch. 11,12,13,14, 2013), p.126, in Opinion of A. J. Bot to Melloni (C-599/12) [2013] 2 CMLR 45 at 538.

The case at the Court of Justice

Facts

Johnny Melloni is a Swedish who set up financial investment schemes in which the savings of some 1,9000 persons are reported to have disappeared. Melloni also disappeared for a while. In his absence, he was convicted to 18 years imprisonment, subsequently reduced to 10 years owing to the introduction of statutory limitation, a conviction confirmed in appeal and convicted. After he had at last been arrested, his surrender to Italy was requested for execution of the prison sentence under a European Arrest Warrant in August 2008. This surrender was consented to by the Audiencia Nacional (Spanish High Court). This court rejected Melloni’s contention that his rights to a fair trial under art.24(2) of the Spanish Constitution had been infringed, Melloni claiming, first, that he had revoked the appointment of the advocates that had defended him at first instance and, secondly, that his surrender should have been made conditional on the possibility of retrial. Melloni subsequently filed a constitutional complaint at the Spanish Constitutional Court, the Tribunal Constitutional, asserting that his rights of defence under art.24(2) of the Spanish Constitution were infringed, on the same grounds involved in the High Court.

The Spanish constitutional protection of the right to a fair trial


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practice in one Member State is constitutionally barred in another—were reason to replace this provision with another set of more precise provisions of the amending Framework Decision 2009/299.

The amended Framework Decision specifies the conditions under which conviction in a trial in absentia cannot constitute a reason for non-surrender of the convicted person (art.4(a)(1) of the amended EAW Framework Decision). The surrender of the person cannot be refused—among other things—in the following circumstances:

- the person was unequivocally aware of the scheduled trial, of the date and place of it, and of the fact that a conviction may follow also in this person's absence;
- the person was defended by legal counsel whom he or she had mandated, appointed either by the person concerned or by the State.

In the case of Mr Melloni, these grounds were relevant: on that basis, his surrender must take place with no right to retrial, a situation that was unconstitutional under Spanish law.

The questions referred to the European Court of Justice

The first of the Tribunal Constitucional's three questions was whether Framework Decision 2002/584 en the European Arrest Warrant, which does not explicitly allow for making the surrender conditional on retrial, precludes such a condition in order to guarantee the fundamental rights of defence of the person surrendered. Secondly, if the EAW Framework Decision does preclude such a condition, it was asked whether this is compatible with the right to a fair trial and the rights of defence under arts 47 and 48 of the Charter.

The third and final question posed would be relevant if the Framework Decision were to be judged compatible with the Charter, and it concerned art.53 of the Charter. This provision reads as follows:

"Level of protection

Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions."

The Tribunal Constitucional asked whether this provision allows a Member State,

"to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the requesting State, thus affecting [the right to a fair trial and the rights of defence] a greater level of protection than that deriving from European Union law in order to avoid an interpretation which restricts or adversely affects a fundamental right recognised by the Constitution of the first-mentioned Member State?"14

The judgment of the Grand Chamber

Admissibility

The court first addressed an issue of admissibility arising for reasons of intertemporal law. The Spanish High Court had ordered the surrender of Melloni on September 12, 2008, while the implementation deadline of the new art.4(a) of the EAW Framework Decision was March 28, 2011, with the possibility of a unilateral extension to January 1, 2014 of which Italy had availed itself; hence, the applicable EU provision was that of the old EAW Framework Decision, which allows for the kind of condition that Spanish authorities would have to impose under Spanish constitutional law.

The Court of Justice rejects this view, holding that the fact that Italy had decided to defer the implementation deadline until January 1, 2014 does not make the present request for a preliminary ruling inadmissible.

"It is apparent from the order for reference that, in order to interpret the fundamental rights recognised under the Spanish Constitution in accordance with the international treaties ratified by the Kingdom of Spain, the national court wishes to take into consideration the relevant provisions of EU law to determine the substantive content of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 24(2) of that constitution."15

Evidently, if a constitutional court interpreting the autonomous meaning of a national constitutional provision wishes to take EU law into account, the Court of Justice will provide it with the requested information as to the meaning of the relevant EU law, also if this is merely for the purpose of determining the autonomous meaning of national constitutional law. This is in line with earlier admissibility case law, but this time explicitly framed with regard to deciding national constitutional questions autonomously. The particular framing of the court's judgment in relation to the Spanish Constitutional Court's task is picked up subsequently by the latter court in its follow-up judgment, as I argue below.

Are there uncodified possibilities of protecting fundamental rights?

The first question submitted was whether art.4(a)(1) of the Framework Decision allows the executing judicial authorities to make the execution of a European arrest warrant conditional upon the convicion being open to review in the issuing Member State, in order to guarantee the rights of the person surrendered.

Essentially, this question concerns the exhaustiveness of the list of cases in which the national court must execute the arrest warrant in the absence of the right to retrial in the requesting state (art.4(a)(1) under (a) and (b)). From the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court by which this question was referred—the first reference in its history—it appears that the referring court did not wish to challenge the exhaustiveness of the list of cases of actual non-surrender as such, but only the exceptional situation of conditioning the surrender under circumstances in which the application would lead to an infringement of fundamental rights protected under primary EU law, as the Framework Decision itself provides that it shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty, including the right of defence of persons subject to criminal proceedings, and any obligations incumbent upon judicial authorities in this respect shall remain unaffected" (Framework Decision 2009/299 art.1(2)).
So, in reality, the question posed was whether the necessity of protecting fundamental rights could be considered as a general condition for the application of art. 4(a)(1) of the Framework Decision. This is not an odd question. After all, the Framework Decision itself claims that it does not preclude the application of fundamental rights, which are, as the Spanish Constitutional Court emphasises, primary rules to which secondary law (the Framework Decision) is subject; all application of secondary EU law is subject to its being in conformity with fundamental rights. Thus viewed, pieces of legislation of exclusive harmonisation are also always subject to an unwritten exception if they would lead under a particular set of circumstances to an infringement of fundamental rights. In other words, the Spanish Constitutional Court posed a question like that addressed in NO:5 does mutual recognition allow for fundamental rights exceptions not explicitly provided for in secondary legislation? This is a controversial question in EU law since, as is commonly held, it potentially undermines the notion of mutual recognition and restricts the number of exceptions.

The Court of Justice sidesteps the issue by rephrasing the question, leaving out entirely the referring court’s explicit reference to the fundamental rights conditionality of secondary law and its application, saying that:

"the Tribunal Constitutional asks, in essence whether Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as precluding the executing judicial authorities, in the circumstances specified in that provision, from making the execution of a European arrest warrant issued for the purposes of executing a sentence conditional upon the conviction rendered in absentia being open to review in the issuing Member State." 17

The court’s answer relies heavily on Rada, in which the court did not want to know about fundamental rights conditionality.18 In Melloni, it reiterates that the EU law’s objective is that of replacing a multilateral system of extradition with a simplified and more effective system based on a high degree of confidence that should exist between Member States. The Framework Decision consequently only allows refusal of the execution of a warrant in cases of mandatory non-execution explicitly provided for. The executing judicial authority may make the execution of a European arrest warrant subject solely to the conditions set out in the Framework Decision. Basing itself on the wording of the optional ground for non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant provided in art.4a(1), the court concludes that the provision precludes "making the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State."

The court seeks further confirmation of this "literal interpretation" in the specific objective of the new art.4(a), which is to restrict the opportunities for refusing to execute an arrest warrant and to harmonise the grounds for non-recognition of judgments, allowing "the executing authority to execute the decision despite the absence of the person at the trial, while fully respecting the person’s right of defence". Surrender can hence not be made subject to a refusal in the issuing Member State, if the person was aware of the trial while absent or has given a mandate to the legal counsel that defended him or her during that trial.19

Although the court’s rephrasing of the question polished it away, the issue of fundamental rights could not be totally avoided either. The court remains aware, however, the possibility of secondary law being applied in conformity with fundamental rights beyond the text of the Framework Decision, by holding—without reference to the Opinion of the Advocate General—that the EU legislature’s providing for:

18 R. v (in the application of NO) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Mr V Refugee Appeal
19 Melloni (C-399/11) [2012] 2 CMLR 43 at [51].
22 Melloni (C-399/11) [2012] 2 CMLR 43 at [41]-[42].
This is the court states, in keeping with ECHR case law, and the court confirms the stated objective of the pending Framework Decision “to enhance the procedural rights of persons subject to criminal proceedings whilst improving mutual recognition of judicial decisions between Member States”. On this basis, the court concludes:

“Article 4a(1) and (b) of Framework Decision 2002/584 lays down the circumstances in which the person concerned must be deemed to have waived, voluntarily and unambiguously, his right to be present at his trial, with the result that the execution of a European arrest warrant issued for the purpose of exercising the sentence of a person convicted in absentia cannot be made subject to the condition that the person may claim the benefit of a retrial at which he is present in the issuing Member State.”

The court then immediately concludes from this that art.4a(1) “does not disregard” the right to an effective remedy and the rights of defence under arts 47 and 48(2) of the Charter and is therefore compatible with these provisions.

Apparently, the court derives the element of a “voluntary and unambiguous” waiver by the convicted person from the case law of the ECtHR, since it is not in the text of art.4a(1) of the Framework Decision (which speaks in various places only about “unequivocally” waiving one’s right to be present, which does not necessarily imply “voluntarily” waiving that right).

Does Article 53 of the Charter allow Spain’s higher level of protection to apply?

Whereas the referring Constitutional Court presented three interpretations of art.53 of the Charter, the Court of Justice cuts the judicial dialogue short and dismisses out of hand any interpretation which would allow a Member State to apply the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by its constitution when that standard is higher than that deriving from the Charter and, where necessary, to give it priority over the application of provisions of EU law. According to the court, any such reading aims to subject surrender “to conditions intended to avoid an interpretation which restricts or adversely affects fundamental rights recognised by its constitution, even though the application of such conditions is not allowed under Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584”.

This the court cannot accept:

“That interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law (as much as it would allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State’s constitution. It is settled case-law that, by virtue of the principle of primacy of EU law, which is an essential feature of the EU legal order (see Opinion 1/92 [1993] ECR I-6879, paragraph 21, and Opinion 1/99 [2011] ECR I-1337, paragraph 65), rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of EU law on the territory of that State (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case 17/70 International Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 3, and Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten [2010] ECR I-8015, paragraph 61).

It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primary, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised.”

In support of this position, the court points out that a Member State is not allowed to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant when the person concerned in it is one of the situations mentioned in art.4a(1) of the Framework Decision. This provision was intended to solve the difficulties in the area of recognition of verdicts rendered in absentia, and effects, “a harmonisation of the conditions of execution of a European arrest warrant in the event of a conviction rendered in absentia, which reflects the consensus reached by all the Member States regarding the scope to be given under EU law to the procedural rights enjoyed by persons convicted in absentia who are the subject of a European arrest warrant.”

The court then refers to the considerations of unity and effectiveness:

“Consequently, allowing a Member State to avail itself of Article 53 of the Charter to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, a possibility not provided for under Framework Decision 2009/299, in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed by the constitution of the executing Member State, by casting doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that framework decision, would undermine the principles of mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to uphold and would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework decision.”

The case at the Tribunal Constitutional

On February 13, 2014, the Tribunal Constitutional handed down its follow-up judgment in Melloni, which was published on March 11. In the third paragraph of the grounds of its judgment, the Tribunal notes that the answers of the Court of Justice are “very useful” (de gran utilidad), but nonetheless need to be supplemented with the doctrine laid down in the Tribunal’s judgment in the Constitutional Treaty case of 2004. It reaffirms that the transfer of powers under the Spanish Constitution is subject to substantive limits, namely “respect of the sovereignty of the State, of our fundamental constitutional structures and of the system of fundamental principles and values consecrated in our Constitution, in which fundamental rights acquire their proper substance”. It then rep eases, with reference to the 2004 judgment, that applying the primacy of EU law is based on the presupposition of respect for fundamental national constitutional structures, which includes fundamental rights. It recalls that it is not the Constitution but the
Treaties that are the framework of validity for Union legislation, "although the Constitution requires that the legislation accepted as the result of the transfer be compatible with its basic values and principles", Moreover, of particular importance in the context of art.53 of the Charter, it repeats that, notwithstanding all this, the Tribunal has held that, "in the unlikely case in which, in the ultimate development of European Union law, this law would prove to be irreconcilable with the Spanish Constitution, while the hypothetical infringement of European law [of primary European law] is not remedied by the ordinary channels provided by that law, ultimately, the achievement of the sovereignty of the Spanish people and the supremacy of the Constitution which it has given itself could lead this Court to approach the problems which in such a case would arise, through the corresponding constitutional procedures, problems which under current circumstances are considered inessential." 39

Next, the Tribunal recapitulates its doctrine on "indirect" infringements of the right to a fair trial under art.24 of the Spanish Constitution, as developed in its case law, but emphasises the importance of international human rights treaties, with which the constitutional value system coincides. The constitutional standard by which the order to surrender Mr Melloni needs to be judged includes, therefore, the human rights treaties to which Spain is a party, among which are the ECtHR and Charter of Fundamental Rights as interpreted by the competent organs established by the relevant treaties, and these interpretations in turn are, "essential elements to interpret the absolute content of the right recognized in Article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution, the disregard of which would constitute an indirect infringement of the fundamental right by the Spanish authorities". 40

After examining the case law of the ECtHR (including more case law than the Court of Justice mentions in its judgment) and that of Court of Justice, the Tribunal concludes that these interpretations "coincide to a large extent" and can therefore provide it with the interpretative criteria to decide the case.

"Hence, we must now affirm, reversing the doctrine laid down in STC 91/2000, that a conviction in absentia does not involve an infringement of the absolute contents of the fundamental right to a fair trial, even if there is no remedy for the absent defendant, when this absence has been voluntarily and unambiguously decided by a defendant who was duly summoned, and has been effectively defended by an appointed Lawyer (Article 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution)."

On this basis, the Tribunal rejects the appeal, considering that the Audiencia Nacional had established on the basis of an examination of the documents that legal counsel appointed by Melloni had not stopped representing him, while voluntarily waiving his right to be present at the hearings at all instances; hence, it had decided to surrender Melloni without infringing the requirements derived from the absolute content of this fundamental right under the Spanish Constitution.

This judgment of the Tribunal was accompanied by three concurring opinions, to which reference is made only briefly in the comments below.

**Bases nacionales entre las que se encuentra los derechos fundamentales (en la STC 1/2004, de 13 de diciembre, T 3,).

39 The reference is to STC 1/2004, of December 13, §14.
41 TC Melloni, 51, p.56.
Proceedings of Lisbon shall follow, I say there Simmenthal and that is not directly to Costav ENEL and national (including only [2006]).


Protocol No. 36 on transitional provisions art. 6: "The legal effects of the acts of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, adopted before the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon shall be preserved and those acts are repeated, amended or extended in implementation of the Treaties.

Among others: "indicative effect", both for regard-directive or non-directly effective EU law, as e.g. in Criminal Procedure against Persons (C-185/93) [1995] ECR I-5259 or (C-261/95) [1997] CMLR 625.

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"I refer to the many authors who have held that the drafters of art. 53 of the Charter did not have the intention to qualify primacy: nor does the text need to be read in that way." For example, Bruno de Witte says, in this context, that if: "the Charter’s authors had wanted to change such a prominent feature of Community law, which the Court of Justice has constantly affirmed over the years, they would have formulated it in clear terms; but even if they had wished to do so, the authors of the Charter did not have the legal authority to modify primary EU law."

Both of these arguments are not, in themselves, persuasive. The Court of Justice may have affirmed and reaffirmed the absolute primacy of EU law over the years, but it is equally clear that this has never been accepted in the same terms in most Member States. Our current Member States representatives either at the Convention on the Future of Europe or at the time of the Lisbon Treaty intended to enter into an obligation that infringed their national constitutional obligations, rather than that they would have wanted to qualify the absolute doctrine of primacy. Given the formally non-binding nature of the original Charter text, the members of the first Convention, notwithstanding the terms of their mandate, could have written into it whatever they liked. Moreover, by the time of the Lisbon Treaty, the parties did not want to lay down a doctrine of absolute primacy in a legally binding text, and it is hard to deny that they had the power to change that as they liked, had they wanted to do so. The history of the making of art. 53 clearly shows concern for its potential effect on primacy, which some of the drafters found a good thing, others not. After the adoption of the Charter, the Commission found it necessary to issue a statement that the Charter would not require constitutional amendments, apparently considering art. 53 as a provision that prevented collisions between national constitutions and the Charter, but without specifying how. In short, the state of affairs as to the interpretable of art. 53 was entirely open and left ambiguous, perhaps consciously. From the EU perspective, one was perhaps able to say primacy was not given up; from the national constitutional perspective, the prevailing national standard of protection was not given up either.

Another argument used for the view that primacy is not what art. 53 is about, was that the text does not allow for a restriction of primacy from the constitutional in as much as it only says that "nothing in this Charter can restrict national constitutional protection, thus allowing for such a restriction.


"8 Declaration 17 concerning primacy, adopted by the Treaty on the Future of Europe under the presidency of the author of the present paper, to the effect that primacy would be, if interpretation does not lead to those agreements, by claiming that it wrongly violates the legal nature of the treaty in question. Prima facie, the statement is true.


"12 Protocol No. 36 on transitional provisions art. 6: "The legal effects of the acts of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, adopted before the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon shall be preserved and those acts are repeated, amended or extended in implementation of the Treaties."

"13 Among others: "indicative effect", both for regard-directive or non-directly effective EU law, as e.g. in Criminal Procedure against Persons (C-185/93) [1995] ECR I-5259 or (C-261/95) [1997] CMLR 625.

"14 Also known as: "indicative effect", both for regard-directive or non-directly effective EU law, as e.g. in Criminal Procedure against Persons (C-185/93) [1995] ECR I-5259 or (C-261/95) [1997] CMLR 625.
on the basis of either EU law, both primary and secondary, as interpreted by the court. This raises the disadvantage that it undermines the primacy as established in art.53 and overrules the 

essentiality of the Charter; at least since the Charter acquired primary status, which is to control 

secondary law by virtue of being superior to it. Secondary law, notwithstanding its primary vis-à-

vis national law, must surely be subject to the superior primary law of the Charter. In other 

words, owing to its superior rank under EU law, the Charter can necessarily qualify secondary 

law's primacy, just as it can qualify its applicability and validity.

The fact is, of course, that Melloni sweeps aside any doubts that art.53 of the Charter might 
raise about primacy, whether they were intended or not. As in Winner Wetten,23 the court 
switches into a different mode when it thinks that primacy might be interfered with. Although as 
(C-399/13) [2013] 2 C.M.L.R. 43 at [60].

the opinion of A.G. Bot is clearly 

one court's approach is the"protection of the public policy" 

exemption of EU law, i.e. protective order provision does not apply to national laws.

The Melloni judgment clarifies what this means in as much as it recognises that when Member 
State authorities implement EU law, they are also bound by national fundamental rights 

provisions.

"Nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 

human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of 

application, by ... the European Convention for the Protection of Human 

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitution."

So, in the court's view, the scope of EU law and that of national constitutional law overlap in the 
case of implementation of EU law. When implementing EU law, Member State authorities both 
are equally within the scope of EU law and are also subject to national standards: the fields of 
applicability overlap, and both national and EU fundamental rights standards apply.

This approach of the court gainsays interpretations which suggested that each of the 

fundamental rights sources only apply within their own ambit, so that the matter of "higher level of 

protection" would not be a matter of conflict, but rather one of delimiting the respective fields 
of competence which are essentially juxtaposed, each unique within its own sphere and to which 

separate standards apply. A suggestion along these lines in the Opinion of A.G. Bot is clearly 

rejected by the court.

The court adds that such an application of national higher standards is, however, 
dependent on two conditions. The first is that the national standard can only apply if it does not 
fall below the standard of the Charter, "provided that the level of protection provided for by the 
Charter, as interpreted by the Court... [is] not thereby compromised".24 This condition is self-
envident and not problematic: the Charter is a minimum standard and does not obstruct a 
national standard providing protection over and above the Charter standard.

The second condition specifies, however, that the national standard can only apply 
"provided that ... the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby 
compromised":25 if the application of a national standard would compromise the "primacy, unity 
and effectiveness" of EU law, the EU standard is the maximum standard, which sets aside 
national standards even if they are higher. This condition further reflection, but I first make some 
remarks on the case of co-applicability of national and EU standards.

If there is sufficient discretion for Member States in the implementation of EU law—or 

if EU law otherwise allows for diversity—primacy, unity and effectiveness are not at stake. 
Such discretion and diversity exist when a directive can be implemented in various ways, 
such as in cases of minimum harmonisation, or explicit references to national standards;26 or 

if primary law allows for differentiation on the basis of national standards, as in the case of 
the restrictions of free movement rights.27 Another example closer to the issues at stake in Melloni 
is the "public policy" exception in secondary law as we find it in the area of civil law in the Brussels 
I Regulation, which can be invoked to refuse recognition of a judgment "if such recognition is 

23 Winner Wetten GmbH v Bürgermeister der Stadt Bergheim (C-499/06) [2010] E.C.R.I-8015;

24 Opinion of A.G. Bot in Melloni (C-399/13) [2013] 2 C.M.L.R. 43 at [100] and [109]; see also, his Opinion at 

25 Melloni (C-399/13) [2013] 2 C.M.L.R. 43 at [60].

26 C-381/06) [2007] E.C.R.I-5673 ("non-compliance with fundamental rights recognised by Member States and the European Charter, such as Articles 8(7) of the pro- 

27 For a more foreign-reading piece to Melloni, see L. Brévillels, "Respecting Constitutional Identity in the EU" (2012) 49 C.M.L.R. 673, 695-696.
manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought. The Court has laid down that it is incumbent on the courts of a Member State to reject a judgment on the basis of the public policy exception where that exception could be traced as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order. This clearly sets a limit to the mutual recognition of judgments in the Member States. Similarly, the text of the Framework Decision Regulation itself, it may seem paradoxical, but in the private law context, the "public policy" exception is stronger than the appeal to the core of a constitutional right in public law. Were the Spanish Constitutional Court's case law on criminal law verdicts in absente to apply to judgments in default in private law, this would be without any problem whatsoever. Private law "public policy" is paradoxically a stronger ground for exceptions to mutual recognition than public law "public policy".

The "primacy, unity and effectiveness" exception to fundamental rights applies only when a piece of EU law is at stake that applies or should apply uniformly throughout the European Union. This leads us to reflect on the threshold expression "primacy, unity and effectiveness", which is contained in Melloni and has barely been used before, and has the potential to become a magic formula. The novelty of the formula here resides in the element of "unity" in combination with primacy and effectiveness—a renovation of the more classic expressions "uniformity" or "uniform effect". Semantically, the difference might be significant, since "the unity of EU law is not immediately at stake if there is no "uniformity". The best example of this may be in the field of public interest exceptions to the free movement provisions, as found in Omore, where the court held that uniformity in the protection of fundamental rights that restrict free movement is not required. This is not, however, cause for optimism about the constitutional diversity which the court allows in the Union, by speaking of "unity" rather than "uniformity", one swallow does not make a summer.

First, the court itself, within two paragraphs, switches back from the "unity" of EU law at [60] to the "uniformity" of EU law at [63]—which is the language of 1970 (Internationale Handelsgeellschaft). Secondly, in contrast to that of the economic free movement rights, the context of secondary legislation is different. The relevant provisions of the EAW Framework Decision can be interpreted in Melloni require "uniformity", rather than "unity"; as we saw, the possibility of allowing fundamental rights exceptions in the application of the relevant provisions is rejected. The court's explanation is that the Framework Decision aims to establish uniformity, and that the court takes at face value: no cases covered by the letter of art.4(e)(1) of the Framework Decision could ever be an infringement of a fundamental right. This unorthodox acceptance of

49 Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L132/1, art.254 under (1): "A judgment shall not be recognised: 1 if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.

50 Trade Agency (C-169/10) September 8, 2012 at [51].

51 A digital full text search in English in the publicly accessible case law of the ECTHR [on "primary unity and effectiveness"] leads to the result that it was not used in this particular combination prior to Melloni, and that it has never been used in Singapore [129-B/29/13] March 26, 2014 at [32]; the expressions "unity and effectiveness" (of community law or Union law) were used in European Commission v. Italy [226/57] [1959] 3 E.C.R. 259, [1988] 3 CMLR 11; the former including "the Community as a whole" in the sense of the "unity of the European Union" was used in Akzo Nobel Chemie and Akzo Chemicals v. Commission [C-556/07 159] [2009] 5 CMLR 19 at [17] and in the Direct and specific context of Commission v. Belgium [C-575/09 190-196] September 19, 2013 at [48].

52 On the phenomenon in the Court’s case law see e.g. I. Fall, "Cases—Case-law—Law—Rule—Case-law—An Illustration of how the Court of Justice of the European Union Constructs its Legal Argument" (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 205.

53 This would be analogous to the distinction made by A.G. Kollet in his Opinion in Struck (C-579/12 11.12.2013) at 39, based on "discerning of the unity and consistency" of EU law as a general legal approach under art.254(1) and (3) TFEU. It must be found that this unity is objectively manifested, in particular, where the General Court has interpreted rules or principles of EU law which have particular importance whereas the consistency of European Union law is already affected where the General Court has reconsidered existing case-law of the European Union courts.

54 See Omore (C-26/02) 2004 ECR I-1069.

55 However, legislator’s stated aims are increasing the scope for constitutional conflict. Thus, it may be argued that this is at least the abstract, some differences can be traced between the language of the Framework Decision and the case law of the ECHR. The difference between an "unequivocal" waiver of the right to be present at trial and a "voluntary and genuine" waiver was pointed out above. Similarly, the text of the Framework Decision Regulation itself. It may seem paradoxical, but in the private law context, the "public policy" exception is stronger than the appeal to the core of a constitutional right in public law. Were the Spanish Constitutional Court's case law on criminal law verdicts in absente to apply to judgments in default in private law, this would be without any problem whatsoever. Private law "public policy" is paradoxically a stronger ground for exceptions to mutual recognition than public law "public policy".

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**Constitutional identity and constitutional dialogue**

The EU Treaty imposes the duty to respect the national identities of Member States inherent in their constitutional and political structures (art.4(1) TEU). Legally, this expresses the plurality of political orders and of their underlying core values: unity in diversity. The notion of respect for constitutional identity regards as essential constitutional values that are common to Member States, but also those which are particular to one or several Member States only. It is not only the constitutional traditions common to the Member States that are protected, but also pluralism of values. This very fact of pluralism confirms that core values and their meanings are contestable. To give an example: whether the form of a state is a constitutional monarchy or a republic may be a question touching on a Member State's identity. Whether the republican form of the state entails a prohibition of noble names and titles is not necessarily identical in all republics, nor generally accepted within a particular republic. And yet, under EU law, this issue is rightly considered to pertain to the constitutional identity of the state.

The Melloni case highlights an element of institutional differentiation that is immediately related to the inherent contestability of substantive values that inheres in pluralism of values. The Spanish Constitutional Court's interpretation of the rights of defence with regard to trials in absentia, as involving human dignity in cases of so-called indirect infringements, was a judicial interpretation that was not shared by the Spanish Government when it adopted the relevant provision of the Framework Decision in the Council, nor was it shared by all other Spanish courts. In decision-making on the EAW, the Spanish Government pursued a different interest from that which was served by the Constitutional Court; it is the difference between waging the fight against terror and crime versus the protection of individual rights in that fight. The salience of this is that when the Spanish Government voted in favour of the 2009 Framework Decision, it acted in violation of the Spanish Constitution as understood in standing case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court.

One may say that it attempted to amend Spanish constitutional law via the Brussels route.

The Court of Justice sanctioned that approach in Melloni. In terms of rights protection, one can criticise this as inclining too much to the crime fighters' perspective—though Stefanos Melloni was neither a terrorist nor involved in organised crime—and too little to the rights of citizens, an inclination that is evident in much of the Court of Justice's EAW case law. From the institutional perspective, it becomes evident that the Court of Justice arbitrated, willy-nilly, on a constitutional disagreement between the Spanish Government and the Spanish Constitutional Court in favour of the former.

This touches on another point that was discussed in the Opinion of the Advocate General in Melloni. It concerned a matter that the court left aside in its judgment, the question whether the rights of defence under the Spanish Constitution are part of the constitutional identity. The

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56 C.L. Benson, "Respecting Constitutional Identity in the EU?" (2013) 49 Comment. 671.


59 C. Opinion of A.G. Bot in Melloni (C-139/11) (2013) 2 CMLR 43 at [20]; fundamental rights should be observed without practical guarantees to which they give rise to under the recognised legal decisions."
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Advocate General comes to the conclusion that they are not (at [337]-[415] of the Opinion). To that effect, he states:

"Apart from the fact that the determination of what constitutes the 'essence' of the right to defend oneself remains contested in the Tribunal Constitutional, the Kingdom of Spain has defended, in the hearing, relying inter alia on the exceptions in Spanish law to the holding of a retrial following a judgment rendered in absentia, that the participation of the defendant at his trial is not covered by the concept of the national identity of the Kingdom of Spain." 11

This is rather unconvincing approach on both counts.

The fact that the core of a right is contested clearly does not imply that there is no such core, as explained above. A superficial glance at the relevant Spanish constitutional case law places it beyond doubt that the relevant constitutional right at stake did not concern the finer points of the right or its outer margins, but its very core only. In the terminology of the Spanish Constitutional Court, its violation affects "human dignity"—a legal concept that was reason for the Court of Justice in Ölmén to accept the differentiated effect of the free movement of services in different Member States. The importance of the core right was not picked up by the Court of Justice: a symptom of Melloni as a dialogue among the dead?

Holding subsequently that it was "the Kingdom of Spain itself" that had stated that rights of the defence in a trial in absentia do not belong to the national identity of Spain is rather naive. It was the government speaking, not the Member State—the same government that had violated its Constitution (as it was then interpreted) when agreeing to the Framework Decision. The situation was similar to that faced by the Court of Justice in Landtová. 12 where the Czech Government had a fundamental—and outspoken—constitutional conflict with the Czech Constitutional Court. 13 One would expect the Court of Justice to be alert to such problems. Perhaps the court avoided getting into the quagmire of arbitrating between national constitutional institutions by avoiding the issue of constitutional identity altogether—but it had got itself into it already by total deference to the Council's (i.e., the Member State governments') intentions with the 2009 Framework Decision. Indeed, the Council in its (in case exclusive) legislative function is an important task to respect national constitutional identities. This could possibly legitimate deference by the court towards the legislature. However, when the Council cannot do so because one of its members chooses to act in conflict with a constitutional obligation, resulting in a failure for the European Union to respect its obligation under art 4(2) TEU, such deference is problematic.

A different way to look at the court's silence on the issue of constitutional identity is that this may still be an option out of future constitutional conflict in the context of art 53 of the Charter. 14 This would lead to a quite different understanding of primacy: although EU primacy is the "normal" case of a conflict between a national and an EU fundamental rights standard, this would suffer an exception if the national standard pertains to constitutional identity of a Member State; and this escape route of constitutional identity is left open in Melloni. 15

In this respect, art 53 of the Charter only applies to the uncontroversial case of Member State discretion, but the higher national standard can only apply when national constitutional identity is at stake. In this last case, it is not art 53 of the

11 Opinion of AG Del to Mellón [C-399/11] [2013] C M L R 45 at 141 ([spanish edition]).
15 Opinion of AG Del to Mellón [C-399/11] [2013] C M L R 45 at 141 ([spanish edition]).
16 C. Opinion of AG Del to Mellón [C-399/11] [2013] C M L R 45 at 141 ([spanish edition]).
17 G. H. Opinión de AG Del to Mellón [C-399/11] [2013] C M L R 45 at 141 ([spanish edition]).
18 C. Opinion of AG Del to Mellón [C-399/11] [2013] C M L R 45 at 141 ([spanish edition]).
This provision—art.12(1) of the Constitution—also takes on board EU law whenever that is relevant to the Spanish legal order. As the Court of Justice acknowledged in its considerations of the admissibility issue, it is precisely in the autonomous interpretation by the Spanish Constitutional Court of the meaning of the Spanish Constitution's provisions relevant to the Mellow case that the Court of Justice's interpretation of the Charter and the RAW Framework Decision comes in; that is to say, within the autonomous interpretation by the Constitutional Court of national constitutional law.

This setting can also explain why the Constitutional Court found it legitimate to "supplement" its interpretation of the Constitution with its remarks about the prevalence of the Spanish Constitution in cases where EU law would conflict with it. For all intents and purposes, the means that if EU law conflicts with the fundamental rights standard of the Spanish Constitution, and this conflict cannot be solved otherwise, the latter will prevail. In sum, the interpretation of art.51 of the Charter by the Court of Justice in Mellow will not, if it really came to it, be followed by the Constitutional Court. That this is not a forcible interpretation of the Constitutional Court's final judgment in Mellow is witnessed by the concurring opinion of Justice Encarnación Roca Trías, which criticizes the majority precisely for making this interpretation at least possible if not the only one intended. For her, the dialogue would have been successful if the Constitutional Court had simply accepted and followed the line of reasoning of the Court of Justice, even though that would seem to be the one-way traffic of "obedience" rather than a plurilateral "dialogue".30

The degree of principled judicial disobedience compensates for the judicial obedience and compliance in lowering the protection provided by what allegedly was the core of a constitutional right. A more "dialectic" element in the Constitutional Court's judgment inheres in its statement that "in the unlikely case"31 of a hypothetical infringement by EU law of the Spanish Constitution which "is not remedied by the ordinary channels provided [by EU law]", the Constitutional Court would have to respect the principle of popular sovereignty and its expression in the Spanish Constitution. This is another way of saying: "Court of Justice, be sensitive and responsive to the implosion of values of national constitutions!" Evidently, the Constitutional Court found that the Court of Justice's judgment in Mellow misconstrued the making of such a remark.

The particular dynamics of the "dialogue" in Mellow may, on the part of the Court of Justice, perhaps be understood in the absence of clear Straubing case law concerning interpretative recognition in the context of trial in absentia that would have given support to the point of the earlier Spanish constitutional case law. Under such circumstances, the court was ready for a conflict with an embedded constitutional court like the Spanish, which is pretty much in competition with ordinary Spanish courts. That the Court of Justice is not likely to do the same with more powerful constitutional courts, like the Bundesverfassungsgericht, is shown by its cases on data protection,32 a legal field that the German Federal Constitutional Court has declared to concern its constitutional identity at an early stage in its data retention judgment.33

Conclusion

The Precaution to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states that the Union "places the individual at the heart of its activities". That is not apparent from the Court of Justice's judgment in Mellow. The court was evidently less concerned with protecting the fundamental rights of individuals granted by primary law than with safeguarding the intentions of the legislators, notably governments, when they made secondary legislation. Its sheer concern for the primacy of secondary law, even though it was not directly effective, led it to a mode of judging which is more like that of making a statement than that of careful consideration of various arguments. As the court's later judgment in synergas makes clear in an obiter dictum, citing Melloni as authority, the objective of fundamental rights protection is not the concern for the rights of the individual but, "the need to avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental rights varies according to the national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and effectiveness of EU law."34

So the Precaution to the Charter was wrong; it is not rights themselves that are important, primacy is the real issue. Fifty years after Costa v. ENEL, the court settles for absolute primacy as a greater concern than substantive rights. It is not the citizen and his rights that move the court; it is the primacy of EU law over national law, even non-directive effective EU secondary law over national constitutional law.

On the more specific legal context of art.53 of the Charter, we in the meantime have to wonder what Melloni has brought. Although it has been suggested that the main purpose of this provision was that "existing regimes should not be applied and interpreted 'downwards' by invoking the language of the Charter",35 this is precisely what the interpretation of art.53 of the Charter in Mellow effected: the interpretation "downwards" of the rights of the defendant under the Spanish Constitution by the Spanish Constitutional Court, which considered itself forced to do so under the influence of the Court of Justice's interpretation of the rights of defence under the Charter. For the moment, this has avoided overt constitutional conflict, but new material for an outbreak of such conflict is provided by the Court of Justice in Melloni itself.

Might there still be a way out? I agree with some commentators that the issue of constitutional identity provides one way out, although there are clear objections as to the manner in which this was (or rather was not) handled in Melloni. Instead of the language of some 40 or 50 years ago, when EU law still needed to establish itself in the Member State legal orders, the court would at any rate have to revert to the different, more mature, subtle, balanced and nuanced ways of Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein—however, the chances of its doing so seem somehow reduced after Melloni.

In terms of the general constitutional situation in Europe, we may understand this state of affairs in terms of shifts within constitutional paradigms. The paradigm of rights prevailing in post-war Western European states, and in Middle and Eastern European Member States since the fall of the Berlin Wall, is in the context of European integration shaped by the paradigm that dominated the "long 19th century" of European constitutionalism, that of power allocation: the assertion of primacy is the main concern of the Court of Justice not only in the age of the early establishment of EU law (the 1960s and 1970s) but even in the 21st century. This may explain the strongly doctrinaire reflex in Melloni that fits into a line of more or less recent cases like Wimmer-Witten, of which the polemic tone contrasts with the more ironic, accommodating and conciliatory approach of Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein. It may also be an indication that the constitutional paradigm of the 21st century will unavoidably be that of neither right nor powers in the exclusive terms it had in the 19th century, but that of relations between constitutional orders.

30 Struygma (C-206/13) March 6, 2014 at art.11[12].
31 See White, "Article 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights" (2014), 43,5429. Similarly, Opinion of A.12 in hellebro (C-449/13) 2015 E.C.L.R. E.43 at [194]. "The Charter has now become the effect of requiring Member States to leave the level of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by their national constitution in cases where EU law has made it impossible to achieve the general objectives of the single market. Article 53 of the Charter is a manifestation of the intention that the Union is a Union of States and the Member States as such will not necessarily be able to achieve the aim of the Charter. The Charter is a manifestation of the intention that the Union is a Union of States and the Member States as such will not necessarily be able to achieve the aim of the Charter."
32 European Court of Justice (2009), "Constitutional and institutional issues relating to the introduction of the principle of proportionality into the judicial review of national legislation [Accessed July 20, 2014]."