The Uninvited Migrant, the 'Autochtoon' and the 'Allochtoon' in the Netherlands

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Introduction

This chapter discusses the process by which the Dutch statistical terms 'autochtoon' and 'allochtoon' turned from neutral tools with which to monitor the effects of integration policies into tools for populist rhetoric. This is done by an analysis of parliamentary minutes and political debates from the past decade and a half. After introducing the Netherlands as a country of immigration, and discussing the country's tradition of dealing with denominational diversity, the genesis of the terms 'autochtoon' and 'allochtoon' is presented. From this it becomes clear why and how especially the second one of this dichotomous couple, denoting foreign origins, is very attractive for populist political use. Following that section, it is tentatively proposed that the internal 'bordering' that is being performed in this manner is related to uncertainties resulting from European integration, for instance in the field of joint asylum and refugee policies, which so far is not matched by a nation-building component.

Going around Europe looking at what is reported in the national media, the likelihood is considerable to hear reference being made to people who are unlike 'us'. This then either pertains to those who take advantage (e.g. political elites in the national capital or in Brussels) of our naivety or to those who should not be here in the first place (Doomernik 2014). Looking a little closer it becomes clear that the precise identity of this second category is puzzling. Generally speaking the subjects are immigrants and their descendants yet the words employed to identify them can be very different. This, moreover, is not merely (if at all) a matter of semantics but one of substance: not just the terms used differ, but actual definitions differ too. Consider the common use of the words foreigner, immigrant, *allochtoon*, or guest

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worker for residents with roots elsewhere or refugee, illegal migrant, or asylum seeker for those who currently arrive uninvited and hoping to resettle. Leaving aside the second set of terms for the moment, the main aim of this chapter is to explore the first set and to investigate how 'objective' terms can be turned into powerful political tools by certain – usually populist – political actors. The exploration starts in the Dutch context.

The 'Others' in the Netherlands

The Netherlands has not always been home to a homogenous Dutch people. After the country's independence from Spain in 1648, the Dutch nation could only exist and survive by considerable tolerance towards religious pluralism. This culminated during the twentieth century in what Lijphart (1968) identified as a consociational democracy. The term refers to a nation that contains parallel societies, geographically segregated to varying extents, and in any case with little social interaction. All denominations (religious and political) thus were self-contained. Popularly the image of pillars was often used (each a denomination) that only touch each other (in the national state institutions such a parliament) in an overarching structure (like a roof). Each 'pillar' had its own political party and social infrastructure like schools, universities, labour unions, medical facilities, media and such. Access on an equal footing to the state's scarce resources guaranteed peaceful co-existence and continuity. This era came to its end with the assent of previously unknown levels of wealth and education and a resultant distance to religion and ideology in the 1970s. With few exceptions, the Dutch no longer consider it relevant whether their neighbours or colleagues subscribe to Communist, Social Democrat, Roman Catholic or Protestant convictions, whereas earlier the social distances between these denominations had been virtually insurmountable. In other words, 'the others' that most Dutch people were most keenly aware of in those days of limited international travel were actually part of 'us' as a nation at the same time.

Since this onset of secularization, the protagonists in the division between 'us' and 'them' have dramatically changed. Of course, the country had seen the arrival and settlement of large numbers of international migrants arriving more or less continuously since the end of the Second World War (not suggesting there had not been significant international migration during earlier periods). Early on in most cases this did not yet mean that 'others' had arrived, especially not if these migrants had been part of Dutch colonial elites. However, other immigrants did bring new cultures and denominations into the country. Their social belonging was less self-evident but since they arrived in response to labour market needs, at the time this did not give rise to political concerns. This not immediately changed once these workers started to bring over their family members. The government's policy focus was inclusive. The past decade and a half this has changed. Considerable electoral support has become available for politicians who point out imported deviation from the Dutch main stream. Among those Islam is the most frequently invoked. This goes

hand in hand with exclusionary rhetoric and policies; in Van Houtum and Van Naerssen (2002) terms (b)ordering and 'othering' and a reshaping of what Geddes (2005) calls conceptual borders. This happens wilfully by political entrepreneurs. And it also is a paradoxical outcome of government's categorization for the benefit of inclusionary migrant policies.

More or less concurrently to secularization Dutch territorial borders lost most of their meaning as a consequence of European integration. Only the seaports and Schiphol airport (Amsterdam) are still actively guarded borders because they are gates of entry for arrivals from outside the Schengen area (the European Union's member states minus the United Kingdom and Ireland, but plus Switzerland, Iceland and Norway). The gradual expansion of this area of free internal mobility has meant that presently many migrants are EU-nationals and, as a consequence, fewer are third-country nationals for whom a restrictive regime applies. Yet more and more efforts are put into keeping out unwanted third country nationals. The borders surrounding the Schengen area obviously have gained relevance as a result. However, though in a certain way these borders are also Dutch, they have little political connection to Dutch sovereignty. This presently is primarily exercised at virtual administrative borders through admission, residence and naturalization policies. In other words: governing admission to the system has replaced admission to the territory as such (cf. Geddes 2005).

As we shall see, prospective immigrants who are to be excluded from admission, at least as much as international legal obligations allow, are those who are not EU-nationals, and whose arrival does not clearly serve an economic purpose. Among those a considerable proportion are ethnically the same as those long-term residents and Dutch citizens of immigrant background who are the subjects of 'othering' by 'conceptual borders'.

Next we describe and analyse the processes by which this reordering, 'reothering' and re-shifting of membership in the Dutch nation takes place; who might be eligible to belong; and who *dejure* belongs but socially speaking is on the outside regardless? In addition, we aim to investigate the role of intensifying bordering practices at Europe's outer perimeter might be playing in this. The reasoning will be much in line with that of Geddes (2005) who identifies close connections between European economic and political integration whilst access to welfare systems and labour markets to an important degree remain national, and the salience of external borders. Geddes furthermore argues that this in a sense means that borders within the nation – those of an organizational and conceptual nature – stay important or even gain in significance. Central in his argument stands the distinction between those who are excluded and included by admission policies. After showing how this works out in the Dutch case, we take Geddes reasoning a few steps further by discussing the effects of specific institutional arrangements that allow for the defining of borders *within* the nation's population; i.e. *not* those between nationals and aliens. The Dutch case may have its specific characteristics but simultaneously, so it is suggested here, is illustrative for virtually universal mechanisms. Indeed, it is postulated that processes of integration of diverse populations (like the European area of Freedom, Security and Justice) almost by definition demand an increased 'othering'

of those who are not partners in such a project. As Karyotis (2007) argues this takes concrete shape in a performative manner at the European borders. Following Elias' (2008) theoretical perspective or Anderson's (2006) reasoning one might also see this as a first step in a process of European nation building induced by instrumental collaboration for defensive, economic and political reasons. On an empirical level counter evidence most certainly is not difficult to find. In any event: as long as Europeans cannot be sure about who they are as 'a nation' at least it is helpful for them to know whom they are not. Here too the scope and implications of the article aim beyond the Dutch case.

As a backdrop against which these developments can be described in detail first of all a brief overview of immigration to the Netherlands of the past half century is given.

The Netherlands as a Country of Immigration

World War II left Europe's colonial powers weakened and in hindsight it was clear that their empires were drawing to a close. The Dutch empire was no exception. In 1943 the Japanese invaded the Dutch East Indies. The occupation that followed laid bare the inability of the Dutch to exercise their colonial rule and after the War cries for independence became loud. Initial attempts to counter such development led to an uprising, which the deployment of Dutch troops could not crush. By 1949 Indonesian independence had become inevitable. Not all of this new nation's inhabitants were equally happy with this outcome and those people preferred to move to the former motherland. They had been members of the Indonesian middle classes, belonging to or being associated with the Dutch ruling elite. From the Dutch perspective, their arrival was seen as unexpected, an inflow of people with a tropical background, but also as a logical consequence of the end of an era. In official discourse these immigrants were referred to as 'repatriates' suggesting they all had been born in the Netherlands, which many were not (Lucassen and Penninx 1997).

After Indonesia became independent, only Suriname and some Caribbean Islands were left as territorial remnants of the colonial past. From 1954 these had been full parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and until today this holds true for the islands Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, Saint Maarten, Saba, and Saint Eustacius. Suriname gained its independence in 1975, in the process of which a large section of the Surinamese population moved to the Netherlands. Their numbers rose further during the 5 years following independence. During that interim period Surinamese citizens could still opt for Dutch citizenship provided they moved to the 'motherland' before late 1980. By that a third or more of all Surinamese people had resettled in the Netherlands, predominantly in the larger cities (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006; Van Amersfoort 2011; Vezzoli 2015).

Once the Netherlands had economically recovered from the devastations of the Second World War, demands on the labour market were such that employers began looking for temporary workers abroad. Between 1960 and 1970 their recruitment

became the subject of the bilateral agreements with a number of Mediterranean countries. Although recruitment first focussed on countries on the European shores the largest numbers of foreign workers ultimately arrived from Turkey and Morocco. The migration of these workers, also referred to as 'guest workers' came to its end as a result the oil crisis of 1973 (Penninx et al. 1994: 10). Implicitly it was taken for granted that these 'guests' would return home once they were no longer needed. However, this did not happen to any major extent. Instead immigration continued, this time of the family members of these labour migrants. Compared to the governments of other states, notably Germany, who had similarly imported 'guest workers' the Dutch relatively early, i.e. by the end of the 1970s, realized that many migrants had settled and therefore their integration should be facilitated. In concrete terms this meant they should have easy access to Dutch citizenship so they could exercise all necessary rights. Naturalization was offered after 5 years of legal residence and few other conditions had to be fulfilled. It also meant that, following the Dutch 'pillarization' tradition they should be encouraged to retain their own culture and religion. On an equal footing with other denominations this allowed for the creation of publically funded schools and also, albeit it small, broadcasting corporations for Muslims and other new religions. Religious organizations were furthermore encouraged to join consultative bodies appointed by national and local governments.

Until the mid 1980s Dutch immigration first and foremost had its origin in these (post) colonial and 'guest worker' experiences. Including its offspring this immigration resulted in sizeable ethnic communities. However, from the second half of the 1980s continuing immigration from these sources became superseded, at least in the public's perception, by a rapidly diversifying immigration of refugees and asylum seekers. Those migrants arrived from many parts of the less developed world and also from the disintegrating and civil war-torn Yugoslav Republic. This immigration stayed dominant during the whole of the 1990s, only to lose its significance after the introduction of a strict new alien's law in 2001 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000).

On January 1, 2015 4372 thousand residents have their roots in Indonesia; 348 thousand in Suriname; 396 thousand in Turkey and 375 thousand in Morocco. The immigration of people seeking refuge in the 1990s added numerous smaller communities. Overall, in 2016, 1.9 million people who live in the Netherlands are immigrants (foreign born) (constituting 11% of an overall population of 17 million). Adding their offspring 22% of the Dutch population has foreign roots, or in the terms normally used in Dutch public discourse, this is the size of the *allochtonous* population (something we return to later on) (figures from CBS Statline 2015 and 2016).

Categories of Native and Foreign

It seems safe to postulate that one of the widest windows through which to see into the heart of a nation is framed by its population statistics because these signify who is considered to be of political concern and for which particular reason. Countries in

which membership traditionally has been characterized by *ius sanguinis* (the law of the blood) assume ethnic homogeneity as the norm. Citizens are all those who are children of citizens and those who are not tend to be discouraged from naturalization. Statistics reflect this by a primary distinction between nationals and foreigners or aliens (Fassmann 2009). Citizenship based on ethnic criteria almost by definition makes it difficult to incorporate newcomers with clearly different ethnic features. Under those circumstances immigrants for prolonged periods of time and to a large degree, indeed are the equivalent to 'foreigners' and thus enumerated in the population statistics. In fact, it is not unusual for the children of immigrants to also (still) be among the foreign part of the population because they too inherit the nationality of their parents. Paradoxically, by the same principle it is quite possible for immigrants to escape enumeration if they are and always have been co-ethnics (and de facto nationals), perhaps even regardless of cultural or linguistic proximity to the 'fatherland'. The millions of *Aussiedler* (ethnic Germans who are descendants of migrants who left Germany for Eastern European destinations two centuries ago) freely resettling in Germany or Jews 'returning' to Israel are well-known cases in point (Doomernik 1997). Another example is found in Japan, a nation virtually closed to foreign settlers but comparatively open towards Peruvian and Brazilian immigrants who are descendants of emigrants who left for Latin America several generations ago (Tsuda 2003).

Nations whose nationality law is based on the notion of *ius soli* (or law of the land) define membership according to place of birth. This usually has a more inclusive effect than *ius sanguinis*. Indeed, countries that are typical representatives of this principle do collect statistics based on immigration (foreign born persons) and on nationality but descendants of migrants as a rule are not traceable in the population statistics (Fassmann 2009). They thus are an unknown quantity.

When the Dutch government developed its migrant integration policies in the early 1980s, as mentioned, these included easy naturalization. At the same time the government expressed an interest in the ability to monitor the long-term effects – i.e. into the second generation – of its integration efforts. This necessitated the introduction of descend as a statistical marker. To this end the concept of *allochtoon* was developed. The term gained currency once the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) embraced it in a milestone report of 1989 titled *Allochtonenbeleid* (Allochtoon Policy) (Jacobs and Rea 2012). The *allochtonous* are currently defined as those residents who are foreign born and has at least one parent who likewise is born elsewhere or, if born in the Netherlands, have at least one parent to whom this applies (Ibid.). To be sure: nationality is of no relevance. Indeed, the large majority of the allochtonous population are Dutch nationals (and often also of the country they or their parents came from). By default, those who are not *allochtoon* are the *autochtonous*. Commonly this applies to all who are Dutch nationals of Dutch native extraction but could and undoubtedly will include persons who are legally speaking aliens.

Not all immigrant groups were deemed to be in need of government support so a further distinction was made between people of western and non-western origin. Westerners are Europeans and others from industrialized countries (for historical

reasons including Indonesia). Non-western *allochtonen* are those who originate from the less developed parts of the world.

This conception of *allochtony* introduces ethnicity in population statistics but at the same time does so in an imprecise way. For instance, migrants and their children who arrived from Kurdistan or who fled Turkey because they belonged to the Armenian or Assyrian minorities are all labelled as 'Turkish'. 'Moroccan' likewise includes people with roots in the Rif Mountains as well as those stemming from the Arab speaking part of the nation. 'Surinamese' is a label under which a heterogeneous people with African, native Indian, Dutch and Asian roots can be found. Needless to say ethnic groups as identified for Dutch policy purposes are also in other ways highly diverse in character and hence also have members with widely differing needs for government attention and support.

Furthermore, compared to population counts that are only based on place of birth of the enumerated individual, the notion of *allochtoon* unavoidably inflates the category of persons in (potential) need of government concern. As mentioned, 1.8 million people or eleven per cent of the Dutch population are immigrants. Of those 723 thousand are of western origin. The remaining 1.1 million migrants were born in a non-western country. Crucial to note is that when we speak about these migrants plus their children in terms of *allochtoon* the category all of a sudden doubles in size. Given the fact that having a single foreign-born parent already meets the criteria of the definition it automatically includes the offspring of exogamous marriages, relationships which paradoxically suggest substantial social integration.

In current Dutch political discourse, the distinctions between western and non-western; migrants and Dutch-born; nationals and foreigners; settlers and temporary migrants; EU nationals and third country nationals; and other possible significant distinctions are more often than not surrendered to the catch-all term *allochtoon*. Obviously, it is not at all easy to then clearly know which speaker is referring to what precisely when (s)he invokes that term. Yet, to this author and others (e.g. Geschiere 2009) it is abundantly clear that the term has gradually moved from being a neutral instrument of benign inclusion to one denoting lacking integration and even to one suitable for pejorative usage. Or as Jacobs and Rea (2012: 46) note "It was gradually bestowed with a connotation of the 'non-white non-European Other'". In effect, while they constitute the majority within this category, it also gradually has become a label for the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their children who, by and large, constitute the Dutch Muslim community (see also Geschiere 2009: 151). This imprecise use is especially noticeable in the popular media but is also found in political discussions (Jacobs and Rea 2012: 45). For these reasons, and fearful of possible (further) stigmatizing effects, the Council for Societal Development (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, RMO) proposed to the Dutch government (in 2012) to limit the use of ethnic categorization to an absolute minimum. Meanwhile, on their own initiative several municipal governments have in recent years decided to ban the word *allochtoon* from their political deliberations, official documents and other communications. Some other actors, in contrast, are very adamant in their claim that it is of great societal importance to keep using this term. To this we turn next.

Populist Discourse and the *Allochtoon*

Added to the above observations on the diffuse, inflationary and possibly stigmatizing nature of the concept *allochtoon* should be some on the ascent of populist political parties in the Netherlands. In the run-up to the general elections of May 2002 a charismatic Jack of many trades founded a new political party. This was Pim Fortuyn who, named the party after himself (Lijst Pim Fortuyn or LPF). One of the issues he was particularly vocal about and which resonated strongly with a considerable part of the electorate was Islam, immigration and integration. Islam he called a backward culture. Furthermore, he advocated a total ban on further immigration (surprisingly he proposed to combine firmly closed borders with a general amnesty for irregular residents, especially failed asylum seekers). Nine days before the general elections, Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal rights' activist (who took offence against Fortuyn's proclaimed love for fur). Nevertheless, or perhaps also as a consequence of this murder, for the public shock by it had been large, the LPF landed a landslide electoral victory (resulting in 26 out of 150 available parliamentary seats). The coalition government that was subsequently formed included a number of LPF ministers. It was not long-lived: after ninety days the government resigned. In the elections that followed, the party itself dwindled but its short-lived success had made clear to many mainstream politicians that it might be wise to echo Fortuyn's sentiments. Notably Geert Wilders, a member of parliament since 1997 for the Liberal Party (VVD, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie), adopted a number of Fortuyn's opinions. Together with his own explicit refusal to consider Turkish membership in the European Union these put him at odds with the VVD's line and subsequently, in 2004, he left the party while retaining his seat in parliament. He entered the 2006 general elections with his own party, de Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV (Freedom Party). It gained nine parliamentary seats. Since then Wilders can be quoted making statements like: 'Islam is not a religion but an evil ideology'; 'Mein Kampf is outlawed – if that's justified so should be the Quran which likewise is a fascist book'; 'because they amount to pollution there should be a tax on headscarves'; 'all criminal Muslims should be expelled'. Wilders and his party, furthermore, call vandalism and crime by young Moroccans 'street terrorism', mosques are 'hate palaces', and Islam is a 'desert ideology'. During a March 2010 press conference in which he once more underscored his refusal to accept Turkish membership in the EU 'because it would mean more immigration from the Islamic culture' he referred to the Turkish prime minister as a 'total freak'.[1] On the same occasion he informed the audience that he prefers to have no further mosques and would applaud the abolition of Islamic schools.

On the night of the 2014 municipal elections Wilders addressed a crowd of supporters in The Hague and posed three questions, each to be answered with 'more' or

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[1] As recalled on the party's website on 13 September 2016: https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/9247-video-inbreng-geert-wilders-debat-over-de-nasleep-van-de-legercoup-in-turkije.html

'less'. It was obvious the crowd was set up to cry 'less' on the first two questions. The third question was 'do you want in this city and in this country more or less [i.e. fewer] Moroccans?' The crowd yelled: 'less, less'.[2] In response to these yells Wilders promised that he 'would fix this'. To be sure: to any Dutch observer it was clear the PVV leader was not referring to Moroccan nationals, i.e. non-nationals, but to all residents who are Moroccan in the allochtonous sense.

It should be added that among the allochtonous groups 'the Moroccans' are most frequently subjected to negative stereotyping: by the PVV, in the popular media and by segments of the population at large (Van Heelsum 2014). The relatively high educational drop-out rates for young men, their overrepresentation in certain types of crime (Van der Laan et al. 2014), relatively highest unemployment rate (Huijnk 2014: 45) and concentrated presence in certain parts of the main cities make them the easiest targets for scapegoating.

The PVV as a party stands not alone in its scepticism towards immigration and its disdain for Islam but tends to phrase its views less veiled and more bluntly than most others, including the more or less prominent public intellectuals who participate in debates on the place of Islam in society. Frequently voiced in public debate, for instance, is an assumed intolerance among Muslims towards homosexuals and disregard of gender equality and it is then proposed their religion is in need of a reformation (like Christianity is said to have needed to become modern) (Mepschen et al. 2010). Dutch morality is more and more conceived in secular terms (Kennedy and Zwemer 2010: 266) adding to the moral high ground claimed by those who see adhering to a religion in general and to Islam in particular as backward or ignorant.

The rhetoric of the PVV intimately links Islam as an assumed threat to modern society with the *allochtoon* in general as a person who is much more prone to crime and a subscriber to different – i.e. non-Dutch – norms and values. For this the connection with young Moroccans is convenient to make.

Whenever doubt arises about the present value of the duo *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* as voiced for instance by the RMO (2012) the PVV is among the first to campaign for its continued use. To quote a PVV parliamentarian on the need for such a widened definition into the third generation: 'Non-western *allochtones* are still overrepresented in the crime figures. Next we won't see that anymore because they'll be registered as autochtoon. (…) Measuring is knowing.' (Volkskrant 29 June 2011).

On 3 July 2014 PVV parliamentarian De Graaf entered a motion in which he requested the government to see to it that the definition of *allochtoon* will not only include the third but also the fourth generation because 'specific third and fourth generation migrant groups are disproportionally represented in [sic] high school drop-out, crime and welfare dependency'.[3]

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[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BaB75uznT8o, last accessed 7 July 2015.

[3] Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 2013–2014, 32824, Nr.69. Motion rejected by a wide majority.

Earlier, in February 2008 its parliamentarians Fritsma and Wilders asked the following questions to the Minister of Justice (who already then had proposed to abandon the term 'allochtoon'):

1. Is it correct you want to ban the words 'allochtoon' and 'autochtoon' from our language? If so:
2. Do you expect the misery caused by many 'allochtonen' for Dutch society to go away if we simply stop using these words?
3. Why do you not want to make the distinction between 'autochtoon – allochtoon' even though the distinction clearly is highly relevant when it comes to crime, street terror, welfare dependency and such?
4. Could the Cabinet stop its politically correct drivelling and move to deal with the many problems that, whatever way looked at are largely connected to immigration/integration? If not, why not?[4]

In June 2010 general elections took place. By then support for the PVV had become considerable and its results had come close to those attained by the LPF in 2002: with 23 seats the PVV had become the third largest party in parliament. Wilders' party remained outside the new coalition government, which was built upon a parliamentarian minority. Following the strategy successfully tested by the Danish People's Party in the decade before, the PVV offered to tolerate and support the new government in return for a substantial say in the coalition agreement. This deal was struck and explains, at least to a large extent, why the government pursued such goals as:

– renegotiating EU law pertaining to family migration (in order to raise the legal age for bringing in a spouse and to introduce integration requirements as a condition for a residence permit);
– a ban on burka wearing;
– discouragement of multiple nationalities;
– naturalization becomes the crown upon successful integration;
– revoking nationality acquired through naturalization in case of serious criminal conduct;
– naturalization conditional on integration (e.g. professional experience, income level or educational attainments);
– turning illegal residence into a crime or offence;
– barring anyone who at any point irregularly resided in the country from ever receiving a residence permit;
– reduce by half immigration from non-western countries.

The latter point is particularly interesting because the PVV motivated this ambition by the need to curtail 'mass immigration' in general and that of Muslims in particular. At the same time, as mentioned, immigration that might be subjected to restriction stood (and still stands today) at a low level because most migrants are EU-nationals (and approximately only a fifth of all immigrants has a non-western

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[4] Published on the PVV's website. http://pvv.nl/index.php/home-mainmenu-1/11-kamervragen/889-voorstel-om-term-qallochtoonq-te-schrappen-kamervragen.html, posted 25 February 2008, accessed 20 October 2011. Author's translation.

nationality) (see Jennissen 2014: 25). Whether this can appropriately be called 'mass immigration' stands open to interpretation. It also is a matter of appreciation whether it is justified to define uninvited migrants who end up in an irregular situation as people who are criminals, and as people who by definition can never be deserving of a residence permit. Yet, the conclusion seems justified that the construction of an 'enemy' or problematic others needs little relationship to reality. It seems, moreover, typical for the discourse employed by the PVV to use language the recipient will have his/her own associations with instead of trying to be as precise as possible in defining political issues. This, obviously, makes it hard to criticize Wilders and his fellow party representatives who might easily evade fact-based discussions by disclaiming the assumed meaning of such statements. More commonly, however, the PVV simply refuses to react to any criticism and Wilders routinely ignores calls for public debate.

As mentioned earlier, the term *allochtoon* tends to be used in an inaccurate and generalizing manner both inside and outside the political sphere, usually by invoking the overall term when actually meaning to remark upon non-western allochtonous people. To be sure, Wilders himself not usually makes this mistake. However, even though he normally speaks about non-western *allochtonen* he then implicitly conflates them with the Muslims among them. The fine differentiation between western and non-western is lost on other PVV parliamentarians. Two of those formulated the following question to the Secretary for Health, Welfare and Sports (following up on media reports about nurses failing to report violent abuse they are subjected to):

> Is it correct that cultural differences often are the cause of violent incidents? What will you do to protect nurses against allochtonen who could not care less about our norms and values?[5]

It is clear the term serves the PVVs purpose. As we saw, not only does it argue against its ban from public discussions, the PVV proposes to expand the definition of the *allochtoon* by adding additional generations.

Already on the basis of the present definition Statistics Netherlands predicts that by 2050 the Netherlands is going to be home to five million *allochtonen* (30% of the total population) (Garssen and Van Duin 2009). By adding the third generation this percentage is set to grow significantly. If at the same time the *allochtoon* remains associated with maladjustment, crime and 'street terror' this would seem a path towards social disintegration and conflict on an unprecedented scale – at least for the Netherlands.

In the spring of 2012, the Freedom Party withdrew its support of the coalition government. The argument was that it would not be made responsible for sizeable cuts in the national budget. New elections followed and in November 2012 a new government was installed, this time consisting of Liberals and Social Democrats. Their stated ambition was to run a pragmatic course. Sense then discussions on Islam and allochtonous people has made way for economic concerns resulting from the Euro crisis and the high price the Dutch nation is likely to pay for the survival of

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[5] Kamervraag 2011Z18965 (vergaderjaar 2011–2012)

the Eurozone. This challenge overshadows others although it did not keep Wilders from holding his 'fewer Moroccans' speech.

Effects of European Integration

Up until 1973 migration regulation in the Netherlands was relatively easy going and legal regularization of migrants without residence or work permits was common practice. With time the government pursued a more restrictive immigration policy but there remained due consideration for humanitarian principles and a generous interpretation of international legal obligations. In effect few obstacles where put in the way of family migration and the arrival of refugees. This relatively welcoming position gradually shifted. Europe became an area of justice, freedom and security (to recall a mantra coined by the European Commission) with no internal limits to mobility of all kinds. While this process developed, it necessitated a joint European position towards the rest of the world: a position that had to be based upon shared interests. The result was, among other things, a common immigration and asylum policies (an ambition laid down in the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty). Looking at what was achieved in terms of those common policies by May 2004 and what is in existence at present, the conclusion is that harmonization has focused on joint restrictions, border enforcement, and off-shoring of refugee protection (Tsolakis and Van Selm 2004). Joint positions on how to be attractive to immigrants (even the Blue Card never really got off the ground) (Doomernik et al. 2009) or to offer optimal protection to refugees on EU territory are meanwhile rare. Discussions on 'burden sharing' between member states lead nowhere. The only truly progressive policies are those towards third country long-term residents who have been granted uniform rights throughout the Union, and uniformed rights to family migration. Emphasis, in other words, is on cordoning-off the joint EU territory and defining those who are outside it as suspects of possible border transgression. For those who uninvited attempt to get in across the highly visible fences around Ceuta and Melilla such terms as bogus asylum seekers, economic refugees, and illegal migrants are invoked. Legally inaccurate as these terms may be their meaning is powerful and thus legitimizes extraordinary control measures. Almost any intervention seems permissible in order to keep out uninvited migrants even when it is obvious that these are people who perfectly fit the definition of the Refugee Convention. There is a wealth of literature on the securitization of migration in political, rhetorical and instrumental terms demonstrating this (e.g. Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006; Van Houtum 2010). Borders are no longer pragmatically managed but 'performed' (Green 2010). Those who manage to get in in spite of these measures and do not successfully claim for asylum (or never apply in the first place) find themselves not only excluded in legal terms but often, and definitely in the Dutch case, also to such a practical extent that their lives become precarious (Doomernik 2008).

These observations are generally true for all EU member states although with the caveat that some are (or were until recently) much more open towards uninvited

newcomers than others. Yet the salience of internal 'bordering' practices generally seems to be growing (Doomernik and Jandl 2008a, b). Some of those are a direct reflection of the hurdles imposed on prospective migrants from third countries and function as internal migration controls at the gates of the welfare state. This aim is much in line with Geddes' (2005) observation that drawing of borders in this respect serves to differentiate between 'useful migrants' and those who are unlikely to be so. Specific for the Dutch case, is that this 'bordering' is not limited to territorial and organizational boundaries but has also found a translation in the folds of society's fabric and this is done by institutionalized means: *de allochtoon.* The term seems to have become the tool for comprehensive 'othering' while its future is unclear. The concept has found little resonance elsewhere in Europe – with the exception of Flanders (Jacobs and Rea 2012) – albeit the 'race' concept used in the British census comes close. Other nations have their own terms by which to signify the 'others'. Even though these too may be derived from official categorization (e.g. by calling a person a foreigner with a German passport) this is not based on institutionalized practice.

Conclusion

Allochtoon was originally devised to target policy efforts and the scientific evaluation of policy outcomes. Over the years, as integration progresses the relevance of being born abroad, and especially of having foreign born parents, normally loses salience. By furthermore including children born out of exogenous relationships (e.g. a Dutch mother and a father of non-western origin) it is assumed that the 'foreign' parent's ethnic or other traits are of greater consequence for the child's identity and societal position than those of the other parent. Obviously this is a problematic assumption. Furthermore, this practice leads to an inflation of the perceived number of people in a disadvantaged position. In other words, where in policy terms and for scientific evaluation the relevance of the distinction between *autochtoon* and *allochtoon* decreases, the category keeps growing in size.

The fact that the size of the *allochtonous* part of the Dutch population increases is convenient for populist political rhetoric for it offers the possibility to identify 'a growing problem'. It is not without reason that the Freedom Party proposes to include the third generation of immigrants. Again: the objective justification for identifying societal problems and attaching those to persons of distant foreign origin becomes smaller while the 'objective' figures proof differently. Populist framing has furthermore associated these growing numbers with a very specific threat: that of an Islamic fifth column already present within Dutch society and to which many more Muslims are added who arrive uninvited in waves of 'mass immigration'.

Geddes (2005) points at the connections between several types of borders; among those that define the nation state and its institutions and those that encircle the joint European Union's territory. On the basis of the Dutch experience we might ask whether there is yet another connection. Might not the loss of visible territorial

borders, the loss of visible sovereignty, and hence the connection between the political and the practical be fertile soil for those populists who stress the need to defend the nation to threats from elsewhere and – having failed to do so earlier – now from within as well?

Van Houtum and Van Naerssen (2002) show by what means 'othering', ordering and bordering are shaped and they convincingly argue that these are dynamic processes. As far as bordering serves administrative and fiscal purposes their presence and function do not pose great riddles. This is not a given when we ask why the 'othering' within societies gains in relevance and follows very particular lines. Nor is it self-evident that the outside borders of Europe should be maintained in such a visible and militant manner as currently is the case, unless the aim is to signify a safe inside versus an unsafe outside. In effect they underscore who are the insiders and who are the outsiders and thus who 'we' are as a European 'nation'. Nation building is not achieved overnight but as Anderson (2006) and Elias (2008) demonstrate nevertheless is a social process that can be made to happen, on purpose by political elites, or as an outcome of joint practices. From that perspective, it does not seem far-fetched to understand the external and internal 'othering' that currently is taking place both as a symptom and perhaps in a perverted way as a contributor to European nation building. For as long as the Europeans have not found a proper common identity it may help them to have a least some idea of whom they are not.

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