Bottom-up influences in representative negotiations: How representatives affect intra-inter group relations
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Chapter 1

General Introduction

“Conflict is inevitable, but combat is optional”
Max Lucado
Intergroup conflicts are part and parcel of human history—they have been integral to the development of societies as we know them. Conflicts between human groups can range from large-scale interstate wars, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism to rather minor conflicts between sports fan groups, street gangs and bullying at school (Atran, 2003; Choi & Bowles, 2007; Fiske, 2002). Results of intergroup conflicts can be catastrophic: As of January 2014, there are eight ongoing major conflicts across the world, leading to more than a million people dying since the start of these conflicts (Global Security, 2014). Some of the more recent conflicts are among the most deadly, such as the Syrian civil war, which takes places between the supporters of President Bashar al-Assad and those who wish to overthrow the current regime and build a civil democratic state (BBC, 2014). As can be observed from the Syrian conflict or many other uprisings that are occurring around the world, despite a serious number of fatalities, groups who long for a social change find it inevitable to stay out of the conflict. Historical examples such as French revolutionary wars also confirm the social change inducing function of conflicts. Given that conflicts and societal developments mostly coexist, conflict is indeed inevitable, but is combat necessary? How can we regulate intergroup conflicts?

To regulate intergroup conflicts, opposing groups often engage in negotiations or dialogues. As it is unfeasible to involve all group members, groups delegate a representative who can manage the conflict on behalf of the group. The elected representative often has the expertise that would help him/her to better handle the negotiations (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Intergroup negotiations that involve representatives from both sides are called representative negotiations (e.g., De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2014; Druckman, 1977; Zechmeister, & Druckman, 1973). To better understand when intergroup conflict results in conflict escalation or resolution, we need to thoroughly analyze the role of representatives in intergroup negotiations. This can be done using a top-down approach or a bottom-up approach.

Research following a top-down approach examines how the representative negotiation processes as well as its outcomes are influenced by constituent pressures and situational demands (De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2014). Accordingly, previous research studied a number of factors (e.g., representative accountability, cooperative vs. competitive social norms, within constituency status differences) that influence representative negotiation behavior, most notably representative competitiveness. The
representative is considered accountable when he/she needs his constituencies’ approval for his/her negotiation behavior or when his or her constituency can punish or reward the representative based on the agreement. Using a diverse range of methodologies, numerous studies showed that accountable representatives act more competitively in negotiations (e.g., Benton & Druckman, 1974; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Breauh & Klimoski, 1977; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Druckman, Solomon & Zechmeister, 1972; Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Hermann & Kogan, 1968; Jackson & King, 1983; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 1974; Mosterd & Rutte, 2000; Pruitt et al., 1978; Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007; Vidmar, 1971). Furthermore, it was shown that the positive relationship between representative accountability and representative competitive behavior was enhanced when the representative was purposely elected for his position (Klimoski & Ash, 1974), when representatives do not expect an interaction with the opposing representative (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984), when the representative has a peripheral status in the group (Van Kleef et al., 2007), when they see (versus do not see) their opponent (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981) and when representatives feel high time pressure (Mosterd & Rutte, 2000).

One common aspect of the research cited above is that representatives did not receive any information about their constituents’ demands, which shows that by default representatives assume that their constituency expects them to be competitive in the negotiations. Confirming this, Benton and Druckman (1973) showed that representatives who did not receive any instructions from their constituency acted just as competitively as representatives who received competitive instructions from their constituency. One main criticism in this study is that authors assumed that the constituents are monolithic entities that speak with one voice. Speaking to this, Steinel and colleagues (2009) distinguished between hawkish (advocating a competitive stance) and dovish parties (advocating a cooperative stance) and showed that representatives acted more cooperatively with an all-dove constituency compared to an all-hawk constituency. Furthermore they showed that representatives who had a hawkish minority in a mainly dovish constituency acted just as competitively as representatives who had an all-hawk constituency. Contrary to this, a dovish minority did not have any influence on the representative’s behavior. To examine whether this disproportionate effect is due to perceived status differences, Aaldering and De Dreu
(2012) manipulated the status of the minority constituency as well as their cooperative versus competitive stance in the negotiations (hawkish vs. dovish) and found that representatives reached more integrative agreements when the majority of the constituency was dovish and the hawkish minority had low status. When the hawkish minority had high status in a predominantly dovish constituency, representatives reached suboptimal agreements equal to those reached when the majority of the constituency was hawkish.

To date, most if not all research on representative negotiations focused on such top-down influences, examining how various aspects of the broader social context influence representative negotiation processes and outcomes. An equally important question, and one that has received very limited attention so far, is how the representative negotiation process influences the broader social context within which the negotiations take place (De Dreu, Aaldering, Saygi, 2014). To complement earlier work on top-down influences, in this dissertation I take a bottom-up approach to representative negotiations and investigate two bottom-up influences. First I examine how representative negotiation tactics influence constituents’ perception of their representative as well as their likelihood to replace or re-elect their representative (ingroup perceptions as a result of negotiations) and second I look at how the representative negotiation process influences overarching intergroup relations regardless of the negotiated outcome (outgroup perceptions as a result of negotiations). Figure 1.1 shows the overall conceptual framework of this dissertation.
Part I: Bottom-up Influences: How Representatives Affect Ingroup Perceptions

In multi-level representative negotiations, representative negotiation strategy or behavior not only influences the agreement and intergroup relations but also the image of the group representative and relatedly whether or not he will be maintained as the representative of the group in future rounds of negotiations. In this section, I focus on the latter question and examine how constituencies perceive their own group representative’s ethically ambiguous negotiation strategies and how contextual factors may change the extent to which constituents perceive these strategies as justifiable.

Figure 1.1. Numbers in parentheses refer to the chapter in which those hypotheses were tested.
In intergroup negotiations, representative negotiation behavior can be ethically ambiguous. For example, a representative can choose to omit critical information during the negotiations and such behaviors are considered to be ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics as they are open for interpretation by the constituents (Lewicki & Stark, 1996). In intergroup negotiations, representatives often have private information and sharing such information can significantly affect the negotiation process as well as its outcomes (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). Representatives can choose to share the information with the opponent party to maintain honesty and integrity in the negotiations or they can withhold the information to increase their chances of winning in the negotiations. Because honesty in negotiations is often linked to substantial risks such as exploitation (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004) and omitting information increases negotiation power (Pfeffer, 1992; Raven & French, 1958), constituent members are likely to experience a dilemma between gaining more versus maintaining a positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir, Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). However, whether constituents perceive the behavior as right or wrong depends on the degree to which they can justify the ethically ambiguous behavior. For example, research by Valdesolo & De Stano (2007) showed that participants perceive the exact same unethical behavior as more right and just if it is enacted by an ingroup member versus an outgroup member (see also Kronzon & Darley, 1999). Such differences in constituents' justification for ethically ambiguous tactics of their own group representative can be conditioned upon some contextual factors.

Previous work suggests that the more stressful a situation is, the more threatened people feel and hence their tolerance towards unethicality enacted by themselves or their group members increases. For example, in line with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) statement that people are often loss averse and they can go greater lengths to avoid a loss than to obtain a gain of a similar size, Kern and Chugh (2009) found that participants under loss framing lied more and were more likely to favor gathering private information than participants under gain framing. Similarly, it was found that tax practitioners acted more unethically when they were trying to maintain a client compared to when they were trying to win a new client (Newberry, Reckers, & Wyndels, 1993). Along similar lines, it was shown that organizational crisis led to increased chances of unethical decision making through elevated stress (Christensen &
Kohls, 2003; Selart & Johansen, 2011). Hence, in this dissertation I examine threat as a contextual factor and test whether constituents’ justification for ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics changes under low versus high threat, such as it occurs in value conflicts.

Resource conflicts occur when individuals need to agree on sharing scarce resources such as time and money (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) whereas value conflicts emerge when people disagree about normative beliefs about what is the most righteous action in a specific situation (Druckman, Broome, Korper, 1988). The main differences between resource versus value conflicts are that values are mostly more central to our personal identities (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002), they are immaterial (Tetlock, 1986), and they cannot be traded off (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000, see also Harinck & Van Kleef, 2012). For example, Kouzakova and colleagues (2012) found that negotiators in a value conflict experienced more self-involvement and perceived less common ground with the opponent negotiator compared to when they were in a resource conflict. Finally, using cardiovascular measures previous research showed that in fact negotiators experience more threat and have more prevention focus when they are in a value versus a resource conflict (Kouzakova, Harinck, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2013). A collective implication of these studies is that people are less willing to compromise and feel more threatened under value versus resource conflicts. Therefore, ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics that reduce the need to compromise, such as withholding information, become more acceptable.

Part II: Bottom-up Influences: How Representatives Affect Outgroup Perceptions

In this section, I look at how representative negotiation behavior influences overarching intergroup relations regardless of the negotiated outcome. Although there is scarce research that took this approach, anecdotal evidence suggests that bottom-up effects occur. One example is Montville’s (1987) "track two diplomacy," which consisted of unofficial meetings with members of the adversarial groups that aimed to build strategy and improve intergroup relations. This idea in fact became the foundation of interactive problem-solving workshops, which consist of a series of unofficial meetings with the representatives of states or groups aiming to teach constituent members to engage in respectful exchanges between themselves (Burton, 1969; Kelman, 1972, 1996; Kelman & Cohen, 1976).
Kelman and colleagues applied an interactive problem-solving approach in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Rwanda-Burundi, the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Kelman, 1997). His main work was focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and yielded successful results. For example, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he brought together political leaders, negotiators, public-political constituencies through personal contact, speeches and interviews (Kelman, 1995, 2005). The result was promising as the repeated interactions over the course of the workshop led participants to change their attitude about the conflict as well as the opposing group in a positive way (Kelman, 2008; see Davidson & Montville, 1981).

A rather recent example that applied the problem-solving approach with a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was facilitated by an Israeli-Palestinian think tank. Organizers intended to build a superordinate identity within the group: membership in the “peace camp”, a group of people and organizations dedicated to dialogue and conflict resolution. The conversations between the participants of the workshop were transcribed and analyzed which showed that indeed participants developed a superordinate identity “peace camp” which led them act in more cooperative and non-ethnocentric ways towards each other. However, one point of critique was that this superordinate identity came at a cost to their national identity and it in fact lessened the ability of participants to achieve a solution to the conflict that embodies the wishes, demands and privileges of their own constituents (also see Kelman 1999, 2002; Rouhana and Kelman, 1994).

Although these intervention studies suggest that representatives play a vital role in intergroup relations, they did not have proper baseline conditions and did not control for the details of the exchanges between opposing parties (De Dreu, Aaldering, Saygi, 2014; Kelman, 2008). Hence, the results of such studies are indicative rather than conclusive about the possibility that representative negotiations can improve broader intergroup relations through respectful exchange between themselves.

The notion that a dignified negotiation process among representatives can improve relations between groups resonates with the main principles of the intergroup contact theory (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2006). The theory proposes that under four conditions- equal status among group members, common goals, intergroup cooperation,
and support from authorities, a positive contact with an outgroup member can improve the perception of the entire outgroup (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). For example, in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict between Catholics and Protestants, researchers examined the link between intergroup contact and action tendencies towards the outgroup. In addition to direct contact between members of opposing groups, they also examined "extended contact," which is defined as the cross-group friendship between another ingroup member and an outgroup member (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). In line with contact theory and the extended-contact hypothesis (Wright et al., 1997), they found that trust mediated the effect of both direct and extended contact on action tendencies towards the outgroup (Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009).

The greatest advantage of extended contact over direct contact is that outgroup perceptions can be improved regardless of the person’s opportunities to interact with an outgroup member. In fact, in conflict regions it is not uncommon to have strict territorial borders to prevent direct contact between the conflicting groups (e.g., Cyprus before April 2003). In these cases, extended contact can be a valuable substitute for direct contact. Confirming this, Christ, Hewstone, Tausch, Wagner, Voci, Hughes, & Cairns (2010) showed that extended contact was most effective among those people who live in segregated areas with very limited to no direct cross-group friendship opportunities. This shows that the effect of extended contact on prejudice reduction was moderated by direct contact (see also Dhont & van Hiel, 2011).

Within the scope of the intergroup contact literature, almost all of the studies defined extended contact as cross-group friendship (e.g., Cameron, Rutland, Brown, & Douch, 2006; Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, & Stellmacher, 2007; Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakaou, 2008; Wright et al., 1997). To broaden the scope, Tausch, Hewstone, Schmid, Hughes, & Cairns (2011) examined the effectiveness of different types of extended contact (intimate versus less intimate ingroup relationships) on outgroup trust. The results showed that the most effective extended contact was through cross-group friendship. However, contact via representatives or leaders was not included in their design. One of the reasons could be that the nature of the representative negotiation context does not necessarily fit the conditions of the intergroup contact theory. For example, some of the preconditions of successful intergroup contact are to have common goals and intergroup cooperation (Allport, 1954). Although negotiators
are motivated to be cooperative in order to reach an agreement, they are also under competitive pressures to outperform their opponent. Moreover, representative negotiations mostly emerge in contexts that are often marked by histories of hostility and violence (Pruitt, 2007). Given this, in this dissertation I examine the role of the representative negotiation process (cooperative vs. competitive) on intergroup relations regardless of the negotiated outcome. Furthermore, I investigate when and why positive perceptions of the outgroup representative spill over to broader intergroup relations.

**Bounded Benefits of Representative Cooperativeness on Outgroup Perceptions**

Both problem-solving workshops and contact theory suggest that a group member can create a positive image for his entire group through behaving in a dignified manner during an exchange with the opposing group, which may in turn ameliorate intergroup relations (e.g., Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999). However, such member-to-group generalization rests on the assumption that the representing group member truly represents cooperative intentions of the entire outgroup. Signs that contradict such an assumption may mitigate generalization processes and abolish the positive effects of cooperative representative behavior on outgroup perceptions. One such representative characteristic that may block generalization processes is the representative’s perceived peripherality to the represented group (Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991).

Self-categorization theory proposes that group members differ in the extent to which they have shared characteristic of their group that distinguish the group from other groups (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Group members who have more of those shared characteristics are considered to be better examples of the group than others and are often called prototypical members of the group. Members who match the group prototypes to a lesser extent are called peripheral members (e.g., Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 2003; Jetten, Hornsey, & Adarves-Yorno, 2006; Van Knippenberg, 2000). Previous research showed that positive contact (even extended contact) can generalize to the entire outgroup, yet this generalization process is most likely when participants encounter a prototypical outgroup member (e.g., Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999; Oakes & Turner, 1986; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991).

Along similar lines, stereotype change studies showed that when a prototypical (rather than a peripheral) member behaved in a stereotype disconfirming way, the
generalization effect was much stronger (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992). Similarly, earlier research showed that the generalization effect was stronger when the stereotype disconfirming information was linked to an outgroup member who was a good fit to the group prototype (Rothbart & Lewis, 1988). Overall, previous research suggests that a representative who is a prototypical member of his group has higher chances of improving outgroup perceptions through his cooperative behavior and/or communication during the negotiations. Hence, in this dissertation I investigate representative peripherality as one of the boundary conditions for the positive effects of cooperative outgroup representative behavior on outgroup perceptions.

The second boundary condition concerns the fact that intergroup negotiations are mostly marked by ample opportunities for distrust and hostile attributions given their mixed motive competitive nature (e.g., Fein & Hilton, 1994; Kramer, 1994, 2004; Messick & Mackie, 1989). Hence, even if a representative is a cooperative prototypical member of his group, the opposing party first needs to trust in the cooperative intentions of the representative as well as the outgroup in order to improve outgroup perceptions. For example, in a recent report prepared for policy makers in Cyprus it was suggested that one of the main constraining factors for conflict resolution in Cyprus is that both Turkish and Greek Cypriots do not trust in the cooperative intentions of each other’s groups. They believe that there is an ulterior motive behind the outgroup representative’s cooperative behaviors. Hence, even if representatives behave in a cooperative way, due to lack of trust in the outgroup, cooperation during the negotiations fails to facilitate conflict resolution (Seeds of Peace, 2013).

Along similar lines, Kramer developed a construct called intergroup paranoia which is defined as “beliefs- either false or exaggerated-that are held by members of one group that cluster around ideas of being harassed, threatened, harmed, subjugated, persecuted, accused, mistreated, wronged, tormented, disparaged, or vilified by a malevolent outgroup” (Kramer, 2004). He suggests that intergroup paranoia in the context of negotiations leads negotiators and their constituents to overly examine the meaning of each move by the other party and also to obsessively reanalyze both past and anticipated interactions with the other party. In fact, previous research shows that a history of hostility is not even essential to have a more biased and negative view of the outgroup. Brewer and her colleague showed that even a mere categorization of individuals into distinct groups can create an ingroup bias which translates into negative
perceptions of the outgroup members such as untrustworthy, dishonest, and competitive (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Silver, 1978). In a negotiation context such negative outgroup perception leads representatives and their constituents to be distrustful and suspicious of outgroup members and also to anticipate competitive negotiation behaviors from them (Insko & Schopler, 1997). Ironically, this means that cooperative negotiation behaviors by an outgroup representative are counter-intuitive and rather unexpected (Benton & Druckman, 1973; Steinel, Van Kleef, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, Homan, Moffitt, 2010), and such counter-intuitive and unexpected behavior by the negotiators may lead outgroup members to overly examine the meaning of each move.

What kind of negotiator characteristic may trigger such suspicion? For example, research shows that negotiators who yield are more likely to be perceived as weak and incompetent (e.g., Neale, 1984), and hence cooperative behavior by a competent negotiator would come out as unexpected and may raise second thoughts. According to Fiske and colleagues, (2002) competent people are in control of their behavior, they know what they are doing, and they pursue their goals effectively. Hence, when unexpected and counter-intuitive behavior (cooperative behavior) is performed by a highly competent negotiator, internal attributions to deliberate strategizing becomes more likely and this may provoke distrust towards the outgroup (Boon & Holmes, 1991). In this dissertation, I therefore examine competence of the negotiator as our second boundary conditions for the positive effects of cooperative outgroup representative on outgroup perceptions.

Overview of the Chapters

In Chapter 2, I investigated constituents’ responses to their representatives’ ethical or ethically ambiguous negotiation behavior, hypothesizing that constituents’ perceptions of their representative’s morality (and re-election tendencies) depend on the degree to which ethical or ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics can be justified by the context. I manipulated ethical or ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics by showing participants that their representative either shared (ethical tactic) or withheld private information from the outgroup (ethically ambiguous tactic). In Study 2.1, I proposed and found that constituent members justified information sharing behavior more than withholding information despite the potential losses associated with information sharing. Hence, Study 2.1 confirmed that constituent members prefer a representative who negotiates fairly and honestly. However, I propose that constituent
members can become more tolerant towards ethically ambiguous tactics under certain circumstances, namely under high threat as such it occurs when they negotiate about their values versus resources.

To investigate the role of threat I conducted Study 2.2 and 2.3. In study 2.2, I manipulated threat and found that constituent members justified information sharing more than withholding information, which led to higher perceived morality of the representative as well as an increased tendency to maintain the representative for the rest of the negotiations. Importantly, however, this was only the case under low threat. Under high threat, constituents justified information sharing and withholding information equally. In study 2.3, I manipulated the type of conflict (resource vs. value) and found that constituents justified information sharing more than withholding information only under resource conflict. Under value conflict constituents justified information sharing and withholding information equally. Findings in this chapter suggest that constituents can stretch their moral standards to justify information withholding when they feel threatened or when their values are at stake.

In Chapter 3, I investigated how the representative negotiation process can influence intergroup relations regardless of the negotiated outcome. In Study 3.1, I manipulated cooperative versus competitive communication of the outgroup representative. The results showed that competitive messages (as opposed to cooperative and neutral messages) from the outgroup representative decreased satisfaction with the outcome and increased outgroup derogation. In Study 3.2, timing of competition was manipulated, so that concessions of the outgroup representative either happened very early in the negotiations or in the last rounds of the negotiations. The results showed that early competition (as opposed to late competition) led to higher outcome satisfaction due to decreased outcome expectations, yet also decreased trust in and perceived closeness of the outgroup.

Chapter 4 focuses on the boundary conditions of the positive effects of representative cooperativeness on intergroup relations. In Study 4.1, I examined representative prototypicality as one of the boundary conditions. The results revealed that, in line with our predictions, cooperative communication of the outgroup representative led to increased perceived outgroup cooperativeness and constructive behavioral tendencies towards the outgroup when the outgroup representative was a
prototypical member, yet decreased such constructive tendencies when the representative was seen as a peripheral member. In Study 4.2, I manipulated representative competence by showing messages from the outgroup representative that either signaled a highly competent or an incompetent representative. The results showed that cooperative behavior of the outgroup representative led to increased outgroup trust and constructive tendencies only when the outgroup representative had low competence. When the outgroup representative had high competence, cooperative communication of the outgroup representative did not significantly improve outgroup trust or constructive behavioral tendencies.

In Chapter 5, I summarized the findings of this dissertation and discussed them in relation to each other.