



UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

A matter of nostalgia: How authoritarian traditions shape the distribution of democratic support on the left-right dimension

de Leeuw, S.; Rekker, R.; Azrout, R.; van Spanje, J.

Publication date

2018

Document Version

Final published version

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

de Leeuw, S., Rekker, R., Azrout, R., & van Spanje, J. (2018). *A matter of nostalgia: How authoritarian traditions shape the distribution of democratic support on the left-right dimension*. Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions, Nicosia, Cyprus.
<https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/b6ef9691-0b9f-4810-97e7-292c7eaa77b8.pdf>

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

A matter of nostalgia: How authoritarian traditions shape the distribution of democratic support on the left-right dimension.

SJIFRA DE LEEUW*, RODERIK REKKER, RACHID AZROUT & JOOST VAN SPANJE
Amsterdam School of Communication Research, University of Amsterdam

* S.E.deLeeuw@uva.nl

Paper presented at
ECPR Joint Sessions
10–14 April 2018, Nicosia, Cyprus

Abstract

While several studies have demonstrated that individuals' left-right orientation is linked to their support for democracy, thus far we know little about the historical roots of this association. Drawing on data from the European Values Study (1999–2008), the present study investigates to what degree this association is shaped by countries' authoritarian past. By distinguishing between countries with a democratic, left-wing authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian legacy, we demonstrate that the direction and strength of this association is aligned with the ideology of the authoritarian predecessor and that leftist orientations are linked to lower levels of support in left-wing legacies while the same holds for rightist orientations in countries with a right-wing legacy. In addition, we show that this association can for a large part be accounted for by individuals' support for the authoritarian predecessor and cannot be reduced to individuals' socialization under authoritarian rule. As such, our study highlights the importance of historical contextualization, when inferring shifts on the left-right dimension to changes in popular support for democracy.

Keywords: democratic support; left-right orientation; authoritarian legacies; authoritarian socialization; authoritarian nostalgia

I. INTRODUCTION

THE collapse of authoritarian regimes has been systematically met with a tremendous optimism with regard to the persistence of democracy [18,59]. In the light of the struggles the recently transitioned democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are facing this optimism has subsided [19,39]. In effect, recent scholarship is focused on exploring factors hindering further democratization, including a lack of popular support for democratic government [12,25,39,42,58].

In this regard, prior research has revealed that the ideological landscape plays an important role in channelling individuals' discontent with democratic establishment. Overall, it is assumed that democratic support is structured

along the same lines as right-wing authoritarian attitudes and hence that rightist orientations signify lower levels of support [1,2,29,80].

The observation that in Central and Eastern Europe leftist orientations are linked to lower levels of support has encouraged some scholars to underline the importance of the historical contextualization when studying how support for democracy maps onto the left-right dimension [20,68,81]. The point of departure in these studies is that the ideological affiliation of the authoritarian predecessor has created a frame of interpretation for contemporary politics, linking ideology to democracy [5,7,23].

Yet, in spite of the centrality of this topic to the conduct of democratic politics, thus far we know little about the historical roots of this association. Drawing on data from the European

Values Study (1999–2008), the present study sets out to investigate *whether* and *how* the authoritarian past shapes the distribution of democratic support on the left-right dimension. More specifically, we argue that the authoritarian frame also translates to the individual level.

In a first step, we test to what degree the authoritarian past shapes the direction of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support. We bring together insights from previous research investigating this association [20, 29, 81], by distinguishing between countries with a democratic, right-wing authoritarian and left-wing authoritarian legacy. We theorize that the direction of this association is aligned with the ideology of the authoritarian predecessor and that leftist orientations are linked to lower levels of support in post-left-wing authoritarian societies, while the same holds with regard to rightist orientations in post-right-wing authoritarian societies. To ascertain that this association can indeed be ascribed to the ideology of the authoritarian predecessor, we employ a counter-factual design in which we contrast the findings in countries with an authoritarian legacy to that in countries with a democratic legacy.

Not only do we seek to identify these changes across different legacies, we also seek to explain them by asking which mechanisms facilitate the translation of this frame to the individual level. In keeping with previous research on authoritarian legacies, we test to what degree individuals' socialization under and evaluation of the authoritarian regime shapes this relation. The first mechanism departs from the democratic socialization literature and holds that even after the demise of the authoritarian regime, the attitudes and ideas acquired by individuals socialized during this regime may persist [30, 32]. By this token, socialization in a context where the link between ideology and democracy is emphasized may also translate to the democratic meaning individuals attach to the left-right dimension. In addition to these attitudes, sympathies for the authoritarian predecessor may also persist after

its demise [12, 25, 34]. This holds particularly true in a context where the populace is divided over whether or not democracy lives up to its expectations. Against this background, the left-right dimension may serve as a useful tool to express support for the authoritarian predecessor.

By addressing these questions, we aim to contribute to our understanding of how the left-right dimension channels discontent with democratic establishment.

II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The classical literature on democratization is predominantly characterized by a remarkable optimism with respect to the transition from authoritarian forms of government to stable democracies. This optimism was grounded in the ease with which the Axis powers transformed into well functioning democracies following their defeat in the Second World War [19, 39]. In light of the many struggles recently established democracies in Central and Eastern European countries are facing in the transition to democracy, this optimism has subsided. As a result, the more recent literature is concerned with exploring factors that inhibit further democratization in these countries.

Most studies in this strand of research are focused on the influence of macro-level developments on democratic stability, such as economic instability [11, 63, 73] and corruption [31, 82]. Increasingly, studies are also tapping into the individual dimension of democratization, by asking which characteristics and attitudes inhibit or foster satisfaction with and support for democracy among the populace [42, 43, 67, 75, 76].

In this regard, several studies have revealed that the left-right dimension plays a paramount role in channelling individuals' discontent with democratic establishment. Overall, support for democracy is thought to be structured along the same line as right-wing authoritarianism, linking rightist orientations with lower levels of support for democracy [29, 80]. Nevertheless, the finding that in the Central and Eastern Eu-

ropean context leftist orientations are linked to lower levels of support [20,81] illustrates that right-wing authoritarian attitudes are only a limited explanation for why ideological orientations are linked to support for democracy.

Against this background, several studies have considered countries' authoritarian traditions as an additional contextual factor explaining the nature of this association. Yet, in spite of the centrality of this topic for the conduct of democratic politics, thus far we know little about the historical roots of this association. In this section, we lay out a theoretical framework focusing on *whether* and *how* the authoritarian past would shape the distribution of democratic support across the left-right dimension.

i. Authoritarian traditions and the left-right dimension

The transition to democracy does not automatically result in a complete separation with the authoritarian past [12, 25, 39, 42, 58]. That is, some elements associated with authoritarianism are retained in the form of a legacy – i.e. social, behavioural, institutional and political patterns introduced by the authoritarian predecessor [14, 38, 68]. Among the most commonly mentioned in this respect are the lack of loyalty to democracy on the part of the newly instated political elite [17, 62, 72] and the lasting influence of authoritarianism on the structure of political competition [16, 48, 49, 51, 64].

To a lesser extent, studies have also explored how the authoritarian past creates frames of interpretation for contemporary politics [23, 33, 57, 61]. The point of departure in these studies is that twentieth century authoritarian regimes were not ideologically neutral. That is, communism and socialism were exclusively associated with the far-left end of the ideological spectrum, while national socialism, fascism and military regimes were situated at the far-right end of the spectrum. In turn, this anti-democratic connotation of the left-right dimension has created a frame, linking ideology to democracy [5, 7, 23].

It is clear that the anti-democratic connotation of the left-right dimension has translated to the elite level. That is, a substantial amount of research has revealed that the authoritarian past has had a significant impact on the nature of party competition. Parties expressing any ideological affiliation with the authoritarian predecessor risk judicial punishment [9, 10, 27] and only parties managing to ward off accusations of political extremism have succeeded in gaining electoral ground [15, 44, 83]. While the translation of this frame on the elite (party) level has already been corroborated by several studies, thus far we know little as to whether and how it translates to the individual level. Assuming such a perspective, leftist orientations can be theorized to be linked to lower levels of democratic support in countries with a left-wing legacy, while the opposite holds in countries with a right-wing legacy.

Yet, in spite of the importance of this question to the conduct of democratic politics, thus far no study has asked whether this frame also translates to the individual level. The few studies that assess to what degree democratic support maps onto the left-right orientation, usually invoke the authoritarian past as a post-hoc explanation for the direction of this association within a particular geographical context. In effect, evidence on this matter is mostly anecdotal and scattered across different regional scientific communities. This is for instance the case in several studies conducted in the Central and Eastern European context, where leftist orientations have found to be linked to lower levels of democratic support [8, 20, 22, 81]. Evidence that rightist orientations are linked to lower levels of support in right-wing authoritarian legacies can be reduced to a single study, drawing on survey data gathered shortly after Italy's transition to democracy [54].

Although these findings are consistent with the expectation that the authoritarian past shapes the distribution of democratic support on the left-right dimension, a thorough test on this matter is still lacking. To ascertain that both these findings can indeed be attributed to countries' authoritarian past a comparison

with a situation in which the left-right dimension is not – or at least hardly – influenced by the authoritarian past [23]. Such a ‘counterfactual’ left-right dimension can be found in countries with a democratic legacy, of which the authoritarian predecessors (mostly absolute or constitutional monarchies) are not affiliated to a particular end of the ideological continuum.¹ Assuming that these findings can be understood as a reflection of the authoritarian past, we expect that:

Hypothesis 1: leftist [rightist] orientations are associated with lower levels of support for democracy in countries with a left[right]-wing authoritarian legacy (H1a) and this association is significantly different from that in countries with a democratic legacy (H1b).

ii. The past in the present: authoritarian socialization and nostalgia

Not only is there no conclusive evidence corroborating that the authoritarian past shapes the association between left-right orientation and democratic support, prior research has also struggled in identifying the social roots of this legacy. That is, it is unclear which conditions facilitate the transmission of this frame to the individual level. Of course, many mechanisms can be envisioned that would explain why individuals use the left-right dimension to signal their support for democracy. It is for instance plausible that this phenomenon is at least in part shaped by individuals’ satisfaction with government performance – an element that previous studies have shown to be strongly correlated with democratic support.

In this study, however, we direct our focus on how direct remnants of the authoritarian past shape this phenomenon. In particular, we focus on mechanisms that are the direct

results of conditions created by the authoritarian predecessor itself, rather than situational factors in the present. Scholars working in such a paradigm, identify two mechanisms accounting for the translation of this link to the individual level, namely individuals’ socialization under and evaluation of the authoritarian regime.

The first mechanism is derived from the democratic socialization literature, which argues that – in spite of minor changes throughout individuals’ life-cycle – political attitudes and behaviour acquired in early adulthood tend to remain largely stable afterwards [30, 39, 40, 56]. This stability is also reflected in individuals’ placement on the left-right dimension as well as the substantive meaning they attach to this placement [53, 74, 77, 78]. Exposure to a context where the link between ideology and democracy gains prominence, should therefore produce an enduring impression on the democratic meaning individuals attach to the left-right dimension.

In this respect, socialization under authoritarian rule may provide for a context in which ideology and democracy on the individual level is more strongly linked than in a democratic context. Overall, socialization under authoritarian rule tends to be a suppressing factor in the development of democratic attitudes itself [70]. That is, individuals socialized in this context tend to view authoritarian forms of government as a more viable and legitimate alternative to the current democratic establishment [24, 66, 70]. Yet, it is unlikely that this context uniformly affects the democratic attitudes of all individuals, independent of their ideological orientations. Instead, the addition of a moral distinction between the ‘good’ proponents of the regime in place and the ‘bad’ opponents of this regime may result in a highly selective transmission process, with individuals adhering to the same ideology being more susceptible to authoritarian viewpoints, than individuals of the opposite ideology [6, 7, 23]. For a large part, this moral distinction also translates to differential experiences with authoritarian rule, since these regimes have undertaken

¹ We refrain from assuming that this link is absent in this group of countries, since all these countries are located in Western Europe, a region that has had aggressive encounters with the Nazi Empire during the Second World War.

violent efforts to eliminate these views. During the Second World War, for instance, left-wing opponents of Nazism were confronted with ferocious attacks against them [84]. The same holds true with respect to opponents of the communist regime and the presence of this intolerance had severely repressive consequences [35,79]. Combining these insights, we can theorize that compared to a democratic socialization environment, socialization under authoritarian rule fortifies the contrast in democratic support across the ideological spectrum. We therefore expect that:

Hypothesis 2: *The association between left-right orientation and democratic support is stronger among individuals who were socialized under authoritarian rule than among individuals who were socialized under democratic rule.*

While the democratic socialization literature tends to focus on the context, the second mechanism ascribes a more active role to the individual. Drawing on Sartori's (1976) schema of issue divides, the second explanation highlights the possibility that individuals use the left-right dimension to signal a particular stance on democratic government [20,22,54].

Key in our understanding of this explanatory mechanism is the word divide. In a context of a transition, a divide over regime choice will largely parallel that of the divide between the winners and losers of democratic transition. This assertion is well embedded in the literature focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. In this region, the recent transformation to democracy and market economy has produced a well-defined schism between winners and losers of democracy. Regardless of whether this involves economic or ideological winners or losers of the authoritarian regime, previous research has indicated that the losers in particular tend to feel that returning to communist rule constitutes a desirable and more viable option – a phenomenon that is generally labelled as communist nostalgia [17,21,25,34,62,70,72].

Literature tapping into this nostalgic element is relatively scarce and the few studies that do

tend to focus on the Central- and Eastern European context. In effect, there is virtually no literature on nostalgia to right-wing authoritarian regimes. In spite of the absence of survey data or prior research in this regard, we can assume that transition to democracy has also created a schism between the winners and losers in countries with a right-wing authoritarian past [55]. However, this schism is expectedly less well-pronounced compared to the Central and Eastern European context. Compared to their communist counterparts right-wing authoritarian regimes were considerably less popular [5,71]. Economically, too, the difference between winners and losers were less pronounced as transition to democracy was coupled with economic prosperity rather than economic malaise.

To the degree that this reactionary impulse shapes individuals' support for democracy, the question remains how they communicate these preferences with the polity. Against this background, support for the authoritarian predecessor does not only serve as a cue determining individuals' support for democracy, but also as a cue to determine their position on the left-right dimension. That is, the left-right dimension serves as a useful handle for individuals to align with the authoritarian predecessor. While there may be substantial differences in the levels of support for democracy and authoritarian nostalgia between countries with a left-wing and right-wing legacy, we can still envision a similar nostalgic mechanism. In countries with a right-wing legacy, this means that rightist orientations would be inferred from high levels of support for the authoritarian predecessor, while the same holds with respect to leftist orientations in countries with a left-wing legacy.

Unfortunately, due to methodological constraints we are limited to testing this mechanism in post-socialist societies. In this context, we theorize that individuals infer both their leftist orientations and their support for democracy from their support for the authoritarian predecessor, thereby rendering the association between left-right orientation and democratic

support obsolete. Hence, we expect that:

Hypothesis 3: *The association between left-right orientation and democratic support reduces significantly when taking individuals' support for the authoritarian predecessor into account.*

III. METHODS

i. Data: European Values Study

In order to answer our questions, we need data that tackles two methodological challenges. The main methodological challenge is to disentangle support for democracy *as a form of government* from individuals' evaluation of and satisfaction with government performance [13, 55, 60]. Measuring this particular form of democratic support requires information with respect to individuals' support for democracy, as well as their endorsement of authoritarian alternatives. Only very few surveys include measures that tap into both these dimensions of democratic support. A second challenge is that this measurement ought to be available across countries with substantially different authoritarian traditions (i.e. democratic, left-wing and right-wing). To our knowledge, the only survey that answers to both these criteria is the third and fourth wave of the European Values Study [28].²

In the third wave of this survey, a representative sample of the adult population was drawn in 33 European countries, using face-to-face interviewing techniques (N=41,125; mean response rate=64.6%). In the fourth wave, this was extended to 46 countries (N=66,281; mean response rate=53.2%).³ Given their substantial differences in civic culture and their experience with authoritarianism, we split-up the sample of Germany into East and West-Germany [69].

² The EVS data can be obtained via the GESIS data archive: www.gesis.org

³ A country-specific list of response rates is available in Annex A.

ii. Regime Classification

The countries in our sample were subsequently classified in accordance with the ideology of their *most recent* experience with authoritarianism, using the criteria catalogued by Hunt and Collander [41] and Kailitz [47].⁴ Three legacies were distinguished: democratic, countries with a right-wing authoritarian legacy and countries with a left-wing authoritarian legacy (see Table ??). Countries with a fascist, national socialist or military regime preceding the democratic regime are classified as right-wing authoritarian legacies. All post-socialist or communist countries were identified as left-wing authoritarian legacies. By democratic legacies, we mean countries with a largely uninterrupted experience with democracy since the beginning of the twentieth century. Countries where the left-right dimension relatively recently gained prominence or that could not be classified under one of these categories were excluded.⁵

iii. Dependent and Independent Variables

To assess the dependent variable, we construct an index 'democracy-autocracy preference' (DAP) using a battery of three items routinely used to measure democratic support in a reliable and cross-nationally comparable way [4, 37, 50, 52, 65]. Democratic preferences were measured by asking respondents to what extent they thought having democratic political system was a good way of governing the country (1 'very good' – 4 'very bad') and to what extent they agreed that democracy is the best form of government (1 'completely agree' – 4 'completely disagree'). These two items were first rescaled from 0 to +3, where higher values indicated higher levels of democratic preferences and subsequently combined in a mean-scale (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.66). The

⁴ A more elaborate explanation of these criteria and the justification for the classification of each country can be found in Annex B.

⁵ This was the case in Turkey and Northern Cyprus, where this dimension gained prominence after the 1960 coup, and in former British colonies Cyprus and Malta

Table 1: *Regime Classification*

Legacy	Countries
Democratic	Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, <i>Switzerland</i> , United Kingdom
Right-Wing	Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, <i>Norway</i> , Portugal, Spain, West Germany
Left-Wing	<i>Albania</i> , <i>Armenia</i> , Belarus, <i>Bosnia Herzegovina</i> , Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, <i>Georgia</i> , Hungary, <i>Kosovo</i> , Latvia, Lithuania, <i>Macedonia</i> , <i>Moldova</i> , <i>Montenegro</i> , Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, <i>Serbia</i> , Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine

Note: countries displayed in *italic* did not participate in the 3rd wave of the survey.

negative end indicating authoritarian preferences was constructed by assessing to what degree respondents agreed that having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections was a good way of government (1 'very good' – 4 'very bad'). This item was rescaled from -3 to 0, where lower values indicated higher preference for authoritarianism. Combining these two ends of the autocracy-democracy dimension, resulted in a scale where -3 indicated full preference for an authoritarian form of government and +3 full preference for a democratic form of government.

We study this dependent variable in relation to individuals' ideological orientation on a left-right dimension. This was measured using a scale ranging between 1 'left' to 10 'right'. In a second step, we tap into the mechanisms that would account for the association between left-right orientation and democratic support. Based on the literature, we identified two mechanisms that would account for the translation of this link to the individual level: i.e. individuals' socialization under and evaluation of authoritarian rule.

To investigate the influence of authoritarian socialization, we distinguish between two cohorts: individuals socialized under authoritarian rule and individuals socialized after authoritarian rule. Using Polity IV's democracy-autocracy index and historical data, we first constructed a timeline for each country on

which we pinpointed the start and end-date of each regime. We consider respondents whose formative year coincided with this period of time as 'socialized under authoritarian rule', and respondents whose formative year took place after the end-date of the regime to be 'socialized after authoritarian rule'. Individuals socialized before authoritarian rule were omitted because this group was too small for statistical purposes and was not present in every country in our analyses.⁶ We take 18 as the formative age, since previous research has shown that this is the age at which political attitudes and orientations largely start stabilizing [3,45,46].⁷ Within this context, we also control for life-cycle and period effects. The measurement of period as a dummy variable differentiating between the third and fourth wave of the survey. Due to high degrees of multicollinearity with cohort (for an elaborate explanation see the section on Strategy of Analysis), we impose constraints on the specification of the age variable. Drawing on the social-

⁶ i. The operationalization of cohort varies cross-nationally in accordance with the year of countries' transition to democracy. For an overview of the number of individuals per cohort, see Annex D

ii. We provide a separate analysis per country with all cohorts, which is available in Annex iii. This does not substantially alter the results.

⁷ We also tested our hypotheses using a more general specification where adolescence as a whole was considered the formative age. This does not substantially alter the results.

ization literature, we specify age as a categorical variable with four categories: adolescence (≤ 25), young adulthood (26-35), middle adulthood (36-50) and late adulthood ($51 \geq$).⁸

To investigate the influence of the second mechanism, we include a measure for individuals' evaluation of the previous regime. This was measured on a scale from 1 'bad' to 10 'very good'. In all countries with a left-wing authoritarian legacy, this question explicitly referred to the evaluation of the communist regime that – at the time of the survey – collapsed approximately ten years ago.⁹ In all other countries this question was framed more neutrally and referred to 'the regime as it was ten years ago'. Unfortunately, the data did not provide for an opportunity to gauge support for the previous regimes in right-wing authoritarian legacies and we therefore confine our analyses to Central and Eastern Europe. An overview of all variables can be found in Table ??.


iv. Strategy of Analysis

As was mentioned earlier, we are agnostic about the direction of the relation between left-right orientation and democratic support. That is, we do not exclude the possibility that people infer their left-right positions from their views on democratic government. In effect, changing the direction of causality would not alter the arguments made in the theoretical framework. For the purpose of this study we do imply such a direction and regress democratic support onto left-right orientation rather than the other way around. To maintain the focus on the correlational nature of this research question, however, we opted to include no control variables.

For the sake of parsimony and clarity, we estimate all analyses separately for each type of legacy. In addition to the readability, this choice has as an advantage that it avoids the

estimation of needlessly complicated models with three-way interactions, which given their ambiguity are considered undesirable.¹⁰ To test how the authoritarian past shapes the association between left-right orientation and democratic support (H1), we benchmark the findings in countries with an ideological authoritarian legacy against this association in democratic legacies. The addition of this comparative element is useful, since it allows us to exclude a large number of situational and individual factors influencing the association between left-right orientation and democratic support.

Figure 1: Cross-Nested Multilevel Model



In a second step, we extend our analyses to include the two explanatory mechanisms we identified earlier. To test the influence of individuals' evaluation of the authoritarian predecessor, we simply add this variable to our equation. Assessing the influence of authoritarian socialization (cohort effects), however, is much more challenging since it is virtually impossible to disentangle this effect from age or period effects due to their perfect multicollinearity [36]. To subvert this problem, we turn to the estimation of an Age Period Cohort Analysis, which allows us to estimate the effects of socialization (cohort) while controlling for life-cycle (age) and wave (period)-effects. To this end, certain constraints had to be imposed on the specification of these variables,

⁸ An overview of the cell frequencies and the correlational structure of age, period and cohort is available in Annex ii.

⁹ This question was only included in the third wave of the survey.

¹⁰ This more complicated modelling structure was only employed by means of robustness, to test whether the coefficients in left-right orientation were significantly different across different legacies.

Table 2: Explaining Democracy-Autocracy Preference using Left-Right Orientation

	MODEL 1: Democratic	MODEL 2: RW Authoritarian	MODEL 3: LW Authoritarian
LR Orientation	-0.05(0.00)***	-0.09(0.00)***	0.03(0.00)***
LR Orientation Squared	-0.00(0.00)ns	-0.01(0.00)***	-0.00(0.00)***
Constant	1.64(0.12)***	1.78(0.13)***	0.93(0.14)***
<i>Number of Countries</i>	9	9	24
<i>Number of Respondents</i>	16,304	17,051	33,083
<i>Intra-Class Correlation (%)</i>	5.94%	10.24%	15.73%

Source: EVS 1999-2008. **Notes:** *** $p \leq .001$ ** $p \leq .01$ * $p \leq .05$. Entries are the result of a cross-nested multilevel analysis, with individuals simultaneously nested in countries and waves. Weights were applied to correct for differences in the composition of the sample and population with respect to age and gender.

which resulted in the operationalization discussed earlier.

Given the nested structure of the data, the requirement of independent observations was violated. That is, it is likely that answer patterns of respondents within the same country will resemble each other and the year in which they were surveyed may also add an additional contextual element of similarity. Not taking this structure into account would therefore lead to an underestimation of the standard error, thereby erroneously increasing the likelihood of finding significant results. We therefore rely on cross-nested multilevel analysis techniques, where individuals (i) were simultaneously nested in their country (j) and the wave in which they were surveyed (t) (see Figure 1). This estimation technique corrects these standard errors, by estimating a separate intercept for each combination of country and year. We focus on the estimation of fixed effects, whereby parameters are held constant across all countries included in the analysis. In view of this focus, we center all continuous variables around the country mean [26].


IV. RESULTS

We start the discussion of the results by asking *whether* authoritarian legacies shape the relation between left-right orientation and democratic support. To this end, we estimate a cross-

nested multilevel model in which we regress democratic support onto individuals' left-right orientations across all three types of legacies (Table 2, Figure 2). We also include a quadratic term of left-right orientation to facilitate a certain level of flexibility in the shape of this association.

Figure 2 clearly demonstrates that the strength and direction of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support varies in accordance with the historical context of a country. In keeping with the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 1a, this direction is aligned with the ideology of the authoritarian predecessor, with leftist orientations indicating lower levels of support in countries with a left-wing legacy and rightist orientations indicating lower levels of support in countries with a right-wing legacy.

To ascertain that this association can indeed be ascribed to the authoritarian past, we benchmark the coefficients in countries with an authoritarian legacy to that in countries with a democratic legacy. At a first glance, the findings summarized in Table 2 appear to be consistent with our expectations. That is, the association in countries with a left-wing legacy flows in the opposite direction as the association in countries with a democratic legacy. While the sign of the association in countries with a right-wing legacy is the same as in countries with a democratic legacy, the strength of this associa-

Figure 2: *The Association Between Left-Right Orientation and Democracy-Autocracy Preference*

Source: EVS 1999-2008. **Notes:** the outer bounds indicate a 95% confidence interval around the predicted marginal mean. Weights were applied to correct for differences in the composition of the sample and population with respect to age and gender.

tion is almost twice as strong. More specifically, in countries with a democratic legacy, the outer left-end and the outer right-end of the spectrum marks a difference of 0.5 in democratic support (8.33% of the scale), while in countries with a right-wing legacy, this difference is 0.9 (15.00% of the scale).

However, to test Hypothesis 1b we do need a more stringent test to ensure that this difference is significant. This was achieved by conducting a random effect multilevel analysis in which we pooled the data for all three legacies, after which we calculated an interaction between left-right orientation and the type of legacy. We then evaluated the difference in direction and strength by conducting a contrast analysis following an estimation of the marginal effects for each legacy. This test revealed that the strength of this association was indeed significantly stronger in countries with an ideological authoritarian legacy, than

those with a democratic legacy.¹¹ Together, these findings provide unambiguous support for Hypothesis 1a and 1b, namely that the direction of this association is aligned with the historical anti-democratic connotation of the left-right dimension.

We proceed this section by asking *how* authoritarian legacies shape the relation between left-right orientation and democratic support. Drawing on the socialization literature, we proposed that socialization under authoritarian rule would cause individuals to attach a democratic meaning to their left-right position (Hypothesis 2). To investigate this mechanism, we turn to the estimation of Age Period Cohort effects (Table 3). This analysis allows us to determine whether the association between left-right orientation and democratic support is stronger for cohorts socialized under authoritarian rule, than for cohorts socialized after authoritarian rule. Simultaneously estimating interactions

¹¹The results are summarized in Annex i.

Table 3: Explaining Democracy-Autocracy Preference using Age Period Cohort

	RW Authoritarian		LW Authoritarian	
	MODEL 4A:	MODEL 4B:	MODEL 5A:	MODEL 5B:
Left-Right Orientation	-0.08(0.01)***	-0.07(0.02)***	0.06(0.01)***	0.05(0.02)**
Left-Right Orientation Sq.	-0.01(0.00)***	-0.01(0.00)***	-0.01(0.00)***	-0.01(0.00)***
Cohort: After	0.03(0.03)ns	0.01(0.03)ns	0.00(0.02)ns	0.05(0.03)ns
Cohort × LR Orientation:	-0.00(0.01)ns	-0.00(0.01)ns	-0.02(0.01)ns	-0.01(0.02)ns
Period: Wave 4	0.03(0.02)ns	0.02(0.02)ns	-0.27(0.02)***	-0.27(0.02)***
Period × LR Orientation:	-0.00(0.01)ns	-0.00(0.01)ns	-0.02(0.01)**	-0.02(0.01)**
Age: Young Adulthood		0.06(0.01)*		0.05(0.03)ns
Middle Adulthood		0.08(0.03)**		0.10(0.04)*
Late Adulthood		0.03(0.03)ns		0.04(0.04)ns
Age × LR Orientation:				
Young Adulthood		-0.01(0.02)ns		-0.00(0.02)ns
Middle Adulthood		0.00(0.02)ns		0.00(0.02)ns
Late Adulthood		-0.01(0.01)ns		0.01(0.02)ns
Constant	1.72(0.01)ns	1.69(0.14)***	1.09(0.13)***	1.02(0.13)***
<i>Number of Countries</i>	8	8	15	15
<i>Number of Respondents</i>	15,996	15,996	25,201	25,201
<i>ICC (%)</i>	10.83%	10.88%	15.11%	15.12%


Source: EVS 1999–2008. **Notes:** *** $p \leq 0.01$ ** $p \leq 0.01$ * $p \leq 0.05$. Entries are the result of a multilevel analysis.

between left-right orientation and age, and between left-right orientation and wave, allows us to control for life-cycle and period effects. In countries with a left-wing legacy, the specification of the youngest age-group for a very large part overlaps with the cohort socialized under democratic rule.¹² In view of the high degree of multicollinearity between age with cohort, we run two analyses: one without age-effects (Models 4a and 5a) and one with age-effects (Models 4b and 5b).¹³

¹²For an overview of the collinearity between Age Period and Cohort, see Annex ii

¹³(i) For an even more stringent robustness check, we also repeated the former analysis for each country separately, the results of which are available in Annex iii.

(ii) We have no information on what the country (or regime) was where individuals resided during their formative years. Including all respondents is the most conservative test, since it also includes respondents that may not have been socialized under authoritarian rule. We also repeated the analyses only including respondents that been born in the country in which they were surveyed. In countries with a left-wing legacy, this ranges between 84.91% in Latvia to 99.93% in Romania. In countries with a right-wing legacy, this ranges between 94.07%

Figure 3: Marginal Effects Left-Right Orientation Across Cohorts


Source: EVS 1999-2008. **Notes:** the horizontal whiskers indicate a 95% confidence interval around the predicted marginal effect.

The democratic socialization literature argues that the substantive meaning individuals attach to the left-right dimension is the result of the context in which attitudes were first acquired. The role of the individual is therefore of a passive nature. By contrast, the cleavage

in Portugal to 89.07% in West Germany. Limiting our analyses to this group respondents did not substantially alter the results.

Table 4: *Explaining Democracy-Autocracy Preference using the Evaluation of the Previous Regime*

	MODEL 6:	MODEL 7:
Evaluation Prior Regime		-0.11(0.00)***
Left-Right Orientation	0.06(0.01)***	0.02(0.01)**
Left-Right Orientation Squared	-0.01(0.00)***	-0.01(0.00)***
Constant	1.10(0.13)***	1.06(0.13)***
<i>Number of Countries</i>	15	15
<i>Number of Respondents</i>	11,462	11,462
<i>Intra-Class Correlation (%)</i>	14.65%	15.94%

Source: EVS 1999. **Notes:** *** $p \leq 0.001$ ** $p \leq .01$ * $p \leq .05$. Entries are the result of a multilevel analysis of the third wave of the survey. Both models only include respondents for whom we had information with respect to all variables included in Model 5.

literature ascribes a much more active role to the individual and underlines that the left-right dimension is deliberately used by individuals to signal particular preferences to the political system. Building on this assertion, we theorized that this also holds for a particular regime choice and that the association between left-right orientation and democratic support would be in part accounted for by individuals' support for the authoritarian predecessor (Hypothesis 3). Due to methodological constraints, the empirical test is confined to left-wing legacies. To evaluate Hypothesis 3, we look at how much of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support can be accounted for by an anti-democratic nostalgic impulse, by comparing a model in which support for the communist predecessor is not included (Model 6, Table 4) and a model in which it is (Model 7). The reduction of the coefficient of left-right orientation from 0.06 in Model 6 to 0.02 in Model 7 yields a remarkable conclusion, namely that over 33% of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support can be accounted for by individuals' support for the communist predecessor. Not only does this finding support the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 3, it also signifies that individuals intentionally use the left-right dimension to signal support for the authoritarian alternative.

V. DISCUSSION

While multiple studies have demonstrated that individuals' left-right orientation is linked to their views on democratic government, thus far we know little about the origins of this association. In this study, we seized the opportunity to explore the historical roots of this association, by asking whether and how the authoritarian past shapes the distribution of democratic support across the left-right dimension.

By comparing the association between left-right orientation and democratic support across countries with a democratic, left-wing authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian legacy, our study provides strong evidence that the ideological affiliation of the authoritarian predecessor creates a frame of interpretation linking individuals' ideological orientations to their support for democracy. In particular, we find that the strength and direction of this association is aligned with the ideology of the authoritarian predecessor and that leftist orientations are linked to lower levels of support in countries with a left-wing legacy, while the same holds with regard to rightist orientations in countries with a right-wing legacy.

We further tap into the individual dimension of this legacy, by looking into what mechanisms facilitate the translation of this frame to the individual level. Drawing on the demo-

cratic socialization literature, we argued that individuals who have been socialized under authoritarian rule would link their support for democracy more to their ideological preferences than individuals socialized under democratic rule. Our analyses demonstrate that this is not the case. Instead, the strength of this association is remarkably stable across generations.

Alternatively, we considered the arguments made in the cleavage literature (see Sartori, 1976), which states that individuals deliberately use the left-right dimension to signal their preferences. We theorized that this assertion can also be extended to democratic support and that this association may in part be explained by a nostalgic impulse, whereby individuals use the left-right dimension to signal their support for the authoritarian predecessor. Indeed, the results demonstrate that over one third of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support can be accounted for by individuals' support for the authoritarian predecessor.

Finally, several theoretical and methodological shortcomings ought to be addressed. Theoretically, our study is confined to how the past shapes the association between left-right orientation and democratic support. Although our study illustrates the importance of historical contextualization in this matter, a substantial amount of disparity hides behind our analyses that has remained unexplained. This leaves an important opportunity for future research to explore contextual factors situated in the present, such as economic stability, to understand why support for democracy still maps onto the left-right dimension, even in a context where the authoritarian alternative itself receives virtually no support.

Methodologically, too, this study suffers from multiple limitations. First, the availability of only two waves necessarily puts constraints on the estimation of Age Period Cohort analyses, due to high multicollinearity between age and cohorts. To look at processes of inter-generational transmission of this association, we ultimately need a dataset that covers

a longer longitudinal trajectory.

Second, this survey only gauged for support for the communist predecessor, thereby excluding opportunities for us to explore how support for right-wing authoritarian regimes. Yet, in spite of the absence of this measurement, theoretically there are no reasons to expect that different mechanisms would apply in countries with a right-wing legacy. That is, even though the aggregate level of support for democracy in these countries is relatively high and the level of authoritarian nostalgia relatively low compared to post left-wing authoritarian regimes, the parallels individuals draw between the authoritarian predecessor and the left-right dimension may result in similar patterns.

In spite of these shortcomings, this historical perspective constitutes an important addition to the current literature on democratization, which generally focuses on how individuals' evaluation of democratic performance *in the present* shapes their support for democratic government. That is, in the current state of research little attention has been paid to the historical contextualization of these questions. When it comes to the association between left-right orientation and democratic support, this is most adequately illustrated by the fact that most studies assume democratic support to be structured along the same cleavage line as individuals' right-wing authoritarian attitudes which tend to be concentrated on the right-end of the ideological spectrum [1, 2, 29]. Yet, the finding that this is not the case in Central and Eastern Europe where leftist orientations are linked to lower levels of democratic support have challenged our current understanding of the link between ideology and democracy. Our study has attempted to bring together these contradicting findings by providing for a historical contextual explanation of this association. As such, our findings fare well with studies focusing on authoritarian legacies, an area that has remained largely uncharted area in empirical research. In line with the latter strand of research, our study demonstrates that no matter how distant, the past – more specifically sympathies for the authoritarian predecessor –

has left an enduring impression on one of the most rudimentary expressions of contemporary politics, namely the left-right dimension.

REFERENCES

- [1] B. Altemeyer. *Right-wing authoritarianism*. Manitoba, Canada: University Press, 1981.
- [2] B. Altemeyer. *The other authoritarian personality*, pages 47–92. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1998.
- [3] D. F. Alwin, R. L. Cohen, and T. M. Newcomb. *Political Attitudes over the Life Span: the Bennington Women after Fifty Years*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
- [4] G. Ariely and E. Davidov. Can we rate public support for democracy in a comparable way? cross-national equivalence of democratic attitudes in the world value survey. *Social Indicators Research*, 104(2):271–286, 2011.
- [5] D. Art. *The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- [6] U. Backes and S. Kailitz. *Ideocracies in Comparison: Legitimation – Cooptation – Repression*. London: Routledge, 2015.
- [7] N. Bobbio. *Left and right: The significance of a political distinction*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- [8] S. Bornschieer. Cleavage politics in old and new democracies. *Living Review in Democracy*, 1(1):1–13, 2009.
- [9] Angela K Bourne. Democratization and the illegalization of political parties in europe. *Democratization*, 19(6):1065–1085, 2012.
- [10] Angela K Bourne and Fernando Casal Bértoa. Prescribing democracy? party prescription, militant democracy and party system institutionalization. *ECPR joint sessions, Salamanca, April*, pages 10–15, 2014.
- [11] R. Burkhart and M. Lewis-Beck. Comparative democracy - the economic development thesis. *American Political Science Review*, 88:903–910, 1994.
- [12] P. Burnell and P. Calvert. The resilience of democracy: An introduction. *Democratization*, 6(1):1–32, 1999.
- [13] D. Canache, J. J. Mondak, and M. A. Seligson. Meaning and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction with democracy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 65(4):506–528, 2001.
- [14] P. Cesarini and K. Hite. *Introducing the concept of authoritarian legacies*, pages 1–24. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.
- [15] Nigel Copsey. Fascism . . . but with an open mind. reflections on the contemporary far right in (western) europe. *Fascism*, 2(1):1–17, 2013.
- [16] A. Costa Pinto. The authoritarian past and south european democracies: An introduction. *South European Society and Politics*, 15(3):339–358, 2010.
- [17] R. Dahl. *Polyarchy : participation and opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- [18] C. E. Dalpino. *Deferring Democracy: Promoting Openness in Authoritarian Regimes*. Washington DC, NW: Brookings Institution Press, 2011.
- [19] R. Dalton. Communists and democrats: Attitudes toward democracy in the two germanies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 24(4):469–93, 1994.
- [20] R. Dalton. Social modernization and the end of ideology debate. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 7(1):1–22, 2006.
- [21] S. De Regt, D. Mortelmans, and T. Smits. Left-wing authoritarianism is not a myth, but a worrisome reality. evidence from 13 eastern european countries. *Communist*

- and Post-Communist Studies*, 44(4):299–308, 2011.
- [22] K. Deegan-Krause. *New Dimensions of Political Cleavage*, pages 538–556. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- [23] E. Dinas and K. Northmore-Ball. The ideological shadow of authoritarianism. 2017.
- [24] D. Easton. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- [25] J. Ekman and J. Linde. Communist nostalgia and the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern europe. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 21(3):354–374, 2005.
- [26] C. K. Enders and D. Tofighi. Centering predictor variables in cross-sectional multilevel models: a new look at an old issue. *Psychological Methods*, 12(2):121, 2007.
- [27] Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield. Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(4):521–548, 1993.
- [28] EVS. European values study 1981-2008, longitudinal data file, 2011.
- [29] M. Ferrin and H. Kriesi. *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*. Comparative politics. Oxford University Press, 2016.
- [30] S. Finkel, S. Humphries, and K. D. Opp. Socialist values and the development of democratic support in the former east germany. *International Political Science Review*, 22:339–361, 2001.
- [31] J. Fortin. Is there a necessary condition for democracy? the role of state capacity in postcommunist countries. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45:903–930, 2012.
- [32] D. Fuchs and E. Roller. Learned democracy? support of democracy in central and east european countries. *International Journal of Sociology*, 36:70–96, 2006.
- [33] M. Gentile. Meeting the 'organs: the tacit dilemma of field research in authoritarian states. *Area*, 45(4):426–432, 2013.
- [34] Sergiu Gherghina and Lina Klymenko. Why look back? citizens' attitudes toward the communist regime in belarus, russia, and ukraine. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 59(1):55–65, 2012.
- [35] J. L. Gibson and R. M. Duch. Political intolerance in the ussr: the distribution and etiology of mass opinion. *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(3):286–329, 1993.
- [36] N. D. Glenn. *Cohort Analysis: 2nd Edition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005.
- [37] C.W. Haerpfer. Support for democracy and autocracy in russia and the commonwealth of independent states 1992–2002. *International Political Science Review*, 29(4):411–431, 2008.
- [38] K. Hite and L. Morlino. *Problematizing the links between authoritarian legacies and "good" democracy*, pages 25–83. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.
- [39] M. Hooghe and E. Quintelier. Political participation in european countries: The effect of authoritarian rule, corruption, lack of good governance and economic downturn. *Comparative European Politics*, 12(2):209–232, 2014.
- [40] P. Horvat and G. Evans. Age, inequality, and reactions to marketization in post-communist central and eastern europe. *European Sociological Review*, 27:708–727, 2011.
- [41] E. F. Hunt and D. C. Colander. *Social Science: An Introduction to the Study of Society*. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2016.
- [42] R. Inglehart. How solid is mass support for democracy – and how can we measure it? *Political Science and Politics*, 36(1):51–57, 2003.

- [43] R. Inglehart. How much should we worry? *Journal of Democracy*, 27(3):18–23, 2016.
- [44] Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. Reputational shields: Why most anti-immigrant parties failed in western europe, 1980-2005. In *Annual meeting of the American political science association, Philadelphia*, 2006.
- [45] M. K. Jennings and G. B. Markus. Partisan orientations over the long haul: results from the three-wave political socialization panel study. *American Political Science Review*, 78(8):1000–1018, 1984.
- [46] M. K. Jennings and R. G. Niemi. *Generations and Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- [47] S. Kailitz. Classifying political regimes revisited: legitimation and durability. *Democratization*, 20(1):39–60, 2013.
- [48] H. Kitschelt. The formation of party systems in east central europe. *Politics and Society*, 20:7–50, 1992.
- [49] H. Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, and G. Toka. *Post-communist party systems*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- [50] H-D. Klingemann. *Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis*, pages 151–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- [51] H-D. Klingemann. *Post-autocratic party systems and the regime cleavage in new democracies*, pages 95–135. Bloomfield Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2005.
- [52] H-D. Klingemann. *Dissatisfied democrats: Democratic maturation in old and new democracies*, pages 116–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- [53] J. A. Krosnick and D. F. Alwin. Aging and susceptibility to attitude change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57:416–425, 1989.
- [54] J. La Palombara and J. B. Waters. Values, expectations, and political predispositions of italian youth. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5(1):39–58, 1961.
- [55] M. Lagos. Support for and satisfaction with democracy. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 15(4):471–487, 2003.
- [56] N. Letki and G. Evans. Endogenizing social trust: Democratization in east-central europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35:515–529, 2005.
- [57] S. Levitsky and L. Way. The durability of revolutionary regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 24(3):5–17, 2013.
- [58] R. C. Lewis. *The Neo-Nazis and German Unification*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.
- [59] A. Lijphart. *Back to democratic basics: who really practices majority rule?*, chapter 8, pages 143–162. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- [60] J. Linde and J. Ekman. Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3):391–408, 2003.
- [61] J. J. Linz. *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
- [62] J. J. Linz and A. Stepan. *The breakdown of democratic regimes: Latin America*. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
- [63] S. M. Lipset. Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53(1):69–105, 1959.
- [64] L. March. Contemporary far left parties in europe. from marxism to the mainstream, 2008.

- [65] S. Marien. *The Measurement Equivalence of Political Trust*, pages 89–103. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017.
- [66] W. Mishler and R. Rose. Trajectories of fear and hope: Support for democracy in post-communist europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 28(4):553–581, 1996.
- [67] W. Mishler and R. Rose. Generation, age, and time: The dynamics of political learning during russia’s transformation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):822–834, 2007.
- [68] L. Morlino. Authoritarian legacies, politics of the past and the quality of democracy in southern europe: Open conclusions. *South European Society and Politics*, 15(3):507–529, 2010.
- [69] A. Neundorf. Growing up on different sides of the wall - a quasi-experimental test: Applying the left-right dimension to the german mass public. *German Politics*, 18:201–225, 2009.
- [70] A. Neundorf. Democracy in transition: A micro perspective on system change in post-socialist societies. *Journal of Politics*, 72:1096–1108, 2010.
- [71] E. Noelle and E.P. Neumann. *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1967.
- [72] G. O’Donnell. *Transitions, continuities, and paradoxes*, pages 17–56. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.
- [73] A. Przeworski and F. Limongi. Modernization: Theories and facts. *World Politics*, 49(1):155–83, 1997.
- [74] R. Rekker. The lasting impact of adolescence on left-right identification: Cohort replacement and intracohort change in associations with issue attitudes. *Electoral Studies*, 44:120–131, 2016.
- [75] R. Rose and I. McAllister. *The Loyalties of Voters: A Lifetime Learning Model*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1990.
- [76] R. Rose, W. Mishler, and C. Haerpfer. *Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- [77] D.O. Sears and C.L. Funk. Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults’ political predispositions. *Journal of Politics*, 61(1):1–28, 1999.
- [78] L. Stoker and M. K. Jennings. Of time and the development of partisan polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(3):619–635, 2008.
- [79] S. C. Stouffer. *Communism, conformity and civil liberties*. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1955.
- [80] Hulda Thorisdottir, John T. Jost, Ido Livitan, and Patrick E. Shrout. Psychological needs and values underlying left-right political orientation: Cross-national evidence from eastern and western europe. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 71(2):175–203, 2007.
- [81] C. Tufis. The geography of support for democracy in europe. *Romanian Political Science Review*, 14(2):165–184, 2014.
- [82] H. Tworzecki and H. A. Semetko. Media use and political engagement in three new democracies: Malaise versus mobilization in the czech republic, hungary, and poland. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 17(4):407–432, 2012.
- [83] Wouter Van der Brug, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(5):537–573, 2005.
- [84] N. Wachsmann. *The policy of exclusion: repression in the Nazi state, 1933-1939*, pages 122–145. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

A. LIST OF RESPONSE RATES PER COUNTRY

Country	Wave 3	Wave 4	Country	Wave 3	Wave 4
Albania	–	87.61%	Latvia	68.96%	72.13%
Armenia	–	61.73%	Lithuania	79.59%	64.85%
Austria	80.49%	66.76%	Luxembourg	61.63%	30.77%
Belarus	67.29%	71.36%	Macedonia	–	71.70%
Belgium	36.59%	49.95%	Moldova	–	46.96%
Bosnia Herzegovina	–	81.95%	Montenegro	–	87.73%
Bulgaria	80.84%	72.85%	Netherlands	36.49%	48.93%
Croatia	54.36%	60.03%	Northern Cyprus	–	87.57%
Czech Republic	65.34%	60.80%	Northern Ireland	68.35%	28.82%
Denmark	56.74%	51.08%	Norway	–	56.36%
Estonia	53.60%	65.63%	Poland	76.79%	82.92%
Finland	61.28%	87.23%	Portugal	39.98%	69.58%
France	42.00%	37.59%	Romania	95.50%	53.33%
Georgia	–	52.58%	Russian Federation	74.23%	35.48%
Germany	56.86%	40.32%	Serbia	–	68.08%
Great Britain	80.00%	23.23%	Slovakia	95.07%	67.33%
Greece	81.57%	32.88%	Slovenia	53.23%	60.71%
Hungary	69.16%	50.75%	Spain	28.28%	50.80%
Iceland	65.85%	53.80%	Sweden	54.13%	45.65%
Ireland	62.16%	47.03%	Switzerland	–	42.83 %
Italy	75.76%	60.76%	Ukraine	66.87%	52.49%
Kosovo	–	73.81%	Total	64.63	53.18%

B. REGIME CLASSIFICATION

i. Classification Criteria

As was mentioned in the methods section, we distinguish between three types of legacies, namely democratic, left-wing authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian. By democratic legacies, we mean countries with a largely uninterrupted experience with democracy since the beginning of the twentieth century that were preceded by ideologically neutral non-democratic regimes. The classification of regimes proceeds in two steps:

1. Using Polity IV data, we first make a distinction between democratic and non-democratic regimes. This was done for each country separately in between 1899 and 2008. To ensure a certain level of uniformity, we take the year of the first fair and democratic elections as the first year of democratic establishment. By doing so, the history of each country was divided into two segments: a non-democratic and democratic segment.
2. Using historical data, we further divide non-democratic regimes into ideologically neutral, left-wing and right-wing regimes. Most ideologically neutral regimes were countries classified as democratic legacies, meaning their transition to democracy took place in the early twentieth century. Former British colonies Malta and Cyprus also fall into the category of neutral legacies, but only became independent democracies in the 1960s. This is why we opted to exclude these countries from the analyses. The Fascist regime in Italy, the National Socialist in Germany and the Austrofascist regime in Austria were categorized as right-wing legacies. The same categorization applies to the short non-democratic regimes in Norway and Finland. The military regimes in Greece, Spain and Portugal too were classified as right-wing because they identified themselves as the polar opposites of the Communist (left-wing) enemy. Finally, all socialist and communist regimes were coded as left-wing.

ii. Start and end-date regimes

Left-wing legacies

Albania	1946–1991	from the establishment of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania in 1946 to the first elections in 1991.
Armenia	1920–1990	from the establishment of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920 to the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1990.
Belarus	1917–1990	from the establishment of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic in 1917 to the first democratic presidential elections in 1994.
Bosnia	1945–1991	from the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 to the first democratic general elections of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held in 1990.
Bulgaria	1946–1990	from the establishment of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria in 1946 to the first democratic elections of the Constitutional Assembly held in 1990 in the Republic of Bulgaria.
Croatia	1945–1990	from the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 to the first (not fully democratic) elections of the Republic of Croatia held in 1990.

Czechia	1948–1990	from the establishment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1948 to the first democratic federal elections held in 1990.
E. Germ.	1949–1990	from the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 to the first democratic elections in 1990.
Estonia	1940–1992	from the establishment of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 to the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1992. Period does not include the Nazi-Occupation between 1941 and 1944.
Georgia	1921–1990	from the establishment of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921 to the first parliamentary elections in Georgia in 1990.
Hungary	1949–1990	from the establishment of Hungarian People’s Republic in 1949 to the first democratic parliamentary elections held in the Third Hungarian Republic in 1990.
Kosovo	1945–2001	from the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, to the first democratic and fair parliamentary elections in 2001.
Latvia	1940–1990	from the establishment of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 to the first democratic elections in 1990. Period does not include the Nazi-Occupation between 1941 and 1944.
Lithuania	1941–1992	Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 to the first democratic elections held in 1992. Period does not include the Nazi-Occupation between 1941 and 1944.
Macedonia	1945–1990	from the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 to the first democratic elections in 1990.
Moldova	1940–1990	from the establishment of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 to the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1990.
Montenegro	1946–1992	from the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 to the general elections in 1992.
Poland	1947–1989	from the establishment of the Polish People’s Republic in 1947 to the first parliamentary elections in 1989.
Romania	1947–1990	from the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Romania in 1947 to the first democratic general elections in 1990 in Romania.
Russia	1917–1991	from the establishment of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the first democratic presidential elections in 1991.
Portugal	1926–1975	from the Coup d’Etat by Antonio Carmona in 1926 to the first democratic constituent assembly elections held in 1975.
Serbia	1945–1992	from the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 to the general elections in 1992.
Slovakia	1948–1990	from the establishment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1948 to the first democratic parliamentary elections held in 1990.
Slovenia	1945–1990	from the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, to the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1990 in the Republic of Slovenia in 1990.
Ukraine	1919–1990	from the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1919 to the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1990.

Right-wing legacies

Austria	1932–1945	from 1932 when Austro-fascist dictator Engelbert Dolfuss assumed his office as Chancellor to the first democratic Austrian legislative elections in 1945.
Finland	1931–1943	from 1931 when Pehr Evind Svinhufvud entered office as president to the presidential elections in 1943.
France	1940–1946	from 1940 when Marshall Philippe Petain assumed office as president of Vichy France to the first democratic elections of the French Fourth Republic in 1946.
Greece	1967–1974	from the military Coup d’Etat in 1967 to the first parliamentary democratic elections held 1974 in the Third Hellenic Republic.
Italy	1922–1946	from the year Benito Mussolini entered office as prime-minister in 1922 to the first democratic general elections held in 1946.
Norway	1942–1945	from 1942 when Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson Quisling entered office as minister president to the parliamentary elections in 1945.
Spain	1936–1977	from the year Francisco Franco entered office as president in 1936 to the first democratic general elections in 1977.
W. Germ.	1933–1949	from the year Adolf Hitler assumed office as Chancellor in 1933 and dictator to the first democratic federal elections in West Germany in 1949.

C. TABLE 2

i. Robustness: counter-factual comparison

	MODEL G1	MODEL G2	MODEL G3
<i>Country-Level</i>			
Legacy: Left-Wing			-0.78(0.17)***
Right-Wing			0.10(0.22)***
<i>Individual-Level</i>			
LR Orientation		-0.01(0.00)***	-0.05(0.01)***
LR Orientation Squared		-0.00(0.00)***	-0.00(0.00)***
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
LR Orientation × Legacy:			0.08(0.02)***
Right-Wing			-0.05(0.02)**
Intercept	1.19(0.12)***	1.26(0.13)***	1.67(0.16)***
Model Type	Null	Fixed	Random
<i>Number of Countries</i>	40	40	40
<i>Number of Respondents</i>	82,081	65,857	62,857
<i>Intra-Class Correlation</i>	14.36%	14.94%	8.00%

ii. Robustness : size association per country

Country	Size	Country	Size	Country	Size
<i>Democratic</i>		Bulgaria	++	Russian Federation	++
Belgium	-	Croatia	-	Serbia	+
Denmark	-	Czech Republic	++	Slovakia	+
Iceland	-	East Germany	--	Slovenia	-
Ireland	±	Estonia	+	Ukraine	++
Luxembourg	±	Georgia	±	Right-Wing	
Netherlands	--	Hungary	+	Austria	-
Sweden	-	Kosovo	-	Finland	-
Switzerland	-	Latvia	+	France	--
United Kingdom	-	Lithuania	±	Greece	-
<i>Left-Wing</i>		Macedonia	±	Italy	--
Albania	±	Moldova	+	Norway	-
Armenia	±	Montenegro	-	Portugal	-
Belarus	+	Poland	+	Spain	--
Bosnia Herzegovina	+	Romania	+	W. Germany	--

Notes: Table summarizes the strength of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support. Effect sizes are expressed in η^2 , with a minus (-) indicating a significant negative association and a plus (+) indicating a significant positive association and plus-minus (\pm) indicating a non significant association. + / - $\eta^2 \leq .02$, ++ / -- $\eta^2 \geq .02$.

D. TABLE 3

i. Number of respondents per cohort

Using the country-level data we coded for the purpose of regime classification in Annex B, within each country we now distinguish between cohorts socialized before authoritarian rule (C1), cohorts socialized under authoritarian rule (C2), cohorts socialized after the change of regime but who have experienced authoritarianism (C3) and cohorts fully socialized under democratic rule (C4). For the sake of comparability within each group of our analysis (i.e. each legacy), we confine our analysis for left-wing legacies to C1 and C2, and in right-wing legacies to C1, C2, and C3. Robustness checks estimate cohort effects for each country separately.

Country	C0	C1	C2	C3	Total
Albania	1	955	578	0	1534
Armenia	0	903	537	60	1500
Austria	1	106	739	2186	3032
Belarus	0	1647	822	31	2500
Bosnia	6	848	658	0	1512
Bulgaria	161	1810	519	10	2500
Croatia	27	1625	816	60	2528
Czechia	319	2519	814	77	3729
E. Germany	222	1418	347	16	2003
Estonia	28	1877	548	0	2453
Finland	0	15	305	1852	2172
France	85	139	670	2222	3116
Georgia	0	972	510	18	1500
Greece	665	325	897	755	2642
Hungary	196	1586	690	41	2513
Italy	0	184	836	2499	3519
Kosovo	3	1087	511	0	1601
Latvia	7	1768	624	36	2435
Lithuania	9	1870	595	1	2485
Macedonia	4	884	579	33	1500
Moldova	4	1006	514	27	1551
Montenegro	14	940	562	0	1516
Norway	0	0	171	919	1090
Poland	146	1695	673	91	2605
Portugal	1	1378	749	425	2553
Romania	155	1850	626	4	2635
Russia	0	3138	852	14	4004
Serbia	13	1031	468	0	1512
Slovakia	228	2075	530	7	2840
Slovenia	104	1630	633	5	2372
Spain	27	1254	935	484	2700
Ukraine	0	2046	635	21	2702
W. Germany	6	216	539	1347	2108

ii. Multicollinearity Age Period Cohort

Cell frequencies APC

	Socialization During			Socialization After		
	Wave: 3	Wave: 4	Total	Wave: 3	Wave: 4	Total
Age: Adolescence	0	0	0	4290	7164	11454
Age: Young Adulthood	2648	421	3069	2650	7685	10335
Age: Middle Adulthood	5894	9272	15166	2331	3903	6234
Age: Late Adulthood	7110	15452	22562	2364	3336	5700
Total	15652	25145	40797	11635	22088	33723

Explained variance age period cohort


IV / DV	Full Sample			LW Legacies			RW Legacies		
	Age	Period	Cohort	Age	Period	Cohort	Age	Period	Cohort
Age	1.00	0.00	0.37	1.00	0.00	0.76	1.00	0.01	0.19
Period	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.00
Cohort	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.66	0.02	1.00	0.15	0.00	1.00

Variance Inflation Factor

IV / DV	RW Legacies		LW Legacies	
	Model 6a	Model 6b	Model 7a	Model 7b
Age: Young Adulthood	–	1.98	–	2.55
Age: Middle Adulthood	–	2.27	–	7.34
Age: Late Adulthood	–	2.67	–	8.25
Period: Wave 4	1.00	1.01	1.00	1.15
Cohort: After	1.01	1.24	1.01	4.68


iii. Robustness : cohort differences per country

Left-wing legacies



Notes: the vertical axis depicts the strength of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support. 0 = socialized before regime, 1 = socialized during regime, 2 = socialized after regime but with experience, 3 = socialized after regime without experience. The vertical whiskers depict a 95% confidence interval around the predicted association. Due to high degrees of multicollinearity, these APC analyses do not control for age-effects.

Right-wing legacies



Notes: the vertical axis depicts the strength of the association between left-right orientation and democratic support. 0 = socialized before regime, 1 = socialized during regime, 2 = socialized after regime but with experience, 3 = socialized after regime without experience. The vertical whiskers depict a 95% confidence interval around the predicted association. Due to high degrees of multicollinearity, these APC analyses do not control for age-effects.