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# Place-based resentment and party support in multiparty systems: A study of three consecutive elections in the Netherlands

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A B S T R A C T

Place-based resentment is often used to explain why some populist radical right parties have gained popularity in rural areas. However, few studies have analysed associations between place-based resentment and party support outside of the US. We propose three theoretical scenarios about how the politicisation of place-based resentment could change patterns of party support in multiparty systems. We analyse changes in the individual level relationships between place-based resentment and party preferences in the Netherlands over a period of three elections: 2017, 2021 and 2023. Our findings indicate that voters with higher place-based resentment were more likely to support the radical right in all three elections, but, importantly, these associations disappeared once other political attitudes were taken into account. Place-based resentment does not form a unique explanation for radical right support in the Netherlands. However, after the sudden increase in salience of agricultural policies and urban-rural divides in the Dutch political debate, place-based resentment became a unique additional explanation for party support by 2023. Taking other relevant political attitudes into account, place-based resentment is positively related to support for the agrarian-populist BBB, and negatively related to support for the two largest left-wing progressive parties (PvdA/GL and D66). This study adds to our understanding of electoral consequences of politicization of urban-rural divides, and hopefully paves the way for cross-national comparative research across European multiparty systems.

## 1. Introduction

Within many advanced industrialized democracies, election outcomes increasingly differ across different types of places (Haffert, 2022; Huijsmans and Rodden, 2024; Rodden, 2019; Taylor et al., 2024), with populist radical right parties and candidates doing increasingly well in rural and peripheral areas and in regions suffering from economic decline (de Dominicis et al., 2022; Dijkstra et al., 2020; Dvořák et al., 2022; Evans et al., 2019; Schmalz et al., 2021). This 'peripheralization of radical right support' has been interpreted as "a revenge of the places that don't matter" (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018, 2020). In line with this narrative, there is an increasing literature on place-based resentment, showing that voters in rural and peripheral areas perceive that their place and its inhabitants are disregarded and disadvantaged, or even disrespected, by (political) elites and inhabitants of other areas ((Borwein and Lucas, 2023; Cramer, 2016; de Lange et al., 2022; Huijsmans, 2023; McKay et al., 2021). These voters may develop stronger anti-elitist and nativist attitudes (Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2023; Huijsmans, 2022; Lunz Trujillo, 2022; Nelsen and Petsko, 2022), which should make them more likely to vote for radical right candidates. In the US, voters' perceptions that 'their place does not matter' are indeed related to voting behaviour in presidential and congressional elections (Jacobs and Munis, 2023; Jacobs and Shea, 2023). However, few studies have analysed the relationship between place-based resentment and party support in multiparty systems.[1] We study (changes in) the relationship between place-based resentment and party support at the individual level in the context of the Dutch party system, where feelings of place-based resentment have been politicized quite recently.

We propose three types of scenarios for how the politicization of place-based resentment could be related to party support. In the first scenario, place-based resentment is positively related to radical right support, all else equal, and thus forms a unique explanation for radical right support. In a second scenario, the success of the radical right in rural and peripheral areas is a 'by-product' of other types of political attitudes that voters in these places hold, which happen to be related to place-based perceptions at the individual level. In the third scenario, place-based resentment is instead positively related to support for an explicitly rural-oriented party. The existing literature provides some tentative individual-level evidence for these scenarios in multiparty systems. The case of Norway, for example, suggests a direct relationship between place-based resentment and support for an explicitly rural-oriented party (Auerbach et al., 2024b), but in most other European multiparty systems associations to party support are unclear.

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[1] With the exception of Norwegian studies that we will discuss later (Auerbach et al., 2024b; Eidheim, 2023).

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How place-based resentment relates to party support, largely depends on the supply of political parties, the mobilisation of these perceptions, and, relatedly, on the historic structure of the party system (Auerbach et al., 2024a). To assess these explanations, one would ideally have survey data on place-based resentment for a wide range of countries, but such data is unavailable. Instead we use repeated cross-sectional survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies of 2017, 2021 and 2023, which contain a measure of place-based resentment. Even though the operationalization of place-based resentment is limited to just one single item, it does enable us to track trends in voters' feelings of place-based resentment and its relationship with party support.[2] We return to this issue when we discuss the data and when showing several robustness checks.

The Netherlands is an interesting case to study these associations, especially over the last few elections. Historically, spatial inequalities have not been strongly politicized and the Dutch party system has not been structured by urban-rural or centre-periphery cleavages. This means that the Dutch party system did not offer a clear choice for voters who wanted to express feelings of place-based resentment. In between the elections of 2017 and 2021, however, spatial inequality between urban and rural, and central and peripheral, areas became highly salient after the government proposed cuts in the agricultural sector that sparked a wave of farmers' protests across the country. The fully proportional electoral system with its low entry barriers for new parties facilitated that a new political party could emerge in late 2019: the *Farmer Citizens Movement* (*BBB*). The party made huge electoral gains over the last years, and it did so largely because of the politicization of place-based resentment. Obviously, the BBB played a large role in contributing to the politicization, but our analyses also indicate that place-based resentment has become more associated with the political right in general. As a consequence, politicization of place-based resentment also contributes to the electoral success of other (radical) right parties in rural and peripheral areas. So, our case study of the Netherlands provides new insights on whether and how increasing politicization of spatial inequalities, and increasing feelings of being left behind in certain types of places, can affect political outcomes in other European multiparty systems as well.

In the following, we start from the literature on 'the places that don't matter' in relation to party support. We then elaborate on three different ways in which place-based resentment may relate to party support and formulate three corresponding hypotheses. After describing the specific case of the Netherlands, we formulate expectations about which hypotheses should receive most support in which of the three elections (2017, 2021 and 2023). Finally, we describe our methods and results, and discuss the implications for our broader understanding of the electoral consequences of increasing politicization of spatial inequalities in times of rising urban-rural electoral divides across European multiparty systems.

## 2. Theory

### 2.1. Place-based resentment in 'the places that don't matter'

Populist and radical right parties and candidates perform increasingly well in areas outside the large economically booming cities (Broz et al., 2021; Carreras et al., 2019; Dijkstra et al., 2020; Essletzbichler et al., 2018), and also particularly well in rural and peripheral areas, across many countries (Evans et al., 2019; Huijsmans and Rodden, 2024; Ziblatt et al., 2024). Rodríguez-Pose (2020, p. 6) famously concluded that "voters in these so-called 'places that don't matter' have sought their revenge at the ballot box". To answer the question how place-based grievances are related to party preferences in these places, we need individual-level survey data. There is indeed evidence at the individual level that voters' perceptions about their local community affect their political outlooks (e.g. Fitzgerald, 2018), which becomes increasingly clear from the burgeoning literature on place-based resentment.

Place-based resentment is the feeling that your place and its inhabitants are *disregarded* by politicians, *disadvantaged* in the distribution of resources, and that their norms and values are *disrespected* by inhabitants of other places. These feelings of unfairness lead people to resent inhabitants of other places (outgroup resentment) and the national government in their country (anti-elitism), because it is perceived to be allied with the interests of these other places (Claassen et al., 2025; Cramer, 2016; Munis, 2022). Place-based resentment is thus an attitude that is related to anti-elitism, but it is conceptually and empirically distinct, because, unlike other anti-establishment attitudes, it is primarily *place-based* (de Lange et al., 2022; Munis, 2022). Place-based resentment therefore varies clearly across types of places, whereas this is less clear for more general forms of anti-establishment attitudes (Huijsmans, 2022). Across both North-America and Europe, place-based resentment is particularly strong among inhabitants of rural and peripheral areas (Borwein and Lucas, 2023; Claassen et al., 2025; de Lange et al., 2022), and more specifically, in places that perform less-well economically, and are demographically declining, culturally more distant from large cosmopolitan cities, and less-well represented politically (Huijsmans, 2023; McKay et al., 2021; Rickardsson et al., 2021; Ziblatt et al., 2024). Place-based identities and resentment are highly amenable to politicization (Jacobs and Shea, 2023), and as we discuss in more detail below, these attitudes have clearly been politicized in the Netherlands since 2017. Based on our reading of the current literature, we suggest three scenarios in which the politicization of feelings of place-based resentment could change patterns of party choice.

### 2.2. Party support and place-based resentment: three scenarios

In the first scenario, radical right parties successfully present themselves as the defender of the interests of rural and peripheral areas. Even if radical right parties are not the initiators of the politicization of place-based discontent, they can jump on the bandwagon and present themselves as such. In that case, the radical right is successfully mobilizing place-based grievances of voters and place-based resentment forms an additional individual-level explanation for radical right support, beyond other well-established explanations in the literature. The most convincing evidence for this direct association comes from the US. Jacobs and Shea (2023) elaborately showed how place-based grievance forms a unique explanation for a dislike of the Democratic party and support for the Republican Party among rural voters, also when controlling for demographic backgrounds and a range of cultural and religious attitudes. Similarly, Jacobs and Munis (2023) showed that place-based resentment among rural inhabitants was positively related to voting for the Republican party in US elections in 2018 and 2020, again even when controlled for demographics, and other potentially important attitudes like racial resentment. These studies did not explicitly analyse radical right support, but were undertaken during a period when the Republican party was under control of an extreme-right candidate. It therefore suggests that these kinds of place-based perceptions may in similar ways be related to radical right support in European multiparty systems. So, to the extent that this scenario has unfolded in the Netherlands, we expect:

**H1**. Place-based resentment is positively related to support for radical-right parties, even when controlling for other attitudes.

A few European studies hint towards this scenario as well. In Switzerland, voters who identify more strongly as rural are more likely to vote for the radical right *SVP* (Zollinger, 2024); and in Sweden

[2] Place-based resentment is defined and operationalized in the broader literature focusing on cultural, socio-economic and political aspects (Borwein and Lucas, 2023; Claassen et al., 2025; de Lange et al., 2022; Hegewald, 2024; Munis, 2022). The common measure across the three waves that we use solely refers to the political aspect.

support for the radical right *Sweden Democrats* is higher among voters in shrinking areas with lower availability of public services (Rickardsson, 2021). One potential explanation underlying these findings is that voters in these types of places perceive that the radical right stands up for their place and its inhabitants' interests, and that place-based grievance or resentment is a unique factor in explaining their support for the radical right. In line with this, inhabitants of historically peripheral places in Germany are more likely to vote for the radical right *AfD* (Ziblatt et al., 2024). However, they also have stronger anti-elitist attitudes and more negative views towards immigration and multiculturalism (Ziblatt et al., 2024), which leaves room for a second potential scenario.

In the second scenario, voters with strong feelings of place-based resentment are more likely to support the radical right, but *not* because of these place-based grievances or resentment. Rather, they support these parties because they simultaneously hold other distinct, but associated, attitudes that are among the most important predictors of radical right support. The types of places where place-based resentment among inhabitants is highest – rural and peripheral areas – are also the places where anti-immigration attitudes are on average stronger (Huijsmans et al., 2021; Kenny and Luca, 2021; Luca et al., 2023) and where political trust and efficacy are on average lower (Horno et al., 2023; Mitsch et al., 2021). Support for the radical right in "the places that don't matter" could thus be explained by these kinds of attitudes that are not place-based. This would not necessarily mean that place-based perceptions are irrelevant, but that place-based resentment is integrated into a broader sociocultural cleavage. Namely, place-based resentment is related to stronger nativist and populist attitudes, because voters who perceive that their place is disadvantaged and disregarded tend to blame outgroups and elites for the unfavourable local circumstances that they perceive (Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2023; Cremaschi et al., 2024; Huijsmans, 2022; Lunz Trujillo, 2022; Nelsen and Petsko, 2022). The relationship between place-based resentment and radical right support could thus be mediated by other political attitudes, most notably nativism and populism. In this second scenario, place-based resentment could still be related to radical right support, but in a more indirect way, so that the association will disappear once anti-elitist and nativist attitudes are taken into account. So, this leads to the following hypothesis:

**H2**. Place-based resentment is positively related to support for radical-right parties, yet this relationship disappears when controlling for other attitudes.

In both scenarios outlined above the radical right would benefit from strong feelings of place-based resentment among voters, either directly because voters see the radical right as the defenders of their place and its inhabitants' interests, or more indirectly, through nativist and populist attitudes. Since to date no studies have explicitly analysed the association between place-based resentment and radical right support in European multiparty systems, it is unclear which of the two scenarios explains the rise of the radical right across rural and peripheral areas best. However, it is not necessarily the radical right that electorally benefits from place-based grievances among rural and peripheral voters.

In a third scenario, place-based resentment forms a unique explanation for party support, but is unrelated to radical right support. Instead, these perceptions are related to support for a different party that 'owns' the issue of place-based resentment. Recent studies suggest that this scenario applies to Norway. Norwegian voters who identify more strongly as rural are more discontented with how the national government treats rural areas, but they are not more negative about immigration or refugees, do not place themselves more to the right of the political spectrum, and are not more likely to vote for the radical right *Progress Party*. Instead, these rural identifiers are more likely to vote for the centre-left agrarian *Centre Party* (Auerbach et al., 2024b). Moreover, the only direct evidence for an individual-level association between place-based resentment and party support in European multiparty systems comes from Norway. Feelings of place-based resentment among rural Norwegian voters are positively related to support for the *Centre Party*, and, importantly, is unrelated to right-wing or radical right voting, even without controlling for populist or nativist attitudes (Auerbach et al., 2024a). Thus, the main explanation behind the success of the *Centre Party* is a general discontent with a central government that disadvantages rural and peripheral areas (Eidheim and Fimreite, 2020), or more generally, rural resentment (Eidheim, 2023). Together, these Norwegian studies show that – at least in some contexts – it is possible for parties to mobilize rural voters who perceive that their place does not matter to political elites, without the radical right benefitting from these perceptions among voters. So, this third scenario leads to the following hypothesis:

**H3**. Place-based resentment is positively related to support for parties that explicitly present itself as the defender of rural or peripheral interests (usually an agrarian party, or a regionalist party).

Importantly, these Norwegian authors conclude that the supply of political parties plays a decisive role in how rural identities and resentment are related to party support in multiparty systems (Auerbach et al., 2024b). In the Norwegian party system, the *Centre Party* historically 'owned' rural issues, and in the lead-up to the 2021 elections the party explicitly campaigned on rural grievances, specifically against structural reforms proposed by the centre-right government that would centralize public services (Auerbach et al., 2024a). Norway may be unique in the sense that (1) its party system has historically been partly structured by a centre-periphery cleavage, (2) spatial inequalities became highly salient around the 2021 election, and (3) a centre-*left* party that historically owns these issues successfully mobilized these grievances. However, the Norwegian case may also illustrate that there are ways of mobilizing place-based grievances of rural voters in such a way that it does not translate into radical right support. Although many countries do not have a party that historically owns issues related to urban-rural divides, that may be applicable to other European multiparty systems too.

In the next section we describe how recent political developments in the Netherlands provide an interesting case to analyse how these scenarios apply, before and after spatial inequalities became highly politicized and an explicitly rural-oriented party emerged.

### 2.3. Politicization of urban-rural divides and the rise of the Farmer Citizen Movement in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is an unlikely case to find strong geographic political divides, and to find strong relations between place-based resentment and party support. The country is small and densely populated. The country does not have very large cities compared to many other countries, nor are there highly remote rural areas. Historically, the Dutch party system has not been structured by a clear urban-rural or centre-periphery cleavage. Although the three Christian parties (*CDA*, *CU*, *SGP*) and their predecessors have always received a relatively large share of their votes from rural areas, no party explicitly politicized conflicts between urban or rural interests.

Over the last decades, the overall urban-rural divide in election outcomes in the Netherlands has been moderate, compared to other European multiparty systems. However, the urban-rural electoral divide has clearly increased over the last couple of elections in the Netherlands (Huijsmans and Rodden, 2024). Moreover, before 2017 inhabitants of rural and peripheral areas in the Netherlands already held relatively high levels of place-based resentment compared to inhabitants of the economic, cultural and political centre of the country – the highly urbanized western provinces, also called 'Randstad' (De Lange et al., 2022; Huijsmans, 2023). Developments after 2017 presumably affected levels of place-based resentment and the way it relates to party support. In 2019 the highest court on public matters ('Raad van State') ruled that nitrogen emission rates in the Netherlands are not in line with EU level agreements. In order to comply with these agreements, the Dutch

government needed to implement policies to reduce the total emission of nitrogen in the country, especially in areas close to nature reserves. As the largest share of nitrogen emission comes from agriculture, the Dutch government proposed several measures to restructure this sector. The announcement of these measures fuelled a series of farmers' protests starting in the fall of 2019.

Radical right parties expressed solidarity with the farmers' protest. Yet, in late 2019, a new political party was founded – the *Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB)* – with the aim to defend the interests of farmers and more broadly to be 'the voice from and for the rural areas'. The party's main message was that the agricultural sector was crucial for the economic sustainability and social cohesion in rural areas, and that national politicians of existing parties did not understand these needs and concerns of citizens living in rural and peripheral areas. This message presumably deepened and politicized feelings of place-based resentment in rural and peripheral areas. The *BBB* won one seat in the 2021 national elections. This increased the visibility of the party and its leader, while the nitrogen emission and a supposed divide between the city and the countryside remained highly salient in political and societal debates. In the provincial elections of March 2023, less than two years after *BBB* entered parliament with one seat, it received the largest vote share in all twelve Dutch provinces, making *BBB* the largest party in the national senate. Half a year later, after the November 2023 parliamentary elections, *BBB* grew from one to eight seats in the national parliament, while the largest radical right party (the PVV) became the largest party. Both parties joined the new government coalition in 2024.

Translating the developments in Dutch politics back to the three theoretical scenarios and associated hypotheses, we can be more explicit about the parties that we refer to. The Netherlands has several radical right parties and we have the required data for two of them: Forum for Democracy, and the PVV. Both parties have expressed solidarity with the farmers during the farmers' protests, and we can test H1 and H2 by modelling support for these two parties in all three elections. We expect to find the strongest support for either H1 or H2 in the elections of 2017 and 2021, before *BBB* had firmly entered the stage. Since then *BBB* was clearly the issue owner of place-based resentment, so we model support for this party to test H3. Having said this, we should note that *BBB* already participated in the elections of 2021, but was still relatively unknown to most voters and the party received just 1 percent of the total vote. Since party support for *BBB* was not yet included in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study of 2021, we only have the data to test H3 in 2023 when it had become a serious player in Dutch politics.

## 3. Methods

### 3.1. Data

In this study we employ repeated cross-sectional data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies 2017, 2021, 2023.[3] We use these data sets, because they contain an item that is designed to tap into place-based resentment and they contain detailed questions about party support and a wide range of political attitudes needed to test our hypotheses. The Dutch Parliamentary Elections Studies are based on probability samples of households and are designed to be representative of the Dutch population (see Van der Meer et al., 2018; Sipma et al., 2021; Voogd et al., 2023). The sample sizes vary between roughly 1400 respondents in the fully specified models in the 2017 elections, to roughly 1000 respondents in 2021 and roughly 2600 in 2023.

### 3.2. Operationalisation

Our dependent variable is the electoral support for each of the parties. The Dutch multi-party system with its many parties does not lend itself well to studying actual vote choice, particularly since some of the parties attract only a few percent of the voters. Therefore, we employ a variable which asks respondents for each of the relevant political parties "how likely it is that you will ever vote for this party?". Respondents are asked to respond by means of a scale running from 0 ("certainly never") to 10 ("almost certainly sometime"). The items have been tested and enable us to arrive at valid estimates of the predictors of party choice (e.g. Van der Eijk et al., 2006). Because it is a continuous measure, it is particularly well suited to analyse the determinants of support for smaller parties.

The main independent variable is place-based resentment. This is measured with a single indicator, namely the extent to which people agree or disagree with the statement "Politicians in the Hague do not care about my region". Responses are measured on a 5-point Likert scale. We conduct our analyses with this single item, because it is the only measure that is available in all three DPES waves. Place-based resentment consists theoretically of three elements: (1) a belief that the place is ignored by policy makers (*political)*, (2) a perception that the place does not get its fair share of available resources (*socioeconomic)*, and (3) a sense that its inhabitants have fundamentally distinct values and lifestyles, which are misunderstood and disrespected by inhabitants of other places (*cultural)* (Claassen et al., 2025; Cramer, 2016; Munis, 2022). Our measure only taps into the political aspect of the concept and not into the economic and cultural elements. Moreover, most existing measures are formulated in terms of comparisons between the ingroup and outgroup, whereas our measure only relates to perceptions about the place of residence (i.e. the ingroup). We thus do not fully capture the 'us vs them' component of place-based resentment in our measure. As we have only a limited measure of place-based resentment, we perform several additional analyses to assess how our findings can still inform the broader literature. These analyses are discussed in the robustness section below.

Further, we include a range of other variables that are likely associated with both party support and place-based resentment. We included several political attitudes that were measured in all three waves of the DPES data and that are known to be important predictors of party support: left-right orientation (ranging from 0 = left to 10 = right), attitudes towards income redistribution (1 = income differences should be larger, to 7 = income differences should be smaller), anti-asylum seeker attitudes (1 = admit more asylum seekers, to 7 = send back more asylum seekers), ethnic intolerance (1 = foreigners living in the Netherlands should be able to keep their own culture, to 7 = foreigners in NL should adjust to Dutch culture), Euroscepticism (1 = EU integration should go further, to 7 = EU integration has gone too far), distrust in parliament (1 = trust a lot, to 4 = Do not trust at all), populism (scale score ranging from 1 to 5), and external political inefficacy (scale score ranging from 1 to 3). To test the hypothesis about radical right support, it is especially important to control for populist attitudes and nativism. In additional analyses, we also include some attitudes that were not measured in each DPES wave, but are particularly relevant for modelling support for *BBB*, like attitudes towards climate change and, specifically, towards nitrogen emission policies. Finally, we include the following demographic control variables: education (3-cat.), age (5-cat.), gender, religion (3-cat.: none, Christian, other) and the urbanisation degree of the municipality (5-cat.). Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in the Appendix.

### 3.3. Empirical strategy

Our theoretical reasoning is based on the assumption that place-based resentment has been increasingly politicized in the Netherlands since 2017. To support this claim, we will start predicting levels of place-based resentment in rural and peripheral places over time. It includes a 'type of place' variable that consists of six categories, based on a municipality's degree of urbanisation and the region in which it is

[3] These data are publicly available through https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/home.




**Fig. 1.** Levels of place-based resentment in six types of places in 2017, 2021 and 2023 (left-hand graph), and the predicted changes compared to 2017, in 2021 and 2023 (right-hand graph).

located. Municipalities in the so called 'Randstad' (the three most urbanized provinces in the Western part of the Netherlands that contain the four largest cities: Amsterdam, the Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht) are regarded as being in or close to 'the centre'. Based on this, we arrived at the following six categories: Very large city, West (1); Large city, West (2); Non-urban, West (3); Large city, other (4); Town, other (5); Rural, other (6). These categories were included in the model as dummy variables, with the first category as the reference.[4] The model also includes dummies for the election years (2021 and 2023) with 2017 being the reference category. The place and time dummies were interacted to see how levels of place resentment developed over time in different types of places. Finally, we included all sociodemographic control variables. The results of the OLS regression model are summarized in Fig. 1.

To test our hypotheses, we performed OLS regression models on party support for all parties in all three elections. For each party in each election we perform two main models. The place-based resentment item is the main independent variable in all these models. Its effect on party support is tested while controlling for political inefficacy in all models, to account for the extent to which our measure captures general external efficacy rather than *place-based* resentment. In the first model, we further control for the sociodemographic background variables (education, gender, age, religion and urbanisation degree of the municipality). In the second model, we control for all political attitudes mentioned above: populism, interethnic intolerance, anti-asylum seeker attitudes, Euroscepticism, income redistribution, political distrust, and left-right orientation. From this final model we infer whether place-based resentment is a unique explanatory factor for party support.

As we perform two OLS regression models for each party in each election, we only summarized the main results in Fig. 2. A full overview of all results from all these models is available at our Open Science Framework Page, together with codes to replicate all analyses.[5]

To interpret these results further, we additionally analyse associations to other political attitudes over time, also because we made several assumptions based on previous studies about these associations, that we would like to verify. Most importantly, we assumed that place-based resentment is related to nativist and populist attitudes (Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2023; Huijsmans, 2022; Lunz Trujillo, 2022; Nelsen and Petsko, 2022). We model the effect of place-based resentment in interaction with election year dummies on all political attitudes that we included in the party support models. Moreover, we performed models for two potentially important attitudes that were not present in all DPES waves, namely attitudes towards climate change policies (available in 2021 and 2023) and, specifically, nitrogen emission reduction policies (only available in 2023). As we explicitly assumed that the association between place-based resentment and radical right support could be explained by populist and nativist attitudes, we also included separate models to test this in the appendices.

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Place-based resentment by type of area in 2017, 2021 and 2023

Fig. 1 presents how levels of place-based resentment have changed over time. The figure on the left presents means and confidence intervals in six place types in 2017, 2021 and 2023. The graph at the right shows how this attitude has changed in 2021 and 2023 compared to 2017.

[4] We could not include such a detailed 'type of place' variable in our models predicting party support, because information about the region where respondents live is only available for a subsample in the DPES 2021 data, while for this particular subsample there is no information about their attitudes towards asylum seekers. Therefore, we include the five-category urbanisation degree measure in these models instead.

[5] https://osf.io/7w2tu/?view_only=c30cc161c6a64d94a6c3c1102e49b0e4 (link to anonymized OSF-page).




**Fig. 2.** Predicted marginal effects and 95 % confidence intervals for the association between place-based resentment and party support, by party, in 2017 and 2021, in four different model specifications.

Fig. 1 shows clearly that these perceptions significantly increased between 2017 and 2023 in all types of places, except for the cities in the west. In the 'very large cities' in the west there was even a significant *decrease* in 2023 compared to 2017 (see the graph on the right). In 2017, place-based resentment was already stronger in the areas outside of the Randstad than in the political and cultural centre, but the difference increased significantly in 2023 (not yet in 2021). The strongest increase is visible in towns and rural areas outside the western provinces, but it is even visible for larger cities in the more peripheral provinces. The findings resemble De Lange et al.'s (2022) conclusion that place-based resentment in the Netherlands is more a peripheral than a rural phenomenon. In sum, we see increasing feelings of place-based resentment among voters in the more peripheral and rural areas, in line with our assumption that place-based feelings of resentment became more salient over time.

### 4.2. Associations to party support, by party and election

Hypothesis 1 predicts that feelings of place-based resentment are positively related to support for radical right parties, even when controlled for other political attitudes. Hypothesis 2 predicts that these associations disappear when controlling for other relevant political attitudes. Hypothesis 3 predicts that place-based resentment is instead related to support for explicitly rural-oriented parties. Fig. 2 summarizes the results of the two regression models that we performed for each party for each of the three elections to test these hypotheses. It shows the association between place-based resentment and party support in the baseline model that only controls for sociodemographic background and political efficacy, and the full model that includes all other potentially relevant political attitudes (left-right orientation, attitudes towards income redistribution, anti-asylum seeker attitudes, ethnic intolerance, Euroscepticism, distrust in parliament and populism). If the association between place-based resentment and support for radical right parties (PVV, FvD) is positive and significant in both the baseline model and the full model, this would be in line with Hypothesis 1. If we only see a positive association in the baseline model but not in the full model, this is in line with Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 would be supported if we find a positive significant association to support for BBB in both the baseline model and the full model.

Focusing first on the radical right, we see a positive effect on *PVV* support in the baseline model, in both 2017 and 2023. In 2021 the effect in the baseline model is also positive but not statistically significant. For *FvD* the positive effect is also positive but not significant in 2017. In 2021 and 2023, we see a positive and significant effect of place-based resentment on support for FvD. Altogether, all six coefficients in the baseline models for the radical right parties are in the expected direction, and four out of these six are statistically significant. From this we conclude that place-based resentment is in general positively related to support for radical right parties in the Netherlands. Whether this is support for the first scenario (Hypothesis 1) or the second scenario (Hypothesis 2) we described, depends on whether these associations remain after including all other relevant political variables in the models. As Fig. 2 shows, place-based resentment is not positively related to support for either *PVV* or *FvD* in any of the three elections in the full models. This is evidence against Hypothesis 1, but supports Hypothesis 2: although place-based resentment is positively related to radical right support, this association disappears when controlling for other political attitudes. The results in Figure A2 in the appendix show that the initial positive association can be almost fully explained by additionally including populist attitudes to the baseline model. Including nativist attitudes also explains part of the initial association. This is in line with several existing studies (Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2023; Huijsmans, 2022; Lunz Trujillo, 2022; Nelsen and Petsko, 2022). Altogether, place-based resentment does not form a unique explanation for radical right support in the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2017, 2021 or 2023.

To test Hypothesis 3, we focus on the association between place-based resentment and support for *BBB*. Fig. 2 shows a positive and significant effect on support for *BBB* in 2023 (the only round of the DPES when data for the BBB were available), both in the baseline model and in the full model with all political attitudes included as control variables. Place-based resentment retains almost half of its initial effect compared to the baseline model once all other political attitudes are included ($M1_{BBB}$: b = 0.396, se = 0.053; $M4_{BBB}$: b = 0.182, se = 0.054). Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported. Place-based resentment is a unique explanatory factor for *BBB* support in 2023, even when all other political attitudes are taken into account.

Although there is only one party (*BBB)* for which we see that place-based resentment forms a unique explanation for its support in a positive manner, we see interesting *negative* associations with support for several other parties in some of the elections. First, voters' place-based resentment was positively related to support for the *Socialist Party* in 2017, but this association disappears when other attitudes are taken into account. Second, there are four parties that formed the government coalition between 2017 and 2023 for which we see a *negative* association in some of the elections: *VVD, CDA, CU* and *D66*. For the centre-right *VVD* and the social-liberal *D66* we see this negative association in the baseline model in all three elections. This applies to the Christian-democrat *CDA* too, in 2021 and 2023, and to the Christian party *CU* as well, in 2023. These associations disappear when all other political attitudes are taken into account, except for *VVD* in 2021 and *D66* in 2023. Voters with higher place-based resentment were less likely to support *VVD* in 2021 and *D66* in 2023, all else equal. These voters may have held *VVD* and *D66* most accountable for the controversial agricultural policy proposals by the government that sparked the wave of farmers' protests, for several reasons. *VVD* was the largest coalition party delivering the prime minister and the minister of agricultural at the time. *D66* was the strongest advocate for stricter agricultural policies aimed at reducing nitrogen emissions among the four coalition parties, with one of its MPs even stating in 2021 that the size of the livestock in the Netherlands should be reduced by fifty percent before 2030. Finally, in 2023 we see a similar negative relationship, even when controlling for all other political attitudes, for the joint list of the greens and the social democrats (*PvdA/GL)*. By 2023, place-based resentment had become significantly negatively related not only to support for *D66*, but also to support for the other large left-wing progressive party – *PvdA/GL*.

### 4.3. Associations to other political attitudes

To help interpret why place-based resentment is related to support for some parties, and why this may have changed over time for some parties, we model its associations to other political attitudes over time. The models include the sociodemographic background variables, urbanisation degree, and political efficacy as control variables. The relationships are presented graphically in Fig. 3. As assumed, we see that place-based resentment is positively related to nativist attitudes, like anti-asylum seeker attitudes, Euroscepticism, and ethnic intolerance, albeit that for the latter the positive association decreased and disappeared by 2023. Also as expected, place-based resentment is positively related to more general anti-establishment attitudes like political distrust and populism. These associations weakened over time, suggesting that place-based resentment became more distinct from more general, non-place-based, anti-establishment attitudes.

For the remaining attitudes, we did not have clear assumptions regarding their association to place-based resentment. Regarding support for income redistribution, we see a positive association in 2017. This may partly explain why we see that voters with higher place-based resentment were more likely to position themselves more to the left on the left-right scale in 2017. These associations to economically, and general, left-wing orientation disappeared over time. The associations towards economic redistribution attitudes was no longer significant in 2023, and by that time the association to general left-right orientation




**Fig. 3.** The association between place-based resentment and other political attitudes, by election.

had even shifted significantly to the right. Finally, we modelled the associations to climate and nitrogen emission policies. We could not measure these attitudes for all three DPES waves, so they were not included in our main analysis. The results show a clear association to more negative attitudes towards climate policies – which has strengthened between 2021 and 2023 – and to stronger resistance towards nitrogen emission reduction policies in 2023.

In sum, while in 2017 place-based resentment was related to economically left-wing and culturally right-wing attitudes, by 2023 it had become related to an overall right-wing orientation on both cosmopolitan-nativist issues and climate and environmental issues, and it became more distinct from non-place-based anti-elitist attitudes. Altogether, this reflects the politicization of spatial inequalities in the political and public debate, and the fact that this debate was tied to highly salient environmental policies.

### 4.4. Robustness checks

In a first robustness check we evaluated whether the attitudes towards climate change and nitrogen emission policies could explain the significant associations between place-based resentment on the one hand and support for *D66*, *GL/PvdA* and *BBB* in 2023 on the other hand. Namely, the first two parties are strong advocates of policies to combat climate change and to reduce nitrogen emissions, while the opposite applies to *BBB*. When we include these climate and nitrogen emission attitudes to our final models for these three parties, the negative association to *D66* and *GL/PvdA* support were no longer significant. For *BBB*, however, the positive association remained significant even in this more complete model.

In the second and third robustness check we evaluated to what extent our results are susceptible to more elaborate measures of place-based resentment. We could evaluate this within the DPES data of 2023 and within a different survey dataset (SCoRE) that was gathered in early 2017. The DPES 2023 data include one additional item (beyond the one used in our main analysis) that is meant to capture feelings of place-based resentment: "*People in the rest of the Netherlands have too little appreciation for people from my region*". Respondents answered on a 5-point Likert scale. This item is supposed to capture the cultural element of place-based resentment. To evaluate the robustness of the main results, we replicated our main analysis with this cultural item as the dependent variable, and with a combined scale of the political and cultural item (Cronbach's alpha = 0.822) as the dependent variable. The

results are summarized in Figure A3 in the Appendix. The most important results from the main analysis of the 2023 elections hold in both specifications of the independent variable. That is, place-based resentment is positively related to support for *BBB* across different model specifications, and the positive association to radical right support disappears after controlling for the other political attitudes. Moreover, we still see the negative association to support for the two largest left-wing progressive parties (D66 and PvdA/GL) in all models with the combined scale as the independent variable. However, these effects are not significant when place-based resentment is operationalized only with the cultural item in the model with all control variables.

Finally, we perform an additional analyses in the SCoRE data that were gathered in early 2017 (see Evans et al. (2019). Place-based resentment is measured with three items that correspond to its three elements: (1) "Politicians in The Hague are not interested in my region"; (2) "The government has done too little to improve the economic situation of my region"; (3) "People in the rest of the Netherlands do not have enough appreciation for the people in my region", with answers on a 7-point scale ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7). The operationalization was previously validated by De Lange et al. (2022). We constructed a place resentment scale that is equal to the mean of the three items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.833). The data also contain party support measures similar to the DPES measures used in the main analysis. Further, we included the same sociodemographic control variables (gender, age, religion and education) and as many of the political attitudes that we used in the main analysis as available. We performed a similar stepwise modelling procedure, with a baseline model only including place-based resentment, the sociodemographic controls, and political efficacy as a control, and ending with a full model that also includes the other available political attitudes (left-right, income redistribution, anti-immigration and Euroscepticism). Figure A4 summarizes all results. It shows that our most important results regarding the 2017 elections hold: place resentment is positively related to support for radical right parties, but this association disappears after including populist attitudes. While the coefficients for all other parties are also in the same direction as in our main analysis, there are some differences when it comes to the strength and statistical significance for some parties. For VVD, the negative coefficient remains significant in the full model, whereas this is only the case in 2021 in our main analysis. For the two largest left-wing progressive parties in 2017 (GL and D66) we see a negative significant effect, while this was only the case in 2023 in the main analysis. This suggests that the negative association between place-based resentment and left-wing progressive support may not be as new as our main analysis suggests. For the Socialist Party we see a positive and significant coefficient in the final model, while this was not the case in the main analysis.

So, even though the exact operationalization of place-based resentment matters in a few cases for some parties, the overall patterns are highly similar across different operationalization and the robustness checks do not shed doubts on our main findings: (1) place-based resentment is not a unique explanatory factor for radical right support in the Netherlands, because the association disappears after controlling for populist attitudes in particular, and (2) place-based resentment is a unique explanatory factor for *BBB* support (positively) and for left-wing progressive support (negatively) in the Netherlands.

## 5. Conclusion and discussion

This study asked how the politicization of place-based resentment changed patterns of party support in the Netherlands. It analysed changes in the individual level relationship between place-based resentment and party support. We proposed three theoretical scenarios for how voters' place-based resentment can be related to party support and formulated corresponding hypotheses. In the first scenario, place-based resentment is positively related to radical right support, all else equal, and thus forms a unique explanation for radical right support. In the second scenario, the association disappears when other political attitudes are taken into account. In the third scenario, place-based resentment is instead positively related to support for an explicitly rural-oriented party. After describing developments in Dutch politics over the last years, we analysed how these scenarios applied to the elections of 2017, 2021 and 2023.

Our findings indicate that voters with higher place-based resentment were more likely to support the radical right in all three elections, but, importantly, these associations disappeared once other political attitudes were taken into account. Place-based resentment does not form a unique explanation for radical right support in the Netherlands, as it is ultimately voters' nativist and populist attitudes that explain their support for the radical right. Further, place-based resentment has been negatively related to voting for several incumbent parties, but these associations disappeared as well when controlling for other attitudes. However, the sudden salience of agricultural policies and urban-rural divides in the Dutch political and societal debate, and the emergence of an explicitly rural-oriented party, means that place-based resentment became a unique additional explanation for party support by 2023. Even when taking a wide range of other political attitudes into account, place-based resentment is positively related to support for the agrarian-populist *BBB*, and negatively related to support for the two largest left-wing progressive parties (PvdA/GL and D66). Ultimately, our results correspond to a mix of the second and third scenario we described. On the one hand, in line with scenario three, we find that place-based resentment forms a unique explanation for support for an explicitly rural-oriented party (*BBB)*. On the other hand, radical right parties still benefit from politicization of place-based resentment in a more indirect way, as it seems strongly integrated into the broader sociocultural cleavage. That is, place-based resentment had become related to an overall right-wing orientation on both cultural and environmental issues, and it became more distinct from non-place-based anti-elitist attitudes, compared to 2017. Altogether, this reflects the politicization of spatial inequalities in the political and public debate, and the fact that this debate was tied to highly salient environmental policies. Although our results show that place-based resentment is not a unique explanatory factor for radical right support, these associations to other attitudes imply that further politicization of spatial inequalities benefits the radical right in an indirect way (see also Cremaschi et al., 2024), and disadvantages parties on the opposite end of the political spectrum, namely left-wing progressive parties.

This may especially be true in multiparty systems without an explicitly rural-oriented party that is not radical right, because in that case voters with higher place-based resentment do not have an obvious party to turn too, and might be even more likely to support the radical right. This is in line with the Norwegian studies concluding that the supply of political parties plays a decisive role in how rural identities and resentment are related to party support in multiparty systems (Auerbach et al., 2024b). In the Norwegian party system, the *Centre Party* historically 'owned' rural issues, and in the lead-up to the 2021 elections the party explicitly campaigned on rural grievances, specifically against structural reforms proposed by the centre-right government that would centralize public services (Auerbach et al., 2024a). In the Dutch context, we see that *BBB* also owns the issue of urban-rural divides since they entered parliament in 2021. However, in the Netherlands place-based resentment is related to (radical) right-wing attitudes, and to support for the radical right when these attitudes are not controlled for, whereas both are not the case in Norway (Auerbach et al., 2024b). It shows that the electoral consequences of these place-based perceptions do not only depend on the existence of a rural-oriented party, but also on *the type of* rural-oriented party that politicizes these issues.

Where the Norwegian *Centre Party* is usually classified as centre-left, the Dutch *BBB* can be classified as a right-wing agrarian-populist party (Rooduijn and De Lange, 2023). We therefore see a different dynamic around the politicization of urban-rural divides in the Netherlands, so

that it is more likely to indirectly benefit the radical right compared to the Norwegian case. This is further illustrated by the strategies of *BBB* itself and the Dutch radical right parties. On the one hand, after BBB entered parliament with one seat in 2021, the party leader received a lot of media attention. She often appeared in the news with statements that resemble those of the radical right: degrading towards *LGBT*-rights' activists, negative about asylum seekers, Eurosceptical, and generally anti-elitist. BBB positioned itself thus to the right from the traditional centre-right parties (e.g. *CDA* or *VVD*), and on several issues very close to populist radical right parties like the PVV. On the other hand, these populist radical right parties were quick to embrace the demands of farmers and to question the negative impact of the agricultural industry on the environment, in contrast to other parties including the centre-right. The radical right parties used the farmers' protest waves as an opportunity to highlight their populist and anti-climate policy rhetoric.

Our findings should nevertheless be interpreted with one notable limitation of our study in mind, namely the limited operationalization of place-based resentment. Our single-item measure only taps into the political element of place-based resentment. Our robustness check with the DPES 2023 data that includes the cultural element, and the replication of our 2017 results in a different dataset with a three-item measure, do assure us that our findings are relevant to the broader literature on place-based resentment, but with at least one important remaining caveat. We could not include the distributive, material, element (or economic dimension) in our analysis of the changing electoral consequences of place-based resentment over time, while these place-based material grievances are unrelated, or even differently related to party support, in the US (Trujillo and Crowley, 2022).

Our findings nevertheless provide some general insights for how place-based resentment may be related to party support in European multiparty systems. In many countries, entry barriers for new parties are substantially higher than in the Netherlands, making it less likely that new parties emerge and capture the support of 'place-based resentful' voters. Simultaneously, farmers' protests appeared in several European countries over the last years, indicating that urban-rural divides may get politicized in other countries too. This may particularly benefit the radical right in rural and peripheral places, especially in countries where rural areas are more sparsely populated and further remote from urban cores compared to in the Dutch case. For example, countries like Germany and France that saw increasing urban-rural electoral divides over the last decade (Haffert, 2022; Huijsmans and Rodden, 2024), do not have a party that historically owns these issues, and entry barriers for new parties are higher than in the Netherlands. If urban-rural divides further increase and get explicitly politicized in these countries, it is likely that radical right parties benefit in rural and peripheral places. However, Spain illustrates that explicitly rurally-oriented parties - that are not radical right - can arise in multiparty systems, even in a country where there is no party that historically owns the issue of place-based resentment (like in Norway) and where entry barriers for new parties are higher than in the Netherlands. The political party *Empty Spain* (EV) was formed in 2021 in response to depopulation of rural areas (Esparcia, 2024), and they won seats in some Spanish regions but did not manage to win any seats in the national parliament in 2023. To better understand the electoral consequences of place-based resentment in multiparty systems, and the electoral success of parties explicitly mobilizing these issues, we need more case studies across European countries, or, ideally, a truly comparative study operationalizing place-based resentment across a large number of countries. With recent cross-national research projects by European scholars that include elaborate measures of place-based resentment (Claassen et al., 2025; Hegewald, 2024; Hegewald and Schraff, 2024), we hope that the current study will pave the way for analysing associations between place-based resentment and party support across a wider range of European countries. For future studies that aim to measure place-based resentment, the Dutch context shows that it is important to acknowledge that it may be strongly linked to regional, centre-periphery, divides beyond urban-rural divides (de Lange et al., 2022).

Altogether, our study shows how the politicization of a new 'wedge issue' (van de Wardt et al., 2014) can change how voters' feelings of place-based resentment relate to party support and other political attitudes, and hence can shift the balance more to the right, at least temporarily. Although place-based resentment does not form a unique explanation for radical right support in the Netherlands, our findings imply that politicization of rural or peripheral resentment can still indirectly benefit the radical right, even when a newly founded political party becomes the issue owner on these divides. The radical right will potentially benefit even more in several other countries that saw large-scale farmers' protests against EU regulations, since in most of these countries it is harder for new parties to emerge and claim issue ownership.

## CRediT authorship contribution statement

**Twan Huijsmans:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Visualization, Methodology. **Wouter van der Brug:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft.

## Declaration of competing interest

We have NO affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter discussed in this study.

## Appendix

**Table A1**
Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the main analysis, by election year

| | 2017 | | | | | 2021 | | | | | 2023 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *N* | *Mean* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* | *N* | *Mean* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* | *N* | *Mean* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* |
| Party support | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| VVD | 1873 | 4.802 | 3.216 | 1 | 10 | 4108 | 5.271 | 3.343 | 1 | 10 | 5073 | 4.130 | 3.252 | 1 | 10 |
| PvdA | 1867 | 4.660 | 2.837 | 1 | 10 | 4062 | 5.064 | 2.939 | 1 | 10 | | | | | |
| PVV | 1862 | 2.865 | 2.896 | 1 | 10 | 4127 | 2.931 | 3.032 | 1 | 10 | 5112 | 3.053 | 2.993 | 1 | 10 |
| SP | 1859 | 4.171 | 2.871 | 1 | 10 | 4046 | 4.216 | 2.960 | 1 | 10 | 5031 | 3.997 | 2.845 | 1 | 10 |
| CDA | 1857 | 4.765 | 2.856 | 1 | 10 | 4079 | 4.952 | 2.970 | 1 | 10 | 5046 | 3.646 | 2.659 | 1 | 10 |
| D66 | 1847 | 5.089 | 2.862 | 1 | 10 | 4046 | 5.121 | 2.934 | 1 | 10 | 5014 | 4.024 | 2.929 | 1 | 10 |
| CU | 1851 | 3.588 | 2.698 | 1 | 10 | 4070 | 3.645 | 2.775 | 1 | 10 | 5061 | 3.211 | 2.660 | 1 | 10 |

(*continued on next page*)

**Table A1** (*continued*)

| | 2017 | | | | | 2021 | | | | | 2023 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *N* | *Mean* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* | *N* | *Mean* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* | *N* | *Mean* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* |
| GL | 1851 | 4.526 | 2.970 | 1 | 10 | 4078 | 4.685 | 3.129 | 1 | 10 | | | | | |
| SGP | 1840 | 2.546 | 2.274 | 1 | 10 | 3937 | 2.421 | 2.341 | 1 | 10 | 4900 | 2.181 | 2.218 | 1 | 10 |
| PvdD | 1853 | 3.293 | 2.744 | 1 | 10 | 4090 | 3.553 | 2.967 | 1 | 10 | 5074 | 3.585 | 2.968 | 1 | 10 |
| DENK | 1848 | 1.643 | 1.645 | 1 | 10 | 3972 | 1.688 | 1.835 | 1 | 10 | 4904 | 1.630 | 1.576 | 1 | 10 |
| FvD | 1851 | 2.481 | 2.330 | 1 | 10 | 4069 | 2.369 | 2.556 | 1 | 10 | 5091 | 1.712 | 1.893 | 1 | 10 |
| PvdA_GL | | | | | | | | | | | 5066 | 4.790 | 3.371 | 1 | 10 |
| Volt | | | | | | | | | | | 4661 | 3.643 | 2.895 | 1 | 10 |
| BBB | | | | | | | | | | | 5033 | 4.104 | 3.094 | 1 | 10 |
| NSC | | | | | | | | | | | 4655 | 5.960 | 2.987 | 1 | 10 |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Low | 2909 | 0.120 | | 0 | 1 | 4366 | 0.115 | | 0 | 1 | 5215 | 0.067 | | 0 | 1 |
| Middle | 2909 | 0.459 | | 0 | 1 | 4366 | 0.447 | | 0 | 1 | 5215 | 0.521 | | 0 | 1 |
| High | 2909 | 0.421 | | 0 | 1 | 4366 | 0.438 | | 0 | 1 | 5215 | 0.412 | | 0 | 1 |
| Age category | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <30 | 3424 | 0.136 | | 0 | 1 | 4839 | 0.168 | | 0 | 1 | 5640 | 0.138 | | 0 | 1 |
| 30–40 | 3424 | 0.128 | | 0 | 1 | 4839 | 0.129 | | 0 | 1 | 5640 | 0.151 | | 0 | 1 |
| 40–50 | 3424 | 0.161 | | 0 | 1 | 4839 | 0.141 | | 0 | 1 | 5640 | 0.135 | | 0 | 1 |
| 50–60 | 3424 | 0.195 | | 0 | 1 | 4839 | 0.186 | | 0 | 1 | 5640 | 0.171 | | 0 | 1 |
| ≥60 | 3424 | 0.381 | | 0 | 1 | 4839 | 0.375 | | 0 | 1 | 5640 | 0.406 | | 0 | 1 |
| Gender | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 3427 | 0.491 | | 0 | 1 | 4835 | 0.481 | | 0 | 1 | 5632 | 0.493 | | 0 | 1 |
| Female | 3427 | 0.509 | | 0 | 1 | 4835 | 0.519 | | 0 | 1 | 5632 | 0.507 | | 0 | 1 |
| Religion | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 3025 | 0.604 | | 0 | 1 | 4316 | 0.575 | | 0 | 1 | 5222 | 0.562 | | 0 | 1 |
| Christian | 3025 | 0.333 | | 0 | 1 | 4316 | 0.349 | | 0 | 1 | 5222 | 0.381 | | 0 | 1 |
| Other | 3025 | 0.063 | | 0 | 1 | 4316 | 0.076 | | 0 | 1 | 5222 | 0.057 | | 0 | 1 |
| Urbanisation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very high | 3347 | 0.167 | | 0 | 1 | 4489 | 0.199 | | 0 | 1 | 5632 | 0.233 | | 0 | 1 |
| High | 3347 | 0.286 | | 0 | 1 | 4489 | 0.261 | | 0 | 1 | 5632 | 0.292 | | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 3347 | 0.205 | | 0 | 1 | 4489 | 0.170 | | 0 | 1 | 5632 | 0.170 | | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 3347 | 0.217 | | 0 | 1 | 4489 | 0.217 | | 0 | 1 | 5632 | 0.198 | | 0 | 1 |
| Very Low | 3347 | 0.125 | | 0 | 1 | 4489 | 0.153 | | 0 | 1 | 5632 | 0.107 | | 0 | 1 |
| Place-based resentment | 2812 | 3.042 | 1.014 | 1 | 5 | 3347 | 3.077 | 1.014 | 1 | 5 | 4652 | 3.292 | 1.093 | 1 | 5 |
| External efficacy | 2737 | 1.364 | 1.215 | 0 | 3 | 3186 | 1.406 | 1.276 | 0 | 3 | 4028 | 1.375 | 1.242 | 0 | 3 |
| Left-right | 3060 | 5.174 | 2.394 | 0 | 10 | 3774 | 4.990 | 2.567 | 0 | 10 | 4683 | 5.027 | 2.565 | 0 | 10 |
| Income redistribution | 3068 | 4.960 | 1.609 | 1 | 7 | 3821 | 4.995 | 1.499 | 1 | 7 | 5233 | 5.134 | 1.351 | 1 | 7 |
| Ethnic intolerance | 3134 | 4.810 | 1.691 | 1 | 7 | 4029 | 4.366 | 1.691 | 1 | 7 | 5312 | 4.572 | 1.620 | 1 | 7 |
| Anti-asylum seeker | 1852 | 4.693 | 1.700 | 1 | 7 | 1948 | 4.781 | 1.590 | 1 | 7 | 4244 | 5.010 | 1.661 | 1 | 7 |
| Euroscepticism | 2963 | 4.417 | 1.878 | 1 | 7 | 3716 | 4.111 | 1.799 | 1 | 7 | 5099 | 4.334 | 1.826 | 1 | 7 |
| Political distrust | 1887 | 2.506 | 0.699 | 1 | 4 | 3561 | 2.468 | 0.724 | 1 | 4 | 5239 | 2.761 | 0.687 | 1 | 4 |
| Populism | 3038 | 3.042 | 0.704 | 1 | 5 | 3640 | 3.095 | 0.695 | 1 | 5 | 4499 | 3.028 | 0.745 | 1 | 5 |

*Additional controls for attitudes towards climate change and nitrogen emission policies*




**Fig. A1.** Association between place-based resentment and support for PvdA/GL, D66 and BBB, when additionally controlled for attitudes towards climate change and nitrogen emission policies.




**Fig. A2.** Association between places-based resentment and support for radical right parties PVV and FVD, in the two main models and two additional models that specifically control for populist and nativist attitudes.




**Fig. A3.** Predicted marginal effects and 95 % confidence intervals for the association between place-based resentment as measured with only the cultural item (black coefficients) or measured as a combined scale of the political and cultural item (red coefficients) and party support in 2023, in four different model specifications, by party.




**Fig. A4.** Predicted marginal effects and 95 % confidence intervals for the association between place-based resentment as measured with three items (political, cultural and economic) and party support in the 2017 SCoRE dataset, in four different model specifications, by party.

## Data availability

The data used for the analyses in this article are publicly available through https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/home. Codes for replication are available at our OSF page.

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