Trust in the World

Going to the Movies With Cavell, Wittgenstein, and Some Prior Philosophers

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Trust in the World. Going to the Movies with Cavell, Wittgenstein, and Some Prior Philosophers

Abstract: One of the challenging aspects of the philosophy of Stanley Cavell is the fact that he connects the central philosophical problem of scepticism with art and cinema. In doing this, he very much relies on Wittgenstein, but has to make two even larger argumentative steps that connect him to a theory of subjectivity, elaborated by German idealism, and to a theory of aesthetic experience first elaborated by Kant. Going to the movies with Cavell, Wittgenstein, and these prior philosophers means restoring our trust in the (modern) world.

We know from anecdotes that Wittgenstein, after teaching a philosophy class at Cambridge University, rushed to a movie theatre especially enjoying Hollywood movies, musicals, westerns, and detective movies. And like every cineaste, he sat in the very first row (Malcolm 1962: 27–28). But we know, as well, that Wittgenstein’s philosophy, until recently, has had little influence on the study of film, corresponding to the general fact that he has written very little about philosophy of art. This situation is—slowly but continuously—changing. Among the group of people that are interested in philosophy and film, Wittgenstein, or let us say: a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy and film, has attracted more and more attention (see Turvey 2009: 470–480, Gilmore 2005, Sinnerbrink 2011, Schmerheim 2016). Stanley Cavell, in such a context is a philosopher who has played an influential role as promoter. One of the challenging aspects of his philosophy is the fact that he connects a central philosophical problem—the problem of scepticism—with art and cinema. In doing this, he very much relies on Wittgenstein but—as I would like to demonstrate—has to make two even larger argumentative steps that connect him to a theory of subjectivity, elaborated by German idealism, and to a theory of aesthetic experience first elaborated by Kant. Going to the movies with Cavell, Wittgenstein, and these prior philosophers finally means restoring our trust in the world, more precisely the modern world. This is the general thesis I would like to argue for, hoping the argument for the thesis is fairly successful.

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1 Scepticism and Acknowledgement

Following the scholarly definition of scepticism, Cavell’s intricate argumentation for the primacy of the counter-principle—“acknowledgement”—can be concentrated on two focal points: on the problem of a relationship to the world as a whole, and on the problem of other minds. Concerning the latter, Cavell counters the sceptics (and their equally cognitivist opponents) with the idea that what separates us as human beings or as subjects is not, or not primarily, our bodies, but our minds, or more precisely “a particular aspect or stance of the mind”. Cavell names this aspect “position” or “attitude”. Thus what separates us from each other as entities in space and time and as empirical subjectivities is an attitude, an ethos in the Greek sense of the word. Separateness, then, is something which can be denied or acknowledged (see Sparti/Hammer 2002: 21, Cavell 1979a: 369).

Cavell’s concept of acknowledgement at first is distinct from the one which made Hegel famous in a German and continental European context. For Cavell’s, acknowledgement simply means that (expressive) statements by another party, or by another person, prompt a reaction, regardless of which one. This reaction can be positive, indifferent or negative. It is the reaction as such which is important, for it conveys a non-epistemic confirmation of the other person. For Cavell, the attitude of acknowledgement represents “a completely elementary form” of intersubjective confirmation located “below the threshold”, marking the “affirmation of specific characteristics of the opposite person in question”. Thus, the attitude of acknowledgement is an affirmation of the non-specific characteristics of a person. This fundamental level is concerned—as we could say—with “existential”, or as I prefer to say: ontological affirmation (Honneth 2005: 60).

Cavell’s argumentation in favour of the primacy of acknowledgement also concentrates on a second context. Cavell sees the “truth” or the “moral of scepticism” in the idea “that the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing”. The term “world as a whole” (Welttotalität) suggests a Kantian understanding, and in fact, Cavell readily refers to “Kant’s insight” that there are “limitations of knowledge”, but that these are not, or do not have to be “failures” (Cavell 1979a: 241, see 48). They are only failures from the point of view of a subject which misunderstands itself cognitivistically, which would like to assume its place opposite to the world as a whole, and which in so doing becomes placeless and homeless in it. For the concept of the world, which is, as Kant clarifies, actually an “inclusive concept” (Inbegriff) or an “idea” (Cavell 1979a: 393, Kant KrV: 406 – 409, Gabriel 2008: 141), this means that in every single act of knowledge we are necessitated to presume a whole, a referential context which, however, we cannot secure cognitively. This
condition of the possibility of knowledge must itself remain within the area of non-knowledge. “Knowing” things (in the world) is one thing; “revealing” (in German “offenbaren”) the world in which these things have their place (their significance) is quite another (Cavell 1979a: 54).

2 Film and Acknowledgement

For Cavell, scepticism and its counterpart, acknowledgement, illustrate the central problem not only of philosophy, but also of art, especially of the art form of tragedy. The tragic dimension of the sceptic as person, which consists in continually denying the existence of the other, the so-called problem of other minds, indeed of existence at all, and in so doing finding himself, the others and the objective world in isolation and meaninglessness, emerges with existential vehemence in the tragedies, for Cavell predominantly those of Shakespeare (Sparti/Hammer 2002: 23).

As for film, Cavell offers the far-reaching hypothesis that it is “a moving image of scepticism” (Cavell 1979b: 188). This means, first of all, that the world which is perceivable on the screen is inaccessible (in a literal sense) for us as viewers, just as for the figures in the screen world, i.e. our world is vice versa inaccessible (Cavell 1979b: 24, 155). Only a movie is able to play with that situation. Then all persons involved are moving between their ontological dimensions, like in Woody Allen’s The Purple Rose of Cairo (1985), or in Last Action Hero (1993, with Arnold Schwarzenegger). Film presents us as viewers with a world to which we may have access in our imagination, and yet not ontologically, at least not at the moment at which we perceive it. As agents we are excluded from it. It is a world, i.e. an action context, in which we cannot be physically present and act in. And this description leads to the well-known sceptical reaction that the world projected onto the screen (thus) does not exist.

But film is a moving picture not only of scepticism, but also of acknowledgement. Corresponding to the two focal points in Cavell’s argumentation for the primacy of acknowledgement, film provides two possible ways of awarding evidence to this primacy. The first one, the acknowledgement of the other, is most at home in the Hollywood comedies of remarriage. Whilst in melodramas the external presentation of happiness in marriage is male-dominated, only permitting the wife to find her own voice and express her individuality in the painful processes of self-discovery, the comedies of remarriage (made prominent by actors like Spencer Tracy, Katharine Hepburn and Cary Grant) show how an individual can only build up a relationship to himself with the help of other individuals, through friendship and love. Here, indeed, we can hear Hegel’s concept of ac-
knowledge in the background. All the verbal battles between the still married and not yet remarried couples are aimed at a readjustment of balance between the self and other. In the melodrama the (married) man fights against the idea of his wife being acknowledged (by himself and by others); in the comedy of remarriage, the battle of the sexes rages turbulently yet with ultimate bite inhibition, a purely verbal battle for mutual acknowledgement (Cavell 1996: 9, 30, Sparti/Hammer 2002: 29, Rothman 2009: 351).

Film also, however, provides a solution to the second central aspect of Cavell’s concept of acknowledgement, namely the relationship to the world as a whole. Building on Kant’s description of the problem, and addressing those problems brought forth by Wittgenstein (and Heidegger), Cavell’s solution is that we as recognizing beings are forced to anticipate a whole (world), but that we are not capable of grasping it cognitively. This accepted coercion, or this insight into a necessity, is the correct consequence to draw from Kant’s theory of finiteness. Film, based on the technique of photography, draws this consequence in its own way. “The camera, being finite, crops a portion from an indefinitely larger field; continuous portions of that field could be included in the photograph in fact taken; in principle it could all be taken. [...] When a photograph is cropped, the rest of the world is cut out” (Cavell 1979b: 24). A photograph is “of a world,” where “world” is a term of totality for an infinite referential context. The recording camera always cuts something out of the world, always presenting a cutting of the world. That is its standpoint of finiteness. But, turned on its head, this means that every cutting implies the whole, that every visual presentation implies what it is not presenting. In the case of the photographic picture, as opposed to a painted picture, the infinite is an implication of the finite.

On the other hand, two obvious objections can be raised for a critique of Cavell’s film philosophy pursuant to his two focal points: acknowledgement of the other and acknowledgement of the world as a whole. Firstly, solving a problem which arises through the medium of film by employing a sub-genre of film must be unsatisfactory. As a medium, film places the viewer in a state of isolation, expressed in a cultural-historical way: in the state of Cartesian, Protestant and tragic subjectivity which existentially describes scepticism. A genre such as the comedies of remarriage can, at best, balance out this formal deficiency of the medium, but not solve it. Secondly, it is obvious that the world as a whole is an implication not only of film, but also of photography. The film’s achievement concerning these two points—its implication of the world and acknowledgement of subjectivity—would therefore have to be presented in a different way. I shall touch upon that way in my further comments below.
3 Subjectivity, Modernity, and Movement

In which way, then, firstly, can film as a medium achieve acknowledgement of subjectivity? In order to answer this question in terms of Cavell, it seems fitting to extend his understanding of the concepts of subjectivity and acknowledgement by including a new dimension crystallised in German idealism. Both concepts—subjectivity and acknowledgement—are considerably less marked by Descartes than by Kant and his German Idealist successors. Thus, what I want to do at this point is obviously not guided by suggestions presented by the later Wittgenstein, though he will pop up in my final considerations.

So what about subjectivity? According to Kant and his Idealist successors, it is a relational concept. It is the term describing an entity whose relationship to other is accompanied by a permanent relationship to self. What we call “I” is, within the so-called mentalist, or subject-object paradigm, nothing other than a (double) relationship. Anyone saying “I” has always already, thus in the mode of an a priori perfect tense, doubled himself. He or she has produced an equation with “I” on both sides. An “I” can only exist as this relationship. It is not a thing, not an object. It is nothing other than the relationship itself, infinite self-reference.

This brings me to a comparison—a speculative analogy—between subjectivity and film, in which the tertium comparationis is movement. As infinite self-reference the Self is a dynamic relation, so to speak a kind of pure movement, or a kind of mental perpetuum mobile. And however one wishes to define film and the type of movement which might be characterized within it, it will not be possible without the category of movement as such. Siegfried Kracauer (for him movement, for example chases, are quasi made for the screen), Gilles Deleuze (the moving-image and the higher estimated time-image), Noël Carroll (film belongs to the class of moving images) and others offer well-known examples for such a thesis (Kracauer 1985: 71–72, Deleuze 1986, Carroll 1996: 49, Currie 1995: 19–47). “Movement” here has three meanings: the mechanical meaning due to the camera and the projection machine; the meaning of objective illusion created by the acceleration of sequences of images; and above all consciously constructed sequences of images via montage (which gives us the impression of a dynamics of space without moving our own body).

Within this framework of a theory of self-consciousness, named especially by Hegel, acknowledgement is the result of an altercation, a “movement” back and forth, in which each subject attempts to grasp the other. But since grasping the other is an act of objectification, it includes seeing the other as an object and insofar destroying the other in its self-reliance. Thus in the “movement” of ac-
knowledge in each subject attempts in externally directed action to do what it has to do for internal reasons: to objectify itself. A subject can achieve consciousness of itself only by objectifying itself; this internal dynamics has an external equivalent in the objectification of another subject because in the process of acknowledgement, as well, it is a necessary step to see this subject as an object. Self-consciousness is a result of a process of objectification. The cultural and artistic medium which can, better than any other, present this complicated movement or process of self-objectification is film, feature film, as literature and theatre but also dance are weaker competitors. It exhibits a story of people who interact with each other and their environment trying to objectivise themselves on a level of reciprocal recognition. At the same time this external relationship between (inter)acting subjectivities represents the internal relationship of subjectivity trying to objectivise itself. In both cases we have to deal with an infinite relationship. What we call subjectivity or self-consciousness is nothing but movement.

Of course, I am aware that these propositions are in need of further and detailed argumentation. I have done that in my recent books (Früchtl 2009, Früchtl 2013). What I can present here, is only the outline of that argumentation. But my first proposition is clear: film is the adequate medium of subjectivity. In it the subject finds the symbolic-aesthetic acknowledgement best suited to its formal philosophical structure worked out by German idealism. And—extending my proposition—as long as subjectivity, again in line with Hegel, also functions as a principle of Modernity (see Habermas 1990), it becomes clear that the presented essentialistic determination of film in fact is a modern one, or put another way, that it requires relativisation in historic terms.

For now, two questions may remain. The first one is whether the concept of acknowledgement as we know it from German idealism may be assigned to the relationship between spectator (subject) and movie (object). In my reading, Cavell is working with two concepts of acknowledgement: an ontological-existentialist and a social. The first one stands in the tradition from Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Sartre, the second one from Fichte and Hegel to Honneth. In Cavell’s Hollywood comedies of remarriage the figures act in the sense of a social and reciprocal acknowledgement, though Cavell doesn’t refer explicitly to the German idealist tradition, only indirectly, we may say, via romanticism and the American transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau. But if it is about the relationship between spectator and the world on screen, we cannot strictly work with the social concept of acknowledgement. In that case, acknowledgement means that the contemplating or perceiving subject feels provoked to show a reaction which in fact is a non-epistemic confirmation: not of what is going on on
screen, but *that* there is something going on. The fact that a subject is reacting to something is already a first and basic act of acknowledging it.

Beyond that, if we conceive of the cineastically perceiving and experiencing subject in the sense of the German idealist theory of the Self, that Self has to follow the infinite dynamics, so to speak the internal movement, that is hidden in the act of self-identification, which in fact is an equation: saying “I” implies “I=I”. Based on that dynamic structure, the Self recognizes itself in the structure of mobilization of a film. The Self reacts to a film before—in a systematic, not a temporal way—reacting to its content. The infinite inner dynamics of subjectivity mirrors itself in the dynamics of the medium of film. And if Hegel is right in claiming for the first time that subjectivity is the principle of Modernity as well, then film is the most adequate aesthetic medium of that epoch.

But why—one might ask anew—isn’t this true for music, too? Music, too, is an art of “movement”, of dynamics of tones and acoustic-compositional forms. My answer, again very quickly, would be that film relies on the structure of space and time, not—like music does—only of time. As Erwin Panofsky has already stated, film offers a “dynamisation of space” and a respective “spatialisation of time”. Different to what is happening on a theatre stage, it is not only bodies that are moving in space but space itself: it is approaching, drawing back, turning around, dissolving and taking shape again (Panofsky 1999: 25, see also Seel 2005: 182–185). In the case of film, seeing means perceiving and experiencing a permanently changing, temporally structured space. Film offers a mobile and pictorial experience of space, the experience of a virtual mobile space. And to this epistemological and ontological structure, film finally adds the performance we know from literature and theatre: acting and verbalising figures that in principal refer to each other in the way of mutual recognition. This is a unique achievement of film that illustrates, seen against the background of Cavell, its twofold manner of acknowledgement.

The second question that remains is whether film as an aesthetic-technological medium does not harken back to a conception of the Self which, following the *linguistic turn*, either no longer stands up at all or only in a modified form. As is well known, German Idealism pursued Descartes’ mental representation model, according to which the word “I” stands for a representation (*repraesentatio*), albeit a very special one, one which represents nothing (sensual), one to which we cannot refer directly, but only regressively-analytically. From this, 20th century linguistic philosophy infers a procession from the substantivistic self to the personal pronoun “I”, analysing the use of this expression and concluding that this expression is “not a concept, not a proper noun, not a label for something (including a representation), but a singular term with an exclusively index-
ical function”. The meaning of the word “I” is to be found not in the fact “that it denotes, but that it indicates” (Schnädelbach 2012: 98).

This question can be answered in two ways. On the one hand, in subject-philosophical terms, the critique based on language philosophy does have to be taken seriously, and yet it is patently not capable of completely replacing the programme of consciousness philosophy. The works of Manfred Frank stand for a critique of the critique (see Frank 1991, Frank 2012). On the other hand, in film-philosophical terms, it should be emphasised that the limits of the mentalistic-idealistic conception of the self can also, and especially, be demonstrated using film, bringing its indexical character to the fore. Film does not primarily show something by pointing towards it in the manner of a sign, but by creating a presence, a sense which cannot be fully expressed in propositions. The showing itself does not fully merge into its apparent message, precisely because of its underlying movement. To this extent, in a sense, film shows that which is gestic. In the words of Kant—to whom I will refer to in the following section—, it indicates something, namely that those who refer to themselves by saying “I” can also refer to the world as something which is “fitting” for them.

4 Aesthetic Experience, the World as a Whole, and Trust

So far I have argued for the first aspect of acknowledgement—the acknowledgement of subjectivity—within the framework of cinema. Secondly, the philosophy of Kant and German Idealism also seem to be helpful concerning clarification of the cineastic acknowledgement of the world as a whole, albeit with one major difference. Whereas acknowledgement of the subjectivity specific to Modernity is best achieved by the medium of film, an equal privilege cannot be claimed for film regarding acknowledgement of the world as a whole, or at least not while it is still dependent upon the technique of photography or is based on the trusted realism of everyday practicality. This is even true of an animation-strong genre such as “mind-game movies”, films which play in the heads of the main characters and therefore at the same time play a game with the viewer, frequently bound up in epistemological and ontological confusions (Elsaesser 2009). In Inception (2010, by Christopher Nolan), a film about a dream within a dream within a dream, the cityscape of Paris collapses in on itself like an egg box; a wonderful, completely original image; but in order to have such an effect, our everyday realism—so to say, our photographic realism—is required.
The imagery of film relies to an unavoidable extent on recordings of our everyday world.

In order to acknowledge the world as a whole cineastically, it is necessary to take two larger argumentative steps. Firstly, one has to deviate to the more general level of aesthetic experience, and for this Kant remains the best starting block. The games of Verstand and Einbildungskraft, of our linguistic-logical and imaginative capacity, which constitutes aesthetic judging permits no cognitive or otherwise definitive judgements. But in the case of aesthetic judgments the strange agreement (Übereinstimmung or Zusammenstimmung) between the cognitive capacities which are actually directed against each other—since our understanding wants to have rules and laws whereas imagination wants to be productive without any law—permits us to conclude the agreement of subjectivity and objectivity, of our self and of the world. In his early works (Kant Refl.Log.: 1820a), Kant coined a formulation for this which sounds just as old-fashioned and classically ancient as it does timeless and gentle: “Beautiful things indicate that human beings match (fit in) the world” (Die schönen Dinge zeigen an, dass der Mensch in die Welt passe). The question of how one feels as a reasonable being would have to be answered in Kantian terms indeed as follows: “One feels at home in oneself and in the world” (Recki 2006: 102). But it has to be repeated that this is a strange feeling, as strange as the agreement between the cognitive faculties, and that it is primarily an epistemological-ontological feeling, not an ethical or political one. The ontological affirmation provided by an aesthetic experience has no implication of political conservatism. The aesthetic feeling of fitting in the world (as such) is prior to a political or ethical judgement, and thus means more than a Wittgensteinian fitting in a way of life (see Scruton 2011). Aesthetic experiences indicate, in an ontological or existential sense, that the basic relationship between man and the world can be viewed as a matching and a match.

This matching can now be further explained in a second step, using the concept of trust. Philosophically speaking, this term has been a part of Political Philosophy since Hobbes and has become a familiar term in Moral Philosophy through a criticism of Kant put forward by Annette Baier and Carol Gilligan. In Sociology, the term has acted as a functional compensation for knowledge since Georg Simmel. Under the conditions of extensive anonymity, coordinated action is not possible in any other way (Hartmann 2001: 10–12; Giddens 1990: 29, 88, 92; O’Neill 2002: 6). For my theme, a psychological meaning of the trust concept is particularly relevant, namely what Erik Erikson called “basic trust” (in German “Urvertrauen”). The sense of the reality of things and human beings is here the product of a relationship of trust that means of a stable, positive interaction. A lack of reality, in reverse, indicates a lack of trust.
And this is precisely Cavell’s theory with regard to sceptics. They deny reality because they lack trust, and they lack it because they cannot build upon the stability, however unstable, of positive interactional relationships. To quote Hilary Putnam, they cannot build upon the “shockingly simple” insight from Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty* that “a language game is only possible if one trusts something” or “relies on something” (“... dass ein Sprachspiel nur möglich ist, wenn man sich auf etwas verlässt. (Ich habe nicht gesagt ‘auf etwas verlassen kann’)”) (Putnam 1995: 177). Sceptics cannot, as Martin Hartmann puts it, rely on a “practice of trust”, which, because it cannot be defined as a practice and yet provides the context for rules and criteria, presupposes a “trust in practice”; a trust in the existence of a practice of trust. According to Hartmann, the vehemence of this vicious circle can be removed by giving the trust “a moderately existential character”, that means to the extent that one names it with recourse to what psychology calls “basic trust” (in German *Urvertrauen*) and phenomenology calls “trust in the world” (*Weltvertrauen*). Normally, as is well known, we rely on the fact that a building will not collapse, that the sun will rise and that our fellow men will not approach us with (very) evil actions. Hartmann initially rejects this manner of speaking because it fails to fulfil a basic condition of action, namely the featuring of options. Where we cannot act any differently because we have no alternative, we cannot trust. To this extent it does not really make sense to say that one trusts in the fact that the building one is entering will not collapse. But for Hartmann, as a trust *in practice*, basic trust or trust in the world is justified. We can do nothing other than to trust that those in whom we place our trust are actually pursuing our practical understanding of trust (see Hartmann 2011: 31, 71, 107, 114, 119, 311).

To the extent, then, that an aesthetic experience—that means, still closely following Kant: the interaction (*Zusammenspiel*) of our epistemic dimensions of experience, i.e. of sensuousness, imagination and reason—in other words: the interaction of affections-perceptions, imaginings and interpretations—permits us to conclude an interaction between the subject of the said experience and the world, such an aesthetic experience achieves an acknowledgement of the world as a whole. As an aesthetic practice, it reinforces that existential or ontological affirmation which we exercise in our various lifeworld, in particular ontogenetic-intersubjective practices. This is, however, as I have said already, an achievement of the aesthetic, and not solely the cineastic experience. Cineastic experiences restore our trust in the *modern* world; aesthetic experiences restore our trust in the world (as such).
5 A Last Remark: Trust and Love

Let me come back to Cavell for the last time. In his extraordinary book *The Claim of Reason* we can find an aphoristic—and beautiful—statement substituting the term “trust” by “love”. The context is Wittgenstein’s simulated discussion with a sceptic asking: “But, if you are certain, isn’t it that you are shutting your eyes in face of doubt?” (“Aber schließst du eben nicht nur vor dem Zweifel die Augen, wenn du sicher bist?”). Wittgenstein’s answer: “They are shut” (“Sie sind mir geschlossen”) is interpreted by Cavell in the following way:

‘They (my eyes) are shut’, as a resolution, or confession, says that one can, for one’s part, live in the face of doubt.—But doesn’t everyone, everyday?—It is something different to live *without* doubt, without so to speak the *threat* of scepticism. To live in the face of doubt, eyes happily shut, would be to fall in love with the world. For if there is a correct blindness, only love has it. (Cavell 1979b: 431)

Relationships of love, friendship and concern promote the practice of trust in a special way. They are felt by the subjects to be so necessary that they are apparently without alternative. But—as said above—where there is no alternative, there is no action and therefore no trust (trust needs the featuring of options, of acting differently). But it is well known that subjects do not feel it to be this way at all. It is precisely these relationships which are overwhelmingly deemed to be marked by trust. The situation here is thus another, and I follow Hartmann again: A loving being is namely “not a being which cannot act differently, it is a being which does not want to act differently”. With the event of the onset of love, the spontaneous “decision” is made “to not want to decide any longer” (Hartmann 2011: 97). Without really realising it, one has opted for trust.

Cavell reminds us that accepting the attitude of trust is meant as entering a practice under unlikely conditions. Cavell’s formulation, quoted above, is cautious, not to say: sceptic. “If” there is a solution at all, it “would be” the one of love, a special kind of trust. Without realising it, the sceptic would have fallen in love with the world, with existence, and would have opted for (not completely, but always partly) blind trust. In so doing he would become a true anti-sceptic, namely a practical one.
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