Disentangling processes of neighbourhood change: Towards a better understanding of upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands

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DISENTANGLING PROCESSES OF NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

Over recent decades, patterns of upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods have changed significantly in many Western cities. Many neighbourhoods have witnessed a transformation from disadvantaged areas with bad housing conditions to popular high-end neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, many neighbourhoods still face decline. This dissertation is about processes of upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands. The research explores the way in which processes of neighbourhood change manifest themselves, by addressing the relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change. In addition, this dissertation obtains insight into the way in which the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands contributes to these processes, by addressing goals and interventions of governing actors — the national government, local governments and housing associations — in generating neighbourhood upgrading and by exploring how residents have contributed to these processes through participating in decision-making processes in neighbourhood governance.

Towards a better understanding of upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands

Annalies Teernstra
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change

Towards a better understanding of upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands

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Voorwoord

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Over recent decades, upgrading and downgrading patterns have changed significantly in many Western cities. Many neighbourhoods have witnessed a transformation from disadvantaged areas with poor housing conditions to popular high-end neighbourhoods. Although this process of inner-city revaluation, or gentrification as it is called, was originally observed in just a small number of neighbourhoods (Glass, 1964), the process has extended significantly and is now seen as one of the biggest forces shaping contemporary cities (Lees et al., 2008; Doucet, 2014). Nevertheless, many neighbourhoods still face decline. Large housing estates in particular, which were planned and built in the urban periphery after the Second World War, have been associated with downgrading (Rowlands et al., 2009; Van Gent, 2009), although this has also been observed in centrally-located neighbourhoods.

Upgrading and downgrading processes have received a great deal of academic and professional attention and are without a doubt one of the most popular topics in urban studies (Lees et al., 2008). Different approaches can be identified in the literature, which focus on varying factors influencing upgrading and downgrading. The structural analysis of neighbourhood change started with ecological models of the Chicago School (Burgess, 1925/1974; Hoyt, 1939), which assumed that the general trend in neighbourhood change was downward: housing stock quality would decline over time and affluent households would consequently move away to higher-quality (newer) neighbourhoods and they would in turn be replaced by lower-income households. However, the models were challenged in the 1960s when a revaluation of historic, inner-city neighbourhoods was observed (Glass, 1964). Fifty years have passed since the coining of the term gentrification and its causes and consequences have been much debated ever since. Traditionally, gentrification was explained based on demand-side approaches where the preferences and decision-making processes of households were central (e.g. Ley, 1986; 1996; Hamnett, 1991; Butler and Robson, 2001), or supply-side approaches, which give the operation of housing markets and capital a key role (e.g. Smith, 1979; 1996).
scholars searched for an amalgamation of these approaches, Lees (2000, p. 390) argued that through this ‘theoretical logjam’, the role of institutional actors in gentrification had long been side-lined. Nevertheless, since the early 2000s, scholars increasingly focused on the role of policies and interventions of governing actors in gentrification (e.g. Wyly and Hammel, 2005; Lees, 2008; Uitermark et al., 2007).

This dissertation focuses on processes of upgrading and downgrading in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands. The aim of this research is twofold. The first objective is to acquire a better understanding of how processes of upgrading and downgrading manifest themselves, while the second aim is to gain insight into the way in which the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands contributes to these processes. These aims are related to two gaps which were identified in the literature on neighbourhood change.

Firstly, many studies about neighbourhood change present the development of neighbourhoods in an orderly progression. For instance, there are several – rather mechanistic – stage models in the gentrification literature that assume that gentrification passes through successive stages, which are characterized by different types of households moving in and out and different phases of physical improvement (e.g. Clay, 1979; Gale, 1979; Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Such models argue that social and physical neighbourhood change are closely related or even synonymous: socio-economic changes are assumed to go hand-in-hand with physical changes. Moreover, a key role is attributed to residential mobility, while incumbent processes – changes in the socio-economic status of sitting households – are often ignored. For instance, it is widely agreed that gentrification is driven by successive in-migration of high-income households, leading to the replacement of lower-income groups (e.g. Smith, 1996; Lees et al., 2008). At the same time, downgrading is often related to the in-migration of low-income and the out-migration of high-income households (e.g. Andersson and Brămå, 2004; Van Ham and Clark, 2009). Few studies actually untangle the relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change. This dissertation addresses these relationships in three Dutch cities and argues that processes of neighbourhood change are more differentiated than assumed.

Secondly, it was already acknowledged in the 1990s that processes of neighbourhood change could be very place-specific (Van Weesep, 1994). However, the role of context has long been side-lined in neighbourhood research, especially in
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gentrification studies. In this respect, Lees (2000; 2012) urged scholars to pay attention to the ‘geography of gentrification’, i.e. the spatial and temporal dimensions of gentrification. Despite growing attention to the context-dependency of neighbourhood change (Lees, 2012), most studies focus on Anglo-Saxon contexts – especially the US and UK – which are characterized by specific institutional arrangements, which differ from Continental-European countries, such as the Netherlands (Hochstenbach et al., 2014). Anglo-Saxon contexts are characterized by more liberal attitudes towards neighbourhood development and private capital often plays a central role. In contrast, many Continental-European countries have stronger welfare states, interventionist governments with their urban and housing policies and presence of social housing (Van Kempen and Murie, 2009). These institutional arrangements often lead to milder forms of upgrading and downgrading (Doucet, 2014). Therefore, neighbourhood change cannot be understood without addressing the role of governing actors.

While the role of governing actors in neighbourhood change has been addressed in highly-regulated contexts with strong traditions in neighbourhood interventions such as the Netherlands (e.g. Uitermark et al., 2007; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008; Van Gent, 2013), many studies only focus on one type of governing actor or treat governing actors as one group which are assumed to follow shared objectives in neighbourhood development. While these studies provided important insights into the relationship between governing actors and neighbourhood change, multiple actors are often involved in creating neighbourhood change, such as national and local governments, private developers and housing associations. In addition, governance arrangements increasingly provided room for residents to participate in decision-making processes. It is likely that the actors involved have different goals and priorities, leading to diverse outcomes in regeneration strategies and, consequently, differing processes of neighbourhood change. Moreover, upgrading and downgrading processes are not only context-dependent at the national scale, but also at the scale of the city or even the neighbourhood (Lees, 2000; 2012). So, this dissertation examines the way in which governing actors – the national government, local governments and housing associations – contribute to neighbourhood change in three neighbourhoods in two Dutch cities. The aim is to understand how goals of different actors in generating neighbourhood upgrading result in different regeneration strategies, to what extent residents have contributed to these strategies through participating in decision-making processes in neighbourhood governance, and how this resulted in different processes of neighbourhood change.
1.1 Studying neighbourhood change

The study of upgrading and downgrading has a long history: since the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars have been examining the trajectories, causes and consequences of neighbourhood change. This section starts by elaborating on the concepts of upgrading and downgrading. Then the relationship between residential and social mobility and neighbourhood change is discussed. This section concludes by discussing institutional approaches to neighbourhood change, as the aim of the second part of this dissertation is to gain insight into the way in which governing actors contribute to these processes.

1.1.1 Upgrading and downgrading

In the academic literature, processes of neighbourhood change often encompass a variety of changes to a neighbourhood’s socio-economic and/or physical environment (e.g. Grigsby et al., 1987; Musterd, 1991; Temkin and Rohe, 1996; Van Criekingen and Decroly, 2003; Aalbers, 2006; Lees et al., 2008). Downgrading may refer to a decline in a neighbourhood’s socio-economic status or educational level, a decline in the quality of the housing stock and public space, a decrease in a neighbourhood’s liveability or a drop in real estate values, a decline in amenities and facilities and/or a rise in the level of crime and nuisance. However, although many studies about neighbourhood change focus on only one of these dimensions (social or physical) (Walks and Maaranen, 2008a), they often assume a close relationship between social and physical changes (Grigsby et al., 1987). Empirical evidence investigating this relationship is consequently scarce. To be clear, downgrading may occur absolutely, or relative to city-wide changes (Lupton and Power, 2004). Furthermore, downgrading does not necessarily have to be measured objectively, as it can also be experienced subjectively, when residents or other actors have the feeling that their neighbourhood is experiencing a downward development (Aalbers, 2006).

Logically, upgrading then refers to an absolute or relative increase in a neighbourhood’s socio-economic and/or physical environment and can be measured both objectively or experienced subjectively. Since the 1960s, most – if not all – attention within upgrading studies has been paid to gentrification, which was originally defined as a spontaneous process in which individual homeowners restored dwellings in disinvested inner-city neighbourhoods (Glass, 1964). What nowadays constitutes gentrification,
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however, has evolved significantly (Lees et al., 2008; Doucet, 2014). In its broadest sense, gentrification can be defined as the “production of space for – and consumption by – a more affluent and very different incoming population” (Slater et al., 2004, p. 1145). This ‘incoming population’ is generally composed of young, highly-educated professionals, living in small-sized non-familial households and creating a neighbourhood ambience that reflects their tastes and values (Clay, 1979; Butler and Robson, 2001; Lees et al., 2008). Davidson and Lees (2005) suggest that the defining characteristics of gentrification should also include capital reinvestment, landscape change and direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups. However, nowadays gentrification takes many different forms, such as super-gentrification, new-build gentrification, family gentrification, rural gentrification and state-led gentrification (e.g. Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Davidson and Lees, 2005; Lees et al., 2008). So, it would be an understatement to argue that gentrification is a highly-differentiated concept.

1.1.2 Residential and social mobility and neighbourhood change

What most studies on neighbourhood change have in common is the key role they attribute to residential mobility in neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading, while incumbent processes – changes in the socio-economic status of sitting residents – are often overlooked. As early as the early twentieth century, scholars assumed a close relationship between residential mobility and neighbourhood change, when the structural analysis of neighbourhood change was initiated with ecological models of the Chicago School. Particularly well-known are the invasion and succession theory of Burgess (1925/1974) and the filtering theory of Hoyt (1939). Both theories argue that chain reactions in residential movement take place from low quality areas (city centre) to newer, higher-quality neighbourhoods. Burgess (1925/1974) assumed that this chain reaction was caused by an invasion of lower-income households into the lowest quality parts, leading to out-migration of sitting households towards higher-quality areas. Hoyt (1939) argued that chain reactions were caused by ageing of the housing stock, as the attractiveness of dwellings would decrease over time. This drove households to move to newer, higher-quality neighbourhoods. Although these approaches have been criticized, for instance, because there was a lack of attention to choices and preferences of households (Bassett and Short, 1980) and later gentrification studies showed a revaluation of aged neighbourhoods (Glass, 1964), these approaches have been quite influential. Although the causes and consequences of gentrification have been debated
ever since the term was coined by Ruth Glass (1964), residential mobility has been a defining characteristic of most – if not all – definitions of gentrification: it is widely agreed that gentrification is driven by successive in-migration of a ‘new’ group of residents (Clay, 1979; Smith, 1996; Lees et al., 2008). It is argued that these residents have high incomes, are highly-educated and possess high levels of social and cultural capital (Ley, 1996; Bridge, 2001; Butler and Robson, 2001). In addition, there have been a large number of studies focusing on out-migrants of gentrifying neighbourhoods, which argued that gentrification led to negative effects such as displacement of low-income households (Atkinson, 2000; Newman and Wyly, 2006; Lees, 2008). Nevertheless, other scholars challenged displacement by arguing that out-migrants often left the neighbourhood voluntarily (Freeman, 2005; McKinnish et al., 2010). A central role has also been attributed within downgrading studies to residential mobility: downgrading is often related to selective in-migration of low-income and out-migration of high-income households, and high mobility is often seen as a trigger of neighbourhood decline (see for instance Andersson and Bråmå, 2004; Van Ham and Clark, 2009).

What many studies tend to overlook is that neighbourhood change may also occur as a result of incumbent processes. This is largely due to a lack of data: most studies use aggregated data to examine neighbourhood change, which makes it difficult to distinguish whether neighbourhood change occurs by in-, out- or non-migrants (Lupton and Power, 2004). Incumbent processes of neighbourhood change can firstly relate to a physical process in which households (re)invest in the housing stock of their neighbourhood (Clay, 1979; Galster, 1987; Van Criekingen and Decroley, 2003). Clay (1979) argues that incumbent upgrading in terms of physical investments is important as it reflects neighbourhood confidence. On the other hand, incumbent processes can relate to changes in the socio-economic status of sitting households of a neighbourhood (Grigsby et al., 1987; McKinnish et al., 2010). Although there is little empirical evidence of socio-economic changes of sitting households, some exceptions can be made. For instance, McKinnish et al. (2010) showed that non-migrants possess higher income levels than in-migrants and consequently suggested the existence of incumbent upgrading. Furthermore, Bailey (2012) demonstrated that – among other factors – changes in the socio-economic status of sitting residents mitigated the effects of mobility on spatial segregation patterns.
1.1.3 Institutional approaches to neighbourhood change

In many countries, especially within Continental Europe, housing regimes and neighbourhood development are – to a certain degree – regulated by governmental institutions. In such contexts, it is therefore important to take the role of governing actors into account in understanding neighbourhood change (Van Kempen and Özüekren, 1998; Bolt et al., 2008). Although the role of governing actors has long been side-lined in gentrification research (Lees, 2000), institutional approaches in neighbourhood change in general date back to the 1960s, when Rex and Moore (1967) introduced their managerialist approach. They introduced the concept of ‘housing classes’, which determine the accessibility of housing markets. This study was influential because it paid attention to mechanisms determining the accessibility of housing markets (Meulenbelt, 1997; Van Kempen and Özüekren, 1998). In addition to a household’s socio-economic status, Rex and Moore argued that accessibility is determined by allocation rules of public and private actors. The managerialist approach was extended by Pahl (1975; 1983), who emphasized the role of ‘gatekeepers’ in housing markets, which may be, for instance, (local) governments, housing associations, estate agents or real estate developers. The argument is that gatekeepers influence housing allocation and production in owner-occupied, privately rented and socially rented housing. As a result, gatekeepers determine which households move into which dwellings and consequently impact processes of neighbourhood change. This dissertation focuses on the role of the national government, local governments and housing associations in generating neighbourhood change, as these are the most important ‘gatekeepers’ in the context of the Netherlands. The remainder of this section therefore discusses the role of these actors in more detail.

Firstly, governmental actors strongly influence tenure structures of housing markets. Especially in highly-regulated contexts such as the Netherlands and Sweden, the government has provided large numbers of social housing for low-income households (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008; Andersson and Turner, 2014). Allocation criteria, such as income level, household characteristics and time of registration, determine the type of household that moves into a neighbourhood. Neighbourhoods with large proportions of social housing have often been associated with downgrading, due to high proportions of low-income households and related social problems (see for instance Rowlands et al., 2009; Van Gent, 2009; Posthumus, 2013).
Secondly, at the scale of the neighbourhood, national and local governments influence neighbourhood change through area-based regeneration policies and interventions, both in Anglo-Saxon and Continental-European contexts – albeit in different forms and intensity (see for instance Andersson and Musterd, 2005; Wyly and Hammel, 2005; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008; Lees, 2008). From the 1980s onwards, regeneration policies and interventions increasingly had a pro-gentrification character: both in North-America and Europe, encouraging higher-income households to move into low-income neighbourhoods has become a popular policy goal (Lees, 2008). This process is referred to as ‘state-led gentrification’\(^1\). The promotion of gentrification by governmental actors has been linked to processes of rescaling and fragmentation of the state as a result of neo-liberalization (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002). Neo-liberalization was characterized by a shift towards market-oriented and market-dependent approaches, and policies shifted towards liberalization and reductions in funding for welfare and affordable housing. Although neo-liberalization is at work in many countries, there are differences between contexts in terms of pace, intensity and effects (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Through the presence of stronger welfare states and interventionist governments, neo-liberalization has been mild in Continental-Europe compared to Anglo-Saxon contexts (Van Kempen and Murie, 2009; Doucet, 2014). Again in these contexts, governing actors nevertheless increasingly adopted gentrification as a regeneration strategy. For example, in the Netherlands, neighbourhood regeneration strategies shifted from focusing on providing affordable housing to stimulating socio-economic differentiation, based on the assumption that this leads to less segregated neighbourhoods (Uitermark et al., 2007; Lees, 2008; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008).

Besides governments, institutional actors such as housing associations have also been identified as important actors in generating neighbourhood change. In a number of countries, housing associations have been selling off parts of their social housing stock, thereby stimulating gentrification. A well-known example is the United Kingdom, where housing associations privatized a significant proportion of social housing, made possible by the Right-to-Buy legislation (Van Gent, 2010b). A similar tendency has been observed

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\(^1\) Instead of ‘state-led gentrification’, these policies and interventions have also been referred to as ‘social mixing’, ‘urban revitalization’ or ‘urban renaissance’. While the terms in fact refer to similar processes (bringing higher-income people into low-income neighbourhoods), the latter are less loaded with a class-based tone. Consequently, these terms are favoured by policymakers and scholars who take a less critical or class-based view of the process (Lees, 2008; Bridge et al., 2012; Doucet, 2014).
in Sweden (Andersson and Turner, 2014). In the Netherlands, housing associations have also been important actors in generating neighbourhood change. This was related to their deregulation in 1995, which implied that financial support of the government disappeared (Blessing, 2013). As the maintenance and construction of social housing are unprofitable investments, housing associations have to generate income from commercial activities such as selling off social housing and conversion of social housing into privately rented housing. Thereby, housing associations became important actors in encouraging gentrification (Priemus, 2003).

Finally, residents have increasingly been included as ‘stakeholders’ in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading (Kokx and Van Kempen, 2009; Bailey, 2010). Opportunities for residents to participate in policy arenas have been linked to the shift from government to governance as a result of neoliberalization, which created opportunities for actors, such as private developers and housing associations, to participate in neighbourhood governance. These local partnerships usually also include some form of resident participation (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2003; Taylor, 2007; Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008), as it is thought that it creates opportunities and benefits for both residents and other stakeholders (Robinson et al., 2005; Taylor, 2007).

This research starts from the premise that a better understanding is needed about the different actors involved in neighbourhood governance to understand institutional approaches to neighbourhood change.

1.2 Research questions

This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part explores and disentangles patterns of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands, while the second part provides insight into the way in which governing actors contribute to neighbourhood change. The first part explores patterns of social and physical upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods and aims to provide insight into the relationship between these processes in three Dutch cities: Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg. The first research question is therefore:

(1) What is the relationship between processes of social and physical upgrading and downgrading of urban neighbourhoods?
The first part also aims to gain insight into the relationship between residential and social mobility and neighbourhood change in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg. Accordingly, the second research question is:

(2) What is the relationship between neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading and residential and social mobility of residents?

The relationship between the first and second research question is visualised in a conceptual schematic diagram in Figure 1.1.

The goal of the second part of this dissertation is to explore the way in which governing actors contribute to neighbourhood change. The aim is firstly to provide insight into goals of different governing actors – the national government, local governments and housing associations – in generating neighbourhood upgrading, to understand to what extent these goals vary between actors and how this results in diverse processes of neighbourhood change. This part focuses on the neighbourhoods of Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam and Rustenburg in The Hague and starts from the premise that processes of neighbourhood change can be very place-specific. The third research question is:

(3) What are goals of governing actors for policies and interventions in generating neighbourhood upgrading and how do different goals result in place-specific regeneration strategies and diverse processes of neighbourhood change?

The final research question focuses on how the inclusion of residents in decision-making processes of governing actors has provided opportunities for residents to influence neighbourhood regeneration strategies, and aims to understand how residents consequently contributed to neighbourhood change. This part focuses on the neighbourhood of Transvaal in Amsterdam. The final research question is:

(4) How and to what degree have residents been included in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading and to what extent have residents thereby contributed to neighbourhood change?
A conceptual schematic diagram visualizing the relationship between the third and fourth research question is presented in Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1** Conceptual schematic diagram of the relationships between the research questions of this dissertation.

1.3 **Research data and methods**

This dissertation consists of an embedded case-study using mixed methods. The first part is a citywide analysis of neighbourhood change, as it addresses processes of upgrading and downgrading in the cities of Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg and makes use of quantitative research data and methods. The second part concerns a neighbourhood analysis, as it focuses on the role of governing actors and resident participation in neighbourhood upgrading and makes use of a combination of qualitative data and methods.

1.3.1 **Quantitative data and methods**

*Data*

In order to explore and disentangle patterns of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading and residential mobility, data was used from the Social Statistical Database (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands and from Kadaster, a government agency that compiles all real estate transactions in the Netherlands. The SSD includes data on the entire
registered population for the period 1999 to 2008\textsuperscript{2} and registers data on income from employment, benefits and pensions, as well as residential trajectories and individual and household characteristics such as ethnicity, age and gender. The data which was used was based on all individuals in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg\textsuperscript{3}. Data at neighbourhood level was obtained by aggregating individual data.

The dataset of Kadaster contains transaction values of owner-occupied housing, as well as rental units converted to owner-occupied housing, for the period 1999 to 2006. Transaction values are included for different types of housing (apartments, terraced houses, corner houses, detached houses and semi-detached houses), averaged at the neighbourhood level. One constraint of using this dataset is that real estate values of social housing are not included. However, Visser and Van Dam (2006) observed that social housing does not significantly influence real estate values, although this may vary regionally. Another constraint is that the dataset does not include square metre values, as real estate values are based on the sale price of different types of housing.

The national neighbourhood classification is the lowest geographical level at which neighbourhood data of Statistics Netherlands and Kadaster are available. In addition, regeneration strategies of governing actors often focused on the national spatial units classification. This was also the case in this dissertation’s case studies. For these reasons, this dissertation adheres to this classification. The neighbourhoods of the national classification are generally socially and physically homogeneous areas that are often clearly delimited by streets, railroad lines or waterways (Statistics Netherlands, 2010). The boundaries are determined by municipalities. As Amsterdam is the largest and most densely populated city, the average neighbourhood population is highest: 11,781 inhabitants (2011). Tilburg and The Hague have an average neighbourhood population of respectively 6729 and 6008 inhabitants. However, the neighbourhoods vary in size: from a population of 150 to two neighbourhoods with over 20,000 inhabitants.

Social upgrading and downgrading

Social upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods are often measured through examining income data (e.g. Grigsby et al., 1987; Musterd, 1991; Bourne, 1993; Meulentbelt, 1997; Hulchanski, 2010). A number of studies have also addressed

\textsuperscript{2} However, at the time of writing chapter 2, data of the SSD was only available for the period 1999 to 2006.

\textsuperscript{3} Although institutional households are excluded, as well as people who were born or died between 1999 and 2008.
occupational, educational and/or unemployment data (e.g. Butler and Robson, 2001; Ley, 2003; Walks and Maaranen, 2008b; Kitchen and Williams, 2009; Davidson and Lees, 2010). In gentrification studies in particular, occupational and educational data are often used, as gentrification is associated with the emergence of a new middle-class working in the tertiary or quaternary sector (Hamnett, 1991). This dissertation measures social upgrading and downgrading by examining income data, as the level of earnings mainly drives the consumption sector and generally determines choice in housing and neighbourhoods (Bourne, 1993). Moreover, educational and occupational data are not available at neighbourhood level in the Netherlands.

This dissertation uses ‘standardised net income per household’ as the key indicator (averaged per neighbourhood), as it corrects for differences in size and composition of households of a neighbourhood. Incomes are converted to that of a household of one person, which facilitates comparison between neighbourhoods. Standardized net income per household is calculated through dividing the total net household income (from work, benefits and pensions) by an equivalence factor\(^4\), derived from Statistics Netherlands.

Social upgrading and downgrading are measured relative to city-wide change. This can be explained by the fact that standardised net household incomes increased significantly between 1999 and 2008: from 14,302 to 19,294 in Amsterdam, from 14,888 to 19,566 in The Hague and from 14,530 to 18,651 in Tilburg. Income levels of all neighbourhoods increased simultaneously, so nearly every neighbourhood would be classified as upgrading when it would be measured absolutely. Yet, neighbourhoods have hierarchical positions within cities, as incomes in some neighbourhoods increased faster than in others. Since this research is concerned with changes in this hierarchy, social upgrading and downgrading are measured in comparison with other neighbourhoods.

Social upgrading and downgrading are calculated as follows: social grading=(mean neighbourhood income in year x/mean neighbourhood income in year y)/(mean city income in year x/mean city income in year y). A neighbourhood was classified as upgrading when the growth of the neighbourhood income is more than half a standard deviation above the growth of the mean city income between 1999 and 2008\(^5\). A neighbourhood was deemed to be downgrading when the growth of its income level was more than half a standard deviation below the average city level. When the growth of the

\[^4\] The formula for the equivalence factor, E, is: E=[A+(0.8*C)]\(^0.5\), where A is the number of adults and C the number of children in a household (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).

\[^5\] 2006 in chapter 2.
income level was between half a standard deviation below and above the average city level, a neighbourhood was considered to be keeping in pace with the city’s overall development.

ArcMap was used to produce maps that display patterns of social upgrading and downgrading in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg.

**Physical upgrading and downgrading**

Although most studies on neighbourhood change focus on the socio-economic dimension of neighbourhoods, a number of scholars examined the physical dimension as well. Some scholars studied changes in the built environment, for instance, in terms of the percentage of renovated housing or the evolution of the mean rent level (e.g. Musterd, 1991; Hammel and Wyly, 1996; Van Crieckingen and Decroly, 2003). Others examined tenure conversions from rent to owner-occupancy (e.g. Boterman and Van Gent, 2014) or changes in the real estate value of dwellings (e.g. Musterd and Van der Oord, 2008; Walks and Maaranen, 2008a). This dissertation measures physical upgrading and downgrading by examining real estate data.

Physical upgrading and downgrading were calculated for different types of dwelling; next, the weighted average of the real estate value per dwelling type was calculated. The data was checked for extreme outliers and, in order to ensure reliability, a minimum of 30 transactions was required for each neighbourhood. In addition, two three-year periods were compared. The first period was based on transaction values from 1998 to 2000, with a total of 48,516 transactions in the three urban cores. The second period was based on values from 2005 to 2007, with a total of 59,149 transactions. These periods are referred to as 1999 and 2006.

Physical neighbourhood changes are calculated in the same way as social neighbourhood change: physical grading=\(\frac{\text{mean neighbourhood real estate value in year } x}{\text{mean neighbourhood real estate value in year } y}/\frac{\text{mean city real estate value in year } x}{\text{mean city real estate value in year } y}\). A neighbourhood was defined as upgrading when the growth of the neighbourhood real estate is more than half a standard deviation above the growth of the mean city real estate value between 1999 and 2006. When the growth of the real estate value was more than half a standard deviation below the average city level, the neighbourhood was considered to be downgrading. A neighbourhood was classified as keeping in pace with the city’s overall development when the growth of the real estate value was between half a standard deviation below and above the average city level.
ArcMap was used to produce maps that display patterns of physical upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg.

Residential mobility
The second research question addresses the relationship between social upgrading and downgrading and residential mobility. Residential mobility reflects the percentage of individuals that moved to another neighbourhood between 1999 and 2008. Neighbourhoods were classified as ‘high mobility’ when the percentage of individuals moving was half a standard deviation above the citywide percentage of individuals that moved. When the percentage of individuals that moved was half a standard deviation below the citywide level, the neighbourhood was classified as ‘low mobility’. When the percentage of individuals that moved was between half a standard deviation above and below the citywide percentage, the neighbourhood was classified as ‘average mobility’.

In addition, income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants of neighbourhoods were examined and related to neighbourhood income development. So, incomes of all in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants were calculated and aggregated to the neighbourhood level for each year. Moreover, in order to provide a better understanding of the contribution of in- and out-migrants to neighbourhood change, income developments of in-migrants after in-migration and of out-migrants before out-migration were examined.

1.3.2 Qualitative data and methods
In order to address the third and fourth research question, a combination of qualitative data and methods was used. These include semi-structured interviews with urban and housing professionals and residents in a selected number of neighbourhoods. In addition, participant observation in the neighbourhoods was conducted, consisting of informal conversations with residents and attendance of neighbourhood activities. Moreover, the research drew on analysis of written resources, such as policy documents of the national and local government and housing associations concerning the regeneration of neighbourhoods and resident participation, and the analysis of local websites and newspapers.

Semi-structured interviews were held with 27 urban professionals and 6 residents and focused on the period 1999-2013. In general, the interviews lasted about 90 minutes.

6 Neighbourhoods constructed after 1999 are excluded.
All interviews were recorded, fully transcribed and analysed using the statistical software program Atlas.ti. The urban and housing professionals are (or were) employed at the Municipality of Amsterdam (5 respondents), Municipality of The Hague (7 respondents), housing associations (14 respondents) and a welfare institution in Amsterdam (1 respondent). The professionals are (or were) employed at different spatial scales – from strategic to very practical – in order to obtain a comprehensive and diverse selection of respondents. Appendix A provides a more detailed overview of the respondents.

Interviews with urban and housing professionals addressed the following topics: (1) perceived development of the neighbourhood over the past decades; (2) policies and interventions of actors involved; (3) goals and motivations for these policies and interventions; (4) how and to what degree residents have been involved in the initiation, formulation and implementation of the policies and interventions; and (5) perceived effects of their policies and interventions on the neighbourhood and those of other actors. Appendix B provides a topic list of the interviews with urban professionals.

Interviews with residents addressed the following topics: (1) resident participation in the neighbourhood in general; (2) participation activities of the resident in particular; (3) respondents’ evaluation of how and to what degree residents were involved in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading; and (4) respondents’ evaluation of how and to what degree residents have consequently contributed to neighbourhood change. Appendix B provides a topic list of the interviews with residents.

1.4 Research cases

1.4.1 Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg

The first part of this dissertation explores patterns of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading in three Dutch cities: Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg (Figure 1.2). These cities were selected for two reasons. Firstly, the Municipalities of Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg – as well as Platform Corpovenista7, Platform31 and Kadaster – participated in the overall research project of which this dissertation forms a part. Together with the University of Amsterdam, these organizations formed a research

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7 Platform Corpovenista is a collaboration between 14 Dutch housing associations, focusing on research and sharing knowledge concerning urban and neighbourhood development.
consortium of the project entitled *Changing households and ‘functions’ of neighbourhoods* (see Musterd et al., forthcoming).

Second, Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg are different types of cities. Amsterdam and The Hague are located in the metropolitan region called the Randstad. Amsterdam is the largest and The Hague is the third-largest city in the Netherlands, with a population of about 800,000 and 505,000 inhabitants respectively (2013). Tilburg is located in the south of the Netherlands and has a population of about 208,000 inhabitants. Tilburg is consequently a medium-sized Dutch city.

Table 1.1 presents key characteristics of the three cities. In addition to variations in size and location, the cities have different social, economic and housing market contexts. Amsterdam is characterized by a large social housing sector: 47 percent of the housing stock consists of social housing, while respectively 28 and 25 percent are privately rented and owner-occupied (2012). Amsterdam is known for its strong economic position and the city is characterized by significant commercial and service industries (Musterd et al., 2006). Not surprisingly, the housing market is generally characterized by high demand and in no other Dutch city gentrification is as visible as it is in Amsterdam.

The Hague is characterized by a comparatively smaller social housing stock: 33 percent of the housing stock is socially rented, while respectively 19 and 46 percent are privately rented and owner-occupied. When compared to Amsterdam, this implies that governing actors have fewer possibilities to intervene in the housing stock. The Hague is one of the most segregated cities of the Netherlands, with both poor and affluent neighbourhoods (Bolt et al., 2002; Pinkster, 2006). The Hague is the governmental centre of the Netherlands and its labour market is characterized by an extensive public sector.

Similar to The Hague, Tilburg’s social housing stock is comparatively small (33 percent), while respectively 10 and 57 percent are privately rented and owner-occupied. Tilburg is strongly characterized by its industrial past. The city emerged from a conglomeration of smaller villages and consequently lacks a major historical centre. Although the economy has diversified since the 1960s, it still focuses on manufacturing and transport. Compared to Amsterdam and The Hague, Tilburg’s housing market is characterized by lower demand and lower prices. From this perspective, Tilburg offers an interesting opportunity to explore to what extent gentrification has ‘trickled down’ the urban hierarchy.
Figure 1.2 Location of Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg in the Netherlands

![Map of The Netherlands showing locations of Amsterdam, The Hague, and Tilburg]

Source: Statistics Netherlands (own adaptation)

Table 1.1 Characteristics of the cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>The Hague</th>
<th>Tilburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population core city (2013)</td>
<td>799,275</td>
<td>505,855</td>
<td>208,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing stock (2012, in %)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially rented</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately rented</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate value (2009, in euro)</td>
<td>293,499</td>
<td>207,362</td>
<td>210,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income¹ (2008, in euro)</td>
<td>19,294</td>
<td>19,566</td>
<td>18,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic background (2013, in %)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Standardized net household income from work, benefit and pensions.

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Kadaster, O&S Amsterdam, Municipality of The Hague and Municipality of Tilburg.
1.4.2 Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg

The third research question addresses the role of governing actors in generating neighbourhood upgrading in three centrally-located, pre-war constructed neighbourhoods: Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam (Figure 1.3) and Rustenburg in The Hague (Figure 1.4). These neighbourhoods were selected because they had – to some extent – similar positions in the 1990s: the neighbourhoods were characterized by a weak position in the housing market and low socio-economic status. These neighbourhoods have consequently been subjected to state-led gentrification initiatives by local government and housing associations. An important difference between Transvaal and Oosterpark, on the one hand, and Rustenburg, on the other hand, is that Transvaal and Oosterpark are characterized by a large social housing stock (respectively 67 and 61 percent, 2012), while Rustenburg’s housing stock is dominated by owner-occupied housing (61 percent). These differences impact the extent to which governing actors are able to intervene in these neighbourhoods, as chapter 4 demonstrates.

Finally, the fourth research question addresses the role of residents in the shaping of regeneration strategies in the neighbourhood of Transvaal in Amsterdam. During Transvaal’s regeneration, varying forms of resident participation were introduced, ranging from top-down organized participation to bottom-up initiatives. Transvaal therefore provides an interesting case to explore how the organization of resident participation has changed and what this has meant for the opportunities of residents to influence regeneration plans and subsequent processes of neighbourhood change.

1.5 Reading guide

This dissertation consists of four empirical studies, each addressing a different research question. These studies are described in the following chapters. The relationships between the chapters are indicated in Figure 1.5. All studies have been published in or submitted to an international peer-reviewed journal and were copied in full in this dissertation.

Chapter 2 unscrambles the relationship between social and physical upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in the urban regions of Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg. The findings of this chapter indicate that social and physical neighbourhood change develop simultaneously in only a relatively small number of neighbourhoods,

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8 However, a number of minor alterations were made in chapter 2, as this chapter has been published in an American journal. As a result, the text has been translated from American into British English.
Figure 1.3 Location of Oosterpark and Transvaal in Amsterdam

Figure 1.4 Location of Rustenburg in The Hague
which are found at the top and bottom of the housing market hierarchy, while the majority of the neighbourhoods demonstrate a more complex relationship.

Chapter 3 explores the relationship between residential mobility and neighbourhood change. This chapter examines income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants of neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg. The findings demonstrate that in- and out-migration are not the only processes at work and that changes in the socio-economic status of non-migrants are of importance in processes of upgrading and downgrading as well.

Chapter 4 addresses the role of governing actors in generating neighbourhood upgrading in Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam and Rustenburg in The Hague. This chapter demonstrates that power inequalities between actors involved, and the different objectives and priorities of actors result in processes of negotiation. This leads to diverse regeneration strategies and, as a result, varying processes of neighbourhood change.

Chapter 5 explores how and to what degree residents have been included in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading and to what extent residents have consequently contributed to neighbourhood change. This chapter focuses on Transvaal in Amsterdam and shows that despite urban professionals’ high ambitions about resident participation and the establishment of varying mechanisms, residents’ achievements in shaping long-term, strategic policy plans for neighbourhood upgrading remain limited.

Finally, chapter 6 synthesizes the findings of the previous chapters, reflects on the findings and discusses directions for future research.

**Figure 1.5** Conceptual schematic diagram of the relationships between the chapters.
Puzzling patterns in neighbourhood change: upgrading and downgrading in highly-regulated urban housing markets

Abstract
This study disentangles the relationship between income and real estate value development in Dutch urban neighbourhoods. Within the literature on upgrading and downgrading, it is often assumed that neighbourhood income and real estate value development are strongly linked. The results reported here – based on research in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Tilburg – indicate that income and real estate values develop simultaneously in only a relatively small number of neighbourhoods, which are at the top and bottom of the housing market hierarchy. The majority reveal a more complex relationship: a number of neighbourhoods show a time lag between the trends, whereas in other neighbourhoods income and real estate values show partially diverging trends. Several tentative explanations are offered for the complex relationship and stress the importance of place-specific knowledge. Three points of attention are suggested for further research: understanding the role of household dynamics, the position of neighbourhoods within their urban system and the role of the state and housing associations in neighbourhood change.

2.1 Introduction
Processes of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading, in terms of income and/or real estate values, have received a great deal of academic and professional interest. Before the 1960s, most studies focused on downgrading processes (e.g. Burgess, 1925/1974;
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change

Hoyt, 1939). These ‘classic’ studies assumed that the general trend in neighbourhood change was downward: once a neighbourhood was fully developed, the quality of its housing stock would decline over time. Affluent households would be replaced by lower-income households and eventually the neighbourhood would fall into disrepair. Neighbourhood change in other directions was generally ignored, but in the 1960s a revaluation of inner-city working-class neighbourhoods was initiated, with a special focus on young single or dual households (Glass, 1964). Over the past several decades, the gentrification process has been recognized as a process that not only spreads to neighbourhoods adjacent to the original gentrifying neighbourhoods, but also to other (smaller) cities (Lees et al., 2008). However, gentrification is but one form of socioeconomic and real estate upgrading, taking place when in-migrants are of higher socioeconomic status than out-migrants together with a reinvestment of building capital (Clark, 1992). Under this definition, gentrification is only one among several distinct processes of neighbourhood change (Clay, 1979; Walks and Maaranen, 2008a). Neighbourhood change may also be related to the in-place population or occur without reinvestment, which is referred to as incumbent upgrading (Clay, 1979). Yet, despite the appearance of upgrading and gentrification, downgrading may still occur, often because an upward trend in one area implies a process of (relative) downgrading elsewhere within the urban area.

Most studies on neighbourhood change use socioeconomic data to assess its status according to criteria such as income, occupation, educational attainment or unemployment data (e.g. Musterd, 1991; Bourne, 1993; Kitchen and Williams, 2009; Mikelbank, 2011). A number of scholars have also examined the physical dimension, by studying changes in the built environment, for example in terms of the percentage of renovated housing or the evolution of the mean rent level (Musterd, 1991; Hammel and Wyly, 1996; Van Crieckingen and Decroly, 2003). Others examine the real estate values of dwellings (Musterd and Van der Oord, 2008; Walks and Maaranen, 2008a). Within neighbourhood studies and especially gentrification studies, it is often assumed that socioeconomic and housing market changes are related and perhaps even synonymous. More specifically, it is assumed that a rise or decline in the real estate value of a residential property covaries with a rise or decline in the income level of a neighbourhood and vice versa. However, few studies actually focus on how these processes relate to one another; we still know very little about this relationship and it is unclear which process dominates in the shaping of neighbourhood change.
Another characteristic of studies on neighbourhood change is their focus on market-dominated urban contexts, in which private capital and investment play a major role in a neighbourhood’s income and real estate value development. Consequently, upgrading and downgrading are portrayed as spontaneous processes of supply and demand. But in Western European cities, the state and other non-market institutions play a leading role in development and regulation of many spheres of life, including those of neighbourhoods and housing markets (Le Galès, 2002; Häussermann and Haila, 2005; Kazepov, 2005; Van Kempen and Murie, 2009; Van Gent, 2010a). The regulation and control of housing markets, the legacy of publicly funded social housing and the presence of interventionist urban policies imply that spontaneous upgrading and downgrading processes may not be that easily observable in Western European cities. As a result, the relationship between income and real estate value development may be influenced by government intervention as well as general neighbourhood change.

This article seeks to address this caveat in the literature by exploring and disentangling the relationship between income and real estate value development in Dutch urban neighbourhoods and providing tentative explanations for observed trends that cannot be attributed to spontaneous processes of supply and demand. These explanations may serve as a first step toward a new research agenda concerning studies of neighbourhood change. The following research questions will be addressed:

1. What patterns of upgrading and downgrading of income and real estate values can we observe at the neighbourhood level in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Tilburg between 1999 and 2006?
2. How are income and real estate upgrading and downgrading patterns related to each other over time?

The first question is mainly focused on spatial patterns of upgrading and downgrading between two fixed points in time; the second question examines the temporal relationship of the neighbourhood processes. The latter also investigates trends more closely to see if the processes occur simultaneously or diverge.

The study is structured as follows. First, essential literature on upgrading and downgrading will be discussed and evaluated, focusing on the assumed relationship between income and real estate values in the relevant literatures. Next, following a section on methodology, the results of the analyses will be presented in two parts to
address each research question separately. The final section will reflect on how successfully traditional approaches to upgrading and downgrading can explain neighbourhood change and three points of attention for future research will be suggested.

2.2 Theories on neighbourhood change

Within the body of studies that treat upgrading, downgrading and gentrification, a distinction can be made between traditional, demand-side, supply-side and institutional approaches. This section will briefly discuss those approaches as it focuses on the assumed sequential relationship between income and real estate value development at the neighbourhood level.

To begin with, neighbourhood change was an important topic of study for the early-20th-century Chicago School. Most relevant is the filtering theory of Hoyt (1939) that discusses the relationship between income and real estate development. In short, he assumed that social changes would be preceded by physical changes: the aging of the housing stock signals the onset of real estate value downgrading and households with sufficient capital begin to move to higher-quality areas. Consequently, the stature of the neighbourhood declines relative to other (newer) neighbourhoods as lower-income newcomers can increasingly afford the vacated dwellings. This leads to income downgrading, but filtering theory cannot provide a satisfactory explanation. Later gentrification studies demonstrate the revaluation of aged neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, households are not as mobile as assumed, and increases in income may not necessarily result in a move (Bassett and Short, 1980).

Demand-side approaches explain neighbourhood change as the result of migration decisions by households (Bassett and Short, 1980). People reside in neighbourhoods and dwellings that best match their socioeconomic status and needs. Tensions resulting from differences in characteristics of households, dwellings and neighbourhoods may trigger a move. The life-cycle approach, for instance, links such residential decisions to stages in a family’s life cycle (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Gentrification studies emphasize the importance of economic and cultural capital (e.g. Bridge, 2001; Butler and Robson, 2001). The latter claim that middle-class households move into disinvesting working-class neighbourhoods as a means to acquire cultural and economic capital and to distinguish them from other middle-class households.
Most demand-side approaches centre on socioeconomic differentiation and do not consider physical neighbourhood aspects. In the gentrification literature, however, stage models describing the gentrification processes focus on both socioeconomic and physical aspects (Clay, 1979; Gale, 1979). Such models assume that physical changes are preceded by social changes. In the first stage, ‘pioneers’ move into disinvested working-class neighbourhoods, generally with incomes similar to those of working-class households. By investing their own labour in the upkeep of dwellings, the attractiveness of dwellings and neighbourhood increases. This increased attractiveness in turn lures higher-income households and thereby produces income upgrading. Further renovation and increased popularity initiates real estate upgrading. In later stages, investments by professionals propel further increases in real estate values and the attraction of more higher-income households into the neighbourhood (Clay, 1979).

Supply-side approaches explain neighbourhood change as a result of the operation of housing markets and the role of capital (Hamnett, 1991). These approaches complement demand-side studies, which tend to overemphasize the role of households as the sole actors in the local housing market (Bassett and Short, 1980) and lack attention for the supply of dwellings and accessibility aspects (Hamnett and Randolph, 1988). The rent gap theory of Smith (1979) stresses the relationship between land and property value. The assumption is that social changes are preceded by physical changes: if the potential ground rent of a neighbourhood is higher than the real ground rent, real estate upgrading will take place as a result of investment in the built environment. This attracts higher-income households. Although influential, this theory does not adequately explain neighbourhood change. In many redeveloping urban areas, the rent gap has never reached the critical point of investment. Redevelopment and subsequent change may be subsidized either by unpaid labour (sweat equity) or by the state, or entirely by state-related institutions (Lauria, 1982). Furthermore, the theory is based on market-dominated conditions and thus only with a relatively small role for government intervention.

Institutional approaches emphasize regulations and the intervention of agents such as governments and housing associations (Pahl, 1970; Robson, 1975; Bassett and Short, 1980). The theories discussed above are mostly based on market-dominated contexts, whereby private capital and investment play major roles in neighbourhood development. However, particularly in Western Europe, the state and other non-market institutions also play an important role in neighbourhood development. Through intervention, social
changes will be preceded by physical changes. Renovation, demolition of public housing and construction of owner-occupied housing cause real estate values to increase. Usually, only higher-income households can afford such dwellings, which leads to income upgrading. In addition, institutional action can be expressed in the form of regulation. For instance, public housing is generally only available to lower-income households, so the influx of such households into public housing may produce income downgrading, with real estate values remaining unaffected.

2.3 Findings of housing and real estate studies

While dealing with real estate values, the literature on neighbourhood change is often focused on social change at the neighbourhood level. Conversely, for housing and real estate studies the emphasis is on real estate values. Here, it is often assumed that income and real estate values are both strongly linked and highly sensitive to each other (e.g. Hort, 1998; Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004; Moos and Skaburskis, 2010). Yet, income is seen as only one factor among many. It should come as no surprise that housing characteristics such as quality, floor space, dwelling type and number of rooms are quite important in determining real estate values (Spit and Needham, 1987; Boelhouwer et al., 2000). However, the spatial rootedness of housing implies that environmental factors play a role too. Gaddy and Hart (1993) argued that real estate values are created and developed by four kinds of interrelated externalities: physical, political, economic and social. First, physical externalities refer to topographic features; in terms of neighbourhood attributes, these may include urban design and location. Second, political externalities entail the institutional framework of tax, building and housing regulations. Contrary to federal states such as the United States, this framework is largely the same for neighbourhoods in the Netherlands; only area-based policies may unevenly affect values among neighbourhoods. Third, the economic situation is always important. In periods of economic growth with rising wages, there is higher demand for housing, which results in a general increase in real estate values (Boelhouwer et al., 2000); at the same time, spill-over demand occurs in weak neighbourhoods, usually those located near high-demand areas (Aalbers, 2003; see also Porter, 2011). Rising incomes allow households to spend more on their dwellings and can result in a greater demand for dwellings as well as a scarcity of available housing. Consequently, real estate values are likely to increase. And fourth, social externalities refer to general demographic changes
in population and household composition. At the neighbourhood level, this may refer to the level of social efficacy (e.g. safety levels in Visser and Van Dam, 2006). In such cases, a level of social organization may be capitalized in higher real estate values, whereas social disorganization would mean low values. Moreover, social externalities may refer to the ethnic composition of a neighbourhood population. In the Netherlands, Visser and Van Dam (2006) showed that the presence of large numbers of non-Western (low-income) immigrant groups may negatively influence real estate values. This is also related to processes of stigmatization, yet immigrants are not necessarily poor and therefore do not always initiate downgrading. Indeed, Moos and Skaburskis (2010) found that Vancouver’s inner-city real estate values increased rapidly in neighbourhoods settled by affluent immigrants.

2.4 The study area

Before focusing on Dutch urban neighbourhoods, we need to consider the institutional context of neighbourhood change in the Netherlands. To begin with, the state has several policy instruments, such as subsidies and taxes, to redistribute income and provide public housing for low-income households in mixed neighbourhoods (Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2007). The interventionist posture of the state has also led to the formulation of extensive policies regarding urban renewal in deprived neighbourhoods. Through renovation and demolition of public housing and the construction of owner-occupied housing, the state together with housing associations aims to improve the physical and social quality of deprived neighbourhoods, which in turn influences upgrading and downgrading patterns (Van Kempen and Van Weesep, 1994; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008; Van Gent, 2010a). These associations pursue public tasks (e.g. housing lower-income households) as well as market activities, such as developing owner-occupied housing (Priemus, 2003; Boelhouwer, 2007). They also work to maintain the quality and value of their properties. Overall, the Dutch state and the housing associations intervene in both the public and private housing market-places to the extent that we can speak of highly-regulated housing markets – which may affect spontaneous processes of neighbourhood change.
The three metropolitan areas – Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg (Figure 2.1) – possess different historical, social and economic contexts, but nonetheless are a good representation of the Dutch urban landscape. There are some size differences that should be noted. Amsterdam consists of 148 neighbourhoods, including Amstelveen, Diemen, Duivendrecht and Badhoevedorp, with a total population of about 875,000. The Hague contains 164 neighbourhoods, including Rijswijk and Leidschendam-Voorburg, with a total population of about 600,000. And Tilburg has 44 neighbourhoods, which are home to about 200,000 residents. Certain variations in social and economic history should also be kept in mind.

Amsterdam is characterized by significant commercial and service industries and the metropolitan region is generally seen as an attractive place for locating economic activities, both nationally and internationally (Musterd et al., 2006). Not surprisingly, the regional housing market is characterized by high demand and high prices. The Hague is the governmental centre of the Netherlands and its labour market is dominated by an extensive public sector. In addition, several international organizations in the fields of
human rights and international cooperation are located here. Moreover, The Hague is one of the most segregated cities in the Netherlands, ranging from very poor areas to extremely affluent villa parks (Bolt et al., 2002). Tilburg is strongly marked by its industrial past and the city emerged from a conglomeration of smaller villages; consequently, it lacks a major historical centre and has only a few densely built pre-war neighbourhoods. Tilburg’s economy has diversified since the 1960s, but still focuses on manufacturing and transport.

2.5 Data and methodology

2.5.1 Income data
Social grading is usually measured by using income data (e.g. Musterd, 1991; Bourne, 1993; Meulenbelt, 1997), but a number of studies have also employed occupational, educational or unemployment data (e.g. Butler and Robson, 2001; Ley, 2003; Kitchen and Williams, 2009). Occupational and educational-attainment data are often used in gentrification studies, because this phenomenon is usually associated with the emergence of a new middle-class employed within the tertiary or quaternary sector. This study measures social grading by examining income data, since the level of earnings mainly drives the consumption sector and generally determines choice in housing and neighbourhoods (Bourne, 1993). In any case, educational and occupational data are not available at neighbourhood level in the Netherlands.

The income data used here derive from the Social Statistical Database (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands. The SSD registers data on income from employment, fringe benefits and pensions, as well as several individual and household characteristics such as ethnicity, age and gender for the period 1999-2006. The standardized net income per household is used as the key indicator (averaged by neighbourhood), which corrects for differences in size and household composition and facilitates neighbourhood comparison.

2.5.2 Real estate data
Real estate data were obtained from Kadaster (Land Registry Office), a government agency that compiles all real estate transactions in the Netherlands. Transaction values for different types of dwellings were used, which then were averaged at the neighbourhood level. The dataset contains values of owner-occupied housing as well as
rental units converted to owner-occupied housing; one constraint, however, is that real estate values of public housing are not included. Notwithstanding, Visser and Van Dam (2006) found that public housing does not significantly influence real estate values, although this may vary regionally. Another constraint is that this dataset does not report square meter values, with real estate values based on the sale price of different types of housing (apartments, terraced houses, corner houses, detached houses and semi-detached houses). For all neighbourhoods, the grading of real estate values was calculated for each type of dwelling. Next, the weighted average of the real estate value per dwelling type was calculated. The data were checked for extreme outliers and in order to ensure reliability, a minimum of 30 transactions were required for each neighbourhood and two three-year periods were compared. The first period was based on transaction values from 1998 to 2000, with a total of 48,516 transactions in the three urban cores; the second period was based on values from 2005 to 2007, with a total of 59,149 transactions. In the remainder of this study, these periods will be referred to as 1999 and 2006.

Although this study relied upon real estate values for owner-occupied housing, it is important to stress the importance of the public housing system. Unlike the United States, Dutch cities still have a significant public housing sector. In Amsterdam, for instance, housing associations owned 55 percent of the total housing stock in 2006 (Woonbarometer, 2010). The public housing system provides affordable housing of relatively high quality for low-income households. Furthermore, many households living in public housing receive rent subsidies. Consequently, low-income households have relatively good housing opportunities. In addition, households are not obliged to vacate their dwelling when their income increases. This means that households sometimes remain in the public sector, particularly in attractive locations and in units of good quality.

2.5.3 Defining neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading

In the first stage of the results, upgrading and downgrading spatial patterns were examined for the 1999-2006 period (Table 2.1). A neighbourhood was deemed to be upgrading when the growth of its income level or real estate value was more than half a standard deviation above the average of the city level between 1999 and 2006. Alternatively, a neighbourhood was classified as downgrading when the growth of its income level or real estate value was more than half a standard deviation below the
average city level. When the growth of its income level or real estate value was between half a standard deviation below and above the average city level, a neighbourhood was considered to be keeping pace with the city’s overall development. ArcMap was used to produce maps that displayed the spatial distribution of income and real estate grading patterns in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg between 1999 and 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Precondition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income upgrading</td>
<td>Growth of neighbourhood income &gt;0.5 standard deviation above average city level</td>
<td>Standardized net income per household</td>
<td>Social Statistical Database (Statistics Netherlands)</td>
<td>Minimal 15 households per neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ‘keeping in pace’</td>
<td>Growth of income between 0.5 standard deviation above and below average city level</td>
<td>Standardized net income per household</td>
<td>Social Statistical Database (Statistics Netherlands)</td>
<td>Minimal 15 households per neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income downgrading</td>
<td>Growth of neighbourhood income &gt;0.5 standard deviation below average city level</td>
<td>Standardized net income per household</td>
<td>Social Statistical Database (Statistics Netherlands)</td>
<td>Minimal 15 households per neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate upgrading</td>
<td>Growth of neighbourhood real estate value &gt;0.5 standard deviation above average city level</td>
<td>Real estate transactions of owner-occupied housing</td>
<td>Kadaster (Land Registry Office)</td>
<td>Minimal 30 transactions per neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate ‘keeping in pace’</td>
<td>Growth of real estate value between 0.5 standard deviation above and below average city level</td>
<td>Real estate transactions of owner-occupied housing</td>
<td>Kadaster (Land Registry Office)</td>
<td>Minimal 30 transactions per neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate downgrading</td>
<td>Growth of average neighbourhood real estate value &gt;0.5 below average city level</td>
<td>Real estate transactions of owner-occupied housing</td>
<td>Kadaster (Land Registry Office)</td>
<td>Minimal 30 transactions per neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the second stage of the results, the temporal relationship between income and real estate value development was analysed. The 1999-2006 period was subdivided into three components. Income data were examined for 1999-2001, 2001-2004 and 2004-2006. In order to enhance the reliability of the real estate transaction values, their grading was based on values for 1998-1999 to 2000-2001, 2000-2001 to 2003-2004 and 2003-2004 to 2005-2006. Moreover, since real estate data were available until 2009, the 2005-2006 to 2008-2009 was used to see if the trend continued after 2006. Both income and real estate grading were analysed for these time periods and their patterns compared to one another to obtain further insight into how the processes were correlated over time. In this manner, it was possible to examine which neighbourhoods showed simultaneous trends of income and real estate change over the entire period; which neighbourhoods exhibited a time lag; which neighbourhoods evinced partial divergence between income and real estate patterns; and which neighbourhoods displayed true divergence between the two processes.

2.5.4 Neighbourhood definition
Finally, this study adheres to the national classification of neighbourhoods in the Netherlands. Neighbourhood boundaries are determined by municipalities. The neighbourhoods are generally socially and physically homogeneous territories that are often clearly set off by streets, railroad lines or waterways (Statistics Netherlands, 2010). Both the income and real estate value datasets are geocoded according to this neighbourhood classification.

2.6 Mapping upgrading and downgrading
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively display grading patterns of income and real estate values in Amsterdam. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show these patterns for The Hague and Figures 2.6 and 2.7 similarly cover Tilburg. At first glance, it is clear there are spatial differences between income and real estate grading patterns. Table 2.2 summarizes the main findings of income and real estate upgrading patterns and briefly elaborates them. Table 2.3 does likewise for downgrading patterns.
Figure 2.2 Income grading in Amsterdam, 1999-2006

Figure 2.3 Real estate grading in Amsterdam, 1999-2006
Figure 2.4 Income grading in The Hague, 1999-2006

Figure 2.5 Real estate grading in The Hague, 1999-2006
Figure 2.6 Income grading in Tilburg, 1999-2006

![Income grading in Tilburg, 1999-2006](image1)

**Legend**
- **Income grading**
  - Red: Downgrading
  - Light yellow: Grading on average city level
  - Green: Upgrading
  - White: No data

Source: Statistics Netherlands (own adaptation)

Figure 2.7 Real estate grading in Tilburg, 1999-2006

![Real estate grading in Tilburg, 1999-2006](image2)

**Legend**
- **Real estate grading**
  - Red: Downgrading
  - Light yellow: Grading on average city level
  - Green: Upgrading
  - White: No data

Source: Kadaster (own adaptation)
Table 2.2 Summary of upgrading patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>The Hague</th>
<th>Tilburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income upgrading</td>
<td>Prosperous neighbourhoods, pre-war and centrally-located; Former working-class neighbourhoods, pre-war and centrally-located</td>
<td>Prosperous neighbourhoods, pre-war and centrally-located; Former working-class neighbourhoods, pre-war and centrally-located</td>
<td>Prosperous neighbourhoods in southwest part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28.6 percent of neighbourhoods)</td>
<td>Some overlap with income upgrading neighbourhoods; Low density neighbourhoods, peripherally-located</td>
<td>Some overlap with income upgrading neighbourhoods; Neighbourhoods near seaside; Centrally-located renewal neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Former working-class neighbourhoods, pre-war and centrally-located</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate upgrading</td>
<td>Some overlap with income upgrading neighbourhoods; Low density neighbourhoods, peripherally-located</td>
<td>Some overlap with income upgrading neighbourhoods; Neighbourhoods near seaside; Centrally-located renewal neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Former working-class neighbourhoods, pre-war and centrally-located</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31.8 percent of neighbourhoods)</td>
<td>→Time</td>
<td>→Time</td>
<td>→Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.1 Income upgrading

In Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg, 28.6 percent of the neighbourhoods show income upgrading, with accompanying income levels at 7 percent above the citywide trend. In Amsterdam and The Hague, most of the upgrading neighbourhoods are centrally-located and were constructed before World War II. In general, two types of neighbourhoods typically characterize income upgrading. The first type includes relatively prosperous neighbourhoods marked by high proportions of owner-occupied, single-family townhouses and a uniform middle and upper-middle class population with generally high income levels. Thus it appears that affluent neighbourhoods are becoming more affluent. The second type includes former working-class neighbourhoods, characterized by lower incomes and real estate values in the 1980s and 1990s. These neighbourhoods became increasingly attractive for middle-income households, which led to the upgrading of income and real estate values. Dutch gentrification studies provide varying explanations for such upgrading: middle-income households were drawn by the proximity to work and other facilities; demographic and sociocultural
changes; the rise of the service industry led to more jobs in the urban core; low real estate values; unoccupied warehouses and business space; and the gentrification aesthetic of pre-war architecture (see for example Cortie and Ostendorf, 1986; Wagenaar, 2003).

In Tilburg, several income upgrading neighbourhoods in the south-western sector of the city are relatively prosperous with high levels of income and real estate values; but other areas are more diverse. However, the scale and extent of gentrification observed in Amsterdam and The Hague are absent in Tilburg.

2.6.2 Real estate upgrading
Of all the neighbourhoods studied, 31.8 percent exhibit real estate upgrading. Real estate values in these neighbourhoods show an average increase of 15 percent above their citywide trend. In Amsterdam, real estate upgrading is widespread across the city. There is some overlap with income upgrading neighbourhoods, but peripheral parts of the city also show real estate upgrading. Those neighbourhoods are generally marked by low densities and owner-occupied, single-family housing. In The Hague, there is some overlap between the upgrading of income and real estate values. In addition, a number of neighbourhoods located near the North Sea coast show real estate upgrading as do certain centrally-located neighbourhoods undergoing urban renewal. The latter are subject to regeneration programs, aimed at improving housing and living conditions. However, renewal areas on the periphery of The Hague (and Amsterdam) do not show any upgrading (see below). In Tilburg, the upgrading of real estate values is confined to former working-class neighbourhoods in and around the city centre. It is also notable that, whereas transaction values rose rather swiftly, these central neighbourhoods did not exhibit income upgrading. Those discrepancies are discussed below.

2.6.3 Income downgrading
In the three urban cores, 38 percent of the neighbourhoods experienced income downgrading (Table 2.3). The income level in these neighbourhoods only rose at an average of 8 percent below citywide trend. In Amsterdam and The Hague, income downgrading is concentrated in the urban periphery. In Tilburg, a number of peripheral neighbourhoods also evinced income downgrading. Most were constructed in the years following World War II. As such, they are characterized by multi-family housing, open space and a substantial quantity of public housing. Like in many Western European countries, the early post-war period in the Netherlands was marked by housing
shortages, so residential construction emphasized quantity and produced overwhelming homogeneity. Such neighbourhoods showed relatively low levels of income and real estate values. Many have undergone decline over the past few decades, much of it attributed by researchers to housing stock characteristics (e.g. Prak and Priemus, 1984; Power, 1999). Individual dwellings tend to be small and noisy and their overall uniformity is not popular. A significant number of households that could afford to leave moved to higher-quality neighbourhoods, mostly suburban neighbourhoods dominated by single-family dwellings. They were replaced by newcomers of lower income and many were recently arrived (non-Western) immigrants or second-generation immigrants who had arrived in the Netherlands in an earlier date (Musterd and Van Kempen, 2007). Consequently, a process of filtering and succession was set into motion. Nowadays, a significant component of the population of early-post-war neighbourhoods is of non-Dutch origin. And it should also be noted that post-war housing can be in demand even when location, price and dwelling size are balanced (Van Kempen and Musterd, 1991).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>The Hague</th>
<th>Tilburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income downgrading</td>
<td>Post-war peripherally-located neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Post-war peripherally-located neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Post war peripherally-located neighbourhoods; Former working-class neighbourhoods, pre-war and centrally-located</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(38 percent of neighbourhoods)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate downgrading</td>
<td>Post-war peripherally-located neighbourhoods, but little overlap with income downgrading neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Post-war peripherally-located neighbourhoods, but little overlap with income downgrading neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Late-20th-century constructed suburban neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(46.6 percent of neighbourhoods)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3 Summary of downgrading patterns
2.6.4 Real estate downgrading
Of all the neighbourhoods investigated, 46.6 percent showed real estate downgrading, with real estate values that increased on average at 10 percent below citywide levels. Real estate downgrading is mainly clustered in high-density post-war neighbourhoods, but generally in neighbourhoods other than those marked by income downgrading. Some real estate downgrading neighbourhoods have experienced renewal before 1999 or between 1999 and 2006; all were formerly characterized by a high percentage of public housing. Physical interventions took place in the form of renovation and demolition of public housing and the construction of new (often owner-occupied) housing, a policy designed to restructure the housing market. Despite this regeneration, the sale of owner-occupied dwellings during the entire period did not increase in value as much as elsewhere in the three urban cores.

In Tilburg, downgrading was mainly concentrated in the western extension of the city that was constructed during the late-20th-century. This area is characterized by suburban type neighbourhoods with single-family and often owner-occupied dwellings. Between 1999 and 2006, new owner-occupied housing was still being added to this stock and may have influenced grading patterns. However, most of the housing predates 1999 and downgrading could very well result from a declining popularity of the area’s housing after the early 1980s.

2.6.5 Complex spatial patterns of income and real estate values
As noted earlier, income and real estate value development display different patterns. No more than 12.7 percent of all neighbourhoods studied showed both income and real estate upgrading; on the other hand, 16.2 percent of all neighbourhoods showed both income and real estate downgrading between 1999 and 2006. In another 16.2 percent, income and real estate grading were seen to be keeping pace with average city development. Therefore, in contrast to the assumption made in the literature that income and real estate value development go hand in hand, it was observed that in more than half of the neighbourhoods (55 percent) the relationship between income and real estate value development was more complex. In some cases there is income upgrading in tandem with the downgrading of real estate values. Or real estate values may follow a citywide trend, while an individual neighbourhood may exhibit income upgrading or downgrading. Furthermore, there can be a time lag between the two processes: for instance, there may first be income upgrading followed by real estate upgrading at a later
stage. The rest of this study will examine how these trends relate to each other over time, because this may provide some of the explanation for the partial dissimilarity between the two trends.

2.7 Temporal relationships between income and real estate value development

One possible explanation for the non-simultaneous trend of income and real estate value development in 55 percent of the neighbourhoods is that the comparison of the processes is based on two points in time (1999 and 2006). There could be a time lag between the two trends: for example, income upgrading could precede real estate upgrading or vice versa. To explore this notion, the 1999-2006 period was subdivided into three components, as discussed earlier (1999-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2006). Both income and real estate grading were investigated for these years and their patterns were compared to each other to better understand how these trends relate to each other over time.

The temporal relationship between changes in income and real estate grading was examined for all neighbourhoods, including those that revealed both upgrading and downgrading of income and real estate values in the previous analysis. Although it may seem that in this latter group income and real estate grading covary, there may still be a time lag between the two. Six categories were distinguished to describe the temporal relationship between income and real estate value development (Table 2.4), into which 87.6 percent of all the neighbourhoods studied could be classified. The remaining 12.4 percent showed an unclear relationship between the two processes, or they could not be classified because data were missing. Two graphs were drawn for each category (Table 2.4): the first shows a temporal relationship between income and real estate development for upgrading neighbourhoods, whereas the second shows that relationship for downgrading neighbourhoods.

In the previous section, in which the examination of upgrading and downgrading patterns was based on two points in time (1999 and 2006), it was shown that 45 percent of the neighbourhoods exhibited a simultaneous trend between income and real estate patterns. However, when the processes are viewed in greater detail by examining the patterns of each of the three time periods (1999-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2006), it is seen that in only 29.7 percent of the neighbourhoods income and real estate value
patterns simultaneously moved up or down or simultaneously adhered to the citywide trend across the entire period (Category A in Table 2.4). In the remaining 15.3 percent, there appears to be a time lag between the two processes, with one following the other at a later stage.

**Table 2.4** The temporal relationship between income and real estate value development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Upgrading</th>
<th>Downgrading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Simultaneous trend (up, down or keeping in pace) (77 neighbourhoods, 29.7 percent)</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Graph A1" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Graph A2" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Real estate value development follows income development at later stage (27 neighbourhoods, 10.4 percent)</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Graph B1" /></td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Graph B2" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Income development follows real estate value development at later stage (23 neighbourhoods, 8.9 percent)</td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Graph C1" /></td>
<td><img src="image6" alt="Graph C2" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Income level following citywide trend, real estate value development up or down (65 neighbourhoods, 25.1 percent)</td>
<td><img src="image7" alt="Graph D1" /></td>
<td><img src="image8" alt="Graph D2" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Real estate value development following citywide trend, income level up or down (14 neighbourhoods, 5.4 percent)</td>
<td><img src="image9" alt="Graph E1" /></td>
<td><img src="image10" alt="Graph E2" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Diverging income and real estate value developments (21 neighbourhoods, 8.1 percent)</td>
<td><img src="image11" alt="Graph F1" /></td>
<td><img src="image12" alt="Graph F2" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 227 neighbourhoods (87.6 percent of all cases)</td>
<td><img src="image13" alt="Legend" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Neighbourhoods with a time lag between the trends were classified in categories B and C. Category B shows neighbourhoods in which income development follows real estate value development at a later stage (10.4 percent), whereas category C shows neighbourhoods where real estate value development follows income development at a later stage (8.9 percent). Therefore, eventually, these neighbourhoods do show upgrading and downgrading of both income and real estate values, but one process follows the other. As noted, a number of neighbourhoods that displayed simultaneous trends in the previous analysis were based on two points in time and appeared to show a time lag between the processes. In addition, several neighbourhoods displayed one trend (upgrading or downgrading), while the other followed the citywide trend in the previous analysis, appearing to show a time lag when viewed in greater detail. For instance, such a neighbourhood could exhibit income upgrading from 1999 to 2006 while real estate grading was consistent with the citywide trend from 1999 and 2004 and only displayed upgrading from 2004 to 2006.

Although a relatively large number of neighbourhoods showed upgrading and downgrading of both incomes and real estate values, whether they occurred simultaneously (Category A) or involved a time lag (Categories B and C), a significant number of neighbourhoods still showed an ambiguous relationship between the trends. A relatively large number of neighbourhoods also exhibited partially diverging forms of the processes: one trend followed citywide development, while the other trend is marked by upgrading or downgrading (Categories D and E). Notably, Category D is much larger than Category E: 25.1 percent vs. 5.4 percent of the neighbourhoods. This appears to reflect the volatile nature of housing markets vis-à-vis neighbourhood income levels. The final Category F showed neighbourhoods with diverging trends, whereby one trend is upgrading while the other involves downgrading. This category is relatively small (8.1 percent of all neighbourhoods).

The next section discusses neighbourhoods with simultaneous trends in income and real estate values. Since most of the neighbourhoods showed a more complex relationship between the trends, these are of particular interest and will be examined in greater detail.

### 2.7.1 Simultaneous trends of income and real estate value development

Neighbourhoods that evinced a simultaneous upgrading of both income and real estate values throughout the entire period (Category A1) were relatively prosperous, centrally-
located and of pre-war vintage. All were located in Amsterdam and The Hague and exhibited high incomes and real estate values. Moreover, they have hosted a prosperous population for many decades and were characterized by demographic homogeneity and a high percentage of owner-occupied housing. Neighbourhoods showing simultaneous income and real estate downgrading across the entire period (Category A2) were mainly peripheral in location, of post-war age, characterized by multi-family housing and possessing a high percentage of public housing. They also showed relatively low levels of income and real estate values.

As already mentioned, both the upgrading/downgrading and housing studies literatures assume a close relationship between neighbourhood income and real estate value development. Based on the data analysed here, it can be concluded that only 29.7 percent of the neighbourhoods showed simultaneous upgrading or downgrading over the entire period and that they rank at the top or bottom of the housing market hierarchy. Affluent neighbourhoods are becoming more affluent, while neighbourhoods with low incomes and real estate values fall farther behind. However, most of the neighbourhoods studied, rank between the top and bottom tiers of the hierarchy and display a more diffuse relationship between the two processes. These patterns are discussed next.

2.7.2  Time lags between income and real estate value development

This section discusses the neighbourhoods that display time lags between the two trends. Like Category A neighbourhoods, these also exhibit parallel trends of income and real estate values in the end (but with a time lag), but the types of neighbourhoods in these categories differ from those in Category A. It should be kept in mind that to fully understand the complex relationship between the trends, each neighbourhood and its evolution would need individual study. Despite this complexity and context dependency, several observable patterns can be highlighted. The discussion will use detailed examples to provide tentative explanations, which may form the basis for future inquiry.

Neighbourhoods in which real estate upgrading follows income upgrading at a later stage (Category B1) are mainly centrally-located, of pre-war age and are primarily found in Amsterdam (Figure 2.8). Many began to gentrify in the 1980s or 1990s and have become popular among middle- and higher-income households; but the gentrification process has now reached a more advanced stage. Single and dual middle-income households and increasingly those with higher incomes, have moved into these
neighbourhoods. In particular, the number of higher-income households with children has increased over the past decade (Boterman et al., 2010). These trends lead to income upgrading, housing has become scarce and real estate values have increased rapidly. This concurs with the assumption made in the gentrification literature that real estate upgrading will follow income upgrading.

Neighbourhoods in which income upgrading follows real estate upgrading at a later stage (Category C1) are mainly found in Amsterdam and resemble Category B1 neighbourhoods (Figure 2.8). In many of these neighbourhoods, new owner-occupied housing was constructed in the 1990s and 2000s. These residences complemented the municipality’s policy of adding larger dwellings to its housing stock in order to keep middle- and higher-income households in the city (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2008); consequently, the addition of these new dwellings led to real estate upgrading. The time between the sale of the dwellings and their delivery (between 1 and 4 years) could have contributed to the observed time lag between the trends. The newly-constructed dwellings could also be a trigger for the real estate upgrading of surrounding housing.

**Figure 2.8** Time lags in upgrading neighbourhoods in Amsterdam
A second possible explanation is related to speculation. Since at least the late-1990s, Amsterdam has been recognized as an especially attractive place to live for city-oriented households and its housing market is understandably dominated by high demand (Aalbers, 2003; Booi et al., 2008). Thus income upgrading could be preceded by real estate upgrading whereby (young) households took out loans in order to buy more expensive dwellings as they speculated on having higher incomes later.

Neighbourhoods in which real estate downgrading follows income downgrading (Category B2) are mainly of post-war vintage, peripherally located, and contain high densities. They are marked by large proportions of multi-family dwellings and public housing. This category is absent in Tilburg, but in The Hague a cluster of Category B2 neighbourhoods in the Southwest district has been subject to the early phases of large scale urban renewal projects since 2000 (Municipality of The Hague, 2010). Through interventions such as renovations, demolition of public housing and construction of new owner-occupied dwellings, the municipality together with housing associations and the central government aim to improve the physical and social quality of these neighbourhoods. The income downgrading may result from the fact that the early phase of renewal requires the movement of residents. The subsequent demolition of public housing and construction of new housing generally impact the safety and liveability of neighbourhoods (Wittebrood and Van Dijk, 2007). This new situation can lead to a depression of real estate values.

Interestingly, in Amsterdam many of the Category B2 neighbourhoods are located next to or near neighbourhoods that had experienced urban renewal since 1999, including the demolition of public housing and construction of new owner-occupied housing. As a result, a significant proportion of households had to move out of these neighbourhoods. However, not all were able to return because a considerable amount of public housing was replaced by more expensive dwellings. This led to the displacement of mainly low-income households (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2005; Den Uyl, 2008), a substantial number of which relocated to Category B2 neighbourhoods. These were generally low-income households, thereby inducing income downgrading in their new neighbourhoods. Thus, real estate values can exhibit downgrading after a neighbourhood becomes less attractive as a result of such social changes. Den Uyl (2008), for example, studied displacement processes in Amsterdam Southeast and found that neighbourhoods receiving relocated households relocated from renewal neighbourhoods had been
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change

recently identified as problem areas (this displacement process is known as the waterbed effect in the Netherlands; see Slob et al., 2008).

Neighbourhoods where the downgrading of income follows real estate downgrading (Category C2) tend to be more diverse, usually constituting disadvantaged high-density neighbourhoods that have not experienced large-scale renewal. Such neighbourhoods are common in and around the three urban cores and, except for an absence of intervention, the relationship among these neighbourhoods is not directly clear.

2.7.3 Partial diverging income and real estate development

Besides time lags, it is also interesting to examine neighbourhoods in which one trend (either income or real estate value) is upgrading or downgrading while the other follows citywide development. The divergence of one trend could be an early sign of change in the neighbourhood, with the other trend perhaps becoming established later. This may represent an early stage in the observed time lags in gentrification neighbourhoods as noted above, but, as we shall see, other explanations are possible. The majority of neighbourhoods with real estate upgrading, but where income levels follow the citywide trend (Category D1, Figure 2.9), are located in Amsterdam and The Hague. These neighbourhoods are characterized by low urban densities and a high percentage of households with children, with the latter indicative of an upward trend in the city over the past two decades (Boterman et al., 2010). In the core cities, however, low-density neighbourhoods with single-family housing are scarce, leading to increased real estate values. This could explain the real estate upgrading as while income levels follow the citywide trend. In Tilburg, on the other hand, several Category D1 neighbourhoods are located near the city centre, perhaps signifying an early stage of revaluation in the inner city. This is an intriguing notion because, as mentioned above, processes of gentrification are less common in middle-sized, older industrial cities such as Tilburg.

Neighbourhoods classified as Category E1, on the other hand, are relatively affluent with high incomes and real estate values. Only five of the neighbourhoods studied belong to this category. One would expect such neighbourhoods to exhibit income as well as real estate upgrading, but they probably showed an upgrading of both trends earlier before the local housing market became less elastic. With real estate values peaking and levelling off, they follow the citywide trend as the neighbourhood continues to show income upgrading.
In Amsterdam, several neighbourhoods that show real estate downgrading as income follows the citywide trend, are centrally-located and only just beginning to gentrify before 2006. A likely explanation for the falling values is the state’s policy of privatization and deregulation of the housing system in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Boelhouwer, 2002; Van Kempen and Priemus, 2002). This meant that part of the public housing stock was sold off. Since the late 1990s, many (relatively small) apartments were placed on the owner-occupied housing market at prices below market level (De Heer and Dignum, 2005). Although this occurs in many urban neighbourhoods, this may have had a particularly strong impact in those where the real estate value of existing owner-occupied housing did not increase substantially. It is therefore unlikely that the observed decrease in real estate values would be followed by a decline in income levels as in the Category C2 neighbourhoods. In those centrally-located neighbourhoods, it is far more likely that both income and real estate values would increase after the privatized dwellings are re-sold on the market.

In Tilburg, Category D2 neighbourhoods are located in the oldest part of the late-20th-century western extension. With new suburban-type housing becoming available here between 1999 and 2006, it is likely that the older dwellings are less attractive than their newer counterparts, which would depress real estate values at least temporarily.
However, these neighbourhoods have seen a surge in the number of ethnically diverse households. In the Vlashof neighbourhood, for instance, the percentage of households of non-Western origin increased from 33.1 percent in 1999 to 42.2 percent in 2006 (Municipality of Tilburg, 2010). The influx of this population may also have stigmatized these neighbourhoods and depressed real estate values (e.g. Permentier et al., 2009).

A small number of neighbourhoods exhibit income downgrading but citywide development of real estate values (Category E2, 3.5 percent of all neighbourhoods) and they are characterized by a large proportion of public housing. Household income level may show downgrading, but real estate values may continue to follow the citywide trend when the physical condition of public housing remains sufficiently high. Another explanation for some Category E2 neighbourhoods may be related to the aging of the original population of post-war neighbourhoods, with much of the latter still in place. Buitenveldert-Oost in Amsterdam, for example, is marked by such population cohorts. Some of these residents settled in this well-located neighbourhood of spacious housing when it was constructed during the 1960s. When these middle-class residents reach retirement age, their incomes would drop significantly and so would the neighbourhood’s average income level, while real estate values would be maintained. This process is often referred to as internal social downgrading.

### 2.7.4 Diverging trends

Only 8.1 percent of the neighbourhoods show a real discrepancy between their growth trajectories of income and real estate values (Category F). Of this category, nine neighbourhoods showed income upgrading concomitant with real estate downgrading, and many were located in The Hague (Category F1, Figure 2.10). The majority are similar to Category E1 neighbourhoods and are relatively affluent with high income levels and real estate values. Like Category E1, one might expect such neighbourhoods to show upgrading of both incomes and real estate values. But the housing market here may have become even less elastic than in E1 neighbourhoods and the rise in real estate values of dwellings has reached its peak. Thus real estate values in these neighbourhoods show relative downgrading even as the neighbourhood still evinces income upgrading.

A number of neighbourhoods displaying real estate upgrading in tandem with income downgrading (Category F2, 12 neighbourhoods) have experienced urban renewal projects. Parts of the public housing stock have been renovated and owner-
occupied housing has been added. This may have led to incumbent real estate upgrading as well as upgrading in nearby neighbourhoods. However, public housing is still dominant and because it is home to low-income residents, the neighbourhoods can still experience income downgrading.

**Figure 2.10** Diverging income and real estate grading in The Hague

![Map of The Hague showing different areas and zones with color coding for income and real estate grading.](image)

### 2.8 Conclusion

This study began with the assertion that there is a close relationship between income and real estate value development in urban neighbourhoods. It is often assumed that these developments are related or even synonymous, but an investigation of upgrading and downgrading of income and real estate values in three Dutch urban cores revealed that this relationship is complex and context dependent. Only in a relatively small number of neighbourhoods (less than 30 percent) did income and real estate values covary during the entire period. As was shown, such neighbourhoods were at the top or bottom of the housing market hierarchy. Another 20 percent of the neighbourhoods showed that income and real estate values develop in parallel fashion but with a time lag between
them. Finally, a significant proportion of the neighbourhoods showed partial divergence between the two.

Whereas the neighbourhoods and categories merit further and more detailed research, the main intention here was to elaborate on several tentative explanations for the disparities in trends and formulate a research agenda for analysing neighbourhood change, especially in non-extreme ‘middle’ neighbourhoods. To encourage future research, attention is drawn to three interrelated issues. First, it has been shown that neighbourhood change can result from both the migration patterns of households as well as the development of existing households within a neighbourhood. As is widely acknowledged, comprehending the social dynamics of an area can be key for understanding neighbourhood change. Earlier, specific references were made to migration patterns among neighbourhoods and to the internal dynamics of households (such as an aging population). There are no general laws that govern these dynamics because mobility patterns tend to differ by type of household and neighbourhood. But it is important to distinguish between different households, not only in terms of demography, employment, educational attainment and size and composition, but also in terms of life course, culture and forms of capital. Different types of households have different attitudes and relationships with respect to different types of neighbourhoods. For instance, a typical relatively poor urban neighbourhood may trap certain disadvantaged individuals, yet it may simultaneously provide a social support network to others and offer new young households the opportunity to come and live in urban core.

Second, to understand the relationship between households and their neighbourhood, it is important to appreciate what one may mean for the other. We asserted that neighbourhood change is defined by household behaviour and attitudes. However, the household neighbourhood relationship is two-way, with household behaviour and attitudes also defined and determined by the neighbourhood itself. Thus the characteristics of the neighbourhood play an important role, especially in and how they translate into meaning for residents. Characteristics imply place-specific features such as physical location, proximity to centres of consumption and production, dwelling characteristics and local housing market structure. These suggest that neighbourhood change is slow, but can become more fluid when its meaning for households is expressed and defined by its reputation. An image based on physical or social neighbourhood characteristics may affect and accelerate neighbourhood change when it is good (‘hip and upcoming area’) or bad (‘underclass ghetto’). A good reputation may result in new
categories of residents migrating into the neighbourhood. But when reputations amount to stereotyping and stigmatization, they can inhibit migration patterns and block neighbourhood change. In short, attention has to be given to the structures that shape opportunities and constraints for households to settle, stay or leave an area, as well as shape meaning for its residents.

Third, the role of institutions and the Dutch state has been described, particularly in the upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods. Although many studies on real estate values have shown that, besides the income level of households, additional factors affect real estate values (such as dwelling and neighbourhood characteristics), it was noted here that disparities in income and real estate value developments can be significantly attributed to the role of institutions and place-specific policies. One concerns policies focusing on local urban renewal, which impact neighbourhood change because these physical interventions usually lead to increases in real estate values. Demolition of public housing causes low-income households to move out of the neighbourhood, whereas higher-income households are attracted to renovated or newly constructed dwellings, thereby producing income upgrading. However, it has been seen that in neighbourhoods undergoing renewal the relationship between income and real estate value development is far more complex, both for the targeted neighbourhoods and for those in adjacent areas. It appears that the renewal stage, whether or not the goal is social transformation and possible displacement (or waterbed) effects, is important.

The state and other institutions can also influence upgrading and downgrading patterns in additional ways. The state developed instruments (subsidies, taxes) leading to the redistribution of incomes as well as fair housing for households. Consequently, low-income households have access to relatively good housing opportunities. First, through privatization and deregulation of the housing system, part of the public housing stock was sold off at a price lower than market price; this led to real estate downgrading in a number of neighbourhoods. Second, the construction of new owner occupied dwellings in a number of neighbourhoods and new city extensions to retain middle- and higher-income households led to real estate upgrading in these areas and in certain cases depressed values nearby. Thus, spontaneous upgrading and downgrading processes are not that readily observable in the Netherlands because of the highly regulated housing market. However, the role of institutions is context-dependent, so their impact on upgrading and downgrading patterns varies in the three urban cores studied.
In sum, it seems that the upgrading and downgrading literature mainly refers to ‘ideal types’ of neighbourhood development, which explain only a part of the process. In reality, upgrading and downgrading patterns are far more complicated. The claims here are based on the Dutch case, but it is likely that they also apply to other Northern and Western European cities, and perhaps even to North-American cities where the state plays a comparatively smaller role and where time lags may occur for other, household-related reasons. A case-study approach should further complement this study and would enable a more in-depth analysis. Moreover, it would serve to capture the historical and institutional contexts of a neighbourhood and identify the role of different actors in upgrading and downgrading processes. In the end, neighbourhoods are shaped by the interplay between two social actors. On one hand, institutions, such as the state and housing associations, shape opportunities, constraints and meaning; on the other hand, households shape and define neighbourhoods through their residential choices as well as their social and financial investments in their living environment. No inquiry into neighbourhood or urban change can afford to ignore either.
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change
Neighbourhood change, mobility and incumbent processes: exploring income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants of neighbourhoods

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Abstract
Most studies on neighbourhood change attribute a key role to mobility in social upgrading and downgrading patterns, while incumbent processes – i.e. changes in the socioeconomic status of non-migrants – are often ignored. This paper explores the relationship between mobility and neighbourhood change by examining income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants of neighbourhoods in three Dutch cities. The paper demonstrates that in- and out-migration are not the only processes at work and that changes in the socioeconomic status of non-migrants are of importance too. Within upgrading neighbourhoods, incumbent processes of non-migrants seem to be an important driver of upgrading. Furthermore, although in-migrants have relatively low incomes when moving in, they experience strong income gains in the years after immigrating. The contribution of out-migrants to upgrading is mixed. In line with previous studies, migration reinforces downgrading processes, although at the same time, incumbent processes of non-migrants impede downgrading.

3.1 Introduction

The study of neighbourhood change has a long history, dating at least from the 1920s when it was an important topic for the early-20th-century Chicago School. Ever since, scholars have investigated neighbourhood change. Gentrification in particular has received much attention, in its classic sense defined as a process of replacement of the
working classes by higher-income households (Glass, 1964). Neighbourhoods undergoing downward development – i.e. decline in a neighbourhood’s housing stock and/or socioeconomic status – have also been intensively studied. What most studies have in common, is the fundamental role that is attributed to mobility in upgrading and downgrading patterns (Millard-Ball, 2002). Migration is even one of the defining characteristics of gentrification: it is widely agreed that gentrification is driven by the in-migration of higher-income households into working-class neighbourhoods, leading to replacement of working-class households (for example, Glass, 1964; Smith, 1996). Furthermore, downgrading is often related to the in-migration of low-income and the out-migration of high-income households. The basic assumption in many studies is that income changes lead people to resettle themselves to keep their socioeconomic status in line with their neighbourhood’s socioeconomic status (also see Bailey, 2012). Incumbent processes of neighbourhood change are often ignored – i.e. changes in the socioeconomic status of sitting residents of neighbourhoods. Although some authors acknowledge that neighbourhood change is achieved through both mobility and sitting residents (for example, Grigsby et al., 1987; McKinnish et al., 2010; Bailey, 2012), few have actually focused on incumbent processes and we know little about changes in the characteristics of sitting residents in relation to those of in-and out-migrants. This gap is largely due to a lack of data: most studies are unable to present data that distinguish between in-, out-and non-migrants, although some exceptions can be made (for example, Van Criekingen and Decroley, 2003; McKinnish et al., 2010; Bailey, 2012). This paper explores the relationship between mobility and neighbourhood change and examines income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants of neighbourhoods. It demonstrates that although in-and out-migration are important in generating neighbourhood change, changes in the socioeconomic status of non-migrants are of importance too.

Understanding socioeconomic neighbourhood change caused by in-, out-and non-migrants is essential for policy-makers in formulating policies concerning future neighbourhood development. First, many deprived neighbourhoods in Western-Europe are targeted for renewal, since policymakers believe that in-migration of low-income people causes decline. Through renovation and demolition of social housing and construction of owner-occupied housing, policy-makers aim to attract high-income households and decrease in-migration of low-income households (Uitermark et al., 2007). However, we know little about the actual socioeconomic characteristics of in-,
out- and non-migrants. Secondly, high mobility is often seen as a trigger of neighbourhood decline (for example, Andersson and Brämå, 2004; Van Ham and Clark, 2009). This is associated with a lack of social cohesion, anonymity and criminality. High mobility could also be understood as a sign of a well-functioning neighbourhood serving as an ‘escalator’. On the other hand, low mobility may mean that households are at the top of their housing career, but it may also reflect a situation of not being able to move (Musterd and van Kempen, 2007). Knowledge about the relationship between mobility and neighbourhood change provides insight into the functions of neighbourhoods for its residents.

This paper aims to contribute to the literature as follows. Since it is often assumed that neighbourhood change goes hand-in-hand with high mobility, first, this relationship is examined. Secondly, income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants of neighbourhoods are analysed and related to neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading. The following research questions are addressed:

1. What is the relationship between processes of social upgrading and downgrading and residential mobility at the neighbourhood level?
2. What are the income developments of in-migrating, out-migrating and non-migrating households at the neighbourhood level and how are these developments related to social upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods?

This study is part of a larger research project, which explores the relationship between changing positions of neighbourhoods and households in three Dutch cities: Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg. Neighbourhood change and mobility are embedded in and influenced by housing market conditions, such as tenure structures and governmental regulations and interventions (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). As the Dutch housing market is highly regulated, this may affect neighbourhood change and mobility patterns. Therefore, the paper discusses the Dutch institutional context and its possible impact on the observed patterns of neighbourhood change and mobility.

Social upgrading and downgrading are measured in terms of the relative growth in mean neighbourhood income: neighbourhoods are defined as upgrading when the growth of the neighbourhood income is above the growth of the average city level. When the growth of the neighbourhood income is below that of the average city level, neighbourhoods are defined as downgrading.
The paper first evaluates literature focusing on the relationship between neighbourhood change, mobility and incumbent processes. This is followed by a discussion of the Dutch institutional context and a methodology section. The results are presented in two parts to address both research questions. Finally, a conclusion section reflects on the results and highlights points for further research.

3.2 Theoretical embedding

3.2.1 Neighbourhood change and mobility
The structural analysis of neighbourhood change started with the Chicago School. Particularly well known are the invasion/succession theory of Burgess (1925/1974) and Hoyt’s (1939) filtering theory. In both theories, mobility is the key to neighbourhood change: chain reactions in mobility take place from low-quality neighbourhoods (city-centre) to newer, higher-quality neighbourhoods. Until the 1960s, most studies assumed that the general trend in neighbourhood change was downward. In the 1960s, Glass (1964) observed a revaluation of inner-city neighbourhoods by young households and, ever since, gentrification has attracted widespread attention. Although there is still disagreement over its causes and consequences, within gentrification studies also, the key role attributed to mobility is central: a ‘new’ group moves into inner-city neighbourhoods, thereby replacing ‘old’ groups of (lower-income) residents and changing the socioeconomic and physical environment. Numerous studies argued that these new groups are highly educated, possess high levels of social and cultural capital and are young single/dual person households (for example, Butler and Robson, 2001; Lees, 2008). Moreover, in-migrants are assumed to have higher incomes, although some argue that initial gentrifiers may have modest incomes, which increase as the gentrification process advances (Clay, 1979; McKinnish et al., 2010). Regarding out-migrants, there is an extensive literature focusing on negative effects such as displacement. These studies criticise gentrification for causing displacement of low-income residents (for example, Atkinson, 2000; Lees, 2008). Although Atkinson (2000) acknowledges that it is difficult to examine which out-migrants are displaced or left voluntarily, he states that displacement is apparent in London. Others challenge displacement by arguing that out-migrants often leave voluntarily, for instance to climb the housing ladder (Freeman, 2005; McKinnish et al., 2010). What is remarkable within gentrification literature, is a lack of data which systematically examine characteristics of
in-, out- and non-migrants. Often aggregated changes of neighbourhoods are examined, which makes insight into the processes by which gentrification occurs difficult (Lupton and Power, 2004). Some exceptions can be made, as is shown later.

Downgrading has also been examined extensively. Many downgrading studies, especially in the Netherlands, focus on declining post-war neighbourhoods which are targeted for renewal, as it is often believed that in-migration of low-income residents causes decline. Through selective demolition of social housing and construction of owner-occupied housing, policymakers aim to attract higher-income households. Many studies evaluate renewal processes and focus on how they changed the neighbourhood’s socioeconomic composition (for example, Murie et al., 2003; Uitermark et al., 2007). Others deal with the mobility of households who are forced to move through renewal and how this affects the neighbourhoods they move into (for example, Bolt et al., 2009). A central element, however, is the focus on in- and (forced) out-migration, while few studies focus on characteristics of non-migrants. Andersson and Bråmå (2004) observed in Swedish distressed neighbourhoods that in-migrants have higher benefit dependency rates and lower incomes than out-migrants, while non-migrants are in between. Thereby, they argue, selective mobility reproduces distressed neighbourhoods. Bailey and Livingston (2008) also found that in- and out-migration increased spatial segregation in England and Scotland, but observed that its impact is weak. This is in line with Shuttleworth et al. (2012), who found no evidence for increases in segregation through mobility in Northern Ireland. However, both studies did not examine the impacts of socioeconomic changes of non-migrants on segregation. Bailey (2012) observed little association between status changes and the direction of mobility. Furthermore, net effects of selective migration were weak and did not offset effects of status changes of non-migrants and other processes (see later).

3.2.2 Incumbent neighbourhood change

Clay (1979) and Galster (1987) were among the first authors paying attention to incumbent processes. They refer to incumbent processes as a physical process, in which homeowners revitalise their dwellings. Of course these investments are related to socioeconomic neighbourhood change, as physical investments are likely to result in longer stays in the neighbourhood. Clay states that incumbent upgrading is the most significant part of neighbourhood revitalisation, as it reflects neighbourhood confidence. Galster argues that the collective upkeep behaviour of homeowners is an important
trigger for neighbourhood change. He found that expectations of a neighbourhood’s future and length of tenure are important determinants of upkeep behaviour. Home investments will change if these expectations change, leading to incumbent upgrading or downgrading.

Grigsby et al. (1987) acknowledge that socioeconomic changes of non-migrants may occur, but argue that neighbourhood change is usually associated with mobility. They measure neighbourhood change by looking at aggregate changes in neighbourhood incomes and do not distinguish between changes achieved through mobility and non-mobility. McKinnish et al. (2010) analysed characteristics of in-, out-and non-migrants of gentrifying neighbourhoods and demonstrate that non-migrants have higher incomes than in-migrants, thereby suggesting incumbent upgrading. Van Criekingen and Decroley (2003) demonstrate the importance of incumbent upgrading in Brussels and Montreal; like Galster, they refer to incumbent upgrading as a physical process of housing stock reinvestments. Millard-Ball (2002) acknowledges the existence of incumbent upgrading, but states that “this route is likely to be slow and of relatively minor importance” (p. 833). Freeman (2005) also acknowledges incumbent upgrading of non-migrants, as gentrifying neighbourhoods may offer possibilities for social mobility. However, little is known about non-migrants.

As noted earlier, Andersson and Bråmå (2004) observed that the socioeconomic status of non-migrants is in between that of in- and out-migrants. However, they did not discuss their absolute contribution to neighbourhood change. Bailey (2012) demonstrates that, although selective migration reinforced spatial segregation to a limited extent, net segregation patterns declined. He attributes this to changes in socioeconomic status of non-migrants and processes of ageing and cohort replacement, which offset mobility effects.

### 3.2.3 Residential mobility

Although it is demonstrated that income changes are among the main triggers to move (Clark and Dieleman, 1996), it is also argued that mobility is closely related to age and life-course. Changes in life-course are characterised by different sizes and compositions of households, which may create the need for more space (Rossi, 1955; Mulder, 1993; Clark and Dieleman, 1996). As the life-course generally shows strong dynamics in early stages, young people have higher mobility rates than older people (Bailey and Livingston, 2007). Also, young households usually start low in the hierarchy. Consequently,
neighbourhoods with accessible dwellings and young populations are likely to show high mobility rates. In later stages, households usually climb the housing ladder to less accessible dwellings. At the final stage, households generally stay a long time, as the chances of obtaining better dwellings in relation to what they can afford are low (Hoogvliet, 1992). It is often assumed that people resettle themselves to keep their socioeconomic status in line with their neighbourhood’s socioeconomic status. Bailey and Livingston (2007), however, challenge this by arguing that a significant part of mobility occurs between neighbourhoods with similar statuses. Together, these factors indicate that income changes do not necessarily lead to mobility and incumbent change might also be of importance in generating neighbourhood change.

3.3 The Dutch institutional context

Neighbourhood change and mobility are embedded in and influenced by housing market conditions, such as tenure structures and governmental regulations and interventions (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). The Dutch housing market is highly regulated: opportunities of households are strongly influenced by the government (Musterd and van Kempen, 2007). The share of homeownership is low compared with other countries (55 percent), while respectively 31 and 13 percent are socially and privately rented. Urban neighbourhoods have mixed tenure structures, although there are variations. Also, the government developed instruments (subsidies, taxes) leading to a redistribution of incomes. The Netherlands are characterised by a relatively equal society, which is reflected in a comparatively low gini coefficient (0.29)\(^9\) (Van den Brakel, 2009). The redistribution of incomes and mixed tenure structures result in relatively small differences in neighbourhood incomes. This may affect upgrading and downgrading, as market mechanisms are reduced.

In general, there are waiting-lists for obtaining socially rented dwellings and allocation rules are strict. This affects mobility rates, as households may have a wish to move, but might not be able to. Once socially rented dwellings are obtained, households cannot be forced to move after income gains. For households no longer complying with allocation rules, moving is associated with strong increases in housing costs.

\(^9\) The value 0 corresponds to perfect equality (all households have the same income) and 1 to perfect inequality (one household possesses all income) (Statistics Netherlands, 2010).
Consequently, households might stay when their dwelling is no longer suitable (Kullberg, 1997), leading to incumbent upgrading.

During the 1980s and 1990s, housing policies changed to a more market-oriented system. Subsidised construction of social housing was abolished and responsibility for adequate housing decentralised to municipalities. This resulted in decreases of newly constructed social housing. Furthermore, the government’s policy of privatisation and deregulation of the housing system meant that part of the social housing stock was sold. So, the owner-occupied housing stock is increasing, although urban neighbourhoods still have mixed tenure structures. The government intervenes in the owner-occupied sector too, through tax breaks, subsidies and guarantees on mortgages, to promote homeownership. Furthermore, conditions for obtaining mortgages have become less restrictive. At the same time, developments in society triggered homeownership, such as increases in incomes and the number of dual-earner households. Increases in homeownership might impede mobility, as homeowners are less likely to move than renters (Van Ham and Clark, 2009).

Finally, in targeted deprived neighbourhoods, mobility and neighbourhood change are triggered by renewal processes. The government aims to improve the quality of deprived neighbourhoods through differentiating the housing stock (Murie et al., 2003). Through demolition of social housing, (low-income) households are forced to move. Simultaneously, newly constructed owner-occupied dwellings attract higher-income households. So, renewal policies affect both targeted neighbourhoods and those receiving forced migrants.

### 3.4 Study area

This paper focuses on Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg, which are characterised by different housing market contexts. Amsterdam had 790,044 inhabitants in 2012 and is characterised by a commercial and service industry. The housing stock consists of a large social housing stock (47 percent) and small owner-occupied stock (24 percent). The market is characterised by high demand, which is reflected in long waiting-lists for social housing and expensive owner-occupied and privately rented dwellings. The Hague had 502,802 inhabitants in 2012 and is the governmental centre of the Netherlands. The share of homeownership is 43 percent, while respectively 33 and 22 percent are socially and privately rented. Tilburg is smaller with 207,579 inhabitants in 2012 and
characterised by its industrial past. Tilburg lacks a major historical centre, as it emerged from a conglomeration of smaller cities. The owner-occupied stock is comparatively large (54 percent), while respectively 34 and 11 percent are socially and privately rented.

### 3.5 Data and methodology

Neighbourhood change is often measured through examining income data (for example, Grigsby et al., 1987; Bourne, 1993). This paper uses 'standardised net income per household' as an indicator, which corrects for differences in size and composition of households of a neighbourhood. Incomes are converted to that of a household of one person, which makes comparison between neighbourhoods possible. Standardised net income per household is calculated through dividing the total net household income (from work, benefits and pensions) by an equivalence factor\(^{10}\). The formula for the equivalence factor, \(E\), is \(E = \left[A + (0.8 \times C)\right]^{0.5}\), where \(A\) is the number of adults and \(C\) the number of children in a household (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).

Data come from the Social Statistical Database (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands, which includes data on the entire registered population for the period 1999 to 2008. The dataset contains data on residential trajectories, individual and household characteristics and income. This paper uses data based on all individuals in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg, except for institutional households and people who were born or died between 1999 and 2008. Data at the neighbourhood level are obtained through aggregating individual data. Income data were checked for extreme outliers before aggregating\(^{11}\). Furthermore, this paper refers to neighbourhood real estate values, which come from Kadaster, a governmental organisation registering real estate transactions. To ensure reliability, a minimum of 30 transactions were required for each neighbourhood and two

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\(^{10}\) The equivalence scale is derived from Statistics Netherlands. To be clear, this formula differs from the ‘OECD equivalence scale’ and the ‘OECD-modified scale’ of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The ‘OECD equivalence scale’ assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, 0.7 to each additional household member and 0.5 to each child, while the ‘OECD-modified scale’ assigns a value of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each additional adults and 0.3 to each child (OECD, 2009).

\(^{11}\) Before aggregating income data to the neighbourhood level, incomes of individual households have been checked for extreme outliers in the upper tail of the income distribution. Households with standardised net incomes of over 100,000 euro were excluded from the analysis (about 1 percent), as they would have had a relatively large impact on the average neighbourhood income.
two-year periods are compared: 1999/2000 and 2008/2009. This paper refers to these periods as 1999 and 2008.

This paper measures neighbourhood change relative to city-wide change. Between 1999 and 2008, city-wide standardised net household incomes increased significantly: from 14,302 to 19,294 euro in Amsterdam, from 14,888 to 19,566 euro in The Hague and from 14,530 to 18,651 euro in Tilburg. Simultaneously, income levels of all neighbourhoods increased. If neighbourhood change was measured absolutely, nearly every neighbourhood would be classified as upgrading. In some neighbourhoods, incomes increased significantly faster than in others, which shows the hierarchical position of neighbourhoods within a city. This paper is interested in changes in this hierarchy and therefore measures neighbourhood change in comparison with other neighbourhoods. Of course, measuring neighbourhood change relative to city-wide change has shortcomings. It can be argued that absolute improvements make differences to people’s lives, instead of the position of neighbourhoods relative to others (Lupton and Power, 2004). Also, it might be counter-intuitive to define neighbourhoods as downgrading when they showed a rise in income.

Social upgrading and downgrading are calculated as follows: social grading = (mean neighbourhood income in year x/mean neighbourhood income in year y)/ (mean city income in year x/mean city income in year y). Neighbourhoods are defined as upgrading when the growth of the neighbourhood income is more than half a standard deviation above the growth of the mean city income between 1999 and 2008. Neighbourhoods are defined as downgrading when the neighbourhood income development is more than half a standard deviation below the city development. When the neighbourhood income development is between half a standard deviation below or above the city level, neighbourhoods are considered as ‘keeping in pace’ with average city development.

First, the relationship between social grading and mobility is examined. Residential mobility reflects the percentage of individuals who moved to another neighbourhood between 1999 and 2008. Neighbourhoods constructed after 1999 are excluded. Neighbourhoods are classified as ‘high mobility’ when the percentage of individuals who moved is half a standard deviation above the city-wide percentage of individuals who moved. Neighbourhoods are classified as ‘low mobility’ when the percentage of moved individuals is half a standard deviation below the city-wide percentage. When the percentage of moved individuals is half a standard deviation above and below the city-wide level, neighbourhoods are classified as ‘average mobility’.
Secondly, income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants are examined, and related to the neighbourhood income development. For each year, incomes of all in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants are calculated and aggregated to the neighbourhood level. Furthermore, income developments of in-migrants after in-migration and of out-migrants before out-migration have been studied, in order to obtain insight into their contribution to neighbourhood change.

This study follows the national classification of neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood boundaries are determined by municipalities and are generally socially or physically homogeneous areas, often set off by streets, railroads or waterways (Statistics Netherlands, 2010). As Amsterdam is the largest and most densely populated city, the average neighbourhood population is highest: 11,781 inhabitants (2011). Tilburg and The Hague have an average neighbourhood population of respectively 6729 and 6008. However, the neighbourhoods vary in size: from a population of 150 to two neighbourhoods of over 20,000 inhabitants.

3.6 Neighbourhood change and mobility

The theoretical framework showed that neighbourhood change is often linked to mobility: upgrading and downgrading are related to in- and out-migration of lower and higher-income groups. Therefore, it is expected that both upgrading and downgrading go hand-in-hand with high mobility rates. However, in the neighbourhoods of this study, there are downgrading neighbourhoods with high and low mobility, as well as upgrading neighbourhoods with high and low mobility. This is reflected in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, which demonstrates the relationship between social upgrading and downgrading and mobility patterns in the three cities. The figures distinguish nine categories: downgrading neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility; average grading neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility; and upgrading neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility. In total, 54 percent of the households moved between 1999 and 2008. Nevertheless, this distribution is irregular at the neighbourhood level: the proportion of households that moved ranges from 28 to 82 percent. Since this paper is interested in the relationship between neighbourhood change and mobility, the remainder of this paper focuses on neighbourhoods experiencing upgrading or downgrading. Since Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg show similar patterns for the
relationship between mobility and neighbourhood change, it was decided to present the results for the three cities combined.

Table 3.1 shows characteristics of downgrading neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility (categories A to C) and upgrading neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility (categories D to F). These categories are discussed next.

### 3.6.1 Downgrading neighbourhoods

Table 3.1 demonstrates that there are only marginal differences in the level of downgrading between low, average and high mobility neighbourhoods: between low and high mobility downgrading neighbourhoods, the difference is only 1 percent. Downgrading neighbourhoods with low and average mobility (A, B) differ from those with high mobility (C). First, category A and B neighbourhoods show higher incomes and real estate values. Most of these neighbourhoods are post-war constructed and are characterised by homogeneous multi-family dwellings and ethnically diverse households. Especially A and B neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and The Hague have high proportions of social housing. Waiting-lists for social housing could impede mobility rates, as households relying on social housing may not be able to move.

**Figure 3.1** Social upgrading and downgrading and residential mobility patterns in Amsterdam, 1999-2008

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**Legend**

Classification of social grading and mobility:
- Downgrading & low mobility
- Downgrading & average mobility
- Downgrading & high mobility
- Average grading & low mobility
- Average grading & average mobility
- Average grading & high mobility
- Upgrading & low mobility
- Upgrading & average mobility
- Upgrading & high mobility
- No data

Source: Statistics Netherlands (own adaptation)
**Figure 3.2** Social upgrading and downgrading and residential mobility patterns in The Hague, 1999-2008

**Figure 3.3** Social upgrading and downgrading and residential mobility patterns in Tilburg, 1999-2008
A and B neighbourhoods in Tilburg show higher levels of owner-occupied (single-family) housing, which is relatively accessible to lower income households. Low mobility could be understood as a sign of well-functioning neighbourhoods. Category C neighbourhoods have lower incomes and real estate values. A number of these neighbourhoods are undergoing or have recently undergone restructuring. Households are forced to move when their dwelling is renovated or demolished, which could explain the high mobility rates. Other C neighbourhoods are characterised by accessible housing: real estate values are comparatively low and, especially in Amsterdam and The Hague, there is a large privately rented sector. This could explain high mobility, as private renters often show higher mobility rates (Bailey and Livingston, 2007).

3.6.2 Upgrading neighbourhoods

Within upgrading neighbourhoods, the difference in upgrading levels between low and high mobility neighbourhoods is also only 1 percent (Table 3.1). Category F neighbourhoods had relatively low incomes and real estate values in 1999. Many are pre-war constructed and former working-class neighbourhoods. The housing stock is characterised by small apartments and the majority are privately and socially rented. These neighbourhoods recently started to gentrify, which is reflected in strong increases in real estate values. Many in-migrants are in the early stages of their life-course. After a few years they are likely to move, which could explain the high mobility rates. This is in line with Van Criekingen (2009), who showed that living in gentrifying neighbourhoods is a transitional stage in the housing career of many young households.

Category D (and E to a lesser extent) neighbourhoods are generally neighbourhoods at the top of the hierarchy. Some have had an affluent population for many decades. Others were among the first gentrifying neighbourhoods, but gentrification is now at an advanced stage. The majority of D and E neighbourhoods are centrally-located and pre-war constructed, characterised by owner-occupied dwellings and (native Dutch) families with children. The presence of these ‘settled’ households could explain the low mobility, as they are in further life-course stages. Also, these neighbourhoods may be inaccessible to households with modest incomes, through high prices and relatively few rented dwellings.
Table 3.1 Relationship between residential mobility and upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods, by category, 1999-2008¹

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Downgrading and low mobility</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>14,456</td>
<td>2,017</td>
<td>18,043</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td>137,924</td>
<td>33,473</td>
<td>199,704</td>
<td>56,374</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Downgrading and average mobility</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>13,526</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>16,959</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>103,993</td>
<td>37,757</td>
<td>183,610</td>
<td>65,962</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Downgrading and high mobility</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>13,207</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>15,933</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>76,025</td>
<td>31,750</td>
<td>139,631</td>
<td>43,619</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Upgrading and low mobility</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>17,907</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>24,965</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>199,711</td>
<td>394,651</td>
<td>263,404</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Upgrading and average mobility</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>15,774</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>22,267</td>
<td>3,743</td>
<td>140,039</td>
<td>272,645</td>
<td>116,931</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Upgrading and high mobility</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>13,555</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>19,249</td>
<td>1,996</td>
<td>121,186</td>
<td>51,426</td>
<td>246,010</td>
<td>74,866</td>
<td>29.2</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>134</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹ Each neighbourhood is categorized into one of the six categories, on the basis of their social grading level (downgrading or upgrading) and mobility rate (low, average or high).
² Social grading refers to the growth percentage of the neighbourhood income level in relation to the growth percentage of the citywide income level between 1999 and 2008 (see Data and Methods).

Source: Statistics Netherlands and Kadaster, own adaptation
3.7 Income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants

The previous section showed that differences in the level of social grading between low, average and high mobility neighbourhoods are relatively small. This poses the question of what the income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants are and how these relate to patterns of neighbourhood change.

3.7.1 In-migrants

Table 3.2 presents income levels of households who moved into a neighbourhood, aggregated per category, for each year between 2000 and 2008. These income levels are relative to their neighbourhood’s income level (which is 100). For instance, the table shows that in 2000 incomes of in-migrants in category A were 9 percent below their neighbourhood’s income, while in 2008, income levels of in-migrants in this category were 31 percent below the neighbourhood income.

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Downgrading and low residential mobility</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Downgrading and average residential mobility</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Downgrading and high residential mobility</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Upgrading and low residential mobility</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Upgrading and average residential mobility</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Upgrading and high residential mobility</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The table presents the average income level of in-migrants in a neighbourhood, aggregated per category, between 2000 and 2008. The income level is relative to the neighbourhood income (which is 100). The formula is: ((average income level of in-migrants of a neighbourhood in category X in year Y/average neighbourhoods income in category X in year Y)*100), X means respectively categories A to F, Y means the years 2000 to 2008.

Source: Statistics Netherlands, own adaptation.
To be clear, the composition of in-migrants varies each year: for instance, in-migrants in 2000 were different households from in-migrants in 2001, since in-migrants in 2000 became non- or out-migrants in 2001. Table 3.2 shows two remarkable patterns: incomes of in-migrants show similar patterns both in upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods and there are no substantive differences between low, average and high mobility neighbourhoods. In all six categories, average income levels of in-migrants in a year are below the neighbourhood level. This pattern applies to all years between 2000 and 2008. There are differences, however. In general, the gap between incomes of in-migrants and average neighbourhood incomes is wider in downgrading than in upgrading neighbourhoods. In downgrading neighbourhoods, in-migrants reinforce downgrading processes, as their incomes are much below the neighbourhood income. This is in line with assumptions in the literature. In upgrading neighbourhoods, however, in-migrants seem to impede rather than reinforce upgrading, as their incomes are a downward force on their neighbourhood’s income.

These observations pose the question as to how far incomes of in-migrants increase once they have moved in. Therefore, for each category, the income development of households who moved into a neighbourhood in 2000, 2001 and 2002 has been studied, but only with respect to those households still living in the neighbourhood in 2008. Table 3.3 shows the income development of households who moved into a neighbourhood in 2000, aggregated per category. The table demonstrates both the absolute income development of in-migrants and their income development relative to the neighbourhood development (which is 100). For instance, the table shows that between 2000 and 2008, in-migrants in category A experienced an absolute increase in income of 32 percent. Also, the table shows that incomes of these in-migrants increased 15 percent faster than the neighbourhood income. Table 3.3 makes

12 Table 3.2 shows that 2002 is a pivotal point: relative incomes of in-migrants before 2002 are (generally) higher than incomes of in-migrants in later years. This could be explained by two reasons. First, from 1999 to 2002, the migration balance of the cities was negative: the number of out-migrants exceeded the number of in-migrants. From 2002, this process reversed and the migration balance became positive. In particular, from 2002 onwards there was a strong increase in the number of young in-migrants aged between 15 and 24 years old. Since these young households often have relatively low incomes, this could explain why incomes of in-migrants relative to the income of the neighbourhood became lower after 2002 compared with before 2002. Secondly, there was an increase in average neighbourhood incomes, which could explain the increasing gap between incomes of in-migrants and average neighbourhood incomes. The positive migration balance after 2002 went along with a decrease in the number of out-migrants; more households stayed in the cities. As these households often have higher incomes, this could (partly) explain why average neighbourhood incomes increased. This implies that incomes of in-migrants, relative to the neighbourhood incomes are declining.
clear that in all categories, in-migrants experienced a significant absolute increase in income between 2000 and 2008. Moreover, their incomes increased faster than their neighbourhood’s income.

**Table 3.3** Income development of households who moved into a neighbourhood in 2000, aggregated per category

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Downgrading and low mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative income development¹</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute income development¹</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Downgrading and average mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Downgrading and high mobility</td>
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<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Upgrading and low mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
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<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>127</td>
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<td>140</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Upgrading and average mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Upgrading and high mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This shows the absolute indexed income development of in-migrants in 2000. The formula is: ((income of in-migrants in category X in year Y)/(income of in-migrants in category X in 2000))*100, X means the categories A to F, Y means the years 2000 to 2008.

²This income development of in-migrants is relative to the neighbourhood income development (which is 100), and aggregated per category. The formula is: ((income of in-migrants in category X in year Y/income of in-migrants in category X in 2000)/(neighbourhood income in category X in year Y/neighbourhood income in category X in 2000)), X means the categories A to F, Y means the years 2000 to 2008.

*Source: Statistics Netherlands, own adaptation*
So, while Table 3.2 showed that, in both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods, incomes of in-migrants were below the neighbourhood level at the moment they moved in, in the years after moving in, in-migrants experience (strong) upgrading. After a few years, their income reaches the neighbourhood income level. Households who in-migrated in 2001 and 2002 show similar patterns (results not shown here). One explanation could be that households anticipate having higher incomes in the near future when in-migrating.

There are differences between the categories. In upgrading neighbourhoods with average and high mobility, in-migrants experienced the greatest absolute increase and after a few years, their incomes are (much) above the neighbourhood level. In other words, in-migrants in upgrading neighbourhoods are important less for their income when in-migrating, but primarily for their future income development. Hereby, they contribute significantly to the upgrading of their neighbourhood. In-migrants in category F experienced the strongest incumbent upgrading (absolute and relative). Many F neighbourhoods recently started to gentrify and many young households in-migrated. For instance, in 2000, about half of all in-migrants were below 30 years old\(^{13}\). These households are in early life-course stages, which are usually characterised by strong upward dynamics (Hoogvliet, 1992). This could explain the observed incumbent upgrading. However, in-migrants in category D and E neighbourhoods also experienced significant income gains, while many in-migrants are in further life-course stages. For instance, in these categories, more than 60 percent of all in-migrants are above 30 years old. So, although it is often assumed that later stages of one’s life-course are characterised by weaker upward dynamics (or stabilisation) in terms of income (Hoogvliet, 1992), these in-migrants still experience significant income gains.

Within downgrading neighbourhoods also, in-migrants experience incumbent upgrading, despite their low incomes when moving in. So, although in-migrants reinforce downgrading when moving in, they impede downgrading in later years, as their incomes increase significantly. As mentioned, many C neighbourhoods undergo restructuring whereby the government aims to attract higher-income households. Therefore, it is remarkable that these in-migrants show relatively low incomes. Nevertheless, this is in line with Wittebrood and Van Dijk (2007), who showed that socioeconomic changes of restructuring neighbourhoods have not been substantial, despite restructuring policies. However, these in-migrants also show significant income gains.

\(^{13}\) Age refers to a household’s oldest member.
gains in later years. In A and B neighbourhoods, characteristics of in-migrants are mixed: the proportion of older and younger in-migrants is similar and many non-native households and families with children have moved in. This could be explained by the presence of large proportions of social housing, on which many non-native and low-income families rely.

3.7.2 Out-migrants

This section examines the income developments of out-migrants, in order to obtain insight into their contribution to neighbourhood change. Table 3.4 presents income levels of households who moved out of a neighbourhood, aggregated per category, for each year between 1999 and 2007. These incomes are relative to the neighbourhood income (100). For example, the table shows that in 1999, incomes of out-migrants in category F are 3 percent above the neighbourhood level, while in 2001, incomes of these out-migrants are 4 percent above the neighbourhood average. Table 3.4 demonstrates that incomes of out-migrants in both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods are not consistently higher than the neighbourhood income. It is clear, however, that their incomes are above those of in-migrants.

Within downgrading neighbourhoods, in some years incomes of out-migrants are above the neighbourhood level. Here, out-migrants reinforce downgrading, which is in line with assumptions in the literature. Nonetheless, in other years, incomes of out-migrants in the same categories are around or even below the neighbourhood income. Regarding upgrading neighbourhoods, the literature often assumes that upgrading is related to the out-migration of households with lower incomes. This seems to apply to most of the years in category D, E and F neighbourhoods: generally, incomes of out-migrants are below the neighbourhood income. Noteworthy, their incomes are still (much) higher than the incomes of out-migrants of downgrading neighbourhoods. In categories E and F, however, in a number of years the incomes of out-migrants are above the neighbourhood level. Hereby, out-migrants impede upgrading.

In conclusion, the contribution of out-migrants to neighbourhood change is complex. In some cases, out-migration reinforces neighbourhood change, but in other cases, out-migration impedes these processes. In order further to examine the contributions of out-migrants to neighbourhood change, their income development has been studied for the years before moving out. Income developments of out-migrants in 2005, 2006 and 2007 have been examined, but only with respect to those who already lived in the neighbourhood in 1999. Table 3.5 demonstrates income
### Table 3.4 Relative average income of out-migrating households, per category, 1999-2007 (neighbourhood income level is 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>A. Downgrading and low residential mobility</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>B. Downgrading and average residential mobility</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>C. Downgrading and high residential mobility</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>D. Upgrading and low residential mobility</td>
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<td>94</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>E. Upgrading and average residential mobility</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>F. Upgrading and high residential mobility</td>
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<td>95</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The table presents the average income level of out-migrants in a neighbourhood, aggregated per category, between 1999 and 2007. The income level is relative to the neighbourhood income (which is 100). The formula is: \((\text{average income level of out-migrants of a neighbourhood in category X in year Y/average neighbourhoods income in category X in year Y}) \times 100\), X means respectively categories A to F, Y means the years 1999 to 2007.

Source: Statistics Netherlands, own adaptation

Developments of out-migrants in 2007, aggregated per category. The table shows both the absolute income development of out-migrants and their income development relative to the neighbourhood development (which is 100). For instance, the table demonstrates that between 1999 and 2007, out-migrants in category A experienced an absolute increase in income of 41 percent. The table also shows that incomes of these out-migrants increased 11 percent faster than the neighbourhood income.

The table shows that out-migrants in both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods experienced strong income gains in the years before leaving. When looking at their income development relative to the neighbourhood development, there are differences between the categories. In downgrading neighbourhoods, incomes of out-migrants increased (much) faster than their neighbourhood’s income. So, they impede downgrading in the years before leaving.
Table 3.5. Income development of individual households who moved out of a neighbourhood in 2007, in the years before out-migration, aggregated per category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Downgrading and low mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>141</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute income development¹</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
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<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>130</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Downgrading and average mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute income development¹</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>137</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative income development²</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>109</td>
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<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Downgrading and high mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>121</td>
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<td>Absolute income development¹</td>
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<td>Relative income development²</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Upgrading and low mobility</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute income development¹</td>
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<td>Relative income development²</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Upgrading and average mobility</td>
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<td>Absolute income development¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative income development²</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This shows the absolute indexed income development of out-migrants who moved out in 2007. The formula is: \(((\text{income of out-migrants in category X in year Y})/(\text{income of out-migrants in category X in 1999})) * 100\), X means the categories A to F, Y means the years 1999 to 2007.

² The income development of out-migrants is relative to the neighbourhood income development (which is 100), and aggregated per category. The formula is: \(((\text{income of out-migrants in category X in year Y})/(\text{income of out-migrants in category X in 1999}))/(\text{neighbourhood income in category X in year Y}/\text{neighbourhood income in category X in 1999}))\), X means the categories A to F, Y means the years 1999 to 2007.

Source: Statistics Netherlands, own adaptation
Out-migration could be related to disequilibrium between current and potential housing consumption: the dwelling and/or neighbourhood might not match the household anymore. Out-migration could also be related to dissatisfaction with the neighbourhood. Many downgrading neighbourhoods are low in hierarchy and the strong income gains might be an opportunity to climb the housing ladder. Interestingly, incomes of out-migrants in C neighbourhoods increased strongly too, where mobility was partly triggered by institutional interventions.

Although out-migrants in upgrading neighbourhoods experienced significant absolute income gains too, their increase in income was generally around their neighbourhood’s increase in income. Also, their absolute income levels are mainly around or below the neighbourhood’s income in all categories\textsuperscript{14}. In other words, these households neither reinforce or impede upgrading significantly.

### 3.7.3 Non-migrants

Table 3.6 demonstrates income levels of non-migrants, aggregated per category. These are both households who did not move and households who moved within neighbourhoods. These incomes are relative to the neighbourhood income (which is 100). To be clear, the composition of non-migrants varies each year: for instance, non-migrants in 2001 may have been in-migrants in 2000 or have become out-migrants in 2002.

Unfortunately, the average stay of households who in-migrated before 1999 is unknown, so distinctions between long-term and short-term households cannot be made. Nevertheless, Table 3.6 demonstrates that incomes of non-migrants in all years are above the neighbourhood level, both in upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods. The table demonstrates that within downgrading neighbourhoods, non-migrants impede downgrading, as their incomes are generally an upward force to their neighbourhood’s income. Within upgrading neighbourhoods, however, non-migrants reinforce upgrading, as their incomes are above the neighbourhood level. Non-migrants seem to be in advanced life-course stages: the share of families with children and retired households is high. A situation of not moving may mean that households are satisfied with their neighbourhood, but households may also be unable to move. However, the data only allow formulating hypotheses about non-migrants.

\textsuperscript{14} Data not shown due to reasons of space.
Table 3.6 Relative average income of non-migrants, per category, 2000-2007 (neighbourhood income level is 100)¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<th>2006</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Downgrading and low residential mobility</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Downgrading and average residential mobility</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>105</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Downgrading and high residential mobility</td>
<td>102</td>
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<td>107</td>
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<td>D. Upgrading and low residential mobility</td>
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<td>102</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Upgrading and average residential mobility</td>
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<td>104</td>
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<td>104</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Upgrading and high residential mobility</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The table presents the average income level of non-migrants in a neighbourhood, aggregated per category, between 2000 and 2007. The income level is relative to the neighbourhood income (which is 100). The formula is: (average income level of non-migrants of a neighbourhood in category X in year Y/average neighbourhoods income in category X in year Y)*100), X means respectively categories A to F, Y means the years 2000 to 2007.

Source: Statistics Netherlands, own adaptation

3.8 Summary and conclusions

This paper focused on the relationship between neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading and mobility. The paper examined income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants and related these to neighbourhood income developments. Most studies on neighbourhood change take for granted that mobility is the main contributor to neighbourhood change, while incumbent processes are often ignored. This paper has shown that in-migration and out-migration are not the only processes at work, and that changes in the socioeconomic status of non-migrants are of importance too, either in reinforcing or impeding neighbourhood change. There are differences between upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods, however.

First, it is often assumed that high mobility triggers neighbourhood decline. This study has shown that, within downgrading neighbourhoods, there are only marginal differences in the level of downgrading between low and high mobility.
neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, in-, out- and non-migrants show generally the same patterns in downgrading neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility. In line with previous studies, in-migrants reinforce downgrading, as their incomes are generally below the neighbourhood income. In other words, their incomes are a downward force on their neighbourhood’s income. The contribution of out-migrants to downgrading is more complex: in some cases they reinforce downgrading, when their incomes are above the neighbourhood level. This is in line with the findings of Andersson and Bråmå (2004). However, in other cases out-migrants impede the process. This paper has demonstrated that in-migrants experience strong incumbent upgrading after in-migration. This raises the question of whether in-migration of low-income households is problematic when their income increases significantly in later years. In addition, out-migrants show strong incumbent upgrading before moving out and incomes of non-migrants are generally above the neighbourhood income. This demonstrates that non-migrants of downgrading neighbourhoods impede downgrading. This corresponds with Bailey (2012), who demonstrated that (among others) status changes of sitting households reduced segregation patterns.

Within upgrading neighbourhoods also there are only marginal differences in the level of upgrading between low and high mobility neighbourhoods. In-migrants show generally the same patterns: initially, they impede upgrading, as their incomes are below the neighbourhood level when in-migrating. However, they experience strong upgrading in the years after moving in. So, in-migrants in upgrading neighbourhoods are important less for their income when moving in, but mainly for their future income development. The contribution of out-migrants to upgrading is more complex. In most of the years, out-migrants reinforce upgrading, as their incomes are below the neighbourhood level. However, in other years, incomes of out-migrants are above the neighbourhood level, whereby they impede upgrading. Incumbent processes seem to be the main driver behind upgrading, as incomes of non-migrants are systematically above the neighbourhood level and in-migrants experience strong incumbent upgrading in the years after in-migrating. So, although incumbent upgrading is often overlooked in the literature, this paper demonstrates the importance of looking at changes in the incomes of non-migrants. This is in line with Bailey and Livingston (2008), Bailey (2012) and Shuttleworth et al. (2012): they demonstrate that mobility is less important than assumed in patterns of neighbourhood change.

One explanation for the observed incumbent upgrading in upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods may be that households are less willing to move after
income changes than assumed (Bailey, 2012). Households may be satisfied in their neighbourhood through processes of attachment. Moreover, a significant part of the Dutch housing stock is social housing, characterised by long waiting-lists. So, households relying on social housing may wish to move, but might not be able to. After obtaining socially rented dwellings, households cannot be forced to move after income gains. This means that, for households no longer complying with allocation rules, moving is associated with strong increases in housing costs. This may lead households to stay in their dwelling. Another explanation could be that differences between neighbourhoods are relatively small as a result of the highly regulated housing market. This might impede the urge to climb the neighbourhood hierarchy after income gains.

Whereas the observed patterns and trends merit further and more detailed research, this paper’s aim was to explore general patterns of the contribution of in-, out- and non-migration to neighbourhood change. This paper raises further questions and gives directions for future research. First, the paper challenges other researchers to pay more attention to the contributions of in-migration, out-migration and especially non-migration to neighbourhood change. Secondly, the paper has shown that mobility and non-mobility patterns differ per household and neighbourhood and indicate that mobility is closely related to age and life-course. Findings suggest that neighbourhoods with high mobility accomplish a function for households starting their housing career, while in low mobility neighbourhoods, more households in later stages of their housing career reside. This paper urges for more insight into stages of housing careers of in-, out-and non-migrants, as it would provide a better understanding of the social dynamics of neighbourhoods and allow formulating expectations concerning their future development.
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change
4 Contextualizing state-led gentrification: goals of governing actors in generating neighbourhood upgrading

This chapter is conditionally accepted by Environment and Planning A

Abstract
This study provides insight into the way in which state-led gentrification has unfolded in three neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and The Hague. Although Dutch gentrification has been comparatively mild, state actors have increasingly adopted gentrification as a policy tool. However, the Netherlands provides a particular context for state-led gentrification. Firstly, the national government plays a key role, as regeneration policies increasingly promote gentrification as tool for differentiating the housing stock and as a necessary requirement for preventing social problems and decline. These goals were adopted by local governments in neighbourhood regeneration. Secondly, housing associations are important stimulators of gentrification. They are hybrid organizations: although their primary task is providing affordable housing, they are also market-oriented actors that generate income from market activities. However, power inequalities between actors, different objectives and priorities of actors and different local contexts have resulted in processes of negotiation and, consequently, diverse regeneration strategies. Although interventions have moved into a neo-liberal direction, governments and housing associations still form a strong buffer between market-interventions and neighbourhood development.

4.1 Introduction

Until the early 2000s, academic attention for the role of state actors in gentrification was limited, even though some authors urged for more attention for the relationship between gentrification and public policies (Marcuse, 1986; Van Weesep, 1994). The focus was mainly on explaining neighbourhood change from a demand-side or market-
oriented supply-side perspective. Lees (2000, p. 390) argued that through this ‘theoretical logjam’, important issues, such as the role of public policies, have been side-lined. In the past decade, however, governments around the world have increasingly adopted gentrification as a regeneration strategy (Smith, 2002; Wyly and Hammel, 2005). Consequently, academic research on the relationship between gentrification and policy has increased significantly (e.g. Special Issue “Gentrification and Public Policy”, Urban Studies 45 (12), 2008; Uitermark et al., 2007; Van Gent, 2013; Andersson and Turner, 2014). Although there were already policies stimulating gentrification in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the provision of improvement grants in London (Hamnett, 1973), state actors usually impeded gentrification, as policies mainly had a redistributive character (Ley, 1996). In the 1990s, state actors started to encourage gentrification more assertively and “more than ever before, gentrification is incorporated into public policy” (Wyly and Hammel, 2005, p. 74).

Although it is nowadays commonly understood that state actors play an important role in gentrification throughout the world, several gaps in our knowledge remain. Firstly, although many studies illustrate that gentrification is ‘a global urban strategy’ (Smith, 2002), our understanding of how and why state actors encourage gentrification in different contexts remains limited (Doucet et al., 2011). The way in which state actors stimulate gentrification is context-specific, as different institutional and housing market structures affect patterns of neighbourhood development differently (Van Weesep, 1994). Lees (2000, 2012) therefore urged authors to pay attention to the ‘geography of gentrification’, i.e. the spatial and temporal dimensions of gentrification. However, most studies focus on Anglo-Saxon contexts, which are characterized by liberal and laissez-faire attitudes towards housing and neighbourhood development. In countries with stronger welfare states and interventionist policies, such as the Netherlands, gentrification has been milder and more regulated (Van Gent, 2013; Doucet, 2014). Insight into the way in which state-led gentrification unfolds and the goals of the actors involved in such contexts may contribute to our understanding of the ‘geography of gentrification’.

Secondly, most studies on the relationship between state actors and gentrification treat state actors as one group of actors which are assumed to have similar perceptions and follow shared objectives in neighbourhood development. However, neoliberalization resulted in the development of new governance arrangements and multiple actors are nowadays often involved in neighbourhood regeneration, each with their own goals and agendas, and also varying by country. For instance, in Anglo-Saxon
contexts private actors often have a central role and governance frameworks are consequently often more ‘free-market’ oriented and focused on profit maximization (Doucet, 2013). In contrast, neighbourhood and housing development in the Netherlands is more regulated and managed by the government. In addition, housing associations are important actors of regeneration, and are at the same time public and private actors (Uitermark et al., 2007). The actors involved all have their own goals and agendas in neighbourhood regeneration, which results in varying outcomes in neighbourhood change (Kokx and Van Kempen, 2009).

The aim of this study is to contribute to the literature on the relationship between state actors and gentrification, by providing insight into the way in which state-led gentrification unfolds in a context where gentrification has been comparatively mild and regulated, but where gentrification has increasingly been adopted as a policy tool (Uitermark et al., 2007). The study focuses on three centrally-located neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and The Hague (the Netherlands) which have been subjected to state-led gentrification initiatives; the aim of the regeneration was to differentiate the housing stock in order to attract/retain higher-income households. The study raises the questions about what the goals of the actors involved are for policies and interventions in generating neighbourhood upgrading, to what extent these vary among actors and how this results in neighbourhood regeneration strategies. In the Netherlands, the “state” in state-led gentrification represents the national and local government, but there is also a strong role for housing associations. Housing associations are hybrid organizations: although they are non-profit organizations, subject to government supervision and with a primary task of providing affordable housing (a task which is compulsory and imposed by the state), they are also market-oriented actors which have to generate income from market activities. So, they are important stimulators of gentrification (section 4.3). This paper demonstrates that each of the actors involved in neighbourhood regeneration have their own goals and agendas, which have resulted in processes of negotiation between actors and, consequently, very different neighbourhood regeneration outcomes.

The study is structured as follows. Section 2 evaluates literature on the relationship between state actors and gentrification, followed by a discussion of the Dutch context. Then, the research design (section 4) and neighbourhoods (section 5) are discussed. Section 6, 7 and 8 examine the neighbourhood regeneration goals of different actors in Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg. Section 9 discusses this study’s findings and,
finally, section 10 reflects on the results and places the findings within the wider context of state-led gentrification.

4.2   The relationship between governing actors and gentrification

4.2.1   Towards state-led gentrification
Gentrification was originally defined as a spontaneous process in which homeowners revitalized dwellings in disinvested inner-city neighbourhoods (Glass, 1964). Over the past decades the definition of gentrification has significantly evolved and nowadays, it involves all processes related to creating affluent space and upward class transformation in urban neighbourhoods (Smith, 1996; Davidson and Lees, 2005). One of the ways in which gentrification has mutated is the emergence of state-led gentrification, in which gentrification is used as a policy tool to create more expensive housing in (low-income) neighbourhoods (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Uitermark et al., 2007; Lees, 2008). By distinguishing three ‘waves’ of gentrification, Hackworth and Smith (2001) demonstrate how the relationship between state actors and gentrification has changed\(^{15}\).

In the first wave (1950s until the economic recession of 1973), ‘risk-oblivious pioneers’ renovated dwellings for their own use in disinvested neighbourhoods, often with public support. In the second wave of gentrification (post-recession 1970s/1980s) the role of state actors was termed ‘laissez-faire’. Gentrification expanded and there was increased connection with the global systems of real estate and banking finance. In the third wave of gentrification (mid-1990s), state actors increasingly adopted gentrification as a policy tool.

4.2.2   Third-wave gentrification in different contexts
The promotion of gentrification by state actors has been linked to systemic changes in the relationship between state, market and individuals as a result of neo-liberalization since the 1980/1990s (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002). Neo-liberalization was characterized by a shift towards market-oriented and market-dependent approaches and rescaling of state power: financial power was transferred upwards to higher governmental levels, while responsibilities for direct collective consumption and social reproduction were transferred to lower levels. This led to increased state support of gentrification: policies shifted towards liberalization and reductions in funding for

\(^{15}\) Although it mainly draws from the context of the United States.
welfare and affordable housing. Many ‘obstacles’ which originally impeded gentrification were eliminated (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002). However, although neo-liberalization is clearly at work in many countries, “we should not expect this to lead to a simple convergence of outcomes […]. The process of neo-liberalization, then, is neither monolithic in form nor universal in effect” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 383). So, neo-liberalization varies between contexts in terms of pace, intensity and effects. Consequently, the way in which state-led gentrification unfolds varies between contexts too. In this respect, Lees (2000, 2012) urged authors to pay attention to the ‘geography of gentrification’: the spatial and temporal dimensions of gentrification.

Despite growing attention to the context-dependency of gentrification, most studies focus on Anglo-Saxon contexts, especially the US and UK, which are characterized by specific institutional arrangements that differ from Continental-European countries such as the Netherlands (Doucet, 2014; Hochstenbach et al., 2014). Anglo-Saxon contexts are characterized by more liberal and laissez-faire attitudes towards housing; private capital in housing and neighbourhoods often plays a central role. In contrast, many Continental-European countries have stronger welfare states, interventionist governments with their urban and housing policies and the presence of social housing (Van Kempen and Murie, 2009). This leads to milder forms of gentrification (Doucet, 2014; Hochstenbach et al., 2014), as its intensity is mitigated by instruments such as rent control and tenant protection (Van Weesep, 1994).

Nevertheless, state actors, again in these contexts, increasingly stimulated gentrification: the policy focus moved away from affordable housing towards promoting more expensive dwellings (Uitermark et al., 2007; Van Gent, 2013; Andersson and Turner, 2014). In the US, local governments play a central role in state-led gentrification, as they are pressed to generate tax revenues through attracting higher-income households (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Lees, 2008). However, local governments receive financial resources from the national government in many Continental-European countries. Instead, gentrification is often stimulated by policies of the national government on the assumption that it leads to less segregated neighbourhoods (Lees, 2008). In this respect, Uitermark et al. (2007) demonstrated that the first priority of regeneration actors in Hoogvliet (Rotterdam), was to create social order through gentrification, while profit margins were subordinate to this. They argued that “gentrification is a means through which governmental organisations and their partners lure the middle-classes into disadvantaged areas with the purpose of civilising and controlling these neighbourhoods” (p. 127).
In addition to pro-gentrification policies, housing associations have also been identified as stimulators of gentrification. A well-documented example was found in the UK, where housing associations stimulate homeownership through the privatization of social housing, made possible by the Right-to-Buy legislation (Van Gent, 2010b). Similarly in Sweden, housing associations invited residents to collectively buy their homes. Homeownership is seen as a superior form of tenure and the proportion of social housing has significantly decreased (Andersson and Turner, 2014). In the Netherlands, housing associations are also important stimulators of gentrification (Teernstra and Van Gent, 2012).

4.2.3 Multiple actors in regeneration

Another important reason for paying attention to the ‘geography of gentrification’ is that state actors are often treated as one group of actors, which are assumed to follow shared objectives in neighbourhood development. Nevertheless, due to neoliberalization, reductions in funding resulted in the increased dependency of local governments on the cooperation of other actors, such as housing associations and private developers (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Nowadays, multiple actors are involved in neighbourhood regeneration, each with their own goals and agendas, and the shift towards governance “…moves away from fixed ideas about power as a commodity rooted in particular institutions to more fluid ideas of power developed and negotiated between partners” (Taylor, 2007, p. 299).

Yet, there are differences between contexts in the composition and influence of actors involved in regeneration, which might lead to varying outcomes in neighbourhood change. For instance, Doucet (2013) observed in Glasgow that government frameworks often include private actors and are thereby more free-market oriented. In contrast, Dutch neighbourhood development is more regulated by the government and hybrid housing associations are important regeneration actors (Teernstra and Van Gent, 2012). Doucet (2013) concludes that strong leadership is essential in governance frameworks, as it combines different goals of actors into a cohesive strategy, but he also stresses the importance of understanding goals of individual actors. However, we know little about goals of different actors in neighbourhood regeneration, to what extent these vary and how this results in different strategies.
4.3 The Dutch context

As mentioned, in the Netherlands, gentrification has been mild compared to for example Anglo-Saxon contexts. Dutch state-led gentrification stands out for two reasons: (1) the role of housing associations as stimulators of gentrification and (2) the presence of pro-gentrification policies.

The Netherlands are characterized by a large social housing stock, owned by housing associations: 31 percent of the housing stock is socially rented, while respectively 13 and 55 percent are privately rented and owner-occupied (2011), although these percentages vary between cities. The quality of social housing is considered high; so poor neighbourhood quality is not directly related to social housing, but mainly to high proportions of low-income households and related social problems. Since the 1990s, however, the position of housing associations changed considerably, which can be related to neo-liberalization.

Until the 1990s, the government financially supported housing associations in providing affordable housing. Between 1945 and 1970, the percentage of social housing increased significantly (Uitermark, 2009). However, subsidies put pressure on the government’s budget. An important shift towards neo-liberalization came with the deregulation of housing associations into private organisations in 1995. Financial support for constructing social housing and management of the existing stock disappeared (Priemus, 2003). And continuing rent regulation meant that maintenance and construction of social housing were unprofitable investments for housing associations. Deregulation also meant that they have to finance these investments themselves. Consequently, housing associations had to generate income from commercial activities. For instance, housing associations were able to generate income by selling off social housing, converting social housing into privately rented housing16 and constructing owner-occupied housing17. Deregulation also meant that housing associations had to compete with each other (Priemus, 2003) and they thus became important stimulators of gentrification.

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16 When a socially rented dwelling is vacated, the rent price is recalculated on the basis of dwelling characteristics (e.g. quality, surface, location). When the new rent price is above the ‘social housing boundary’ (664,66 euro in 2012), the dwelling is transferred from the social to the privately rented sector. The housing association still owns the dwelling, but there are no longer any allocation rules in terms of income.

17 However, at least 30 percent of the housing constructed in housing projects in some cities must be designated social housing.
However, deregulation did not imply that housing associations became private actors. Their rights and obligations are established in regulations based on the Housing Act. Their primary task is still providing affordable housing and the government closely monitors their activities and finances, and controls rent levels. For instance, regulations compel them to maintain the quality of dwellings; when maintenance is put off for too long, technical deficits have to be eliminated. Moreover, housing associations are legally obliged to invest surpluses in social housing. Furthermore, there are limits to the number of dwellings which can be differentiated and housing associations have to request permission from the local government for demolition and construction of new housing. This demonstrates that housing associations became hybrid organizations: while performing market activities, they can also be public actors.

A second shift towards neo-liberalization came with changes in regeneration policies in favour of gentrification in the 1990s. The government saw differentiating the housing stock as necessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, the focus on affordable housing between 1945 and 1970 resulted in the realisation of a limited number of owner-occupied dwellings. Moreover, suburbanization meant that many higher-income households suburbanized. By providing a differentiated housing stock, the government aimed to retain higher-income households in cities (Van Kempen and Van Weesep, 1994; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008). Secondly, the government aimed to stimulate the urban economy: by attracting higher-income households, the government assumed that they would spend their money here as well (Musterd and Van der Ven, 1991). Thirdly, gentrification was promoted in order to improve the competitiveness of cities (Doucet et al., 2011). Finally and the most important in this study, social housing was increasingly seen as problematic: it had weakened the position of many urban neighbourhoods (Uitermark et al., 2007). Social problems were assumed to be caused by concentrations of low-income households and ethnic minorities.

The new urban renewal policy was set out in the Urban Renewal Memorandum, which is part of the Big Cities Policy (BCP). The key objective was differentiating the housing stock into neighbourhoods with ‘one-sided’ housing, in order to create socio-economic upgrading – thereby promoting gentrification. Since social housing is owned

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18 This is established in agreements between housing associations and the local government. There are agreements, for instance, that determine the number of social housing units to be sold-off by housing associations, and they include quota’s per district. In Amsterdam, for instance, there is a threshold for social housing of 33 percent of the total stock in the central urban district and 25 percent in the other districts. In addition, 50 percent of the converted dwellings should be sold to middle-income households.
by housing associations, they became important actors of regeneration. In addition, the government increasingly expected housing associations to invest in the liveability of neighbourhoods. Within the guidelines for regeneration, which are dictated by the national government, local governments and housing associations developed their own visions. As this chapter demonstrates, this resulted in diverse regeneration strategies.

4.4 Research design

4.4.1 Data and methodology
This study draws on semi-structured interviews with 24 actors involved in regeneration. The respondents were employed by the Municipality of Amsterdam (four), the Municipality of The Hague (seven) and housing associations (thirteen respondents). The interviews were held in 2011/2012. The focus was on the period 1999 to 2011 and four topics were addressed: (1) neighbourhood development over the past decades; (2) policies and interventions of the actors involved; (3) the goals and motivations for these policies and interventions; and (4) the perceived effects of their policies and interventions on the neighbourhood and those of other actors. Of course, these perceived effects were coloured because of their position. So, they needed to be reflected with the statistical analyses of income and real estate data (Teernstra and Van Gent, 2012) and other neighbourhood statistics (Table 4.1).

The interviews were coded and analysed with the software programme Atlas.ti. In addition, policy documents concerning the regeneration of the neighbourhoods were analysed, as well as policy documents of national and local governments.

4.4.2 Case selection
This study provides insight into the way in which state-led gentrification has unfolded in Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam and Rustenburg in The Hague. The neighbourhoods were selected because they had – in a certain respect – similar positions in the 1990s: they were characterized by a weak position in the housing market, low socio-economic status and they had consequently been subjected to state-led gentrification initiatives. However, Amsterdam and The Hague represent different urban contexts. This raises the question to what extent there are variations between the cities in the way in which state-led gentrification occurs. It is argued that the process of gentrification is rooted in the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial urban
economy, based on financial, business and creative services, and accompanying changes in earnings and lifestyles (e.g. Ley, 1996; Hamnett, 2002). In the Netherlands, this transition is best seen in Amsterdam: manufacturing industry jobs have largely disappeared and, nowadays, the largest sectors include finance and business services, ICT and creative industries. Amsterdam is seen as an attractive place for economic activities. Not surprisingly, the housing market is characterized by high demand and high prices. Consequently, many centrally-located neighbourhoods have experienced gentrification (Teernstra and Van Gent, 2012). On the other hand, The Hague is the Dutch governmental centre. The labour market is characterized by an extensive public sector and there are several international organizations in the fields of human rights. The Hague is one of the most segregated cities in the Netherlands, with both poor neighbourhoods and affluent villa parks (Bolt et al., 2002). Compared to Amsterdam, The Hague’s housing market is characterized by lower demand and lower prices. This study aims to understand to what extent the way in which state-led gentrification unfolds varies between the two urban contexts.

4.5 Research neighbourhoods

4.5.1 Transvaal and Oosterpark
Transvaal and Oosterpark are centrally-located, adjacent neighbourhoods and part of Urban District East of the Municipality of Amsterdam. The municipality has a particular administrative structure: there are seven relatively autonomous districts, which have their own budgets and are responsible for tasks such as land-use planning.

Oosterpark and Transvaal are densely-built neighbourhoods, but their construction periods differ: Oosterpark was developed in the late 19th century, Transvaal in the early 20th century. While the development of Oosterpark was largely unplanned, Transvaal was constructed after the Housing Act of 1901. Transvaal was among the first neighbourhoods (partly) built by housing associations, in the expressionist and characteristic style of the Amsterdam School, which explains the presence of social housing (Table 4.1). The socially rented dwellings from that period are relatively large and many low-income families with children live here.

\[19\] The large housing stock is also the result of urban renewal policies in the 1970s and 1980s, when many privately rented dwellings were converted into social housing.
### Table 4.1 Characteristics of the neighbourhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transvaal</th>
<th>Oosterpark</th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>Rustenburg</th>
<th>The Hague</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (2012)</strong></td>
<td>9,190</td>
<td>10,287</td>
<td>790,044</td>
<td>6,052</td>
<td>502,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing stock (2012, in %)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially rented</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately rented</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction period (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1945</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;1990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real estate value (euro)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>162,704</td>
<td>185,625</td>
<td>198,173</td>
<td>65,223</td>
<td>113,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>199,325</td>
<td>234,776</td>
<td>293,499</td>
<td>114,824</td>
<td>207,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1999-2009</td>
<td>+22%</td>
<td>+27%</td>
<td>+48%</td>
<td>+76%</td>
<td>+82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income¹ (euro)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12,248</td>
<td>12,996</td>
<td>14,302</td>
<td>14,117</td>
<td>14,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16,079</td>
<td>17,539</td>
<td>19,294</td>
<td>18,158</td>
<td>19,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1999-2008</td>
<td>+31%</td>
<td>+35%</td>
<td>+35%</td>
<td>+29%</td>
<td>+31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education level² (2008, in %)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic background (2011, in %)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residents’ opinion about neighborhood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.5*</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subjective safety index³</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective safety index³</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Standardized net household income from work, benefit and pensions.
² Education level of individuals above 15 years old
³ The index is based on police data (objective index) and survey data (subjective index). All scores are relative to the average city index in 2003, which was 100. A score higher than 100 means the neighbourhood is relatively unsafe, a score below 100 means the neighbourhood is relatively safe.

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Kadaster, O&S Amsterdam and municipality of The Hague.
In Oosterpark, the large social housing sector is partly the result of regeneration in the 1970s/1980s, when 35 percent of privately-owned housing was replaced by social housing. These dwellings are generally smaller, built for singles during an era of suburbanisation. In addition, many privately-owned dwellings were converted into social housing. From the 1970s, many native-Dutch families left Transvaal and Oosterpark to go to new towns; they were replaced mainly by immigrants. Nowadays, the majority of the population is of non-Dutch origin.

While many centrally-located neighbourhoods in Amsterdam experienced upgrading in the 1990s, Transvaal and Oosterpark had comparatively low real estate values and socioeconomic status (Table 4.1). Despite their proximity and similar position, however, the neighbourhoods vary from each other: problems relating to social deprivation, crime and nuisance are of minor importance in Oosterpark.

4.5.2 Rustenburg

Rustenburg is located to the west of The Hague’s inner-city. Unlike Amsterdam, The Hague’s districts have little autonomy. Rustenburg was constructed for low- and middle-income households in the early 20th-century. The architecture is largely preserved and the housing stock is characterized by small apartments and a few single-family dwellings. In contrast to Transvaal and Oosterpark, Rustenburg has a large owner-occupied housing stock. About half of the households are of native-Dutch origin, while about one-third has a non-Western background. In 1999, Rustenburg’s socioeconomic status and real estate value were below average (Table 4.1).

4.6 Transvaal, Amsterdam

In the 1990s, Urban District East of the Municipality of Amsterdam noticed a downward development in Transvaal: the housing stock and public space were in poor condition. This was related to the presence of a large social housing stock, which was considered as ‘one-sided’ with small and inexpensive apartments. The downward development was also related to technical deficits in privately rented housing. It was assumed that these aspects resulted in selective migration:

“What happened was that more and more underprivileged families, non-native families, settled down. […] So, the neighbourhood acquired poorer reputation,
and when something [a dwelling] became vacant, there were no long waiting lists of privileged people to settle down.” [District manager, Urban District East]

According to the respondents, this led to further decline: a weak neighbourhood economy, high unemployment levels, crime and nuisance. In 1999 the district therefore developed a regeneration strategy; the aim was to turn the downward spiral in cooperation with housing associations. The strategy marked the first (although marginal) steps towards state-led gentrification, as the central aim was to retain and attract higher-income households. In 2004, the plan was further intensified, but it was not until 2007 that downgrading was actually turned; this was when the national government launched the *Forty Neighbourhood Programme* and selected Transvaal as one of the Netherlands’ forty ‘worst’ neighbourhoods. So, Transvaal’s regeneration was characterized by different phases in state-led gentrification.

### 4.6.1 Preventing further decline

Transvaal’s regeneration is strongly influenced by policy objectives of the national government. As mentioned, in the 1990s there was a major shift in national regeneration policies. For Transvaal, this implied that the regeneration strategy was focused on stimulating gentrification in 1999, as the key objective was to create more owner-occupied and large socially rented dwellings, in order to retain and attract higher-income households and families with children, counteract decline and halt selective migration. This is in line with Uitermark et al. (2007) who showed that regeneration actors aimed to create social order through gentrification, while profit margins were subordinate. Furthermore, in Transvaal, technical dwelling deficits had to be eliminated and interventions to improve safety levels and neighbourhood economy were formulated. However, regeneration was not solely focused on stimulating gentrification: a limited share of the housing stock would be differentiated, while the majority would be preserved as social housing. Moreover, the district formulated interventions to stimulate socio-economic improvement of residents. In other words, interventions supporting gentrification co-exist with interventions stimulating socio-economic improvement of incumbent residents. So, the impact of gentrification is mitigated, which was also demonstrated by Doucet (2014) and Van Gent (2013).
4.6.2 Interventions in the built environment
Although the aims of regeneration were clear, the implementation of the interventions was far more complex because it involved a variety of actors, which each had their own agendas. The district aimed to establish a coalition with four housing associations active in the neighbourhood, but initially three of these associations had other objectives than the district authority. As mentioned earlier, housing associations became deregulated in 1995. Consequently, they have to generate income from commercial activities in order to finance investments in social housing. They could not therefore financially be ‘active’ in all neighbourhoods simultaneously. This implied that some housing associations prioritized interventions in neighbourhoods other than Transvaal, where the housing stock was in a worse condition. Only one association was willing to cooperate, and consequently only part of Transvaal’s housing stock was renovated. So, different actors do not necessarily have similar perceptions: although according to the district government, Transvaal was a prioritized neighbourhood, for most housing associations interventions were initially less urgent. This shows how the shift towards governance leads to more ‘fluid’ ideas of power and negotiations between actors, which is in line with Taylor (2007, p. 299).

In the course of the 2000s, the housing associations which initially did not participate, developed a sense of urgency to intervene: they realized that downgrading had not turned. Although housing associations are legally obliged to maintain the quality of dwellings, maintaining – or increasing – real estate values of dwellings is important for their financial sustainability. So all associations started to renovate their housing stock in the course of the 2000s. Moreover, differentiation of the housing stock became a prominent strategy and housing associations consequently became stimulators of gentrification. Like the government, housing associations differentiated housing, as they saw concentrations of low-income households as a cause of decline:

“One of the reasons for intervening physically is that it is often an instrument to create more differentiation in the neighbourhood. […] Dwellings are not always in a poor condition, but there are especially too many underprivileged people in one place, causing huge problems.” [Local manager, Housing association A]

So, five years after starting ‘negotiations’, the district and housing associations now have similar agendas concerning the housing stock.
However, an important difference between housing associations and district is that for housing associations differentiating the housing stock is important to generate income. In Transvaal, housing associations sold off a part of their housing stock, converted social housing into privately rented housing and constructed new (owner-occupied) housing. Housing associations determine strategically in which neighbourhoods they differentiate. These are generally neighbourhoods where they see potential for raising real estate values; they are often centrally-located neighbourhoods, which were constructed in the early-20th century, such as Transvaal. However, the revenues are not necessarily spent in the neighbourhood, but are spent citywide. This demonstrates that, for housing associations, the aim of differentiation is not solely to stimulate gentrification. However, it does trigger gentrification, as conversion of social housing into condominiums attracts higher-income residents.

4.6.3 Interventions beyond the built environment

In addition to interventions in housing, the district formulated interventions to improve social and economic neighbourhood aspects. As mentioned earlier, the government increasingly expects housing associations to invest in the liveability of neighbourhoods. The district therefore aimed to cooperate with housing associations in order to implement the interventions. However, the associations did not prioritize investments in other aspects than housing. Consequently, the district implemented only a few social and economic interventions. It was mainly interventions to improve safety that were implemented, as this was considered urgent:

“We had to, because there were shootings every week… So to say. There was something going on every week. There was a lot of nuisance with drug addicts. [...] It was terrible.” [District manager, Urban District East]

This demonstrates that a sense of urgency among actors is important in implementing interventions.

However, in the course of the 2000s it became clear that the focus on housing and safety issues had been insufficient to turn downgrading. Furthermore, the district and housing associations mainly worked in isolation from each other, which was seen as another cause of the failure of regeneration.
4.6.4 An integral approach, but multiple agendas

The selection of Transvaal in 2007 as one of the forty neighbourhoods in the national regeneration programme brought the neighbourhood under the renewed attention of actors. The national government provided funding in order to tackle decline\(^{20}\); the aim was to create close cooperation between local government and housing associations. The government dictated the implementation of an integral approach of social, physical and economic interventions. The programme therefore included a broad range of interventions: interventions to stimulate socio-economic improvement (e.g. coaching disadvantaged youth) and participation of incumbent residents (e.g. involving residents in the decision-making processes), improve the neighbourhood economy (e.g. attracting entrepreneurs) and increase safety levels (e.g. reducing crime) and physical interventions (housing and public space). Interestingly, the focus of regeneration shifted towards socio-economic improvement of incumbent residents. However, pushing forward gentrification was still key objective. This – again – demonstrates that multiple goals can be pursued within one neighbourhood.

A coalition between district and housing associations was established. Most associations indicated that they participated because it was dictated:

“It is interesting that because a minister suddenly determines that housing associations and governments have to sit together... That was a good one of Vogelaar [Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration]. Otherwise it would not have happened.” [District manager, Housing association D]

This demonstrates the strong role of the national government in regeneration. Although a coalition was established, individual actors still have their own priorities: they do not participate in the same degree and do not focus on the same aspects.

Firstly, in contrast to the district, financial motives are important in determining the degree to which housing associations participate. They determine strategically how much money and time they invest in aspects beyond housing. The housing association with the most dwellings in Transvaal invested the most and vice versa:

\(^{20}\) Although local governments and housing associations were expected to contribute financially too.
“The more property you have [in a neighbourhood], the more important it is to make the neighbourhood healthy in all regards.” [Area developer, Housing association C]

Housing associations with fewer dwellings in Transvaal take a more marginal role in the coalition and invested less in neighbourhood aspects beyond housing. Instead, they focused on neighbourhoods where they own larger numbers of dwellings. Here, it is clear that neo-liberalization makes housing associations competitive and aspire towards strengthening their economic position. In line with Priemus (2003) and Van Gent (2013), this demonstrates that housing associations have two ‘faces’: although they are public organizations, they are also market-oriented actors and maintaining – or increasing – real estate values is important for their financial sustainability. Their market-oriented role is also clear in that they indicated that they participated in the coalition because they saw a potential for increasing real estate values in Transvaal.

Secondly, the type of interventions implemented by housing associations in aspects beyond housing vary. For instance, one association focuses on the socio-economic improvement of residents, while others invest in economic or safety issues. This is partly the result of a division of ‘tasks’, but, more importantly, partly the result of different ideas about their role:

“Actually, I was confronted with the role of a housing association. Because, if you look at the chances of children receiving a good or bad education… Everybody understands that. And investing in education is a good thing. But, does a housing association have to do that? Yes, [Housing association X] is doing that. But we don’t.” [District Manager, Housing association D]

So, differences between housing associations concerning ideas about the role they should fulfil result in different types of interventions. Yet, this is also related to their financial position: associations with the strongest position are most able to invest. Since the associations are not able to intervene in all neighbourhoods and neighbourhood aspects simultaneously, they strategically determine in which neighbourhoods and in what types of neighbourhood aspects they want to invest most.
4.7 Oosterpark, Amsterdam

Like Transvaal, the adjacent neighbourhood Oosterpark has been subjected to state-led gentrification initiatives. However, the respondents argue that the neighbourhoods vary from each other despite their proximity and similar socio-economic and real estate position. The problems observed in Transvaal, such as social deprivation, crime and nuisance were of minor importance in Oosterpark. An important difference was that in Oosterpark an upward development had to be stimulated, while in Transvaal a downward spiral had to be turned. This was related to on-going gentrification of the inner-city, from which Oosterpark benefitted more than Transvaal owing to its proximity:

“Expansion of the city has meant that neighbourhoods in the 19th-century ring are becoming more popular: they are centrally-located, accessible and have a clear urban character. […] Oosterpark is becoming an increasingly strong housing market area.” [Urban District East, 2004, p. 6]

4.7.1 Stimulating marginal upgrading

A barrier to ‘spontaneous’ gentrification in Oosterpark was its housing stock: it was characterized by technical deficits, but moreover, it was considered one-sided, which did not “meet the demand of current and future residents anymore” (Urban District East, 2004, p. 6). It was assumed to result in selective migration. So in 2004, Urban District East formulated a regeneration strategy and received funding from the Big Cities Policy. The strategy reflected key objectives of the national government: the aim was to stimulate gentrification by differentiating the housing stock, in order to retain/attract higher-income households, halt selective migration and increase Oosterpark’s competitiveness. Furthermore, interventions to stimulate the economy and improve public space were formulated. However, the implementation of the interventions unfolded differently than in Transvaal.

4.7.2 A profitable neighbourhood

As in Transvaal, the district aimed to establish a coalition with four housing associations that were active in the neighbourhood in order to improve the housing stock. However, as said before, for most associations, both establishing a coalition and
interventions in Oosterpark were not initially a priority. A local manager of Housing association B recalls:

“I think because the problems were less urgent. [...] There was not a lot of nuisance or other problems which would necessitate to sit together around the table, I guess.”

Some associations prioritized other neighbourhoods, because they were financially unable to be active in all neighbourhoods simultaneously.

Yet, the associations felt the urgency to renovate and differentiate housing in the course of the 2000s. So the district and housing associations now had similar agendas, although the associations intervened at different moments and in isolation from each other. As in Transvaal, housing associations differentiated social housing through selling off and conversion into privately rented housing. In addition, some associations proposed demolishing social housing blocks in a poor condition. Replacing these blocks with newly-constructed dwellings was cheaper than renovation and provided more opportunities for differentiation. As mentioned earlier, housing associations legally have to request permission for demolition (section 4.3). However, the local government does not often favour demolition of early 20th-century architecture and residents protested against demolition. This resulted in long processes of negotiation between housing associations, local government and residents and, consequently, some demolition plans were cancelled, while others were delayed. This demonstrates how negotiation and conflicts between actors can change regeneration strategies (Kokx and Van Kempen, 2009).

While differentiation of the housing stock in Transvaal was a strategy to decrease both social problems and generate income, generating income in Oosterpark seems to be the dominant reason for housing associations. This can be explained by two reasons. Social issues are of minor importance and the demand for owner-occupied dwellings is comparatively high:

“We notice that the sale of dwellings in other neighbourhoods is not always going very well. But in Oosterpark, it is still going good21.” [District Manager, Housing association A]

21 Here, the District Manager refers to the impact of the economic crisis on the sale of dwellings.
The respondents relate this to Oosterpark’s proximity to the inner-city and low real estate values. Oosterpark is therefore a profitable neighbourhood for selling off and converting social housing. This demonstrates a shift towards a liberalization of policies and again shows the hybridity of housing associations (Van Gent, 2013). In Oosterpark, the respondents argued that they have to generate income:

“Of course, we are not real estate agents, we are a housing association. […] But in the end, money is important, of course. Because if you don’t have it, you cannot continue, no matter how idealistic you are.” [District Manager, Housing association A]

Resulting displacement is not considered problematic by the district and housing associations, firstly because direct displacement is limited by tenant protection. Social housing can only be converted into owner-occupied or privately rented housing when vacant – i.e. after tenants leave voluntarily. In addition, the respondents justified displacement due to demolition by arguing that households were placed on top of waiting lists for social housing and received financial compensation:

“When a dwelling is demolished, people always have the opportunity […], if they want to stay in the neighbourhood, to wait until another dwelling becomes available.” [Former district manager, Urban District East]

In addition, the respondents argued that there was still sufficient social housing, despite long waiting lists22. Finally, newly-constructed housing projects in Amsterdam have a quota of on average 30 percent of social housing. So while social housing is declining through differentiation, new social housing is added at the same time. As direct displacement is limited, the total decline in social housing is not perceived as problematic.

4.7.3 The hybridity of housing associations
Although social problems were of minor importance, the district formulated interventions to stimulate socio-economic improvement of incumbent residents.

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22 In Oosterpark and Transvaal, respectively 61 and 67 percent of the housing stock consists of social housing (2012). The average waiting period for a social housing unit in Oosterpark and Transvaal was respectively 11 and 9 years in 2009 (O&S Amsterdam).
Similar to Transvaal, this demonstrated that multiple goals could be pursued within one neighbourhood, which mitigated the effects of gentrification (Van Gent, 2013; Doucet, 2014). However, these interventions were only implemented marginally as they were considered less urgent. The district refurnished public space and reduced crime. In contrast to Transvaal, housing associations in Oosterpark limited investments to housing, except for the investments made in economic aspects by two associations. In cooperation with the district, these associations attracted more 'upscale' entrepreneurs, as they owned a substantial proportion of housing in (this part of) Oosterpark and therefore have an interest in increasing real estate values. This – again – shows that housing associations can take different positions within neighbourhoods.

Moreover, the same associations in Transvaal and Oosterpark (except for D and E) took different positions in both neighbourhoods. In Transvaal, they established a coalition with the district and implemented an integrated approach. Here the focus was on improving the socioeconomic position of residents and attracting higher-income households. In contrast, housing associations in Oosterpark intervened in isolation from each other and focused on housing. Here the emphasis was solely on attracting higher-income households. The different position taken by the associations can be explained as follows. Firstly, the problems in Oosterpark were considered less urgent. Secondly, the establishment of the coalition and the integrated approach in Transvaal was dictated by the national government.

4.8 Rustenburg, The Hague

In the 1990s, Rustenburg was characterized by a similar position as Transvaal and Oosterpark: a low socioeconomic position and poor housing condition. In contrast to Transvaal and Oosterpark, Rustenburg’s housing stock was largely owner-occupied; it was also considered one-sided, as it consisted of small and cheap apartments: 77 percent of the housing stock consisted of apartments, with an average size of 72 square metres and real estate value of 114,824 euro in 2009. This was assumed to result in selective migration:

23 In The Hague, 77 percent of the housing stock consists of apartments, with an average size of 89 square meters, and an average real estate value of 207,362 euro.
There were processes of selective migration, which were mainly caused by the quality of dwellings. People who could afford to do so moved out and people who could not afford to do so moved in. What was originally a very nice neighbourhood... Well, there was a different type of resident entering the neighbourhood.” [District manager, Municipality of The Hague]

With ‘a different type of resident’, the respondent implies residents with low incomes and non-Dutch background. These households were assumed to in-migrate because of a lack of alternatives, leading to further decline: physical decline and lack of social cohesion. This demonstrates that respondents portrayed Rustenburg’s downward development mainly in terms of mobility. Identifying a neighbourhood’s residents as a main cause of decline was termed the “Camden Syndrome” by Smith et al. (2001): they argue that this systematically disguises the importance of the migration of capital, which precedes residential choices and possibilities on the housing market. However, the municipality developed a regeneration strategy for Rustenburg based on their observations. The municipality had similar ambitions as Urban District East in Amsterdam: a key objective was to stimulate gentrification through differentiating the housing stock.

4.8.1 Endogenous upgrading

However, the implementation of regeneration was entirely different in nature than in Transvaal and Oosterpark because of the large owner-occupied housing stock. In addition to three housing associations, the municipality had to deal with owner-occupants. The municipality aimed to demolish a significant part of the owner-occupied housing, which would be replaced by larger dwellings, in order to attract/retain higher-income households. This would improve the neighbourhood’s socioeconomic position, real estate value and social cohesion. However, this resulted in a large demonstration by residents. A district manager recalls:

“We thought we could do this as the government, as we also did this in Schilderswijk [...] But there was one big difference which was not taken into account: the housing stock was different. [...]Schilderswijk consisted mainly of social housing. So there you had control over the housing stock. And here there was no control, as they were all owner-occupants, who said: what’s all this about?”
So, the municipality experienced that owner-occupants are able to resist gentrification, while renters are not. The municipality was unfamiliar with regenerating owner-occupied housing, as previous regeneration had addressed neighbourhoods with social housing. Consequently, a new plan was developed in cooperation with residents, which was a compromise between the agendas of the municipality and the residents. Similar to Kokx and Van Kempen (2009) and the findings in Oosterpark and Transvaal, this demonstrates how negotiations and conflicting objectives could change regeneration strategies.

Instead of stimulating gentrification through demolition and construction of ‘upscale’ dwellings, the strategy was to create socioeconomic upgrading ‘endogenously’ by retaining upwardly-mobile households in place. The assumption was that they would stay if they were offered larger dwellings. The strategy was implemented by stimulating homeowners to enlarge their dwellings, by providing subsidies. This method of differentiation was acceptable to residents, as it was voluntary. Furthermore, the municipality urged homeowners to eliminate technical deficits, in order to improve Rustenburg’s competitive position. The municipality also refurnished public space, because:

“We wanted to restore the confidence of homeowners. We as municipality, it [public space] is our domain, we take care of it and make it nice. […] It was also intended as a sort of ‘flywheel’: we take care of the public space, so homeowners, take care of your dwellings.” [Project Manager, Municipality of The Hague]

So state-led gentrification took place in a quite different way than in Transvaal and Oosterpark. The respondents argued that this way of regeneration was new and they described the process as intensive and challenging, as they were dependent on the willingness of homeowners to invest.

4.8.2 Negotiation between the municipality and housing associations
Owner-occupants were not the only actors involved in regeneration: the municipality also wished to renovate the social housing stock, however small. Yet, in contrast to Transvaal and Oosterpark, the aim was to maintain social housing – instead of converting such housing into owner-occupied or privately rented housing. This can be explained by the presence of a small social housing stock in centrally-located neighbourhoods in The Hague, which the municipality aimed to preserve. Similar to
Transvaal and Oosterpark, the municipality was dependent on the cooperation of housing associations. Some of them were reluctant.

One housing association prioritized renovations in other neighbourhoods. This – again – demonstrates that different actors do not necessarily have similar perceptions. The other associations were willing to invest, but did not have similar goals to the municipality. They preferred demolition and construction of new housing. A part of the newly-constructed dwellings would be sold off, in order to generate income and create socioeconomic differentiation. The municipality, however, did not favour demolition of early 20th-century architecture and decreasing social housing was (politically) sensitive. The municipality therefore negotiated with the associations, and this resulted in a compromise:

“Because the municipality wished to maintain social housing, we decided to go along with it. However, we told the municipality: ‘it’s okay, but we want to develop this area [respondent points at another district]. So we want more tolerance there.’ That’s the card game that is played. […] It is a very strategic process.” [Local manager, Housing association G]

So, the association agreed to preserve social housing in Rustenburg in exchange for the opportunity to develop another district. The municipality agreed with the third association that they would be allowed to demolish social housing, as it was in a poor condition, but newly-constructed housing would converted into socially rented housing. Furthermore, the association was allowed to construct additional dwellings on a vacant area in Rustenburg.

In short, Rustenburg’s regeneration was the outcome of complex processes of negotiations:

“Between policy and the actual implementation…that is a difference of almost 180 degrees. Policies have been implemented nowhere for 100 percent. It is often negotiated and changed and things like that.” [Local manager, Housing association F]
4.9 Discussion

This study’s findings demonstrated that the promotion of gentrification was a key element in the regeneration of Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg. Yet, the implementation of the strategies was difficult: different actors were involved, each with their own goals, and multiple goals were pursued. This raises the question of to what extent goals have been achieved.

In Transvaal, the respondents argued that the *Forty Neighbourhood Program* halted the downward spiral and stimulated marginal upgrading: the neighbourhood has become more ‘liveable’, as the quality of public space and neighbourhood economy have improved. Furthermore, the population has become socio-economically more mixed and safety levels and residents’ opinion about the neighbourhood have improved. This marginal upward development is reflected in the statistics (Table 4.1). The respondents mainly related the marginal upward development to their joint efforts and integrated implementation of social, economic and physical interventions. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that Transvaal also benefitted from increasing popularity of Amsterdam’s inner-city. However, regeneration has not finished yet, as there are still problems related to youth and nuisance. The coalition therefore continued its interventions.

In Oosterpark, the respondents indicated an upward development. In contrast to Transvaal, they related this mainly to on-going gentrification in the inner-city and assumed that Oosterpark would have experienced upgrading without regeneration. However, the interventions *triggered* upgrading and created a ‘domino-effect’: renovations of housing and public space and attraction of up-scale entrepreneurs created a spin-off, as these aspects attracted new entrepreneurs and residents to Oosterpark. The upward development is reflected in the statistics: residents’ opinions about the neighbourhood and safety levels improved significantly (Table 4.1). Furthermore, the number of owner-occupied dwellings increased from 569 (2002) to 1215 (2012). Nevertheless, real estate values did not increase as fast as citywide increases (Teernstra and Van Gent, 2012). These statistics only account for the period until 2009, so the upward development may not be visible yet.

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24 However, 2013 was the last year of the implementation of the *Forty Neighbourhood Program* in Transvaal, (partly) because of budget cuts of local government and housing associations as a result of the economic crisis. Until 2013, the impact of the economic crisis on Transvaal’s regeneration has been relatively small, as Transvaal has been spared in many of earlier budget cuts.
In contrast, respondents of Rustenburg acknowledged that the objectives to create socioeconomic and real estate upgrading were not realized. Instead, they were only able to halt downgrading. The respondents argue that only a small number of residents were willing to enlarge their dwelling, as it was expensive: even though households could get subsidy, they still had to pay a significant share. This demonstrates that stimulating gentrification is difficult when actors do not own the housing stock and do not therefore have control over the housing. Furthermore, the respondents stated that the presence of neighbourhoods in The Hague with higher-quality dwellings – which many households chose in preferences to Rustenburg – prevented upgrading. This shows the importance of the ‘geography of gentrification’ (Lees, 2000; 2012), as the urban context in which the neighbourhoods are located influences regeneration outcomes. The halt in downgrading is reflected in the statistics: the socioeconomic status and real estate values showed neither upgrading or downgrading, but followed citywide increases (Table 4.1 and Teernstra and Van Gent, 2012).

4.10 Conclusions

This study focused on the way in which state-led gentrification unfolded in three neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and The Hague, by examining the goals of the actors involved in neighbourhood regeneration. Although neo-liberalization has been comparatively mild in the Netherlands, it is certainly occurring and it has increasingly supported gentrification. An important shift towards neo-liberalization came via changes in regeneration policies in favour of gentrification in the 1990s. At that time, the research neighbourhoods had a weak position, which was assumed to be caused by a one-sided housing stock. State actors therefore pursued gentrification: the housing stock had to be differentiated in order to attract/retain higher-income households. Gentrification was seen as a medicine to avoid decline.

This study aimed to provide insight into the way in which Dutch state-led gentrification stands out compared to – for instance – Anglo-Saxon contexts. Firstly, while state-led gentrification is often seen as a municipally-led goal (to generate local tax revenues for instance; see Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Lees, 2008), the national government plays a key role in Dutch gentrification. The government increasingly saw social housing as problematic: social problems were assumed to be caused by concentrations of low-income households living in social housing. Differentiating the housing stock was seen as necessary to prevent further decline and create social order –
in line with Uitermark et al. (2007, p. 127), who demonstrated that gentrification is used as a strategy to ‘civilize’ and ‘control’ the neighbourhood. These goals were adopted by the local government in the regeneration of Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg.

Secondly, housing associations are important actors in regeneration. As is the case with national and local governments, gentrification is a solution for housing associations to prevent decline and ‘control’ the neighbourhood. However, the generation of income is a dominant reason as well; this relates to the deregulation of housing associations in 1995. They became *hybrid* organizations with two ‘faces’: although their primary task is still providing affordable housing, they also became market-oriented actors who have to generate income in order to exist.

This study demonstrated that the actors involved all had their own objectives and priorities, resulting in processes of negotiation and different outcomes in interventions. Goals of housing associations did not always match those of the government. As housing associations have to strengthen their economic position, they determine strategically in which neighbourhoods they differentiate and invest in aspects beyond housing. Moreover, they take different positions in different neighbourhoods, as the cases of Transvaal and Oosterpark illustrated. Although local governments aimed to bring together the goals of actors involved into a cohesive strategy (similar to findings of Doucet, 2013), the eventual interventions were a compromise between goals of the government and housing associations, which resulted in diverse strategies to create upgrading.

Moreover, this study demonstrated the importance of the urban contexts in which the neighbourhoods are located. Firstly, Amsterdam’s housing market is characterized by high demand. Its central location meant that Oosterpark (and Transvaal to a lesser extent) benefitted from the on-going gentrification of Amsterdam’s inner-city. In contrast, The Hague is characterized by lower demand and the presence of higher-quality housing around Rustenburg impeded upgrading. Secondly, this study showed the importance of tenure structures in regeneration. In contrast to Transvaal and Oosterpark, differentiating the housing stock in Rustenburg was difficult as the housing stock is largely owner-occupied and housing associations and government did not have *control* over the housing stock.

In conclusion, although gentrification is relatively mild in the Netherlands, both governments and housing associations increasingly aim to generate neighbourhood upgrading and change the population composition. Nevertheless, neighbourhood
interventions are not implemented in the same way everywhere, and this did not result in similar outcomes. Varying actors, operating at different spatial levels, together determine and implement regeneration strategies. The study showed that within the ‘intervention space’ that is available for these actors within the set of government rules and regulations, power inequalities, different objectives of actors involved and different local contexts are of key importance. This is ultimately reflected in a range of regeneration strategies and very different outcomes. This includes gentrification by selling off social housing, conversion into privately rented housing, constructing owner-occupied housing, investments in socio-economic improvement of residents and attracting entrepreneurs.

However, even though the interventions are moving into a neo-liberal direction, the government and housing associations simultaneously form a strong buffer between market interventions and neighbourhood development. Social motives remain important drivers, which impede harsh forms of gentrification. Housing associations are still obliged to realize social objectives by law. Furthermore, the government provides extensive regulations to reduce negative effects of the functioning of the market, such as rent regulation and maintenance requirements. As Newman and Wyly (2006) argued, these bodies and regulations can still make the difference.

In summary, the gentrification debate should take into account the roles of national and local governments in stimulating gentrification; and in addition other actors such as housing associations. All actors have their own intervention goals, which vary between but also within contexts. Insight into goals of actors in different contexts contributes to our understanding of the ‘geography of gentrification’. In the end, neighbourhood change is the outcome of negotiation between actors, resulting in varying regeneration strategies and consequently, diverse processes of neighbourhood change.
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change

Source: H. van Herk
Participation in neighbourhood upgrading: achievements of residents in a Dutch disadvantaged neighbourhood

This chapter is co-authored by Fenne M. Pinkster and under review at an international peer-reviewed journal.

Abstract
This paper addresses the way in which the opening up of governance spaces has created new opportunities for residents to contribute to neighbourhood upgrading through participation in decision-making processes in policy plans for neighbourhood upgrading. The paper focuses on the disadvantaged neighbourhood of Transvaal (Amsterdam), which has gone through successive stages of regeneration from 1999 onwards and therefore allows for a comprehensive analysis of participation mechanisms established over the last fifteen years. Findings demonstrate that creating opportunities for resident participation in neighbourhood governance may form the new ideal, but turns out to be a process of trial and error. Participation mechanisms that contribute to improving everyday concerns of residents in particular domains (e.g. safety, nuisance and strengthening the local community) are quite successful. However, the mechanisms did not result in more open planning processes at the scale of the neighbourhood as a whole. Especially strategic and long-term decisions about tenure conversion remained out of reach for residents. Despite urban professionals’ high ambitions about resident participation, residents’ achievements in shaping policy plans for neighbourhood upgrading still remain limited.

5.1 Introduction

Until a few decades ago, decision-making processes about neighbourhood change did not open up very far. Decisions about the need for and nature of neighbourhood
interventions were made by governmental organizations and resident engagement with these processes was limited to resistance against top-down interventions. Perhaps one of the most famous examples of this is the story of Jane Jacobs, who played a key role in saving the West Greenwich Village in New York from urban renewal in the 1950s/1960s, through mobilizing residents into resistance against these plans\(^{25}\) (Flint, 2009). There are many similar examples from the early days of gentrification of resistance against neighbourhood change and displacement (e.g. Beauregard, 1990; Smith, 1996; Newman and Wyly, 2006).

Such forms of resident activism and protest have diminished (Lees et al., 2008). At the same time, planning processes have opened up to include residents in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading (Bailey, 2010; Parés et al., 2011). This is related to the shift from government to governance, which created opportunities for varying actors, such as private developers and housing associations, to participate in institutional arrangements in neighbourhood regeneration. These local partnerships usually also include some form of resident representation (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2003; Blanco et al., 2011). Resident participation in decision-making processes in neighbourhood regeneration is thought to create opportunities and benefits for both residents and other stakeholders (Robinson et al., 2005; Taylor, 2007).

Nevertheless, the value of resident participation in neighbourhood governance is much debated (Bailey, 2010). On the one hand, participation is seen as ‘a good thing’, because it represents the democratization of bureaucratic decision-making and resident empowerment (e.g. Chaskin and Garg, 1997; Lawson and Kearns, 2010) and provides local knowledge which is otherwise unavailable to state actors (Robinson et al., 2005). On the other hand, Fainstein (2010) has criticized studies on resident participation for being pre-occupied with the process of planning and not focusing enough on the city or neighbourhood as objects of planning. Too often, studies address how participation is organized and who participates, rather than on the way in which residents influence interventions and thereby contribute to place-making. The actual achievements of residents in planning processes may in fact be limited (e.g. Jones, 2003; Chaskin et al., 2012). Resident involvement may serve as ‘showcase participation’ in the sense that it legitimizes state interventions, while the contribution of residents often remains limited in scope. Whether residents are able to influence neighbourhood interventions seems

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\(^{25}\) These processes inspired her to write her famous book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961).
to depend largely on how resident participation is organized (Jones, 2003; Boonstra and Boelens, 2011). In practice, the formulation of regeneration plans is a highly-complex, bureaucratic and ‘sticky’ process, which requires specific resources and competencies which residents may not have (Taylor, 2007; Chaskin et al., 2012).

This paper focuses on the way in which the opening up of governance spaces increased the possibilities of residents to contribute to neighbourhood change through participating in the shaping of regeneration plans. The aim is to explore to what degree and how the organization of participation influences residents’ opportunities to shape policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading, and how residents thereby actively contribute to neighbourhood change. A case study was performed in the disadvantaged neighbourhood of Transvaal (Amsterdam, the Netherlands), which has been subjected to regeneration and state-led gentrification initiatives by the local government and housing associations from 1999 onwards. Since then, varying forms of residents participation were introduced, ranging from top-down organized participation to bottom-up initiatives. Transvaal therefore forms an interesting case to study the changing organization of resident participation and to explore what this has meant for residents’ possibilities to influence neighbourhood upgrading. Instead of focusing on individual participation projects, the paper provides a comprehensive view of all participation mechanisms which were established over the past fifteen years. Although several community-led projects in Transvaal have been celebrated in the media and by urban professionals as a best practice case (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008), these success stories have focused largely on the process of participation itself, rather than on the outcomes of participation. It is less clear what residents have achieved at the neighbourhood level.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 examines the literature on the ways in which residents can be engaged in local decision-making processes and what the limitations are. Section 5.3 describes the research design, methodology and research neighbourhood, followed by a discussion of the Dutch context (section 5.4). Sections 5.5 and 5.6 examine the ways in which residents have been involved in policy plans for neighbourhood regeneration in Transvaal. Finally, section 5.7 reflects on the results and places the findings in the wider context of the literature on resident participation.
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change

5.2 Resident involvement in neighbourhood interventions

Until a few decades ago, residents were generally excluded from decision-making processes about neighbourhood change. Resident engagement was generally limited to protest, outside formal government spaces. Specifically during the second wave of gentrification in the 1970s/1980s, residents mobilized through anti-gentrification movements (Smith, 1996; Hackworth and Smith, 2001) and more localized forms of protest against displacement (Newman and Wyly, 2006). For example, Robinson (1995) describes how residents fought against the high-rise restructuring of central San Francisco and gentrification pressures in the Tenderloin neighbourhood. Similarly, Beauregard (1990) demonstrates how residents of Spring Garden (Philadelphia) resisted displacement by government-assisted gentrification and advocated the development of affordable housing. Although residents were often unsuccessful at fully resisting gentrification, in some cases they reached agreements with private and state actors to make the process less harmful to sitting residents (Hackworth, 2002).

These forms of resistance against policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading seem to have diminished since the 1990s (Fainstein, 2010), even though displacement of low-income residents is still a real concern in gentrification (Lees et al., 2008). One explanation is that residents who resisted gentrification in the past have been displaced (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Newman and Wyly, 2006). Yet, another explanation is that resident contestations have been ‘channeled’ into formal participation arrangements in local decision-making (Taylor, 2007; Parés et al., 2011).

New opportunities for resident participation in policy arenas have been linked to processes of rescaling and fragmentation of the state, as a result of neo-liberalization since the 1980s. These processes are well-documented in the literature and have also been observed in the Netherlands (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2003; Van Gent, 2013). Important for this study is the devolution of responsibilities from central to local governments through decentralization and deconcentration (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2003). Reduced funding by national governments resulted in increased dependency of local governments on cooperation of other actors in neighbourhood regeneration. Consequently, neighbourhood regeneration is increasingly organized through partnerships, including central and local governments, housing associations and private developers. Thereby, neighbourhood governance has become a form of governance-beyond-the-state (Swyngedouw, 2005), which “… moves away from fixed ideas about power as a commodity rooted in particular institutions to more fluid ideas.
of power developed and negotiated between partners” (Taylor, 2007, p. 299). These partnerships were also thought to better reflect the complexity of urban societies (Chaskin and Garg, 1997).

The resulting governance spaces have increasingly opened up to include residents in the formulation and implementation of regeneration strategies (Bailey, 2010; Chaskin et al., 2012). Different reasons can be identified for including residents in local decision-making processes. First, urban professionals value residents as sources of local knowledge, which is otherwise unavailable to them (Chaskin and Garg, 1997; Robinson et al., 2005). Second, participation is stimulated based on the assumption that ‘good governance’ and democratic policy-making result in better decisions (Lawson and Kearns, 2010; Chaskin et al., 2012). Third, resident participation is attractive to governments because it provides legitimacy in the public sphere (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008). Fourth, it smoothens the implementation of policies for neighbourhood upgrading (Jones, 2003; Lawson and Kearns, 2010). Finally, resident participation is nowadays often required by national governments as condition for local funding (Sullivan et al., 2004). In all of these arguments, resident engagement in neighbourhood governance can be seen as a means to achieve neighbourhood change effectively and efficiently.

In addition, resident participation is often seen as end in itself: urban professionals may stimulate participation in order to strengthen local communities. For instance, it is assumed that resident engagement in decision-making processes enhances social cohesion and increases solidarity between residents (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2009), avoids conflicts (Jones, 2003; Lawson and Kearns, 2010) and closes the gap between disadvantaged communities and society (Taylor, 2007). It is also argued that participation provides residents opportunities to acquire skills and knowledge – also referred to as ‘community capacity building’ (Chaskin and Barg, 1997; Lawson and Kearns, 2010).

## 5.2.1 Planning the participation process

Resident engagement in decision-making processes may take different forms, ranging from top-down organized involvement to bottom-up initiatives. Jones (2003; derived from Pretty, 1995) presented a typology of participation, which distinguishes a range of seven ‘ladders’: (1) Manipulative participation, in which participation is only a pretence and residents don’t have actual power; (2) Passive participation, which mainly consists of information sharing by professionals; (3) Participation by consultation, whereby
residents are consulted by and answer questions of urban professionals; (4) Participation for material incentives, in which residents participate through supplying resources (e.g. labour or volunteering time) in return for incentives; (5) Functional participation, in which professionals see participation as a means to achieve goals; residents can be involved in decision-making but major decisions already have been made by urban professionals; (6) Interactive participation, whereby participation is seen as a right; residents actively participate in analysis and development of plans; and (7) Self-mobilisation, in which residents take initiatives and address problems; they retain control over used resources.

These forms and types of participation illustrate that the organization of participation largely determines residents’ influence in decision-making processes. In the case of resident involvement in interventions for neighbourhood upgrading, research has shown that the organization of participation varies greatly and thereby affects residents’ actual influence in shaping policies (Jones, 2003; Taylor, 2007). However, one of the limitations of participation is that its exact form is often left undefined, which leads to different expectations and perceptions of urban professionals and residents about the form and amount of participation (Atkinson, 1999; Robinson et al., 2005). In this respect, Chaskin et al. (2012) observed that resident participation in three mixed-income neighbourhoods in Chicago was mostly symbolic, as participation mainly took place in the form of information sharing. This is in line with Taylor (2007), who demonstrates that residents were mostly involved at the end of the policy-cycle. Residents’ impact on decision-making processes was thereby marginal, as residents “…had much greater voice, but not much more power.” (p. 304). Huisman (2014) reports similar findings in a study on resident participation in state-led gentrification in Amsterdam. She demonstrates that resident participation mechanisms provided urban professionals a platform to impose regeneration plans, which were presented as facts, while residents’ power was marginal. Through discrepancies between expectations and perceptions of urban professionals and residents about the form and amount of participation, resident participation can turn out to be a frustrating experience (Kokx and Van Kempen, 2009).

5.2.2 The practice of participation

A second limitation of resident participation is related to discrepancies between resident participation in theory – as it has been planned – and the actual practice of and everyday experiences with participation. For instance, participation is often deployed
by urban professionals who determine the rules of the game, which requires specific knowledge and skills (Martin, 2007; Denters and Klok, 2009; Boonstra and Boelens, 2011; Parés et al., 2011; Chaskin et al., 2012). Taylor (2007, p. 307) argues that “…the ‘rules of the game’ tend to limit the number of people who can take up this role by demanding certain skills and knowledge and by placing practical limitations on who can participate”. Also in the Netherlands, participation mechanisms have been found to be formal, bureaucratic and technical, providing advantages to higher-educated residents (Huisman, 2014). In addition, it is demonstrated that while urban professionals may believe in the ideal of participation, they tend to have little trust in capabilities of residents and neighbourhood problems and solutions are defined differently by professionals and residents (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2009; Kokx and Van Kempen, 2010). Moreover, the implementation of participation is often ‘mainstreamed’ into mechanisms defined by urban professionals. For instance, Martin (2007) demonstrates that neighbourhood organizations with transparent decision-making structures, engaged in traditional community-building activities, were more likely to obtain support from professionals. In addition, Taylor (2007) observed cases where urban professionals only involved residents into their partnerships who were like themselves, which meant that only few voices were heard.

In sum, although the opening up of governance spaces has increased residents’ opportunities to participate in local decision-making processes, there are a number of limitations related to participation, which challenge residents’ actual contribution to the shaping of neighbourhood regeneration plans. Consequently, the reality of resident participation can be far removed from the ideal (Fainstein, 2010).

5.3 Research design

To explore how and to what degree the organization of resident participation influenced residents’ opportunities to shape neighbourhood interventions, a case study was performed in the disadvantaged neighbourhood of Transvaal (Amsterdam). Transvaal has been subjected to regeneration since the end of the 1990s, whereby varying participation mechanisms were introduced – ranging from top-down organized involvement to self-mobilization. Thereby, Transvaal provides an interesting case to study the changing organization of resident participation over a long period of time.
Transvaal is located in Urban District East of the Municipality of Amsterdam\textsuperscript{26}. Amsterdam has a substantial social housing stock; the share of social housing in Transvaal is even above the city’s average (Table 5.1). This is related to the fact that Transvaal was among the first neighbourhoods constructed by housing associations after the 1901 Housing Act. In addition, the smaller share of privately rented housing was converted into social housing during urban renewal in the 1970s/1980s. Transvaal is characterized by a large share of low-income families with children, who are attracted to the relatively large socially rented dwellings. The majority of the population is of non-Dutch origin, which replaced native-Dutch families who left Transvaal from the 1970s onwards for suburban new towns.

Although many other centrally-located neighbourhoods in Amsterdam experienced socio-economic and/or real estate upgrading in the 1990s, Transvaal went through a process of downgrading. The neighbourhood became increasingly characterized by high unemployment levels, a weak economy, social and physical disorder and crime. The housing stock and public space were in poor condition. It was assumed that this exacerbated selective out-migration of higher-income households. To address these problems, Urban District East developed a regeneration strategy in 1999. In 2007, the regeneration plans were expanded, after Transvaal was selected by the national government for the \textit{Forty Neighbourhood Program}.

5.3.1 Data and methodology

To study how residents have been involved in decision-making processes about neighbourhood regeneration in Transvaal, a combination of research methods was used. These include semi-structured interviews with governing actors and actively participating residents, participant observation in the neighbourhood and analysis of secondary (policy) documentation.

Intervews with urban professionals working with the municipality (4), housing associations (8) and a welfare institution focused on neighbourhood interventions in the period 1999-2013 and addressed the following topics: (1) Transvaal’s development over the past decades; (2) goals and motivations for policies and interventions of actors involved; (3) the way in which residents have been involved in the initiation, formulation and implementation of policies and interventions. Interviews with six

\textsuperscript{26} The municipality of Amsterdam is characterized by a particular administrative structure: it is subdivided into seven districts with – until recently (2014) – some autonomy, which each have their own budget and responsibility for tasks such as land-use planning, building permits and public space.
residents provided insight into (1) resident participation in the neighbourhood; (2) participation activities of the respondents in particular; (3) residents’ evaluation of the way in which residents were involved in policy plans for regeneration; and (4) to what extent their achievements contributed to neighbourhood change.

In addition, the paper draws on informal conversations with neighbourhood residents, attendance of neighbourhood activities and analysis of written resources, such as local websites and newspapers, and policy documents of the national and local government and housing associations concerning Transvaal’s regeneration and resident participation.

| Table 5.1 Characteristics of Transvaal compared to Amsterdam |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                   | Transvaal        | Amsterdam        |
| Population (2013)                 | 8,918            | 799,442          |
| Housing stock (2013, in %)        |                  |                  |
| Socially rented                   | 65               | 46               |
| Privately rented                  | 16               | 26               |
| Owner-occupied                    | 19               | 28               |
| Construction period (%)           |                  |                  |
| <1945                             | 79               | 43               |
| 1946-1990                         | 9                | 38               |
| >1990                             | 12               | 19               |
| Real estate value (euro)          |                  |                  |
| 1999                              | 162,704          | 198,173          |
| 2009                              | 199,325          | 293,499          |
| Change 1999-2009                  | +22%             | +48%             |
| Income¹ (euro)                    |                  |                  |
| 1999                              | 12,248           | 14,302           |
| 2008                              | 16,079           | 19,294           |
| Change 1999-2008                  | +31%             | +35%             |
| Household structure (2013, in %)  |                  |                  |
| One-person                        | 55               | 55               |
| Family, no children               | 20               | 19               |
| Family, with children             | 25               | 26               |
| Ethnic background (2011, in %)     |                  |                  |
| Dutch                             | 37               | 49               |
| Non-Western                       | 50               | 35               |
| Western                           | 13               | 15               |

¹ Standardized net household income from work, benefit and pensions.

Source: Statistics Netherlands and Kadaster
5.4 The Dutch policy context

Before going into the findings, it is useful to provide additional information on the Dutch policy context. Despite the shift from government to governance, the national government plays a key role in regeneration policies (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2003), as these policies form a strong regulatory framework for neighbourhood governance and regeneration of disadvantaged neighbourhoods like Transvaal.

Until the 1990s, national urban and housing policies focused on providing affordable housing. In the 1990s, however, the national government saw social housing increasingly as problematic: social housing was associated with accumulation of social problems, such as poverty concentrations and social and physical disorder (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008). To address these problems, the government launched the so-called Big Cities Policy (BCP). The BCP prescribed area-based interventions that integrated three ‘pillars’: a social pillar, focusing on education, social mobility and safety; an economic pillar, focusing on lower unemployment levels and stimulating the local economy; and a physical pillar, focusing on restructuring and differentiating the housing stock. In neighbourhoods with ‘one-sided’ (social) housing, the aim was to construct owner-occupied and upscale privately rented housing, to prevent further decline and halt selective out-migration of affluent households (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008). This program, set out in the Urban Renewal Memorandum, marked the first steps towards state-led gentrification (Van Gent, 2013).

The BCP also marked a shift in terms of governance arrangements, which the national government prescribed for area-based interventions. Local governments were expected to fulfil an initiating and directing role in neighbourhood regeneration, but had to cooperate with ‘stakeholders’ such as housing associations and residents to formulate plans for area-based interventions (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2003). As owners of the social housing stock, housing associations carried a lot of weight in these arrangements. Although their primary task is to provide housing for low-income households, they were much privatized in the mid-1990s and public financial support disappeared for management of the social housing stock and the construction of new social housing (Priemus, 2003). Consequently, housing associations depend on market activities to generate income, such as selling off social housing, converting social housing into privately rented housing and developing owner-occupied housing, in

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27 In the Netherlands, private actors have a more limited role in the regeneration of neighbourhoods.
order to be able to finance unprofitable investments in social housing. Housing associations can therefore best be described as hybrid organizations: they have their own objectives and priorities in terms of neighbourhood interventions (Teernstra, 2012). In this already highly-complex arrangement of negotiation between different stakeholders, the national government put resident participation on the agenda as criterion for funding.

In 2007, the national government expanded the BCP with the launch of the Forty Neighbourhood Program. The forty ‘worst’ neighbourhoods of the Netherlands were selected. As before, the government dictated cooperation between local actors and implementation of an integral approach of social, physical and economic interventions. State-led gentrification through differentiation of the housing stock was further emphasized. However, there was much more attention for sitting residents: there was more emphasis put on improving their economic opportunities and resident participation in the planning process became a central theme. Residents were designated as important partners in regeneration, because “through the involvement of residents, a better picture of what goes on in the neighbourhood is achieved, and the strategy better meets the demands and needs of the resident. Moreover, resident participation can be a means to increase social cohesion and stimulate interethnic relationships.” (Ministerie van VROM, 2007, p. 15). The fragment demonstrates that resident engagement in neighbourhood regeneration is not only seen as a means to achieve neighbourhood change effectively, whereby residents are sources of local knowledge and resident involvement leads to better decisions. Participation has also become an end in itself: participation is stimulated in order to strengthen local communities.

5.5 Resident involvement in the early years

The regeneration strategy of 1999 in Transvaal clearly reflects the integral approach prescribed by the BCP. It was initiated by Urban District East of the Municipality of Amsterdam, which aimed to establish a coalition with four housing associations active in the neighbourhood. The strategy marked the first (but marginal) steps towards state-led gentrification, as the key objective was to differentiate Transvaal’s housing stock in order to attract/retain higher-income households and families with children and increase the neighbourhood’s competitiveness. In addition, the district aimed to
improve safety levels, strengthen the local economy and create economic opportunities for sitting residents.

5.5.1 Organizing participation

According to formal guidelines, the district had to discuss regeneration plans with Transvaal’s residents. Therefore, the district approached the Buurtbeheergroep ('Neighbourhood management group'), a voluntary community association. In 1990, the Buurtbeheergroep was formally designated as discussion partner for the district concerning policies and interventions in Transvaal. Although the group was neither elected, nor really representative for the neighbourhood, it was invited to advocate resident interests by critically following governmental decisions.

The Buurtbeheergroep received professional support of a community worker, employed by a welfare institution. So, while it is argued that one of the difficulties with resident participation is that it requires specific knowledge and skills and that the rules of the game are determined by urban professionals (Chaskin et al., 2012; Jones, 2003; Martin, 2007), in Transvaal these difficulties were to some degree mitigated. The community worker formed a bridge between residents and district, because she was familiar with the rules of the game of the district and informed by urban professionals about policy plans and developments. She also organized and chaired meetings and guided residents in the interpretation of policy documents. The respondents underline the importance of this professional support to understand the technicalities of developing regeneration plans.

Yet, despite professional support, the Buurtbeheergroep was only invited at the end of the policy-cycle. The respondents of the district explain this by arguing that the development of the regeneration strategy was complex and time-consuming. The complexity partially lay in the fact that the district had to negotiate with four housing associations, who own the majority of the housing stock, but each had their own agendas and priorities. Moreover, the district was confronted with time constraints related to application deadlines for national funding, which was needed to implement the proposed plans. Consequently, the Buurtbeheergroep received the plans after negotiations with the housing associations were over and with a hard deadline ahead. In meetings between the district and group, the plans were discussed and residents were asked to respond to the pre-formulated plans. A former district manager of Urban District East explains:
“We had very short sessions with the Buurtbeheergroep. […] We literally threw it [the regeneration plan] into the neighbourhood and said: what do you guys want to have in the plan? […] But at the same time we told them that we had time constraints.”

So, although an effort was made to hear the voice of the Buurtbeheergroep, major decisions already had been made.

Nevertheless, the former district manager argues that the district was informed on residents’ interests concerning the neighbourhood through the community worker, who he calls his “eyes and ears” of the neighbourhood. So, urban professionals saw the community worker as an indirect form of resident participation:

“They [Urban District East] assumed that I represented the neighbourhood. I always said: that is not true. I pass on information. And vice versa: I bring back information. […] There are so many people and of course I only talk to a few of them.” [Community worker, Welfare institution]

In other words, although professional support was meant to create a bridge between residents and district, it in fact replaced direct participation and led to the exclusion of residents in decision-making processes itself. Indeed, residents felt that although they were provided an opportunity to voice their concerns and ideas, these were not really heard:

“We were not involved in the first stages. […] They don’t open it up completely with public hearings and information meetings and so on. […] It [participation] is mainly writing down your reaction and making a number of suggestions.” [Resident, female, 18 years in neighbourhood]

Consequently, for some members of the Buurtbeheergroep participation turned out to be disappointing. A number of residents quit participating, as they did not feel taken seriously.

In sum, the contribution of residents to the regeneration plans, and consequently to Transvaal’s improvement, was negligible. Although the national government prescribed the discussion of regeneration plans with residents as criterion for funding, in reality participation was not high on the district’s agenda. From this perspective, the
organization of participation in Transvaal in the early years can be identified as ‘functional participation’ (Jones, 2003): although residents were formally involved in formulating regeneration plans, major decisions already had been made and participation was mostly a means to achieve goals.

5.5.2 Resident activism

Between 1999 and 2006, the actual implementation of the regeneration plans stagnated. The cooperation with housing associations proved problematic, because three of the four associations prioritized interventions in other neighbourhoods. Only a part of Transvaal’s housing stock was renovated and the district’s long-term objective to stimulate gentrification through diversification of the housing stock was not realized. Moreover, everyday problems with crime and nuisance associated with drug dealing were not addressed. The community worker recalls:

“Especially with regard to nuisance… there was a lot of drug dealing here, nuisance of kids that hang around, we also had gamblers here… I found the attention of the urban district and housing associations very limited. In that respect, it was a dilapidated neighbourhood.”

In response to problems of neighbourhood disorder, a number of residents mobilized themselves in order to counteract disorder, outside of the formal policy arena. One example is the establishment of the panel Wij van de Wijk (‘We, the Neighbourhood’) in 2003. In contrast to the Buurtbeheergroep, which aimed to improve Transvaal by critically following governmental decisions, the panel’s strategy was to organize activities amongst themselves to provide residents a sense of social control over their environment and reduce anonymity (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008). The panel argued that the district undertook insufficient measures to counteract nuisance and presented an ‘action plan’ to the district. In addition, there were other forms of resident activism against neighbourhood disorder, specifically in particular ‘hot-spots’ of nuisance and crime. Here, small groups of residents mobilized to address these issues. Some sought collaboration with the Buurtbeheergroep, who brought the problems under the district’s attention.

Eventually, the district responded by implementing new interventions to improve safety levels. For instance, a registration point was established, where residents could report nuisance and crime, police surveillance was intensified and public consumption
of alcohol was prohibited. These interventions strengthened residents’ confidence in the district:

“I think that what is especially of importance, is that residents finally felt taken seriously. Because there was attention for their neighbourhood. Because it was really terrible sometimes, you know.” [Community Worker, Welfare Institution]

These examples of collective action demonstrate that, although residents had little voice in formal decision-making processes about long-term neighbourhood plans, they were able to mobilize themselves and develop alternative ways to influence interventions concerning nuisance and crime. Thereby, residents were able to improve the quality of everyday life. This demonstrates that residents could strengthen their position better from outside formal partnerships, rather than from within. This form of participation can be classified as ‘self-mobilisation’ – the highest ladder of Jones’ (2003) participation typology.

5.6 Calling the active citizen

The selection of Transvaal in 2007 as one of the forty neighbourhoods in the national regeneration program brought Transvaal back in the limelight. Moreover, it signified a turning point in the organization of participation. The national government dictated a coalition between the urban district and housing associations and designated a substantial part of funding to resident participation.

A ‘Participation Pyramid’ was even designed, to communicate different participation mechanisms in Transvaal’s regeneration (Figure 5.1). Interestingly, the pyramid is very similar to Jones’ (2003) participation typology, as the pyramid ranges from low to high levels of impact. Moreover, table 5.2 demonstrates how the pyramid reflects the changing focus on resident participation as a means to participation as goal in itself. The coalitions’ high ambitions about participation were translated in the establishment of different mechanisms: new forms of formal resident representation were introduced, involving residents in specific projects and a ‘Neighbourhood Initiatives Program’, in which residents were able to develop their own plan for the

28 The national government provided funding for regeneration, although local governments and housing associations were expected to contribute financially too.
neighbourhood (Table 5.2). The coalition put a lot of money, time and effort in the organization of resident participation. In order to manage the participation mechanisms, the district even appointed a participation manager. However, the realization of the proposed forms of participation turned out to be more difficult than envisioned.

5.6.1 Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee

Based on general resident meetings, the coalition established five themes of intervention: 1) safety and nuisance; 2) neighbourhood economy; 3) housing; 4) public space; and 5) socio-economic improvement of (deprived) residents. The Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee was invited to join the formulation of these plans. This ‘newly created’ committee was a sub-committee of the Buurtbeheergroep and was formally designated as the coalition’s ‘advisory board’. Their aim was to critically follow Transvaal’s regeneration and actively join decision-making processes. So, this form of participation represents level 3 of the participation pyramid (Figure 5.1) and can be identified as ‘interactive participation’ according to Jones’ (2003) typology.

The role of the committee in decision-making processes of the coalition consisted of discussing draft versions of plans and advising the coalition. Furthermore, the committee brought concerns in the neighbourhood under attention. On behalf of the coalition, the district manager regularly attended committee meetings in order to exchange information. The coalition experienced this collaboration as positive:

“Of course, I find the Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee fantastic. For me, it is a very good way to just discuss draft versions of regeneration plans.” [District Manager, Urban District East]

In order to form a bridge between residents and professionals, the committee received professional support of the community worker: she organized and chaired meetings and guided residents in interpretation of policy documents and contact with the coalition. So, again the difficulty related to knowledge and skills, which are assumed to be required in order to be able to participate (Chaskin et al., 2012; Martin, 2007), were to some degree mitigated.
Figure 5.1 Participation Pyramid

Table 5.2 Clarification of Participation Pyramid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level in pyramid</th>
<th>Role of residents</th>
<th>Role government/other actors</th>
<th>Participation mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Information sharing</td>
<td>Resident is seen as consumer and has a passive role</td>
<td>Informing; influencing; convincing</td>
<td>Information meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interaction and dialogue</td>
<td>Resident is seen as expert and co-owner of regeneration and actively shares information; focus on collective (instead of personal) interests.</td>
<td>Organizing; listening; connecting</td>
<td>Information meetings; Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee; Resident Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Partnerships</td>
<td>Resident is seen as active partner and actively participates and shares information; focus is on building capacity and shared responsibility</td>
<td>Connecting; stimulating; facilitating</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee; Open planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Neighbourhood initiatives</td>
<td>Resident actively participates and takes initiatives; focus is on creating solutions; resident is responsible for implementation.</td>
<td>Facilitating; financing; participating</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Initiatives Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban District East, 2009
But to what extent was the committee able to shape regeneration plans and contribute to Transvaal’s improvement? The committee’s members, which were mainly of native-Dutch origin, agree that their engagement in the formulation of policy plans significantly improved in relation to previous years; in general, they were involved in earlier stages of decision-making processes. However, the committee members also experienced various difficulties.

Firstly, it was unclear to the committee if and to what extent the coalition took their advices and adjustments into account. As one member argues:

“We often said: this is not such a good idea or we do not agree with that. But it was very difficult to find out to what extent it was a factor in the decision-making. […] For me, that was the difficulty of being a member of the committee. It takes a lot of time, but you don’t know the effects.” [Resident, male, 5 years in neighbourhood]

In some cases, draft plans were adjusted on the committee’s advice, but in many cases the committee felt that the coalition did not actually take their advice on board and it was unclear whether their considerations were even taken into account in final decisions about the plans.

Secondly, although the committee was formally engaged in the formulation of plans, the coalition determined the rules of the game. For instance, for the committee it was difficult to keep up the speed of decision-making processes. Once the committee had discussed draft plans and formulated their response, the coalition was often already further in decision-making. In a number of cases, the coalition already adjusted or cancelled plans. For the members, this was frustrating as the committee took a lot of time and effort:

“That bothered me, the pace of a professional is much faster than that of residents. […] It is a lot of work […] and residents who have their own serious jobs can hardly keep up with full-time working urban professionals.” [Resident, male, 22 years in neighbourhood]

29 The committee actively attempted to attract residents of non-Dutch origin, but to no avail.
Thirdly, the committee was not allowed to comment on all implementation plans: they were excluded from interventions focusing on the physical ‘pillar’ of regeneration, aiming at stimulating gentrification through differentiation of the housing stock. Differentiation mainly takes place by housing associations, through selling off social housing and conversion of social housing into privately rented dwellings\(^{30}\) (see Teernstra, 2012). There are agreements between housing associations and local government which determine the share of tenure change. As long as housing associations comply with these agreements, they do not have to engage residents in decisions of the conversion process. This meant that the committee was effectively excluded from strategic decisions about tenure diversification in order to attract and retain higher-income households, which is also referred to as ‘state-led gentrification’ (e.g. Lees, 2008; Van Gent, 2013; Doucet, 2014). Although the housing stock is differentiated gradually and direct displacement remains limited, because dwellings can only change tenure when they become vacant, the members express their concern about the decreasing share of social housing\(^{31}\).

In summary, although residents were involved in earlier stages of decision-making processes compared to previous years, their actual contribution to the regeneration plans and consequently neighbourhood change still remained limited. One explanation for this is that the committee and coalition interpreted the committee’s role differently: the residents aimed to be a serious partner in decision-making processes (level 3 of the pyramid), while in practice the coalition used the committee solely as advisory board (level 2).

5.6.2 Resident platform

After establishing the Regeneration Committee, the *Buurtbeheergroep* repositioned themselves as a platform for a wider group of residents, to meet each other in order to

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\(^{30}\) Social housing units can be converted into privately rented housing or sold off when they become vacant. There are thresholds for the number of dwellings which can be sold off (in Amsterdam, the threshold is 33 percent social housing in the central district and 25 percent in other districts). Social housing can only be converted into privately rented housing when the rent price is above the ‘social housing boundary’ (681.02 euros in 2013). When a socially rented dwelling becomes vacant, the rent price is recalculated on the basis of dwelling characteristics such as surface, quality and location. When the dwelling is transformed into privately rented housing, it is still owned by the housing association, but there are no allocation rules in terms of income level.

\(^{31}\) Between 2007 and 2013, the share of social housing decreased from 70.4 to 64.5 percent.
stimulate social cohesion amongst residents. Although the platform did not aim to be engaged in shaping policy plans, their goal was to discuss concerns in the neighbourhood and bring these under the coalition’s attention.

The urban professionals describe the platform as an important mechanism as it contributed to community building and was an important source of local knowledge. This is in line with observations of Chaskin et al. (2012) and Robinson et al. (2005). The participation manager explains:

“Because it is good for the attachment to the neighbourhood. That people come into contact with each other and people exchange information. And that we have a network which we can use to know what is going on [in the neighbourhood].”

Thereby, this participation mechanism represents level 2 of the pyramid (Figure 5.1) and can be classified as ‘functional participation’ according to Jones’ (2003) typology.

At the start, the platform was supported by both the participation manager and community worker: they provided information about policy plans and developments and guided residents in contact with the district and housing associations. However, as a result of budget cuts in the late 2000s, professional support of resident participation diminished significantly – both for the Resident Platform and Regeneration Committee. Now, residents had to organize and chair meetings themselves as well as collect information about policy plans and developments. The members argue that especially the last point was difficult for them to obtain. This had negative impact on the motivation for residents to participate and consequently, a number of residents quit participating. As the community worker argues:

“Residents were furious, they really felt abandoned, when the district withdrew professional support of the Resident Platform. […] I don’t think you can expect residents to be informed that well about the whole neighbourhood.”

So, while one of the aims of the regeneration program was to stimulate resident participation, simultaneously participation was impeded as a result of budget cuts.

5.6.3 Open Planning Process

Besides these two forms of structural resident representation at the neighbourhood level, the coalition sought ways to involve residents in temporary and small-scale
regeneration projects. One example is the regeneration of five social housing blocks, consisting of 452 dwellings owned by one of the housing associations. The housing association argued that there were technical deficits and liveability problems as a result of nuisance and concentrations of low-income households. Therefore, the association aimed to formulate a regeneration strategy and established an ‘Open Planning Process’. The aim was to create a partnership between the housing association, urban district and residents:

“…in which there is space for residents to develop plans for their dwellings and neighbourhood in an open dialogue. In an open planning process, it is important that nothing is defined yet. Possibilities such as demolition or renovation can all be discussed.” [Ymere, 2012, p. 14]

Residents were designated as co-partners in the formulation of the strategy. Thereby, this form of participation represents level 3 of the participation pyramid and can be identified as ‘Interactive participation’ according to Jones’ (2003) typology.

The housing association argued that the direct reason for creating a partnership was the Forty Neighbourhood Program, in which resident participation became a central theme. So, resident participation was in fact dictated by the national government. The aim of the partnership was twofold:

“[W]e formulate a plan through an open planning process, in order to create support for transformation and to empower residents by engaging them actively, so to say.” [Housing Professional, Housing Association]

The assumption was that participation provided benefits for the community, as it stimulated social cohesion and empowerment, as well as for the housing association, as it created support for regeneration. In other words, for the association participation was both a means and an end in itself.

In order to include as many residents as possible – irrespective of their knowledge, skills – the housing association established different forms of participation: there were information meetings to inform residents and obtain their opinion about their dwelling and neighbourhood and for the same reason a door-to-door survey was conducted. In addition, there were working groups in which residents together formulated ideas about regeneration. As most residents were of Turkish and Moroccan origin, there
were translators to overcome language difficulties. Moreover, the housing association appointed ‘resident advisors’: a number of residents were trained in reaching out to other residents, in order to stimulate them to participate in the process. As the resident advisors had a significant network and different ethnic backgrounds, they were able to activate a wide and diverse group of residents. A resident of Moroccan origin explains:

“There were forty residents which I had to approach and tell: […] [Housing association] is going to organize a meeting and it is important for you. It is about your neighbourhood, your block and your dwelling. So it is important to pass by and to listen what [Housing association] is going to do.” [Resident, male, 15 years in neighbourhood]

In sum, it seems that residents were seen as serious co-partners in formulating the regeneration strategy and there were many opportunities for residents to participate. 77 percent of the residents agreed with the final plans, which implied the demolition of two social housing blocks, which would be replaced by newly-constructed housing, and renovation of three blocks (Ymere, 2012). A part of the socially rented dwellings would be transformed into privately rented and owner-occupied dwellings.

Yet, a number of residents expressed their doubts about the ‘openness’ of the planning process. Although the housing association argued that “nothing was defined yet” (Ymere, 2012, p. 14), in reality the association determined a number of preconditions for regeneration. One of these preconditions was that the plan should be ‘financially achievable’. In order to create a financially achievable plan, housing associations have to generate income from commercial activities such as conversion of social into privately rented housing and construction of owner-occupied housing (see Teernstra, 2012). This implied that the association had to create a mix of owner-occupied, privately rented and social housing. Although residents get a return-guarantee after regeneration32, a number of residents worried about the decline in the total share of social housing. Moreover, the regeneration process implied an increase in

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32 Through renovation and demolition, residents have to move out from their dwelling to a social housing unit elsewhere in the city. Yet, residents are guaranteed that they can return to a (renovated or newly-constructed) social housing unit in one of the five housing blocks after regeneration. As experiences from the past demonstrate that a significant share of residents decides not to return, the housing association is able to provide all residents a return guarantee.
the rent of social housing. Consequently, a number of residents argue that the planning process was not as open as assumed. As one of the respondents explains:

“An open planning process, if it is implemented the way it is meant to be, good idea. But! If they hide behind the open planning process, and carry out their own projects and opinions, then I think: it is just a pretext.” [Resident, male, 31 years in neighbourhood]

The aim of the Open Planning Process was to create a partnership between the housing association, district and residents, but in reality residents were excluded from predetermined decisions which were related to pursuing gentrification.

5.6.4 Neighbourhood Initiatives

A final way in which the coalition stimulated resident participation in Transvaal was the introduction of a Neighbourhood Initiatives Program. Rather than being invited into formal participation mechanisms designed by the coalition, residents were stimulated to develop their own (small-scale) plan for the neighbourhood. Residents were fully responsible for the formulation and implementation of the plan – the coalition only provided funding and facilitated the process. The coalition assumed that:

“This form of participation contributes to the improvement of the neighbourhood in two ways. The initiative has to be a positive contribution for the neighbourhood, and it contributes to the empowerment of the initiator.” [Urban District East, 2009, p. 8]

So, participation was both a means to improve the neighbourhood and an end in itself: it was assumed that it stimulated social cohesion and empowerment through development of knowledge and skills. Thereby, the program represents the highest level of the participation pyramid and can be classified as ‘self-mobilisation’ following Jones’ (2003) typology.

33 To be clear, the Neighbourhood Initiative program is not unique for Transvaal; it was implemented by the national government as part of the Forty Neighbourhood Program.
Submitted initiatives were reviewed by a committee of residents and the participation manager\(^3^4\). The coalition and committee together established criteria which had to be met: the initiative had to contribute to the social, physical and/or economic neighbourhood quality, reach a substantial number of residents and could not be commercial. A substantial amount of funding was designated to the program (Table 5.3). Between 2008 and 2013, 135 initiatives were approved; the average amount assigned per initiative ranged from 7862 euro in 2008 to 4687 euro in 2011. The selected initiatives were mostly small-scale and focused on specific target groups, such as projects for children education, youth activities to reduce nuisance and integration projects for non-native Dutch women. Other projects included festivals and theatre shows organized by residents to foster community-building. In addition, there were community garden projects aiming to improve the physical environment and stimulate social cohesion.

In the interviews, urban professionals state that the Neighbourhood Initiatives Program improved the sense of community in the neighbourhood:

“If you see to what extend [people] mix and get into contact with each other, that is very valuable. And also the contacts at the community garden. Conversations are firstly maybe about a carrot, but later about how your child is doing. I do not have the illusion that it is the solution for everything, you know. But it is a step you take.” [Participation Manager, Urban District East]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount available for initiatives (in euro)</th>
<th>Average amount assigned per initiative (in euro)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>98,538</td>
<td>7862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>136,120</td>
<td>7862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>136,120</td>
<td>5858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>121,324</td>
<td>4687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban District East

\(^3^4\) The committee was non-elected, as residents were invited to participate in the committee through advertisements and information meetings. The committee was not really representative for the neighbourhood; most of the members were highly-educated and of native-Dutch origin.
The urban professionals also indicate that a diverse group of residents participated, which were generally other residents than those participating in more formalized mechanisms such as the Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee and Resident Platform. This is in line with Tonkens and Verhoeven (2011), who studied Neighbourhood Initiatives in 24 Amsterdam neighbourhoods. They observed that compared to ‘traditional’ participants, participants in the Neighbourhood Initiatives Program were more often female, young, of non-Dutch origin and had lower educational backgrounds. Moreover, they found that residents who implemented an initiative activated and stimulated social cohesion among other residents.

Moreover, the interviewed residents have positive attitudes towards the program. A resident of native-Dutch origin explains:

“I think that the neighbourhood initiatives are very positive things for a neighbourhood. Everybody was enthusiastic about it. […] It is visible to the neighbourhood. People see something [happening] at the square and notice: a lot of positive things happen.” [Resident, male, 5 years in neighbourhood]

Nevertheless, the program’s success should be nuanced to some degree. First, a number of residents as well as the community worker do not think that the initiatives contributed substantively to Transvaal’s improvement. They question the sustainability of the initiatives, as many initiatives were small-scale and short-term, whereby only a few residents were involved, while large amounts of funding were spend. The community worker recalls:

“There were great things, which I really find fantastic. But there were also things of which I thought: what does it actually leave behind? […] For instance, HEIM, the yearly theatre spectacle and community art. Then I think: now, after three times, what kind of communities have been left behind? What are the effects?”

They argue that the coalition’s aim of the program was ‘window dressing’: creating a feel-good atmosphere and showing the outside world that the neighbourhood was being improved.

Second, although the coalition’s job was to facilitate initiatives, in reality it turned out to be difficult to hand over responsibility to residents and there was distrust in their capabilities. In some cases, residents felt impeded and had to ‘fight’ for their initiative.
One example is a group of residents who designed and implemented a community garden. The district disagreed on many aspects of the garden’s design, mainly out of fear for vandalism. After long negotiations between the district and residents, the garden was finally approved. One resident recalls:

“[They] are defining us as this small percentage of criminals. And if you define us like that, that is who we are. And if you define us as healthy people who are going to garden, then that’s what we become. That’s who we are. […] I’m really proud of that project, but you know we really had to fight for it.” [Resident, female, 6 years in neighbourhood]

Interestingly, now the community garden is celebrated as one of the best practices of the Neighbourhood Initiative Program in the city.

### 5.7 Discussion and conclusions

This paper addressed the way in which the opening up of governance spaces has created new opportunities for residents to contribute to neighbourhood upgrading through participation in decision-making processes. The paper focused on the neighbourhood of Transvaal, which has gone through successive stages of regeneration in the last fifteen years and allows for a comprehensive analysis of participation mechanisms established since the end of the 1990s. The case study in Transvaal can therefore illustrate the changing nature of resident participation and what this has meant for their possibilities to influence policies for neighbourhood interventions.

From the start of regeneration, Transvaal has been seen as a best practice case for the new focus on resident participation in neighbourhood governance (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008). Indeed, particularly in the second phase of regeneration (2007-2013), the number of participation mechanisms is almost overwhelming and reflects the strong local presence of the welfare state in Transvaal and the resulting dense formal social infrastructure. From this perspective, resident participation in Transvaal appears to be a resounding success. However, as Fainstein (2010) argued, a focus on participation mechanisms alone is not enough: there is a need to look at how participation contributes to actual place-making. If we look at Transvaal from this point of view on the achievements of resident participation, there are some important
nuances to be made, as discrepancies between resident participation in theory – as it has been planned – and the actual practice of participation were identified.

In the first period of regeneration (1999-2006), resident participation was officially incorporated in formal policy procedures, but in practice it was not systematically developed. First, the *Buurtbeheergroep* was only involved at the end of the policy-cycle, when major decisions already had been made. Residents’ input was limited to reacting to plans, rather than co-producing them. Consequently, few ideas from the *Buurtbeheergroep* found their way into the plans and the residents did not feel that they were heard. Second, the district designed the rules of the game and dominated the process of formulating regeneration plans. Although the *Buurtbeheergroep* received professional support of a community worker, full-time employed urban professionals determined the pace of the participation process, which made it hard for residents to ‘keep up’. Therefore, in line with many previous studies (e.g. Chaskin et al 2012; Jones 2003; Taylor, 2007), resident participation seems to have served mostly to legitimize top-down interventions, rather than leading to more open decision-making processes. Consequently, in line with findings of Kokx and Van Kempen (2009), residents had to turn to traditional forms of activism – outside the governance spaces – to get attention for their concerns. Although they were successful in putting problems of neighbourhood disorder on the district’s agenda, their influence remained limited to contributing to the improvement of a particular domain of everyday nuisances in the neighbourhood.

In the second stage of regeneration (2007-2013), the regeneration coalition stepped up their game and Transvaal became the example of ‘how it should be done’. The coalition put a lot of money, time and effort into the organization of participation and developed varying ways to bridge the distance between formal policy arena and knowledge and skills of residents. Participation ranged from formalized and long-term mechanisms (Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee and Resident Platform) to small-scale, temporary and project-based initiatives (Neighbourhood Initiative Program and Open Planning Process). In the interviews, both urban professionals and residents state that the interventions from 2007 onwards halted the downward development of Transvaal and stimulated marginal upgrading: Transvaal has become more ‘liveable’, as safety levels, residents’ opinion about the neighbourhood, the quality of the housing stock, public space and the neighbourhood economy have improved – although there are still problems related to youth and nuisance. This process of marginal upgrading is reflected in neighbourhood statistics (see Teernstra, 2012).
However, the actual contribution of resident participation to this process varied. A distinction can be made between contributions to reducing everyday concerns of residents in particular domains, such as safety, nuisance and strengthening the local community on the one hand, and contributions to long-term strategic neighbourhood inventions on the other hand.

Two participation mechanisms, The Resident Platform and Neighbourhood Initiatives Program, can be considered quite successful in terms of strengthening local community: these initiatives managed to activate more, and a more diverse group of residents. So, these mechanisms are fruitful from the perspective whereby participation is seen as an end in itself. In addition, the Neighbourhood Initiatives Program enabled residents to improve particular domains in the neighbourhood, such as safety and nuisance, through formulating and implementing their own small-scale projects.

The two other participation mechanisms, the Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee and Open Planning Process, were designed to create opportunities for co-production for residents and the neighbourhood coalition. However, the findings demonstrate that co-production remained largely out of reach. Most importantly, in both mechanisms residents were excluded from fundamental, strategic and long-term decisions about tenure conversion. The Open Planning Process was not that open, as the housing association determined preconditions concerning to the creation of a diversified and more expensive housing stock. The Neighbourhood Regeneration Committee was left standing on the side-lines in complex negotiations between the urban district and housing associations. Neither the involved residents nor urban professionals can therefore confirm how residents actually influenced the vision laid out in the long-term regeneration plans. So from the perspective of participation as a means to create locally-embedded regeneration strategies, resident involvement is not very successful. This is in line with Chaskin et al. (2012), Jones (2003) and Taylor (2007), who demonstrated that residents’ influence in shaping policies for neighbourhood upgrading often remains limited despite the existence of formal participation arrangements.

In sum, what this case study demonstrated is that creating opportunities for resident engagement in neighbourhood governance may form the new ideal, but often turns out to be a process of trial and error. It seems to be easier to create participation mechanisms that contribute to reducing everyday concerns of residents in particular domains in the neighbourhood, such as safety and nuisance, than it is to create mechanisms that open up long-term, strategic neighbourhood interventions. In
Transvaal, participation can be considered quite successful as a way to strengthen the local community and in its contribution to small-scale projects that improve particular places in the neighbourhood. However, the realized participation mechanisms did not result in more open planning processes at the scale of the neighbourhood as a whole. Despite the coalition’s high ambitions about resident participation, residents’ achievements in shaping policy plans for neighbourhood upgrading still remain limited.
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change

Source: Suzanne Blanchard
6 Conclusion and discussion

6.1 Introduction

This dissertation focused on processes of neighbourhood change in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands. The aim of this research was twofold: the first objective was to obtain a better understanding of how processes of upgrading and downgrading manifest themselves, while the second aim was to obtain insight into the way in which governing actors contribute to these processes. These aims are related to two gaps which were identified in the literature on neighbourhood change.

Firstly, many studies about neighbourhood change assume a close relationship between social and physical changes: socio-economic changes are assumed to go hand-in-hand with physical changes and vice versa (e.g. Clay, 1979; Grigsby et al., 1987; Lees et al., 2008; Walks and Maaranen, 2008a), but empirical evidence underpinning these relationships is scarce. In addition, studies about neighbourhood change attribute a key role to residential mobility, while incumbent processes – changes in the socio-economic status of sitting households – are overlooked. Downgrading is related to immigration of low-income and out-migration of high-income households (e.g. Andersson and Brämå, 2004; Van Ham and Clark, 2009) and migration is even one of the defining characteristics of gentrification: the cause of which is assumed to be the immigration of high-income households, leading to replacement of lower-income groups (e.g. Lees et al., 2008). Processes of incumbent neighbourhood change are often overlooked: few studies actually explore the relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change. So, these relationships were addressed in the first part of this research.

Secondly, many studies addressing the relationship between governing actors and neighbourhood change focus on only one type of governing actor (e.g. Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Andersson and Turner, 2014) or treat governing actors as one group, which are assumed to follow shared objectives in neighbourhood regeneration (e.g.
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Uitermark et al., 2007). Although these studies have led to important insights into the way in which governing actors contribute to neighbourhood change, multiple actors are often involved in neighbourhood regeneration. Moreover, residents are increasingly included to participate in decision-making processes in neighbourhood governance (Bailey, 2010; Parés et al., 2011). It is likely that the actors involved have different goals and priorities, leading to varying outcomes in regeneration strategies and diverse processes of neighbourhood change. The second purpose of this research therefore was to understand how goals of governing actors aimed at generating neighbourhood upgrading resulted in different regeneration strategies, to what extent residents contributed to these strategies through participating in decision-making processes and how this resulted in different processes of neighbourhood change.

This concluding chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the main findings and provides conclusions of the first part of this research, while section 6.3 discusses the findings and presents a conclusion of the second part. An agenda for future research is provided in the last part of this chapter.

6.2 Part I: disentangling patterns of neighbourhood change

The first part of this research (chapters 2 and 3) involved a citywide analysis of patterns of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg. Chapter 2 provided insight into the relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change, by addressing the following research question: what is the relationship between social and physical upgrading and downgrading of urban neighbourhoods? The aim of chapter 3 was to further unravel processes of social upgrading and downgrading, by exploring the relationship between residential mobility and neighbourhood change. Chapter 3 addressed the research question: what is the relationship between neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading and residential and social mobility of residents? This section discusses the main findings of these chapters, provides answers to the research questions and concludes with a discussion of the role of the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands in understanding social and physical changes in neighbourhoods.
6.2.1 The relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change

Chapter 2 began with the assertion that many studies assume a close relationship between social and physical upgrading and downgrading. The chapter investigated this relationship by examining income and real estate patterns of neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg between 1999 and 2006. The findings showed that only a relatively small number of neighbourhoods (thirty percent) in these cities demonstrate a simultaneous trend in social and physical neighbourhood change. These are generally neighbourhoods at the top and bottom of the housing market hierarchy: on the one hand, these are prosperous neighbourhoods, characterized by owner-occupied housing and a central location, while on the other hand, these are relatively poor neighbourhoods with large proportions of social housing and a peripheral location.

Other neighbourhoods, however, displayed a more complex relationship between social and physical developments. About twenty percent showed parallel trends of social and physical change in the end, but with a time lag between the processes. In some cases, physical changes preceded social changes, while in other cases this was the other way around. Another thirty percent demonstrated a partial diverging relationship between the processes. For instance, these neighbourhoods experienced social upgrading, but the physical development followed city-wide change, or vice versa. Only a small number of neighbourhoods (eight percent) showed completely diverging trends with social upgrading and physical downgrading or vice versa.

Chapter 2 provided tentative explanations for these complex relationships and stressed the importance of a number of interrelated issues. Firstly, the findings highlighted that the complex relationship between social and physical changes in neighbourhoods may be attributed to the multiple social dynamics of households which can become manifest in neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood change can result from residential mobility as well as developments of sitting households. In addition, it may be that neighbourhoods fulfil different functions for different types of households: some neighbourhoods can mainly accomplish a function for households at the start of their housing career, while other neighbourhoods can be places where many households are found in the later stages of their housing career (also see Musterd et al., forthcoming). To complicate the issue, a neighbourhood can simultaneously fulfil different functions for different types of households at the same time. A poor neighbourhood may trap certain disadvantaged households, but may provide a social support network to other households and can thereby offer young households the...
opportunity to start their housing career. In other words, a relatively homogeneous housing stock can serve a heterogeneous population. This can result in multiple social dynamics within a neighbourhood, which is also likely to contribute to the diffuse relationship between social and physical dynamics of a neighbourhood. In order to fully understand the relationship between household and neighbourhood dynamics, more research in this direction is needed.

Secondly, the findings revealed the importance of the institutional and housing market contexts in understanding the disparities between social and physical changes. For instance, the findings illustrated that area-based regeneration policies do not only lead to physical neighbourhood change through interventions in the housing stock, but can also cause social change as the aim of regeneration is often to attract higher-income households. In addition, the presence of social housing can affect the complex relationships: the in-migration of low-income households might lead to social downgrading, but physical grading may continue to follow the citywide trend when the condition of social housing remains sufficiently high. Furthermore, the findings highlighted the impact of privatization and deregulation of the housing system on the patterns observed. The conversion of social housing into owner-occupied housing affects both physical neighbourhood change, as social housing is often sold off at a price below the market value, and social change, as higher-income households are attracted to these dwellings (also see Boterman and Van Gent, 2014).

6.2.2 The relationship between residential mobility and neighbourhood change

Chapter 3 further disentangled processes of social upgrading and downgrading. The chapter investigated the relationship between residential mobility and social neighbourhood change, because many studies assume that mobility plays a key role in neighbourhood change, while incumbent processes are often overlooked. The focus was placed on neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg between 1999 and 2008. The chapter started with the expectation that that processes of upgrading and downgrading go hand-in-hand with high mobility rates. However, the findings demonstrated that there are both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility rates.

In order to get a better understanding of the relationship between mobility and neighbourhood change, income developments of in-migrating, out-migrating and non-migrating households were examined and related to neighbourhood income
developments. The findings demonstrated that in- and out-migration are not the only processes at work, but that changes in the socio-economic status of sitting residents were also important. In downgrading neighbourhoods, in-migrants reinforce downgrading, as their incomes are – generally – a downward force on the income level of their neighbourhood. However, the findings showed that sitting households impede processes of decline, as their income levels and income developments are generally above the neighbourhood level. The contribution of out-migrants to downgrading is mixed: in some cases, they reinforce downgrading, while in other cases they hinder the process. In upgrading neighbourhoods, incumbent processes seem to be the main driver of upgrading: incomes of non-migrants are systematically above the neighbourhood level and although in-migrants initially impede upgrading – as their incomes are below the neighbourhood level when moving in – they experience strong income gains in the years after in-migration. In general, out-migrants reinforce upgrading because their incomes are below the neighbourhood level when moving out. However, in other years, their incomes are around the neighbourhood level. The income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants together determine whether the neighbourhood as a whole is upgrading, downgrading or keeping in pace with city-wide development.

The findings demonstrated that neighbourhood change results from both migration patterns and social mobility of sitting households of a neighbourhood: households with income levels below the neighbourhood average move into a neighbourhood, cause incumbent upgrading as they experience strong income gains soon after in-migration, and leave the neighbourhood after a certain period of time – expectedly in order to advance their housing career. These patterns were observed in both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods and it seems that households anticipate having higher incomes in the near future when moving to a new neighbourhood.

These observations are striking for at least two reasons. Firstly, one of the key assumptions in an important part of the gentrification literature is that the in-migration of progressively more affluent households into low-income neighbourhoods leads to displacement or replacement of the low-income sitting population (see Marcuse, 1986; Lees et al., 2008; Slater; 2009). The findings of this research indicate a more nuanced picture. In upgrading neighbourhoods in the Netherlands, income levels of in-migrants are not systematically higher than the neighbourhood average, but in-migrants experience strong income gains in the years after in-migration. In addition, income
levels of sitting households are above the average neighbourhood income level. Although income levels of out-migrants are generally below or around the neighbourhood level, their incomes are higher than those of in-migrants. In other words, the findings do not provide clear evidence for displacement of low-income households. Of course, the findings presented in chapter 3 are average income levels and do not provide developments of individual households. Moreover, in-migrants may possess higher education levels and can have higher levels of cultural capital than sitting and out-migrating households, which can be translated into higher levels of economic capital in later stages. Also, sitting households might experience displacement pressures as a result of changes in the social, physical and/or economic neighbourhood environment (see Slater, 2009), which can cause sitting residents with lower incomes to move out. Nevertheless, the findings of this research add a new perspective on the progression of gentrification to the academic literature, which is schematized in Figure 6.1.

**Figure 6.1** Two perspectives on gentrification. *Left*: the progression of gentrification as assumed in an important part of the gentrification literature. *Right*: the progression of the process based on the research findings.

Source: Hochstenbach, Musterd and Teernstra, 2014 (own adaptation).

Secondly, although the findings demonstrate that in-migration, and in some cases, out-migration reinforce downgrading, the findings reveal that in-migrating households experience strong income gains after moving in. In addition, income levels of sitting households are above the neighbourhood level. These observations stress the importance of taking income developments of sitting households into account, and raise the question of whether in-migration of low-income households is problematic when their incomes increase significantly in later years.
Chapter 3 presented a number of tentative explanations for the patterns observed. Firstly, processes of incumbent upgrading can be related to the fact that households may be less willing to move after an increase in income, as they may be happy with their current neighbourhood. Secondly, the chapter stressed the importance of social housing in understanding the relationship between residential and social mobility and neighbourhood change. The social housing stock is characterized by long waiting lists and households relying on social housing may consequently wish to move out, but might not be able to. In addition, in the Netherlands, households cannot be forced to move out after income gains. For households which do no longer comply with the allocation rules of social housing, moving is associated with strong increases in housing costs. So, households may choose to stay in their dwelling, even when they are no longer appropriate for them – which can lead to incumbent upgrading.

6.2.3 The meaning of the local and institutional context
The findings of chapters 2 and 3 revealed the variety of social and physical transformations that may manifest in urban neighbourhoods. In short, there does not appear to be one type of upgrading or downgrading process, but in fact there are multiple processes operating simultaneously. Both chapters indicated the importance of the institutional and housing market contexts in which the cities and neighbourhoods are embedded: the complex relationship between social and physical upgrading and downgrading and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change could be attributed, at least partly, to the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands.

Firstly, the complex relationships could be related to the presence of social housing. The housing markets of Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg are characterized by a significant proportion of social housing: although these proportions vary between the neighbourhoods – ranging from 0 to 96.6 percent (CBS, 2012) – most neighbourhoods in these cities have at least a certain proportion of social housing. The presence of social housing firstly may affect the relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change: as mentioned earlier, the in-migration of low-income households may cause social downgrading, but does not necessarily lead to physical neighbourhood change. In addition, the presence of social housing implies that low-income households are able to move into both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods and can prevent the exclusion of low-income households from gentrifying neighbourhoods – which is often feared in the gentrification literature (Van
As chapter 3 demonstrated, this can partially explain the comparatively low income levels of in-migrants in both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods. Furthermore, chapter 3 suggests that the presence of social housing can explain the observed processes of incumbent upgrading. As social housing is scarce and characterized by comparatively low rents, households might decide to stay in their socially rented dwellings, even when they are no longer suitable or when they can afford to live in dwellings higher up in the hierarchy. In the tight housing market of Amsterdam in particular, where demand exceeds the supply of housing and privately rented housing is expensive compared to social housing, many higher-income households remain in socially rented dwellings for which they once qualified (Musterd, 2014). This has been termed ‘scheefwonen’ (skewed living). This leads to processes of incumbent upgrading and, moreover, it may affect the relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change: the neighbourhood may demonstrate social upgrading with physical changes following the citywide trend.

Secondly, the research findings indicate that the complex relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change could be attributed to policies and interventions of governing actors, such as the national government, municipalities and housing associations. As mentioned, a number of neighbourhoods have been subjected to area-based regeneration policies and interventions. In these neighbourhoods, (large) proportions of social housing have been demolished and replaced by a mixture of social housing, privately rented housing and owner-occupied housing. These regeneration processes may trigger residential mobility, as demolition of social housing forces low-income households to move out of the neighbourhood. As regeneration generally results in lower proportions of social housing, not all households are able to return. Simultaneously, higher-income households are attracted to renovated or newly-constructed housing, which may lead to social upgrading, and physical interventions in the housing stock and public space are likely to cause increases in real estate values. Moreover, area-based policies may cause changes both in targeted neighbourhoods and the surrounding neighbourhoods, for example, in neighbourhoods receiving the (low-income) households which are relocated from the neighbourhoods being regenerated.

In addition, processes of privatization and deregulation of the housing system may contribute to the complex patterns and trends. In particular, part of the social housing stock is converted into owner-occupied and privately rented housing. In chapter 2, it was argued that social housing is often sold off at a price below the market value, which
might lead to physical downgrading. At the same time, higher-income households are attracted to the converted dwellings, thereby affecting residential mobility patterns and, consequently, social neighbourhood change.

In sum, the findings of the first part of this dissertation highlight the importance of the institutional and housing market contexts in which the cities and neighbourhoods are located, in understanding the social and physical transformations that may manifest in urban neighbourhoods. In order to obtain a better understanding of the impact of the highly-regulated context on neighbourhood change in the Netherlands, the second part of this research explored the importance of the institutional context in processes of neighbourhood change.

6.3 Part II: the role of the institutional context in neighbourhood change

The second part of this dissertation (chapters 4 and 5) addressed the importance of the institutional context in neighbourhood change in the Netherlands. Chapter 4 explored goals of different governing actors – the national government, local governments and housing associations – in generating neighbourhood upgrading by addressing the following research question: what are goals of governing actors for policies and interventions in generating neighbourhood upgrading and how do different goals result in place-specific regeneration strategies and diverse processes of neighbourhood change? Then chapter 5 examined how the inclusion of residents in decision-making processes in neighbourhood governance provided opportunities for residents to influence neighbourhood regeneration strategies. This chapter addressed the research question: how and to what degree have residents been included in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading and to what extent have residents thereby contributed to neighbourhood change? The main findings of these chapters are discussed in this section. In addition, this section provides answers to the research questions and concludes with a reflection on institutional approaches to neighbourhood change.

6.3.1 Goals of governing actors in generating neighbourhood upgrading

Chapter 4 focused on the way in which governing actors in the regeneration of the neighbourhoods of Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam and Rustenburg in The Hague aimed to achieve neighbourhood change. The chapter concerned a
neighbourhood analysis and made use of a combination of qualitative data and methods. Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg were targeted for regeneration with the objective to upgrade them, because they had a weak socio-economic and housing market position in the 1990s. This was assumed to be caused by a one-sided housing stock, resulting in selective out-migration of high-income households. The findings of chapter 4 showed that a central element in the regeneration of the neighbourhoods was state-led gentrification: the aim was to attract and retain higher-income households through differentiation of the housing stock (such as conversion of social housing into privately rented and owner-occupied housing) as well as upgrading of the physical, economic and social environment. The findings demonstrated that the national government played an important role in the formulation of these regeneration goals, as national regeneration policies shifted in favour of gentrification in the 1990s, which was related to processes of neo-liberalization. These goals were adopted by the municipalities of Amsterdam and The Hague.

However, although the formulated regeneration goals were similar in Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg, the findings of chapter 4 showed that in each neighbourhood, the actors involved all had their own objectives and priorities. These objectives and priorities did not only vary between contexts, but also within contexts. This resulted in processes of negotiation between actors and led to different outcomes in neighbourhood interventions. In each neighbourhood, the municipalities initiated the regeneration process and aimed to establish a coalition with the housing associations active in the neighbourhoods. As owners of the social housing stock, housing associations are important partners for the local governments – especially in Transvaal and Oosterpark, where the housing associations own the majority of the housing stock. However, through their deregulation in 1995, housing associations have become hybrid organizations (Blessing, 2013): although their primary task was to provide affordable housing, they have now also become market-oriented actors which have to strengthen their economic position and generate income from market activities by, for example, selling off social housing and converting social housing into owner-occupied housing. For the regeneration of the research neighbourhoods, this implied that the housing associations strategically determined in which neighbourhoods they wanted to intervene and where they wanted to invest in the housing stock and other

35 As mentioned in the introduction (p. 16), policies and interventions aiming at attracting higher-income households to the neighbourhoods have also been referred to as ‘social-mixing’, ‘urban revitalization’ or ‘urban renaissance’.  

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neighbourhood aspects. The findings of chapter 4 demonstrated that the goals of housing associations did not always match those of the government. The actors involved all had their own objectives and priorities, which resulted in negotiation between actors and consequently different outcomes in terms of regeneration strategies and varying processes of neighbourhood change.

Moreover, although pushing forward gentrification was a central element in the regeneration of Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg, the findings demonstrated that the government and housing associations still form a strong buffer between market interventions and neighbourhood development. In other words, social motives remain important drivers. Housing associations are still obliged by law to realize social objectives and the government imposes comprehensive regulations to impede gentrification and reduce its negative effects.

6.3.2 Resident participation in neighbourhood upgrading

Finally, chapter 5 explored how the inclusion of residents in decision-making processes in policies for neighbourhood upgrading provided opportunities for residents to influence neighbourhood regeneration strategies and, consequently, processes of neighbourhood change. This chapter specifically focused on the neighbourhood of Transvaal (Amsterdam) and made use of a combination of qualitative data and methods. During its regeneration from 1999 onwards, varying forms of resident participation were introduced. Consequently, Transvaal provides an interesting case in which to study how the organization of participation in neighbourhood governance has changed over time and what this has meant for residents’ opportunities to influence neighbourhood interventions.

The research findings demonstrated that governing actors had high ambitions in creating opportunities for resident participation in neighbourhood governance. However, it turned out to be a process of trial and error in terms of the actual contribution of residents to decision-making processes and subsequent processes of neighbourhood change. In the first period of regeneration (1999-2006), resident participation was officially incorporated in formal planning processes, but the implementation was not sufficiently developed. Residents were only involved at the end of the policy-cycle, when major decisions had already been made. Moreover, the rules of the game were determined by the urban district. In line with previous studies (e.g. Jones, 2003; Taylor, 2007; Chaskin et al., 2012), resident participation seemed to have mostly served to legitimize top-down interventions, while it did not lead to more
democratic decision-making processes. Consequently, residents had to turn to traditional forms of activism, outside formal governance forums, to get attention for their concerns. Although the urban district responded to these forms of activism, residents’ influence remained limited to a particular domain of everyday nuisances.

During the second stage of regeneration (2007-2013), the regeneration coalition put a lot of money, time and effort into the organization of participation. New participation mechanisms were introduced, which ranged from formalized and long-term mechanisms to small-scale, temporary and project-based initiatives. These mechanisms ranged from low to high levels of impact and largely determined the actual contribution of residents to neighbourhood change. Participation mechanisms that contribute to reducing everyday concerns of residents in particular domains, such as safety and public nuisance and strengthening the local community, were quite successful. These mechanisms were also fruitful from the perspective whereby participation is seen as an objective in itself. The coalition also aimed to create opportunities for co-production. However, the findings demonstrated that co-production largely remained out of reach for residents and the participation mechanisms did not result in more open planning processes at the scale of the neighbourhood as a whole. In particular, residents were excluded from decision-making processes regarding strategic and long-term interventions about tenure conversion. So, from the perspective of participation as a means to create locally-embedded policies for long-term neighbourhood change, resident participation was not very successful. So, despite the high ambitions of urban professionals about resident participation and the establishment of varying mechanisms, residents’ achievements in shaping policy plans for neighbourhood upgrading remained limited.

6.3.3 Reflections on institutional approaches to neighbourhood change
Chapter 4 started with an important assertion of this research that although gentrification has become ‘a global urban strategy’ (Smith, 2002), the way in which governing actors contribute to gentrification is context-specific, as institutional and housing market contexts affect patterns of neighbourhood development differently. The objective of chapter 4 was to explore goals of governing actors in generating neighbourhood change, in order to provide insight into the way in which state-led gentrification unfolds in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands. Thereby, the aim was to contribute to the ‘geography of gentrification’ (Lees, 2000; 2012). The findings demonstrate that Dutch state-led gentrification stands out in a number of ways
when to compared to gentrification in – for instance – Anglo-Saxon contexts. Firstly, in the Netherlands the presence of social housing and rules and regulations (e.g. rent control and property protection) mitigates the negative effects relating to gentrification to some degree. Low-income residents are not systematically excluded from gentrifying neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, governing actors increasingly adopted gentrification as a regeneration policy.

Secondly, while state-led gentrification is often seen in the academic literature as a municipally-led goal (for instance to generate local tax revenues), the findings revealed that in the Netherlands, the national government still plays a central role in the promotion of gentrification. National regeneration policies shifted in favour of gentrification during the 1990s: as mentioned, the government assumed that the presence of a one-sided housing stock resulted in processes of selective migration in many urban neighbourhoods (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008). The government assumed that processes of in-migration of low-income households and out-migration of high-income households resulted in neighbourhood decline. The government therefore attributes a key role to residential mobility. These observations are striking in comparison with findings of chapter 3, which demonstrated the importance of incumbent upgrading: in-migrants experience strong income gains after in-migration and income levels of non-migrating households lay above the average neighbourhood income level, which impeded processes of decline.

Nevertheless, the shift in national regeneration policies towards gentrification resulted in rather uniform policy objectives: in Transvaal, Oosterpark as well as Rustenburg, governing actors aimed to counteract decline through attracting and retaining higher-income households. This is in line with observations of Lees (2000, p. 405), who argued that state-led gentrification policies have become ‘one size fits all’. However, the findings demonstrated that although the formulated regeneration goals were similar, the were differences in the practice of the regeneration strategies between the research neighbourhoods. These differences could firstly be attributed to the local contexts in which the neighbourhoods are embedded. For instance, because of its central location, Oosterpark (and Transvaal to a lesser degree) benefitted from the ongoing gentrification of the inner-city and Amsterdam’s tight housing market. In contrast, upgrading was hindered in Rustenburg, due to the presence of higher-quality housing in the vicinity and The Hague’s rather loose housing market. In addition, the findings demonstrate the importance of tenure structures of the housing market. As the majority of the housing stock in Transvaal and Oosterpark is owned by housing
associations, differentiation of the housing stock was much easier than in Rustenburg. Differentiation was difficult in Rustenburg because the majority of the dwellings is owned by owner-occupants and governing actors therefore did not have control over the housing stock. So, although the goals of the regeneration strategies were quite similar in the research neighbourhoods, the outcomes in terms of neighbourhood change varied, which could – partly – be attributed to the local contexts and characteristics of the neighbourhoods. In other words, the findings demonstrate that the ‘geography of gentrification’ is not only of importance at the national scale, but also at the scale of the city and neighbourhood.

Secondly, the differences in the practice of the regeneration between the neighbourhoods could be related to different goals and priorities of the actors involved, as was discussed earlier. The municipalities had to deal with housing associations in the regeneration of the neighbourhoods, all having their own objectives and priorities, which resulted in negotiation between actors. In these already highly-complex arrangements, chapter 5 demonstrated that the national government prescribed the inclusion of another stakeholder in neighbourhood governance: regeneration plans had to be discussed with residents. For residents, this meant that they were able to address their concerns in the neighbourhood through participating in formal decision-making processes – instead of by resisting these policies or by leaving the neighbourhood. However, the implementation of resident participation was not that easy – both for governing actors and residents. For governing actors, residents were only one of the negotiation partners in the formulation of regeneration plans. In the first stage of regeneration, this implied that residents were included at the end of the policy-cycle, when major decisions had already been made. Although in the second stage of regeneration, governing actors implemented various participation mechanism, the achievements of residents in shaping policy plans still remained limited.

6.4 Agenda for future research

The aim of this research was to contribute to the ‘geography of neighbourhood change’ by exploring the manifestation of processes of upgrading and downgrading in the highly-regulated institutional context of the Netherlands. What this dissertation demonstrated is that there is a great variety in the social and physical changes that may occur in urban neighbourhoods. There is not just one type of upgrading or downgrading process, but there are multiple processes at work simultaneously. This
dissertation demonstrated the interplay between social and physical neighbourhood change, the importance of residential and social mobility of households and the impact of policies and interventions of governing actors. Although the findings provided much insight into processes of upgrading and downgrading in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands, the findings also raised a number of questions which provide directions for future research.

Firstly, this dissertation encourages scholars to conduct more refined studies that show and explain the place-specificity of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading. In the academic literature, there is a tendency to generalize processes of neighbourhood change. The knowledge on gentrification in particular has evolved significantly since the concept was coined in the 1960s: while it is increasingly considered a globalized phenomenon (e.g. Smith, 2002), in fact it does not operate uniformly everywhere. This dissertation demonstrated that the ‘geography of neighbourhood change’ is not only of importance at the national scale, but also at the scale of the city and neighbourhood, and stressed the importance of the institutional and housing market contexts in which the neighbourhoods are embedded in understanding the complex processes. More refined studies, which demonstrate and unravel these place-specific characteristics, may contribute to our understanding of neighbourhood change.

Secondly, the results of this dissertation suggest the importance of further examining and unravelling the relationship between changes in the lives of individual residents – in terms of residential and social mobility – and neighbourhood change. This study demonstrated the importance of both processes in understanding upgrading and downgrading. With respect to social upgrading and downgrading, most studies tend to use income data, but educational and occupational data are other important indicators of social neighbourhood change. For instance, gentrification is often associated with the in-migration of highly-educated households, working in the tertiary or quaternary sector, which is assumed to lead to the displacement or replacement of lower-educated working-class households (Hamnett, 1991; Lees et al., 2008). Especially when these in-migrating households are young and have only recently started their working career, their income levels may be modest when moving in, but may increase significantly in the (near) future (e.g. Van Criekingen and Decroley, 2003). Despite their modest income levels, these households can change the neighbourhood ambience reflecting their tastes and values, which might lead to indirect displacement of sitting households. Moreover, it can be argued that students in particular may enter neighbourhoods with modest incomes, but within a few years may experience a marked
increase in earnings. This may explain the finding that sitting residents seem to be a driver of neighbourhood change. In order to obtain a better understanding of the contribution of in-migrating, out-migrating and sitting households to neighbourhood change, it would therefore be valuable to examine educational and professional data. In addition, it would be worthwhile to examine and unravel the relationship between residential and social mobility and neighbourhood change in other – less regulated – contexts than the Netherlands. This research stressed that the observed processes of incumbent upgrading and relatively low income level of in-migrating households could (at least partly) be attributed to the highly-regulated Dutch context, which is, among other things, characterized by the presence of a large social housing stock. This raises the question what the relationship is between residential and social mobility of households in countries with a comparatively smaller role for governing actors, such as Anglo-Saxon contexts.

Thirdly, the Social Statistical Database of Statistics Netherlands, which was used for this research, would be very useful to go even further in understanding residential mobility and the dynamics of neighbourhoods by, for instance, following individuals in their housing and social careers over a certain period of time, in order to obtain a better understanding of the social dynamics that manifest in urban neighbourhoods.

Fourthly, although this research examined the role of governing actors in generating neighbourhood change, the focus was on creating upgrading and the question can be raised whether processes of downgrading can also be related to policies and interventions of governing actors or to the absence of policies and interventions. For instance, the research findings demonstrated that governing actors have to make strategic choices in which neighbourhoods and neighbourhood aspects they invest (most). This implies that some neighbourhoods are selected for regeneration, while others are characterized by significantly lower levels of investment or even by disinvestment, which might lead to downgrading. In addition, Boterman and Van Gent (2014) observed that in Amsterdam, the selling off of social housing may contribute to processes of ethnic polarisation between centrally-located, pre-war constructed neighbourhoods and peripherally-located, post-war constructed neighbourhoods. It would therefore be worthwhile to investigate the relationship between the role of governing actors and downgrading.

Finally, this dissertation focused on the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands and examined – among other factors – the way in which governing actors generate upgrading. Although the role of market actors in generating neighbourhood
change was beyond the scope of this research, the question can be raised what the highly-regulated Dutch context means for the possibilities of market actors to generate neighbourhood change, as they have to operate within the set of rules and regulations established by the government.
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Appendices

Appendix I: Overview of respondents

A total number of 33 interviews were conducted for this dissertation. Table I presents an overview of the respondents. As the respondents of the Municipality of Amsterdam and Housing Associations A to C worked in Transvaal as well as in Oosterpark, these interviews focused on both neighbourhoods. The interviews with actors of Housing Association D, the welfare organization and six residents focused solely on the neighbourhood of Transvaal.

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<td>7</td>
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<td>Municipality of The Hague</td>
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<td>Housing Association B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>13</strong></td>
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</table>
Appendix II: Topic lists of interviews

This is a translation of the topic lists used to conduct the semi-structured interviews with governing actors of the Municipality of Amsterdam, Municipality of The Hague, eight housing associations, one welfare association and six residents. The interviews lasted ninety minutes on average, were recorded and fully transcribed.

I. Topic list of interviews with actors of the Municipalities of Amsterdam and The Hague

Part A. Introduction
- Introduction by the respondent about his/her function and tasks

Part B. Respondent’s perception of neighbourhood development
- Perception of social development of the neighbourhood(s) since 1990
- Perception of physical development of the neighbourhood(s) since 1990

Part C. Policies and interventions in neighbourhood regeneration
- Reasons for formulating a regeneration strategy
- Goals of regeneration of the municipality and overview of policies/interventions to achieve these goals
  • Housing stock
  • Public space
  • Neighbourhood economy
  • Liveability and safety
  • Socio-economic aspects
- The role of the national government in the formulation of regeneration goals
- Goals of other actors (e.g. housing associations) – and policies and interventions to achieve these goals – in regeneration, in comparison with the municipality’s goals
- Implementation of the regeneration strategy
  • Implementation of the formulated policies and interventions of municipality and other actors
  • Evaluation of cooperation with actors involved

Part D. Resident participation in decision-making processes
- Organization of resident participation in decision-making processes
- Reasons for including residents in decision-making processes
- Cooperation between governing actors (municipality and housing associations) and residents
- Respondent’s evaluation of achievements of resident participation

**Part E. Perceived effects of regeneration strategy**
- Perceived effects of policies/interventions of the municipality on neighbourhood change
- Perceived effects of policies/interventions of other actors involved in generating neighbourhood change

**II. Topic list of interviews with actors of housing associations**

**Part A. Introduction**
- Introduction by the respondent about his/her function and tasks

**Part B. Respondent’s perception of neighbourhood development**
- Perception of social development of the neighbourhood(s) since 1990
- Perception of physical development of the neighbourhood(s) since 1990

**Part C. Policies and interventions in neighbourhood regeneration**
- Reasons for formulating a regeneration strategy
- Goals of regeneration of housing association and overview of policies/interventions to achieve these goals
  - Housing stock
  - Public space
  - Neighbourhood economy
  - Liveability/safety
  - Socio-economic policies/interventions
- Role of national government in the formulation of regeneration goals
- Goals of other actors (e.g. municipality and other housing associations) in regeneration in comparison with the housing association’s goals
- Implementation of the regeneration strategy
  - Implementation of the formulated policies and interventions of the housing association and other actors
Disentangling Processes of Neighbourhood Change

- Evaluation of cooperation with actors involved

**Part D. Resident participation in decision-making processes**
- Organization of resident participation in decision-making processes
- Reasons for including residents in decision-making processes
- Cooperation between governing actors (housing associations and municipality) and residents
- Respondent’s evaluation of achievements of resident participation

**Part E. Perceived effects of regeneration strategy**
- Perceived effects of policies/interventions of housing association on neighbourhood change
- Perceived effects of policies/interventions of the municipality and other actors involved in generating neighbourhood change

**III. Topic list of interview with welfare organization**

**Part A. Introduction**
- Introduction by the respondent about his/her function and tasks

**Part B. Respondent’s perception of neighbourhood development**
- Perception of social development of the neighbourhood(s) since 1990
- Perception of physical development of the neighbourhood(s) since 1990

**Part C. Resident participation in Transvaal**
- Overview of possibilities for residents to participate in decision-making processes since the end of the 1990s
- Differences between participation mechanisms according to the respondent
- The role of the welfare organization in these participation mechanisms
- Cooperation with residents in these participation mechanisms
- Cooperation with governing actors (e.g. municipality, housing associations)

**Part E. Evaluation of achievements of resident participation**
- Respondent’s evaluation of the degree to which residents were involved in decision-making processes of governing actors
Appendices

- Respondent’s evaluation of the achievements of resident participation in generating neighbourhood change
- Perceived effects of the regeneration strategy of the municipality and housing associations in generating neighbourhood change

IV. Topic list of interviews with residents

Part A. Introduction
- Introduction by the respondent about household characteristics, number of years in the neighbourhood and reasons for moving into the neighbourhood

Part B. Respondent’s perception of neighbourhood development
- Perception of social development of the neighbourhood since 1990
- Perception of physical development of the neighbourhood since 1990

Part C. Resident participation in Transvaal
- Overview of possibilities for residents to participate in decision-making processes since the end of the 1990s
- Differences between participation mechanisms according to the respondent

Part D. Participation activities of the respondent
- Overview and description of participation activities of the respondent
- Motivation of respondent for participating in these activities
- Cooperation with welfare organization in these participation activities
- Cooperation with governing actors (e.g. municipality, housing associations) in these participation activities

Part E. Evaluation of achievements of resident participation
- Respondent’s evaluation of the degree to which residents were involved in decision-making processes of governing actors
- Respondent’s evaluation of the achievements of participation activities of the respondent in particular and resident participation in general in generating neighbourhood change
- Perceived effects of the regeneration strategy of the municipality and housing associations in generating neighbourhood change
Summary

Introduction
Over recent decades, patterns of upgrading and downgrading have changed significantly in many Western cities. Many neighbourhoods experienced a transformation from disadvantaged areas with bad housing conditions to popular high-end neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, many neighbourhoods still face decline. This dissertation focuses on processes of upgrading and downgrading in the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands. The aim of this research is twofold. The first aim is to acquire a better understanding of how processes of upgrading and downgrading manifest themselves. The second objective is to obtain insight into the way in which the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands contributes to these processes. These aims are related to two gaps which were identified in the academic literature on neighbourhood change.

Firstly, many studies on neighbourhood change present the development of neighbourhoods in an orderly progression. Many of these studies assume a close relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change, but few studies actually disentangled these relationships. Therefore, this dissertation firstly addresses these relationships and argues that processes of neighbourhood change are more differentiated than assumed.

Secondly, despite growing attention to the place-specificity and context-dependency of neighbourhood change, most studies focus on Anglo-Saxon contexts, which are characterized by more liberal attitudes towards neighbourhood development. Continental-European countries, such as the Netherlands, are characterized by stronger welfare states, interventionist governments and presence of social housing. While the role of governing actors in neighbourhood change has been addressed in such highly-regulated contexts, many studies only focus on one type of governing actor, or treat governing actors as one group who are assumed to follow shared objectives in neighbourhood development. However, multiple actors are often involved in the regeneration of neighbourhoods. In addition, residents are increasingly included to participate in decision-making processes in neighbourhood governance. It is likely that the actors involved have different goals and priorities. This leads to varying outcomes in regeneration strategies and, consequently, differing processes of neighbourhood change. This dissertation aims to understand how goals of governing actors – the
national government, local governments and housing associations – in generating neighbourhood upgrading result in diverse regeneration strategies, to what extent residents have contributed to these strategies through participating in decision-making processes in neighbourhood governance and how this resulted in differing processes of neighbourhood change.

**Studying neighbourhood change**

The process of downgrading often encompasses a decline in a neighbourhood’s socio-economic and/or physical environment, while upgrading often refers to an increase in the socio-economic and/or physical environment. However, although many studies about neighbourhood change focus on only one of these aspects, they often assume a close relationship between social and physical changes. Empirical evidence investigating the relationship between these processes is consequently scarce. Upgrading and downgrading can be measured objectively or experienced subjectively. In addition, the processes can be measured absolutely, or relative to city-wide changes. Within upgrading studies, most attention has been paid to gentrification, which refers to a process of revaluation of (disinvested) neighbourhoods by higher-income households, which is assumed to lead to direct or indirect displacement of lower-income groups.

What most studies on neighbourhood change furthermore have in common is the central role they attribute to residential mobility. Migration is even one of the defining characteristics of gentrification: it is widely agreed that gentrification is driven by the successive in-migration of a ‘new’ group of residents, often with higher income levels, leading to replacement of lower-income groups. Also within downgrading studies, a key role is attributed to mobility: downgrading is often related to the selective immigration of low-income and the out-migration of high-income groups. What is often ignored, is that neighbourhood change may also occur as a result of incumbent processes. Incumbent processes can relate to a physical process, in which households (re)invest in the housing stock of their neighbourhood, or to changes in the socio-economic status of sitting households of a neighbourhood.

Neighbourhood change cannot be understood without addressing policies and interventions of institutional actors – especially in highly-regulated contexts with strong traditions in neighbourhood interventions, such as the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, but also in other parts of the world, national and local governments influence neighbourhood change (among other factors) through area-based policies.
and interventions – albeit in different forms and intensity. From the 1980s onwards, regeneration policies and interventions increasingly had a pro-gentrification character (i.e. stimulating higher-income households to move into low-income neighbourhoods). This has been linked to processes of rescaling and fragmentation of the state as a result of neo-liberalization. However, there are differences between contexts in terms of pace, intensity and effects of neo-liberalization. In the Netherlands, neo-liberalization has been comparatively mild, although governing actors increasingly adopted gentrification as a regeneration strategy as well. In addition, in a number of countries, housing associations have been identified as important actors in neighbourhood change, as they have been selling off part of their social housing stock and thereby stimulated gentrification.

Finally, planning processes have increasingly opened up to include residents in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading. This has been linked to the shift from government to governance as a result of neo-liberalization. Resident participation in neighbourhood governance is thought to create opportunities and benefits for both residents and other stakeholders. However, the value of resident participation in these processes is much debated. Various studies question the actual influence of residents in decision-making processes, which is – among other factors – related to the organization of participation. It is unclear how residents actually contribute to neighbourhood change through participating in local planning processes.

This research starts from the premise that a better understanding is needed of the different actors involved in neighbourhood governance to understand institutional approaches to neighbourhood change.

**Research questions**

This dissertation addresses four research questions. These were answered in chapters two to five. All chapters have been published in or submitted to an international peer-reviewed journal. The research questions are:

1. What is the relationship between processes of social and physical upgrading and downgrading of urban neighbourhoods?
2. What is the relationship between neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading and residential and social mobility of residents?
(3) What are goals of governing actors for policies and interventions in generating neighbourhood upgrading and how do different goals result in place-specific regeneration strategies and diverse processes of neighbourhood change?

(4) How and to what degree have residents been included in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading and to what extent have residents thereby contributed to neighbourhood change?

**Research area, data and methods**

An embedded case-study was conducted, using mixed methods. The first part of this research addressed patterns of upgrading and downgrading in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg and made use of quantitative research data and methods. Data were derived from the Social Statistical Database (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands and from Kadaster. Social upgrading and downgrading were measured by examining income data, while physical upgrading and downgrading were measured by investigating real estate data. A neighbourhood was classified as social or physical upgrading when the growth of the neighbourhood income level or real estate value was more than half a standard deviation above the growth of the mean city income or real estate value. A neighbourhood was classified as downgrading when the growth of its income level or real estate value was more than half a standard deviation below the city-wide level. When the growth of the income level or real estate value was between half a standard deviation below and above the average city level, a neighbourhood was considered as ‘keeping in pace’.

The second part of this research addressed the role of governing actors in generating neighbourhood upgrading in Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam and Rustenburg in The Hague. These neighbourhoods were selected because they had similar – comparatively low – positions in the 1990s and have consequently been subjected to regeneration. In addition, the role of resident participation in generating neighbourhood change was examined in the neighbourhood of Transvaal (Amsterdam). The second part of this research made use of a combination of qualitative data and methods. These include semi-structured interviews with 27 governing actors and 6 residents, which focused on the period 1999-2013. In addition, participant observation in the neighbourhoods was conducted and written resources were analysed, such as policy documents of the national and local government and housing associations. Finally, local websites and newspapers were analysed.
Part I: disentangling patterns of neighbourhood change

The relationship between social and physical upgrading and downgrading

Chapter 2 explored the relationship between social and physical upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg between 1999 and 2006. It is often assumed that social and physical developments are related, but the results revealed that this relationship is much more complex and context-dependent. In only a relatively small number of neighbourhoods (thirty percent), social and physical neighbourhood change develop in tandem. On the one hand, these are prosperous neighbourhoods at the top of the hierarchy, characterized by owner-occupied housing and a central location. On the other hand, these are relatively poor neighbourhoods at the bottom of the hierarchy, with a large percentage of social housing and a peripheral location. Most of the neighbourhoods, however, ranked between the top and bottom tiers of the hierarchy and displayed a more diffuse relationship between social and physical change. Twenty percent of the neighbourhoods were characterized by a parallel relationship between social and physical upgrading or downgrading, but with a time lag between them. Another thirty percent demonstrated a partially diverging relationship between the processes. Finally, only eight percent of the neighbourhoods showed a completely diverging trend, such as physical upgrading and social downgrading or vice versa.

This chapter offered several tentative explanations for the complex relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change and highlighted the importance of three interrelated issues in understanding the observed patterns and trends. Firstly, the research findings stressed the importance of gaining insight into the social dynamics of neighbourhoods in order to understand neighbourhood change, as upgrading and downgrading can result from both residential mobility and developments of sitting households, and because neighbourhoods can accomplish different functions for different types of households. This results in multiple social dynamics within neighbourhoods and likely contributes to the complex relationship between social and physical changes. Secondly, it was argued that the disparities between the processes could be attributed to the role of governing actors, such as the presence of area-based regeneration policies and interventions, processes of privatization and deregulation of the housing system and the presence of a large social housing stock. However, the role of governing actors is context-dependent, so their impact on social upgrading and downgrading patterns varied between the cities.
Chapter 3 explored the relationship between residential mobility and social upgrading and downgrading of neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg between 1999 and 2008. As most studies attribute a key role to residential mobility in neighbourhood change, it was expected that upgrading and downgrading would go hand-in-hand with high mobility rates. However, the findings demonstrated that there were only marginal differences in the level of downgrading between neighbourhoods with low, average and high mobility rates. Similarly, the difference in upgrading levels between low, average and high mobility was only 1 percent.

In order gain more insight into the relationship between mobility and neighbourhood change, income developments of in-migrants, out-migrants and non-migrants were explored and related to neighbourhood income developments. The findings showed that in- and out-migration are not the only processes at work in neighbourhood change and that changes in the socio-economic status of non-migrants are of importance too. In downgrading neighbourhoods, in-migrants reinforced downgrading, as their incomes were a downward force on their neighbourhood’s income. However, they experienced strong income gains soon after in-migration, thereby impeding the process of downgrading. Similarly, sitting households impeded downgrading, as their incomes were generally above the neighbourhood level. The contribution of out-migrants to downgrading was more complex and varied per type of neighbourhood and year. In upgrading neighbourhoods, incumbent upgrading seems to be the main driver of the process, as incomes of non-migrants were systematically above the neighbourhood level. Moreover, although in-migrants initially impeded upgrading – as their incomes were below the neighbourhood level when moving in – they experienced strong income gains after in-migration. The contribution of out-migrants to social upgrading was mixed.

One possible explanation for the observed incumbent upgrading is that households are less willing to move after income changes than assumed. Moreover, the chapter stressed the importance of the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands. The Dutch social housing stock is comparatively large and is characterized by long waiting-lists. So, households may have a wish to move, but might not be able to. Another explanation could be that differences between neighbourhoods are relatively small, as a result of the highly-regulated housing market, which might impede the urge to climb the neighbourhood hierarchy after income gains.
Part II: the role of governing actors in neighbourhood change

Goals of governing actors in generating neighbourhood upgrading
Chapter 4 provided insight into the goals of governing actors – the national government, local governments and housing associations – in generating upgrading in the neighbourhoods of Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam and Rustenburg in The Hague. These neighbourhoods were targeted for regeneration because they had a weak position in the 1990s, which was assumed to be caused by a one-sided housing stock, resulting in selective out-migration of high-income households. A central element in the regeneration of the neighbourhoods was state-led gentrification: the aim was to attract/retain higher-income households through differentiation of the housing stock and upgrading of the neighbourhood environment. The chapter demonstrated that the national government played a key role in the formulation of these regeneration goals, as national policies promoted gentrification, which was seen as necessary to prevent social problems and decline. These goals were adopted by the local governments of Amsterdam and The Hague.

Although the formulated regeneration goals were similar in the research neighbourhoods, the findings demonstrated that in each neighbourhood, the actors involved all had their own objectives and priorities, which did not only vary between contexts, but also within contexts. This resulted in processes of negotiation and led to different outcomes in interventions and, consequently, differing processes of neighbourhood change. In the research neighbourhoods, the local governments aimed to establish a coalition with the housing associations. As owners of the social housing stock, housing associations are important partners for the local government. Through their deregulation in 1995, however, housing associations have become hybrid organizations: although their primary task is to provide social housing for low-income households, they have now also become market-oriented actors which have to generate income from market activities. This implied that goals of the housing associations did not always match those of the local government and housing associations took different positions in different neighbourhoods. In addition, the chapter demonstrated the importance of the urban contexts in which the neighbourhoods are embedded: Oosterpark, and Transvaal to a lesser extent, benefitted from on-going gentrification of Amsterdam’s inner-city. Finally, although gentrification was a central element in the regeneration of the three neighbourhoods, the government and housing associations simultaneously formed a buffer between market interventions and neighbourhood
development: social objectives remained important drivers, which impeded gentrification.

Resident participation in neighbourhood upgrading

Chapter 5 examined the way in which the opening up of governance spaces increased the possibilities of residents to contribute to neighbourhood change through participating in decision-making processes in policies and interventions for neighbourhood upgrading. The aim was to understand how and to what degree the organization of participation in Transvaal (Amsterdam) influenced residents’ opportunities to shape regeneration strategies. The findings demonstrated that creating opportunities for resident participation in neighbourhood governance turned out to be a process of trial and error.

In the first period of regeneration (1999-2006), resident participation was officially incorporated in formal planning processes. However, it was not systematically developed. Residents were only involved at the end of the policy-cycle, when major decisions had already been made. In addition, Urban District East of the Municipality of Amsterdam determined the rules of the game. In line with many previous studies, resident participation seems to have mostly served to legitimize top-down interventions, rather than leading to more democratic decision-making processes. Consequently, residents had to turn to traditional forms of activism, outside of formal governance spaces, to get attention for their concerns.

In the second stage of regeneration, the regeneration coalition put a lot of money, time and effort into the organization of participation. Participation mechanisms ranged from formalized and long-term mechanisms to small-scale, temporary and project-based initiatives. These mechanisms ranged from low to high levels of impact and largely determined the actual contribution of residents to neighbourhood change. In sum, participation mechanisms that contributed to improving everyday concerns of residents in particular domains, such as safety, nuisance and strengthening the local community, were quite successful. However, the participation mechanisms did not result in more open planning processes at the scale of the neighbourhood as a whole. Especially strategic and long-term decisions about tenure conversion and state-led gentrification remained out of reach for residents. Despite high ambitions of urban professionals about resident participation and the establishment of varying mechanisms, the achievements of residents in shaping policy plans for neighbourhood upgrading still remained limited.
Conclusion and discussion

Chapter 6 reflected on the findings of this dissertation and provided directions for future research. The first part of this research demonstrated the variety of social and physical transformations that may become manifest in neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, The Hague and Tilburg. In short, it was demonstrated that there does not appear to be one type of upgrading or downgrading process, but in fact there are multiple processes operating simultaneously. Chapters 2 and 3 indicated the importance of the institutional and housing market contexts in which the neighbourhoods are embedded: the complex relationships between social and physical upgrading and downgrading and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change could – at least partly – be attributed to the highly-regulated context of the Netherlands. Firstly, the complex relationships could be related to the presence of social housing. For instance, the immigration of low-income households in social housing may cause social downgrading, but does not necessarily lead to physical changes. In addition, low-income households are able to move into social housing units in both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods, which can partially explain the relatively low income levels of immigrants in these neighbourhoods. Secondly, the complex relationships could be attributed to policies and interventions of governing actors. For instance, a number of neighbourhoods have been subjected to regeneration, where (large) proportions of social housing were demolished and replaced by a mixture of social housing, privately rented housing and owner-occupied housing. These regeneration processes impact both the relationship between social and physical neighbourhood change and between residential mobility and neighbourhood change. Thirdly, the complex relationships could be related to privatization and deregulation of the housing system, in particular to conversion of social housing into owner-occupied housing.

In order to obtain a better understanding of the impact of the highly-regulated Dutch context on processes of neighbourhood change, the second part explored the role of governing actors in generating neighbourhood change in the neighbourhoods of Transvaal and Oosterpark in Amsterdam and Rustenburg in The Hague. As mentioned before, chapter 4 demonstrated that a central element in the regeneration of these neighbourhoods was state-led gentrification. However, the chapter demonstrated that Dutch state-led gentrification stands out when compared to gentrification in (for instance) Anglo-Saxon contexts. Firstly, the presence of social housing and rules and regulations mitigate the negative effects which are related to gentrification to some degree. Secondly, while state-led gentrification is often seen as a municipally-led goal in
the academic literature, chapter 4 demonstrated that in the Netherlands, the national
government still plays a central role in pushing forward gentrification. This resulted in
rather uniform policy objectives in Transvaal, Oosterpark and Rustenburg. However,
there were differences in the actual practice of the regeneration strategies between the
neighbourhoods. These differences could firstly be attributed to the local contexts in
which the neighbourhoods are embedded, such as the presence (or absence) of
processes of gentrification in the vicinity of the neighbourhoods and the tenure
structures of the housing stock. In other words, the ‘geography of gentrification’ is not
only of importance at the national scale, but also at the scale of the city and
neighbourhood. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the differences could be attributed to
different objectives and priorities of the actors involved. In addition to housing
associations, the local governments had to deal with another stakeholder in
neighbourhood governance: the national government prescribed that regeneration
plans had to be discussed with residents. However, chapter 5 demonstrated that the
implementation of resident participation was not that easy: for governing actors,
residents were only one of the negotiation partners and the achievements of residents
in shaping policy plans remained limited.

The aim of this research was to contribute to the ‘geography of neighbourhood
change’, by exploring the manifestation of processes of upgrading and downgrading in
the highly-regulated institutional context of the Netherlands. Although the findings
provided much insight into processes of upgrading and downgrading, the findings also
raised a number of questions which provide directions for future research. Firstly, this
research encourages scholars to conduct more refined studies that show and explain the
place-specificity of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading. For instance, while
gentrification is increasingly considered a globalized phenomenon, this research
demonstrated that it does not operate uniformly everywhere. Secondly, the findings
suggest the importance of further unravelling the relationship between residential and
social mobility and neighbourhood change, by examining educational and professional
data and by examining these relationships in other (less-regulated) contexts. Thirdly,
the Social Statistical Database allows for more detailed analysis of the dynamics of
neighbourhoods and offers the opportunity to follow individuals in their housing and
social careers, in order to obtain a better understanding of the social dynamics of
neighbourhoods. Fourthly, it would be worthwhile to further examine whether
processes of downgrading can be related to the role of the institutional context, such as
(the absence of) policies and interventions of governing actors. Finally, although the
role of market actors in generating neighbourhood change was beyond the scope of this research, it would we worthwhile to examine what the highly-regulated Dutch context means for their possibilities in generating neighbourhood change.
Samenvatting

Introductie

In de afgelopen decennia zijn patronen van upgrading en downgrading flink veranderd in veel westerse steden. Veel buurten hebben een veranderingsproces doorgemaakt van vervallen gebieden met slechte woonomstandigheden naar populaire, gewaardeerde woonlocaties. Er zijn echter ook nog steeds veel buurten die een neerwaartse ontwikkeling doormaken. Dit proefschrift gaat over processen van upgrading en downgrading van buurten in de Nederlandse context, die sterk gereguleerd is. Het doel van dit onderzoek is tweeledig. Het eerste doel is beter begrip krijgen van hoe patronen van upgrading en downgrading zich manifesteren. Het tweede doel is meer inzicht krijgen in de manier waarop institutionele actoren aan deze processen bijdragen door middel van beleid en interventies. Deze doelen zijn gerelateerd aan twee aspecten in de academische literatuur over buurtverandering waar nog weinig over bekend is.

Ten eerste veronderstellen veel studies over buurtverandering dat buurten zich in een bepaalde orde ontwikkelen en dat er een sterke relatie is tussen de sociale en fysieke ontwikkeling van buurten. Ook bedeelt men vaak een centrale rol aan verhuismobiliteit toe in de totstandkoming van upgrading- en downgradingprocessen. Dit, terwijl er maar weinig aandacht is geschonken aan interne veranderingsprocessen, veroorzaakt door de zittende bewoners van een buurt. Er zijn maar weinig studies die de relaties tussen sociale en fysieke buurtverandering en tussen verhuismobiliteit en buurtverandering onderzocht hebben. Het eerste doel van dit proefschrift is daarom de relaties tussen sociale en fysieke buurtverandering en de relaties tussen verhuismobiliteit en buurtverandering te onderzoeken.

Ten tweede richten veel studies zich – ondanks groeiende aandacht voor de context-afhankelijkheid van upgrading- en downgradingprocessen – op Angelsaksische contexten. Deze contexten kenmerken zich door een liberale houding ten opzichte van de ontwikkeling van buurten. Continentaal-Europese landen, zoals Nederland, kenmerken zich daarentegen door een veel sterkere welvaartsstaat met overheden die door middel van beleid en interventies ingrijpen in de woningvoorraad en in buurten. Ook is in dergelijke contexten vaak een (veel) grotere sociale huurwoningenvoorraad aanwezig. Hoewel de rol van institutionele actoren in buurtveranderingsprocessen is onderzocht in sterk gereguleerde landen zoals Nederland, richten veel van deze studies
zich vaak op slechts één type actor, of behandelen zij institutionele actoren als één groep, waarvan wordt verondersteld dat zij dezelfde doelen nastreven in het opwaarderen van buurten. Vaak zijn er echter meerdere actoren betrokken. Bovendien betrekt men bewoners steeds vaker bij beslissingen over beleid en interventies in buurten. Het is denkbaar dat de betrokken actoren in het opwaarderen van buurten verschillende doelen en prioriteiten nastreven. Dit kan leiden tot verschillende strategieën van opwaardering en vervolgens tot verschillende processen van buurtverandering. Het tweede doel van dit proefschrift is daarom inzicht krijgen in de manier waarop doelen van institutionele actoren – de nationale overheid, gemeenten en woningcorporaties – in het opwaarderen van buurten resulteren in verschillende strategieën, in welke mate bewoners hebben bijgedragen aan deze processen door middel van bewonersparticipatie in beleid en interventies, en hoe dit heeft geleid tot verschillende processen van buurtverandering.

De studie van upgrading en downgrading
De academische literatuur definieert downgrading vaak als een achteruitgang van sociaal-economische en/of fysieke aspecten van een buurt. Met upgrading wordt vaak een vooruitgang van deze aspecten bedoeld. Veel studies richten zich echter vaak op één van deze aspecten om buurtveranderingsprocessen in kaart te brengen. Upgrading en downgrading zijn zowel objectief te meten als subjectief te ervaren. Ook is upgrading en downgrading relatief of in absolute zin te meten ten opzichte van stadsgemiddelde ontwikkelingen. Binnen upgradingstudies is de meeste aandacht uitgegaan naar gentrification. Gentrification heeft betrekking op het proces van herwaardering van een (achterstands)buurt door huishoudens met een hoger inkomen. Dit kan leiden tot directe of indirecte verdringing van lagere inkomensgroepen. Zoals eerder aangegeven, veronderstellen veel studies over upgrading en downgrading dat sociale en fysieke veranderingsprocessen nauw aan elkaar zijn gerelateerd, hoewel empirisch bewijs schaars is. Wat veel studies daarnaast gemeen hebben, is de centrale rol die wordt toebedeeld aan verhuismobiliteit in de totstandkoming van upgrading en downgrading. Verhuismobiliteit staat zelfs centraal in de definitie van gentrification: de veronderstelling is dat gentrification wordt veroorzaakt door de instroom van een ‘nieuwe’ groep bewoners, vaak met hogere inkomens. Dit kan tot verdringing van lagere inkomensgroepen leiden. Ook binnen downgradingstudies heeft mobiliteit een centrale rol: downgrading relateert men vaak aan de selectieve instroom van lagere inkomensgroepen en uitstroom van hogere inkomensgroepen. Wat vaak over het hoofd
wordt gezien, is dat upgrading en downgrading ook veroorzaakt kunnen worden door interne processen. Interne processen kunnen betrekking hebben op een fysiek proces, waarbij huishoudens (her)investeren in de woningvoorraad van hun buurt, of op een sociaal-economisch proces, waarbij de sociaal-economische status van zittende bewoners verandert.


De overheid veronderstelt dat bewonersparticipatie leidt tot kansen en voordelen voor zowel bewoners als andere actoren. Verschillende studies betwisten echter de daadwerkelijke bijdrage van bewonersparticipatie aan het beleid en de interventies. Deze studies stellen de bijdrage van bewonersparticipatie ter discussie, wat onder andere te maken heeft met de manier waarop bewonersparticipatie georganiseerd is.

Dit onderzoek start met de veronderstelling dat een beter begrip nodig is van de verschillende actoren die betrokken zijn bij het genereren van upgrading van buurten, om meer inzicht te krijgen in institutionele benaderingen in veranderingsprocessen van buurten.
Onderzoeksvragen
In dit proefschrift zijn vier onderzoeksvragen opgesteld. Deze zijn aan de orde gekomen in de hoofdstukken twee tot en met vijf. Alle hoofdstukken zijn gepubliceerd in of ingediend bij een internationaal peer-reviewed tijdschrift. De onderzoeksvragen zijn:

1. Wat is de relatie tussen sociale en fysieke upgrading- en downgrading-processen van stedelijke buurten?
2. Wat is de relatie tussen upgrading en downgrading van buurten en verhuismobiliteit en sociale mobiliteit van bewoners?
3. Wat zijn doelen van institutionele actoren m.b.t. beleid en interventies in het genereren van upgrading en hoe resulteren verschillende doelen in plaats specifieke herstructureringsstrategieën en diverse processen van buurtverandering?
4. Op welke manier en in welke mate zijn bewoners betrokken bij beslissingen met betrekking tot beleid en interventies gericht op het genereren van upgrading en in welke mate hebben bewoners daardoor bijgedragen aan buurtverandering?

Onderzoeksgebied, data en methoden
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een embedded casestudie en maakt gebruik van verschillende methoden van onderzoek. In het eerste deel zijn patronen van upgrading en downgrading van buurten in Amsterdam, Den Haag en Tilburg onderzocht. Er is gebruikgemaakt van kwantitatieve onderzoeksdata en –methoden. Data zijn afkomstig van het Sociaal Statistisch Bestand (SSB) van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek en van het Kadaster. Sociale upgrading en downgrading zijn gemeten door middel van inkomensdata. Fysieke upgrading en downgradingprocessen zijn gemeten door woningwaardendata. Een buurt is geclassificeerd als sociale of fysieke upgrading als het inkomen of de woningwaarde van de buurt een halve standaarddeviatie sneller was gegroeid ten opzichte van de stadsgemiddelde groei van het inkomen of de woningwaarde. Een buurt is geclassificeerd als sociale of fysieke downgrading als het inkomen of de woningwaarde van de buurt een halve standaarddeviatie langzamer was gegroeid ten opzichte van de stadsgemiddelde groei. Wanneer het gemiddelde inkomen of de woningwaarde van een buurt tussen een halve standaarddeviatie sneller of langzamer ten opzichte van het stadsgemiddelde was gegroeid, is de buurt geclassificeerd als gelijke tred.
In het tweede deel van het onderzoek is de rol van institutionele actoren en bewoners onderzocht in het genereren van upgrading in de Transvaalbuurt en Oosterparkbuurt in Amsterdam en Rustenburg in Den Haag. Deze buurten hadden eind jaren negentig een vergelijkbare positie en zijn daarom door de overheid geselecteerd voor vernieuwing. Dit deel maakt gebruik van kwalitatieve data en methoden, die betrekking hebben op half gestructureerde interviews met 27 institutionele actoren en 6 bewoners (gericht op de periode 1999-2013). Daarnaast is *participant observation* uitgevoerd in de buurt. Ook zijn geschreven bronnen geanalyseerd, zoals beleidsdocumenten van de overheid, gemeenten en woningcorporaties. Tot slot zijn lokale websites en kranten geanalyseerd.

Deel 1: het ontrafelen van patronen van upgrading en downgrading

*De relatie tussen sociale en fysieke upgrading en downgrading*

In hoofdstuk 2 is de relatie tussen sociale en fysieke ontwikkelingen voor de periode 1999 tot 2006. Hoewel veel studies veronderstellen dat sociale en fysieke ontwikkelingen nauw aan elkaar zijn gerelateerd, laten de resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 zien dat deze relatie complex en context-afhankelijk is. Sociale en fysieke processen gaan slechts in een klein deel van de buurten (dertig procent) hand in hand. Dit zijn enerzijds relatief rijke buurten met veel koopwoningen en een centrale ligging, aan de top van de woningmarkthierarchie. Anderzijds gaat het om buurten met een lage sociaal-economische status, met hoge percentages sociale huurwoningen en een perifere locatie, aan de onderkant van de hiërarchie. De meeste buurten bevinden zich echter tussen de top en onderkant van deze hiërarchie en kenmerken zich door een diffuse relatie tussen sociale en fysieke processen. Twintig procent van de buurten toont een parallelle relatie tussen sociale en fysieke upgrading en downgrading, maar hebben te maken met een *time lag* tussen de twee processen. Dertig procent van de buurten wordt gekenmerkt door een gedeeltelijk divergerende relatie tussen de processen. Tot slot heeft slechts een klein gedeelte van de buurten (acht procent) te maken met een echt divergerende relatie, zoals sociale upgrading en fysieke downgrading of *vice versa*.

In dit hoofdstuk is een aantal tentatieve verklaringen gegeven voor de complexe relatie tussen sociale en fysieke upgrading en downgrading. Ook is het belang genoemd van onderling samenhangende aspecten in het begrijpen van de relaties. Ten eerste het belang inzicht te krijgen in de sociale dynamiek van buurten. Zowel verhuismobiliteit
als ontwikkelingen van zittende huishoudens kunnen veranderingen in buurten veroorzaken. Buurten kunnen ook verschillende functies vervullen voor verschillende typen huishoudens. Dit zorgt voor een complexe sociale dynamiek binnen buurten, wat kan bijdragen aan de diffuse relatie tussen sociale en fysieke processen. Ten tweede kon de complexe relatie tussen de processen worden toegeschreven aan de rol van institutionele actoren, zoals gebiedsgerichte herstructureringsprogramma's, de aanwezigheid van sociale huurwoningen en privatisering en deregulering van de woningvoorraad. De rol van institutionele actoren is echter context-afhankelijk en de impact ervan verschilt tussen de steden.

De relatie tussen verhuismobiliteit en sociale upgrading en downgrading

In hoofdstuk 3 is de relatie tussen verhuismobiliteit en sociale upgrading en downgrading van buurten onderzocht in Amsterdam, Den Haag en Tilburg, voor de periode 1999 tot 2008. Omdat uit literatuuronderzoek bleek dat veel studies een centrale rol toebedelden aan verhuismobiliteit in de totstandkoming van upgrading en downgrading, was de verwachting dat upgrading en downgrading hand in hand zouden gaan met een hoge verhuismobiliteit. De bevindingen lieten echter zien dat de verschillen in de mate van downgrading in buurten met een lage, gemiddelde en hoge verhuismobiliteit marginaal zijn. Hetzelfde gold voor upgradingbuurten.

Om een beter begrip te krijgen van de relatie tussen verhuismobiliteit en buurtveranderingsprocessen, zijn inkomensontwikkelingen van instromende, uitstroomende en zittende huishoudens onderzocht. Deze zijn vervolgens gerelateerd aan de inkomensontwikkeling van de buurt als geheel. De bevindingen toonden aan dat in- en uitstroom niet de enige processen van belang zijn in het genereren van upgrading en downgrading. Ook veranderingen in de sociaal-economische status van zittende huishoudens spelen hierin een belangrijke rol.

In downgradingbuurten versterken instromers het proces van downgrading, omdat hun inkomens lager zijn dan het gemiddelde inkomen van de buurt op het moment van instroom. Na hun komst in de buurt maken zij echter een sterke inkomensontwikkeling door, waarmee zij het proces van downgrading dempen. Ook zittende huishoudens temperen downgrading, omdat hun inkomensniveaus zich boven dat van de buurt als geheel bevinden. De bijdrage van uitstromers was complexer en verschilde per type buurt en jaar.

In upgradingbuurten lijkt incumbent upgrading – veranderingen in de sociaal- economische status van zittende bewoners – de belangrijkste drijver van upgrading te
zijn, omdat het inkomensniveau van zittende huishoudens zich systematisch boven het gemiddelde inkomen van de buurt bevindt. Hoewel instromers het upgradingproces in eerste instantie dempen – omdat hun inkomensniveau zich onder dat van de buurt als geheel bevindt – maken instromers bovendien een sterke inkomensontwikkeling door in de jaren na hun instroom. De bijdrage van uitstromers aan upgrading was gemengd.

Een mogelijke verklaring voor de aanwezigheid van *incumbent* upgrading in buurten in Amsterdam, Den Haag en Tilburg is dat huishoudens minder geneigd zijn om te verhuizen na een inkomensstijging dan wordt verondersteld. Daarnaast speelt de sterk gereguleerde Nederlandse context hier naar verwachting een rol in. Nederland kenmerkt zich door een relatief grote sociale huurwoningenvoorraad met lange wachtlijsten. Dit kan betekenen dat huishoudens die in sociale huurwoningen wonen mogelijk verhuiswensen hebben, maar deze niet in vervulling kunnen laten gaan. Dit kan leiden tot *incumbent* upgrading. Tot slot heeft de sterk gereguleerde woningmarkt ertoe geleid dat de verschillen tussen buurten relatief klein zijn, wat de urgentie om te verhuizen na een inkomensstijging zou kunnen temperen.

**Deel II: de rol van institutionele actoren in veranderingsprocessen van buurten**

*Doelen van institutionele actoren in het genereren van upgrading*

In hoofdstuk 4 is meer inzicht gegeven in de doelen van institutionele actoren in het genereren van upgrading in de Transvaalbuurt en Oosterparkbuurt in Amsterdam en Rustenburg in Den Haag. Deze buurten zijn onderworpen aan vernieuwingsprocessen vanwege hun zwakke positie eind jaren negentig. De veronderstelling was dat dit werd veroorzaakt door een eenzijdige (goedkope) woningvoorraad, wat zorgde voor selectieve uitstroom van huishoudens met hogere inkomens. Een centraal element in de vernieuwing van deze buurten was *state-led gentrification*: het doel was om huishoudens met hogere inkomens aan te trekken en te binden aan de buurt, door middel van differentiatie van de woningvoorraad en opwaardering van sociale, economische en fysieke aspecten van de buurt. In hoofdstuk 4 kwam naar voren dat de nationale overheid een centrale rol speelt in de vernieuwingsprocessen, omdat nationaal beleid differentiatie van de woningvoorraad voorschrijft. Men veronderstelt dat dit processen van downgrading tegengaat. Deze doelen werden overgenomen door de gemeenten.

Hoewel de algemene beleidsdoelen in de drie buurten op elkaar leken, kwam naar voren dat de betrokken actoren elk hun eigen doelen en prioriteiten hadden in de
vernieuwing van de buurten. De doelen van de actoren verschilden niet alleen tussen de steden, maar ook binnen de steden. Dit resulteerde in onderhandelingsprocessen tussen de actoren en in verschillende typen interventies. Dit leidde tot verschillende veranderingsprocessen in de buurten. De gemeente had tot doel een coalitie te vormen met de woningcorporaties. Door de deregulering in 1995 zijn woningcorporaties echter hybride organisaties geworden. De primaire taak van woningcorporaties bestaat uit het verhuren en beheren van sociale huurwoningen, terwijl zij tegelijkertijd marktgeoriënteerde actoren zijn die inkomsten moeten genereren uit marktactiviteiten, zoals de verkoop van sociale huurwoningen. Dit betekende dat de doelen van woningcorporaties niet altijd overeenkwamen met die van de gemeente. Bovendien namen de woningcorporaties verschillende posities in in verschillende buurten.

Daarnaast kwam in hoofdstuk 4 het belang van de stedelijke context waarin de buurten gelegen zijn naar voren. Zo kon de Oosterparkbuurt, en de Transvaalbuurt in mindere mate, meeliften op processen van gentrification in de Amsterdamse binnenstad. Tot slot lieten de bevindingen zien dat – ondanks het feit dat het stimuleren van gentrification een centraal element was in de vernieuwing van de buurten – de overheid en woningcorporaties tegelijkertijd negatieve effecten van gentrification tegenaan.

**Bewonersparticipatie in de upgrading van buurten**

In hoofdstuk 5 is de manier onderzocht waarop bewoners worden betrokken bij beslissingen met betrekking tot beleid en interventies gericht op het creëren van upgrading. Ook is onderzocht in welke mate bewoners daardoor hebben bijgedragen aan buurtverandering. Het doel was inzicht te verkrijgen in de manier waarop en in welke mate de organisatie van participatie in de Transvaalbuurt (Amsterdam) de mogelijkheden van bewoners heeft beïnvloed om bij te dragen aan het formuleren van vernieuwingsstrategieën. De bevindingen toonden aan dat bewonersparticipatie een proces van vallen en opstaan is.

Hoewel in de eerste periode van de vernieuwing van de Transvaalbuurt (1999-2006) bewonersparticipatie officieel was opgenomen in het planningsproces, is dit onvoldoende geïmplementeerd. Bewoners werden pas betrokken in de laatste fase van het besluitvormingsproces, toen de belangrijkste beslissingen al waren genomen. Bovendien bepaalde het stadsdeel de regels van het spel. Het lijkt erop dat bewonersparticipatie eerder werd gezien als middel om top-down interventies te legitimeren, dan dat het heeft geleid tot meer democratische besluitvormingsprocessen.
Hierdoor voelden bewoners zich genoodzaakt om zich te richten tot traditionele vormen van protest, buiten de formele besluitvormingsprocessen, om aandacht te krijgen voor hun zorgen.


**Conclusie en discussie**

In hoofdstuk 6 is gereflecteerd op de bevindingen van de voorgaande hoofdstukken en zijn suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek gegeven. Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift toont aan dat er een grote variëteit is aan sociale en fysieke veranderingen die zich kunnen voordoen in buurten. Er is aangetoond dat er niet één type upgrading of downgrading proces bestaat, maar dat meerdere processen zich tegelijkertijd voltrekken. De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 tonen het belang van de institutionele en woningmarktcontext waarin de buurten zijn gelegen: de complexe relaties tussen sociale en fysieke upgrading en downgrading en tussen verhuismobiliteit en upgrading en downgrading kan – in ieder geval gedeeltelijk – worden toegeschreven aan de sterk gereguleerde Nederlandse context.

Ten eerste zijn deze complexe relaties toe te schrijven aan de aanwezigheid van sociale huurwoningen. De instroom van huishoudens met lage inkomens in sociale huurwoningen kan bijvoorbeeld tot sociale downgrading leiden, maar leidt niet noodzakelijkerwijs tot fysieke veranderingen. Daarnaast kunnen huishoudens met lage inkomens in sociale huurwoningen in zowel upgrading- als downgradingbuurten
instromen. Dit kan gedeeltelijk het relatief lage inkomensniveau van instromers in deze buurten verklaren.

Ten tweede zijn de complexe relaties toe te schrijven aan beleid en interventies van institutionele actoren. Een aantal buurten is bijvoorbeeld onderhevig (geweest) aan herstructurering, waar delen van de sociale huurwoningenvoorraad zijn gesloopt en vervangen door een mix van huur- en koopwoningen. Deze processen beïnvloeden zowel de relatie tussen sociale en fysieke upgrading en downgrading, als tussen verhuismobiliteit en upgrading en downgrading.

Ten derde zijn de complexe relaties toe te schrijven aan processen van privatisering en deregulering van de woningmarkt, in het bijzonder aan de verkoop van sociale huurwoningen.

Om een beter begrip te krijgen van de impact van de sterk gereguleerde Nederlandse context op processen van upgrading en downgrading, richtte het tweede deel van dit proefschrift zich op de rol van institutionele actoren in het genereren van upgrading in de Transvaalbuurt en Oosterparkbuurt in Amsterdam en Rustenburg in Den Haag. Zoals eerder is aangegeven, toont hoofdstuk 4 aan dat state-led gentrification een centraal element was in de vernieuwing van deze buurten. State-led gentrification in Nederland onderscheidt zich echter op een aantal manieren van (bijvoorbeeld) Angelsaksische landen. Allereerst verzachten de aanwezigheid van sociale huurwoningen en regelgeving (zoals huurbescherming) de negatieve effecten van gentrification tot op zekere hoogte. Daarnaast speelt de nationale overheid een centrale rol in het stimuleren van gentrification, terwijl gentrification in de internationale literatuur voornamelijk als doel van gemeenten wordt gezien. Dit heeft geleid tot relatief uniforme beleidsdoelen in de Transvaalbuurt, Oosterparkbuurt en Rustenburg.

De daadwerkelijke uitvoering van het beleid verschilt echter tussen de buurten. Deze verschillen kunnen ten eerste worden toegeschreven aan de lokale context waarin de buurten gelegen zijn, zoals de aanwezigheid (of afwezigheid) van gentrificationprocessen in nabijgelegen buurten en de eigendomsstructuur van de woningvoorraad. Het blijkt dat de ‘geografie van gentrification’ niet alleen van belang is op nationale schaal, maar ook op het schaalniveau van de stad en de buurt. Ten tweede kunnen de verschillen in de uitvoering van het beleid tussen de buurten worden toegeschreven aan verschillende doelen en prioriteiten van de betrokken actoren. Naast woningcorporaties hadden de gemeenten te maken met nóg een stakeholder in de buurten: bewoners dienden te worden betrokken bij de totstandkoming van
Samenvatting

vernieuwsplannen. Hoofdstuk 5 laat echter zien dat de implementatie van bewonersparticipatie niet zo makkelijk was: voor de gemeente (en de woningcorporaties) waren bewoners slechts één van de onderhandelingspartners. Hoewel verschillende participatiemechanismen werden geïmplementeerd, bleef de bijdrage van bewoners aan de vernieuwingsplannen beperkt.

Dit onderzoek heeft tot doel een bijdrage te leveren aan de ‘geografie van upgrading en downgrading’ van buurten, door de manifestatie van upgrading- en downgradingprocessen in de sterk gereguleerde Nederlandse context te onderzoeken. Hoewel de bevindingen inzicht hebben geboden in deze processen, roepen de bevindingen ook vragen op voor toekomstig onderzoek. Ten eerste moedigt dit onderzoek andere onderzoekers aan om meer verfijnde studies uit te voeren, die de plaats specificiteit van upgrading en downgrading laten zien en verklaren. Gentrification beschouwt men bijvoorbeeld steeds vaker als een geglobaliseerd fenomeen, terwijl deze studie heeft aangetoond dat gentrification zich niet overal op een uniforme manier voordoet. Ten tweede geeft dit proefschrift aan dat het van belang is om de relatie tussen verhuismobiliteit, sociale mobiliteit en buurtveranderingsprocessen verder te onderzoeken. Het gebruiken van opleidings- en/of beroepsdata als indicator ter aanvulling op inkomensdata zou bijvoorbeeld tot waardevolle inzichten kunnen leiden, evenals het onderzoeken van de relatie tussen verhuismobiliteit, sociale mobiliteit en buurtverandering in minder sterk gereguleerde contexten. Ten derde kunnen in het Sociaal Statisch Bestand nog meer gedetailleerde analyses van de dynamiek van buurten worden gemaakt. Het bestand biedt bijvoorbeeld de mogelijkheid om individuen te volgen in hun woon- en sociale carrière. Op deze manier is het mogelijk meer inzicht te krijgen in de sociale dynamiek van buurten. Ten vierde is het de moeite waard om te onderzoeken of downgradingprocessen kunnen worden toegeschreven aan de rol van de institutionele context, zoals (de afwezigheid van) beleid en interventies van institutionele actoren. Hoewel het onderzoeken van de rol van marktactoren in upgrading- en downgradingprocessen van buurten buiten het kader van dit proefschrift valt, is het tot slot waardevol om te onderzoeken wat de sterk gereguleerde Nederlandse context betekent voor de mogelijkheden van marktpartijen in het genereren van buurtverandering.