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INTELLIGENCE AND THE COLD WAR

*Ben de Jong*¹

During the Cold War substantial financial and human resources were spent on intelligence by both sides of the Iron Curtain. Intelligence and security services in the East and West fought their own war, largely hidden from public view and mostly not in a very gentlemanly way. This chapter will discuss the ebb and flow of this “intelligence war” in general terms and in particular with respect to intelligence from human sources (Humint), signals intelligence (Sigint) and covert action, called “active measures” by the KGB.² The main protagonists in this war were the KGB and the CIA. Both services were assisted at crucial junctures by allied services of member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and by services from other parts of the world. The cooperation between US intelligence and security services and British services, which dated from the Second World War, was particularly close and far reaching.

At the beginning of the Cold War the main Western powers, the United States and Great Britain, found themselves in the intelligence field at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Both countries had spent their financial and human resources in previous years primarily on fighting the Axis Powers and had not made a serious effort of spying on the Soviet Union, their main ally in the war against Nazi Germany after June 1941. Indeed, the British had suspended intelligence operations against the Soviet target for the duration of the war, even though the leadership of the NKVD, the main intelligence and security service of the USSR in 1934–46, could hardly believe this when it was told so by one of its most valuable British agents during the war.³ As far as the United States was concerned, it did not have a foreign intelligence service worth mentioning at the beginning of the Second World War. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA, was established only in June 1942, and abolished by President Truman immediately after the war. The British had much more experience in the field of intelligence and security than the Americans. Both the British Security Service, also known as MI5, and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6), were founded in 1909.⁴

Immediately after the October Revolution of 1917, Soviet leaders had established a security apparatus to which, in 1920, a foreign intelligence component had been added. In the 1920s, Soviet intelligence had penetrated anti-communist Russian exile organizations abroad and, in a very sophisticated operation, lured some of their leading figures back to the USSR, where they had been dealt with.⁵ Soviet intelligence also managed from the 1930s onwards to lay the foundation of many successful Humint operations in the West.

Humint

At the end of the 1940s and in the early 1950s, US and British authorities discovered that Soviet intelligence had been running several hundred agents in their countries, dating from before the Second World War. Of these agents, dozens were in vital positions in government departments and ministries. To give but two examples: Alger Hiss, a high official at the US State Department and a member of the American delegation at the Yalta conference in 1945, had been an agent of the GRU, Soviet military intelligence, since the mid-1930s. Harry Dexter White, who became Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in 1945 and the first American director of the International Monetary Fund in 1946, had originally also been a GRU agent, but was later handled by the NKVD. Julius Rosenberg, later executed, along with his wife Ethel, on account of espionage for the Soviet Union, was recruited by the NKVD at the end of 1941. He did not occupy a position within the US government, but ran a network of agents that engaged in industrial and technological espionage on a large scale. Soviet agents, two from Rosenberg's group among them, had also penetrated the Manhattan Project, America's top-secret program that produced the first atomic bomb, as well as the British atomic project codenamed Tube Alloys.⁶ The information that Soviet intelligence acquired from the Manhattan Project played an important part in the development of the first Soviet atomic bomb in the 1940s, and the acquisition of Western, in particular American, military technology had a high priority for the KGB and the military intelligence service GRU throughout the Cold War period.

The best-known Soviet penetration of the British establishment is the case of the Cambridge Five, freshly graduated students from Cambridge who were recruited by the NKVD in the mid-1930s and managed to get various government positions that gave them access to many secrets for Soviet intelligence. Kim Philby, probably the most productive agent of the five, became SIS liaison with US services in Washington in 1949, which meant that he was in a position to betray not just British intelligence secrets, but many American ones as well.⁷ In the first ten or fifteen years of the Cold War, American and British security managed to uncover many of these Soviet agents, though arguably not all of them. The first break came with several important defections to the West of Soviet intelligence officers or agents who brought with them documents and other information on intelligence operations and agents. But it was the Venona project that undoubtedly made the biggest contribution to the unmasking of many important agents in the US and Great Britain in the early phase of the Cold War.

The Venona project – the name is a code name without particular meaning – was originally an American code-breaking, or Sigint, program which began in 1943 and continued to operate until 1980. Venona decrypted encoded messages exchanged between *rezidenturas* (i.e. stations) of the NKVD and GRU in the United States and Moscow headquarters or vice versa, through a very slow and difficult process. Most of the messages were sent in 1942–45; only a tiny portion were decrypted, and in many cases only partly.⁸ Almost all big cases involving Soviet espionage in the United States or Great Britain in the beginning of the Cold War were discovered by information from Venona. This applies to the network of the Rosenbergs, to other important cases of atomic espionage in Great Britain and the United States in the beginning of the 1950s, and to the Cambridge Five. The fact that in the end only a tiny part of the Venona traffic could be decrypted had a serious drawback, however. This relatively small amount of information still resulted in about 350 code names of Americans who had been in contact with the NKVD or GRU in the 1940s, out of which more than half could not be identified properly. These discoveries led to a general fear, within the American and British services, particularly during the 1960s, that they still had Soviet agents within their ranks. This

fear can partly be attributed to the fact that the tiny portion of decrypted Venona messages already contained references to many Soviet agents. The part that was not decrypted therefore probably contained references to many more that would never be discovered. Also, at the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, American and British services did not have the kind of agents-in-place in the KGB that could give leads to KGB penetrations of the West in the way that they had come out of Venona. This fear of Soviet penetration led to a series of "misdirected molehunts," inside the CIA and MI5 in particular, with often disastrous results for the careers of officers who were wrongly suspected or against whom suspicions could at the very least not be confirmed.⁹

An important characteristic of most Soviet agents in the West in the 1930s and 1940s was that they were "ideological agents" who worked for Soviet intelligence out of communist sympathies or convictions. They were usually highly motivated, barely needed recruiting for that reason and were generally not interested in receiving a financial reward from their Soviet masters. Indeed, had they been offered payment for their services they would probably have been offended. The ideological Soviet agent was mostly a phenomenon of the beginning period of the Cold War. From roughly the 1960s onwards, as the political attraction of Soviet communism gradually waned, the motivation of agents was more likely to be financial. Frustrations of some kind about the employer or the workplace would also often play a role in many individual cases. During the whole Cold War period, the KGB and GRU would also make use of Western Communist parties or their individual members for their intelligence operations,¹⁰ even though they went about this in a circumspect way after Western security services had discovered at the end of the 1940s the important role that dedicated communists had played in spying for the Soviet Union.

A typical example of agents and their motivations in the later period of the Cold War was the Walker spy ring, which operated for the KGB between 1968 and 1985 and had US Navy Chief Warrant Officer and communications specialist John Walker at its center. Walker and his three associates were spying primarily for financial gain. They succeeded in handing over so much information about US Navy codes, and other technical information, to the Soviets that they probably changed the military balance considerably, to the detriment of the United States, at least for the period in which they were active as agents.¹¹

American and British governments suffered from a serious lack of information on the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s, especially as far as the intentions of the Soviet leadership were concerned. Even the state of Soviet military readiness was largely a mystery to Western intelligence services. A telling example is the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, of which the Americans became unexpectedly aware that it had taken place when the US government detected radioactive material resulting from the test in the atmosphere. One of the main concerns on the Western side during the Cold War, especially during its early phase when intelligence was scarce, had to do with the possibility of a surprise attack by the Soviets. Indeed, the first question posed to a defector from the communist East in the early days was if he knew of any signs of an impending war.¹² The serious lack of intelligence on the Soviet Union and its allies was made worse by the presence of "fabrication factories" in the early Cold War period: political exiles from the East and all kinds of shady characters in need of cash who provided "intelligence" on demand to Western services in dire need of it.¹³

The little real information in the field of Humint came from defectors from the KGB and other Soviet organizations who decided to stay in the West when they were on a mission abroad. Due to the very strict security environment inside the USSR (the KGB ran very successful counterintelligence and surveillance departments), it was almost impossible for a service like the CIA to run an agent in Moscow. Maintaining vital communication with an

agent, often causing headaches in the best of circumstances, is an almost insurmountable obstacle in a non-democratic state with a ruthless and ubiquitous security apparatus. The CIA managed to place its first operational officers at the US Embassy in Moscow only at the beginning of the 1960s, but even then it was very difficult for them to escape the attention of the KGB when moving about the Soviet capital.

It is telling that the most important human source in the Soviet Union for both the SIS and the CIA in the beginning of the 1960s, GRU colonel Oleg Penkovsky, was a British-American agent for only a year and a half. Luckily for the CIA and SIS, his handlers could arrange meetings with him in hotels in London, Leeds and Paris when he was in the West as a member of a Soviet delegation. In Moscow, dead-drops or brush-passes were the only possibility to exchange information with Penkovsky. The CIA and SIS were not able to run him in Moscow for very long and, like most Western agents in the Soviet Union, he paid for his spying with his life. The stationing abroad of a Soviet citizen for a long period as a diplomat or KGB officer offered practically the only way for the CIA to approach him and run him as an agent. What often was missing, however, was intelligence on the mindset and intentions of the Soviet leadership. Sources in the Kremlin or very close to it, closer still than Penkovsky had been, would have been necessary to achieve this, but they never materialized.

It was American technological prowess that filled some important gaps in Western knowledge about the Soviet Union from the end of the 1950s. Important information was acquired by the US U-2, by far the most famous photo and electronic reconnaissance plane of the Cold War, which made altogether twenty-four overflights of Soviet territory in 1956–60. The downing of a U-2 above Soviet territory on 1 May 1960, however, led not only to a major international crisis but to the end of U-2 overflights of Soviet territory.¹⁴ Fortunately for the West, U-2 overflights were soon to be followed by another important development which took off in the early 1960s: putting into orbit satellites that generated more and more intelligence on the Soviet Union from signals (Sigint) and images (Imint). The US was always far ahead of the Soviet Union in this technology, and, just like the overflights of the U-2, it gave Washington and London vital information about the Soviet order of battle, i.e. the number of tanks, missiles and other weapon systems, that could not have been acquired by Humint.¹⁵

In the later stages of the Cold War, roughly from the end of the 1970s, American technology again made an important contribution to a safe way of running agents on Soviet territory by rapid advances in communications technology. The CIA developed a short-range agent communication device (SRAC), for instance, which could be used by agents to send text messages to receivers placed on several locations in Moscow.¹⁶ The CIA also developed sophisticated operational methods to avoid the usually heavy KGB surveillance in Moscow and thus to maintain contact with valuable agents. That virtually all CIA and FBI agents in the Soviet Union and at the Soviet Embassy in Washington DC were arrested by the KGB in the mid-1980s, about a dozen of whom were subsequently executed, was not the result of thorough KGB surveillance in Moscow but of betrayal on a grand scale from the American side by Aldrich Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI.

Sigint

Sigint (signals intelligence) refers to the interception and analysis of “foreign communications and non-communications radio-electronic transmissions.”¹⁷ As far as intercepting radio communications is concerned, every Sigint organization tries to read another state’s messages, even if it is a close ally diplomatically, the US and the UK being a possible exception in this regard. To give but one example: by the end of the Second World War the United States had

not only broken the codes of the three Axis Powers, but it was also reading the encrypted diplomatic and military traffic of more than forty other countries, among them allies and neutral states.¹⁸

The role of Sigint during the Cold War tends to be underestimated by historians, which is partly due to the fact that daring exploits by human agents fire the imagination much more than the tedious work of installing antennae, breaking codes and reading other people's messages in nondescript government buildings. The main factor, however, for the lack of information on Sigint during the Cold War until fairly recently has to do with the fact that governments in both East and West, though more so in the former, for obvious reasons tended to keep their Sigint capabilities as secret as possible.

The importance of Sigint can be seen from the number of reports based on intercepts sent to other government agencies and officials by the National Security Agency (NSA), the US Sigint organization. In 1964, for instance, the NSA distributed 150,000 intelligence reports among its customers in Washington – more than 400 a day. This figure had more than doubled just a few years later, at the end of the decade. The KGB, on the other hand, decrypted 188,400 diplomatic messages sent by seventy-two countries in 1967 alone, a rate of 516 decryptions a day.¹⁹ A particular problem that applies to Sigint is what is called by some authors the “wheat versus chaff problem”: the amount of material coming in is often so huge that it is not possible to process and evaluate it in a timely fashion and thereby to separate the valuable items from background noise. The outbreak of the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War, which caught the Nixon administration by complete surprise, is a case in point. One of the reasons for the Arabs' surprise lay in the fact that “NSA intercepts of Syrian and Egyptian war preparations in the period preceding the attack were so voluminous – an average of hundreds of reports each week – that few analysts had time to digest more than a small portion of them. Even fewer analysts were qualified by technical training to read raw NSA traffic.”²⁰

As was often the case with intelligence generally during the Cold War, Sigint successes for one side in the struggle could easily be followed by dismal failures; such was the ebb and flow of the intelligence war between East and West. The so-called Black Friday episode, which occurred in 1948, offers a prime example. In cooperation with the British, the Army Security Agency (ASA), a forerunner of the NSA, had succeeded in breaking several low-grade ciphers of the Soviet army, navy and air force, which resulted in important information on the order of battle. Very suddenly, on Friday, 29 October, called Black Friday in the history of the NSA, the Soviet government started a massive change of practically all its main cipher systems, which went on for several months after that date. Newer and more sophisticated cipher machines were also introduced by the Soviets, all of which resulted in the Americans and British not being able to break Soviet ciphers for almost thirty years. Eventually, it became clear that the Soviets had carried out this massive change as a consequence of information obtained by them from a human source inside the ASA.²¹

The disaster of Black Friday forced the Americans and British to look for other ways to eavesdrop on Soviet communications. Tapping into Soviet landlines would have the additional advantage that such communications would not be encrypted, since they would be considered inaccessible and therefore secure by the KGB. This is exactly what the British and Americans did, often with great success. In late 1948 in Vienna, the SIS managed to dig a tunnel in the British sector to a Soviet underground cable, and a further two tunnels would follow later. In February 1954 in Berlin, in a joint operation with the CIA codenamed Gold, the SIS started work on a tunnel from the American sector to a Soviet underground cable not far away in the Eastern sector. This listening post operated for only little over a year, until April 1956, when it was discovered by the KGB. The SIS officer and KGB agent George Blake had betrayed the

Berlin tunnel operation when it was still in the planning phase. American and British intelligence services considered the material from the tunnel operation as a good source of early warning in case of a Soviet attack.²²

On many occasions during the Cold War the United States displayed a very high level of technological inventiveness, such as it had done in the case of the high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance plane during the 1950s. Highly advanced American technology also played an important part in an operation code-named Ivy Bells, carried out jointly by the NSA and the US Navy, which involved eavesdropping on a Soviet underwater communications cable in the Sea of Okhotsk in the Soviet Far East. This operation, revealed in 1980 by a KGB agent in the US, resulted in vast amounts of intelligence on the Soviet Pacific Fleet, including early warning of a possible Soviet military attack.²³

Intelligence cooperation between the US and Great Britain during the Cold War was generally very close. Services of the two countries sometimes cooperated in the field of Humint, as in the case of the GRU colonel Penkovsky, but especially with respect to Sigint. The Sigint alliance between the United States and Great Britain, also known as "UKUSA," is a stable and long-lasting intelligence liaison which dates from the Second World War, when the two Western allies worked closely together in breaking German and Japanese codes. UKUSA consists of a series of sometimes overlapping agreements, the first concluded in 1943 and 1946, to which other agreements were added over the years and which also came to include Canada, Australia and New Zealand.²⁴

The Sigint effort of the Soviet Union was more fragmented than the one of the US, since it involved participation from both the KGB and GRU. Judging from available evidence, it seems that Soviet Sigint successes during the Cold War resulted largely from installing bugs (hidden microphones) in Western embassies and other establishments and from operations with agents, rather than from cryptanalysis pure and simple.²⁵ It is well known that Western embassies in Moscow, the American and British ones in particular, were a constant target for the KGB, and its efforts in this regard were often successful. From roughly the 1970s onwards, the KGB also installed specialized listening posts in Soviet embassies and other establishments abroad with which it could eavesdrop on local communications. By 1970 the KGB residency in Washington could listen in on the communications of a host of US government agencies, including the White House, the FBI, the State and Defense Departments and the local police.²⁶ Humint operations, i.e. agents, were used frequently by the KGB to acquire Sigint from the West. A good example of this was the Walker spy ring, already mentioned. Geoffrey Prime, who in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s worked at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the main British Sigint establishment, was also a very valuable KGB agent.²⁷

Covert Action

The American term "covert action" is formally defined as an "activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."²⁸ The scope of covert action is very broad. It can take different forms, from common propaganda and political activities such as giving financial support to political parties, to organizing a coup and different kinds of paramilitary action. The KGB used the term "active measures" during the Cold War to refer to roughly the same as "covert action."²⁹

Both the CIA and the KGB practiced covert action, though arguably the CIA did this in a way which was the most haphazard and inconsistent of the two. The collection and analysis of

information were and are ongoing activities of the CIA. Covert action, if carried out properly at least, needs to be based on accurate information, i.e. intelligence, but its goal, of course, goes further than that. In the American system, covert action during the Cold War was very much a tool of presidential politics and, depending on the spirit of the times and the preferences of the president and his advisers, it could be practiced somewhat reluctantly or with great fervor, the latter being especially the case in roughly the first decade of the CIA's existence. At least until the mid-1970s legal arrangements hardly played a role in CIA covert action and congressional oversight did not exist.

The 1950s became the "golden era" of CIA covert action, in which almost everything seemed legitimate that served the greater purpose of countering and undermining the threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. The extent to which the idea of such a threat had taken hold of leading circles in the US government becomes clear from the content of a document drafted by a team of high officials from the State Department and the Department of Defense in 1950, which became known as NSC 68 (National Security Council Paper 68). In the document, the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union was seen in terms of a struggle between forces of Good and Evil and it called for the "intensification of ... operations by covert means in the field of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare."³⁰ The so-called Doolittle Report, written at the request of President Eisenhower in September 1954, saw the struggle in equally apocalyptic terms:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.³¹

This thinking was the ideological basis for the ample use of covert action by the CIA during the Cold War, especially in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the late 1940s and well into the 1950s, Europe was the primary focus of CIA covert action, the funding of the Christian Democrats against the Communists at the elections in Italy in 1948 being a good example. Apparently, money was spent by the CIA on Italian political parties during election time well into the 1970s.³² In the same way, the CIA also routinely meddled in elections in Chile in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. The agency was apparently not directly involved in the coup against President Salvador Allende in September 1973, but at the behest of the White House it had done its best to destabilize his government in the preceding years.³³ Supporting friendly, i.e. anti-communist or at the very least non-communist political parties and other organizations all over the globe was to be one of the CIA's main activities during the Cold War. In the first years after the end of the Second World War the CIA, together with the British SIS, also actively supported resistance movements against the establishment of communist rule in the Eastern periphery of the Soviet empire in such regions as the Baltic states, Poland, Western Ukraine and Albania. These movements were spectacularly unsuccessful, since most of them had been penetrated by the KGB or its East European counterparts from the outset. British and American support for them therefore came to nothing.

During the 1950s, after the Iron Curtain had been firmly established in Europe, the focus of the CIA shifted increasingly to the Third World. Coups were organized in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, for instance, against regimes that were perceived to be friendly towards the Soviet Union or simply not friendly enough towards the United States. The ignominious failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 by Cuban anti-Castro exiles trained and financed by the CIA was a very public event and came as a shock to many. It was openly trumpeted by Fidel Castro and led to the resignation of Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles.³⁴ In the 1960s the CIA continued on its by now well-trodden path of intervention in the Third World by supporting Joseph Mobutu in taking power in the Congo in 1965, after having looked the other way, at the very least, when the first elected Congolese leader after independence, Patrice Lumumba, was murdered in 1961.³⁵

Front organizations were used widely by both sides throughout the Cold War. On the surface, such organizations were not connected to the CIA or the KGB, but behind the scenes the ties could be very strong indeed. The CIA, especially, set up many front organizations during the Cold War, so-called proprietaries, to carry out tasks connected with its many covert actions, such as arms deliveries and air transport in general. Several air corporations were established during the wars in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s, the best-known of which was Air America. Both the CIA and the KGB made wide use of radio and television stations, print journals, other media and individual journalists for propaganda purposes, in most cases, of course, without proper attribution. The best-known use by the CIA of radio as a propaganda tool concerned Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), founded in 1949 and 1951 respectively. RFE broadcast to communist Eastern Europe and RL to the Soviet Union. Both stations were subject to almost constant jamming by the communist authorities. They were funded and run by the CIA until the early 1970s, and thereafter by the US Congress. In many cases, the CIA also set up radio stations within the wider context of the coups and paramilitary actions it carried out.³⁶

A series of congressional investigations in the mid-1970s led to revelations about the CIA's involvement with repressive regimes in the Third World, tarnishing its relationship with the US Congress and its image in the eyes of US public opinion. These investigations started in the wake of the Watergate affair, and led to severe criticism of the CIA because of its involvement in several surveillance operations against US citizens which were expressly prohibited by law. Several CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders, some of them quite exotic, also became publicly known as a result of these investigations, most notoriously those directed against Cuban leader Fidel Castro. As a result of these revelations, President Ford issued an Executive Order in 1976 prohibiting political assassinations. Further, from the mid-1970s onwards the activities of the CIA came under a measure of congressional oversight. It is important to keep in mind, however, that whenever the CIA breached the law or displayed other activities deemed undesirable, the agency had never acted as a "rogue elephant," as some critics later called it, but on the President's instructions.³⁷

With hindsight, one of the striking aspects of covert actions in the American political context is the extent to which they created periodic problems for the CIA when they became public. The congressional oversight instituted after the scandals of the mid-1970s did not prevent the agency from supporting the Contras in Nicaragua and mining the country's harbors in the first half of the 1980s, in contravention of resolutions by the US Congress, after which another scandal ensued.³⁸ As a consequence of all this, periods of feverish CIA activity were often followed by others in which the agency and the US president it served seemed to engage in covert action only reluctantly and with some trepidation. The CIA ended the Cold War against the Soviet Union, again, with a period of great activity in Afghanistan, where it successfully financed and armed, together with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Mujahedeen

resistance against the Soviet invasion. This, of course, would all come back to haunt the CIA and the US in September 2001.

From Stalin's time the KGB had a tradition of assassinating or abducting enemies of the Soviet state abroad, mostly anti-communist exiles and defectors. Several leading opponents of the Soviet regime were murdered in the 1950s, mainly in West Germany, and often with poison in a very sophisticated manner. From the beginning of the 1960s onwards the number of KGB assassinations abroad abated considerably, probably due to bad publicity from earlier failed attempts, even though the KGB is said to have given essential technical assistance to Bulgarian state security in connection with the murder of the Bulgarian exile Georgi Markov in London in 1978. The operation was carried out with a rare poison, ricin, inserted into the victim's body with the use of an umbrella converted into a silent gun.³⁹

As far as setting up proprietaries was concerned, the KGB seems to have practiced this art to a much lesser extent than the CIA, although it had a long tradition of using firms as a cover for intelligence operations, especially in countries where no Soviet embassies existed. It also routinely used Soviet press agencies and other Soviet organizations to provide cover positions for its intelligence officers abroad. During the Cold War the KGB was also very keen on using media outlets and agents to disseminate reports that reflected positively on the USSR or served Soviet interests in other ways. Furthermore, within the KGB there existed a strong tradition of distributing disinformation, mostly a mixture of facts and rumors or outright lies, which was used to discredit the West, in particular the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, the KGB used its many contacts in the world of journalism to promote the conspiracy theory that President John F. Kennedy had been assassinated on the orders of US right-wing circles or by the CIA.⁴⁰ Another example of KGB disinformation was the campaign carried out in 1983–88 by the KGB and other Eastern-bloc communist services, in particular the East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (Main Reconnaissance Administration, HVA), in which reports were circulated, especially through media outlets in the Third World, that the virus which caused AIDS was developed in biological warfare laboratories of the Pentagon, after which it was used to deliberately target gay communities and other minority groups.⁴¹

During the Cold War, the KGB also offered ample support in the form of arms deliveries and training to many communist groups and liberation movements in the Third World. In Central America in the 1970s, for instance, the KGB trained several of the Sandinista guerrillas who were to seize power in Nicaragua in 1979. After the Sandinista takeover it was primarily the KGB which stayed close to the new revolutionary government and not the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the Middle East in the 1970s, one of the leading figures of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), according to Andrew and Mitrokhin, was a KGB agent. The KGB was involved in arms deliveries to the PFLP and also cooperated closely with it in several terrorist operations. The KGB also established contact with other Palestinian terrorist groups. Around 1980, both the KGB and East German state security had extensive contacts with the PLO and the KGB provided military training to some of its guerrillas. Moscow always had doubts, however, about closely cooperating with the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat.⁴² With all these operations, the KGB acted under orders and with the consent of the top leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow, just as the CIA carried out its covert actions at the behest of the president of the United States.

Historiography

Especially during the first three decades of the Cold War, writings on intelligence were very few in number and often of questionable quality. In an article originally written in 1955, the

founder of CIA intelligence analysis, Sherman Kent, noted the fact that intelligence as a discipline lacked a body of literature. In his words, “you are unlikely to have a robust and growing discipline without one [i.e. a body of literature].”⁴³ It was to remain this way for quite some time. Two British scholars edited a volume published in 1984 in which intelligence was aptly referred to as “the missing dimension” in the history of international relations.⁴⁴

In the Soviet Union the workings of the “organs of state security” were naturally shrouded in a cloak of secrecy, which made research into this topic for Western scholars extremely difficult. Indeed, it can be said that the first scholarly work discussing the many different aspects of KGB activities inside and outside of the USSR, including its place in the Soviet political system and not just its intelligence operations, was published in the West only in 1988.⁴⁵ Even in a relatively open political system such as the United States, the operations of the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s were barely spoken about publicly. The situation in other Western countries in that period was not much different and change came slowly. In the beginning of the 1970s the secret of “Ultra,” the breaking of German codes during the Second World War, was revealed, which deeply changed historians’ understanding of the period and stimulated an interest in intelligence generally. The scandals involving the CIA in the mid-1970s meant that from that moment the interest of the public and of historians in the doings of this organization was guaranteed. Indeed, in combination with the release of records from CIA archives that took place over the two decades since the end of the Cold War, it can be said that there is no intelligence or security service in the world about which so many books and articles have been written as the CIA. The declassification of US intelligence records was strongly influenced by the end of the Cold War: since the mid-1990s millions of documents of the CIA and other US intelligence agencies have been made available by the US government. Since 1995, the National Security Agency in the US also has released over 3,000 Venona messages into the public domain, containing important information on Soviet intelligence operations in the US in the 1930s and 1940s.⁴⁶ Regular releases of material from the archives of MI5 and MI6 now also take place in the United Kingdom and much of this material naturally finds its way into the works of intelligence historians in both the US and the UK.

Due to the nature of the Soviet state and the Russian state that followed it, the availability of material from KGB archives would always be problematic, even in the best of circumstances. By the end of the 1980s, however, when the Soviet “organs of state security” had come under a lot of criticism from the liberal media in the USSR, even the KGB leadership, under its then chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, realized that there was some use in cultivating a positive public image of the organization by releasing records selectively.⁴⁷ These records mostly had to do with past Soviet intelligence successes in the West, such as the Cambridge Five, of which the outlines in most cases were already known.⁴⁸ Significantly, they did not deal with, for instance, the KGB suppression of the dissident movement in the USSR since the 1960s. Under the auspices of the Russian intelligence service SVR, a six-volume series covering the whole Soviet period and more, *Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence*, was also officially published in Moscow in 1999–2006.⁴⁹ Even more important, however, was the uncensored material from the KGB archives that was smuggled to the West by the KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin at the beginning of the 1990s. This resulted in two volumes that offer the most complete overview of KGB intelligence operations in the West and the Third World that has been published so far.⁵⁰ In the mid-1990s, the former KGB officer Alexander Vassiliev managed to bring to the West, unbeknownst to the Russian authorities, a fair amount of information from the KGB archives on Soviet intelligence operations in the US in the 1930s and 1940s. Vassiliev’s material partly confirmed earlier information from Venona and resulted in two important publications.⁵¹ In sum, the number of serious publications on intelligence, especially relating to the Cold War

period, is much larger nowadays than could even have been imagined little over two decades ago, and it is still growing.

Did Intelligence Matter?

Arguably the most important function of intelligence during the Cold War, at least for the West, was that of early warning of an enemy attack and, related to this, the acquisition of intelligence about the other side's order of battle. Initially, the West was in a weak position in this respect, having as its opponent a Soviet system that practiced extreme secrecy with respect to the most mundane matters. Largely thanks to new American technology such as the U-2 and satellites, from the late 1950s the West managed to receive enough imagery and other information about Soviet weaponry and its disposition to make an unexpected attack unlikely. There always remained ample room, however, for exaggerated estimates and worst-case analysis, as is exemplified by the "missile gap" of the end of the 1950s, when there was high uncertainty in the US intelligence community about Soviet capability in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The number of ICBMs was hugely overestimated, at least in some parts of the US government. The Democrat presidential candidate John F. Kennedy aptly made use of the non-existent missile gap during the 1960 campaign by making a Republican administration responsible for it. Khrushchev himself was at least partly to blame for the US misperception, since in his efforts to intimidate the West he had grossly exaggerated Soviet capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons.⁵² Even though gaps remained in Western knowledge of Soviet military power, in the 1970s and 1980s there was, generally speaking, good intelligence, largely thanks to American technology operating from a distance, on the Soviet military dispositions and the specifications of Soviet missiles, for instance. Estimating military effectiveness, however, remained difficult and information on the intentions of Soviet leaders was also mostly lacking.⁵³

The KGB had an aggressive intelligence program targeted at the West right from the beginning of the Cold War, especially in the field of Humint. From what has become known about these operations one can conclude that the results were often spectacular. About the acquisition of Western military secrets by the Soviet Union it has been said that "it is clear that every military secret of any significance was betrayed."⁵⁴ It is generally assumed that the Soviet Union had no great difficulty in using the Western technology it acquired for its own needs. The question is, however, if it also managed to do this with the huge amounts of political intelligence received from the West. The Soviet worldview, which was the worldview of the KGB as well, was highly conspiratorial and ideologically extremely one-sided. It accepted only information which was slanted towards this worldview and which confirmed the idea of the West and its intelligence services as constantly plotting and scheming for the downfall of the Soviet Union as their ultimate objective.⁵⁵

Extreme Soviet suspicion towards the West, the US in particular, manifested itself on several occasions during the Cold War. When relations between the US and the Soviet Union reached a new low during President Reagan's first term in office at the beginning of the 1980s, the old guard in the Kremlin took the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack by the West, a first strike, very seriously and ordered its intelligence services, in particular the First Chief Directorate of the KGB and the GRU, to look out for preparations for such a first strike.⁵⁶ According to Andrew and Gordievsky, Soviet fears of a nuclear first strike by the West reached their climax in November 1983, during a NATO military exercise codenamed Able Archer which had to do with nuclear release procedures.⁵⁷ It has been said that KGB experts on the US and other intelligence officers regarded this fear with considerable

skepticism, but the chief of the First Chief Directorate, Vladimir Kryuchkov, took it very seriously.⁵⁸ On another occasion about two decades earlier, in June 1960, the KGB in Moscow had received a document apparently sent by a NATO liaison officer at the CIA to his own government. It said that the US military leadership in the Pentagon was hoping to launch a preventive war against the Soviet Union before the military balance between East and West, especially in the field of nuclear missiles, would change in favor of the USSR. Apparently KGB chairman Alexander Shelepin took this information very seriously and sent a report on it to the party leadership, including First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Measures were taken to get its contents confirmed from other sources.⁵⁹ Almost two years later, it was the turn of the military intelligence service GRU to raise the alarm about the danger of an American nuclear first strike. According to two GRU intelligence reports received in March 1962, based on a source within the US national security establishment that was usually ~~considered reliable, the United States had decided in June 1961 to launch a nuclear surprise~~ attack on the USSR a couple of months later, in September of that year. It was only the huge Soviet nuclear tests in the fall of 1961 which had deterred the US government from proceeding with plans to launch such an attack.⁶⁰

In spite of such misunderstandings with potentially disastrous consequences, it is possible to argue that intelligence about the order of battle and military preparedness of the other side tended to take away to a large extent the danger of surprise from the military confrontation which the Cold War partly also was. This seems to have held true for Western governments generally, but probably not to the same extent for the Soviet leadership, judging by the episodes just mentioned. Intelligence also played an important role in the verification of the arms control treaties of the 1970s, mainly SALT I and SALT II, especially by "national technical means," i.e. satellites and the like. In this sense intelligence could be said to have played a stabilizing role during the Cold War.

Remarkably, inside the KGB there was scant attention paid to intelligence analysis. Traditionally, Soviet leaders were presented mostly with "raw" intelligence on which they did the analysis themselves. Both Stalin and Khrushchev largely were their own intelligence analysts. According to two authors on KGB foreign intelligence reporting at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was seriously hampered by having to conform to prevailing Party orthodoxy, as expressed in the views of members of the CPSU Politbureau. The reports of the First Chief Directorate were characterized as "largely compilations of information collected on a topic," which lacked "any overarching argument."⁶¹ They were, in other words, not intelligence estimates in the proper sense of the term. The new KGB chairman after the failed coup of August 1991, Vadim Bakatin, when discussing the reporting by the KGB to the leadership of the country, complained in his memoirs about the "Practically undigested pieces of information that came together on the desk of the KGB Chairman, who chose from them as he saw fit for the state leadership."⁶² This process, of course, further tended to confirm the leadership's existing worldview. In the United States and Great Britain the situation was different, since there was a system of all-source intelligence in place during the Cold War in which, ideally, intelligence from a variety of sources, Humint, Sigint or open sources, among others, was combined into reports for policy makers.

It has always been notoriously difficult to analyze the concrete input of intelligence into the decision-making process of governments at the highest levels. Policy makers tend to take decisions for a combination of reasons, often of a domestic nature or for other reasons not related to available intelligence. Sometimes, but not always, intelligence plays a role. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, for example, intelligence handed over by the British-American agent Oleg Penkovsky played a role in the decision-making process on

the US side. One could argue that intelligence occasionally tended to reinforce the hostility between the two camps during the Cold War because of the role it played in particular incidents or crises. If an important part of the struggle between East and West was between competing ideologies, then incidents related to intelligence such as the downing of the American U-2 plane over Soviet airspace in 1960 could be said to have reinforced this mutual hostility.⁶³

The same could be said about several politically and emotionally charged individual spy cases, such as the one against the Rosenbergs in the beginning of the 1950s in the United States, in which the two main defendants in the end died on the electric chair. Similarly, the British and American covert actions in the opening phase of the Cold War, in which armed resistance fighters were infiltrated into the Soviet Union and some satellite states, clearly must have fed the omnipresent suspicions on the part of the KGB and the Soviet leadership against the West and its intelligence services. In some ways, Soviet suspicions of the West, though often grossly exaggerated, were not entirely without foundation. Neither were those of the West against the Soviet Union, for that matter.

Notes

- 1 The author is grateful to W.P.J. Keller M.A. in Overijse, Belgium, and Dan Mulvenna in Leesburg, VA, USA, for their comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
- 2 Terminology differs considerably between countries and even between intelligence and security services of one country, but Humint's human sources are in most cases called "agents." As to covert action, some authors do not see it as a part of "intelligence," because its primary focus is not on the collection of secret information, but on influencing the political situation in a country or other target in a variety of ways. Covert action was such an important part of the activities of intelligence services during the Cold War, however, of the CIA and the KGB in particular, that it will be discussed here.
- 3 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Allen Lane, 1999), 157–158. This valuable agent was Kim Philby, among others. The Russian acronym NKVD stood for "People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs," of which state security (including the intelligence service) was an important component.
- 4 Gordon Corera, *The Art of Betrayal: Life and Death in the British Secret Service* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011), 28.
- 5 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 43–46.
- 6 The case of Alger Hiss has long been extremely controversial in the United States, but there can now be no doubt that he was a GRU agent. See, for instance, John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, *Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2009), ch. 1. On Harry Dexter White, see *ibid.*, pp. 258–262. For the case of the Rosenbergs and the Soviet penetration of the American and British atomic projects see *ibid.*, ch. 2 and *passim*. The case of the Rosenbergs was equally controversial during the Cold War and many historians and others rejected the US government version, insisting the couple were innocent. Apart from all the other evidence, including Venona (see below), their innocence can no longer be maintained, however, since one of Julius Rosenberg's NKVD controllers, Alexander Feklisov, wrote his memoirs in which he detailed his contacts with this highly productive Soviet agent. See Alexander Feklisov and Sergei Kostin, *The Man Behind the Rosenbergs* (New York: Enigma Books, 2001).
- 7 On Philby see Genrikh Borovik, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of the Master Spy – The KGB Archives Revealed* (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1994); Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, *passim*.
- 8 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1999); Nigel West, *Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War* (London: Harper Collins, 2000).
- 9 David Wise, *Molehunt: How the Search for a Phantom Traitor Shattered the CIA* (New York: Avon Books, 1994), on the molehunts inside the CIA. Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 503–521 on MI5.
- 10 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 360–382.

- 11 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 268–269; Pete Earley, *Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988).
- 12 Corera, *The Art of Betrayal*, 164–65, 215.
- 13 Former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms has a whole chapter on these fabrication factories in his memoirs. Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003), chapter 9.
- 14 Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).
- 15 Matthew M. Aid, *The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 129, 155, 183 and passim.
- 16 Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, with Henry R. Schlesinger, *Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Dutton, 2008), 110–158 and passim.
- 17 Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes, "Introduction: The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War," *Intelligence and National Security, Special Issue on Secret of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond*, Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes (eds.), 16 (2001), 1–4. The terminology used by different authors can be confusing and is not always consistent. Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 4th ed. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2009), 91.
- 18 Aid, *The Secret Sentry*, 3.
- 19 Aid and Wiebes, "Introduction: The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War," 9.
- 20 As quoted from a House Select Committee on Intelligence report in Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: Harper Collins, 1996), 391. Especially in the internet era, the problem of wheat versus chaff certainly applies to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) as well, i.e. intelligence acquired from regular media and other outlets.
- 21 Aid, *The Secret Sentry*, 11–19. Black Friday was in fact not just one day but covered a longer period of several months.
- 22 Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: HarperPress, 2010), 169–173.
- 23 Aid, *The Secret Sentry*, 184.
- 24 Aldrich, *GCHQ*, ch. 5, esp. 89–90.
- 25 See Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 439–461 for Soviet Sigint during the Cold War.
- 26 Oleg Kalugin, with Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 92.
- 27 Aldrich, *GCHQ*, 367–386.
- 28 As quoted in Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 4th ed., 165.
- 29 See Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, Third Edition (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002), 76–77 for the difference between the two.
- 30 Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 181–183.
- 31 As quoted in John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 277.
- 32 Kevin A. O'Brien, "Interfering with Civil Society: CIA and KGB Covert Political Action during the Cold War," in Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World. An Anthology* (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004), 262–263.
- 33 Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 370–374, 390.
- 34 On the coups in Iran and Guatemala, and on the Bay of Pigs see Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 202–206, 206–211, 262–267.
- 35 Corera, *The Art of Betrayal*, 127–130; Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 253, 406.
- 36 O'Brien, "Interfering with Civil Society," 264–267.
- 37 Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 275–276; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 338–345, 383–390 and passim. On President Ford's Executive Order see *ibid.*, 627. Similar Executive Orders were issued by Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan in 1978 and 1982, respectively.
- 38 Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 466–467, 478–479.
- 39 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 507–508.
- 40 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 293–297.
- 41 Thomas Boghardt, "Operation Infektion: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and its AIDS Disinformation Campaign," *Studies in Intelligence*, 33, 4 (December 2009), 1–19.
- 42 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 117–122, 246–250, 252–253, 255, 145.

- 43 Sherman Kent, "The Need for an Intelligence Literature," in Donald P. Steury (ed.), *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays* (History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C., 1994), 14.
- 44 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds.), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984).
- 45 Amy W. Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
- 46 See http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/venona/index.shtml, accessed on 15 July 2012.
- 47 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 26–29.
- 48 Examples of publications based on such records are John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions* (London: Century, 1993); Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, *The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives* (London: HarperCollins, 1998). Both volumes contain important new information on the Cambridge Five and other Soviet intelligence operations.
- 49 *Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoy Vneshney Razvedki tom 1–6* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1999–2006).
- 50 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*. The US editions of these two volumes are entitled *The Sword and the Shield* and *The World Was Going Our Way*, respectively.
- 51 Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – the Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 1999); Haynes, Klehr and Vassiliev, *Spies*.
- 52 John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 69–74.
- 53 Michael Herman, "What Difference Did It Make?" *Intelligence and National Security* 26, 6 (2011), 886–901.
- 54 Gordon S. Barrass, *The Great Cold War: A Journey through the Hall of Mirrors* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 393, as quoted in Herman, "What Difference Did It Make?" 895.
- 55 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 720–725. For the conspiratorial worldview prevalent within the KGB see Julie Fedor, "Chekists Look Back on the Cold War: The Polemical Literature," *Intelligence and National Security* 26, 6 (2011), 842–863.
- 56 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB. The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), 488–507; *Instructions from the Centre. Top secret files on KGB foreign operations 1975–1985*, edited by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 67–90; Benjamin B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm>. Accessed on 11 May 2012.
- 57 Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 502. Cold War scholar Mark Kramer, speaking at the conference "Need to Know: Intelligence and Politics: Western and Eastern Perspectives" in Brussels on 8–9 November 2012, did not believe that in fall 1983 there was a real fear of a nuclear surprise attack by the West among the Soviet political and military leadership.
- 58 Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 488; *Instructions from the Centre*, 69.
- 59 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": *Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 51–52.
- 60 Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," 155. According to the authors, it is not clear to whom, within the Soviet political establishment, these reports went.
- 61 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Intelligence and National Security, Special Issue on Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, edited by James G. Blight and David A. Welch, 13(3) (1998): 66. On Stalin and Khrushchev doing their own intelligence analysis, see also Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 240, 720.
- 62 Wadim Bakatin, *Im Innern des KGB* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1993), 59. In this quotation Bakatin is not referring to reports from the First Chief Directorate, but from the KGB leadership as a whole. There existed, to be sure, within the First Chief Directorate a Directorate of Information and Analysis, which prepared reports for the party leadership. Nikolai Leonov, chief of this directorate in 1973–1983, is somewhat skeptical in his memoirs about the amount of attention the leadership paid to them. According to Leonov, Soviet leader Gorbachev often did not respond at all to reports. Nikolai Leonov, *Likholetye* [Stormy Years] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1994), 112–113, 288, 317, 321.
- 63 Herman, "What Difference Did It Make?" 899–900.