Parochial and universal cooperation in intergroup conflicts

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Conflicts between groups are deeply rooted in our society. Such intergroup conflicts may occur far from home (e.g. the Arab Spring, the Civil War in Syria or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) but also closer to our daily lives, for example between political parties, between organizations and labor unions or between organizational departments. The effects of intergroup conflicts can be very costly or even disastrous, ranging from union strikes to a country without a government to deathly war victims or even genocide. For example, a recent strike in the London underground against austerity measures cost the British capital both a loss of reputation and approximately 241 million euro; the US government shutdown in 2013 cost an estimated 24 billion dollars as well as, again, a loss of reputation. During its recent 100 year memorial in 2014, attention was drawn to the First World War (or Great War) with estimated costs of 208 billion dollar and over 35 million deathly victims.

To understand the occurrence and possible ways to resolve conflicts, it is important to know when and why parties decide to cooperate. Cooperation in intergroup conflict can serve different functions, of which the two most relevant ones are investigated in this dissertation. One function of cooperation is to mitigate or resolve the conflict: To make investments, contribute resources or make concessions to regulate the conflict such that both parties receive a satisfying outcome and the conflict can be resolved. Since this function of cooperation is to promote the welfare of all (both) parties, we call it universal cooperation. The other function of cooperation is to strengthen the own group: Making investments and contributions to benefit the own group or refusing to concede towards the other party. This latter, parochial, form of cooperation can have adverse effects on the other party and hence has potentially negative implications for the course of the conflict. It can even result in an arms race between parties both strengthening their own parties, thereby fueling competition and potentially leading to conflict escalation rather than conflict resolution (Bornstein, 2003, De Dreu, 2010a).

This dissertation investigates what kind of people under what circumstances will display universal versus parochial cooperation (the tendency to serve one’s own group, potentially at a cost to rivalling other groups). We specifically investigate how cues from a person’s personality (intrapersonal), cues from other members of the own group (intragroup), and cues about the relation between the groups (intergroup) direct an individual in an intergroup conflict towards either universal or parochial cooperation. Seven experiments are reported using two different paradigms, which reflect different forms of handling intergroup conflict. The first
three empirical chapters employ negotiation paradigms. In negotiations, searching for a mutually beneficial agreement and making concessions reflects universal cooperation while refusing to concede and forcing the other party into concessions reflects parochial cooperation. The last empirical chapter employs an experimental game paradigm, where individual and group outcomes depend on individuals’ and (opposing) group members’ contributions to their own group or the collective of both parties.

In the remainder of this dissertation, the two described forms and functions of cooperation in intergroup conflicts will be explained in detail, with an emphasis on theories suggesting that humans are generally inclined towards parochial cooperation. Subsequently, internal, intragroup and intergroup factors which affect cooperation will be clarified. This chapter ends with an overview of the empirical chapters that will be discussed in this dissertation. The research described in these chapters ultimately lead to an answer to the question of how certain features of the (individuals within the) groups and the conflict situations can direct cooperation in an intergroup conflict. When will individuals resort to parochial cooperation and when to universal cooperation?

**Cooperation in the form of a negotiated agreement**

Once an intergroup conflict occurs, there are several reactions possible among the conflicting parties. For example, one party can subordinate itself to the dominating other party; one of the groups can withdraw from the conflict area; or parties can increase their aggression towards each other, leading to conflict escalation with potentially disastrous consequences for all members involved (De Dreu, 2010a). Probably the best way to deal with intergroup conflicts, however, is by seeking a constructive and lasting solution for the groups by means of negotiations—the communication among parties aimed at reaching agreement on how to resolve (perceived) conflict (De Dreu, 2010a; Pruitt, 1981). Examples include labor management negotiations to strike an agreement on new collective employment contracts, negotiations between political parties to form a new government and intra-organizational negotiations between departments on resources distributions. On an international level, negotiations include diplomacy such as peace talks to halt new violence and instigate a cease fire in the Middle East, the Syrian Civil War, or the end of the Cold War.

Negotiation between conflicting groups usually involves representatives that are invoked to handle a negotiation on behalf of a group. Representatives are
engaged because of their specific expertise in the field, or because of practical reasons - It is rarely feasible to bring all members of two competing groups together (Mnookin & Susskind, 1999). The representative has the assignment to reach an agreement with the opposing party on the conflict, as well as to defend the interests of his constituency in doing so. Since interests between the own and the opposing party are incompatible, the representative thus faces the cooperation dilemma described in the above. Should he direct cooperation towards a lasting beneficial agreement for both parties, thereby sacrificing at least some of the own parties’ interests and risking their disapproval, or towards strengthening the own party and trying to win over the other?

Ideally, a negotiated agreement serves the function of universal cooperation by leading to an integrative win-win solution which satisfies both parties’ interests. Such an agreement is called ‘integrative’, because it integrates interests of both parties (Walton & McKersie, 1965). To reach an integrative agreement, parties should be willing to make concessions and to take the perspective of the other party and gain their trust such that they can freely communicate about their preferences. Once the preferences and priorities of both parties are clear, parties can exchange issues leading to a mutually beneficial agreement. For example, in a labor-management conflict, both parties do not value all issues equally. By conceding on the less important issues (for example restructuring health insurance benefits for labor union), representatives can gain more on the more important issues (for example discharge regulations). Such agreements have positive consequences for the relationship between the parties, stimulating harmony and economic thriving and reduce the likelihood of future conflict (De Dreu, 2010a; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Chapter 2 investigates the role of cooperative intra-group signals on a potentially integrative negotiated agreement.

Cooperative behavior in negotiations however can also serve the less beneficial function of strengthening the own group only, thereby potentially intensifying the conflict. Such kind of cooperation towards the own group can also take the form of competition towards the other group, where negotiators refuse to concede or use threats to get higher outcomes for their own group (Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2014). An agreement resulting from this kind of cooperation usually has a win-lose or even a lose-lose outcome, where one party triumphs over the other party on most of the issues involved or where both parties end up with little value, resulting in reduced prosperity and satisfaction for both parties (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). In this case, negotiators both take competitive
stances, are unwilling to make concessions, use threats towards each other and try to claim as much value as possible, at the expense of the other party. Especially in a negotiation between groups, such outcomes are likely: Representative negotiations generally take a more competitive course than inter-individual ones (for a review, see De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygı, 2014). Indeed, representatives more often than not direct their cooperation towards their constituency by strongly defending their interests and using a competitive strategy vis-a-vis the other party. This leads to poorer quality outcomes on the economic as well as the social relations level- and in turn increases the risk of conflict intensification (Steinel, Van Kleef, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, Homan, & Moffit, 2010). Chapters 2 and 3 investigate how cooperative signals from their constituency may instigate or inhibit representatives’ use of this parochial form of cooperation in a negotiation setting.

Cooperation in the form of individual investments

Next to negotiation research, there is a vast amount of research on individual decision making in interdependent social situations such as intergroup conflicts. Conflicting interests between parties are modeled using experimental games. In these games, individuals usually can choose how to invest an endowment of valuable tokens. Each choice yields different outcomes for themselves and the other players of the game. In their decision, they need to consider the consequences for the other players, keeping in mind that these interdependent others play the same game, which in turn affects their own outcomes (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Colman, 2003). Especially relevant for the study of intergroup conflict are experimental games modeling intergroup dilemmas. Here, individuals face a conflict of interest on how to invest their resources between themselves and the group they belong to, but also between what’s best for their group and what’s best for the two groups together (Bornstein, 1992; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Note that the outcomes associated with this latter decision are similar to the ones described under parochial and universal cooperation in negotiations: They can serve to regulate and solve intergroup conflicts (when resources are invested in the collective of both parties combined) or to strengthen the own group only (when resources are invested into the own group). Another possible outcome is to not invest anywhere and keeping the resources to oneself.

The direction of individuals’ cooperation largely determines the course of the conflict: Towards mutually beneficial outcomes and conflict resolution or towards strengthening the own group and conflict intensification. Three of such
intergroup conflict games will now be explained to illustrate how conflicting interests can drive cooperation.

In the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (IPD; Bornstein, 1992), individuals are asked to make decisions about keeping resources to themselves or investing them in their own group. The latter option increases resources of the own group including themselves but concurrently subtracts resources from another group- Thereby essentially creating an intergroup conflict. The universal cooperation option would be to withhold any investments. By investing in their own group (parochial cooperation), individuals not only strengthen their own group but also weaken the other group. This could cause conflict intensification—especially considering that members of the other group have the same investment options. Overall, if members of both groups invest in their own group, they quickly end up in a negative conflict spiral by simultaneously reducing the overall resources that could have been saved by withholding investments. The IPD thus models an intergroup conflict where groups are already fighting over certain resources at the expense of one another, for example nations fighting over territory or (members of) political parties trying to take each other down in debates prior to elections. Research indicates that individuals are likely to show parochial cooperation by investing in their own group, thereby harming the other party (Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, & Orzen, 2012; Bornstein, 2003).

A more benign form of this game is the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma Maximizing Difference Game (IPD MD; Halevy et al., 2008). Here, an additional option is available where individuals can choose to invest in their own group without harming the other group. If all members of both groups invest in their own group, the amount of total resources (thus, the collectively optimal option) is highest (universal cooperation). Similarly, investing in the own group (with or without harming the other group) increases the resources of the own group, thereby reflecting parochial cooperation. This game thus reduces the likelihood of conflict escalation by providing a less competitive option for benefiting the own group. However, interests of the own and the other group are no longer negatively correlated, thereby reducing the experienced intergroup conflict considerably. An example of an intergroup situation with the structure of an IPD MD is choosing to put effort into community or military service. Research has consistently shown individuals’ tendency to invest in their own group, without harming the other party (Halevy et al., 2008; Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012; De Dreu, 2010b; De Dreu et al., 2010). These results suggests that parochial cooperation rests on and is
motivated by a preference to help the own group rather than to harm the other group (De Dreu, Balliet & Halevy, 2014).

A third game modelling conflicting interests of parties is the Nested Social Dilemma (NSD; Wit & Kerr, 2002; Halevy et al., 2012). In this game, individuals are a member of one of two subgroups, which in turn form a common collective. For example, two companies may continue acting in the interests of their previous company after a merger where the new company forms the overarching collective, pursuing new and other goals. In turn, individuals within the companies may decide to invest their resources (e.g. time, effort) in their previous company, in the new overarching company, or not to invest much resources at all (Polzer, 2004). Interests on these three levels conflict such that individuals have to decide whether to withhold resources, invest in their subgroup (parochial cooperation), or invest in the overarching collective (universal cooperation). Investing in the own group does not directly harm the other group, but also does not serve the collective, thereby providing a milder form of the previously mentioned IPD including a more accessible option for universal cooperation. Research into this paradigm generally shows highest investments on the subgroup level (Wit & Kerr, 2002; Polzer, 2004), again suggesting a general tendency towards parochial cooperation. Individuals’ choices of cooperation in an intergroup dilemma with conflicting interests will be investigated in Chapter 5.

Prevalence of parochial cooperation

Overall, both in the negotiation and in the experimental decision making paradigms, parochial cooperation seems to be a prevalent course of action in intergroup conflicts, even when this comes at the expense of the other party (such as in the IPD or in competitive negotiations). This suggests that representatives’ or individuals’ investments in intergroup conflicts may serve the intended function of strengthening the own group. At the same time however, this parochial cooperation can adversely affect the potential for mutually beneficial outcomes and conflict resolution. Instead, it fuels a negative conflict spiral potentially leading to intensification and escalation of the conflict (De Dreu, 2010a).

The findings regarding the prevalence of parochial cooperation support several theories from different academic fields, including social and evolutionary psychology. Three perspectives will be discussed below, leading to the question of how cooperation can be directed towards a more constructive form of conflict resolution.
Evolutionary perspective. From a traditional evolutionary perspective, altruism is unlikely. Showing generosity and investing resources or even sacrifice to benefit others without the likelihood of reciprocity is not adaptive to individual fitness and survival. The solution to the evolvement of altruism and cooperation is provided in a more recent evolutionary model--Group Selection Theory (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). In this model, a larger number of cooperators in a group has an adaptive function and helps the group to survive and prosper. Darwin once stated, ‘groups with a greater number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other... would spread and be victorious over other tribes’ (Darwin, 1873, p. 156). Theoretical models based on archaeological data as well as simulation models have supported this possibility, showing that groups with a larger number of members willing to self-sacrifice for their group in the face of warfare, were more successful. Conversely, aggression towards members of another group promoted the welfare of the own group, suggesting that parochial cooperation evolved due to its functionality in times of war, and that intergroup conflicts were both necessary and sufficient to promote parochial cooperation (Arrow, 2007; Bowles, 2008; 2009; Choi & Bowles, 2007; De Dreu et al., 2014; Lehmann & Feldman, 2008).

Parochial cooperation may thus have become institutionalized into a natural inclination (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003); willingness to self-sacrifice became an important group norm with deviating members receiving punishment from fellow group members (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004; Gneezy & Fessler, 2012; Henrich & Henrich, 2007). Research evidence indicates that parochial cooperation indeed is hardwired into the human brain: Artificially increasing their neuropeptide oxytocin in turn increased individuals’ display of parochial cooperation as modeled with experimental games (De Dreu et al., 2010, 2011). Overall, the evolutionary approach suggests that parochial cooperation is a natural inclination which evolved due to its adaptive function in intergroup conflicts. Intergroup conflicts thus fuel the display of parochial cooperation. Ultimately, the strongest, more internally cooperative groups survived such conflicts, and their individual members along with their cultural and biological preparedness for self-sacrifice and cooperation reproduced and spread.

Social Psychological perspectives. One social psychological perspective on parochial cooperation is related to Group Selection Theory, and proceeds on the basis of the evolutionary tenable assumption that humans are social animals. Throughout the times, individuals have learned to cooperate with each other by
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Trusting one another and relying on each other’s skills. This cooperative interdependence is needed for survival of the group. Such cooperative interdependence however cannot be unlimited: Only members of the own group are trusted to reciprocate this cooperation, which limits on the one hand the number of individuals that receive and give cooperation, while on the other hand also limiting the risks associated with unreciprocated cooperation. This conditional cooperation thus creates a social category of a group with members willing to cooperate with each other (Brewer, 1999).

The occurrence of such parochial cooperation has been confirmed multiple times by Yamagishi and colleagues, showing that cooperation with the own group only occurs in a setting where the receiver is not only a group member, but also knows that the sender is a group member too (Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2004; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling, 2008; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008; 2009; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). Interdependence with the other group members is a strong predictor of parochial cooperation, suggesting that the expectation of reciprocity plays an important role in eliciting such behavior (Balliet et al., 2014). Reputation concerns may cause this effect: One does not want to risk the loss of reputation and sanctions imposed by other group members by refusing to cooperate. However, cooperating with a member of another group does not impose reputational concerns and is furthermore unlikely to yield positive outcomes for oneself or the own group (Yamagishi et al., 2008; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008; 2009). Other studies support the importance of reputation in parochial cooperation (Milinski, Semmann, Bakker, & Krambeck, 2001; Nowak & Sigmond, 1998) and the idea that cooperation with own group members has become an institutionalized heuristic (Efferson, Lalive, & Fehr, 2008). Based on this ‘Group Heuristics Model’, it can be concluded that individuals engage in indirect reciprocity, or parochial cooperation, to further the interests of their group, including their own interests. Taking it one step further, indirect reciprocity does not even strictly require an outgroup to occur- even without the salient presence of an out-group, reputation concerns can instigate indirect reciprocity. This approach thus deviates from Group Selection Theory in that it considers intergroup conflict neither a necessary nor sufficient precursor of parochial cooperation. However, it acknowledges that intergroup aggression may occur as ‘by-product’ of parochial cooperation. Individuals will not refrain from parochial cooperation when this has negative side effects for another party (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008).
A different yet much researched alternative from social psychology is the Social Identity Approach. It suggests that individuals categorize themselves as part of a group (the in-group), automatically leading people not belonging to that group to form the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The theory states that individuals largely derive self-esteem from their group, rendering it important for them to develop and maintain a positive group identity. One way to do so is by favoring the in-group and emphasizing its positive characteristics (in-group favoritism; viz. in-group love). Another, closely related way is by derogating the out-group and discriminating against them: emphasizing their negative features and the distinctions between the in- and the out-group (out-group derogation; viz. out-group hate; Brewer, 1999). Both tendencies are expressed in and give rise to intergroup bias: Devaluing the other group by valuing the own group. Research supporting expressions of intergroup bias is abundant, and indicates that prejudice and stereotyping largely originate from in-group favoritism; the motivation to positively distinguish the own group from the out-group (see for reviews Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Hornsey, 2008). The Social Identity Approach does not include the concept of bounded reciprocity as reputation concern, but states that mere categorization is enough to create parochial cooperation or in-group favoritism (De Dreu et al., 2014). Categorization can only occur if there is a distinction, however minimal, between groups. The Social Identity Approach differs in this respect from the Group Heuristics Model, in which the important role of reputation concerns within the group should be sufficient to instigate bounded cooperation within a group, even in absence of a salient out-group. Especially in situations where another group poses a threat to the own group, for example when resources are scarce, evaluations of and actions towards the other group will become more negative (for a review, see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Striving for a positive identity can thus lead to intergroup bias and relative deprivation. Relative deprivation, the perception that one cannot reach anticipated outcomes for one’s group due to the presence or actions of another group, in turn promotes intergroup conflict (De Dreu, 2010a; De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2014). According to the Social Identity Approach, intergroup competition does not fuel displays of in-group love and out-group hate; instead both tendencies are the outcome of positive social identity striving. However, such positive identity striving may invite negative evaluations of the other group, which in turn can fuel intergroup conflict (Brewer, 1999; De Dreu et al., 2014).
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In sum, Group Selection Theory (Bowles & Gintis, 2011), the Group Heuristics Model (Yamagishi, 2000), and the Social Identity Approach (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012) all suggest that individuals are strongly motivated or even predisposed to show parochial cooperation (or conditional cooperation or indirect reciprocity). The perspectives differ in the extent to which they assume that parochial cooperation is fueled by intergroup competition, but especially the latter two acknowledge its dangerous potential. Although research has consistently supported parochial cooperation to be driven by in-group love rather than out-group hate (See Balliet et al., 2014 for a meta-analysis), some forms of parochial cooperation simultaneously include out-group derogation and in turn conflict intensification and escalation. Given its potentially disastrous consequences, it is of pivotal importance to uncover how individuals facing an intergroup conflict can be (re)directed towards the more beneficial function of universal cooperation, creating win-win agreements and investments into the collective welfare.

We propose that individuals’ behavior is driven by cooperative signals. These signals direct their cooperative actions, often towards parochial cooperation, but they may under certain circumstances shift towards universal cooperation. The next section will review the cooperative signals that are investigated in the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

Cooperative signals: Intrapersonal, intragroup and intergroup factors

Intrapersonal cooperative signals refer to individuals' personal inclination towards cooperation. The current dissertation focuses on social value orientation as an intrapersonal cooperative cue: One’s general preference for the distribution of outcomes between oneself and interdependent others (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Individuals can broadly be divided into two types: pro-social and pro-self. Pro-socials prefer equality, reciprocity, fairness, cooperation and high outcomes for both themselves and others. Pro-selves are self-interested, focused on maximizing their own outcomes and, sometimes, willing to exploit others by non-cooperation (McClintock, 1972; Van Lange, 1999).

Research has abundantly supported the predictive power of social value orientation in social situations. Pro-socials contribute more to public goods and consume less of common resources (for reviews, see Au & Kwong, 2004; Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008; Van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007), are more willing to make concessions in interpersonal negotiations (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Dijk, De Cremer, &
Handgraaf, 2004), and are more willing to self-sacrifice to protect and promote the
group to which they belong than pro-selves (De Dreu, 2010b; De Dreu et al., 2010). Pro-socials are more likely to perceive a social dilemma in terms of collective rationality, leading them towards cooperative actions (i.e., investing in the collective good, making concessions, protecting their groups’ interests), while pro-selves perceive each situation in terms of individual rationality, leading them towards the (often competitive) option with highest personal pay-off (i.e., keeping endowments to self). Pro-socials also expect cooperation from others, whereas pro-selves anticipate selfishness from others, which reinforces this behavioral pattern (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Iedema & Poppe, 1994; 1995; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). Overall, pro-social individuals are more than pro-selves sensitive to social and contextual cues, and more likely to adapt their behavior to the situation, and their partner (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Van Lange, 1992).

Although a pro-social value orientation seems a clear predictor of cooperation, research in this area thus far has not distinguished between parochial and universal cooperation. While many studies found pro-socials willing to sacrifice for the collective good, those studies did not incorporate an intergroup setting where parochial cooperation was possible (Bogaert et al., 2008). Other studies investigating pro-social behavior in intergroup settings however, found pro-socials to be particularly likely to display parochial cooperation, sometimes even combined with negative behavior towards the other group. However, these studies did not provide a clear option for universal cooperation (Abbink et al., 2012, De Dreu, 2010b). Based on these findings, and the theories previously described regarding humans’ general proclivity towards parochial cooperation, we reasoned that pro-socials, compared to pro-selves, would be more willing to self-sacrifice for the benefit of the in-group. A question remains however whether pro-socials are willing to harm the other group in displaying parochial cooperation and, most importantly, how their level of universal cooperation can be increased. The current dissertation investigates how individuals’ social value orientation affects parochial and universal cooperation depending on whether their group approves of their initial negotiation strategy (Chapter 3), on the extent to which their interests conflict with those of their own group and the adversary during a negotiation (Chapter 4) as well as on the presence of an intergroup conflict when parochial cooperation comes at the cost of the out-group modeled by a social decision making game (Chapter 5).
Intragroup cooperative signals. Expectations and preferences of group members regarding cooperation can greatly affect individual behavior. Especially in a negotiation, representatives need constituencies’ approval and are tuned towards their directions about preferred strategies. Research into representative negotiations has shown that representatives adopt competitive strategies towards the adversary, especially when they are highly accountable to their constituency (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Benton & Druckman, 1974; Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007, for a review see De Dreu et al., 2013). They do so to protect the interests of their group and to gain their approval. Put differently: During negotiations, representatives are likely to display parochial cooperation. This parochial cooperation however can be shifted towards more universal cooperation if the constituency clearly communicates a preference for cooperative and constructive handling of the other group. Indeed, research showed that in presence of a clear cooperative norm, representatives show more cooperation with the other party (Benton & Druckman, 1973; Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009). Based on these findings, it seems possible to induce universal cooperation among representatives when the constituency approves of or encourages such behavior, which should in turn lead to better agreements and intergroup relations. The current dissertation tests this hypothesis in Chapter 2 using an integrative negotiation paradigm and in Chapter 3 with a more distributive bargaining task.

Intergroup cooperative signals

The theoretical perspectives on parochial cooperation differ with respect to the cause and effect chain of intergroup conflict and parochial cooperation. The evolutionary perspective suggests that the two are strongly related and that intergroup competition fuels parochialism. Both the social psychological perspectives however, do not believe that intergroup competition leads to parochial cooperation. Instead, they argue that parochialism is a result from internalized reciprocity and reputation concerns or from positive social identity striving. However, both these perspectives acknowledge the potential of parochial cooperation (conceptualized here as expression of in-group favoritism) to start or intensify a conflict.

Whether parochial cooperation indeed fuels intergroup conflict largely depends on parties’ perceptions about each other. Intergroup conflict may start out of a greedy desire to win over the other party, for example when the other party is considered to be vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation. The 'social support for
‘self-interest’ hypothesis states that groups are more likely to act competitively than individuals because their competitive actions towards the other party can be justified to own group members by furthering the groups’ interest (Insko et al., 1990; Wildschut, Insko & Gaertner, 2002; Schopler et al., 1993). Indeed, experimental research has supported the claim that groups are more aggressive than individuals towards each other (Meier & Hinsz, 2004). This explanation is closely related to the previously described explanation for competitive behavior in representative negotiations: Competition towards the other party is allowed when this serves the members of the own group. Thus, according to this hypothesis, parochial cooperation and competition or even aggression towards another party are closely intertwined. Both the Group Heuristics Model and the Social Identity Approach however explicitly state that intergroup conflict is rarely triggered by a desire to harm the other group. Rather, it may occur as a result of positive distinction of the own group when in-group favoritism is confounded with out-group derogation (Balliet et al., 2014; Brewer, 1999; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Groups aim to maximize their group outcomes and will accept harm to the other group as collateral damage if this is needed to reach their goal (Halevy et al., 2008).

Although there is evidence that greed plays an important role in furthering both parochial cooperation and intergroup conflict, theories agree that perceived threat between the parties is a more important determinant of conflict escalation (Insko et al., 1990). Threat is for example perceived when resources between groups are scarce, or when the other party is expected to prepare for a hostile aggressive action (Brewer, 1999). Perceived threat is the result of distrust towards another party and the fear of being exploited by the other party. Once fear about the threat is experienced, parochial cooperation may take the form of defensive aggression, where individuals self-sacrifice to help strengthen their group, thereby increasing their own perceived threat for the other group (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; De Dreu, Shalvi, Greer, Van Kleef, & Handgraaf, 2012; Hewstone et al., 2002). Even worse, fear may lead groups to a pre-emptive strike: based on the idea that ‘offense is the best defense’, groups may lash out to each other as a form of defensive aggression (De Dreu et al., 2010; Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013; Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). Needless to say, such defensive aggression quickly inflicts retaliation and parties end up in a negative conflict spiral. All theories described earlier agree on this fear based explanation for intergroup conflict. The evolutionary approach suggests that ‘offense is the best
defense’, thereby encouraging defensive aggression towards the other group. Both the Group Heuristics Model and the Social Identity Approach state that cooperation with the own group often goes hand in hand with a fear of exploitation, hence inviting defensive aggression. According to the Group Heuristics Model, within group cooperation and the group reputation should be preserved. Threats from another party to attack this reputation will promote a pre-emptive strike (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). Similarly, according to the Social Identity Approach, the perception of high self-esteem is important, and when another party threatens this self-esteem, competitive action is likely to ensue (Hewstone et al., 2002). These theoretical standpoints are corroborated by repeated findings that in-group love (parochial cooperation) is a more important trigger than out-group hate for (defensive) aggression (De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2008; Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012).

In sum, whether or not intergroup conflict ensues largely depends on the perception of competition between the parties: If no competition and hence no threat is perceived, parties should be less likely to start a conflict, even when they show parochial cooperation. At the same time however, they might still be tempted to exploit the other party and increase the benefits for their own group. The current dissertation tests how the degree of conflicting interests affects whether individuals’ parochial cooperation has negative consequences for the other party in a negotiation setting (Chapter 4) and whether the presence of perceived conflict may ironically also reduce parochial cooperation if there is a peaceful mutually beneficial option available (Chapter 5).

The three described cooperative cues do not operate in isolation. Individuals may, depending on their social value orientation, be differently affected by the norms communicated by their group members regarding cooperation, or by the extent to which their groups’ interests conflict with those of the other group. This dissertation investigates the combination of these cooperative factors and their interactions, thereby providing a more complete picture of how cooperative cues internal and external to the individual promote parochial or universal cooperation.

**Overview of chapters**

The first empirical chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 2) addresses how parochial cooperation can be shifted towards universal cooperation depending on intra-group cooperation signals. Specifically, we investigated whether representatives in a dyadic negotiation with integrative potential would reach
higher joint outcomes depending on the cooperative nature of messages from their constituency members. Previous research has indicated that even when a minority in the constituency advocates a competitive approach towards the counterpart, representatives will indeed use competitive tactics (Steinel et al., 2009). This research however used a distributive negotiation task, precluding a collectively optimal outcome. In our study, we allow for a mutually beneficial agreement by using an integrative task. We furthermore invoke the concept of relative status within the group and show that representatives attach more weight to the voice of the competitive (hawkish) constituency members, even when they are in the minority, unless they have low status. Results showed that when the majority of the constituents favored a cooperative approach and the hawkish minority had low status, representatives were able to reach more integrative, mutually beneficial outcomes. Thus, a majority of group members with a preference for cooperation can induce a more universal form of cooperation among representatives as long as the minority has low status, thereby heightening the chance of a longer lasting agreement and satisfaction with the agreement among representatives and constituents of both parties.

In Chapter 3, we investigate representatives’ negotiation behavior in response to intragroup cooperation signals again. We furthermore address the question of how the intrapersonal cooperation signal of social value orientation affects parochial and/or universal cooperation. We departed from the idea that pro-socials are more parochial cooperators than pro-selves, but also that approval from the constituency regarding a cooperative strategy towards the other group should lead (especially pro-social) representatives to adopt a more universally cooperative strategy. Hence, we investigated how (dis)approval from the constituency in terms of emotions following an initial offer affected representatives’ subsequent allocations to the own and the other party, depending on their social value orientation. We show in a first experiment that without guidance from their constituency, pro-socials expect their constituency to prefer a more generous offer towards the counterpart than pro-socials and subsequently propose such a generous offer. In a second experiment, we manipulated whether the constituency communicated positive (happiness) or negative (anger) emotions towards the representative about this offer. Results show that upon positive communication from their constituency, pro-social more than pro-self representatives extend their initial generous offer with another generous offer towards the other party, thus showing universal cooperation. Upon negative communication however, pro-
socials try to appease their constituency by focusing their cooperation on their own group. This research indicates that especially pro-socials are firstly focused on satisfying their own group by parochial cooperation, and will extend their cooperation to the other party once their own group is satisfied.

Chapter 4 again uses a representative negotiation paradigm to investigate how their social value orientation (intrapersonal cooperation signal) affects representatives’ parochial or universal cooperation, and whether intergroup factors in the form of perceived conflict of interests matter. We investigated whether pro-social representatives would be more or less willing to self-sacrifice for the benefit of their own group (i.e., display parochial cooperation), or the benefit of both their own and the other group (i.e., universal cooperation). We manipulated the interest alignment between the representative, the own constituency and the other party such that personal interests were either aligned with their own party, with the other party, or with neither, in which case the two parties had common interests that were opposed to those of the participant. Results showed that pro-social representatives were more willing to self-sacrifice for the benefit of their own party than pro-selves, thus displaying more parochial cooperation. When self-sacrificing to cooperate with the other party came at the expense of the own group, however, pro-socials were not more likely than pro-selves to do so. Remarkably, pro-socials were even more willing to self-sacrifice if this helped their constituency only compared to when both their constituency and the other party could benefit. This research importantly shows that pro-socials’ parochial cooperation has a dark side. Their inclination to protect and promote their own group may come at a cost of the other party, thereby potentially intensifying the conflict and harming subsequent intergroup relations.

In the last empirical chapter (Chapter 5) we examine how intergroup factors in terms of competition between the groups affect individuals’ display of parochial and universal cooperation in a social decision making game, depending on their social value orientation. We investigated whether pro-socials would be willing to harm the other party in their display of parochial cooperation when the alternative of universal cooperation would be readily available. We let individuals take part in a nested social dilemma, thereby manipulating the presence of competition between the subgroups. Pro-socials were found to invest more than pro-selves in their subgroup, but only when this was not harmful to the other party. When competition was present and subgroup investments did harm the other party, pro-socials invested more in the collective benefit. This universal cooperation was
calculated however, and decreased under cognitive depletion. We thus show that although pro-socials are first and foremost willing to benefit their in-group, they are reluctant to harm the other party and will try to find another way to help their in-group that is not costly to the other party, namely (calculated) universal cooperation.

The final chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 6), discusses the findings of the empirical chapters. We relate back to the questions and theories as described in the beginning of this chapter and draw conclusions on when and why individuals show parochial or universal altruism, depending on the intrapersonal, intragroup and intergroup cooperation signals they receive. We distinguish between and integrate findings on the described theoretical perspectives based on the two different paradigms that we researched. Implications of the findings in the dissertation as well as potential limitations are discussed, followed by an extensive discussion on future steps within this line of research and its potential theoretical as well as practical implications.