Using logic to model interests in ethnic conflicts: the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Slovenia

Lempp, F.; Marácz, L.

Published in:
Acta Universitatis Sapientiae. European and Regional Studies

DOI:
10.1515/auseur-2015-0011

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
Using Logic to Model Interests in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia and Slovenia

Frieder LEMPP
Massey University, Palmerston North

László MARÁCZ
University of Amsterdam

Abstract. This article investigates the situation of Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities in Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. It compares the extent to which the two minority groups’ interests are satisfied and provides an explanation for differences between their de facto statuses. The authors use a logic-based methodology to extract the key parties, issues, and interests. Drawing on the analysis, the structure of each case (i.e. the dependencies between the parties’ interests) is displayed as a simple graph. Differences in the de facto status of the two groups can thus be explained by differences in the respective conflict structure. The authors argue that – as evidenced by the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia – a number of unresolved ethno-linguistic minority issues in Central Europe have a high conflict potential and may be a threat for security in the region and the European Union.

Keywords: Hungarian minorities, Slovakia, Slovenia, conflict analysis, modelling, interest-based negotiation

Introduction

Following the Treaty of Trianon (1920), Hungarian linguistic minorities live in the neighbouring states of Hungary. The old kingdom of Hungary being part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed in the aftermath of the First World War and was partitioned into a series of nation-states. Due to the turbulent history of the European continent, the fragmentation into nation-states continued in the course of the twentieth century. Hence, due to the Trianon Treaty, World War II, and the collapse of communism, Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities now live predominantly in concentrated territories in seven countries neighbouring...
Hungary, i.e. Slovakia (520,000), Romania (1,500,000), Ukraine (200,000), and smaller communities in Austria, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia.¹

In all these countries, the Hungarian language is recognized as an official language for communication between Hungarian speakers and the institutions of the state. However, the Hungarian language is restricted by special laws conditioning the use of the Hungarian language; there is no canonical norm in terms of recognition and the actual linguistic rights granted to speakers of Hungarian in these nation-states vary (Marácz 2014a, 2014b). While the situation of the Hungarian minorities has improved substantially after the Central and Eastern European states joined the EU in 2004, the ‘unresolved’ cases of ethno-linguistic diversity remain a source of conflict and tension (Skovgaard 2007). Some of these states, like the Slovak Republic, have envisaged a fall-back in the sense that there is hardly a tolerant climate towards the implementation of ethno-linguist minority rights (Csergő 2007). These patterns accommodate to ‘Nelde’s Law,’ coined after the linguist Peter Nelde, who hypothesized that when two languages are in contact there will unavoidably be a conflict for hegemony (Nelde 1987). Marácz (2014a) argues – following a concept coined by Smith (2002) – that these ethno-linguistic conflicts are contextualized in a framework of international relations that can be called a ‘quadratic nexus’ including the ethno-linguistic minorities, the host- and kin-states, and the supranational organizations like the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (abbreviated in the following as EU, CoE, and OSCE respectively). It is the interplay between these four actors that will determine the consequences of a local conflict for the security and stability of bigger regions.

This paper will compare the cases of the Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities in Slovenia and Slovakia. The comparison will demonstrate that, while there are some ‘minimum standards’ due to the interference of supranational organizations (Kymlicka 2007, 380), there are still big differences regarding the recognition of ethno-linguistic rights of autochthonous minority groups.² Of the seven cases listed above, the Hungarian ethno-linguistic community enjoys ‘cultural autonomy’ in three cases only (Lapidoth 1996, 39). This is the case now in Serbia’s multilingual, multinational northern Province of Vojvodina, where next to Serbian five autochthonous languages, including Croatian, Slovak, Russine, Romanian, and Hungarian are officially recognized (Dembinska et al. 2014, 366–367), in the easternmost region of Slovenia, the so-called Pomurje region (in Hungarian: Muravidék), and in Croatia’s northern parts of Slavonia (Cabada...

---

² See Marácz (2011a, 164) for a different language typology in terms of ‘inclusion’ or ‘exclusion’ using two vectors: ‘nationalist language policies’ and ‘multicultural language policies’.
Using Logic to Model Interests in Ethnic Conflicts...

2011, Marácz 2014b). The ‘worst practice’ is offered by the Slovak case where a language law has been drafted to protect the majority language against the minority languages, e.g. Hungarian spoken in the country (Dembinska et al. 2014, 12). The implementation of the Slovak language law has caused much tension between the Hungarian-speaking community in Slovakia and successive Slovak governments but also in the international arena outlined by the quadratic nexus.

The structure of the article is as follows. First we provide an outline of the situation of the Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities in Slovenia and Slovakia. Second, we introduce the methodological framework used to analyse and compare the two conflict cases. Then we apply the methodology to the situation of Hungarian speakers in Slovenia and Slovakia respectively. This is followed by a comparison between the two cases and a brief discussion in which we provide some explanations for any differences observed. In conclusion, we present some high-level policy recommendation based on our findings.

Hungarian Ethno-Linguistic Communities in Slovenia

There is a small community of Hungarians (around 6,000) living in the easternmost region of Slovenia, neighbouring Hungary. This region is called the Pomurje region, making up an area of less than 200 km$^2$. The Pomurje Hungarians constitute only 0.32% of the total population of Slovenia (1,964,034). According to the census of 2002, 5,212 people declared themselves to be ethnic Hungarians and 6,237 regarded Hungarian as their mother tongue (Göncz 2014). The Hungarian minority enjoys a high level of legal protection in Slovenia: the Hungarian language has the status of a regional official language; the Slovenian Constitution, more precisely articles 11 and 64, grants the autochthonous Hungarian – and Italian – communities full linguistic and community rights in the Pomurje region (Göncz 2014, 106–107). The Hungarian community has a representative in the parliament, who has a right to veto in questions related to the Hungarian minority, and the educational programme for the Pomurje Hungarians grants a bilingual education programme implying that both languages are used as target and as medium. Actually, the ethno-linguistic Hungarian community was granted the status of ‘cultural autonomy,’ meaning that they were recognized as an ethno-linguistic group enjoying collective linguistic and ethnic rights (Lapidoth 1996, 15).

The Pomurje Hungarians received cultural autonomy for two reasons. First of all, their size is rather small. Even compared to the total population of Slovenia, which is also small, the Pomurje Hungarian community is a fraction. Secondly, some 3,000 speakers of the Slovenian language live scattered in the southwest of Hungary. In order to stress the good neighbourliness and to arrange the linguistic rights of the ethnic Slovenes in Hungary and vice versa, the democratically
elected Hungarian and Slovene governments concluded an inter-state agreement in 1992. Considering the size, there is actually a case of balance. Furthermore, the newly independent Slovenia did not want to risk a conflict with its two bigger neighbours, the kin-states, i.e. Hungary to the east and Italy to the west, because of their ethno-linguistic minorities. Furthermore, the Slovene government could gain ‘cultural autonomy’ for the dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungarian. For the Hungarian government, a settlement with Slovenia over the linguistic and community rights of their ethnic communities is extremely important because it strengthens Hungary’s negotiation position in other arenas. A settlement with Slovenia could demonstrate to the other actors in its quadratic nexus – i.e. Romania, Slovakia, and the supranational organizations – that Hungary is willing to compromise over ethnic minority rights.

**Hungarian Ethno-Linguistic Communities in the Slovak Republic**

In contrast to the Hungarian community in Slovenia, the Hungarian community has suffered a traumatic history of persecution and oppression in the Czechoslovak Republic and later on in the Slovak Republic. The present-day ethnic conflict between Slovaks and Hungarians is deeply rooted in history (Just 2007). The Hungarians in Slovakia form a relatively large group. According to the 2011 census, 458,000 Slovak citizens declared themselves Hungarians, i.e. 8.5 percent of the total population (5,488,000).³ The Hungarians of Slovakia live in a strip of 30 kilometres from the Slovak-Hungarian border. This strip counts 650 kilometres all along the Hungarian-Slovak border. In this territory, the Hungarian communities are in very different situations, ranging from compact settlements with an absolute or relative Hungarian majority through mixed Hungarian-Slovak communities, where ethnic Hungarians are a minority and to scattered speakers of Hungarian living in a kind of an internal diaspora.

The Slovaks have been traumatized when the southern part was returned to Hungary under the so-called First Vienna Award in 1938. Slovakia and Hungary agreed to redraw their common borders mediated by the Axis Powers, i.e. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In the Peace Treaty concluding the Second World War, the southern part of Slovakia with the Hungarian settlements were returned to Czechoslovakia. Slovakia is always afraid that the Hungarian community will follow a secessionist policy and will join the kin-state Hungary supporting or initiating such a policy. There is however no evidence that Hungary conducts

---

³ This section on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was written while heavily relying on Fiala-Butora (2014), Kirschbaum (2003), Marác (2011a, b), Mikes (2010), Petőcz (2009), Petőcz et al. (2013), Škrobák (2009), and Vass (2013).
Using Logic to Model Interests in Ethnic Conflicts...

a revisionist policy, like Hungary pursued in the interwar period. The policy of the new democratic Hungary concerning its co-nationals in the neighbouring countries has been driven by the guidance of EU regulations and those of other supranational organizations, like the CoE and OSCE, to improve the legal situation of the Hungarians in Slovakia in the first place.

However, the policy of the Slovak government is characterized by an exclusion and discrimination of its Hungarian minority speakers. Firstly, the Slovak Constitution does not grant rights to the Hungarian community on the basis of collectivity. Linguistic minority rights are recognized in Slovakia only on individual basis. Secondly, a territorial division of Slovakia was designed in which the administrative districts are set up from north to south and not from east to west in order to prevent Hungarian majorities on the level of local administrative authorities. Thirdly, the second Mečiar-government (1994–1998) already drafted in 1995 a state language law ‘protecting’ the Slovak majority language against the ‘dominance’ of minority languages, including Hungarian but excluding the Czech language. The state language law was less restrictive concerning the Hungarian language under the centre right Christian democratic government of Mikuláš Dzurinda, which included the political representative of the Hungarian community, the Hungarian Coalition Party (Magyar Közösség Pártja (MKP)) as well. This had to do with the fact that the state language law had to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria for Slovakia’s accession to the European Union in 2004. The Dzurinda-government was succeeded by a centre left government under the leadership of Robert Fico. The Fico-government amended the state language law in 2009, drafting it in the style of Mečiar’s 1995 law ‘protecting’ the official language of the state, i.e. the Slovak. The state language law has the effect of driving the use of the Hungarian language in Slovakia from the public domain to the private sphere. The result of the policy of exclusion towards the Hungarian communities in Slovakia has led to a continuous state of conflict and tension in the relations of Slovakia with its own Hungarian minority and Hungary.

The Hungarian community in Slovakia has not been very successful in resisting the Slovak policy of exclusion. The main reason is that the political representation of the Slovak Hungarians is divided into two political parties: the Hungarian Coalition Party and the party Most-Híd (Bridge). Both parties independently operate within the legal framework of the Slovak state. MKP is striving for Hungarian cultural autonomy in Slovakia and for equal rights of the Hungarian language in the multilingual, multinational south Slovakia. It lost its parliamentary representation in the 2010 parliamentary elections and did not reach the threshold in the elections of 2012. The Hungarian Coalition Party is represented with one representative in the European Parliament. Most-Híd won 13 seats in the Slovak National Council in the 2012 parliamentary elections.
Although both parties are not in agreement with the language law, the Bridge Party has a more pragmatic stance and has been satisfied with slight modifications, actually cosmetic accommodations, of the law in 2011, when the party became a member of the centre right government under Prime Minister Iveta Radičová. The Radičová-government was somewhat longer than a year in power before it fell in 2011. In 2012, the centre left party SMER of Robert Fico won the elections convincingly, and now it enjoys an absolute majority in the Slovak National Council. Under the Fico-government, the language law remains to discriminate the speakers of Hungarian in Slovakia.

The Slovak-Hungarian state relations are characterized by continuous tension. Recently, the Hungarian Orbán-government offered double citizenship to persons who can prove their ancestors to have been Hungarian citizens. The Slovak government prevented that their Hungarians would receive a Hungarian-Slovak dual citizenship by adopting a law that makes this impossible and automatically strips Slovak citizens of their Slovak citizenship should they become a citizen of another country. This new Slovak law caused, however, problems for North American Slovaks that are quite often dual citizens. This issue is pending at the moment and causing serious stress in the Slovak-Hungarian relations. Interestingly, the Slovak minority in Hungary, which is living especially in the northern part of the country and is substantially bigger in size (around 100,000) than the Slovenian minority, does not play a neutralizing role in the Hungarian–Slovak conflict, comparable to the Slovenian minority in Hungary. Probably, the perceived threat of a much larger Hungarian community in Slovakia than the small size of the Hungarian community in Slovenia makes the difference between these two cases.4

Methodology

The methodological framework within which the two conflict situations are analysed is Lempp’s logic-based model of conflict resolution (Lempp 2009, 2014). This model is based on the idea that conflicts are constituted by sets of mutually incompatible interests pursued by a number of parties. The focus of the analysis is, therefore, placed on the reconstruction of the conflicting parties’ interests as propositions and an assessment of the relationships between those propositions as either being compatible or incompatible.

To describe the parties’ interests and the relationships between them, the model uses a semi-formal language. The following four questions provide a guideline for applying the propositional model to a specific conflict situation, such as the situation of Hungarian speakers in Slovakia and Slovenia:

1. Who are the parties involved in the conflict situation?

4 The authors are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this issue.
2. What are the issues (i.e. points of disagreement) in the conflict situation?

3. What are the parties’ interests in relation to those issues?

4. For any given pair of interests, are those interests mutually compatible or incompatible?

In providing answers to the above questions, it is necessary to adhere to the model’s specific propositional format. As to the first question, this means that each party involved in the conflict must be uniquely identified and represented by a corresponding party identifier (e.g. \(p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\)).

Next, each issue in the conflict must be identified as a proposition and represented by a unique issue identifier (e.g. \(i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n\)). Propositions are statements for which it makes sense to ask whether it is true or false (Russell 1919). Both argumentation theory (Fisher 1988) and content analysis (Holsti 1969) can provide useful guidance on how to systematically extract propositional statements from written or verbal materials.

Having represented the issues in the conflict as propositions, the next step is to reconstruct the parties’ interests as propositional attitudes, i.e. claims towards the truth or falsity of the propositions that represent the issues (Richard 1990). In the simplest case, an interest implies the truth of a single issue. More complex interests can have the form of negations (i.e. the interest implies the falsity of an issue), conjunctions (i.e. the interest implies the simultaneous truth of two issues), disjunctions (i.e. the interest implies the truth of at least one of two issues), or conditionals (i.e. the interest implies the truth of an issue, given the truth of another issue). For an introduction to propositional logic, see for instance (Beall 2010, Copi et al. 2011). The term ‘interest’ is used in a broad sense for the purpose of this paper. Essentially, any goal, value, belief, emotion, etc. that is capable of making a propositional claim towards the issues can be considered an interest. Once all interests are identified as a propositional claim towards the issues, they are labelled by unique interest identifiers (e.g. \(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n\)).

In the final step, for each pair of interests \(c_i\) and \(c_j\), one needs to determine whether \(c_i\) and \(c_j\) are mutually compatible or incompatible. This is done by looking at the truth conditions of the interests. If it is possible to jointly satisfy \(c_i\) and \(c_j\) (i.e. it is possible for \(c_i\) and \(c_j\) to be simultaneously true), then \(c_i\) and \(c_j\) are considered compatible with each other. Otherwise, \(c_i\) and \(c_j\) are incompatible with each other. The compatibility/incompatibility relations can be illustrated graphically in form of a graph which directly represents the structure of the conflict.

More specifically, to determine if two interests are compatible or incompatible, one needs to generate a list of all possible outcomes regarding the two interests. This set comprises all outcomes that are logically possible. It is generated from the set of issues, which the interests are composed of, by considering for each issue \(i_j\) the case that \(i_j\) is true and the case that \(i_j\) is false. For instance, if there are two issues, \(i_1\) and \(i_2\), there are four possible outcomes: one where both \(i_1\) and \(i_2\) are
true, one where \( i_1 \) is true and \( i_2 \) is false, one where \( i_1 \) is false and \( i_2 \) is true, and one where both \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) are false. For each outcome, one can determine which, if any, of the two interests are satisfied. This depends on the propositional structure of the interests. For instance, a conjunctive interest (i.e. a propositional attitude towards the conjunction of two issues) is satisfied in all outcomes in which both issues the conjunction is composed of are true. A disjunctive interest, on the other hand, is satisfied in any outcome in which any one of the two issues the disjunction is composed of is true. If there exists at least one outcome in which both interests are satisfied, the two interests are compatible with each other. If no such outcome exists, the interests are incompatible with each other. Note that two interests that are concerned about fundamentally different basic issues are always compatible with each other as their satisfaction conditions are independent of each other and hence there is always a possible outcome in which they can both be satisfied.

**Parties, Issues, and Interests in Slovenia**

The first step in the analysis is the identification of the parties. In the case of Slovenia, we identify the following three parties:

1. **MIN**: Hungarian community in Slovenia
2. **SLN**: Slovenian government
3. **HUN**: Hungarian government

While each of those three parties is likely to be composed of a number of sub-groups pursuing their own different interests, we treat them as homogeneous entities for the purposes of this paper.

In a second step, one needs to identify the key issues in conflict. On the basis of the narrative description of the situation in Slovenia provided earlier in the paper, we argue that the following issues are the most relevant:

- \( I_1 \) Hungarian is recognized as a regional official language in the Pomurje region.
- \( I_2 \) The Hungarian community has comprehensive and special constitutional rights.
- \( I_3 \) The Hungarian community has a parliamentary representative with veto rights regarding any question relating to the Hungarian minority.
- \( I_4 \) There exists a bilingual educational programme for the Slovenian majority and the Hungarian minority to learn the respective other language.
- \( I_5 \) The Hungarian community is recognized as a community with collective language rights.
- \( I_6 \) The relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovenian government is good.
- \( I_7 \) Dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary are recognized as a collective with collective language rights.
The legal rights of the Hungarian community are practically implemented.

Each issue is expressed as a propositional statement (i.e. a statement for which it makes sense to ask whether it is true or false). This allows one to reconstruct the parties’ interests, such as their goals and beliefs, as propositional attitudes (Richard 1990).

In a third step, we now identify the parties’ interests. For the purposes of this paper, we identify two types of interests: goals pursued or beliefs held by the parties. Starting with MIN, the Hungarian community in Slovenia, the goals pursued by this party are:

\[(MIN^G_1) \text { MIN wants Hungarian to be recognized as a regional official language in the Pomurje region (i.e. MIN wants } I_1 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(MIN^G_2) \text { MIN wants the Hungarian community to have comprehensive and special constitutional rights (i.e. MIN wants } I_2 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(MIN^G_3) \text { MIN wants the Hungarian community to have a parliamentary representative with veto rights regarding any question relating to the Hungarian minority (i.e. MIN wants } I_3 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(MIN^G_4) \text { MIN wants there to be a bilingual educational programme for the Slovenian majority and the Hungarian minority to learn the respective other language (i.e. MIN wants } I_4 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(MIN^G_5) \text { MIN wants the Hungarian community to be recognized as a collective with collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants } I_5 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(MIN^G_6) \text { MIN wants the legal rights of the Hungarian community to be practically implemented (i.e. MIN wants } I_8 \text { to be true).}\]

The Slovenian government, SLV, pursues two goals in this situation:

\[(SLV^G_1) \text { SLV wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovenian government to be good (i.e. SLV wants } I_6 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(SLV^G_2) \text { SLV wants dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary to be recognized as a collective with collective language rights (i.e. SLV wants } I_7 \text { to be true).}\]

Note that while SLV is not opposed to \(I_1, I_2, I_3, I_4, I_5, \text { or } I_8\) to be realized, SLV does not pursue the realization of those propositions as a direct goal. We argue that SLV as a whole is indifferent towards those propositions.

The goals of the Hungarian government, HUN, regarding the issues in this situation are similar to those of MIN, but they also share a goal with SLV:

\[(HUN^G_1) \text { HUN wants Hungarian to be recognized as a regional official language in the Pomurje region (i.e. HUN wants } I_1 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(HUN^G_2) \text { HUN wants the Hungarian community to have comprehensive and special constitutional rights (i.e. HUN wants } I_2 \text { to be true).}\]

\[(HUN^G_3) \text { HUN wants the Hungarian community to have a parliamentary representative with veto rights regarding any question relating to the Hungarian minority (i.e. HUN wants } I_3 \text { to be true).}\]
(HUN\textsuperscript{G}_4) HUN wants the Hungarian community to be recognized as a community with collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants I\textsubscript{5} to be true).

(HUN\textsuperscript{G}_5) HUN wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovenian government to be good (i.e. HUN wants I\textsubscript{6} to be true).

Having identified the parties’ goals, we now turn to the parties’ beliefs. We identify two beliefs for SLV and HUN respectively. We argue that SLV believes that to realize its goal SLV\textsuperscript{G}_1 (good relationship with the Hungarian government) it needs to address the goals of the Hungarian government. Further, SLV believes that to realize its goal SLV\textsuperscript{G}_2 (recognition of dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary as a collective with collective language rights) it also needs to address the goals of the Hungarian government. These two beliefs of SLV can be expressed by the following propositions:

(SLV\textsuperscript{B}_1) SLV believes that IF I\textsubscript{6} THEN (I\textsubscript{1} AND I\textsubscript{2} AND I\textsubscript{3} AND I\textsubscript{5});

(SLV\textsuperscript{B}_2) SLV believes that IF I\textsubscript{7} THEN (I\textsubscript{1} AND I\textsubscript{2} AND I\textsubscript{3} AND I\textsubscript{5}).

The two beliefs, SLV\textsuperscript{B}_1 and SLV\textsuperscript{B}_2, held by the Slovenian government together with its two goals, SLV\textsuperscript{G}_1 and SLV\textsuperscript{G}_2, provide an explanation as to why it facilitates the realization of I\textsubscript{1}, I\textsubscript{2}, I\textsubscript{3}, and I\textsubscript{5}. This is because the Slovenian government believes that the realization of those propositions is necessary for the achievement of its goals SLV\textsuperscript{G}_1 and SLV\textsuperscript{G}_2.

We identify two beliefs held by the Hungarian government as follows:

(HUN\textsuperscript{B}_1) HUN believes that IF I\textsubscript{7} THEN I\textsubscript{6};

(HUN\textsuperscript{B}_2) HUN believes that IF I\textsubscript{6} THEN (I\textsubscript{1} AND I\textsubscript{2} AND I\textsubscript{3} AND I\textsubscript{5}).

HUN\textsuperscript{B}_1 expresses the Hungarian government’s belief that if it recognizes dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary as a collective with collective language rights (I\textsubscript{7}), then it has a good relationship with the Slovenian government (I\textsubscript{6}). The second belief, HUN\textsuperscript{B}_2, stands for the Hungarian government’s belief that good relationships with the Slovenian government (I\textsubscript{6}) will ensure that its goals relating to the Hungarian community in Slovenia (HUN\textsuperscript{G}_1, HUN\textsuperscript{G}_2, HUN\textsuperscript{G}_3, HUN\textsuperscript{G}_4) are achieved. Again, the two beliefs explain why the Hungarian government is not opposed to realizing I\textsubscript{7}, even if this is not one of its immediate goals.

**Parties, Issues, and Interests in Slovakia**

In the case of Slovakia, we apply our analysis to three parties as follows:

1. MIN: Hungarian community in Slovakia;
2. SLK: Slovakian government;
3. HUN: Hungarian government.

As in the previous case, the parties are assumed to be homogeneous for the purposes of this paper.
In terms of the main issues that can be extracted from our narrative description of the situation in Slovakia above, we consider the following ten issues as crucial:

(I₁) The Hungarian community is granted collective language rights.
(I₂) The Hungarian community is granted individual but no collective language rights.
(I₃) The Hungarian and Slovak languages are granted equal rights.
(I₄) European Union regulations are used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community.
(I₅) Members of the Hungarian community are granted double citizenship.
(I₆) The Hungarian community follows a separatist policy aimed at joining the kin-state Hungary.
(I₇) There exists a Hungarian autonomy within Slovakia.
(I₈) The administrative division of Slovakia ensures that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority.
(I₉) The Slovak language is legally protected as the majority language.
(I₁₀) The relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovak government is good.

Having expressed the key issues as propositional statements, we can now reconstruct the parties’ goals and beliefs as attitudes towards those propositions. Starting with the goals of the Hungarian community in Slovakia, we can identify the following six goals:

(MIN₁) MIN wants the Hungarian community to be granted collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants I₁ to be true).
(MIN₂) MIN does not want the Hungarian community to be granted individual but collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants NOT-I₂ to be true).
(MIN₃) MIN wants the Hungarian and Slovak languages to be granted equal rights (i.e. MIN wants I₃ to be true).
(MIN₄) MIN wants the European Union regulations to be used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community (i.e. MIN wants I₄ to be true).
(MIN₅) MIN wants members of the Hungarian community to be granted double citizenship (i.e. MIN wants I₅ to be true).
(MIN₆) MIN does not want the administrative division of Slovakia to ensure that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority (i.e. MIN wants NOT-I₈ to be true).

For the Slovakian government, we identify the following goals:

(SLK₁) SLK does not want the Hungarian community to be granted collective language rights (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I₁ to be true).
(SLK₂) SLK wants the Hungarian community to be granted individual but no collective language rights (i.e. SLK wants I₂ to be true).
(SLK\textsubscript{3}) SLK does not want the Hungarian and Slovak languages to be granted equal rights (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I\textsubscript{3} to be true).

(SLK\textsubscript{4}) SLK does not want the European Union regulations to be used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I\textsubscript{4} to be true).

(SLK\textsubscript{5}) SLK does not want members of the Hungarian community to be granted double citizenship (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I\textsubscript{5} to be true).

(SLK\textsubscript{6}) SLK does not want the Hungarian community to follow a separatist policy aimed at joining the kin-state Hungary (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I\textsubscript{6} to be true).

(SLK\textsubscript{7}) SLK does not want there to exist a Hungarian autonomy within Slovakia (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I\textsubscript{7} to be true).

(SLK\textsubscript{8}) SLK wants the administrative division of Slovakia to ensure that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority (i.e. SLK wants I\textsubscript{8} to be true).

(SLK\textsubscript{9}) SLK wants the Slovak language to be legally protected as the majority language (i.e. SLK wants I\textsubscript{9} to be true).

(SLK\textsubscript{10}) SLK wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovak government to be good (i.e. SLK wants I\textsubscript{10} to be true).

For the Hungarian government, we identify the following goals:

(HUN\textsubscript{1}) HUN wants the Hungarian community to be granted collective language rights (i.e. HUN wants I\textsubscript{1} to be true).

(HUN\textsubscript{2}) HUN wants the Hungarian and Slovak languages to be granted equal rights (i.e. HUN wants I\textsubscript{3} to be true).

(HUN\textsubscript{3}) HUN wants members of the Hungarian community to be granted double citizenship (i.e. HUN wants I\textsubscript{5} to be true).

(HUN\textsubscript{4}) HUN wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovak government to be good (i.e. HUN wants I\textsubscript{10} to be true).

Following from the parties’ goals, one can identify their beliefs in the final step. As in the case of Slovenia, the reconstruction of beliefs provides an explanation for the parties’ positions in the situation. We only identify beliefs for the Slovakian government as the other parties’ beliefs are less prominent in the situation. We argue that the Slovakian government is likely to hold the following beliefs:

(SLK\textsubscript{11}) SLK believes that I\textsubscript{6};

(SLK\textsubscript{12}) SLK believes that IF (I\textsubscript{1} AND I\textsubscript{3} AND I\textsubscript{4} AND I\textsubscript{5}) THEN I\textsubscript{6};

(SLK\textsubscript{13}) SLK believes that IF (I\textsubscript{1} AND I\textsubscript{3} AND I\textsubscript{4} AND I\textsubscript{5}) THEN I\textsubscript{7};

(SLK\textsubscript{14}) SLK believes that IF (I\textsubscript{8} AND I\textsubscript{9}) THEN NOT-I\textsubscript{6};

(SLK\textsubscript{15}) SLK believes that IF (I\textsubscript{8} AND I\textsubscript{9}) THEN NOT-I\textsubscript{7}.

The first belief, SLK\textsubscript{11}, expresses that the Slovakian government assumes that the Hungarian community in Slovakia is pursuing a separatist policy aimed at joining its kin-state Hungary. SLK\textsubscript{12} stands for the belief that if the Hungarian community were granted collective language rights the Hungarian and Slovak languages were
granted equal rights, the European Union regulations were used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community, and members of the Hungarian community were granted double citizenship, and then the Hungarian community would be supported in following a separatist policy aimed at joining the kin-state Hungary. SLK$_3$ stands for the belief that if those actions were taken then the Hungarian community would be supported in creating a Hungarian autonomy within Slovakia. The last two beliefs, SLK$_4$ and SLK$_5$, stand for the belief that the pursuit of a separatist policy and the creation of a Hungarian autonomy in Slovakia can be prevented by making sure that the administrative division of Slovakia ensures that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority and by legally protecting the Slovak language as the majority language.

**Evaluation and Comparison**

Having identified the parties’ interests (goals and beliefs) in the situation in Slovenia and Slovakia, we now move on to the final step of evaluating and comparing the two cases. The evaluation involves an assessment of all pairs of positions as to the compatibility of those positions. Positions are identified as compatible (if it is possible to simultaneously satisfy both positions) or incompatible (if the positions cannot be satisfied at the same time).

In the case of the 13 goals identified for the situation in Slovenia, any pair of those goals is simultaneously satisfiable. As outlined in the methodology section above, this is because each of those goals relates to the truth or falsity of a simple proposition which is independent of the truth or falsity of the propositions the other goals relate to. Consequently, the parties’ goals in this situation are all mutually compatible. Graphically, this can be illustrated as shown in Figure 1 below:

![Figure 1. Goal structure in Slovenia](image-url)
In Figure 1, the three parties’ goals are represented by dots. There are no lines between the dots as all goals are mutually compatible. All beliefs of the parties in Slovenia are also mutually compatible.

In the case of the 20 goals identified for the situation in Slovakia, the following pairs of goals are incompatible, respectively:
1. $\text{MIN}^G_1$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_1$
2. $\text{MIN}^G_2$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_2$
3. $\text{MIN}^G_3$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_3$
4. $\text{MIN}^G_4$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_4$
5. $\text{MIN}^G_5$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_5$
6. $\text{MIN}^G_6$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_6$
7. $\text{HUN}^G_1$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_1$
8. $\text{HUN}^G_2$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_3$
9. $\text{HUN}^G_3$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_5$.

All other pairs of goals and beliefs are compatible. The evaluation of pairs of goals/beliefs in terms of their compatibility was conducted in line with the methodology described in the Methodology section above. For each pair, the set of all possible outcomes was generated on the basis of the propositions contained in the respective goals/beliefs. If there was an outcome, in which both goals/beliefs of a pair were satisfied, then the respective goals/beliefs were considered compatible. Otherwise they were considered incompatible. For instance, the pair $\text{MIN}^G_1$ is incompatible with $\text{SLV}^G_1$ because the latter one is the negation of the former one. Hence, there is no possible outcome in which both goals are satisfied.

The goal structure of the situation in Slovakia can be illustrated by the following graph:

![Figure 2. Goal structure in Slovakia](image)
Note that goals are represented by dots; pairs of incompatible goals are connected by lines.

When comparing the two graphs with each other, it is obvious that the parties’ goals are significantly more incompatible in the case of Slovakia than in the case of Slovenia. In the former country, all parties’ goals are compatible with one another, whereas in the latter country there are nine pairs of incompatible goals. This suggests that the parties in Slovenia are not in conflict with each other, whereas the parties in Slovakia face a conflict situation. The main explanation as to why the parties in Slovakia are faced with a conflict is provided by looking at the beliefs held by the Slovakian government. Most of the goals pursued by SLK are a result of their assumption that the Hungarian community in Slovakia pursues a separatist policy and aims at creating an autonomy within Slovakia.

**Conclusion**

This paper applied a logic-based methodology to analyse the goals pursued and beliefs held by three parties, respectively, in the minority language disputes faced by the Hungarian minorities in Slovenia and Slovakia. The analysis showed that, while all parties’ goals in Slovenia are mutually compatible, the parties’ goals in Slovakia are in many instances incompatible with each other. This suggests that the parties in Slovakia face a conflict, whereas the parties in Slovenia do not face a conflict where conflicts are defined as situations in which parties are faced with incompatible interests. Further, our analysis of the parties’ beliefs reveals some of the underlying assumptions made by the parties and the parties’ rationale for the goals they pursue.

The graphic representations in figures 1 and 2 allow us to define and compare the conflicting goals and beliefs and their structures more precisely. Each dot in the two figures represents a party’s goal. A red line between two dots means that the two goals represented by the dots are incompatible with each other. In the case of Slovenia, it turns out that there are no conflicting goals and beliefs between the parties involved. Thus, there are no red lines between any of the dots in Figure 1. In the case of Slovakia, the conflict potential is high with nine conflicting pairs of goals among the parties involved. Here we can observe nine red lines in Figure 2. Clearly, the more red lines (i.e. the more conflicting goals) there are in a graph, the higher is the level of conflict in the situation depicted by the graph. In that sense, our analysis provides a deeper insight into the question as to why the level of conflict is higher in Slovakia than in Slovenia. There are simply more conflicting pairs (nine in total) depicted by the red lines in the case of Slovakia and no red lines in the case of the Slovenia. In sum, the propositional logic is an effective tool to define and make visible the belief and goal structure of ethnic conflict in an international setting.
Our model also provides guidance into the direction where conflict de-escalation should be sought. The Hungarian minority – backed by its kin-state Hungary – should (it can be argued) address those assumptions to de-escalate the situation. It is important that the Hungarian side signal to the Slovakian government that they do not have the intention to pursue a separatist policy and create a Hungarian territorial autonomy within Slovakia. More precisely, the Hungarian community and the Hungarian government should refrain from claiming the Territoriality Principle, i.e. claiming minority rights to be implemented territorially, and should rather pursue the Personality Principle, i.e. rights attached to individuals instead of being attached to territory (Dembinska et al. 2014, 56). Those signals may change the Slovakian government’s perception and might result in a more comprehensive granting of inclusive rights for the Hungarian community in Slovakia. This might imply that instead of contested territorial rights more favourable language rights can be negotiated.

Another reason to refrain from territorial rights is that the conflict potential in Slovakia might affect the rise of extremist-nationalist politics among all the parties involved in this triadic nexus, i.e. in the ranks of the minority, host-state, and kin-state concerned. As a result of a political swing to extremist views, there can be a threat to the peaceful equilibrium in the Central European region. In that case, ethnic tensions from Slovakia will spill over to other cases with concentrated Hungarian minorities referred to in the introduction above.

The recent outbreak of violence among Ukrainians and Russian-speaking minorities in the eastern part of Ukraine refutes the opinion that in the case of seemingly peaceful ethnic relations where the conditions for a ‘security dilemma’ are not fulfilled violent clashes are unlikely to happen. Security scholars like Posen (1993, 38–43) have argued that numerous conditions to prevent an ‘Eastern Ukrainian security dilemma’ were present, e.g.: Russian speakers in the eastern parts of Ukraine were allowed to use their own language; Russian-speaking minorities and Ukrainians had no traumatic inter-group history; the presence of former Soviet nuclear forces acted as stabilizers in both Russia and Ukraine; geographic patterns created comparatively less pressure for offensive action as Russians in Ukraine are not settled in vulnerable islands and can be protected in numerous ways; no violent bands engaging in communal terror emerged; no shifts in relative power could be expected; external factors reinforced restraint in Russian-Ukrainian forces, and so on. The conditions can change or can be overruled by other factors, and, unexpectedly, the security dilemma might arise after all.

But even if the ‘worst case scenario’ in such cases, an ethnically driven war and ethnic cleansing, will not arise the constant state of conflict will paralyse the system of international relations. Note that all the states involved with Hungarian minorities are member or candidate states of the European Union and NATO and co-operate in regional coalitions, such as the Visegrad-Cooperation (i.e. the co-
operation of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary), to harmonize their security and European policy. If anti-democratic tendencies in the Central European region will prevail, however, it certainly will hamper the functioning of these international entities at the expense of European political, economic co-operation, peace and stability.

**Note**

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under Grant Agreement No 613344.

**References**


SKOVGAARD, J. 2007. Towards a European Norm? The Framing of the Hungarian Minorities in Romania and Slovakia by the Council of Europe, the EU and the OSCE. *EUI Working Papers SPS No 07*.


