Affecting meaning: Subjectivity and evaluativity in gradable adjectives
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Our positive proposal on how to make sense of subjectivity in predicates of personal taste (PPTs, as we have labeled them) and other relative gradable adjectives (dubbed RGAs in previous chapters) starts here with an epistemological inquiry into the normativity of judgements containing these adjectives. We need a better grip on what making or understanding evaluative judgements amounts to, in order to see how to redress the semantic analysis we are after.

Unrestricted judgements like *This cake is tasty* or *This suitcase is heavy* demand the assent of others. But only the latter can, sometimes, be made on the basis of evidence that can persuade others to think like we do, and to prove them wrong if they do not. Our attempts to persuade others when it comes to taste are not made by offering proofs for the purported falsity of their judgements. Our goal here is to explicate the notion of (in)correctness at stake in taste and similar judgements. This will give us a first lead on how to account for intersubjective understanding when we exchange evaluative judgements.

Fortunately, we are not alone in this search. In his [1790], Kant offers a way to see how taste judgements can make a claim to the agreement of others without relying on veridicality. Wittgenstein’s late epistemology and philosophy of psychology also provides a rich source of observations on how the (in)correctness of certain claims lies outside the realm of what we prove true or false, and how claims concerning one’s feelings and experiences can be successfully understood by others. Our deployment of Kant and Wittgenstein should be seen as an argumentative move which does not aim to achieve its exegetical completeness or to

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1We are aware that the edition of the *Critique of Judgement* we are using is perhaps not the ideal choice (see a critical review in Ginsborg [2002]). We use it for reasons of availability rather than of preference. Note as well that except for a few remarks coming from the Introduction, most paragraphs in Kant [1790] we refer to below come from the First Part, First Section, First Book (Analytic of the Beautiful). To reduce clutter, we do not indicate this every time.

2Note that Kant’s notion of *Geschmacksurteil* is usually translated as “judgment of taste” rather than taste judgment. We choose the latter locution because of its relative simplicity and because it helps us suggest that we do not straightforwardly adopt Kant’s view.
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imply a full endorsement to their views.

We will first focus on Kant’s view on taste judgements, understood as those judgements which are determined by a feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and how they differ from cognitive judgements in which we formulate empirical knowledge. In section 4.1 we will see that Kant claims that the faculty of reflective judgement, i.e., our ability to take our perceptions to be universal, is involved in both sorts of judgement, but in a different way in each case. Its involvement in judgements of taste is the key to Kant’s explanation of how they are in a sense subjective, and yet also normative.

We then turn to Wittgenstein’s considerations on certainties like Moore’s famous claim *This is a hand*, and of avowals like *I am in pain*. Certainties and avowals are different but they have something in common in Wittgenstein’s observations. Such statements do not express something true or false, but rather constitute the framework which makes it possible to communicate judgements which are true or false. Certainties and avowals are, in a specific sense, indubitable; they resist correction based on empirical proofs. In section 4.2 we will relate certainties and avowals to judgements featuring PPTs and those featuring other RGAs. We shall see that faultlessness in a faultless disagreement may be best understood by relating it to the groundlessness of our certainties and our avowals. This will not be a plea for expressivism, but rather a step back from the discussion that expressivists engage.

4.1 Reflective judgement and the normativity of taste

The relevance of *Kant* [1790] to the study of judgements of taste is straightforward to philosophers, *perhaps* less so to semanticists and linguists. *Kant* can be

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3Section 4.2 is partly based on Crespo [2013].

4The most eloquent way to put this is Allison [2001]: “The eighteenth century, usually known as the ‘Age of Reason’, has also been characterized as the ‘Century of Taste’. If this juxtaposition seems strange to us today, it is because we have lost sight of the ideal, normative element, which ... was essential to the concept of taste as it developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries. Thus, whereas for us to say that a question or evaluation is a matter of taste is to imply that it is merely a private, subjective matter lacking any claim to normativity, this was not at all the case in the eighteenth century. On the contrary,... taste was thought of as a special way of knowing, one for which rational grounds cannot be given, but which nonetheless involves an inherent universality. In short, it was not a private but a social phenomenon, inseparably connected with a putative *sensus communis*. Moreover, taste, so construed, was not limited to the realm of the aesthetic, but also encompassed morality, indeed, any domain in which a universal order or significance is thought to be grasped in an individual case.” (p. 1)

5Both Umbach and Buekens make explicit reference to *Kant*, so our move should not be so surprising. We will discuss in subsection 4.1.4 the differences between their interpretation and use of *Kant’s* ideas and our own.
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seen as facing the same dilemma posed by faultless disagreements, and as making a marked and arguably successful effort to eschew relativism. He argues that judgements of taste are subjective, as we will see in subsection 4.1.1. Therefore, a disagreement about whether a given object is beautiful cannot be resolved by means of argument. However, as we shall see in subsection 4.1.2, they legitimately make a claim to the agreement of others, thus extending the notion of validity of a judgement developed in the Critique of pure reason. So for instance, when we make a judgement like This painting is beautiful, we do so based on feeling and thus cannot give an empirical proof that could convince our interlocutors, but at the same time we take it that others who perceive the painting ought to judge it to be beautiful as well.

Taste judgements ('Geschmackurteile') as judgments which are grounded on feeling and in particular on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, receive a great deal of attention in the third Critique. Here we have to introduce an important distinction though. Although one may identify This cake is tasty as a paradigmatic taste judgement, actually Kant would put this under a different label, namely under those which he calls judgements of the agreeable, whereas a paradigmatic example of a taste judgement is, e.g., This painting is beautiful. Common to these two is that their are aesthetic, in the specific sense that they are grounded on feeling. But This is beautiful makes a normative claim: it does not merely report that the utterer has a certain affective response, it also demands that others also ought to have that affective response. Below we will explain further the difference between taste judgements and judgements of the agreeable, and we will argue in subsection 4.1.3 that pace Kant, judgements like This is tasty can make a claim to the agreement of others, which is precisely what happens in a faultless disagreement. Of course, we will not claim that there are no interesting differences between beautiful and tasty. We just think that the phenomena we are interested in do not call for making a distinction here.

4.1.1 Taste judgements are aesthetic

In this subsection, we explain why for Kant taste judgements like This painting is beautiful and gustatory judgements like This cake is tasty are aesthetic. This has a precise meaning in the First moment of the Analytic of the beautiful in Kant [1790], namely that they are necessarily grounded on the subject’s feelings and,

Cf., Kant [1790], esp. §§32-33.

This claim of ‘grounding’ is not necessarily the same that Wittgenstein discusses in [1969]. While empirical judgements are grounded, certainties are groundless in the sense of not being based on evidence. We will defend in section 4.2 below the idea that judgements involving PPTs are groundless, precisely in Wittgenstein’s sense. So in a way we will conclude the opposite of Kant’s idea: we will conclude that taste judgements are groundless.

This notion of ‘aesthetic’ is closely related to the Greek notion of aisthesis as designating perception involving the senses. The contemporary use of the term designating a specific branch of philosophy can be seen as taking up the main Kantian concerns.
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as such, only bear on how objects affect us. Perhaps the best way to understand what this means is to confront taste judgements with cognitive judgements like This cake contains nuts in which we make an empirical claim.

Taste judgements are necessarily related to feelings. While in a cognitive judgement like This cake contains nuts, we ascribe a specific property to the object, a claim invoking the concept of nut (a fruit composed of a hard shell and a seed) that could be verified or shown to be false, taste judgements like This painting is beautiful do not determine a genuine property of the object. They rather express something about the subject making the judgement and her feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and they do not make a conceptual claim that could be verified or falsified. Judgements like This painting is beautiful are made on the basis of our affective response to the painting. Unlike a cognitive judgement, we cannot infer that something is tasty because it meets certain criteria, or be persuaded of this by means of arguments or proofs. There are no objective rules of taste. This is a basic difference with cognitive judgements, where modulo trust, we accept a judgement on the basis of someone else’s claims and the evidence she can offer. For instance, if we hear someone we trust say that a cake has nuts, or be told that walnuts are brown, we can come to hold these judgements ourselves. This cannot be done when it comes to beauty. Unless we have our own experience with the object, we cannot formulate a taste judgement. In this sense, taste judgements are similar to judgements of the agreeable like This Canary wine is

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9 We disagree then with Umbach’s rendering of Kant’s view on the aboutness of taste judgements as being “about properties the subject ascribes to the object.” For us, the “as if” (‘als ob’) in the following passage from Kant [1790], §6 is rather crucial: “Hence he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a property of the object...” (our emphasis). One can also press on the point made in Kant [1790], §1, where he claims that the feeling of pleasure and displeasure designate nothing at all in the object. More on this will be said in subsection 4.1.2 and further discussion of Umbach’s position is provided below.

10 Kant’s account is strongly representationalist: in taste judgements we relate our representation “not to the object for cognition,” but rather “to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure.” (Kant [1790], §1.) We would like to remain uncommitted to his theory of judgement as a whole, for we do not feel compelled to follow his representationalist account of judgement. This may be taken to be a contradiction: to ponder on Kant’s notion of reflective judgement without endorsing his theory aesthetic judgement, or of judgement as a whole. But after we introduce Kant’s notion of reflective judgement, we will argue that it characterises a kind of operation, independently of whether our judgements are representational.

11 Kant [1790], §7.

12 One may wonder whether we should not be referring to Wollheim [1980], who claims that “...judgments of aesthetic value... must be based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to another.” (p. 233) After all, this idea has already been employed to formulate a semantics for PPTs in Nanan [2014]. First of all, we believe that Kant takes priority here, both chronologically and philosophical. Second, Nanan exploits Wollheim’s suggestion by turning it into an “Acquaintance principle” quite reminiscent of Russell’s ideas on knowledge by acquaintance. When we get to section 4.2 we will see that taking PPTs to be based on a sort of first-hand knowledge is debatable and problematic.
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Pleasure in the beautiful is very peculiar, according to Kant, for it seems to follow from the very act of perceiving the object we judge. This becomes a very specific claim, namely, that the faculties of understanding and imagination interact as in cognitive judgements, except that for taste judgements, imagination is not governed by determinate concepts. They are in “free play”. “Free play” or free harmony refers to the fact that unlike in cognitive judgements, imagination is not constrained by understanding in taste judgements. There is room for discussion among Kant scholars regarding the intentionality of pleasure. The issue is relevant for us because if Kant would clearly stand against the intentionality of taste judgements, endorsing his views would lead us close to some form of expressivism. A first line of interpretation claims that the feeling of pleasure aroused by our contact with an object has no specific contents, and that taste judgements only have contents because there is a second act of judgement through which we identify pleasure as the outcome of the ‘harmony’ of our faculties. This second, separate act yields a prediction: others are likely to undergo a similar feeling of pleasure. A second line of interpretation holds that pleasure comes with a specific intentional content. It is claimed that “the pleasure involved in a judgment of beauty constitutes intentional awareness of the activity of the faculties”. The feeling involved in judgements of beauty is an appraisal of how our faculties are enhanced or diminished. A third line of interpretation, the one we follow, argues that to do full justice to the intentionality of pleasure in the beautiful, one should not distinguish the feeling of pleasure in the beauty of an object from the judgement that the object is beautiful. Instead, they claim, “to feel pleasure in an object’s beauty just is to take it to be beautiful, that is, to make a judgment of beauty about it.” Pleasure in the beautiful embodies a claim to its own universal validity. Taste judgements are contentful because there is an intentional relationship of the feeling to the object, but they are in a sense, self-referential because “Judging an object to be beautiful consists in a single act of taking one’s state of mind, in that very act of judging, to be universally valid.”

Kant admits that pleasure and displeasure are essentially related to taste judgements and to judgements of the agreeable. However, according to him, a
line can be drawn between these two sorts of judgements because only the former sort of pleasure is disinterested. The feeling of pleasure connected to judgements like This is beautiful does not depend on the subject’s having a desire for the object, nor does it generate such a desire, whereas desire is always present in the sensuous gratification typical of judgements on which judgements like This is tasty are grounded. Pleasure in the agreeable is produced by an object, and it engenders desire and, therefore, interest in it.

Now we move on to see how exactly taste judgements can be based on feeling and yet make a claim to the agreement of others. The disinterestedness of pleasure in these judgements place a crucial role in Kant’s argument concerning their normativity but one can argue whether disinterested pleasure is so crucial as Kant had it, as we shall see in subsection 4.1.3.

4.1.2 Reflective judgement and normativity

For Kant, what distinguishes taste judgements from judgements of the agreeable is that only the former make a claim to the agreement of others. A judgement like This painting is beautiful claims intersubjective validity. For Kant, we do not do this when we say something like This cake is tasty.

Intersubjective validity is introduced in the third Critique as a middle point between objectivity and subjectivity. When we say This painting is beautiful, we speak “as if beauty were a property (‘Beschaffenheit’) of the object and the judgement logical (constituting a cognition of the object through concepts of it)” we take it that others ought to share our judgement. Thus, only for taste judgements can there sensibly be a dispute or a quarrel, not when discussing gustatory delight. In being normative, taste judgements are similar to judgements of experience like This stone is warm, that is, to cognitive judgements which make an empirical claim about their object, as opposed to what he calls judgements of perception, like I find this stone warm. Normativity is not a characteristic

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20 Another characterisation relates disinterested pleasure to its having no connection with a representation of the object’s existence. Cf., Ginsborg [2008], p. 3.
21 Zangwill [1995] distinguishes primitive and productive interest. Primitive interest is to have a desire that precedes the pleasant sensation. Productive interest is to have desire (or inclinations) be raised by the pleasant sensation. Zangwill argues that for Kant, gustatory judgements are sometimes primitively interested but always productively interested, which is why they cannot aspire to universal validity.
22 See e.g., Kant [1790], Introduction VII, and §6.
23 Kant [1790], §6.
24 At this point, we disagree with Umbach [2014], who claims: “There is no room for something akin to faultless disagreement in Kant’s system.” We believe the opposite, that is, that Kant’s conception of taste judgement tackles the very issue raised by faultless disagreement, the essential tension between subjectivity and normativity.
26 This is a convenient paraphrase of the example Kant gives in the Jäsche Logic, XVI: “In touching the stone, I feel warmth”, cited and discussed in Ginsborg [1990a], pp. 68-69. There
feature of taste judgements. Cognitive judgements are also normative, although not in the same way.

Interestingly, for Kant it does not make sense to make restricted taste judgements like *This painting is beautiful to me*. If we put it in linguistic terms, his claim is that adding an explicit agent to qualify a taste judgement is absurd.\footnote{Cf., Kant [1790], §7. “It would, on the contrary, be ridiculous if any one who plumed himself on his taste were to think of justifying himself by saying: ‘This object (the building we see, the dress that person has on, the concert we hear, the poem submitted to our criticism) is beautiful for me.’ For if it merely pleases him, be must not call it beautiful.”} Similarly, he claims that whenever we make an unrestricted judgement of the agreeable like *This cake is tasty*, this is actually a shorthand for *This Canary wine is tasty for me*, so it is not possible to make an unrestricted judgement of the agreeable. In linguistic terms, Kant sees the possibility to add an explicit agent as a lexical divide between *tasty* and *beautiful*. Adjectives like *tasty* seem to force an agent qualification, whereas *beautiful* prohibits it.\footnote{This is also noted by Umbach [2014].} We will not follow Kant’s view this far, but rather extend the normativity of taste judgements as he characterises it as being related to unrestricted judgements featuring *beautiful* or *tasty*. The way he sees judgements of the agreeable like *This cake is tasty* and judgements of perception like *I find this stone warm*, as making a report that does not make a claim to the agreement of others, is the way we see restricted judgements like *I find this beautiful/tasty/heavy*. In any case, that will be argued for later on, here our effort is to reconstruct Kant’s view.

Taste judgements like *This painting is beautiful* have the form of a full-blown cognitive judgement, a judgement of experience through which we get a concept of the object.\footnote{Cf., J"asche Logic, §46, Ak. IX, cited in Ginsborg [1990a].} The normativity of taste judgements and of cognitive judgements is subtly but importantly different. While for a cognitive judgement, we claim that others should share our judgement because we judge on the basis of evidence, taste judgements make a claim to the agreement of others that is not based on rules, which does not “rest on any concept” or empirical criteria.\footnote{Kant [1790], §8. Note that Kant is not always so clear about the non-conceptuality of taste judgements. In the Antinomy of Taste, he makes a weaker claim because he then states that a judgment of beauty rests on an “indeterminate concept” (cf., §57). But it appears that one should interpret this not as a claim to there being an indeterminate kind of representation which can figure in cognition when we judge that something is tasty, but rather as saying that understanding has no determinate content when we judge an object to be beautiful because no concept determines beauty as a property of objects. Cf., Ginsborg [2014].} Our taste judgements make a claim to universal agreement, but we speak as if [als ob] our
judgement were objective and based on concepts, while in fact it is not. We take our judgement as “the example of a universal rule which cannot be stated [die man nicht angeben kann]” [32].

The normativity of taste is also specific, i.e., different from that of cognitive judgements, because of the prescriptive character of the normative claim that is made [33] we demand “not that everyone will [werden] agree with our judgment, but that everyone ought to [sollen] agree with it” [34]. Arguably then, for Kant the claim to the agreement of others made by taste judgements is not an empirical presumption, the hypothesis that people will share our pleasure in the object and agree with my judgement, but rather a claim that others ought to do so [35]. Our judgement is meant to serve as an example of how everyone ought to judge. So our disappointment in encountering people, one or many, who in fact disagree with us is not per se a reason to give up our taste judgements. But how is it possible for a taste judgement to make a claim to universal agreement while there are no criteria by which we can distinguish correct and incorrect judgements? As we will see below, reflective judgement as a faculty (or, in more contemporary terms, as a cognitive operation) [36] plays a crucial role in Kant’s explanation.

In [Kant [1790]], the faculty of judgement is presented as our capacity “for thinking the particular under the universal” [37], where two operations can be distinguished, a contrast which is not drawn in the first Critique [38]. In determinative

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[32] Kant [1790], §18. This translation is the one taken up by Ginsborg [2006b], p. 33, which in this case makes a much clearer point than the translation of the edition we are using.

[33] Contrast this with the case of cognitive judgements, where “[t]he force of the ‘ought’ ... is not practical but cognitive: the normativity that it expresses is that implicit in the possibility of a judgment’s being correct or incorrect, rather than that of an action’s being the right or wrong thing to do.” Ginsborg [1990a], fn. 76.

[34] Kant [1790], §22. Maybe even more stunning is the following claim made earlier in §7. If a person says that an object is beautiful, then “...he says that the thing is beautiful, and does not count on the agreement of others with his judgment of satisfaction because he has frequently found them to be agreeable with his own, but rather demands it from them.” Actually, there is room for discussion among interpreters about whether the taste judgements in Kant is normative or merely predictive of how other fellow cognitive agents will likely respond to a given object. Some interpreters think that Kant’s taste judgements just set rational expectations about others’ perceptual states. (Guyer [1979], pp. 139-147 and pp. 162-164; Savile [1987] and Chignell [2007] follow Guyer.) In contrast, other authors argue that taste judgements are normative because we thereby demand that others ought to feel disinterested pleasure, rather than merely predict that this should be the case (Allison [2001], Rind [2002] and Ginsborg [1990a] et ss.)


[36] To admit this contemporary terminology, one should admit a broad notion of cognition so that it makes room for intentional contents which are not conceptually subtended, so that we do not run into the contradiction of attributing to Kant the idea that taste judgements are cognitive, after all.

[37] Kant [1790], Introduction IV.

[38] Cf., Ginsborg [1990a], although Allison [2001] rather suggests that the distinction is not explicitly made, and discusses whether it amounts to a major change in Kant’s conception of judgement, as suggested by Longuenesse [1998].
judgement we subsume a particular under a previously given universal, mostly and ultimately the pure concepts of the understanding or the categories. Here the faculty of judgement is governed by the principles of the understanding, so in this role it coincides with judgement as introduced in the first Critique. Reflective judgement is the operation by which we do the opposite, i.e., we try to produce new universals in order to classify given particulars. In this mode of operation, the faculty of judgement proceeds not by the principles of understanding but by a principle of its own. This is the transcendental assumption that nature is systematically organised in a way that is purposive for our faculties, “the principle that, for all things in nature, empirically determined concepts can be found”. We can find a universal for a given particular because, we assume, particulars form an intelligible landscape for our cognitive abilities. In other words, we need to assume that things in nature form a comprehensible structure. Cognition necessitates something like natural kinds not as an ontological claim, but rather a condition of possibility for thinking the particular under the universal. Without such an assumption, “human beings would find in it no similarities or continuities that could yield the material for empirical concepts”. In reflective judgement, our perceptual experience claims its own appropriateness, to the effect that we expect others ought to have similar experiences. We take our response to

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40 Cf., Ginsborg [2014].
41 The interpretation of the notion of reflective judgement of course calls for divergent views. A rather standard one takes reflective judgment to consist primarily in the capacity for engaging in systematic natural science. But as argued by Ginsborg [1990b] et ss., when reflective judgement is understood as being primarily or exclusively related to the possibility of systematic natural science, it seems harder to understand why Kant takes it to be at the basis of aesthetic judgments which claim universal validity. Kant’s account of the connection has been criticised by several commentators as contrived or misleading (Guyer [1979], pp. 33–67). Specifically, Kant’s view that aesthetic judgment is based on the principle of the systematicity of nature has been rejected as a distortion of his theory of taste. But Kant claims that “aesthetic judgment, as a special faculty, must be regarded as comprising under it no other faculty than reflective judgment” (Kant [1790], § XX). A related claim made by Kant is that reflective judgement is also responsible for teleological judgments. As a matter of Kantian scholarship, this reveals something about the relation he draws between aesthetic judgement in its pure form, i.e., judgements of beauty (in particular, of nature) and teleological judgements as related to both ethics and biology. There will be something to say in chapter about the relation between taste judgements like we conceive of them, i.e., including This cake is tasty and teleology in the sense of purposiveness, or fitness. But we will not establish there a bridge with Kant’s notion of teleology.
42 If it does not have its own a priori principle, then it cannot be called a faculty.
43 Cf., Kant [1790], § XX.
44 Without such an assumption, “human beings would find in it no similarities or continuities that could yield the material for empirical concepts”. Ginsborg [1990a], p. 65.
45 This ‘something like’ is important because this is not a claim we wish to attribute to Kant himself. What Kant states is that “nature,... in regard to its empirical laws, has observed a certain economy proportional to our judgment and a similarity of forms which is comprehensible to us” (Kant [1790], § XX).
46 Ginsborg [1990a], p. 65.
be adequate to the object, and therefore that others with an equal or sufficiently similar cognitive equipment ought to respond as we do, which puts intersubjective agreement at the basis of cognition. Reflective judgement plays a crucial role making it possible for us to acquire empirical concepts, and it is thus a condition of possibility of empirical science because it enables us to regard nature as empirically lawlike.

Reflective judgement thus intervenes in making a claim to universal validity, both in cognitive judgements of experience and in taste judgements. But then how these two differ can be traced back to a difference in how reflective judgement works in each case. In cognitive judgements, reflective judgement as a faculty has a classificatory role, for we find a universal for the particular by taking the object to have a feature shared in common with other objects. For Kant, in the cognitive case, we pass from judgements of perception reporting a feeling or sensation, expressed by e.g., *I find this stone warm*, which make no claim to universal validity to judgements of experience like *The stone is warm*, in which there is a claim to universal agreement couched on the empirical properties that we ascribe to the object.

Perception here serves a classificatory function, with the aid of the operations of our understanding. In taste judgements, however, we find a universal for the particular by taking our own response to the object under assessment as being universally valid. In the case of beauty, a judgement claims intersubjective agreement by making a claim to the appropriateness of a response which is not grounded on anything else that the very judgement one makes. Perception in this case evaluative: it takes the form of an appraisal that claims its own intersubjective validity. The subject’s claim in a taste judgement has the same structure as the claim implicit in her perception of an object as having this or that empirical feature: in both cases, she is claiming that the object ought to be perceived this way. Reflective judgement is exercised when we appreciate an object as being beautiful because we impute our delight in the object to everyone. But unlike a cognitive judgement like *This cake has nuts*, a taste judgement like *This is beautiful* involves the exercise...

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47 Cf., Ginsborg [1990b], Preface.
48 Cf., Kant [1790], §XX.
49 See Kant [1790], Introduction V.
50 Jäsche Logic XVI, cited in Ginsborg [1990a], pp. 68-69. See as well footnote 26 above.
51 The function of reflective judgement goes even deeper, because is involved in coming up with the concept STONE in the first place (and thereby, formally speaking, not only making use of, but actually developing the comparison class).
52 It is curious that for Kant, judgements of beauty on a mass or plural noun are, strictly speaking, not taste judgements but rather “aesthetically grounded logical judgment”, and he gives the case of *Roses in general are beautiful*. This problem, the one concerning differences between singular vs. plural nouns is a very interesting one but we will no delve into it for lack of space. See our take on bare plurals in a formal setting in appendix A.
53 Cf., Ginsborg [2006a].
54 Cf., Kant [1790], §7.
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of mere reflection. We take our response to be one which all other perceivers of
the object ought to share, we take it to be the right one, but we do so not based
on any concepts, not taking the object to have any specific empirical property.
It follows that judgments of beauty cannot, despite their universal validity, be
proved. Such perceptions cannot be defeated by evidence because when we treat
the object as if it had a feature that requires that everyone experience pleasure
in it, no determinate concept is applied. Judgements made by others can make
us wonder about our own judgement, but they can never convince us that ours
is incorrect.\footnote{Cf., McGonigal \cite{McGonigal2006}, p. 331.} As a consequence, taste judgements cannot be proved or endorsed
on the basis of testimony or hearsay. This is a revealing difference between taste
judgements and cognitive judgements.\footnote{But see Hopkins \cite{Hopkins2001} for discussion.}

We mentioned in the previous section that Kant makes a big deal of the
disinterested character of the pleasure, as opposed to the interested nature of
the pleasure associated to judgements of the agreeable. For Kant the claim to
universal agreement that mere reflective judgement produces when we judge an
object to be beautiful hinges quite crucially on the assumption that our pleasure
is disinterested. For if we take our pleasure not to be determined by contingent
circumstances which distinguish us from other subjects, then we can be entitled
to “require a similar liking from everyone.”\footnote{Kant \cite{Kant1790}, §6.} Another way to understand the
distinctiveness of disinterested pleasure is to note our feeling is given by the mere
structure of our cognitive apparatus which we take to be shared by all cognitive
agents. Thus, “since I am entitled to demand that everyone share my capacity
for empirical conceptualization, I am also entitled to demand agreement for a
feeling which rests on the exercise of that capacity.”\footnote{Ginsborg \cite{Ginsborg2006a}, p. 4.} Instead, pleasure related
to judgements of the agreeable like \textit{This Canary wine is nice}, pleasure is not
disinterested, which for Kant means that it only has private validity.\footnote{Cf., Kant \cite{Kant1790}, §9.} Sensuous
gratification as the one felt in eating a tasty cake or drinking a nice wine is
bound up with the contingent state the sentient subject is in. The involvement of
appetitive states like desire in gustatory judgements like \textit{This is tasty} binds the
validity of this judgement to the sensations undergone by he who judges. In the
next section, we will offer arguments to unlatch ourselves from Kant’s requirement
of disinterestedness.

4.1.3 Reflective judgement beyond Kant

We want to get reflective judgement beyond Kant, so that it also reaches judg-
ments like \textit{This cake is tasty} and, more generally, judgements which have a feeling
as a basis, as when we say \textit{This suitcase is heavy} after a straining attempt to lift
our luggage. First, we argue that Kant’s dismissal of the normativity of judg-
ments of the agreeable is linguistically unmotivated. Then, we discuss the role
of disinterestedness in Kant’s conception of pleasure, to see that a judgment
which is not disinterested in that sense may nonetheless make a claim to its own
appropriateness.

For Kant taste judgements like *This is beautiful* can claim universal validity
by virtue of the exercise of reflective judgement, but judgements of the agreeable
like *This cake is tasty* cannot because pleasure in the agreeable is essentially
related to the production of a desire. In a sense, as we said, Kant claims that
an unrestricted judgement like *This cake is tasty* always reduces to a qualified
judgement like *This cake is tasty to me*. The kind of agreement that can at most
be claimed by a judgement of the agreeable relates to the authority exercised by
someone who develops a critical position to lay down practical rules concerning
how to please every guest at a dinner, for instance. In this sense, we call this
person someone who has taste, but her judgement is merely general and not
universal.\footnote{Our own doubts were inspired by Genette [1997].}

However, the initial phenomena we laid down in chapter 2 speak against the
cleavage that Kant argues for. Kant’s dismissal of the normativity of judgements
of the agreeable predicts that disagreements about gustatory matters are sheer
nonsense, for a judgement like Alf’s in example (1) does not easily license a denial
if it is equivalent to *This cake is tasty to me*.\footnote{Cf., Kant [1790], §7. Hers “is a judgment in respect of sociability so far as resting on empirical rules.”}

(1) Alf: This cake is tasty. = This cake is tasty to me.
    Bea: No, it’s not.

If denials as those in faultless disagreements are licensed, as everything seems
to indicate, then judgements of the agreeable in unrestricted form should be
normative as well.\footnote{Semanticists and philosophers who write about faultless disagreements all seem to agree in
thinking that denials as those in taste disagreements are licensed. Analyses of such disputes
differ, as we have seen in chapter 3.} Moreover, if Bea’s response would mean *This cake is not tasty to you*,
then Bea’s denial here rejects Alf’s expression of his personal preference,
possibly on grounds of previously observed behaviour, it does not thereby commit
Bea to the claim *This cake is not tasty*. But it would be rather strange if an
eavesdropper of this conversation, Carl, would now offer Bea a piece of cake. Her
denial is not just a rebuttal of Alf’s claim, but a statement of her own stance.

If one follows Kant in making it essential to the meaning of adjectives like *tasty*
that they have mere “private validity”, then in becomes difficult to explain
what the difference is between restricted and unrestricted judgements. Besides, if
one makes it essential to the meaning of adjectives like *beautiful* that they make
a claim to the agreement of others, independently of any structure in which it
is embedded, then it becomes hard to explain how it is possible that restricted judgements involving such adjectives appear in actual use and present no challenge for the competent speaker. Additionally, Kant’s idea that the only claim to the agreement of others that a judgement of the agreeable can make is a general one, resting on empirical rules concerning social conduct, would imply that a claim as This is tasty but I don’t find it tasty actually expresses something like People find this tasty but I don’t find it tasty. But this latter rendering makes the contradiction that we see in the first formulation disappear.

Now, besides the inadequacy of Kant’s characterisation of judgements of the agreeable as predictions of actual linguistic use, we wish to dispute the role of Kant’s disinterestedness in pleasure. First off, note that various commentators have argued against Kant’s idea that taste judgements must be disinterested. The disinterested delight that Kant thought was distinctive of taste judgements like This is beautiful, they argue, is not always present. There is very often a clear effort in preserving objects which are considered beautiful, like works of art or landscapes, and beautiful objects often lead to a curious attitude, an intellectual attention is raised.

Note as well that Kant’s idea that judgements of the agreeable are intrinsically related to the existence or production of desire has also been challenged. The case of ‘sated pleasure’ illustrates a situation where Kant would yield the wrong prediction. Let us illustrate this with an example:

(2) Alf: The cake is tasty.
     Bea: So do you want some more?
     Alf: Oh, thanks but I’m full now!

Should we take Alf to have been insincere, or even wrong? It seems that Alf may well stop eating if he is full and not be charged with being dishonest. Nor should he be expected to judge only things that he desires prior to producing the judgement of the agreeable. It seems capricious to demand that a desire should pre-exist in order for someone to judge something to be tasty. Even though sometimes “Hunger is the best sauce” meaning that one may experience delight when eating something fulfills a crave or after food deprivation, a gustatory judgement may well be made when treating oneself, or upon a spontaneous and unforeseen occasion. This, we think, suggests that desire is not intrinsic to judgements of

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63 Granted, Kant could reply to that the speaker is using the word beautiful, but actually expressing the mental concept of the agreeable, but that would be a different discussion.
64 Crawford [1974], Zangwill [1995].
65 Interpreters have also argued that Kant claims that taste judgements cannot be based on interest, although they may occasionally raise interest. Cf., Allison [2001], pp. 95-96.
66 Crawford [1974], p. 53.
67 Cf., Kant [1790], §§41-42.
68 Cf., Zangwill [1995].
69 Kant [1790], §49.
Chapter 4. The epistemology of taste

To see that gustatory judgements are not merely related to sensations of physical (dis)pleasure, one should consider how food appreciation relies as well on our capacity for empirical conceptualisation. This is not to claim that empirical concepts are applied when we judge something to be tasty, but rather to see that our cognitive abilities and not merely our (physical) hedonic feelings are involved in gustatory experience. Think for instance of the expert categorisation of a wine, coffee, or cheese expert. Gustatory experience may lead to complex empirical categorisations, as in the case of a professional expert who classifies coffee by its bitterness or astringency, or cheese by its creaminess or aging. The expert categorises empirically and aesthetically using her senses. When she classifies the coffee concerning a property such as astringency or ageing, she relies on the same kind of experience on the basis of which she may judge a coffee to be tasty or a cheese to be bland. But in a judgement like This is tasty, as in the case of beauty, the particular is not subsumed under specific empirical properties. The judgement provides no specific information concerning the object, besides a certain category requirement. In saying This is tasty, unlike when we say I find this tasty, we make a claim to the intersubjective validity of our affective response which relies on the same abilities that allow us to make cognitive judgements, and which are independent from the pre-existence or the production of desire.

We try to generalise the notion of reflective judgement so that we can see it involved in aesthetic judgements featuring gradable adjectives like tasty, heavy, painful, etc. We argue here that all aesthetic judgements are interested in a minimal sense, a sense impregnated with normativity related to our affective responsiveness to, e.g., beauty, tastiness, heat, or pain. So all aesthetic judgements may be seen to be interested in a way that involves the exercise of reflective judgement. Here we consciously move beyond Kant, we do not claim that this view should be imputed to him.

We should closely reconsider the role that our affective responsiveness plays when we judge that something is tasty, nice, or painful, so that we can see that judgements of the agreeable do not refer to a judge’s (dis)pleasure, they do not denote their sensations or experiences, but rather make a claim to the appropriateness of an affective response. This claim is further elaborated in chapter 5 and it is the crux of our own take on PPTs. Kant’s can be read as admitting or proposing that the affective response of pleasure in taste judgements is a motivating force that drives our attention and perception forward in a certain direction. We will not discuss here the exegetical question, whether the weaker or the stronger claim is a correct interpretation of Kant. Let us focus on the idea that the affective response that comes with an aesthetic judgement drives

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Footnotes:
2. Cf. Tinguely [2013].
us to cognise and act on the world following a particular direction. Even if they are scarce, there are some textual cues in Kant suggesting that the feeling of pleasure associated with judgements of beauty ‘animates’ the imagination and understanding: “The animation (‘Belebung’) of both faculties (the imagination and the understanding) ... is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgment of taste.” Independently of whether this is an (un)controversial interpretation of Kant, our own claim is that in judgements regarding beauty, gustatory taste, pain, heat, effort, etc., our affective response is interested in the minimal sense suggested above: our perceptual experience and our actions are steered by the affective responses associated to our judgements.

This notion of affective responsiveness as related to movement or change will be further elaborated in chapter 5.

So when we claim *This is painful, This is tasty, This is hot*, this motivating force of our affective responsiveness is one that we take others ought to share. When we tell someone *This is painful, This is tasty, This is hot*, we expect an appropriate affective response from our interlocutor, independently of whether in fact she experiences a feeling of pleasure, displeasure, pain, heat, etc. Unlike when we say *I find this painful/tasty/heavy*, when we say *This is painful/tasty/heavy* we expect that our interlocutor will avoid the procedure deemed painful, that she will give the tasty cake a try, that she bend her knees when lifting the suitcase, etc. We expect her to react appropriately. Unrestricted aesthetic judgements make a claim to universal agreement precisely because of the normative character of our concernfulness, of this minimal sense in which they involve interest. The presupposition of commonality is not an empirical hypothesis about other’s factual responses, but a normative claim about how our fellow agent are expected to react to the object under assessment. Thus, reflective judgement as our ability to take our affective response to be one that others ought to share may be seen as playing a role in aesthetic judgements beyond judgements of beauty.

Now, while the presupposition of commonality may be backed up by the assumption that our interlocutor has cognitive skills as ours, the expectations con-

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73 This idea is supported as well by the editor’s fn. 3 to §1, p. 366 of Kant [1790]. There, they say: “Kant explained pleasure as the feeling that expresses a condition that promotes life and its activity, while the feeling of displeasure expresses a hindrance to life or a check to its activity; this conception is presupposed by Kant’s conception of the pleasure in the free play of the cognitive faculties”.

74 Kant [1790], §9.

75 As Tinguely [2013] put it: “affective sensibilities can orient our perceptions which can in turn intensify or refine our responses through a self-reinforcing and self-correcting cognitive-cum-affective ‘momentum’ (Schwung).”

76 It is interesting to note that one can find a similar idea in Spinoza, for whom affects are “the affections of the body whereby the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished... together with the ideas of these affections” (Ethics, Part III Definition 3). We would be curious to investigate how Kant and Spinoza relate at this point but we obviously cannot do that here.
veyed by *This is painful, This is tasty, This is hot* do not lie on criteria set by empirical concepts: if I touch the hot pan and I burn myself I do not tell to the person next to me *The pan is hot!* because it is at a certain temperature (say, 50 or 60 degrees Celsius), but rather because of my affective response that I take others *ought* to share. There may be an empirical justification for why objects above a certain temperature burn our hands, but this is not the reason why we call something hot when we burn our hand when touching a pan. We take our response (to remove our hand) to be adequate or appropriate, and for this we have no proof or justification. Our burning sensation is not a piece of evidence we can offer to someone else precisely because it is an affective response. The response is not a proof for the judgement but rather an example that is taken to hold good for others as well. A great deal of unrestricted judgements we make using gradable adjectives are aesthetic in this sense, and thus make a claim to intersubjective agreement which is not based on recognising the object under evaluation as falling under a concept or satisfying a criterion. This lack of conceptual or empirical criteria can be seen as the key to the loopholes into which faultless disagreements can lead us. To change someone’s taste, one should get to change that person’s affective responses, and while this can be predisposed by our arguments and critique of what we eat, touch, or feel, it cannot be achieved without there being a change in our interlocutor’s appraisal, her phenomenological stance.

Like in the case of taste judgements, the normative claim of judgements of the agreeable and, more generally, of aesthetic judgements, does not depend on their veridicality for the (in)correctness of a judgement is not determined by a whether the object has certain properties. Their normativity is primitive, in the sense that it does not depend on conformity to an antecedently recognised rule. In this view, the meaningfulness of aesthetic judgements, both taste judgements and judgements of the agreeable, does not hinge on their truth or falsity, but rather on the normativity of our affective responsiveness. More on this will be said in section 4.3 and in chapter 5.

### 4.1.4 Interim conclusions

We have presented an interpretation and an extension of Kant’s solution to the “essential tension” characterising taste judgements and cognitive judgements. What lessons do we draw for an analysis of the meaning of PPTs and other RGAs? What does our investigation contribute beyond what other semanticists have already taken from Kant to analyse PPTs?

We have gone beyond Kant in arguing that any unrestricted judgement based on a feeling also involves the exercise of reflective judgement. Unrestricted judgements involving these adjectives are meaningful by virtue of a presumption of commonality of our affective responses, an expectation which is not predictive but normative.

Surely, not all unrestricted judgements involving gradable adjectives would
4.1. Reflective judgement and the normativity of taste

work this way, for some are clearly cognitive in the Kantian sense. We may set up a rule by which we judge, e.g., any suitcase weighing less than 23 kg to be allowed without extra payments upon check-in. In such case, our own response to the suitcase is irrelevant: we may not find it heavy, and still it may be too heavy to be accepted at the check-in desk. If we have drawn a line, we have a concept that works as a criterion for correct application of the gradable adjective. Rendered in this way, the claim to others made by unrestricted judgements “applies to all individuals, irrespective of any perceptual deficiencies they may have”\textsuperscript{77} In such cases, having such a criterion, disagreements can be (more or less) easily resolved. However, empirical judgements such as these are, in the Kantian reconstruction we have offered, made possible by the reflective principle. Taste judgements lay bare the working of reflective judgement and, as such, are prior to empirical conceptualisation. As long as the kind of affective responses that are at play when making such a judgement are shared, there is not a difference in meaning when you draw a line here and I draw the line there. The picture of evaluativity we drew in chapter 2, subsection 2.2.4 can now be seen through the Kantian lens: reflective judgement is behind the normative claim made by unrestricted judgements featuring either strongly or weakly evaluative adjectives, but in the case of strongly evaluatives mere reflection is involved.

Kant’s rendering resists extreme absolutism or relativism\textsuperscript{78} Taste judgements are aesthetic but, when formulated as unrestricted claims, they make a claim to the agreement of others, so they cannot be held to only hold for specific individuals, the speaker or whoever. This is precisely Kant’s point and worry in distinguishing, on the aesthetic side, taste judgements from judgements of the agreeable, and on the cognitive side, judgements of experience from judgements of perception. Relativism concerning PPTs takes all judgements involving PPTs to be like Kant’s judgements of the agreeable, because they do not make a claim to universal agreement but rather make a restricted claim about specific judges. In any case, this form of relativism makes no room for the claim of intersubjective agreement that Kant claimed to be essential for judgements of beauty\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{77}Ginsborg [1990a], fn. 6.
\textsuperscript{78}One can actually see Kant as responding to a rationalist tradition defending the objectivity goodness or perfection of things (notably supported by Leibniz and Baumgarten) vs. an empiricist view seeing aesthetic judgement as expressing an individual sentiment (Shaftesbury, Burke and to some extent Hume). (Cf., Ginsborg [2011b]) To some extent, one can associate absolutism concerning the semantics of PPTs with rationalism, and relativism for PPTs with extreme forms of empiricism. However, the agendas of people like Leibniz or Hume in these matters was not directed at showing if and how the truth of a taste judgement we utter is absolute or relative. In fact, Hume\textsuperscript{[1757]} rejects altogether the idea that taste judgements may be true or false (see our remarks in chapter 3, fn. 21). So one should be cautious with any association one suggests.

\textsuperscript{79}Stephenson [2007] has a pragmatic story about normativity: to assert This is tasty, a speaker only needs to believe that This is tasty is true for her. But if this judgement is added to the common ground of the conversation, then the judgement should be true for all
The contextualist account of PPTs takes it that in a specific conversation, we may disagree about the actual comparison class. In case different criteria, e.g., different standards and/or comparison classes are used, the discussion can move to that area: whether criteria are (in)compatible, motivated, trusted, etc. A standard is no more and no less than a criterion or conceptual determination of the application of the adjective. Lines are drawn only in specific circumstances, but in taste judgements and, more generally, our unrestricted judgments we do not compare our current pleasure or feeling with past experiences. Of course, a comparative judgement would do this, but comparison is not constitutive of the positive judgement in the story we have told. The specific turn taken by the metalinguistic contextualist is to argue that gradable adjectives and, in particular, PPTs can also be used to change the prevailing denotational borderline, the linguistic convention which settles what counts as, e.g., tasty. But, we have argued, correctness and incorrectness that is most relevant to understand the aboutness of taste judgements does not first and foremost concern language, but how we act and expect others to act.  

The nuanced genericity-based account of PPTs makes room for general judgements imputing a judgement to a group of people. First-person based genericity seems to reflect the way in which reflective judgement makes the normativity of taste judgements possible. However, we make a generic statement in which from a first-person subjective experience that we consider normal, we generalise to quantify over over relevant and normal individuals in the domain. However, this implies that if someone (one or many) whom we consider normal does not like the cake, then we should consider that the judgement is false. But this means that to take our experience to be normal and therefore to be one that normal people share is not the same as taking our experience to be one that normal people ought to share. The point is that the implicit generic quantification is still a generalisation which can be falsified, not a normative claim.

Kant’s cognitive vs. aesthetic judgement is an epistemological categorisation. Does this mean that for Kant aesthetic judgements express non-cognitive states, as the expressivist has it? In a way, we have already addressed this question and given a negative answer to it in the discussion about the intentionality of pleasure at the end of subsection 4.1.2. Still, one could say, the expressivist wants conversational participants. But in her picture, because it is relativist, a judgement may be true for me but not for you, whereas for Kant truth makes a claim to universal agreement by itself: if a judgement is true, it is true simpliciter.  

Gutzmann’s expressivism adds a use-conditional layer that can be seen as a variant of the metalinguistic view, as we have argued in chapter 3.  

So here we disagree with Umbach’s interpretation of the moral left by Kant’s view on taste, namely, that “an analysis of taste judgments (in the sense of Kant) has to refer to normativity with respect to language use”. Umbach, 2014, p. 9.  

The notion of common sense [sensus communis] and contrasting interpretations about the exact role it plays in Kant’s 1790 (see esp. §§20-22).
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to include the “commending function” of taste judgements and one could think that the claim to the agreement of others that Kant insists aesthetic judgements have is another way of defending that same commending function. After all, kosher expressivism places the subject transcendent character in the pragmatic, hence defeasible module of interpretation, and Kant is explicitly referred to as a source of his claim that invites others to have a similar response to ours with regard to the object under evaluation. However, this invitation has an optional character which does not fit well the normative claim of taste judgements sketched in this section. We take it that others ought to share our affective responses, we prescribe and not merely invite others to react as we do. And in any case, for Kant cognitive judgements would also be commending, because they are also subject-transcendent, they also invite others to regard objects as we regard them.

Kant claims that taste judgements are aesthetic because their determining ground, disinterested delight, cannot be other than subjective. If delight is such determining ground, then a taste judgement may be seen as positing that beauty or tastiness inhere in the object’s substance. This is problematic because to claim that aesthetic judgements are grounded on a privately accessible state renders such grounds intersubjectively inaccessible by assumption, so the claim to the agreement of others would be impossible. To get this clear, we should closely reconsider the relation between the feeling of pleasure and our affective responses, examine the notion of justification holding between judgements and feelings, and be more precise about how subjectivity presupposes that there is already some intersubjective agreement. For this, in the section 4.2, we draw upon Wittgenstein’s social conception of the self, and his characterisation of certainties and avowals.

4.2 Certainty, subjectivity, intersubjectivity

Unrestricted judgements, we have argued, work by taking others ought to share our affective responsiveness. If this affective responsiveness is an inner state or process, then we have not made one step further. An inner state or process gives room for privileged access and underscored authority of the first person,

\footnote{Cf., Hare [1952].}
\footnote{Part of Buekens [2011]. Buekens’ reconstruction suggests that for Kant, an object or situation judged tasty causes pleasure, which is the evidential ground for the judgement \textit{This is beautiful}. For a discussion about the relation among the object, the judgement, and pleasure, see our discussion in subsection 4.1.1. Concerning the claim that pleasure is the evidential ground for a judgement of beauty, this seems to be an unfortunate rendering of Kant’s idea that judgements of beauty are not objective as cognitive judgements, but rather make a claim to intersubjective validity that does not impute an objective property to the object, which implies that judgements of beauty are not based on evidence. However, a detailed assessment of Buekens’ understanding of Kant is beyond the space and purposes of our discussion.
\footnote{Cf., Watkins [2005].}
while we claim that unrestricted judgements make claims concerning the affective responsiveness not only of the speaker or a specific judge, but of any qualified interlocutor. To secure the meaningfulness of evaluative judgements, unrestricted and restricted, it is not enough to claim that our reactions ought to be shared: our reactions ought to be intersubjectively accessible.

This last point is made by Wittgenstein in his late works dealing with questions related to the philosophy of psychology, epistemology and, more generally, introducing a social conception of subjectivity. We will deploy his discussion of avowals and certainties to couch a more adequate view on the meaning of unrestricted and restricted judgements. In subsection 4.2.1 we give a condensed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s view avowals, i.e., first-person present tense ascriptions of bodily or psychological states like I am in pain or I am frightened, and discuss the extent to which restricted judgements are similar to these. But unrestricted judgements like This is tasty are not, at least from a superficial point of view, ascriptions of psychological states to others or to ourselves. We shall show that they share a number of features with certainties like Moore’s claim This is a hand, reconstructed in subsection 4.2.2 to get a better grip on their meaning. Unrestricted judgements owe some of their specific traits to how the inner relates to the outer, and to how the inner hinges on what we take as a given even before we can discuss about what is true or false. We will see that what is subjective about PPTs and related adjectives has more to do with the phenomenology of embodiment than with judge-dependence. The subjectivity of PPTs is better understood when seen as being constitutively related to the outer, through our embodied expressions and reactions given in gestures and characteristic behaviour. We try to draw these lessons explicitly in subsection 4.2.3. When we conclude this chapter in section 4.3, we try to bring forward the connection we see between reflective judgement and certainty: the former lays down the conditions of possibility of normativity without rules, the latter is an eloquent example of how this sort of normativity works.

86 Bax [2011] distinguishes two main discussions concerning subjectivity — an ordinary understanding according to which subjectivity is a name for relativity of viewpoints, and a philosophical understanding of this term referring “to a Cartesian-style ego, to ego cogito, to thinking substance whose inhabiting a (social) world and a body accordingly do not pertain to its essence.” (p. 2) Here we bring these two senses together because, it seems to us, the recent literature in semantics has tried to explain the apparent relativity of viewpoints that seems to be inherently associated with PPTs by resorting to an ego cogito which determines either the meaning of certain adjectives, or the worldly circumstances they describe.

87 Wittgenstein [1969, 1980a], and other works we will be referring to below.

88 The term avowal comes into philosophy from the hands of Ryle. It relates to Wittgenstein’s work as being a witness for how psychological verbs and linguistic expression work. Note that some authors (e.g., Bar-On and Long [2001]) claim that avowals have a special presumption of truth. This is not exactly in line with Wittgenstein’s own view, as we shall see here.
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4.2.1 The outer as a locus of the inner

First-person ascriptions of ongoing mental or bodily states, also known in the literature as avowals, have bolstered a considerable thread of positions and debates on subjectivity in philosophy of mind. It is hard to give a general definition of avowals given that it is a theoretical notion and as such it gives rise to different conceptions. We do not wish to offer here a precise demarcation of all and only avowals, but rather point out that restricted evaluative judgements are very much akin to first-person statements like I am in pain and how they stand with respect to the third person case. Avowals give rise to discussions concerning first-person epistemic authority and privilege: are they resistant to correction because the speaker has privileged access to the evidence on which such judgements are grounded? Are avowals based on evidence at all? Positions differ, polarised from a Cartesian introspective cum privileged epistemic access, to simple expressivists arguing that avowals do not specify cognitive content and rather express an emotion like a laughter or a sorrow, to sophisticated neo-expressivist views defending immunity to error as presumptive truth but avoiding a Cartesian introspective view of our mental lives. Here we will not review all stances in the debates but rather focus on some of Wittgenstein’s considerations in order to explore the relation between restricted judgements and avowals.

Avowals are distinctive self-attributions in that they seem to enjoy an extremely secure status, they are resilient to correction but unlike a priori judgements, their claims concern contingent matters, like someone’s pain, itch or anger. Sincerity can be challenged, but if sincerity is conceded, the accuracy of the self-ascription cannot be disputed. But this apparent immunity to error, the technical label coined in the literature on avowals, is characteristic of the first-person perspective: “while we sometimes fail to see what someone else is thinking or feeling, there can normally be no doubt as to the psychological state we ourselves are in.” First- vs. third-person asymmetries have fed the discussion about whether and how one can get to know anything beyond the Cartesian cogito, how can we get to know anything about others who, like us, have intentional states of all sorts and flavours, and how can we get a hold of them as persons rather than as

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89 As it is oft noticed, strict definitions such as these are both too exclusive, because some self-ascriptions of occurrent mental states do not make explicit reference to the first person like It hurts.


91 Look at Ryle 1949, Evans 1982, Wright 1998, etc.

92 Nor will we take a position with respect to whether Wittgenstein’s own view can be interpreted as supporting a form of expressivism. Such exegetical matters lie beyond our own purposes. Compare for instance the positions of Hacker 1986, and Moyal-Sharrock 2000.


94 From Shoemaker 1998.

95 Bax 2011, p. 40.
clusters of natural phenomena, like a thunderstorm or another event in nature. As we noted in ch. 2, restricted judgements like *I find this cake tasty* can very rarely be sensibly contested by an interlocutor with a denial of the form *No, you don’t*. This makes us think that restricted judgements are akin to avowals.

Although remarks concerning subjectivity can be found in Wittgenstein’s early writings, here we focus on his late philosophy of psychology. Psychological statements concerning memory, pain or fear form a witness case of competing accounts of linguistic meaning and of subjectivity from which Wittgenstein steps away. In particular, they provide a limit case for the normative requirements of natural language, for they bring out most clearly how experiences turn out to be completely irrelevant when one conceives of self-ascriptions as descriptions which are bound to be true because they stem from infallible introspection. The resilience to correction of avowals is related to the fact that observation normally plays no role in first-person ascriptions of ongoing states, rather than to a lofty view on a privately delimited and given realm. Avowals signal an embodied experience which is associated with characteristic gestures and patterns of behaviour, rather than describe an inner process only accessible via introspection. There are exceptional cases where Alf could be mistaken about her own pain, but this is not because Alf has infallible access to what pain designates. This signaling can, of course, be informative to others about Alf’s ongoing states. However, the signaling is not done upon the verification of Alf’s own experience or behaviour fitting a descriptive range of the self-ascription Alf utter’s.

Does Wittgenstein see avowals as being immune to error? Once more, this is an exegetical question that we do not need to fully address, given our limited purposes. All we would like to say here is that even though Wittgenstein distinguished uses of I-as-subject (*I see so and so, I hear so and so, I try to lift my arm, I think it will rain, I have a toothache*) vs. I-as-object (*My arm is broken, I have grown six inches, I have a bump on my forehead, The wind blows my hair about*), and pointed out that only in the latter case it makes sense to ask whether I have made a mistake concerning the identity of the one whose arm is broken or who has grown six inches, it would be a bit too swift to suggest that for Wittgenstein all self-ascriptions of ongoing states involve a use of I-as-subject.

*We say “very rarely” because one can think of scenarios where such denials could occur. Think, for instance, of patients suffering from frontotemporal dementia (see fn. 95 in chapter 2).

See *Wittgenstein [1922], §§5.631, 5.632, 5.641, Wittgenstein [1961], 2.8.16, 2.9.16.*

To fragments from *Wittgenstein [1964], 1958b, 1980a, 1958a, 1982/1992*. Our reading of these works has been influenced by sources other than those explicitly reported below, e.g., *Overgaard [2005], Schulte [1993], Glock [1996], Finkelstein [2010].

*This stepping away can actually be seen, as *Ter Hark [1991] argues, as a transition, from Wittgenstein’s middle period to his late years. Different aspects of the issue around the formation of psychological concepts, but also slightly different positions, are defended in different works, from 1929 to 1951.*


*This is part of what is at issue in the Shoemaker-Evans discussion. The claim that immunity
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Indeed, if no identification of the subject is required in order to utter *I have a toothache*, then referring success is guaranteed because no actual reference is involved. However, it requires lengthy, not always convincing arguments to claim that Wittgenstein denied the referentiality of the pronoun ‘I’, let alone to claim that he thereby characterised avowals.

Wittgenstein notes that resilience is peculiar to first-person ascription in present tense: when one considers statements like *She is in pain* or *I was afraid*, mistakes and errors are surely possible: someone may pretend she is in pain, my memory about an experience’s being frightening might be simply wrong, we may be mixing up memories about two different occasions. These asymmetries are examined in various passages, and accepted rather than neglected or explained away as an inherent feature of how psychological concepts are formed, learnt, and applied. Nevertheless, the asymmetry is constructed in such a way that, in a sense, mistakes are excluded not only in the first-person case but, perhaps surprisingly, also in the third-person case. Judgements concerning other people’s states are partly constituted by what Wittgenstein calls “Einstellung zur Seele”: they involve observation but they are not purely observational, as when we verify that a thermometer marks 20 degrees. What he called “characteristic expressions” are gestures, facial expressions, and patterns of behaviour by which we make sense of our fellow human being’s ongoings. When we see someone weeping, we do not infer her sadness, we see it. The sort of evidence we have in this case is, as Wittgenstein puts it, imponderable gestures and patterns of behaviour that make up for a third-person ascription of an ongoing state are subtle. We may make mistakes, given that imponderable evidence is, as such, resistant to systematisation and to full predictability. If we cannot speak with error through misidentification is present for all avowals is made by e.g., Bar-On, “inspired by Wittgenstein”. Fair enough, she does not claim this claim should be attributed to Wittgenstein himself.

If one looks at earlier work by Wittgenstein, one may find a different view about these asymmetries. Ter Hark [1991] argues that in his middle period, Wittgenstein endorses a form of behaviourism which turns statements about others’ mental states into a hypothesis, as much as one’s own state can only be hypothesised by others, which ends up removing rather than accommodating the asymmetries so characteristic of avowals. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein makes room for the asymmetries and explicitly rejects behaviourism.

This acceptance of the asymmetries has been glossed by what Wright calls a default view, an allegedly Wittgensteinian view which takes asymmetry to “belong primitively to the ‘grammar’ of the language-game of ordinary psychology.” (Wright [1998], pp. 41-43) Like expressivism, this view denies that an avowal can represent a genuine “cognitive achievement, based on cognitive privilege”, but unlike expressivism it claims that truth-conditions of avowals can and should be specified by taking first-person avowals to be by default true. We neither support this account, nor do we want to argue here whether this is a tenable interpretation of Wittgenstein’s views.

*In general I do not surmise fear in him—I see it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside.* [Wittgenstein 1967], §170.

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total security about other people’s ongoings, this is not because our epistemic access to someone else’s mind is somehow inferior. Third-person ascriptions are not mere conjectures. I may be wrong about the other’s ongoing state, not because his inner life is hidden from me, but rather because what we immediately see of someone else’s condition is entrenched, in a delicate way, with how that person acts, what she shows, and what she knows.

Of course, pretense is possible. The weeping person might be faking it to make us think she is sad. But this requires us to learn a different game, one in which our experiences and their characteristic expressions are dissociated. However this does not mean that genuine expression is a sum of specific behaviour plus something else, something inner. If I think a person’s fear is genuine and someone else does not, there is nothing more I can do other than say and show what I have heard and seen and know about her. To think of a genuine expression as a sum of specific behaviour plus something else, something inner, turns that inner addendum into the specific point at which truth and truthfulness collapse — the Cartesian dead-end. To think of genuine expression as mere gestures and behaviour, no difference is made between mimic and truth — the behaviouristic dead-end.

Here we come to the point we want to make, built on the brief summary of a Wittgensteinean view on avowals. We want to note that, to some extent, restricted judgements like I find this tasty or She finds this heavy work like avowals. Please note that we do not make the more straightforward claim, i.e., that first-person restricted judgements are avowals because we note a number of features in which avowals and first-person restricted judgements seem to differ. Here we limit ourselves to notice some of the points of contact and of contrast. There are intended to help us substantiate the idea that subjectivity in restricted judgements concerns an entrenchment of inner and outer, rather than describe an inner process or state, or a set of physical dispositions or actions.

We want to note three points of similarity between avowals and restricted judgements. To begin with, as already noted in chapter 2 subsection 2.3.2, first-person restricted judgements in present tense do not leave much room for correction, certainly much less than third-person ascriptions:

(3) a. A: I find this cake tasty.
   B: No, you don’t.

b. A: She finds this suitcase heavy.
   B: No, she doesn’t.

Third-person evaluative judgements may be based on what someone says or on the observation of gestures and behaviour. We see someone’s physical effort when carrying a suitcase, we conclude that she finds it heavy. We see someone’s relish

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in savouring something, we conclude that she finds it tasty. Third-person evaluative judgements like \( \text{(3-b)} \) may be uttered echoing someone’s linguistic behaviour, what she has said in the past, but also relying on her non-linguistic, characteristic expressions. Meanwhile, a first-person restricted judgement is normally not uttered on the basis of an observation of our own behaviour or gestures. Suppose you are lifting weights at the gym in front of a mirror: do you need to look in front of you to say whether the weight you are carrying is heavy? In normal circumstances, you just feel the effort you make as you lift it. Likewise, you do not say \textit{I find this chocolate tasty} upon observing your gestures in the mirror when eating a piece. Delight is normally felt, not inferred or concluded.

Our second point is that, like avowals, first-person restricted judgements do not leave much room for correction errors concerning the identity of agent referred to in the matrix subject. In both cases, misidentifications are hardly imaginable in the first-person case (a-c), whereas this is surely possible for the third person case (b-d).

\begin{align*}
(4) \quad & \text{a. A: I have a migraine.} \\
& \quad \text{B: No, it’s not you who has a migraine!} \\
& \text{b. A: She has a migraine.} \\
& \quad \text{B: No, it’s not her who has a migraine, it’s him!} \\
& \text{c. A: I find this lemonpie tasty.} \\
& \quad \text{B: No, it’s not you who finds this lemonpie tasty!} \\
& \text{d. A: She finds this lemonpie tasty.} \\
& \quad \text{B: No, it’s not her who finds this lemonpie tasty, it’s him!}
\end{align*}

In most cases, it does not make sense to wonder: someone has a migraine but is it me? Or someone finds lemonpie tasty but is it me?

Our third point is that like avowals, first-person restricted judgements leave some room for empirical mistakes. I may be wrong about whether I have a headache or a migraine, if I do not know a migraine is defined as a neurological disorder. What I cannot be wrong about is about my experience of pain. Similarly, a restricted judgment express a subject’s relation to an object under assessment, and we may be wrong about how we identify this object, e.g., if Alf says \textit{I find this lemonpie tasty}, and someone corrects him indicating that what he has tried is not a lemonpie but a lemon cheesecake. Still, an empirical mistake does not amount to a mistake regarding the appreciation of a subject: we are not wrong about our experienced pain, or our delight and relish. To make this point sharper, consider again the Müller-Lyer arrows. When I realise that the two segments are equally long, I may still say \textit{I find the segment in the image above longer than the one in the image below}.

Why not just say that first-person restricted judgements are avowals? We mention here a few points of contrast. First of all, restricted judgements may express an assessment upon a specific gustatory experience, as in example \( \text{(5-a)} \).
or they may generalise the appreciation of a sort of item, as in example (5-b):

\[\begin{align*}
(5) & \quad \text{a. } A: \text{I find this cake tasty.} \\
& \quad \text{b. } A: \text{I find chocolate cake tasty.}
\end{align*}\]

So restricted judgements do not necessarily report on an ongoing state. A judgement concerning repeated exposure or a habit covers a collection of past states.

Second, we count as a restricted judgement something like \textit{I find it expensive!}, given that \textit{expensive} is an RGA. Concerning price, interest or suitability, it may be harder to speak of characteristic expressions as those related to pain, fear or surprise. Can we say of a third person that she finds something, e.g., convenient or appropriate if we have not her make an explicit verbalisation which makes this known? These are hard questions, partly because the boundaries of what is a characteristic expression are not really sharp. One could try to argue that a characteristic expression of finding something expensive is not to buy that thing, but of course this is a rather refined type of reaction when we compare it to a reaction of pain or of disgust, which seem to be more animal, more primitive. Perhaps more importantly, distinguishing “negative expressions” can be very hard. Absence of action of a certain sort does not easily lead to a pointer of the sort of action that is missing. For example, we may see Alf not buying a pair of shoes, and thereby conclude that he finds them expensive, but perhaps he is refraining from buying them now because he wants the fancier, though more expensive model. In the more standard case of pain, we can see a characteristic expression of pain but can we see an expression of endurance of pain? It seems that to see endurance to pain as an expression, we should already know that an expression of pain is suppressed.

These may be seen as questions about whether Wittgenstein considered that avowal always has an associated characteristic expression. However, he raises doubts himself about this, for not every psychological concept has characteristic expressions, e.g., numbness, tingling, sensation of heat. In any case, independently of this exegetic point, it is worth noting that even what counts as a verbal report of someone’s finding something interesting or expensive is not such a straightforward matter. Does a person need to actually say, in these words, \textit{I find this expensive} for us to say that she finds this expensive? Obviously, this is too much to ask. An interjection like My goodness!, or an expression like I can’t believe it!, or even something like Are they crazy? could, in normal circumstances, be the basis on which we say that someone found something expensive. This suggests that just as one may have difficulty in naming the characteristic behaviour and gestures associated to finding something, e.g., expensive, it may be likewise difficult to list specific verbal expressions that suffice to say that someone finds

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110 This relates to the question whether self-ascriptions of epistemic states like believe, know, surmise count as avowals.
111 Wittgenstein [1980a] II, §63
Certainty, subjectivity, intersubjectivity

something expensive. And still, we do say of people that they find things expensive, interesting or suitable. So what lesson should one draw? It may be hard to make third-person ascriptions of ongoing states like She is in pain, as it may be hard to make third-person restricted judgements like She finds this expensive, although it is clear that finding something painful or someone attractive may have more iconic characteristic expressions than finding something interesting or expensive.

In this discussion we have shown that restricted judgements resemble avowals, to some extent. In subsection 4.2.3 we will discuss what lessons we think this yields for a semantics dealing with the subjectivity of PPTs and other RGAs.

In our Kantian detour in section 4.1 we argued that unrestricted judgements go beyond the mere expression of an individual’s bodily or psychological ongoings. They claim intersubjective agreement like avowals because they are ungrounded, in the sense that they are not judgements made on the basis of evidence we gather. But they do not merely express the psychological undergoings of an individual, so our perusal of avowals seems not to give us tools to better understand this case. Or so it seems. Actually, Wittgenstein’s view on avowals is closely related to his characterisation of what he calls certainties. In the next subsection, we present a few of the central features of certainties, to then put them in relation to unrestricted judgements.

4.2.2 Certainties and agreement in judgement

In his discussion against Moore’s alleged defeat of skepticism in 1969 (referred to as OC henceforth), Wittgenstein discusses statements he often refers to as certainties, though not identifying them as a syntactically or a semantically unique category of sentences. Certainties are unstriking judgements like Moore’s This is a hand, general claims like Everyone has ancestors, or identity statements

\footnote{This work gathers a bundle of fragments coming from the Nachlass, edited under the criterion that it allegedly constitutes a discussion of the topic of the topic of certainty. (See Wittgenstein 1969, Preface. See Moyal-Sharrock 2004 for a critical discussion). Some related discussions appear in Wittgenstein 1958a and Wittgenstein 1958b.}

\footnote{This is mostly a label issued in the literature concerning Wittgenstein’s late work. One should not think that in Wittgenstein 1969 something like a neat definition. Certainties should not be seen as a unique, clear cut category of sentences. (Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §§52, 318-320) One and the same sentence may fluctuate between different uses, some of which express certainties and some of which do not. So a certainty is not a specific verbal locution, a designated set of propositions.}

\footnote{Moyal-Sharrock 2013 insists, against Coliva 2010, on calling certainties ‘hinges’ rather than ‘judgements’ because of her fierce rejection of these being truth-evaluable. Further discussion appears below.}

\footnote{Many statements concerning one’s body appear in a racconto of certainties (see examples concerning feet and head), where proprioception does only sometimes play a distinctive role; that inside a skull there’s a brain and not sawdust is a certainty but not because we can have a}
like My name is MIC. Against Moore’s use of the claim This is a hand as an immediate and incontrovertible defeat of skepticism, Wittgenstein argues that certainties fail as responses to skepticism basically because they do not voice pieces of knowledge, something we have evidence for, something we are justified in believing and in taking as true. We do not delve into how certainties may disarm skeptical arguments, but instead focus on features of certainties which we will then transpose and discuss with respect to unrestricted judgements like This cake is tasty.

What is special about certainties is that doubt is normally out of the question. Think for instance of whether you are sitting or standing, whether you have ten toes or whether the earth has existed for more than five minutes. When uttered, these statements do not express opinions which we hold by virtue of having gathered and verified a number of observations. Though one can regard this as the most explicit locus of Wittgenstein’s (late) epistemology, these passages are sometimes closely related to passages in other works extending to philosophy of mind, to the semantics of psychological concepts, and to the powerful but general idea of a language game and the role it plays in his philosophy of language. If one reads OC as a strongly epistemological oeuvre, one may see it as an inversion of Cartesianism: in his Meditations, Descartes argues that knowledge is possible if doubt is excluded. In OC, knowledge is seen to be possible if and only if doubt is possible. The notion of a certainty is central to his ‘critique of human knowledge’ and it stands in the backbone of his ideas concerning the social formation of subjectivity. Knowledge and doubt are possible within the framework that certainties form. But Wittgenstein does not endorse Cartesian foundationalism. Certainties are contingent statements, not tautologies. They form a background of assumptions that, when linguistically formulated, escapes the logical vs. empirical status. They are themselves unjustified, but not necessarily or eternally true, like a tautology or another sort of foundationalist bedrock. To a great extent, they are community-dependent, and they can change though not easily or by means of a simply discursive argument. A certainty resides in shared actions and reactions of a community, not in propositions that are undoubtedly true. They manifest our attitude towards our environment, natural and social, as a by-and-large uniform whole, where exceptions are what they are because they are rare and because they break an otherwise stable pattern.
Certainties are peculiar in their discursive function: in normal circumstances, they are informatively idle because when voiced they state the obvious, that which we take for granted, we all agree on. As an underlying background we assume, certainties are seldom voiced in conversation. But a certainty can be verbally voiced, like Moore does with his famous *This is a hand.* A sentence voicing a certainty may thus fluctuate between informative and non-informative uses, between a description of facts and a statement of a norm.

Wittgenstein points out that certainties are ungrounded, in the sense that they do not rest on justifications. Grounded statements are justified by evidence, by publicly accessible information but justifications of this kind come to an end. Certainties are not reached via maximal or direct evidential support, or thanks to an infallible or privileged form of justification. They constitute a complex, modifiable framework of beliefs and patterns of behaviour which is not embraced by means of a process of verification. When this happens, we reach an ungrounded way of acting. They are embraced without reasons; reasons are needed to withhold or relinquish a certainty, not to live by it.

Where grounds lack, mistakes and doubt are logically excluded. Because certainties are ungrounded, doubting them strikes us as inadequate or absurd, an expression of a certainty like *This is a hand* cannot be wrong because we do not say this on the basis of evidence. Mistakes can be made only when we are able to provide a correction, yet what correction could we give to convince someone who doubts that what she has at the end of her arms are her hands? Disagreement amounts to folly.

Change in a framework of certainties is possible but not on the basis of an

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124 Seldom voicing has been interpreted as (a form of) ineffability. “[Certainties] cannot be meaningfully said qua certainties in the stream of the language-game. Articulating these certainties as such in the language-game is useless, pointless, meaningless, and its only effect is to arrest the game.” Moyal-Sharrock [2004]. We do not want to engage this rather extreme interpretation here, especially in view of the fact that the ritual of introducing oneself is very common and rather meaningful, although surely not if one sees this as a speaker satisfying herself of newly acquired information.


126 In the literature, this is also called groundless. One may see these two adjectives as synonymous. On an odd day, one may think that something is groundless when it has no grounds, and ungrounded when it has no grounding. The latter is an action, the former is condition which may also comprise fiction statements which do not describe or inform about facts.

127 The public character of grounding comes at odds with a claim like Kant’s concerning aesthetic judgement given that, for him, we ground it on subjective feelings. The tension is removed if one couples feelings and characteristic gestures and behaviour that bring feelings to the intersubjectively accessible arena. More is said in the las subsection.


129 Cf., Wittgenstein [1969], §§ 110, 152, 204, 274.

130 Cf., Wittgenstein [1969], §115.


132 What would a mistake here be like?” Wittgenstein [1969], §17.

133 Wittgenstein [1969], §611.
argument or of isolated exceptions. The framework changes when the facts force it.\(^{134}\) If these change, then our language games, and henceforth our concepts and words, may have to change too. Giving up is led by a pragmatic criterion: does it do any good to me to keep this?\(^{135}\) For instance, while years ago it may have absolutely certain that one had not been to the moon, one may say that (some time) after 1969 this ceased to belong to the steady points of society.\(^{136}\) After this change of stance or conversion takes place, we might try to justify the falsity of former certainties.\(^{137}\)

Certainties are learnt through experience and practice rather than by merely discursive means, and they express the basic framework that shapes our actions and deeds. But neither practice nor experience constitute justifications for certainties.\(^{138}\) Experience does not teach us this or that proposition, but rather a host thereof.\(^{139}\) Expertise is acquired through repeated exposure: a child learns *This is my hand*, *These are my feet*, etc. through play and repeated interactions: we do not teach this by providing arguments. Learning, like in any case, requires trust.\(^{140}\) Infants and newcomers to a cultural community have to grow into the framework certainties provide. Doubt is possible only after a good deal of trust and following of our forebears and caretakers. This trust, which should not be conflated with epistemic trust which adults may hold, is rather basic, infantile, primitive. Trust in this case has to be seen as a form of openness and responsiveness, an impulsive form of identification that is especially present at a young age.\(^{141}\) Such basic trust makes it possible for there to be “agreement in judgements”, the recurrence not only in nature as external phenomena but also in our human nature. Agreement in judgements is a requirement for communication.\(^{142}\)

We assume that certainties are, by and large, shared with others.\(^{143}\) This agreement has, as it were, a natural and a social constitution. Our ungrounded but solid belief in the regularity of nature also plays a constitutive role, a point we shall discuss further in section 4.3.\(^{144}\) The compelling character of, say, the thought that the floor below our feet is still there is not just an externally given

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\(^{134}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §617

\(^{135}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §97; see also §§96, 98-99, 211, 256, 336.

\(^{136}\) Two remarks: this change is witnessed in how we read today Wittgenstein’s example in Wittgenstein 1969, §§106, 106, 111, et ss., and the resistance to believe in the landing of Apollo XI on the moon exemplifies how resistant people may be to give up on a certainty.

\(^{137}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §§65, 92, 98, 256, 578, 612.

\(^{138}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §130.

\(^{139}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §274.

\(^{140}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §238, as well as §§150, 337, 509, 600, 604, 672.

\(^{141}\) Cf., Bax 2011, ch.5.

\(^{142}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1958a, 242, see as well II, pp. xi, on which we give further comments below.

\(^{143}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §§225, 274, 298.

\(^{144}\) Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §472. “The character of the belief in the uniformity of nature can perhaps be seen most clearly in the case in which we fear what we expect. Nothing could induce me to put my hand into a flame — although after all it is only in the past that I have burnt myself.”
norm, but an internalised assumption. But we are also born in communities which already live by certainties, we grow up with these steadfast points in our frameworks drilled into us rather than being taught to us explicitly. There is something universal here; not just something personal. Whom do we expect to share our certainties with? Challenging these statements can leave us outside the community, become ostracised by our defiance to conform with the background of our fellow human beings. This is a normative function of a certainty, as it delimits the boundaries of a community, those we admit and those we feel are beyond our reach and understanding. But identification is not total. In spite of the power and effect of the community in shaping the certainties that its members adopt and inherit, Wittgenstein’s picture leaves some room for change in time, and for plurality among agents. In fact, differentiation is the condition of possibility of subjectivity.

This differentiation also plays a role in avowals like I am feeling pain or My name is MIC. Avowals can be seen as a subclass of certainties. For certainties like Arms do not grow back after they are cut off, everyone equally takes this for certain. If My name is MIC is a certainty, then the idea that all certainties are shared and informatively idle when uttered needs qualification. The case of introducing oneself is indeed informative for someone whom I have never met before. But this is possible on the basis of my interlocutor’s taking for granted that I am certain of what I utter. Does this mean that error is impossible? This means that error is hardly conceivable, and that such a mistake would put in question my sanity. In any case, an “asymmetric” certainty like the statement of my own name shows that one should beware of thinking of all certainties as grammatical rules and of deeming all meaningful utterances of a certainty impossible. Perhaps surprisingly, a third-person restricted judgement like He is in pain also shares some features with certainties: “One says I know that he is in pain although one can produce no convincing grounds for this”, and this is different from a non-certainty like I am sure he is in pain. A person’s characteristic expressions of, e.g., pain are not simply a collection of behaviour we note and from which we conclude that the other one is in pain. In this sense, characteristic expressions are not evidence of someone’s inner life. This behaviour should make sense as a phenomenon of pain to count as a characteristic

\[146\] Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §440.
\[147\] Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §74.
\[148\] This is one of the main lessons in we take from Bax 2011.
\[149\] Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §§41, 504.
\[150\] Cf., Stein 1997, ch.6. But note that this interpretation is not widely known or discussed.
\[151\] Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §570.
\[152\] Cf., Wittgenstein 1969, §§571, 572.
\[153\] Cf. as well with Wittgenstein 1969, §628.
\[154\] This is a trend of interpretation found in, e.g., Moyal-Sharrock 2004 et ss.
\[155\] Wittgenstein 1969, §563.
expression of pain. Interpreters have given different answers. OC does not give clear cut answers. In a sense it is clear that certainties are not true by being justified, by tallying with the facts. They make truth and falsity of this sort possible, they delimit the space of facts. Still, certain passages call this into question, suggesting that certainties “are true, if anything is”. Likewise, the observation that certainties can change when reality cuts us short suggests that, in a sense, they can be denied. If one can speak of truth regarding certainties, this is a pragmatic notion: they are held as long as they let us flow in the flux of our environment, they are abandoned when they fall down from their place in the backbone of the epistemological framework, to become pieces of empirical knowledge with needs to be tested and which can therefore be challenged.

Are certainties judgements? Obviously, answering this depends on one’s conception of judgement. If the question is whether for Wittgenstein certainties were judgements, we see that interpretation trends have defended different positions so giving a simple answer is not possible. We do not want to examine that debate here, but just indicate that there is textual support claiming that certainties are judgements. So if we want accept that certainties are judgements, we should accept that a judgement may be such even when questions of truth and justification are excluded. When there is a clash in the certainties we hold, we may just “have to put up with it”. If certainties are judgements, then we need to accept that we judge even when our justifications have come to an end, even when all we have are our ungrounded ways of acting.

We think that unrestricted judgements like This cake is tasty/expensive/heavy function in some, though not all respects, like certainties. The first point to

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156 Cf., Hausen [2009], p. 38.
157 Here we follow the hesitations in Stein [1997], ch. 6.
158 Hacker [1996] sees certainties as unfalsifiable empirical propositions. Moyal-Sharrock considers that certainties are grammatical rules which are non propositional, non judgemental, non truth evaluable. Once more, we leave a discussion with the different interpreters out of the reach of this chapter.
159 Cf., Wittgenstein [1969], §§94, 191, 205. Also: “If you measure a table with a yardstick, are you also measuring the yardstick? If you are measuring the yardstick, then you cannot be measuring the table at the same time.” Wittgenstein [1956], III, 74. 
161 Coliva [2010] claims that certainties are judgements which play a normative role. For Moyal-Sharrock [2013], this claim is not granted by OC because Coliva takes judgement to be “bona fide judgment (belief or opinion that results from evaluation)”.
162 Wittgenstein [1969], §§124, 128, 129, 130, 140, 149.
163 Cf., Tas [2011], p. 131.
164 Wittgenstein [1969], §238.
165 Cf., Wittgenstein [1969], §110.
166 Perhaps it would be more interesting to relate unrestricted judgements to Wittgenstein conception of aesthetic judgement, which is not to be assimilated to his position concerning certainties. Space limitations prevent us from attempting this here.
4.2. Certainty, subjectivity, intersubjectivity

raise is that unrestricted judgements are ungrounded. Taste judgements signal our practical coping, our readiness to act in accordance with patterns of behaviour shared by our community, being thereby informative to others of our readiness to act in particular ways. Taste judgements are normally exempt from doubt because they are not empirical generalisations made upon evidence. What could count as evidence? I can tell someone why I like something and this may not take me any further. The cake is tasty because it has ginger can be met with a blunt: Ginger is disgusting! What would a mistake be like? If a speaker utters This is tasty, then if her gestures and bodily reactions show aversion or disgust, we will probably be puzzled. Correct use of taste judgements is established by the ensemble of shared practices, shaped partly biologically and partly culturally, associated with them.

But not all unrestricted judgements are like this. Similar would be a situation in which we lift a suitcase and say: This suitcase is heavy. But suppose we say this after looking at the scale at the airport and noticing that its weight is greater than the maximum allowance per passenger. Here, a justification is due and a rebuttal is possible. For instance, one may argue that the scale must be broken, since the suitcase was weighed twice before reaching the airport and in each case the scales indicated 20 kg. Does this mean that heavy or that judgements containing this adjective are ambiguous? No, but in the scale case we count on a public, conventional method and in the lifting case we do not. On which basis do we take the reading of a scale to be accurate? Don’t we take this as evidence precisely because we know that the greater the number on a scale, the heavier it is? The method of putting something on a scale to check whether something is heavy does not define, but rather presupposes that we understand in like manner what it is for something to be heavy, or to be heavier than something else.

If we consider the role of experience in certainties and in unrestricted judgements, we see another point in common. We have defended the idea that to be able to say whether something is tasty, the speaker should have had gustatory experiences, at least one, with the object under assessment. Unrestricted judgements concerning taste, heaviness, temperature, etc., communicate one’s embodied experience and reactions, voicing as well a definite normative attitude towards that object. However, not all unrestricted judgements require experience in the same way, in the sense of requiring specific embodied appraisals. If I carry the suitcase and this takes great effort, then I do utter This is heavy on the basis of experience. But when I pronounce this after weighing the suitcase on a scale, the judgement does not require that I undergo any specific bodily experience, it just requires that I master the measurement conventions that are shown by the

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167 What is it like when people do not have the same sense of humour? They do not react properly to each other. It is as though there were a custom among certain people to throw someone a ball, which he is supposed to catch & throw back; but certain people might not throw it back, but put it in their pocket instead. Or what is it like for someone to have no idea how to fathom another’s taste? [Wittgenstein 1980b], MS 138 32b.
So is experience equally involved in certainties and unrestricted judgements? Certainties require drilling and repeated exposure, while a taste judgement can be made after one single gustatory test. Acquired tastes require drilling and experience. But to say whether something is tasty, one need not have tried something many times. So it seems that the exposure needed to grow into a framework of certainties is much more pronounced than that needed to make or assent to an unrestricted judgement.

Trust plays a different role in certainties and in unrestricted judgements. On the one hand, we mostly trust others when it comes to pain or disgust, but concerning taste or interest, someone else’s view is not enough to let us make an assessment, but trust of a very personal sort allows us to follow someone’s views advice. Trust is also what delineates the personal variation tolerated in the case of taste preferences: growing up within a culture, an infant is exposed to various food items, some of which she may openly and clearly refuse. To some extent, an infant’s responses are accommodated, even if they do not tie in with the expectations of caretakers. Some variation is accepted, because not everyone likes the same, not everyone is equally strong or tolerant to pain. Plurality is accepted to a great extent, perhaps more for taste than for disgust, which shows that (some) interpersonal variation is acceptable. Early on, young infants show taste preferences and aversions that may not be shared by their caretakers. These responses (when repeated) are responsible for the differentiation that contributes to the shaping of the individual’s subjectivity. But we should stress that these differentiations (a) are normally not massive, they occur against the background of shared reactions and (b) they are not always accommodated: there is a negotiation by which “the subject is able to disengage itself from the world picture it has inherited”.

Disagreement is possible only against the background of agreement in what we (don’t) call tasty. There is a host of gestures, facial expressions and other embodied reactions related to food ingestion that we share. Furthermore, there are naturally and culturally shared aversions (to e.g., very bitter or pungent tastes or coprophagia). When we join basic eating practices, caretakers react to our gestures and behaviour, they call the things we are fed with tasty.

Like certainties, taste judgements can change, both via taste acquisition and development of expertise (e.g., when learning to appreciate wasabi) and also via circumstantial conditions of our environment and/or ourselves (a wine may become acidic if left uncorked; a wine may taste poorly if tasted after eating chocolate). But, like when certainties change, this resembles more a change in world picture than a blunder or a retraction as the semantic relativist in the PPTs debate thinks of it. However, while a change in certainties is a change in world-
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picture, a revision of assessment may be due to a change in oneself.

We have been careful enough not to claim that unrestricted judgements function exactly like utterances voicing certainties. We have already pointed out a few points at which the similarities break down. Here we add a few more comments in this direction.

First, certainties are often thought to be grammatical rules for our language-games. Can we think of unrestricted judgements like *This is tasty* in that way? Should we follow the metalinguistic explanation of how PPTs work in unrestricted judgements? When one says *Lemons are sour*, it is not clear whether we are positing a grammatical rule or making an assessment concerning the taste of lemons. Is the unrestricted judgement an evaluation or the open statement of a certainty? While we may be tempted by this case to liken certainties and taste judgements, we should see that a statement like *Pears are tasty*, which on a surface level is as much of an unrestricted judgement as *Lemons are sour*, is nothing like a rule. *Who says so?*, might someone ask. This surely is not a grammatical rule. Second, certainties like *This is a hand* are seldom voiced in conversation, unlike taste judgements or assessments concerning the heaviness or heat of an object. Third, there is a clear difference in the possibility and frequency of disagreement. While for certainties, disagreement or doubt might leave us outside of our community, challenging a taste judgement may be perceived as a somewhat impolite intervention, but in normal circumstances we are not deemed crazy for disliking one thing or another. Fourth, change seems to be somewhat more capricious for taste than for, e.g., heaviness, or with respect to certainties. After eating chocolate, I may not be ready to say that a certain wine I very much appreciate is tasty. We do not relinquish a certainty just for a while, as a consequence of contingencies which we see as being merely circumstantial.

We hope to have shown in this discussion that unrestricted judgements resemble certainties, to some extent. What does this yield with respect to the subjectivity of PPTs and other RGAs?

4.2.3 Lessons for a semantics of evaluative judgements

So, what lesson does this all leave for the task of modeling the meaning of restricted and unrestricted judgements?

We suggested that first-person restricted judgements, like avowals, are not based on evidence. We believe this gives some clues of what a semantics for an attitude verb like *find* should look like. Think of *find* as expressing a relation which is essentially asymmetric between first- and third-person perspective. What sort of relation? The speaker of a first-person restricted judgement does not have infallible knowledge about herself, she cannot provide you with evidence for her state but just display expressions that, if matching the characteristic

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170 This is, e.g., Hacker’s view, contested by Moyal-Sharrock, among others.
expressions of the assessment she states in her judgement, normally lead the addressee to accept that the speaker feels what she says she feels. This requires that the speaker is taken to be honest, of course. She can feign and her behaviour can be only sheer mimicry, but we do not always suspect that others deceive us; this only happens in specific occasions, when expressions somehow do not match the assessment and where there is an alleged purpose for being misleading. Likewise, the speaker of a third-person restricted judgement is not condemned to make educated guesses about the assessments made by at the subject she speaks about. Her report is not one of imperfect evidence because the subject she speaks about does not have perfect evidence to her own undergoings. It is best not to see find as an epistemic relation we have with a proposition acquired by direct evidence for the first-person case, and with indirect evidence for the third-person case. At least in English, third-person restricted judgements like Bea finds this cake tasty are unproblematic. The fact that in Japanese a marker is needed saying Bea shows signs of finding this cake tasty can be seen as confirming the importance of characteristic expressions.\footnote{And maybe and as showing how different cultures have different views on the kind of attitude towards others as soul [eine Einstellung zur Seele] (Wittgenstein 1958a §178) we have.} This suggests that, like avowals, restricted judgements do not merely depend on the internal psychological states, or rather, that psychological states of individuals are not purely internal.

To put it more daringly, we believe that in a restricted judgement I find this cake tasty or She finds this cake tasty, the verb find does not embed the proposition That this cake is tasty. The attitude verb find is not a propositional attitude verb. The asymmetry has to be taken at the core of this attitude verb, to stop seeing it as a mere fixer of an argument or index which may be the speaker herself or someone else.\footnote{We develop in chapter \[6\] the idea that attitude verbs like find are relations, a relation which is not equally given to the first- and third-person should be reduced to neither of these perspectives.} Restricted judgements, we propose, signal our affective responsiveness. We propose to think of find as an affective relation, as signaling a manner in which the matrix subject and the object under assessment relate, one which can be characterised via the adjective tasty and the expressions that typically come with it. This object is a motivating force that drives the agent in a certain direction. You can expect that the agent acts in certain ways and not others. It is subjective because it is affective, but it is visible and intersubjectively accessible.

Of course, the sentences I find this cake tasty or She finds this cake tasty can be seen as expressing propositions, but on this basis we may not conclude that the agent of the verb has evidence for the truth of That this cake is tasty. If we think of find as an affective relation, we see how in the suitcase-lifting scenario, my finding is neither confirmed nor refuted by someone else’s finding. Think of the third-person case: I say She finds this heavy, you carry it yourself and you say: She was right! Again, is her finding confirmed or refuted just because you have
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a similar experience? Maybe it is, but this is not a verification of our experience, it is a case of agreement in judgement.

We do not mean this to be a plea for expressivism. We do not claim that certain regions of natural language are descriptive and others are expressive or normative. When I say *I believe this box is heavy*, you may ask me: *Why?*, and I may show you a declaration of contents in which the owner of the suitcase indicates that there are 10 books inside. When I say *I find this box heavy*, then you may guess that this box is heavy but you may just as well reaffirm your idea that I am a very inexperienced carrier who does not know how to balance a small box on her shoulder. But suppose you, the experienced carrier, try to put it on your shoulder and then you exclaim: *Oh, but it is heavy!* My restricted judgement is, as it were, ratified. But if you agree with me, this is still not evidence for my first-person judgement. Does this mean that my expression is right? If so, in what sense? It seems that its rightness should be seen as righteousness: since you also find it heavy, you conclude that it *is* heavy. So did my expression give you any information about the weight of the box? In the end, it didn’t. A restricted judgement is not a representation of how the world may be, but rather a signal of how an agent stands in relation to its environment. Of course, we learn how to lie: I may tell you I find a suitcase heavy just to get you to carry it for me. The possibility of insincerity makes it clear that a restricted judgement expresses a proposition, even if the attitude verb *find* is not propositional. This is the main point we want to make.

What consequences should we draw, from what we have said so far, for a semantics of unrestricted judgements? We saw that it is not quite reasonable to claim that certainties are a particular kind of proposition. How about unrestricted judgements? Are unrestricted judgements a specific sort of proposition? This of course depends on how one conceives of propositions. Insofar as we can and do encounter denials of our taste judgements, of fun or beauty, one should admit that an unrestricted judgement is a proposition. Their negation is possible, imaginable and thinkable: both possibilities lie within the game.

Furthermore, we can lie about our tastes, our pains and our preferences. Deceit misinforms others about our undergoings and what can be expected from us. The lesson is that in order for it to be possible to lie and deceive, a lot has to be in place. To distinguish our gut feeling from what we say and the gestures we show requires that we recognise our own reactions and dissociate from them our outer expressions.

We want to say that unrestricted judgements express propositions, in that they specify contents, but on the other hand an unrestricted judgement, like a certainty, signals a pattern of behaviour that is visible to, and to some extent shared with and shaped by, our forebears and caretakers. So an unrestricted judgement may be said to express a proposition, as long as we see that its satisfaction is not given by states of affairs but rather by the satisfaction of the expectations that

\[^{173}\text{Cf., Wittgenstein 1997 288.}\]
such evaluations induce. We signal that we partake in a pattern of behaviour and gestures which are expected to be shared with others in the community. Gestures and behaviour that we let others expect and that we expect of others has to become part of our semantics. The challenge ahead is to provide a specification of how exactly this is possible.

4.3 Conclusion: normativity without rules

We wish to close this chapter with a bridge between our selective readings of Kant and Wittgenstein. We want to briefly discuss a point of contact between merely reflective judgement and the normativity of certainties, the junction of our explorations in this chapter. In Kant’s notion of merely reflective judgement, we found an epistemological characterisation of taste judgements which sheds light on their claim to universal agreement in spite of their lack of empirical grounds. In Wittgenstein’s social conception of the self, related to his late philosophy of psychology and epistemology, we saw how experience is coupled with characteristic gestures and behaviour which are at the center of the communicative moves we make with restricted judgements like I find this cake tasty and unrestricted judgements like This cake is tasty. We can try to put the pieces together and see that mere reflection leaves evaluative judgements ungrounded in the sense introduced in OC. Mere reflection yields certainties, and these belong the the framework within which, via reflection, we produce and assess empirical claims. When we express in unrestricted judgements the patterns of behaviour and reaction that go along our experiences, we expect others ought to partake in those patterns. This sort of exemplary necessity is ungrounded in that it lies beyond justification, but it is basic to hold the frame on which scientific knowledge is woven.

A necessary word of warning is that it is not our intention to provide a (neo) Kantian interpretation of OC\textsuperscript{174}, or a Wittgensteinean approach to Kant’s third Critique, if that is even possible. We do believe that one can see a critical task behind Wittgenstein’s work, including the bundle of observations edited as OC, as an investigation of the necessary conditions of possibility of language, meaning, communication, knowledge, psychological concepts, etc. However, this is not the occasion to do full justice to this claim, as it would become a discussion of its own going beyond our convenient perusal of the epistemological remarks we have reconstructed in this chapter.\textsuperscript{175} The point we will press is more specific, that is, we argue that there is a point in common between Kant’s conception of merely

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  \item \textsuperscript{174} Coliva [2010] argues that certainties can be seen as synthetic a priori judgements. We find this claim interesting but we neither support it here, nor will we touch upon it in these paragraphs, for lack of space. See other relevant articles in Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner [2007], part II.
  \item \textsuperscript{175} But see Leinfellner [1982] and more recently Hanna [2011] for an some discussion.
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4.3. Conclusion: normativity without rules

reflective judgement and Wittgenstein’s notion of certainty, namely, that they both make sense of how a claim can be normative without this being determined by rules, related to a basic and pre-linguistic normative attitude, which in both sorts of normativity have to do with the “primitive”. These notions play for each of these authors a key role in making empirical judgement possible. Reflective judgement allows us to bring particular objects under empirical concepts. Reflection is bare (‘blosse’) where we take our perception to be one that everyone who perceives the object ought to share, but where this is not based on the application of concepts or on the application of rules. One can see that mere reflection is ungrounded in the sense discussed in OC, as it subsumes the particular under the universal but “without any concept”. This does not mean that all content is non-conceptual, but rather that not all content is conceptual.

We saw that very much like avowals, restricted judgements are asymmetric but not due to there being an infallible or privileged observation that the subject ought to make. The asymmetry is due to the dual nature of our appetites, as an embodied experience is peculiar to each subject, but experience is conceptually inseparable from the gestural and behavioural reactions displayed by our fellow human beings. When we consider the unrestricted case, we see that these reactions are declared to be those which other members of our community ought to share, but that when disagreements arise, giving reasons is only possible where evidence and observation take place. In a taste dispute as a faultless disagreement, none of the dialogue partners has the upper hand, not because the judgements exchanged are based on subjective evidence, but because these judgements are simply not based on evidence. This implies that the concept of disagreement likewise has to be dissociated from evidence. Disagreement concerns how the interlocutors are prepared to act and how they expect each other to act. Faultless disagreements are not a result of there being a subjective determination of the truth-conditions or cognitive content of the proposition that the dialogue participants respectively assert and deny, but rather a clash of different ways to be oriented in the world. Our subjectivity, the existence of a self that is different from others, is revealed in a faultless disagreement. But why does such a conversation start anyway? To create community!

In both accounts revised here, the intersubjective agreement aimed at when uttering an unrestricted judgement is one that we can call ‘primitive’, in the sense that “the claim to agreement implicit in your response is not based on your recognition of the object as falling under a concept or satisfying a criterion”.

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176Cf., Kant [1790], §XX.
177Kant [1790], §XX.
178Ginsborg [2011a], p. 24. Here and in Ginsborg [2012], the author elaborates on primitive normativity as a key to escape the skeptical interpretation of the rule-following considerations in Kripke [1982]. Here we will not delve into this discussion, that is, on the debate around semantic normativity, mainly due to its vastness. What we find valuable is that this notion which, according to Ginsborg can account for how linguistic meaning is normative although this
We have seen how this notion has a Kantian pedigree in the way merely reflective judgement makes it possible for aesthetic judgement to demand the agreement of others. Certainties exemplify the sort of agreement in judgement that makes it possible to acquire concepts without presupposing that, for this, concepts are already in place. They act as a contingent bottomrock for which we often do not have reasons because they don’t involve evidential grounding or rules. Normativity without rules, this rara avis of epistemology, provides a meeting point for the primitive substrate of language and communication. Appropriateness preceding veridicality, that is the common core of the lesson we draw from this chapter for the semantics of evaluative judgements.

Interestingly, Wittgensteinean primitive normativity as the one in certainties and in unrestricted judgements like This cake is tasty involves, like Kant’s reflective judgement, an unspoken belief in the uniformity of nature which goes beyond what we can justify, and which is necessary for justification and scientific knowledge. This claim to the intelligibility and regularity of nature does not stem from a naive form of naturalism, but rather stands as a transcendental condition of possibility for normativity without rules.

Finally, let us make a note for the reader familiar with the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. One could try to summarise their positions as follows: while McDowell argues that all human experience is “conceptual all the way out”, Dreyfus presses on examples of skilful coping involves non-conceptual form of experience, to argue that not all experience involves concepts. McDowell can be seen as supporting a conceptualist epistemology, whereas Dreyfus lines up with the tradition in phenomenology that takes the practical aspect of human interaction with the world as being basic for all cognition.

A first observation we make here is that what we have examined in this chapter is whether certain judgements can make a claim to the agreement of others, where correctness is not guaranteed by concepts but where normativity is exemplary and ungrounded. Does this mean that the experience involved in a taste judgement is non-conceptual? It does if one endorses the view according to which pleasure results from the act of making a taste judgement, but we have seen that there are different positions in this respect. In any case, we would like to make sure that one does not convert this into an exclusive feature, to the effect that when concepts are involved in our taste judgements these cease to be legitimate judgements. We referred to the case of an expert who invokes refined conceptual knowledge normativity is not provided by oughts which rest on rules we agree upon, also plays a key role in the specific case of aesthetic judgement (understood broadly, i.e., as judgements related to a feeling or sensation, not just as assessments of the beauty or a related property of an object or work of art).

\[179\] Cf., Wittgenstein [1969], §95.
\[180\] Cf., Wittgenstein [1969], §472.
\[181\] The different stances and reactions in this debate can be found in Dreyfus [2005, 2007a,b] and in McDowell [2007a,b, 2008a,b].
to classify, e.g., sorts of coffee. If she would say *This ‘robusta’ is very tasty!*, her judgement is no less of a taste judgement than the layman’s judgement *This coffee is tasty!*

A second, more contentful observation is that if one puts more emphasis on the role of reflective judgment as the ability to generate concepts, one may see Kant in the third *Critique* as standing somewhat closer to Dreyfus than one might have guessed if one focused on the more intellectualist sort of position coming from, for instance, the first *Critique*. We generate concepts through the operations of comparison, reflection, and abstraction, where similar operations are involved in producing the feeling of pleasure (as free play of the faculties) while not terminating in a concept. So a conceptualist epistemology actually springs from primitive normativity. We do not want to press on this point to far here for it would require lengthy discussions to defend it in detail, discuss it, and qualify it. This is, however, the most salient way to see how this chapter would echo the debate.

The third and last observation is that a way of conceiving of skilful coping, namely as selective responsiveness to relevant affordances, is used in the next chapter to make sense of the intentionality of taste judgements. This will not be presented as a stance with respect to the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, but rather as a strategy to identify the specific aboutness of taste and similar judgements. We shall see that while in a way this deepens our inclination towards Dreyfus’s position, we will also move along McDowell’s objections to a naive distinction between the descriptive and the normative as distinct sorts of meaning.