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Religious regimes. Rethinking the societal role of religion in post-war Europe¹

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Introduction
At the end of the 19th century, new communities emerged across Europe which put forward new ways of thinking about the societal role of religion.² Ultramontane Catholics and revivalist Protestants broke away from the nation as the predominant moral community, proposing instead their own communities to be the locus of morality within the nation. In many European countries, these communities succeeded in claiming special arrangements for their communities. In some, like Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and to some extent in Germany, they proved capable of dominating modes of social organisation during the first half of the twentieth century. However, after the Second World War, the societal role of religion in Europe changed in apparently dramatic fashion, leading scholars to apply metaphors of death and dying to the history of Christianity since the 1960s.³

This post-war history of religion in Europe, which stresses disintegration, loss and discontinuity, inadequately accounts for the dynamic role of religion before and after the 1960s, its complex relationship to modes of social organisation and the ways in which
transformation of these modes come about through a combination of the development of competing visions of the social role of religion and manifest struggles for power. In this article, we argue in favour of the concept of ‘religious regimes’ to more aptly analyse the history of the place of religion in different European countries. In the first paragraph, we discuss the relevance of the concept of religious regimes for the history of religion against the background of existing conceptualisations of the role of religion in society. To demonstrate the significance of this approach, in the following paragraphs we will analyse the case of the Dutch post-war history of religion. By analysing the dynamics of religion in Dutch society since 1945 through the lens of religious regimes, we will prove to have been fundamentally shaped by the claims of competing – and not just religious – groups. The article concludes with an exploration of the insights this analysis of the Dutch case provides for future research.

Religious Regimes

Ever since religion became the object of scholarly attention, many different approaches have been developed to analyse its contents, functions and social embedding. The main historiographical traditions have struggled to come to terms with the history of religion in the second half of the twentieth century. The theory-based approaches stressing quantitative dimensions of religion, such as the French tradition of the history of mentalities or the German tradition of analysing religious milieus, subcultures or ‘pillars’ have interpreted this period as an era of decline. Neither have approaches which have less explicitly referred to a conceptual framework, such as the rich studies of Callum Brown and Hugh McLeod about the 1960s, managed to avoid the image of decay. Many of these studies seem to regard as religion only the specific forms and practices of religion which have been dominant in Western Europe roughly between 1850 and 1950. Closely connected to this narrative of
decay, the changing relationships between religious communities and the state is regularly framed as a gradual ‘modernization’ as differentiation. The disestablishment of state churches, the social equality of all religious groups and state neutrality vis-à-vis these groups are portrayed as the result of an all but inevitable historical development.  

The concept of religious regimes takes us beyond these narratives of decay and discontinuity. First developed to highlight the interplay between religion and the socio-political order by anthropologists such as Mart Bax and Peter van Rooden, we define a religious regime as an institutionalised arrangement regulating the social position of religion in a society during a certain period. This perspective therefore asks how different understandings of the role of religion have become dominant during different historical epochs. Crucially, religious regimes rarely result from a single vision of the role of religion, but represent a compromise between several competing views. The competition between these views explains why religious regimes are usually not comprehensively implemented, whilst also providing decisive insight into the process of transformation of religious regimes through shifts in the balance between groups representing different views of the desired social role or religion. Unlike Van Rooden then, we pertain that transformations from one religious regime to another usually present themselves not as radical ruptures between different regimes, but as gradual changes.

The concept of religious regimes has four general advantages. First, it historicizes religion. Religion is not regarded as a fixed entity, but as a dynamic one. It changes according to how people have understood and emplaced it. Second, it allows for a social and spatial contextualization. Because it requires the analysis of religion as a socially embedded phenomenon, the concept bridges the divide between the traditional history of religion and the broader perspective of the history of society. Such a connection necessitates mutual questioning: how did changes in the religious sphere relate to changes in other parts of
society? Were they instigators of social transformation or reactions to new circumstances? Regarding the spatial dimension, the concept questions the relationship between religious regimes and the national political order. The entanglements between ruling elites discussing preferred modes of organising religion and between religious groups staking out their claims, the transnational nature of many religious communities and the crucial role of reflections on developments throughout the world played in forming notions of the desired social role of religion call for an approach which acknowledges the importance of nation states without singling it out as an isolated entity. Instead, we should ask what the relation between local, regional, national, colonial and transnational religious regimes has been. Did the existing religious regimes at these various levels augment or challenge each other? Where did new visions of the role of religion originate, how did they disseminate and on what spatial scale could they be institutionalised?

Third, the vantage point of religious regimes makes us aware of the role of power. Although the power structures of religion are not usually a popular subject among believers and scholars on the subject, power plays an essential role both within religious communities and within the broader societal context in which religious communities are situated. Within the history of religious communities, issues of social control and struggles among religious leaders have traditionally been essential ingredients. Religion also provides a way to in- and exclude others and is thus part of the power structures which shape societies as a whole. In analysing religious regimes, the ways in which religious communities staked out their claims to shape the socio-political order are questioned. Critically, religious regimes have however not been shaped according to visions of religious communities themselves, but also by the other non-religious groups who exerted influence. Thus, the shifting coalitions and compromises between different religious and non-religious groups become elementary in understanding the dynamics of religious regimes.
This emphasis on power, fourthly, helps us to keep a critical distance to the recent history of religion, which has often been portrayed as a history of the liberation from the bonds of traditional religion.¹¹ Such accounts position a cultural revolution at the heart of post war history, which for better or worse supposedly led to emancipation and individual self-fulfilment. For example, according to Van Rooden, ‘the stress on consumption and individual self-fulfilment clashed radically with the unreflexive and authoritarian character of the religious practices of Christianity – and the latter collapsed.’¹² Consequently, he has not defined a new religious regime for the period after the 1960s.¹³ However, people have not ceased to be determined by what is expected from them since then. Michel Foucault has pointed to the changing shapes of power, calling attention to ‘a power that governs by freedom, not repression, and which reigns over people by regulating and positioning them, not excluding and institutionalizing them’.¹⁴ Since religion has not ceased to be of social relevance since the 1960s neither, it becomes necessary to consider the shape of the religious regimes since the 1960s.

We regard the history of religion in post-war Dutch society as a shift from a religious regime of segmented pluralism to a religious regime of national unity, caused by the interplay of three competing views which have been prevalent throughout Europe: segmented pluralism, the unified Christian nation and the unified secular nation. In the following paragraphs we will demonstrate the new insights the concept of religious regimes yields by analysing a case study about the role of religion in Dutch society since 1945. Dutch religious history has often been presented as a uniquely shaped by the processes of ‘pillarisation’ and ‘depillarisation’. This claim to unicity within the Netherlands served to urge societal changes in order to become a more regular country, or contrarily, to point out a national tradition to which the Dutch should hold firm. Internationally, the claim served to present the Netherlands as a rare and therefore interesting case.¹⁵ Instead, this article argues that the
history of religious regimes in the Netherlands is worthwhile not because of its alleged unicity, but because it yields insights into a development of the societal role of religion which connects the European histories of religion.

Segmented pluralism contested

During the transition from a country occupied by German forces back to an independent constitutional democracy in 1945, the societal role of religion in the future Netherlands was heavily contested. On the one hand, supporters of a restorative course insisted on a pivotal role for religious communities and their network of civic organisations, which had come to dominate society in the pre-war period. On the other hand, advocates of a more profound renewal of Dutch society favoured an order in which national unity would rise above divisions based on denominational affiliations. With these two contrasting visions a pre-war debate recurred under novel circumstances, striking a new balance in the contest between a view of a religious regime placing separate religious communities at the heart of Dutch society and two views of religious regimes regarding denominational differences as unwarranted, one informed by the goal of a unified Christian nation, one by the aspiration of a secular nation.

In the late nineteenth century, the development of highly integrated and isolated communities throughout Europe had challenged the traditional religious regimes which in many countries had bound a single denomination to the nation as a community. In the Netherlands, the rise of an Orthodox-Protestant, a Catholic and a social-democrat community contested the traditional assumption of a Protestant nation, which had been adhered to by liberal and conservative elites alike until that time. All three of these groups claimed themselves to constitute the moral heart of the nation instead. Orthodox Protestants at least referred to Protestantism as the key element of the Dutch nation, but proclaimed liberal
Protestants to have forsaken this tradition, positioning themselves as the true keepers of the Dutch Protestant flame. Catholics and social-democrats outright rejected such a Protestant tradition, claiming instead a position dating back to the ‘Catholic’ middle ages or deeming the worker class the moral heart of the nation. In staking out their claims both by articulating their ideas and by channelling these into practical attempts at organisation, the developments in Germany were an important foil for their Dutch neighbours: whilst liberal Protestants considered the advantages of the methods of the *Kulturkampf*, their challengers took to the methods employed by Catholics and social democrats in the 1870s and 1880s.

Eventually claiming a majority of the Dutch voters, the elites of these three communities set out to cement their position, thus establishing a new religious regime against the opposition of those adhering to the former regime of the Protestant nation and groups advocating a more radical reduction of the societal role of religion. The exact time of this transition has been debated in Dutch historiography. Van Rooden has dated it as early as the 1880s, pointing towards the successful establishment of the orthodox Protestant and Catholic in separate communities around that time. The influential political scientist Arend Lijphart has proclaimed the adoption of two major changes in the Dutch constitution in 1917 to be the critical divide in Dutch history in this period. The instalment of universal suffrage (for women in 1919) and the equal status of denominational schools and public schools regarding school funding by the state indeed served to consolidate the position of the three communities both through a majority of the votes and through the possibility of educating their youth in separate schools. Similar to our claim about the post-war transition to a new religious regime, the period from about 1880 to around 1930 can possibly best be described as a phase of gradual transition from the regime of the Protestant nation to the regime of segmented pluralism.
Although the constitutional changes in 1917 do point towards the new combined power of orthodox Protestants, Catholics and social-democrats to influence governmental arrangements to their advantage, their position was not undisputed thereafter. The 1920s saw a prolonged battle for similar arrangements in the developing broadcasting services, where advocates of a national broadcasting service comparable to the British Broadcasting Corporation opposed supporters of a broadcasting service dominated by the broadcasting associations representing different denominational and ideological communities. It was only after a long and halting public debate that a government dominated by Catholics and orthodox Protestants dealt the latter view the upper hand: four broadcasting associations – one Catholic, one orthodox Protestant, one social democrat and one general – would each have 20 percent of the available broadcasting time at their disposal. The remaining 20 percent was available for general items such as the news bulletins and for smaller associations such as the liberal Protestant broadcasting organisation. This arrangement, which is cited by Arend Lijphart as a prime example of segmented pluralism in practice\textsuperscript{22}, thus turns out to be a compromise between those who wanted one national broadcasting service and those claiming the available time for their associations: 60 percent of the available time was allocated to representatives of the three communities claiming moral superiority for their own group, 40 percent was in the hands of groups contesting their claim and aspiring the moral unity of the nation instead. The religious regime of segmented pluralism thus not just appears as a compromise between three groups claiming their own space within the framework of the nation. It was also a contested regime, which could not be implemented comprehensively.

The balance of power between these different visions of the societal role of religion slowly shifted in the post war-period. During the years of German occupation, the call for national unity had strengthened. Both the Christian and the secular nation thus came to the fore as possible alternatives for the pre-war institutionalization of segmented pluralism. The
vision of the unified Christian nation was above all invigorated by members of the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlands Hervormde Kerk). During the German occupation, they had debated why their church had not done more to ward off National Socialism. This resulted in concrete plans to build up an institute which would reach out to estranged societal groups such as workers. It also gave fuel to a broader movement to turn the Dutch Reformed Church into a ‘Christ-avowed church of the people’. Several members of this church became champions of national Christian unity, publicly questioning the old institutions of segmented pluralism.

In political matters, the push for unity was embodied by Protestant ministers such as Willem Banning joining ranks with former Social Democrats and Liberal politicians to found the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) in 1946. Even before the party was founded, a group of seven prominent ministers publicly announced that they regarded the 1937 Social Democrat program to be a meaningful starting point for Christian politics. Religious views could to their mind not predetermine political views. Therefore, founding socio-political organisations on the basis of a separate denomination was pointless. According to the authors of the pamphlet which explained this position, it would make more sense to define practical political goals and cooperate with whoever shared these goals. The program of the former Social Democrat party could to the minds of these ministers serve as a starting point for such cooperation across the boundaries of denominations. The new party, which they joined, distanced itself from pre-war politics by choosing a new name and by stressing the open nature of the organisation: it did not hold any religion or ideology above others, but wanted to give room to citizens from different backgrounds to cooperate pragmatically in political matters. This openness was stressed by the institution of study groups for Protestants, Catholics and secular Humanists within the party.
A similar push for inclusive organisation also took place within the trade union movement. Here, the Dutch Reformed commission for ‘Church and Trade Union Movement’ played a pivotal role. Through this commission the church established regular contacts to the Social Democrat trade union, Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (NVV) and questioned the segmentation within the movement. In 1946, it issued a statement claiming ‘the separation of the trade union movement in Christian and non-Christian organisations cannot be regarded as self-evident’. The commission urged workers from both organisations to strive for a new, joint union which would ‘act in accordance with the demands of the Word of God in all its activities’. In the meantime, the committee tried to find middle ground between speaking out on behalf of either the Christian trade unions or the supra-denominational NVV. This half-hearted stance reflected the internal division within the Dutch Reformed Church, where the faction aiming at a new Christian national unity was opposed by sympathisers of social segmentation along denominational lines.

Within the ranks of both the PvdA and the NVV, the boundary between those who strove for a unity inspired by Christianity and those aspiring a secular unity was unclear in practice. This lack of clarity was caused by the similar political views held by both groups, which in both instances resulted in attempts to loosen the ties between religious communities and civil society and adopt policies directed at general welfare. This made it easy for their opponents to characterise the movement for more unity as a socialist, secular project. For example, after NVV-official Ad Vermeulen had presented an international conference with his unions’ claim of inclusivity and labelled the resistance of Catholic bishops concerning this issue a breach of individual rights in 1949, both Catholics and orthodox Protestants rejected his speech as socialist and disrespectful vis-à-vis the Dutch Catholic community. An organisation which harboured officials who did not respect the opinions of those holding on to their denominational identity could not at the same time claim to represent all of the Dutch
workers. The effect of the call for unified organisations thus remained relatively small. The pre-war associations remained influential, although the post-war order was at the same time shaped by overarching boards, which acknowledged the need to co-operate. Nonetheless, the support for the attempts to create unified bodies in the fields of politics and trade unions in some Christian circles cannot be understood without recognizing the appeal of a vision of unity inspired by a missionary Christianity rather than secularism.

Bridging divides: the post-war welfare state

The contest between a vision of separate religious communities at the heart of Dutch society and two visions regarding denominational differences as unwarranted tilted in the course of the fifties. The latter two visions slowly gained more influence, as can be seen in the development of the Dutch welfare state. In this field, the balance between self-organised communities and a common infrastructure provided by the state had heavily favoured self-organisation before the Second World War. Compared to other European countries, Dutch social provisions had long remained underdeveloped. With the exception of the social-democrats, the political parties preferred a mixed system that would combine a minimum of state regulations with the responsibility of civil society, often religious organisations. After 1945, social security became one of the main elements of the political consensus. Especially in the years from 1957 to 1967 welfare provisions were rapidly expanded. In those years, the Dutch welfare state became ‘one of the most comprehensive, generous, and passive of its sort’.  

The preference for the domination of civil society in social and health policy until the 1960s can be traced back to the religious regime of segmented pluralism. According to this view, which was advocated in particular by both orthodox Protestant and Catholic politicians in slightly different versions, every community was entitled to the freedom to organise health
and social facilities in its own way. However, during their exile in London members of the Dutch government developed the notion of a unified national social security system, in which state provisions would be more important than the freedom of communities to organise themselves. Within such a system of social security, communities would be represented by the state. This idea was inspired by international developments regarding social security, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter (1941) as ‘freedom from want’, and in William Beveridge’s *Social insurance and allied services* (1942).\(^{30}\) After the Second World War, the responsibility of the national state for social provisions and health care was no longer debated. Religious divisions were suppressed in favour of a pragmatic approach, which was focused on rebuilding the country and providing citizens with much-desired security.\(^{31}\) The pursuit of ‘social life assurance’ for all civilians was formulated to guide the post-war social policy.\(^{32}\) Instead of gifts of charity, health and social security thus became rights guaranteed by the state. The focus of debate on social policy therefore shifted towards questions concerning the required extent of intervention by the state.

This new notion of social security and state regulations, which proliferated throughout Western Europe, regarded individual membership of the national community as more important than membership of a religious community. However, segmented pluralism remained influential in the early post-war years. During the 1950s a system of inclusivist social laws was developed. This system included such regulations as the General Old Age Insurance Law of 1957. Although the new post-war legislation rooted in a vision of society as a national community, (religious) civil society organisations remained dominant in its implementation during the 1950s. For example, civil society organisations could receive grants from the department for social work. This department was intended to assist private initiative ‘in accordance with its own nature and responsibility to ensure execution of tasks’ according to minister Marga Klompé. Historian Patrick Pasture has therefore stated that the
Dutch system of social security of the 1950s was ‘largely organised under public law and with public finances, but in practice the state had only limited functions while the social partners remained largely responsible for its administration, execution and even supervision’. In the building-up of the welfare state segmented pluralism and national unity were combined. The post-war welfare state thus bridged visions of the societal role of religion influential at the same time.

The welfare state would also become a bridge diachronically, accommodating the transition from the regime of segmented pluralism to the regime of national unity. This transition was enabled not only by the growing influence of views on religion as a binding rather than an excluding element among politicians and bureaucrats, but also by changing opinions among both clergy and laity about their role in society. During the 1950s, religious leaders valued personal belief over collective rituals and presented themselves as critical prophets in society instead of part of the establishment. This new self-conception suggested a smaller role in the field of social security. The Poor Law of 1912 had preferred private and church-related social security. This was overturned by the realization of the General Assistance Act [Algemene Bijstandswet, ABW] at the beginning of the 1960s, often considered the keystone of the Dutch welfare state. At the presentation of the law to the parliament in 1962 the responsible Catholic ministers stated the duty of the state to provide social security and the disappearance of the role of the churches. ‘The realization of social security and social justice’ the ministers wrote in their explanation of the law, ‘has become one of the main responsibilities of the state and is one of the characteristics of the welfare state.’ This view was hardly controversial.

A new self-image developed by many civil society organisations similarly paved the way for the changes in the Dutch system of social security to match a religious regime of national unity. The trend to strife for a more professional outlook and to leave members and
clients room for individual self-fulfilment loosened their ties to religious communities and made them look towards the state for financial support. For example, the board of management of Sonneheerdt, an orthodox Protestant institute of blindcare drastically revised its self-image during the late 1950s and 1960s. Had they formerly regarded both the blind and the nursing staff as different parts of the same family, management now stated that the institute was neither a home nor a guesthouse, and the ‘staff should not be regarded as family’. The board first and foremost wanted its staff to be professional: ‘There is a difference between staff today and in the past. Previously people acted out of vocation. Now they want to isolate themselves in their spare time. The blind have to let go of the idea of total care. They should emancipate’. The former vision of ‘total care’, which had included the joint participation in the religious life of the institute with collective rituals such as prayers and churchgoing, was abandoned. Religious provisions were left to local churches and ministers.

On the one hand, professionalization of care can be regarded as secularization through differentiation. On the other hand, the process of professionalization should not be regarded as just a form of secularization. Religious inspiration remained important to organisations such as Sonneheerdt, which continued to recruit its board and staff predominantly among orthodox Protestants. However, the board and the staff took a step back in stimulating and regulating the religious life of the institute. This gradual transformation, which was brought on voluntarily in many parts of Dutch civil society, can most accurately be interpreted in terms of a shift to a new religious regime. Within the new regime religious life was primarily regarded as a matter of the individual. Professionalization was aimed for because it was seen as the best way to supervise the process of self-realization of the care-receivers. This aim fitted the new orientation of the 1960s well: individual self-fulfilment and consumerism replaced community-oriented and often hierarchical religious practices.
Clashes and new arrangements

The growing influence of visions of national unity would result in a decisive blow to the regime of segmented pluralism in the 1960s, which may be illustrated most clearly by the developments of the Catholic community. Since support for the arrangement had dwindled among social democrats around the founding of the PvdA in 1946, the majority in favour of segmented pluralism was unstable. Only Catholics and orthodox Protestants held on firmly to the ideal of segmented organisation. Small bursts in the Catholic stronghold had been evident: a group of Catholics had refused to fall in line with their bishops after these had urged their flock not to join organisations aimed at denominational inclusivity such as the PvdA.\(^{39}\)

The issuing of a pastoral letter in 1954 once more urging Catholic believers to remain faithful to distinct Catholic organisations had evidenced further signs of discord. The need for such an exhortation made it clear that not all Catholics were convinced of the need for loyalty to the ideal of segmentation. Less visible, but just as striking was the disunity among the Dutch Catholic bishops during the conception of the letter. Whereas one group wanted to repeat an unequivocal ban on membership in organisations labelled dangerous by the bishops, several younger bishops saw the need to leave room for the conscience and personal responsibility of believers.\(^{40}\) A similar insecurity about the significance of Catholicism for social commitment spoke from the appeal to the Catholic social organisations by the bishops in the same year to elaborate a ‘Catholic social program’. The request was fulfilled by a group of Catholic scholars, who published a series of books titled *Prosperity, welfare and happiness* (*Welvaart, welzijn en geluk*) published between 1960 en 1965 to the lively attention of the officials looking to formulate the identity of their Catholic organisations anew.\(^{41}\)
With the advent of the Second Vatican Council, these attempts to formulate new positions became more pressing and more radical. In instating the council, Pope John XXIII had sought to redefine the church’s outlook on the world by placing an open dialogue at its centre. The council regarded the church, explicitly including the laypeople, as the people of God. In its constitution, the council stated it to be the task of the clergy to support the ordinary believers to fulfil the real task of the church: to carry their Catholic faith out into the world. The proclaimed redefinition of the relationship between laypeople and clergy as equal partners for example led union officials to question the role of the clerical advisor who was representing the bishops within the Catholic union. In 1964, the bishops made it known that the role of these advisors had up till now been defined negatively as custodians of church doctrine, although the board members of Catholic associations themselves were perfectly capable of making decisions in line with their faith. Clerical advisors could be called upon by them for spiritual counsel, but were to do so in the service of the laypeople, not as their commanders. The Dutch Catholic hierarchy did not just loosen the ties with their own flock, they also became more open to the idea of cooperation across denominational boundaries. Thus, in 1965 they renounced the ban on membership in the NVV. The official reaction by its Catholic counterpart acknowledged the freedom the bishops conceded to the individual to make personal choices about social engagement. However, in private conversations with church representatives, union officials showed signs of disorientation. What need was there for a Catholic trade union when Catholics could just as well join other unions and the practical differences between their own organisation and the NVV were more and more negligible?

Such debates about the meaning of faith for societal engagement were widespread among Catholics in the 1960s. As a result, the formerly Catholic national newspaper *De Volkskrant* discarded its subtitle ‘Catholic daily newspaper for the Netherlands’ in 1965. In
1967, Catholic political leadership decided to study the possibilities of a merger with its Protestant political counterparts. At the same time, discussions within the Catholic trade union resulted in the conclusion that although social engagement inspired by faith was desirable, a separate trade union was not. In the face of growing consensus between the members of the existing separate unions, a merger would result in an organisation in which Catholics could cooperate more effectively with people from different backgrounds in order to obtain the goals they were now trying to achieve independently.

With this transformation of Catholic thought and organisational practice, the stronghold of the regime of segmented pluralism fell. This however did not result in a sudden collapse of the institutionalised practice which had carried the regime up till then. The changes in the allocation of broadcasting rights may serve as an example once more. The aforementioned 1930 compromise had divided 80 percent of the time available between a neutral, a Protestant, a Catholic and a Social Democrat association. In 1965, a new compromise was reached for radio and television broadcasting. This new regulation did not end the essential role of broadcasting associations as the organisations fashioning the actual content of the radio and television program. The strict partition was replaced by a more fluent one, which stipulated that the amount of broadcasting time an association would receive depended on the number of members it could muster. New associations not associated with the order of segmented pluralism could thus claim airtime after the new regulations were implemented in 1969. The power of the old broadcasting associations was not radically abolished by this arrangement. Instead, they were slowly but surely overshadowed by new, more popular associations – as was the case in the field of health and social services.
The dominance of the religious regime of segmented pluralism, which had developed from the 1880s through to the 1920s, was overturned in the course of the 1950s to the 1970s by the combined force of Christian and secular views on national unity. Both traditions stressed the need to transcend denominational boundaries in public life and were critical of those who stressed religious difference. The common trait of these traditions can be found in their vantage point, which is the responsibility of each citizen to make his own choices concerning societal activities. These choices could be based on religious convictions on an individual level. Social activities should however not be restricted to a single denominational community, but be in accordance with bridging intentions. Thus, this new regime of national unity did not exclude religious traditions from society altogether, but called upon them to inspire purposes common to all citizens, instead of creating differences between them. For example, the Christian philosopher Feitse Boerwinkel titled one of his most influential publications *Inclusief denken. Een andere tijd vraagt een ander denken* (*Inclusive thinking. Another time requires another way of thinking*), pleading for a respectful encounter between different religions and world views.\(^5^3\)

Although traces of the regimes of segmented pluralism remain visible in institutions until today, the Christian and secularist visions were further institutionalised since the 1970s. The welfare sector, the universities and social movements provide prime examples of this institutionalization. Social movements of feminists and gays for example, that fiercely opposed the representatives of segmented pluralism, developed their own institutes thanks to subsidies of the state.\(^5^4\) Until the 1990s the view of the Christian nation was predominant. One of the most important examples can be found in Dutch politics, where the Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) appeared on the stage as a Christian-democratic political party in 1980. The CDA resulted from a merger between the Catholic party and two large orthodox Protestant counterparts after a long process of deliberation. Like no other new organisation,
this political party signified the trend towards a new understanding of religion: though professing a ecumenical Christian identity, the party stressed it welcomed anyone supporting its political goals.\textsuperscript{55} Its adherence to an inclusivist religious outlook can also be discerned in its politics vis-à-vis civil society. Heading government in the 1980s its leaders proposed to restore the economy by replacing the expensive and anonymous state care by a ‘caring society’ which would rely on familial and communal care. This revaluation of religious civil society however did not mark the return of a civil society divided by religious differences. Instead, the CDA stressed active individual citizenship aided by professional private organisations.\textsuperscript{56}

The view of the Christian nation did not just become a major force in Dutch politics, but also on the streets. As James Kennedy has argued religion ‘served as the motivation for the forms of social action that characterised the Netherlands from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s’.\textsuperscript{57} This can be seen in the Dutch peace movement, which organised vast demonstrations around 1980. Within this movement, the churches and religious organisations such as Pax Christi and IKV played a central role.\textsuperscript{58}

The dominance of the Christian nation view declined during the 1980s, as private spirituality and a local commitment of churches became the norm: a development that gave room to the predominance of a secular view of the nation. The revision of the Dutch constitution in 1983 had a twofold relevance in this respect. On the one hand it stressed the dominance of the new regime of national unity, allowing for an equal approach to any religious community based on the equality of their members. The new constitution stressed individual rights, symbolically positing the right to equal treatment of all individual citizens and their safeguarding from discrimination as the first article. On the other hand religious institutions were arguably marginalised, as references to religious institutions were
eliminated, the last remaining ties to Protestant churches severed and the provision allowing
the prohibition of religious processions was annulled.59

The opposition against the ideal of a Christian nation after the 1960s was of little
consequence until the 1980s. In reaction to the transformations in the religious landscape
some groups organised themselves on the basis of a conservative religious identity by means
reminding of earlier segmented communities. Evangelicals and Pietists in the Netherlands
had never obtained a major impact on society at large, but from the 1960s onwards they
constructed networks aiming to influence the public sphere. From these networks a
broadcasting company was founded in 1965 and a new political party in 1975.60 In the 1970s
and 1980s pietistic groups erected a new network of organisations with the aim of guarding
their people against liberal Christians and the secular world, comprising among other
institutions an independent newspaper and schools.61 For these groups the dividing lines
between believers and non-believers and above all the line between orthodox and liberal
believers were as important as they were to large parts of Dutch society before the Second
World War. Because the decline of the regime of segmented pluralism they were convinced
they had to take new initiatives, which were modelled after practices common to the
communities which had been dominant in earlier days.62

The notion of an inclusive Christian nation was more seriously contested by the vision
of a united secular nation, as can be illustrated by the approach to Islam in Dutch society
during the last decades. During the 1970s and 1980s policymakers had categorised migrants
as ethnic minorities who ‘should be given a chance to emancipate while preserving and
further developing their own cultural identity’ as Catholics and orthodox Protestants had done
in the past. Due to the developments of an international Islamic movement, and especially the
regime change in Iran, the category of ‘Muslim migrants’ was invented and religion became
an important marker in this field of policy. The state-subsidised construction of an Islamic
civil society, which had been advocated by the Christian Democrats, was increasingly confronted by secular critics, who pleaded to sever the relations between the state and religious organisations.63

In the 1990s the perspective of ethnic minorities was replaced by a more individualistic one which regarded integration as a two-way process. At the same time, Islam was increasingly viewed as a dangerous adversary of the modern liberal democracy.64 In this respect, emphasis was and is regularly placed on the outward and exclusive elements of this religion, which are supposed to be at odds with the perception of religion as private and inclusive, as became clear from the recent prohibition of face-covering headscarves.65 Public debate since the 1990s tends towards a dominance of the secular nation, with widespread support for a ban on ritual slaughter as an important indication in the very recent past.66 However, explicit attempts at marginalising Islamic communities have also reasserted the Christian character of the Dutch nation. For example, the populist politician Pim Fortuyn claimed the Netherlands were shaped by a joint Judeo-Christian-Humanist tradition, to which Islam in its current forms was ill-suited.67

Thus, the regime of national unity which was gradually established in the post-war years is itself an unstable coalition between a Christian and a secularist interpretation of national unity. Since the 1970s religion is mainly seen as a private matter and therefore should only assert itself in society if it serves ‘public well-being’. Although the regime was also challenged by religious groups claiming minority rights or outright criticising dominant morality, the main instability of the regime stems from the shifting balance between the Christian and the secularist inclusivist vision. In reacting to the challenges of religious minorities, these visions clashed over whether to demand adhesion to secular norms, or to give priority to respecting religious freedom.
Lessons from the Dutch case

The analysis of recent Dutch history through the lens of religious regimes thus yields fascinating insights about the way religion’s role in society is defined and transformed over time, which may inform future research on the societal roles of religion. A first noteworthy observation concerns the succession of religious regimes. Transitions between religious regimes may in some instances occur as radical ruptures, but in recent Dutch history religious regimes have rather replaced each other through a gradual development in which new views of the desired role of religion came to be accepted and institutionalised even as some held on to formerly dominant views. The post-war construction of Dutch welfare regulation as a system dominated by the state instead of civil society is a case in point: whereas the pre-war arrangements leaned heavily on civil society, the early post-war regulations slowly shifted responsibility to the national state. A new series of laws from the late 1950s onwards then completely cleared civil society of its primarily responsibilities in the domains of welfare and health.

This perspective therefore provides an alternative perspective to the one-sided notion of religious decay since the 1960s. The gradual rise of a new religious regime of national unity, replacing the regime of segmented pluralism, shows how religious traditions could maintain societal presence under different arrangements. It highlights the importance of the ways in which believers have changed their own minds on the proper societal role of religion during the post-war era, as well as stressing the need to look beyond religious communities in order to understand the shape of religious regimes.

Secondly, it seems crucial to note that different religious regimes may become dominant over time, but in the Dutch case were not accepted equally by all parts of society. The constant challenging of religious regimes is not just an important aspect of the development of single religious regimes, but also a key in understanding the ways in which
transitions from one regime to the next have come to pass. Just as in many instances welfare regulations appear to have been compromises between adherents of different views of the societal role of religion, the regulations in the Dutch pre-war broadcasting system made allowances for those who advocated segmented pluralism and those adhering to visions of a unified nation. This was achieved by transferring many responsibilities to the broadcasting associations of the well-organised denominational and ideological communities, but also leaving 40% of the available broadcasting time to associations advocating other viewpoints. The new regulations of the 1960s modified this compromise in favour of the currently dominant stance by abolishing the pre-determined allocation and installing a system which distributed broadcasting time based on the amount of members broadcasting associations could muster.

In the third place, the relationship between religious traditions and religious regimes becomes a crucial field of investigation. Whereas Van Rooden had suggested an alignment between religious regimes and the views of dominant religious groups, our own investigation has proffered a more ambiguous result. Whereas the consecutive religious regimes established in the Netherlands were all supported by the related views of religious communities, they could only become dominant because these views were not only shared across different religious communities, but also across groups which were not related to a specific denominational tradition such as social-democrats. Religious communities moreover have frequently transformed their views on the preferred relationship between their faith and its societal impact. As we have pointed out, the changing relationship between religious civil society and the state resulted from a new self-perception among civic organisations themselves. Thus, the views on the proper role of religion inside and outside religious communities are constantly evolving, changing the ways in which religion becomes
institutionalised. In turn, such institutional arrangements have played an important role in defining both proper religion and the accepted social roles.69

The characteristics of the new regime of national unity, with its preference for bridging rather than bonding social activities and a critical stance towards those who stress difference seems to extend beyond the realm of religion. Is this trend towards an at once more individualistic and a more inclusivist interpretation of religion position in social life fed by sources also at work in other parts of society? Regarding religion as an integral part of social history thus challenges the notion that religion might be regarded as an entity which can be separated neatly from other domains of society such as politics.70

Finally, an analysis of the Dutch case through the lens of religious regimes undermines a perspective focusing on purportedly unique national development, without losing sight of the importance of the nation state in defining the social role of religion. National arrangements especially in the fields of legislation, cooperation between the state and churches and relations between civil society and state bodies have profoundly shaped religious regimes in the era under review. At the same time, the limits of a national perspective have come into view: not just the Catholic Church, but many other religious communities also crossed state borders regarding their organisational structures.71 The exchange of interpretations of religious traditions has always been markedly transnational in its shape.

The attempts by different religious communities to position themselves within their respective nation states were at once unique episodes, but also examples of similar developments, which were often informed by the attempts of communities in other parts of the world. Likewise the reactions to these attempts by other groups, as instances ranging from the Dutch attentiveness to the German Kulturkampf in the 19th century to the international debate on the relationship between Islam and the West in the 21st century show. Moreover,
international treaties, such as the post-war human rights declarations, shaped the debates about and drew limits for the relationship between religious communities and the states in which they were situated. Regional and transnational identities have continuously challenged the dominance of national identities and the religious regimes attached to national identities.

European integration specifically has developed into a challenge to the dominance of religious regimes oriented towards the nation. The debates about a reference to God in the European constitution and recent decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union – for example about state funding of religious organisations which do not grant women equal rights – thus highlight the growing importance of transnational arenas for the mediation of the role of religion. Taking their cue from such debates, scholars of religion may at once find common ideas and practices across Europe as well as national differences in those instances where European regulations have been disputed or implemented in different manners. The concept of religious regimes may serve such future research by providing a fruitful perspective on the discourses regulating the role of religion in society.

1 This article traces back to discussions at the conference on ‘Regimes of religious pluralism in 20th-century Europe, which was held in Amsterdam, April 19-21, 2012 (a report is available at: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=4286). The authours would like to thank the participants of the conference for their thought-provoking contributions. They would also like to thank Benjamin Ziemann, the anonymous reviewers for Contemporary European History and the editors at the journal for their insightful comments on earlier version of this article.


the problematic status of Mart Bax’ scholarly work, see: Michel Baud, Susan Legêne, Peter Pels, *Circumventing reality. Report on the anthropological work of professor emeritus M.M.G. Bax* (Amsterdam 2013). These severe problems notwithstanding, his conceptual insights into the interplay of religion and power remains valid.


13 Van Rooden tends to use characterise the post-sixties period as an epoch of secularization, cf. Van Rooden, ‘Dutch concepts’.


24 A similar reaction could be observed among German Protestants, see Jens Murken, ‘Gesellschaftspolitische Neuorientierungen des Protestantismus in den fünfziger Jahren. Tagungsbericht’ in: Norbert Friedrich and Traugott Jähnichen ed.,
Gesellschaftspolitische Neuorientierungen des Protestantismus in der Nachkriegszeit
(Münster: LIT, 2002) 145-151; Martin Greschat, Protestanten in der Zeit. Kirche und
Gesellschaft in Deutschland vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,
1994) 167-168; Ralf Jürgen Treidel, Evangelische Akademien im Nachkriegsdeutschland.
Gesellschaftspolitisches Engagement in kirchlicher Öffentlichkeitsverantwortung (Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 2001).

25 Jan Buskes e.a., Wat bezielt ze? (Amsterdam: Amsterdamsche Boek- en
Courantmaatschappij, 1945).

polarisatiestrategie (1945-1966)’, Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der

Hervormde Kerk. Verklaringen, kanselafkondigingen, boodschappen, herderlijke brieven en
rapporten, uitgevaardigd door of namens de generale synode der Nederlandse Hervormde

28 ‘De samenwerking in gevaar?’, Herstel 26 (1948-49) 32-33, 1; ‘Een veelbesproken rede’,
van het CNV (Hilversum: Verloren, 2009) 207; Frits de Jong and Rob Neij, Naar groter
eenheid. De geschiedenis van het Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 1906-1981

29 Kees van Kersbergen, ‘Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands’, in: Kees van
Kersbergen and Phillip Manow eds., Religion, class coalitions and welfare states
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 119-145; Ido de Haan, Zelfbestuur en
staatsbeheer. Het politieke debat over burgerschap en rechtsstaat in de twintigste eeuw
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1993) 92-93. For this paragraph we also used an unpublished article of George Harinck about the Dutch Welfare State.


31 De Haan, Zelfbestuur, 93-97.


actieve vrouwelijke religieuze in Nederland in de 19e en 20e eeuw (Hilversum: Verloren, 2010).

38 Van Rooden, ‘Dutch concepts to express religious difference’, 136-150.

39 On dissenting Dutch Catholics, see Paul Luykx, Andere katholieken. Opstellen over Nederlandse katholieken in de twintigste eeuw (Nijmegen: SUN, 2000).


44 ‘De bisschoppen van Nederland aan de nationale besturen van Katholieke organisaties in Nederland’, 24-03-1964, Katholiek Documentatiecentrum: KAB/NKV, nr. 5772.


