Political actors playing games: Theory and experiments
Kamm, A.

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Political actors exert enormous influence over our daily lives. Their influence on economic activities cannot be underestimated. Voters determine the distribution of political power, political candidates choose policy platforms that they intend to enact if elected, and legislators bargain to arrive at laws. Understanding political actors’ behavior is therefore essential for explaining economic outcomes. This thesis follows the tradition of the political economy literature and considers the effect of institutional rules on the behavior of three types of political actors: voters, candidates, and negotiators. It does so by combining insights from game-theoretic models and controlled laboratory experiments.

Specifically, this thesis analyzes voter behavior in mandatory and voluntary voting regimes; investigates how candidate behavior differs between plurality voting and proportional representation as well as what role coalition governments play in this context; and explores bargaining behavior in asymmetric environments.

Aaron Kamm holds a BSc degree in economics from Mannheim University and a MPhil in economics from the Tinbergen Institute. After graduating from the Tinbergen Institute, he joined the Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED) at the University of Amsterdam to write his dissertation. His main fields of interest are Experimental Economics and Political Economy. In September 2015, he joined New York University Abu Dhabi as a Post-Doctoral Associate.
POLITICAL ACTORS PLAYING GAMES
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POLITICAL ACTORS PLAYING GAMES

Theory and Experiments

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Aaron

Amsterdam, June 2015

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