Dismantling the Pink Door in the Apartheid Wall: Towards a Decolonized Palestinian Queer Politics

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ABSTRACT

This essay engages with over a decade of Palestinian queer organizing and addresses how a politics around gender and sexuality takes shape within a context of occupation and Zionist settler colonialism. In conjunction, it identifies and analyses the way in which Israel’s pinkwashing project is rooted in a single-issue identity politics akin to the universalization of hegemonic western LGBT politics as the emancipatory model par excellence. Within pinkwashing Palestinian queers can only become recognizable as victims of their society and through a language of gay rights. Visibility, pride, coming-out, and gay rights circulate as dominant frameworks imposed on Palestinian queers to understand their struggle. However, Palestinian queer groups emphasize the necessity to understand the complexity of the Palestinian queer struggle as inherently anti-colonial. This essay argues for a queer politics around gender and sexuality that does not operate in isolation, but is rather responsive to and part of a larger political context of Palestinian liberation.

During the last decade, crucial political events, transformative personal journeys and complicated organizational decisions shaped the Palestinian queer movement’s current (sexual) politics. The movement actively situates its work, discourse and analysis within a broader understanding of the colonial context of Palestine. There are two groups that are especially vocal and active in developing comprehensive decolonizing strategies that target both LGBT and queer issues and the broader political context of occupation and Zionist settler colonialism. 1 The first is alQaws for Sexual and Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society, the national Palestinian LGBTQ organization,
which focuses on creating an intersectional and continued analysis of the political context, the creation of a discourse on sexual and gender diversity, and the formation of community and community resources, and, in extension, works on articulating an analysis of pinkwashing – the promotion of Israeli gay life and gay rights to obscure Israel’s ongoing occupation and settler colonial system – and a praxis of anti-pinkwashing work both locally and internationally. The second group, Palestinian Queers for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (PQBDS) – a grassroots activist collective that came out of alQaws – engages in important civil society debates around ending Zionist settler colonialism through clearly defined strategies of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions.²

In order to understand the geopolitical material reality in which Palestinian queer activism takes shape, we first look at the history and trajectory of Palestinian queer organizing. Palestinian queer politics is ultimately configured as a project of decolonization and anti-colonialism, therefore it is necessary to understand how it is interpellated by pinkwashing and how it needs to both formulate a response to this incitement to discourse, while at the same time seeks to renegotiate queer meanings and desires within the context of Palestinian daily life. Second, we discuss the politics of pinkwashing as they are mired in Israel’s Zionist settler colonialism and occupation, and hegemonic global schemes of Islamophobia, anti-Arab hatred, and gay imperialism. Last, we discuss the implication of queer activism in Palestine on thinking about solidarity and the creation of counter-hegemonies. We discuss how the dismantling of the pinkwashing project by the queer movement has shifted the debate on the meaning of (transnational) queer politics. But, before we begin we need to situate the trajectory of the term queer in Palestine.

Queer began to be used as a reaction to the political limitations of hegemonic depoliticized LGBT frames and lack of language related to discourses around gender and sexuality. Although one of the focal points, especially for alQaws, is to generate an alternative discourse around sexual and gender diversity, terms such as, lesbian, trans, bi and gay, but also queer, are used as a way to reach out to different target groups. In this sense, language takes up a pragmatic position. alQaws uses LGBT and queer in Arabic and English, as these identities and terms circulate within a global economy of universalized western style sexual politics with which people are confronted daily and which some individuals and groups across Palestinian society adopt and identify with despite its limitations. Yet, there is a strong awareness of the charged and historically rooted context of their emergence and the necessity of a discourse specific to the local cultural and political context.

The use of the term queer is more a matter of affiliation with and transformation of a political lens of analysis than an identity politics or a mimicking of US style sexual emancipation. alQaws’ use of these different terms can be considered experimental and dynamic. The use and meaning of concepts and terms has changed
according debates and experiences within the local organizing context and in response to global dynamics. When terms no longer capture the complexities of the lives of the people that are part of alQaws or part of its target group, or when the community refuses to adopt a term for a variety of reasons, language has to change.

Already when alQaws was formed there was a strong reluctance to associate the organization with the language of LGBT politics. Therefore alQaws, to the surprise of many, was not named alQaws for LGBTQ’s in Palestine, but rather alQaws: for Gender and Sexual Diversity in Palestinian Society. The term queer itself started to emerge in 2011 as a frame of analysis the group began to identify with politically. As queer carried a radical connotation, it allowed for an understanding of intersectionality and a refusal to participate in the depoliticization of LGBT. To use queer, also with the growing international reputation of alQaws, was a way to avoid the branding of alQaws as a gay organization and maintain a radical position. This does not mean that the term was simply adopted. The emergence of the term sparked local debates and activists publicly shared their responses to its use on public forums such as the website Qadita and in community meetings. Reactions were both filled with excitement and suspicion, which in the end urged alQaws to give up on queer as the only term to refer to its politics, and instead helped shift focus to the development of new texts that carefully explain the work of alQaws without depending on the connotations of a single term.

The debate focused on three main points that remain relevant: first, despite the contribution to political analysis, queer is still a western term and instead of promoting it alQaws should focus on developing terms in Arabic. Second, the term and its different and ambiguous meanings contributed to a division in the community by creating a distinction between those who identify with queer politically and understand its analysis, and those who don’t relate, understand and, most importantly, refuse to adopt it. Third, queer, despite its anti-identitarian stance became yet another identity. In conjunction, queer was adopted by straight allies who then announced themselves as queer without any predating process of individual accountability and without accounting for their gender and sexual privileges.

Currently, alQaws has let go of the term queer, but still uses its radical frames of analysis. Although queer and LGBT remain part of its outreach project, it is set on generating analysis and discourse that can describe gender and sexual diversity and desires that focus on the lived experience of people. This process is ongoing and its success is dependent on how communities engage with this new language. Queer will remain a frame of analysis that alQaws leadership will refer to, but it needs to be seen as immersed in a frame that encompasses feminism, sexual and gender diversity, anti-colonialism and decolonial projects if we want to understand all aspects of the struggle and the ongoing project of liberation in a holistic way. In this article, we use queer because it continues to capture a political approach to gender and
sexuality that we wish to engage in here and defines, at least within the Anglophone setting of this essay, a broad perspective on the dynamics of gender and sexuality within a larger matrix of subjugation and control, but also of liberation.

This essay therefore examines what languages, strategies and praxes are created that resist the ongoing erasure of Palestinians and Palestinian land by Israel’s settler colonial and segregationist policies and its Zionist pinkwashing project. How do these approaches imagine a queer politics, or a politics around sexuality and gender that does not reiterate the parameters of recognition set by pinkwashing and Zionist ideology? In what ways do Palestinian queer groups use and reconfigure queer as decolonized thinking and praxis and formulate a “queerness” in decolonized thought?

A Decade of Palestinian Queer Activism: Building a Movement

Palestinian queer groups began to organize for the first time during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), a pivotal period in recent Palestinian history, particularly for Palestinian citizens of Israel. For many young Palestinians – the third generation after the Nakba living within the 1948 borders – the Second Intifada was a turning point in the conception of their identities as Palestinian and redefined their identification with the Palestinian liberation struggle. This turning point was the beginning of a decade of developing forms of resistance that directly addressed the Zionist colonial fragmentation strategy that aims to divide Palestinians into social and religious groups as an attempt to erase Palestinian history, identity and culture. It was within this political climate that a Palestinian queer movement began to emerge, at first as an apolitical initiative of a Jewish-Israeli LGBT organization, the Jerusalem Open House, where the focus was on “saving” gay and lesbian Palestinians, and then as an autonomous Palestinian initiative that separated from the Jewish-Israeli organization in 2007. The focus on sexual orientation dominating Jewish-Israeli LGBT groups created a dissonance between one of the most turbulent political periods of recent Palestinian history and the birth of a Palestinian queer movement. Within these organizations it was accepted to talk about sexuality, but politics had to be left at the doorstep, unless it aligned with demanding inclusion into the state, a priori excluding Palestinians. Because of its initiation within the Jewish-Israeli gay and lesbian organizational structure, the movement commenced as an apolitical one, but proved to simultaneously be the starting point of a transformative political process led by alQaws. The outcome: redefining sexual liberation and sexual self-determination as part of and central to an anti-Zionist and anti-colonial (queer) struggle.

It is important to locate the process of alQaws separating from the Israeli gay and lesbian organization as part of a broader political process that took place in the last twenty years among different Palestinian social movements. During this period – between the Oslo Accords and the Second Intifada – most of the joint Israeli and
Palestinian projects and organizations were dismantled as a response to field experience of Palestinian groups. Colonial dynamics and Jewish-Israeli hegemony and supremacy were reproduced and duplicated within feminist and human rights projects that were promoted as “joint” ventures. These projects normalized Palestinian-Israeli power dynamics, presenting the two as two equal partners. The queer Palestinian movement went through a similar process at a different time period. This was because alQaws established itself only after the Second Intifada and LGBT organizing and questions of sexual orientation started to become more prominent in the 1990s. In conjunction, the question of sexuality was articulated quite late in comparison to, for example, the feminist struggle. The issue of sexuality was always already addressed from within the relation between Israelis and Palestinians. This process of initial assimilation was followed by a radical transformation as a result of the material reality of occupation that became irreconcilable with the idea of “joint” projects. In the course of constructing the Palestinian queer movement, experiences and analyses of Zionist sexual politics, pinkwashing and the Palestinian liberation struggle began to shape the primary concerns of the movement and disconnected the movement from a single-issue identity politics that focused exclusively on sexuality.

The movement focuses on dismantling three main hegemonies: first, Palestinian patriarchal culture and its norms and taboos on sexualities; second, the hegemony of western LGBT organizing, Gay Internationalists and western (cultural) imperialism; and third, the Zionist colonization of Palestine, including the Israeli LGBT movement’s complicity with Zionist settler colonialism through pinkwashing and Zionist sexual politics. The role that Palestinian queer groups play in the broader anti-colonial struggle is the result of a multilayered and complex process of politicization over the last decade. Queer organizing in Palestine began to reflect the complex realities of Palestinian queers as both situated within a normative society and under colonial occupation, two elements that cannot and should not be dissociated. This experience positions queer organizing as an integral and influential part of Palestinian communities.

As Maikey argued in “The History and Contemporary State of Palestinian Sexual Liberation Struggle”: “Prior to the appearance of Palestinian queer groups, and especially after the Oslo Agreement in the mid-1990s, sexuality – and particularly homosexuality – began to emerge as a political issue in the region” (122). During the decade predating Oslo, in the 1980s, the Israeli LGBT group ha-Aguda (Society for the Protection of Individual Rights) and different Knesset (Israel’s parliament) members lobbied for the repeal of the anti-sodomy clause in Israel’s penal code, which was repealed in 1988 and followed by some basic policy changes with regards to the Jewish-Israeli gay and lesbian community. These developments engendered a growing international interest in the legal status of Palestinian LGBTs under the Palestinian Authority and in the Occupied Territories. The colonizer’s gay rights standards
became the yardstick by which the colonized were measured and to which they had to conform. Pinkwashing, therefore, before its inauguration as an organized and state-funded effort to brand Israel as a liberal democracy, is situated within these particular historical dynamics that fostered the framework from which pinkwashing and the subjectification of Palestinian queers could develop. Pinkwashing is a continuation of a familiar colonial discourse and logic, comparable to women-saving narratives, that uses the colonizer’s “development” and “progress” to measure the colonized Palestinian society.

The sudden international interest in sexual rights in Palestine was directed at an “LGBT community,” despite there being no formal organizing efforts within Palestinian civil society before the Second Intifada. In effect, the emerging Israeli LGBT movement became celebrated as the authority and most relevant source concerning the lives of Palestinian queers and functioned, and still too often functions, as the go-to spokesperson and authority for human rights organizations, western gay organizations, and mainstream media, inquiring about the topic. The hegemonic conception of Palestinian queers that permeates this approach is that of desirable Orientalist objects or victims of “homophobic Palestinian society.” The colonial-savior mentality embedded in this logic disguises the reproduction of racist settler colonialism. It re-iterates a rhetoric of “progressive” Israel and “backward” Palestine. Moreover, it consolidates a narrative around Palestinian queers, their needs, desires, and politics through the perspective of the colonizer. The birth of the Palestinian queer movement must be situated within this colonial dynamic and heavily impacts the lived reality of queer Palestinians as Palestinians under colonial occupation, and as sexual minorities within a hegemonic patriarchal struggle for Palestinian self-determination.

Over a period of twelve years of activism and despite the growing local and global impact of Palestinian queer groups, the implications of these dynamics remain vivid. One effect of this dynamic is how the colonizer’s standards and fantasies are internalized within the Palestinian LGBTQ community. The discourse of “the victim” or “the exotic object” impacts the sense of agency of Palestinian queers. These affective and discursive constructions have become normalized over time. The activism of alQaws therefore focuses on both transforming hegemonic discourse and decolonizing the mind by resisting these modes of subjectification and self-perception. As a form of colonization, pinkwashing promotes the false idea that Palestinian LGBTQ communities have no agency. These toxic colonial fantasies become part of the mind, actions, and visions of the oppressed, leaving the impression that the colonized can provide nothing for themselves. Zionist pinkwashing narratives are not only based on exploiting the Palestinian queer struggle, but more important, they are directly and violently appropriating the bodies, personal stories, experiences and traumas of queer Palestinians as “proof” of the “unprogressiveness” of Palestinian society. However, the colonizer’s attempt to deprive Palestinian queers of a sense of
agency has not been successful. This does not mean it has had no effect, but rather that alQaws works relentlessly on providing points of identification and discourse for Palestinian queers to regain a sense of agency and resist the colonization of body and mind. The focus is on providing different tools of narrativizing Palestinian queer experience in direct opposition to, or in disassociation with, narratives of “modernity” and “backwardness” that permeate pinkwashing and Zionist sexual politics. Through working groups, support programs, community building efforts and leadership development, alQaws provides tools and information in different activist spaces and groups about sexual politics and how Palestinian sexualities become politicized and exploited, and how one can resist.

The impact of hegemonic pinkwashing discourse is most visible in the recurring story of “the gay Palestinian” who desires to “run” or “leave” “homophobic” Palestinian society in the West Bank/Gaza, in exchange for a life as a gay refugee without status in Tel Aviv.10 The false promise of safety underwriting this story and the promise of “the good life” under Israeli rule is reinforced by the growing pinkwashing campaign and its division between “modern” and “backward” societies. Part of alQaws’ queer work is therefore aimed at challenging this binary of Palestinian society being “backward” and “unsafe” for queers, while Israel is a queer Palestinian’s “safe haven.”

With the start of the Second Intifada it became increasingly impossible to disassociate or disconnect sexual politics and sexuality from the political and social reality of occupation and apartheid. This awareness led to the questioning of the relationship between LGBT politics, occupation and colonialism. The questions central to the discussion led by alQaws were: how can we build and sustain social and political processes that focus on promoting a new discourse on sexual and gender diversity that is rooted in the political, social and cultural context of Palestine. In another words: how can alQaws’ work become a relevant organization in Palestine?

The shift in internal and public debates about queer groups and local/regional politics in Palestine occurred explicitly for the first time during Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanon. That same year, the Jerusalem Open House (JOH) organized World Pride events in Jerusalem – a city at the heart of political tension and settler colonial advancements. For the first time, Palestinian queer groups were required to respond publicly to questions such as: How to celebrate pride during the brutal 2006 war on Lebanon? How can there be a World Pride parade during such a period with an apartheid wall only twenty minutes away that prevents Palestinian freedom of movement and hides the reality of sixty-five years of occupation and colonial domination (Maiky 124)? This resulted in a division between Palestinian queers and Israeli LGBT organizations that focused singularly on sexuality. The Lebanese queer group Helem and the Palestinian lesbian group Aswat publicly signed a call for boycott of the pride events (Queer Undermining Israeli Terrorism 2006). It also became an incentive for alQaws members, at that time still part of the Jerusalem Open House,
to reject the pride events and join the counter-demonstration. While Palestinian queer groups started to address questions of intersectionality, reconfigure the terms of their own engagement in ideological struggle, and join, step by step, the anti-occupation/anti-colonial struggle for Palestinian self-determination, Israeli queer groups instead strengthened the Israeli national project by promoting values such as militarism and heteronormativity as primary routes to acceptance by society, “proving that Israeli LGBTQ groups were, after all, microcosms of an Israeli society that is based on decades of denial and complicity with state-based and systematic oppression” (Maikey 124–25).11

In late 2007, alQaws officially separated from the Jerusalem Open House and constructed an independent Palestinian LGBTQ entity that understood politics at the center of the daily reality of Palestinians – queer and non-queer. Sexual orientation for alQaws did not limit itself to single-issue identity politics, but became a matter of understanding sexual oppression within a complex web of power and subjugation in which sex became but one aspect to understand the material reality of Palestinian queers and non-queers. These realizations and decisions helped build an aware Palestinian queer community that on the one hand could, for the first time, be relevant to the shared daily realities of many queer Palestinians, and on the other hand respond to pinkwashing. It is important to mention that alQaws’ work focuses predominantly on four major locations: Haifa, Ramallah, Jerusalem and Yaffa. These major cities are accessible, and due to lack of resources, capacities, and restrictions of movement it is difficult for alQaws to gain access to other areas, especially access to Gaza is practically impossible due to Israel’s construction of an open air prison, and control of land, water, and air. One of the main challenges alQaws negotiates is the imposition of borders and limited mobility on Palestinians. In order to address and contain this challenge alQaws negotiates two structures. First, alQaws defines its work as grassroots, in which local leadership and a development of sensitivity around particular local specificities are crucial in order to deal with differences in legal rights, mobility and citizenship. Local leadership is in charge of building novel strategies and reaching out. Second, alQaws functions at what we call, for lack of a better term, the national level. By this we mean that long-term strategies and politics are discussed across the organization and across different borders. These strategies and politics then become accessible to local leadership groups. All of alQaws’ activist meetings, organizational retreats, strategic planning and board meetings, for now, take place in the Occupied West Bank.

Since 2007, the Palestinian queer struggle shifted its focus from narratives of victimhood towards an intersectional politics that places sexual liberation within the broader context of colonized Palestine. Further, Palestinian queers reclaimed their bodies and voices by offering an alternative to the representations and identifications offered by pinkwashing. This strategy proved relevant, yet again, during the 2009 war
on Gaza. Besides participating in demonstrations in support of the people in Gaza, Palestinian queer groups addressed the assault within queer communities and organized independent events for Gaza (Maikey 125). Within this climate, gay rights and gay pride proved an irrelevant framework, despite constant interpellation by Israeli and international gay NGO’s and pinkwashing. “Try organize a gay pride in Gaza,” they would say, to prove a point about queer Palestinian reality, and, moreover, about the “progressive human rights” of Israel (Hilal 2013). We want to point out the absurdity of the above incitement: try to organize anything in Gaza, without being confronted with Israel’s military siege, violence, and impoverishment of the Palestinian population. What is the purpose of a gay pride in an open air prison? Although it might have a glittering glow, there is nothing fabulous about white phosphorous.

The decolonization of queer politics by alQaws opposes the model of inclusivity into the nation promised by gay rights and reveals how that relation between the reified gay-citizen and the state is immediately wrought with the erasure of modes of belonging and desire that do not fit regularized notions of homonormativity and homonationalism. Furthermore, it counters the logic that a discussion of LGBTQ issues in Palestine always already includes a discussion or comparison with “gay rights” in Israel. By actively opposing this normalization and instead insisting on the constant reconfiguration of a decolonial queer politics that negotiates other modes of belonging, the queer politics formulated by the Palestinian queer movement unsettles queer from its prior and commodified usage and places it both in disruption and dialogue with the more re-appropriated politics of “we are here, we are queer, get used to it” and its conservative version, gay rights. It employs queer as a way to address both its commodification and put it to alternative uses in thinking about its transformative potential within a struggle for Palestinian, sexual, and gender self-determination.

alQaws’ alliance with a more radical sexual politics and the principles of anti-normalization and BDS in combination with severe restrictions on mobility for its members, have complicated its work. Because of alQaws’ anti-colonial agenda it has been increasingly more difficult to receive funding for projects. If the organization would limit itself to the question of gay rights this would not have been a problem. Within queer-savior mentalities it is accepted to talk about sexuality, but once this discourse aligns itself with the anti-colonial, it becomes more difficult to receive funding.

Within Palestinian society pinkwashing, colonialism and imperialism impact the way in which Palestinian queers are perceived. A common figure within the Palestinian popular imaginary is that of the Palestinian queer as “Israelized,” a phenomenon “imported from the west,” and sometimes even a “collaborator” (Maikey 2012). These imaginaries have led to mythical proportions and are not uncommon to other national and anti-colonial struggles where queers are perceived, by virtue of the Gay International, as threatening to the national narrative and as a “western invention.” This discourse impacts the struggle against gender and sexual oppression and the
efforts to promote a grassroots sexual discourse in Palestine and Palestinian society. Another complication for this project is the way in which the hegemonic Palestinian national liberation struggle reproduces a patriarchal structure that assumes a national liberation of Palestine first, and social liberation later. Both Palestinian feminist and queer movements deconstruct this fantasy and articulate the necessity of a nuanced and multilayered approach to liberation. Sexual liberation is considered anti-nationalist; it is understood to harm and divert attention from the national liberation struggle. National history and the narration of Palestine become tied to and foster normative and patriarchal configurations of a gendered national history and forms of belonging (Amireh, “Between Complicity and Subversion”). The queer movement engages with how the patriarchal narration of Palestinian liberation constitutes a hierarchization of struggles, where a homogenous Palestinian liberation struggle arises as the most valid one. The larger social struggle within this dominant framework is considered secondary and will automatically follow the liberation of Palestine. However, the Palestinian queer movement is set on articulating these struggles as intertwined and coextensive.

Queer thus becomes relevant to the extent that it is articulated within the struggle for Palestinian self-determination. The primary project of disconnecting queer from its commodified incarnation (single-issue identity politics), and making it relevant to the Palestinian context, is the resistance to the impact of pinkwashing. Pinkwashing is not just a branding campaign inaugurated in the mid 2000s, but must also be understood within the earlier inquiries of western NGOs into the status of Palestinian LGBTQs, who approached Israeli NGOs as experts on the topic. Whereas the call for solidarity with queer Palestinians is shaped around a solidarity that addresses and focuses on the colonial reality, pinkwashing attempts to redefine an apolitical sexual solidarity based on a single-issue identity politics. The Israeli LGBT movement, its relation to the state, and its appeal to the international community is one of the main ideological and capital forces behind pinkwashing. The quest for inclusion can only be rewarding, both financially and in terms of legal recognition and visibility, under the umbrella of the Zionist project and its terms and conditions. In other words, the Israeli LGBT movement has been one of assimilation and inclusion, and in this case inclusion means complicity with pinkwashing and state violence. The relation between inclusion and equality is an antithetical one. In today’s Israel, inclusion, passing as “equality,” means the equality to serve in the Israel Defense Force and participate in the racist objectification and oppression of Palestinians.

**Dismantling Pinkwashing**

There are many intersections that we take into consideration regarding the impact of Zionist pinkwashing on the Palestinian queer movement. The intersections of different forms of subjugation and power within a colonial context directly impact
Palestinian (queer) lives as we have shown above. An important aspect that shapes the discourse and praxis of the Palestinian queer movement consists of an expanding analysis of and activism against the impact of Zionism and pinkwashing on the lives of (queer) Palestinians.

By interpellating Palestinian queers within a logic of gay rights, coming-out (gay visibility), and pride, pinkwashing continuously reifies a division between liberated gay Israelis and oppressed Palestinian queers. This incitement moreover fosters and is based on Islamophobic and anti-Arab hatred that portrays Palestinians and Arabs as “collectively homophobic” and “therefore backwards,” and Palestinian queers as “weak” and “immature.” Pinkwashing is a powerful means to make Zionism and Israel more appealing to gay people around the globe, but particularly to those who have assimilated Islamophobic, racist, and anti-Arab messages into their vision of “progress.” Pinkwashing not only promotes racist fictions about Palestinians to the world but it also relies on the fact that racism and Islamophobia already exist within liberal LGBT communities and politics in other parts of the world.

Instead of a language of coming-out, pride, and gay rights, it became pertinent for alQaws to articulate a politics and language that was more significant for the experiences of queer Palestinians: a language around liberation and desire as disconnected from hegemonic gay emancipatory discourse, which mobilizes a “discourse of Islamophobia and Arabophobia . . . [that] is part of a larger project to anchor all politics within the axis of identity, and identitarian (and identifiable) groups” (Mikdashi). alQaws specifically addresses the attempted normalization of power dynamics, and emphasizes the necessity to decolonize queer politics.

Years of research and visualization of Israel’s pinkwashing project, now accessible on the public online platform Pinkwatching Israel,¹² has exposed that Israel’s pinkwashing campaign does not stand on its own; it is part of a larger attempt to promote Israel as tolerant and diverse to obscure the ongoing Zionist and racist project of exclusive Jewish sovereignty. Furthermore, it keeps redefining the borders of this Jewish state by continued illegal colonial settling on the Occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.¹³

In 2005, Israel commenced its multi-million dollar Brand Israel campaign to divert attention from colonial occupation and attract investments (Schulman). At the Tenth Herzliya Conference in 2010 – a global policy gathering that brings together influential Israeli and international participants from the highest levels of government, business and academia to discuss national, regional, and global issues – the policy makers reflected on what they call the core message of the campaign, which is framed as “Creative Energy.” The conference paper “Winning the Battle of Narrative” explains that, “Creative energy repositions Israel away from an image of a country in a state of war and conflict to a brand which represents positive values and ideals like, – ‘building a future,’ ‘vibrant diversity’ and ‘entrepreneurial zeal’” (Michlin 213).
Brand Israel is a direct response to the successes of the BDS campaign in garnering support for the struggle against Israel’s violations of International Law and Palestinian rights to self-determination.

However, pinkwashing is more than a branding effort. Anti-pinkwashing work insists that it must be understood within Israel’s history of Zionist (settler) colonialism and occupation: in other words, Israel’s Zionist project to maintain and establish exclusive Jewish sovereignty and its shifting body politic that now embraces the Jewish-Israeli gay citizen-subject. In conjunction, pinkwashing works because it appeals to western LGBT projects that seek to implement their understanding of sexual politics, gay rights and gay identity to the rest of the world. Joseph Massad quite rigidly calls this the Gay International, which divides the world in two groups, those with gay rights and those without it. Gay rights seem to have become a litmus test to measure a country’s (neo)liberal modernity and human rights standards. The fact that the Gay International, represented through international NGOs and western gay rights groups, universalizes its perception of gayness disallows an investigation into the epistemological underpinnings in which this universalization takes place (Massad 174). Massad’s analysis is crucial to the extent that it helps us understand the way in which pinkwashing appeals to the global gay. However, it fails to offer an understanding of resistance to this Gay International. By rejecting any appeal to sexual identities/identifications, cultural translations, or queer politics, Massad subsequently dismisses the use of these categories as a submission to colonialism and (cultural) imperialism. Massad presents Arabs engaging in this language as either naïve native informants to the Gay International, or bourgeois Arab westernized elites.

Although we need Massad’s critique of the Gay International to understand how pinkwashing works through “universalizing neoimperialism that penetrates societies through both material and affective processes” (Amar and el Shakry 332), we like to stress that we disagree with Massad’s insistence on an almost impenetrable dichotomy between “East” and “West” and his refusal to consider critical ambiguities and cultural translations, and the way in which queer trajectories (also in the title of this collection) (re)shape a queer resistance and sexual counter-publics (332), in our case in Palestine. By force of its redeployment, we investigate what queer does in the Palestinian context, how it is both problematized and re-imagined, instead of reject it as a static imperialist Western indoctrination of “the Arab mind.” We would give in to pinkwashing if we would accept the rigid parameters set by Massad, because we would admit to its hegemonic force over queer epistemologies and desires and reaffirm its power to divide and dichotomize “East” and “West” and thereby its continued control not only of the land, but also the terms and conditions of understanding it and on which it is understood.

Massad assumes that any engagement with what he calls Gay International discourse “only [has] two reactions to claims of universal gayness – support them or
oppose them without ever questioning their epistemological underpinnings” (Massad 174). Instead, we are more keen on formulating and thinking about counter-hegemonies and knowledge productions that negotiate queer(ness) performatively and affectively from within decolonial thought, which, we argue, indeed questions and destabilizes epistemological underpinnings of the modern and the colonial. In what follows, we aim to dismantle some of the primary discursive and affective features of the pinkwashing campaign, in order to provide an in depth understanding of the discourse we’ve addressed.

In 2011, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the US Congress. He argued that “in a region where women are stoned, and gays are hanged, Christians are persecuted, Israel stands out. It is different” (“Address to US Congress”). The sense of difference that he alludes to can be understood within a cultural politics of emotions (Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions) that uses difference as a (neo)liberal strategy of governance and surveillance that depends on inclusion and assimilation of some forms of difference, like homosexuality, into the national narrative at the expense of the bodies that can never fully belong. Netanyahu’s quote participates in what Jasbir K. Puar calls homonationalism, which operates “as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects” (Puar 7). Israel’s Prime Minister in a US Congress speech, pre-repeal-of-DOMA-and-DADT, publicly celebrates Israel’s gay tolerance that now allows Jewish-Israeli gays and lesbians to “come-out” as Zionist homos proudly waving Israeli national flags mixed with the colors of the rainbow wearing a soldier’s uniform at Tel Aviv’s gay pride parade.

Netanyahu’s speech invites us to scrutinize the way in which pinkwashing mobilizes racist security narratives. Summoning a gay citizen-subject center stage in the narration of Israel’s Zionist and sexual exceptionalism, the (predominantly Ashkenazi) Jewish-Israeli gay is posited as the one who legitimizes the securitization of Israel’s borders, by abjection of the Arab as threatening and fearsome. Netanyahu’s address relies on an affective charge that presents those “lingering” at and in Israel’s every changing borders as threatening.

Sara Ahmed, in her work on affective economies asks: “How do emotions work to align subjects with some others and against other others?” (“Affective Economies” 117). Netanyahu’s recognition and celebration of gay subjects hails the securitization of Israel’s borders, and realigns a narrative of fear with a narrative of national (gay) pride. Civilization, in his narrative, is equated with the imposition of colonialism and border control. Ahmed writes, “it is the regulation of bodies in space through the uneven distribution of fear which allows spaces to become territories, claimed as rights by some bodies and not others” (The Cultural Politics of Emotions 70). In Netanyahu’s speech it becomes clear how bodies are realigned in order to make territorial claims and affective relations within geopolitics.
Colonialism, domination and occupation are deemed not only necessary but also desirable. The promise of citizenship for the Jewish-Israeli gay citizen-subject is founded upon the abjection, expulsion, and murder of non-citizen-subjects, or surplus populations. This recalls what Agathangelou, Bassichis and Spira describe as the process, or logic, by which pleasure becomes sutured to the murder of the other. They analyze how formerly marginal subjects, like the gay subject, are now folded into empire affectively, generating gleeful participation in the death of others, where death amounts to rendering the other politically unrecognizable.

To deal with pain, fear and insecurity, this logic tells us, the demonization and demolition of the racially and sexually aberrant other must be performed again and again. Moreover, within this imperial fantasy, this production, consumption, and murder of the other is to be performed with gusto and state-sanctioned pleasure, as a desire for witnessing executions becomes a performance of state loyalty. (Agathangelou et al. 123)

Besides the relation to state sanctioned violence, the fantasy of moral superiority and the necessity of domination and control that Netanyahu’s quote alludes to, the erasure, or murder of the other also occurs through a continued process of exoticization and eroticization that happens when a Palestinian character becomes visible within pinkwashing.

The last scene of the short film *Lizzy the Lezzy does Gay Israel*, screened at the opening of the 2008 Tel Aviv LGBT Film Festival, is emblematic of what happens when a Palestinian queer character does become visible. In the film, Lizzy, a cartoon character, interviews real life people active in Israeli gay and lesbian life. In the final scene of the short film, a Palestinian character is presented. In this scene, Lizzy asks three friends whether it is good to be a lesbian in Israel. One woman replies “it’s quite alright as long as you are not a lesbian Palestinian like Samera here” (6:21–6:27). The film does not reveal any further why it would be hard to be a Palestinian lesbian in Israel and we are left only to assume the reasons. The only Palestinian character in the video thus becomes visible as a victim. Instead of providing an understanding of the way in which Israel’s colonial domination determines the livelihood of any Palestinian regardless of sexual proclivity, the scene corresponds to the way in which pinkwashing reduces Palestinian political subjectivity to the idea of Palestinian queer victimhood, in which Palestinians are presented as “collectively homophobic.” Further, to articulate a response to sexual oppression within Palestinian society (like sexual oppression exists in any other society) becomes more complicated because of the configuration sexual oppression into the pathologization of Palestinians as “collectively homophobic” and therefore “backward.”

Although Samera responds to Lizzy’s inquiry suggesting that Israel might “open the gates” to let (lesbian) Palestinians through, her critical comment is muted by her
friend, who responds with, “bring them all darling” (6:43). The apartheid wall is turned into a “rainbow” wall that can keep “homophobes” out, but holds the promise of a secret “pink door” for Palestinian lesbians to pass through and unleash Jewish-Israeli Orientalist desires.

At work in this dynamic is what Amal Amireh describes as the hypervisibility and invisibility of Palestinian queers. She writes, “Palestinians occupy two extreme locations: either they are hypervisible, or they are invisible. In both cases, it is their Palestinian-ness, not their queerness, that determines [if and] how they are seen (“Afterword” 636). Indeed, the emphasis on Samara’s Palestinian-ness as the cause for her queer victimhood allows for an eroticization and hierarchization of the relation between Israeli and Palestinian queers in Orientalist fashion, and makes Palestinian-ness and queerness appear as a priori irreconcilable. When Samara mentions that Palestinians “fuck in Arabic,” Lizzy, now wearing a Keffiyeh (the symbol of Palestinian resistance) on her head, declares, “I must try that one day. It could be my contribution to the peace process” (6:51–6:56). The very idea of Palestinian lesbians behind the wall creates, within the pinkwashing imaginary of Lizzy the Lezzy, not the possibility for a critique of this wall, but for the eroticization of colonial power dynamics. For pinkwashing to work, colonialism needs to be rendered sexy. Although pinkwashing is usually understood as a state-sponsored PR campaign, Lizzy the Lezzy offers insight into how the Israeli LGBT community advances Israel’s Zionist logic by portraying itself as either the savior of Palestinian queers via an eroticization of colonialism as a mission civilisatrice, or in Netanyahu’s speech perpetuates the fantasy of Israel as always already under threat.

Zionist pinkwashing not only brands Israel as a vibrant place, but, more crucially determines the way in which Palestinian queers become recognizable as victims of their society rather than political agents, which undermines a transformative discourse that seeks to articulate a vision of social, political, and economic justice that does not reify a gay subject in its wake. In pinkwashing, pride, visibility, coming-out, and solidarity on the basis of a reified sexual identity circulate as dominant frameworks imposed on Palestinian queers.

Where pinkwashing works through rendering colonialism invisible, necessary or desirable, the discourse developed by the Palestinian queer movement repositions the occupation and colonialism center stage to foreground an anti-Zionist and anti-colonial queer politics in friction with, outside, or even in rejection of liberal frames of gay rights, pride, and coming-out. It is exactly these frameworks that are complicit to occupation and colonialism and sustain the very politics of visibility at work in pinkwashing and the larger Zionist project of the erasure of Palestine. Therefore, in what follows, we foreground modes of resistance that reclaim queerness neither as western universal, nor as a identitarian or identifiable category, but as a repository for knowledges and practices of resistance and at the same time as an empty signifier to be reworked to address issues of political, social, economic justice.
Conclusion: Shifting Alliances

It is possible to engage in this work [anti-pinkwashing and queer BDS work] while expanding our terrain of struggle and I think the critique of pinkwashing is really important in this respect . . . it broadens the terrain of struggle against the occupation and against the Zionist policies of Israel. This is to say that PQBDS not only directs its message at people who identify into LGBTQ communities . . . It is not a question of saying simply ‘support queer individuals in Palestine.’ In fact, it’s clear about not wanting support from those who refuse to see that cynicism and that contemptuousness behind Israel’s pro-gay image, but rather it directs its message at anyone who is a potential supporter of BDS. And it provides, it seems to me, a different kind of literacy. It allows us to read the racism and the violence that is covered up by the putatively pro-gay stance of Israel in a different way . . . And, queer BDS, it seems to me, can help radical forces around the world to develop new ways of engaging in ideological struggle.
—Angela Davis at the World Social Forum: Free Palestine Davis, 2012

In the last two years, we have witnessed changes in the framing of anti-pinkwashing activism from what was problematically promoted and understood as the new salvation of the global queer movement, to a more coherent solidarity work to end and resist the Zionist project, Jewish-Israeli supremacy and support the project of decolonizing Palestine. Too often anti-pinkwashing work has been conflated with a project to make Palestine more appealing to queer people. But as Angela Davis argues, anti-pinkwashing work provides a different kind of literacy that does not foreground simple single-issue identity politics and sexual solidarities.

In 2010, PQBDS issued a call for Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions that rapidly reached the international community. It called for international queer and LGBT groups to support BDS as one of the primary strategies for social justice for Palestinians. In recent years, many radical queer groups have set themselves to dismantling Israel’s pinkwashing campaign. Although, initially the call for BDS was addressed to queer and LGBT communities worldwide, quite rapidly PQBDS started to focus on making the pinkwashing analysis relevant to a broader understanding of Israel’s racist and colonial politics, which made PQBDS’ call not about solidarity with queer Palestinians, but about expanding the terrain of struggle.

At the World Social Forum: Free Palestine in December 2012, a group of transnational anti-pinkwashing activists led and coordinated by the Palestinian queer movement came together for the project Queer Visions at the World Social Forum. Besides working on transnational projects against pinkwashing, one of our contributions consisted of designing two panels that highlighted the way in which anti-Zionist work requires an understanding of how sexual politics circulate within Zionism and pinkwashing. The goal was to understand the fight against pinkwashing as integral to
the larger struggle against Israel’s Zionist occupation and settler-colonialism. In our declaration at the closing General Assembly, we stated that:

We, the assembly of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2012, hereby decide to
1. identify pinkwashing as one of the main strategies used by the Israeli state and its supporters to divert attention away from the oppression of the Palestinian people;
2. oppose the use of pinkwashing by Israel;
3. actively support the work of organizations resisting pinkwashing as an essential part of the movement;
4. fight against racism, Islamophobia, and forms of sexual and bodily oppressions including patriarchy, sexism, homophobia and transphobia in all societies.
(Pinkwatching Israel)

By joining the call for Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions, the Palestinian queer movement has shaped both its anti-colonial politics, its decolonization of queer politics and the conditions of solidarity in response to BDS’ call.

When activists and scholars transnationally respond to pinkwashing there is a necessity to develop an ongoing understanding of the way in which global alliances take shape. Although many groups appear to, initially, have taken up the plight of Palestinian LGBTQs under the banner of sexual solidarity, Angela Davis remarks that it is clear that the Palestinian queer movement does not ask for a solidarity based on a sexual identification that does not understand the cynicism of pinkwashing and does not “come-out” against Israel’s occupation and settler colonialism. Further, PQBDS’ plight is not one that singularly addresses LGBTQs, it does that too, but also invites others to participate “in new ways of engaging in ideological struggle” (Davis 2012).

Solidarity and alliances can never be meaningful when they accept the invitation to imperial and colonial violence perpetuated through the depoliticized frame of gay rights and sexual solidarity – promised by the Gay International, pinkwashing, and the Zionist project. This solidarity can never be significant to, and might potentially harm a transformative queer politics of decolonization. In effect, it sustains the systemic violence disguised by an affective economy of “feelings of desire, pleasure, fear and repulsion utilized to seduce all of us into the fold of the state – the various ways in which we become invested emotionally, libidinally, and erotically in global capitalism’s mirages of safety and inclusion” (Agathangelou et al. 122). These limited forms of solidarity and alliance building rely on a wretched sense of equality that (neo)liberal rights frames offer and will remain complicit to the unequal distribution of equality, in which the gesture of equality to one community means the containment, erasure, and destruction of another. Transnational solidarity and alliances could instead resist the desire to be folded into the state and into capital and refuse to participate in the consolidation of (neo)-liberalism, empire and imperial(ist) and colonial violence.
The emergence of a Palestinian queer movement and its international impact have shifted the workings and meaning of “queer.” Instead of queerness meaning a resistance to the normalization sought by western gay movements, the queer movement in Palestine puts queer to work there where it resists both the impact of Zionist pinkwashing and provides new epistemologies and affective charges for what queer work can do. Queer, in this sense, becomes something other than identification or anti-identification, it becomes a political identifier, a work, ever shifting to address questions of social, economic, sexual and political justice. However, an important question remains: When queer has increasingly become commodified as yet another identification on the sexual spectrum, can we still think of a queer politics that refuses “the normalization of sexual dissidence and the colonization of sexuality” (Sabsay 89)?

The work of the Palestinian queer movement’s redeployment of queer as outside of, and in resistance to the imposition of hegemonic and depoliticized lesbian and gay identity politics reified in pinkwashing, and as a praxis that addresses the complexities of creating a politics that resists Zionist ideology on all of its fronts, uses queer as “a site of collective contestation, the point of departure for a set of historical reflections and future imaginings” (Butler 228). The way in which Palestinian queers have redeployed “queer” summons Butler’s understanding of the term: “it will have to remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes” (ibid.). The work of the Palestinian queer movement refutes the “normalization of sexual dissidence,” by foregrounding the way in which sexual dissidence is easily folded into state violence. It resists the colonization of sexuality by providing discursive and affective points of identification that are not dependent on pre-defined frames of sexuality within colonialism.

The use of “queer” within this context is both a reflection on its commodification, and, more importantly, a form of reading, literacy, activism and analysis that reveals the ways in which frames of sexual rights and sexual solidarity have folded LGBT subjects into the state, and colonial and imperial violence, and as a praxis that brings to the surface what is concealed or left behind, elicit what was rendered unintelligible, and foreground those political subjectivities and voices that are rendered most marginal. In the words of alQaws board member Ghaith Hilal, “the language that we use is always revisited and expanded through our work. Language catalyzes discussions and pushes us to think more critically, but no word whether in English or Arabic can do the work. Only a movement can” (“Eight questions”). If queer becomes both a praxis of historical reflection and of future imaginings it denotes a radical interruption into the dominant ideologies of sex, gender, nationalism, imperialism and colonialism. In the work of the Palestinian queer movement it offers a glimpse of a radically decolonized futurity.
Notes

1. In this article we address the queer Palestinian movement from the perspective of alQaws and PQBDS. Both have a strong leadership and active groups and initiatives on both sides of the green line, also known as the 1967 borders. We are not including the important work of Aswat in this article, a third group that consists of Palestinian lesbian and bi women organizers. We are involved and familiar with the work of alQaws and PQBDS and do not think it is in our capacity to address the work of Aswat, which focuses specifically on female identified people and does not necessarily use the term queer. Interested readers will find further information on Aswat via the group’s website.

2. The call for Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions of Israel was issued in 2005 by over one hundred Palestinian civil society organizations and individuals. It calls for a boycott of Israel until: 1) it ends its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantles the wall; 2) recognizes the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and, 3) respects, protects, and promotes the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194. Next to an economic boycott, there is also the Palestinian Call for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel.

3. The second Palestinian Uprising against the occupation.

4. The Nakba (Arabic: catastrophe) refers to the ethnic cleansing, forced expulsion and displacement of Palestinians in 1948. However, we want to stress that the Nakba is understood not only as a historical event, but also as a continuous experience, including ongoing house demolitions and Jewish-settling on Palestinian land.

5. With Palestinians living within the 1948 borders we refer to those Palestinians (about 1.5 million) who live in what today is known as Israel and make up about twenty percent of that population.

6. Palestinians within the borders of 1948 are rendered second-class citizens and do not have the same rights as Jewish-Israeli citizens.

7. In 1993, the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Israeli government signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, better known as the Oslo Accords. This agreement resulted in the establishment of an official Palestinian Authority that, for the first time since 1948, gave some Palestinians some authority over some of their land. This Palestinian Authority became diplomatically accountable for different social, legal, and political matters, but remained under Israeli military control. The Rabin-era which commenced with the election of Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, started with the reconfiguration of Israel’s Basic Laws, which solidified Israel as a Jewish “Democracy,” where freedom for “all” Israel’s inhabitants (read: Jewish Israelis) was enshrined. The Rabin-era and its liberal “advancements” are often understood as having enabled the acceleration of Israel’s gay rights legislation.

8. We use the term Zionist sexual politics to refer to the organization of discourses around sexuality/sex in conjunction with race, gender and class within the Zionist project. The term describes the way in which sex/sexuality become discursive and affective tools of subjugation and control.


10. An example of this narrative is the film Invisible Men, which features three Palestinian men who have allegedly escaped the West Bank and exchanged it for Tel Aviv. For a critical analysis of this film see Jankovic. In her paper for the Homonalism and Pinkwashing conference she addressed how the film perpetuates a pinkwashing logic, disguised under the idea of saving Palestinian gay men (Monthly Review).

11. The way in which Israeli LGBT groups sought entry into the Israeli mainstream becomes most evident with the articulation of two key points of struggle. First, participating in the Israel Defense Force. The figure of the gay soldier shaped gay
visibility in the public sphere. With the public coming-out of former and revered Lieutenant General Uzi Even, a chemist in Israel’s nuclear program, the gay body became sutured to the figure of the soldier already in 1993. Another important aspect of Israel’s gay agenda is the desire to participate in the reproduction of the nation in order to amend what is commonly called Israel’s “demographic problem,” in other words Israel’s emphasis on the exclusive Jewish character of the state.

12. *Pinkwatching Israel* is an archival and communication platform created by PQBDS with contributions from transnational solidarity activists.

13. We are aware that this definition of settler colonialism implicitly divides Israel/Palestine into the borders decided upon in the Oslo Accords in 1993 and breached constantly by Israel. However, it is our opinion that the artificial partition of the land and a two-state solution is not a viable and justifiable solution to end the totality of colonization, expulsion and apartheid. Although we do not accept these parameters, they are important for understanding the terms of citizenship and the way in which Jewish exclusivity extends beyond Israel’s “official borders” to include an ever increasing illegal settler population.

14. DOMA refers to the Defense of Marriage Act and DADT is the USA’s Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy referring to the US military. Contemporary gay politics appear to focus on those institutions enforcing militaristic, racist nationalist, heterosexism: the army and marriage.

15. Ashkenazi within the context of Zionism and Israel refers to whiteness as it designates Jews from Europe. It is a loaded term as the national body in Israel is structured as white/Ashkenazi, not only in opposition to Palestinians and non-Jewish Arabs, but also to Arab and African (or, Mizrahi and Sephardi) Jews (Shohat).

16. Examples are Queers Against Israeli Apartheid groups in Canada (Vancouver, Toronto) and the United States (New York, Seattle), Meem and Nasawiya in Lebanon, Queers Undermining Israeli Terrorism in San Francisco, Siegebusters in New York, queer fractions of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign in the UK, Queeristan in Amsterdam, Panteras Rosas in Portugal, and the transnational initiative *Pinkwatching Israel*.

**Works Cited**


