Securing the European ‘Homeland’: Profit, risk, authority
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Citation for published version (APA):
Introduction
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No one informed us. Just as some people predicted, a new kind of war has arrived – conveniently referred to as the New War. A war whose very existence is subject to question, no one knowing whether it’s already raging or yet to start. Something from a futuristic novel (Terrin, 2009, 89).

The security challenges we are facing today are numerous, complex, interrelated and difficult to foresee: regional crises can occur and turn violent, new technologies can emerge and bring new vulnerabilities and threats, environmental changes and scarcity of natural resources can provoke political and military conflicts. At the same time, many threats and risks spread easily across national borders, blurring the traditional dividing line between internal and external security (Commission of the European Communities, 2013a, 2).

Introduction: The Guard
In The Guard, Belgian novelist Peter Terrin tells the story of two security guards, Harry and Michel, who live in the basement of a luxury apartment building, protecting its rich residents.¹ Their state of isolation is only interrupted by the sporadic delivery of food supplies from “the Organization,” the company that employs them. As for what is going on in the world outside, Harry and Michel have little knowledge. There are hints that a nuclear
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war has broken out, a new kind of war “whose very existence is subject to question, no one knowing whether it’s already raging or yet to start” (Terrin, 2009, 88-89), but about what has occurred exactly they are kept in the dark. The uncertain and undefined situation is described in great detail by Michel, who registers and interprets every sound, scent, and change of light. The sudden sound of a cyclist passing, for example, leads him to reflect that “everyone’s gone, everyone has fled … The city wasn’t evacuated, its inhabitants just ran for it as best they could. Harry, me and the mad cyclist have been left behind” (Terrin, 2009, 88). Michel goes on, describing the state of this new kind of war, “[something] from a futuristic novel.” This is a war in which “[the] weapons and the wounds they cause, the objectives and who’s set them are anybody’s guess.” “And that is the chief characteristic of this world war,” Michel concludes, “[that’s] what makes everyone flee: the enemy is unknown” (Terrin, 2009, 89).

Meanwhile, Harry and Michel continue to carry out their daily inspections meticulously and with iron discipline. A large part of the book describes the recurring and banal routines performed by the two guards: the daily round of inspections around the basement, the careful counting of munition, and the cleaning of their uniforms. Once Harry and Michel become entirely cut off from the outside world after the apartment’s residents have done a moonlight flit, their daily routines become even more obsessive. Indeed, in The Guard the uncertain and undefined situation does not affect the book’s characters equally: while the rich residents of the apartment building have long fled the city, the security guards are left behind. Michel eventually concludes that he and Harry have slipped off the Organization’s radar. “After a nuclear attack on the south coast they would have come to pick us up,” reflects Michel, “[after] a viral terrorist attack they would have done everything in their power to lift the quarantine in this crucial part of the city as soon as possible. [But] Harry and I have been left behind. There is no one for us to protect and no concrete threat to the building” (Terrin, 2009, 89).

The Guard bears interesting resemblances with what characterizes security today. On the one hand, the novel refers to an understanding of contemporary security threats as irreducibly speculative and impossible to detect or forecast. As in Terrin’s novel, this is not just due to a lack of knowledge, but because “the nature of threat cannot be specified … [Threat] has become proteiform and it tends to proliferate unpredictably” (Massumi,
These are threats that exceed traditional frameworks of risk assessment in the sense that they may emerge from anywhere at any time and confront us with a danger we “can only imagine, suspect, presume, or fear” (Éwald, 2002, 286). On the other hand, The Guard nicely captures the interplay between radical unknowability and the increasing securitization of everyday life. Today, the logic of speculative or preemptive security has been brought into the most mundane and prosaic spaces. Writes Louise Amoore (2009a, 50), “[from] the remote sensing of bodies on a railway platform, to the securing of identity via biometric algorithms, or the profiling of risk at the airport, the practices of the war on terror exceed any clear distinction between military/civil/commercial spheres.” Or, as Huysmans (2011, 377) puts it, “[credit] cards, CCTV, filling in forms for a myriad of services, monitoring workers, consumer data, advertising that sustains precautionary dispositions and products associated with risks (e.g. fertilizers) intertwine profiling, control and national security with daily activities.” Many of these activities appear to come about in a highly fragmented fashion. When connected to the dispersal of risks and control of dangers, however, they “fade out the distinction between the everyday and security practice” (ibid).

Another relevant theme that can be identified in Terrin’s novel is related to the growing commercialization of everyday security and its implications for who can claim and expect to get what kind of security. Over the last decades, commercial security firms have become increasingly involved in tasks that were formerly the domain of police, customs, and other parts of the public sector, including border control and critical infrastructure protection, risk management, surveillance, and manned guarding. The growth of commercial security has been a global phenomenon that extends far beyond the spectacular activities of corporate soldiers and private military companies. In effect, private security has become an integrated part of everyday life – to the extent that these developments have been largely unnoticed (but see e.g. Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, 2011; Leander and Van Munster, 2007). Nonetheless, the commodification of security combined with the privatization of everyday public spaces has profound consequences for who or what is worthy of security. As a limited but growing literature points out, these developments have resulted in the unequal provision of security and the redrawing and hardening of boundaries between social insiders and outsiders (Bigo, 2008; Bislev, 2004; Loader, 1999; Murakami Wood and Ball, 2013; Zedner, 2006).
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This thesis explores the commercialization of European security in the context of changing conceptions of risk. It investigates the commercial investments that are generated in the context of the “politics of preemption” (Amoore and De Goede, 2008a, b), and the complex relationship between affective perceptions of risk and the everyday commercializations of security. Empirically, the thesis focuses on the performative constitution of the European market for homeland security equipment and the growing involvement of homeland security firms in defining and enacting security. These developments have been understudied as most debates in the academic literature on the privatization of security have focused on the role of private military companies in conflict areas or in states where the public sector is underdeveloped. But, the thesis is not only an empirical enterprise, however important it is: by widening the empirical lens to include non-militarized forms of private security, I seek to anchor the study of private security more explicitly in recent academic debates about the role and implications of preemptive risk post-9/11. I ask: what are the security concepts that motivate the growth market for homeland security applications and the growing involvement of commercial security actors in Europe? In what ways does the commercialization of security in Europe change our understandings of current security institutions, practices, and forms of governance? How are commercial security actors involved in (re)shaping (in) security and in the construction of preemptive risk? And how are these actors enrolled into the daily performativity of security, and with what effects for the relationship between public and private authority?

This introduction embeds these research questions in three sets of literature. First, it examines how the study of private security has been addressed by the discipline of International Relations (IR). Building on the literature that has focused on the everyday work of global private security companies and the coming into existence of complex public-private security “assemblages,” I argue that there is a need for knowledge about private sector involvement beyond weak states where the public sector is underdeveloped. I thus engage with a second body of scholarship that analyzes private security involvement as part of the emerging securitization of everyday life, particularly in the context of the so-called war on terror. On this view, what motivates the commercialization of security is a specific way of governing that is related to the proliferation of preemptive risk in security. Third, I explain how the emergence of dispersed forms of security organi-
zation and intervention has particular resonances in the European context. Building on the literature on European Union (EU) governance, I suggest that the emerging alliances between the commercial world of security and European institutions is symptomatic for EU governance.

Before turning to these three sets of literature, a few words need to be devoted to explain the title of the thesis. To be sure, the term “homeland security” has been almost entirely absent from European political debates, most likely because of its controversial association with President George W. Bush. Instead, EU security cooperation has taken place under the headings of “internal security” or “civil security.” Although homeland security is not part of the EU’s security rhetoric, this dissertation emphasizes that there is much to gain from using this term. On the one hand, homeland security usefully captures significant EU policy developments in areas as diverse as immigration, asylum, border control, counterterrorism, crisis management, and critical infrastructure protection (Kaunert, Leonard and Pawlak, 2012; Rhinard and Boin, 2009). As a descriptive term, homeland security allows for a comprehensive analysis of EU integration in policy areas that cross-cut different institutional set-ups (former pillars), sectors, and the distinction between internal and external security. On the other hand, homeland security challenges the seemingly more neutral concepts of internal or civil security. It raises profound questions about European security, citizenship, community, and political identity that are not captured by these other terms. Deploying the term homeland security is, thus, a critical intervention that allows me to re-politicize EU security integration and to ask questions about who or what belongs to the European “home.”

**Profit, privatization and homeland security**

Over the last decades, commercial security firms have become increasingly involved in tasks that were formerly the domain of police, customs, and other parts of the public sector. Spurred by the end of the Cold War, private security companies have significantly increased their annual spending and number of personnel as well as the scope of their activities. Commercial security activities now range from border control and critical infrastructure protection, to risk management, surveillance, alarm installation management, and manned guarding. The commercialization of security has been a global phenomenon: in the United States, employees of private security firms outnumber the public workforce by a ratio of nearly three to
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one, but also in Japan, Russia, and in Latin America and Africa, the market for security has grown spectacularly (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, 1-3). In Europe, the private security service industry has a total turnover of 35bn per year and an annual growth rate of 13.3 percent (Confederation of European Security Services, 2011). Following a series of rulings by the European Court of Justice, the private security service industry that is developing is genuinely European. For example, in 2007 the Court ruled that Italy had breached European regulations concerning the freedom to provide services by drawing up a list of obligations for foreign companies, including the requirement to swear an oath of allegiance to the Italian Republic and a minimum and maximum number of employees (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2007).

Beyond manned guarding and security service provision, a key development has been the emergence of a global growth market for homeland security applications. A European Commission report estimates that the global security market has grown nearly tenfold from 10bn in 2001 to a market size of 100bn in 2011 (Commission of the European Communities, 2012). The global demand for homeland security equipment is further projected to grow by 5% annually in the coming years, primarily benefitting newly emerging markets corresponding to critical infrastructure protection, counter intelligence, and airport security. In terms of market share, the US market is the largest homeland security market with a market share of 40 percent, followed by Europe, which accounts for 25 to 35 percent of the global market (Ecorys Research and Consulting, 2009, v). A report by Ecorys Research and Consulting expects fast growing markets in Asia and the Middle-East, but a clear divide continues to exist between the North and the global South: while many countries have a large number of corporations involved in the provision of (low-tech) manned guarding, only a few specialize in more sophisticated and high-end security solutions. Over recent years, the European Union (EU) has sought to exploit Europe’s technological advantage, for example by actively promoting “civil-military synergies” and “dual-use” technologies (see e.g. Commission of the European Communities, 2013). It has also established a large-scale security research program as part of which it has invested 1.4bn for research and development of homeland security applications between 2007 and 2013. In the US, similar developments can be identified (Transparency Market Research, 2014).
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These developments mark important transformations in contemporary security practices. Notwithstanding the industry’s global expansion and increased media attention to obscure military firms such as Blackwater, we know relatively little about the commercialization of security and the effects on the state for two reasons. Firstly, scholars in IR have traditionally defined security in relation to the nation state and military power, thereby overlooking non-state actors and the ways in which these transform global security governance. Secondly, private security is often examined in opposition to more “legitimate” transformations in structures of international authority and governance (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, 13). On this view, actors involved in private security are treated as “illicit” authorities, associated with privatized military force and mercenaries (Hall and Biersteker, 2002, 16). They are consequently viewed as “both marginal and as outside” the scope of academic research agendas (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, 13; emphasis in original).

Within the literature in IR that does approach private security as a relevant object for research, a central question has been that of the division of public and private authority as a result of the displacement of security provision toward the private sector. On the one hand, there is a group of scholars who consider the decline of the state as a result of private-sector intervention unlikely, because they believe that the formal capacity to decide over security and the use of force remains with the state (Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Shearer, 1998). According to this literature, commercial security companies should be viewed as secondary international actors, subordinate to the state and liable to the decisions that national governments make about their size and the distribution of their contracts. For example, in their analysis of public-private partnerships in global governance, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2005, 202) maintain that security privatization “appears to be the exception rather than the rule,” as it is often “closely scrutinized” by state authorities. For them, the security domain is largely unaffected by a broader tendency to roll back the state.

On the other hand, we can distinguish a group of scholars who pinpoint the outsourcing of security from the state to the private sector. This literature describes how a significant transfer of authority has taken place from public to private, which is closely related to the broader rise of neoliberalism as a paradigm of governing that accords substantial power of private business over state interest (see e.g. Holman, 2009, 2007; Ryner
and Cafruny, 2003; Rosén, 2008). A number of studies in criminology describe how private security sits easily with the broader neoliberal themes of individual choice and responsibility (see e.g. Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader, 1999; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; De Waard, 1999; Van Steden and Sarre, 2007). In this context, commercial security actors are encouraged to identify themselves as experts or professionals within neoliberalism, through practices and techniques such as benchmarking, accountancy and auditing (see also Larner and Walters, 2004). Individuals, in turn, are urged to become aware of themselves as “active subjects” (Dean, 1999), and to take responsibility for their own security, for example through the hiring of security and risk management firms (see e.g. Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).

Along these lines, much of the research that has focused on the activities of private military companies (so-called PMCs) and the ways in which these modify state power and the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force tends to describe these developments in terms of a clear shift from public to private (Shearer, 1998; Singer, 2003; Isenberg, 2004; Leander, 2005; Avant, 2006). With some exceptions, these contributions give emphasis to the challenges private military actors pose to public authority. However, what is lost in those analyses is what these processes do for the state. Broadening the empirical focus to include the everyday work of global private security companies (so-called PSCs), Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams (2009, 2011) argue that what is at stake is not the simple transfer of previously public functions to the private sphere, but the emergence of what they call “global security assemblages.” As part of these assemblages, broader transformations in national and global governance support and legitimate the growing involvement of private actors (see also Epstein, 2007; Leander, 2005, 2006; Leander and Van Munster, 2007). These developments, Abrahamsen and Williams argue, are most visible in states with weak administrations, “where the state’s financial, managerial, and technical resources are often surpassed by PSCs, corporate capital or development organizations” (ibid, 14).

Yet, as Abrahamsen and Williams themselves, in fact, emphasize, private security is “neither rare, nor limited to weak Third World governments” (ibid). Taking their argument seriously, this study presents an enquiry of private security provision in Europe. This is more than an empirical contribution: it builds on the recent literature that has called for a close analysis of private security as part of the emerging securitization of every-
day life, particularly in the context of the war on terror. What motivates the commercialization of security is a specific way of governing related to the prevalence of preemptive risk in security.

Risk, preemption, and the everyday

The study of private security requires that we take a more extensive interest in the “widening and deepening” of security as has long been emphasized by critical security studies. In particular, it calls for an engagement with a critical body of scholarship that explores the proliferation of discourses and practices of risk in the context of the war on terror (see e.g. Amoore and De Goede, 2008a, b; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero and Van Munster, 2008; Daase and Kessler, 2007; Huysmans and Tsoukala, 2008). According to these literatures, “risk” has emerged as a key technology across the domains of security and economy. It is not strictly the case that we have seen the emergence of new risks; rather, the point is that society has come to understand itself and its problems in terms of risk management, and, increasingly, in terms of risk avoidance (Éwald, 2002; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). Risk should be considered a construction, “a way in which we govern and are governed” (Adam and Van Loon, 2000, 2); and to examine risk in this way is “to engage with the practices that are enacted in the name of managing risk and uncertainty” (Amoore and De Goede, 2008a, 9, emphasis in original).

The identification of risk, suggest Amoore and De Goede, “draws private commercial techniques and expertise into state security in novel forms that are not primarily surveillant” (2008b, 176, emphasis added). For them, the commercialization of security has become closely connected to the homeland securitization of the war on terror and to the ascendance of preemptive risk, whereby preemption diverges from security governance based on risk in that it operates on future threats that are considered incalculable and indeterminate (Amoore and De Goede, 2008a, b; Anderson, 2010a, b; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007, 2011; Massumi, 2007). Amoore and De Goede emphasize that preemptive security should not be understood as a self-evident response to the events of 9/11: many of the same commercial techniques that are now used to preempt as-yet-unknown threats in the war on terror were previously deployed to identify and target potential consumers (Amoore and De Goede, 2008a, 11). The events of 9/11, in this sense, opened up a space for the enrolment of mundane techniques that had been
used in the gathering of everyday and commercial transactions (Amoore, 2013, 41-42).

Nonetheless, preemptive security post-9/11 diverges from these earlier practices of surveillance in two ways. First, as suggested, preemption exceeds surveillance in the sense that it is oriented toward an uncertain and unknowable future. Preemptive security requires intervention at the earliest possible stage (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007, 103), and often operates on the deployment of imagination, affective perceptions of risk, and on the mobilization of speculative and data-driven associations (see e.g. Anderson, 2010a, b; De Goede, 2008a). Secondly, in contrast to earlier methods of surveillance, preemption relates to a specific means of governing life, a biopolitical mode of governing that governs through life itself. In his analysis of biopower, Michel Foucault (2007, 45) argues that the concern for security – as opposed to disciplinary modes of governing – is not to “allow nothing to escape,” but, rather, “to let things happen.” Foucault argues that while discipline is about preventing events from happening, the problem of security is a different one, that is to say, this is a problem that is about allowing “circulations to take place” (ibid, 65).

Along these lines, a rich literature in security studies and political geography examines new risk management practices and procedures that separate desired and undesired flows of people, goods, and financial transactions in movement and in advance, as such “producing new spaces of governing, and the exceptions and exemptions that apply to those spaces” (Amoore and De Goede, 2008b, 177; see also Amoore, 2006, 2007; Cowen, 2010; Epstein, 2007; Lyon, 2008; Sparke, 2008; Walters, 2002). It is precisely in this context that we should understand the increased engagement with expertise in the commercial realms of data mining, risk assessment, and homeland security, and the emergence of what Bigo (2004) describes as “managers of unease” – those public and private security professionals involved in the identification and classification of risk and security threats.

Yet, about these private security professionals and the ways in which they become enrolled in anticipatory security we know very little. In fact, if we recognize that security risks are a construct, how are private security actors involved in (re)shaping (in)security, especially in the relation to the constant iteration of worst-case scenarios that we find in the context of preemption? And how do these actors engage in, and capitalize upon, the imaginative constitution of unknowable yet disastrous futures? Moreover,
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while the literature suggests that private actors are increasingly pulled into thinking about processes of inclusion and exclusion, there is a need for detailed knowledge about their everyday practices and responsibilities. Indeed, how precisely do commercial actors become drawn into the daily governing of threats? In what way are they involved in determining what is normal or abnormal, safe or risky, or deciding who should be included or excluded?

Methodologically, then, my aim is to provide an account of the heterogeneity of everyday security practices and the variety of actors involved in security work (see also Côté-Boucher, Infantino and Salter, 2014). I am particularly concerned with identifying the discrepancies between the performative expectations and promises of these new security technologies and markets and the gritty realities of their manifestation. In developing this argument I build on ethnographic research (participant observation and semi-structured interviews), conducted during four examples of “problematization” (Foucault, 1977, 185-186). Studying these examples allows me to identify practices and technologies when they are unstable and under construction and to fully engage with the activity of politics (Best and Walters, 2013). A focus on Europe is thereby particularly relevant, as I will argue below.

Authority and EU security governance

A key element of current European Union (EU) security and counterterrorism policy is the ambition to prevent, anticipate, and intervene early in crisis and conflict. EU initiatives range from preventing radicalization and recruitment (De Goede and Simon, 2012); to mitigating the vulnerability of cross-border critical infrastructure; to enabling Europe-wide data-sharing on passenger records and financial data in order to “connect the dots” of future terrorist threat (see e.g. Council of the European Union, 2005). Although less spectacular than the much-discussed US preemptive strike on Iraq, EU anti-terror practices including data retention, financial surveillance, and countering radicalization are strongly embedded in anticipatory and preemptive logics. As Marieke de Goede (2011, 10) points out, “if we understand preemption as encompassing not just overt military acts, but also more mundane modes of proactive security intervention … we will find it to be a key aspect of the European security model.” Consequently, De Goede (2008b) argues, there is a need for greater reflexivity with regard to Europe’s supposed cosmopolitan identity and the idea that Europe
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presents a counterweight to US preemptive politics in the war on terror (see e.g. Ash, 2002; Habermas and Derrida, 2005).

This thesis considers Europe to be a particularly relevant focus for a study of preemptive security. As suggested, the deployment of preemptive risk in the war on terror invites us to think about the complex new interplays of public and private authority and to cut through the intellectual stalemate that sees the growth of private security as either irrelative to the enduring sovereignty of nation states, or as the complete and unaccountable transfer of security authority to the private sector. Returning to what Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 15) have called “global security assemblages,” the relationship between new commercial security actors and changing conceptions of risk indicates the coming into existence of new security practices and governance structures that are “simultaneously public and private, global and local.”

The emergence of dispersed forms of security organization and intervention has particular resonances in the European context (Rhodes, 1996). There is now a rich literature on EU “multilevel governance” (e.g. Marks et al., 1996), or “network governance” (Diez, 1997; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999), arguing that the enrolment of private actors is symptomatic for EU governance. A particularly important question that has informed these approaches is how European governance styles are shifting from the traditional Community or Monnet method toward a more voluntary mode of governance that relies on the enrolment of non-state actors and on new practices such as the open method of coordination (OMC) (see e.g. Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004; Zeitlin, Pochet and Magnusson, 2005). According to much of the EU governance literature, these shifts should be embraced, for they suggest the possibility of having a wider range of issues addressed at the European level and not just at the national level (see also Barry, 2001, 90). Moreover, the enrolment of non-state actors that characterizes these governance forms should enable the EU to govern at once more effectively and democratically (Peters and Pierre, 2009, 92).

From a more critical perspective, the prevalence of network-type and dispersed forms of governing could be analyzed beyond EU politics and linked to what Rose (1996, 61) describes as “advanced” liberal rule. Advanced liberalism, Walters and Haahr (2005, 118) explain, operates on the basis of the mobilization of society and through networks and partnerships with non-state actors (see also Donzelot, 1991, 178). Advanced liberal gov-
ernment is not strictly about outsourcing public responsibilities and functions to the private and voluntary sectors. For it relies on the enactment of particular technologies of power, including partnership frameworks, benchmarking, best practices, and performance contracts (Larner and Walters, 2004). As Walters and Haahr point out, building on Rose, there has been a proliferation of these “little regulatory instances,” which subtly constrain us, “enjoining us to exercise our freedoms and liberties in particular ways, and towards particular ends” (Walters and Haahr, 2005, 119; following Rose, 1996, 61).

My analysis seeks to contribute to critical perspectives on “Europe” and European integration by focusing on the ways in which the enrolment of commercial security actors is suggestive for this type of advanced liberal rule. On the one hand, the conceptual lens of little regulatory instances sits easily with recent conceptualizations of the EU as a regulatory state that materializes through technical practices and devices (Barry, 2001; Majone, 1996). On the other hand, this conceptual lens seems less appropriate for a study of EU security, which, in spite of important developments toward a more diverse and expansive EU security and defense and justice and home affairs policy (see e.g. Bickerton, Irontelle and Menon, 2011; Edwards and Meyer, 2008; Trauner and Carrapiço, 2012), is still very much regarded as a domain that belongs to the member states and that is subject to the intergovernmental method (see also Øhrgaard, 1997). In this regard, European security presents a difficult case for a study of public-private partnerships and complex constellations of government. How can we think about the emerging alliances between the commercial world and EU security? And what does this mean for the study of Europe and the EU? What kind of Europe is brought into being through these practices and relations?

**Aims and structure of the thesis**

To summarize my claims here, three sets of questions are asked in the context of this thesis, each corresponding to three ‘gaps’ in the literature as introduced in the above. The core research questions are the following:

- What are the security concepts that motivate the growth market for homeland security applications and the growing involvement of commercial security actors in Europe?
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- How are these newly emerging actors involved in the construction of preemptive risk and in the daily governing of threats?
- How can we make sense of the emerging alliances between the commercial world and public security authority beyond weak states?

These questions will be asked throughout the thesis and in all chapters. The concluding chapter will return to them in a more concise manner.

Chapter 1 first gives an assessment of how the commercialization of security takes key debates about security and the role of the state in IR and political science into important new directions. This chapter identifies four theoretical starting points that will broadly guide the empirical research in Chapters 3 to 6, the first two related to debates about security, and the latter two to the role of the sovereign state. These are: 1) a focus on security as invoked and enacted through discursive practices, routines, and technocratic processes; 2) a conceptual interest in the intersections between market discourse and security discourse; 3) a preference for the terms “commercialization” and “marketization” over “privatization”; and 4) close attention to the networks of commercial firms and EU actors that are operating “above” the state.

Chapter 2 turns to the methodological implications of the study of everyday practices, objects, and procedures of security. This chapter raises two questions, the first related to the question of ‘what’ we should study. Here, I propose to follow a particular method of analysis by Foucault referred to as “thinking problematically” (Foucault, 1977, 185-186). Thinking problematically involves the analysis of problematized objects, or problematizations, and the discursive practices that underpin their emergence. Furthermore, it entails a focus on “problematizing moments,” or events of crisis (Bacchi, 2012, 2). By examining these, this enables me to identify routinized security practices as well as newly emerging ones. Secondly, the chapter raises the question of ‘how’ to study these problematizations and interpret security practices. I will identify and discuss three principal means of data collection and data analysis: document analysis, (intensive) interviewing, and participant observation. On a secondary level, an important motivation behind the chapter is to reflect on the relationship between my object of study and my position as researcher. In particular, I will address the question of how to conduct research in a context of secrecy and surveillance.
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In Chapter 3, I will turn to an investigation of how, in recent years, the EU has supported the development of a new civil security market, capable of providing security technology for new and global security challenges. This chapter maps and analyzes the emerging growth market for civil security in relation to contemporary notions of potential crisis and emergency. Building on ongoing academic analysis of what Cooper has termed “economies of emergence,” the chapter points out how the figure of emergence generates investment in more flexible, adaptive and, so it is argued, potentially lucrative markets for civil security. Drawing on observations at a number of security trade shows and stakeholder workshops, my analysis demonstrates how “civil” aspirations, concepts and technologies build on earlier formulations of military strategic discourse in the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs – though in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. More generally, the motivation behind the chapter is to investigate civil security and civil markets as performative enactments, and so to critically engage with the emergence of the civil security market as a priority in EU policymaking.

Chapter 4 explores how “critical infrastructure protection” has become an object of thought and what work it does in mobilizing particular policies, practices and technological innovations. The chapter points out how at the heart of the concept of critical infrastructure is a distinctive approach to security that has the perceived vulnerability of larger, interconnected socio-technical systems as the prime object-target of potential emergencies. Confronted with increased system vulnerability, traditional approaches to security based on predictability, centralization, and hierarchy appear to be at odds with the way in which potential incidents are unfolding. In this context, I argue that critical infrastructure protection has become a key site for expert reflection, new practices, and new security markets. The chapter combines this focus on the problematization of critical infrastructure with an interest in the question of what critical infrastructure protection may tell us about the European homeland. In particular, it suggest that the idea of the homeland refers to a specific sense of belonging that is constituted by infrastructural connections and circulations.

Chapter 5 and 6, then, zoom in on specific examples of securing vulnerable systems. Drawing on a detailed study of the EU Secured Urban Transportation – European Demonstration (SECUR-ED) project, Chapter 5 first examines the ways in which the problem of urban transport security
Securing the European ‘Homeland’ has been addressed in Europe. This chapter analyses the SECUR-ED project as a performative space, in which risks and capabilities are identified, enacted and contested, and relationships across public and private actors are forged. Combining the literature on the performativity of security with John Law’s work on “the project,” it proceeds by assessing how, in the context of SECUR-ED, connections and continuities are performed across European differences and across public–private space. Hence, the chapter argues that the main function of the project was precisely this: to enact a common security culture, outlook or network in the realm of mass transportation in Europe. This is not a stable culture, but one that is subject to multiple possibilities for re-articulation and mis-performing. The chapter aims to engage with these moments of re-articulation by focusing on the situated practices of mass transport security. It concludes with a critical analysis of the broader European Union project for security research under the Seventh Framework Programme.

Chapter 6 provides a detailed study of the alleged 2006 liquid bomb plot, investigating two sets of questions. First, I ask how the liquid bomb plot was mediated as an event beyond risk, requiring immediate action. Secondly, the chapter examines the technologies, knowledge-forms, and modes of governing that are developed to protect airports after the liquid bomb plot. Building on Deborah Cowen’s notion of the space of the “seam,” I am particularly concerned with reform and experimentation at the airport and with the ways in which newly emerging technologies are targeted at keeping airports both secure and open. As part of this analysis, I discuss three future checkpoint projects: the Checkpoint of the Future, the Smart Security initiative, and Morpho Pass. The chapter investigates these initiatives as relevant problematizations of the airport space and as insightful attempts to ensure a secure and “seamless” journey at the airport.

The concluding chapter will return to the three sets of questions raised above. This chapter will also summarize the main claims and the way in which the thesis contributes to the existing literature. It will conclude by outlining the thesis’ implications for future research and for questions of democratic authorization, legitimacy, and equality.
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Endnotes
1. In Dutch, *De Bewaker*. Terrin won the European Union Prize for Literature with this book.
4. See e.g. Burgess, 2010; Buzan and Hansen, 2010; CASE Collective, 2006.
5. Although I don’t want to reduce Europe to the practice of the European Union, my focus in this thesis is primarily on EU practices of governing.