Securing the European 'Homeland': Profit, risk, authority

Hoijtink, M.

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Introduction
What are the security concepts that motivate the growth market for homeland security applications and the growing involvement of commercial security actors in Europe? How are these newly emerging actors involved in the construction of preemptive risk and in the daily governing of threats? How can we make sense of the emerging alliances between the commercial world and public security authority beyond weak states?

The commercialization or privatization of security has been the subject of considerable academic analysis. This thesis has examined private security as part of the emerging securitization of everyday life, particularly in the context of the war on terror. It has focused on the performative constitution of the emerging market for homeland security equipment in Europe – a development that has been understudied as most debates in academia have been concerned with the role of private military companies in conflict areas or in states where the public sector is underdeveloped. This was both an empirical and a conceptual enterprise: by widening the empirical lens to include non-militarized forms of private security and private involvement beyond weak states, the study has anchored private security more explicitly in recent academic debates about the role and implications of risk and uncertainty after the attacks of 9/11. What motivates the growing commercialization of security, I have suggested, is a specific way of governing related to the prevalence of preemptive risk in security.
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This chapter summarizes my claims and relevant contributions to the literature, highlighting three arguments, corresponding to: the marketization of risk and security; private sector enrolment in the protection and management of flows and circulation; and the emerging Europeanization of security. Each argument corresponds to a set of questions raised in the Introduction (and in the introduction of this chapter), and each argument makes a particular contribution to the literature related to, respectively, uncertainty and risk, the so-called practice turn in security, and EU governance. The chapter will conclude by reflecting on the recent developments toward a common European defense market and on implications for future research.

Economies of emergence

Locating my analysis in a critical body of scholarship that points out how current events are assembled and governed as emergencies, disasters or catastrophes, I have argued that the commercial and political investments in homeland security markets derive from an understanding of contemporary threats as irregular, incalculable, and inherently speculative. In Europe, such framings underpin investment in supposedly more flexible, adaptive, and, so it is argued, potentially lucrative markets that cut through categories of civil/military and public/private. Borrowing the term from Melinda Cooper, I have described these developments in terms of the rise of an economy of emergence that relies on the deployment of speculation and affective perceptions of contingency, unpredictability, and potential profit. Writes Cooper, “everyday productivity is increasingly determined by the capacity to respond in unforeseen and unforeseeable situations, emergent situations” (Cooper, 2008, 96; following Marazzi).

Throughout my analysis, the economy of emergence has been a fruitful lens to examine security market development in Europe for two reasons. Firstly, it has enabled me to place emphasis on the ways in which newly emerging security markets are rooted in changing conceptions of risk. In particular, contemporary threat imaginaries that support market development articulate that Europe has become exposed to global security challenges that are indeterminate and incalculable. According to these imaginaries, the end of the bipolar order has given way to a more fluid threat environment with new types of threats that require early, preemptive intervention. An important contribution of this study has been to understand the politics of the governmentality of preemptive risk and to examine what is at stake.
in the constitution of these discourses of (in)security. The prevalence of preemptive risk should not be understood as the self-evident response to the events of 9/11, nor as the result of high-level speech acts warranting emergency measures (Copenhagen school securitization). Rather, following the practice-oriented literature in IR and security studies (Paris school securitization), this study has placed emphasis on the emergence of a more diverse group of actors participating in the formation of preemptive risk.

In particular, I have insisted on the emerging alliances between EU institutions and certain branches of the European security industry and on the importance of their involvement in framing (in)security in the context of security expert groups such as the Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research. These actors have played a critical role in articulating problems and concepts and in shaping the discourse in which European policy-making is embedded. On the one hand, the analysis has illustrated how the commercial security firms involved in these debates have drawn military practice more closely into proximity with everyday life. These firms promote a culture of planning, programming, and foresight that is similar to that of the military and a militarization of thinking that is co-present in calls for interoperability, situational awareness, and the development of dual-use technologies. On the other hand, the ability to profit from ambiguity and indeterminable and uncontrollable risks strongly relies on the performative constitution of a new market for civil security. Civil security markets are decisively different from traditional defense or private security markets in that they are claimed to be at once better able at providing technology for an increasingly fluid and asymmetric threat environment, and potentially more lucrative. The invention of civil security seems to have been primarily oriented toward the interests of some of the larger European defense companies. Firms such as the Thales Group and Safran Morpho have been important exponents of these developments precisely because they have successfully combined defense expertise with capabilities in the emerging market for transportation, (aero)space, and civil security (or, so they claim).

Secondly, the conceptual lens of the economy of emergence has placed emphasis on how private security is rooted in market logics and longer histories of defense and security capitalization in Europe. Not a strict privatization of security, this analysis has insisted on the importance of the marketization of security. The difference lies in the way in which, in the context of the latter, the commercialization of security becomes entwined
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with logics of global business, trade, and (potential) market development, empowering those institutions and actors that are directly embedded in global structures, such as finance and trade ministries. In this context, it is imperative to go beyond an account of traditional security institutions, including the military, police, or ministries of home affairs or justice, and to bring into view those actors concerned with relations to the global economy. The EU is a case in point here – that is, the market-shaping power of European institutions has a long and relevant history that is reinvigorated through the current economy of emergence. In Europe it is not without significance that civil security research and development has become the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry. Under the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, the emphasis has come to lie on establishing a profitable and coherent functioning European internal market for homeland security technology. In this context, security has become a commodity that can be bought and sold in the marketplace and traded globally, and the empowerment of the security industry has taken place with the active endorsement of European institutions.

Nonetheless, market development is never seamless and cannot be understood as driven by the free and constant circulation of products in a liberal world economy. In particular, there is a continuous process of negotiating between commercial interests and security requirements as local actors or potential ‘end users’ are enrolled into security tasks and responsibilities. Confronted with far-reaching demands linked to targeting terrorism and a need to maintain business-as-usual, transport operators, airports, and other end-users often refuse to become responsible (and liable) for the protection against high-level security threats. At the same time, in Europe, the problem of the market is often determined as one of competitiveness and relative economic performance vis-à-vis emerging economic regions. The solution involves further market integration and the constitution of a better functioning or true internal market through common EU market tools such as the standardization and harmonization practices. In this regard, we have seen how the market has itself become a prime object for protection.

To summarize my arguments here, my contribution to the literature on private security is twofold. First, shifting our focus away from private security services and toward the performative and sometimes contested constitution of newly emerging markets for homeland security equipment, the analysis has explained the growing involvement of commercial security
actors as embedded in changing conceptions of risk, on the one hand, and the performative expectations and promises associated with civil security market development, on the other. Second, I have suggested to move beyond the notion of privatization and to analyze these developments in terms of the progressive marketization of security. This has allowed me to focus on the importance of market logics for the growth of private security and on the role of a more heterogeneous group of professionals involved in the formation of preemptive risk and (in)security. It is to the involvement of these newly emerging actors in the constructions and incorporation of risk and the daily governing of threats that I will turn next.

**Protecting circulations and private enrolment**

Situating my analysis in another body of literature concerned with the emergence of a distinctive mode of security that focuses on the protection of the systems underpinning collective life, a second contribution made by this dissertation relates to the way in which newly emerging private actors are involved in the protection, production, and management of flows and circulations. My analysis has been influenced in particular by the literature on what Collier and Lakoff (2015) have defined as “vital systems security.” At the core of this form of security is the objective to protect the systems that are critical to economic and political order, ranging from transport and distribution, energy, utilities, food supply, communications, and banking and finance systems. For Collier and Lakoff, vital systems security does not simply succeed territorial or population security: it shares with Foucault’s notion of population security a concern with the health and welfare of populations. However, Collier and Lakoff point out that with the intensification of modernization and industrialization processes, planners and policy-makers increasingly acknowledge that collective life has come to rely on interconnected systems and networks. As such, “the very instruments of biopolitical government, which aimed to foster the health and wellbeing of the population, came to be seen as potential sources of vulnerability” (Collier and Lakoff, 2015, 21).

Along these lines, the projects and technological applications that are investigated in the context of this thesis are all tied to the transformation of the practices managing, upholding, and producing connections and circulations. At the core of them is a desire to foster interoperabilities and interconnections between systems and organizations, and, by so doing, to
keep critical and large-scale systems and networks at once open and secure. Recent contributions to border studies have made a similar argument, in particular those authors who have been interested in the enrolment of new border technologies (e.g. biometrics) and agents. My analysis contributes to this literature in at least two ways. First, empirically, I move beyond a study of “traditional” territorial borders to look for evidence of bordering practices in other places. In a world of interconnected systems and networks of flow multiple borders still exist (see also Paasi, 2009). They are, for example, connected to data mining practices and performed across the ordinary spaces of city subways or rail transportation (Amoore, 2009). With the enrolment of private techniques and expertise these borders and boundaries are further hardened, and with profound implications for who can claim and expect to get what kind of security (see e.g. Bigo, 2008; Leander, 2010). For some time now, the constitution of a transnational and highly mobile elite *vis-à-vis* the subaltern in the context of fast-track and automated border systems has received increased scholarly attention (Lyon, 2008; Salter, 2008a, b; Sparke, 2008). My objective has been to focus on the ways in which these forms of expertise spill forth into new spaces such as urban transportation, and on the significant role of the manufacturing industry in promoting particular ideas, concepts, and technologies.

Second, my findings demonstrate the *discrepancies* between the performative expectations and promises of these new security technologies and the gritty realities of their manifestation. In developing this argument I built on ethnographic research (participant observation and semi-structured interviews), conducted during crisis moments or events in which current structures and routines fail. Studying these particular moments has allowed me to identify practices and technologies when they are unstable and under construction and to fully engage with the activity of politics. It is often tempting to accept the idealized renderings of cutting-edge technology that can be found in company brochures and publications or at security trade exhibitions. However, these ideals do not write out the human, and it is imperative to draw attention to the ways in which these technologies are not always enacted exactly as they are described. So, throughout the analysis I have described how technological systems are fetishized and yet governmental authorities and local operators had no interest in buying them. Beyond the technology, I have shown how the enrolment of local actors and frontline staff into the daily performativity of security is by no means seam-
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less. To give an example, the successful enlistment of urban transport staff and passengers in the context of the SECUR-ED project strongly depended on the establishment of training programs and demonstrations. These were specifically designed to reflect everyday working conditions and to encourage participants to incorporate the demands linked to security into their daily practices.

And yet, an important conclusion of my study of the SECUR-ED project was that local actors often had no interest in becoming responsible for the protection against high-profile security threats or to buy the new equipment. Faced with these failures and the project’s lack of effectiveness, I have shown how the initial objective of the project shifted away from fighting high-level risks and toward the constitution of a common security culture in the realm of urban transportation. Likewise, I have argued that the EU’s security research frameworks programs (FP7 and Horizon2020) are primarily directed toward the development of shared meanings and perceptions of security and the creation of public-private expert networks in Europe. The vagueness of this objective, I have pointed out, renders critical questions about the programs’ use, desirability, and effectiveness obsolete.

Let me now summarize my arguments. Following the recent body of scholarship that has examined the rise of vital systems security, my findings have shown that the marketization of security is closely linked to the transformation of the practices protecting, producing, and managing systems of flow. I have combined this focus with detailed and technical description of security practices, building on insights from Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and practice-oriented literature, to ask questions about the ways in which a diverse group of private actors becomes enrolled into the daily performativity of security. This focus on detail and the gritty realities of private practices and technologies brought into view other types of knowledge and new kinds of questions. Most importantly, this has enabled me to argue that in the face of potentially catastrophic events and/or exponential growth, it seems that no investment is disproportionate or excessive (see also De Goede, Simon and Hoijtink, 2014, 419).

European security, authority, and democracy

This thesis set out to explore the commercialization of security in the context of changing conceptions of risk and the role of newly emerging actors in the performativity of risk and (in)security in Europe. While the initial
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focus was on private security, this turned out to be a study of “Europe” as much as of commercial security practices. Taken together, the chapters have addressed a wide array of EU actors, agencies, projects, publications, meetings, negotiations, standards, agreements, and best practices in different areas such as transport security, critical infrastructure protection, and security research and development. To make sense of their relevance, I have engaged with the idea that the EU is closely tied to the circulation and appropriation of knowledge and technological artefacts. In particular, my analysis has been influenced by the literature on “infrastructural Europeanism,” which proposes a history of European integration that considers Europe to be the outcome of, and a catalyst for, infrastructure-related negotiations (see e.g. Schipper and Schot, 2011; Van der Vleuten and Lagendijk, 2010). The formation of Europe, in this sense, takes place through the development of transnational and large-scale infrastructural projects or, more implicitly, through everyday working practices and soft tools and regulation, such as facilitation and negotiation, research, standardization, and best practice development. Such a focus shifts our attention away from the idea that European integration is driven by single moments of crisis and toward the thickness and production of everyday policy-making in Brussels.

Overall, the chapters have presented an image of the EU as a unique political entity. This is not so much because of the idea that Europe exemplifies a globalized, post-nation-state world (for a critique, see e.g. Jansen, Celikates and De Bloois, 2014). Neither was this strictly because of the way in which the Europe typifies a peculiar constellation of states, politically and economically speaking. Instead, Europe’s unique character derived from the variety and intensity of ad hoc, highly technical, and market-driven types of governing. My analysis has placed specific emphasis on the way in which EU governing takes place through the creation and integration of markets. It is well known that Europe is primarily defined and governed as a space of markets. From the Treaty of Rome onwards, the ambition to govern or complete Europe has largely taken place through the formation of markets, and the framing of security as an issue that is subject to internal market considerations could be seen as a latest example of this tendency.

For the study of EU cooperation and integration, the marketization of security implies an increasingly complex and expansive form of EU security governance, with the Commission as a key driving force even if it lacks the formal capacities to legislate. These developments, as Karen Smith puts it
(2009, 3), encourage us to understand EU security as a “policy universe,” or as a pluralistic policy area that cross-cuts different institutional set-ups (first pillar, second pillar, and remnants of the third pillar), and sectoral boundaries (see also Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2006). Cross-pillarization, here, is not so much about the inclusion of strongly political and security-oriented issues into a policy area accustomed to dealing with economic and technical issues, as the literature on EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) suggests (see e.g. Barros, 2012; Trauner and Carrapiço, 2012). Precisely the opposite appears to be happening: these developments point to an incremental and seemingly low-key approach to security that incorporates market-driven and technocratic forms of governing.

In this regard, EU security integration takes place in a way that reflects the Monnet method of integration “by stealth” (Majone, 2005). As Giandomenico Majone puts it, the core principle of the Monnet method “is to implement, wherever possible, the principle of the fait accompli – the accomplished fact that makes opposition and argument useless” (Majone, 2010, 159). This is despite the supposed emergence of “new modes of governance” based on “good governance” and principles such as “voluntarism, subsidiarity, flexibility, participation, policy integration, and multi-level integration” (Boras and Jacobsson, 2004, 189). The literature on new modes of governance rightly indicates that interest groups and civil society organizations are increasingly pulled into thinking about EU policy processes, for example through methods such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) or the civil dialogue. However, as argued by Cram (2011, 649), the practices traditionally associated with the Commission's integration by stealth are now “increasingly supported by elites faced with skeptical publics and unable to push ahead in a straightforward legislative manner with their preferred projects at the EU level.” Or, as Kröger (2007, 579) points out, access to OMC “is accorded only to those who more or less share a common interpretation of the world, while access is denied to those with more or less share a common interpretation of the world, while access is denied to those with more fundamentally divergent views.” Viewed from this perspective, new modes of governance “are no less ‘stealthy’ … than the traditional attempts of the Commission to expand its competence and capacity to govern” (Cram, 2011, 649).

Contrary to the normative assumptions of the new governance literature, these modes of governance are no more democratic either. That
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is, the likelihood for a more democratic form of governance as emphasized by the new governance literature is questionable in the light of the opaque and unaccountable partnerships that are forged between the Commission and the security and defense industry, for example in the context of the Group of Personalities. “A true competition of policy ideas would open up the debate, making it impossible to pursue the strategy of fait accompli,” Majone (2006, 159) points out, yet this is prevented by the position of the Commission and the overall structure of EU governance. On the one hand, in spite of the European Commission’s monopoly of agenda-setting, the Commission is still very much dependent upon the decision-making power of the Council of Ministers. This means that it is key for the Commission to ally with powerful social groups (see also Van Apeldoorn, 2000, 160). On the other hand, there is no need for the Commission to legitimate its partnerships with strongly organized interest groups such as the security lobby, because of the absence of political accountability more generally. This is not to say that these partnerships are necessarily stable, and, throughout the analysis, my objective has been to be attentive to differences and contestations between “public” cultures of bureaucracy and “private” cultures of innovation. For example, the industry often complains that EU institutions are slow, clumsy, and excessively bureaucratic. By comparison, EU representatives lament the manufacturing industry’s emphasis on technology as a silver bullet to insecurity. At the same time, these characteristics crosscut categories of public and private. That is, a more complex assemblage of public and private actors comprising certain branches of the Commission (i.e. the current Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) and the manufacturing industry combine in their desire to facilitate economic activities aimed at a European growth market for homeland security equipment.

To sum up my arguments, my contribution to the EU studies literature is twofold. Firstly, contrary to the dominant idea in EU studies that security and defense policy is the poor cousin of economic integration, the conclusion of this thesis has been that it is a particularly thriving policy field and a driving force for European integration. Secondly, I have suggested that EU security space materializes through little regulations and “technical practices and devices” (Barry, 2001, 3), and in a way that reflects the Monnet method of integration by stealth, even if the Commission lacks the formal capacities to legislate in this area. Taken together, my findings sug-
gest that security policy spans the different institutional frameworks of the EU, beyond the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy (see also Bickerton, 2010; Missiroli, 2001). In this context, the emerging role of the European Commission as a “policy entrepreneur” vis-à-vis the member states and powerful social groups is a particularly relevant new research direction that requires further analysis (Argomaniz, 2009, 159).

**Implications for future research: a “new” deal for EU defense integration?**

At the Milipol exhibition of internal state security in Paris in November 2013 the European Commission officially launched the next seven-year security research program as part of the EU’s “Horizon2020” research budget. Director of Aerospace, Maritime, Security and Defense Industries in the Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, Phillipp Brunet, explained that the new research framework would be “but the first step of a series of initiatives aimed at maximizing civil-military synergies.” At the same time, Brunet told the audience that “it has to be clear to all of us that these ambitious goals can only be achieved if the civil and military worlds would work closely together, hand in hand.” Fellow panelist Claude-France Arnold, Chief Executive of the European Defense Agency (EDA), added that the lines between security and defense are “increasingly blurred but the challenge nonetheless is to find the right synergies.” Arnold pointed out that EDA and the Commission have synchronized their respective research agendas in order to promote “civil-military synergies” and the development of “dual-use” technologies within the EU – a partnership that will further intensify with the launch of the Horizon2020 framework.\(^{103}\)

This focus on dual-use technology took place against the background of another development: the emergence of a number of European-level projects to encourage European defense-industrial cooperation. In 2013, the Commission published a Communication “towards a more competitive and efficient defense and security sector,” recommending several actions to support the internal market for defense and security and strengthen the competitiveness of the defense technological and industrial base (Commission of the European Communities, 2013a). One of the instruments identified by the Commission was a Preparatory Action on military research, which is supposed to “illustrate the value added of an EU contribution in new research areas,” and, if successful, “prepare the ground for a possi-
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ble CSDP-related research theme which could be funded under the next multi-annual financial framework” (Commission of the European Communities, 2014b, 10). The plan for a Preparatory Action in the military domain has already been backed by the European Council in its conclusions of December 2013 (Council of the European Union, 2013a), and has been further elaborated in a Commission roadmap published in June 2014. This roadmap proposes that in order to identify the scope of the Preparatory Action scheme “an independent advisory body made up of top level decision-makers and experts” should be set up (Commission of the European Communities, 2014b, 10). “Such a Group of Personalities,” the Commission writes, “would consist of around 20 high level representatives from Member States, the European Parliament, the industry and academia” (ibid).

There exist important similarities between these proposals and the earlier efforts by the European Commission to establish a European market for homeland security. With respect to the role of the Commission in these discussions we can again identify a clear emphasis on existing Community instruments and project-based expertise in the realm of security. The Commission’s role is one of “asserting and developing the market-based route to closer European defense-industrial cooperation by emphasizing internal market and regulatory tools” (Fiott, 2015, 248). It thereby views defense policy as a structural, market issue, and the defense market as any other market. On the one hand, one could view this as an attempt by the Commission to offer a supranational alternative to the intergovernmental approach favored by member states and the newly established European Defense Agency (EDA). On the other hand, this should be seen as an effort to build on and exploit best practices and existing expert networks in the realm of homeland security. The new Preparatory Action scheme for research and innovation (this time in the area of defense), and the establishment of a new Group of Personalities on defense research (following the 2003-2004 Group of Personalities on civil security) are key examples.

With the Group of Personalities formed in the first half of 2015, similar questions as the ones posed by this thesis should be raised. For example, how and why have these markets emerged as a problem space? What work does the problem of European defense do in terms of mobilizing a range of policies, practices, and technologies, and with what effects and for whom? New types of questions should also be raised about the way in which these defense markets are embedded in discourses of global (wea-
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ons) trade, export, and regional competitiveness. These developments call for empirical knowledge about how defense companies, equipment, and expertise circulate outside of Europe and into “third markets” (Commission of the European Communities, 2013c), as well as for a critical analysis of how these forms of technology and expertise are locally understood, interpreted and transformed through practices of appropriation and/or resistance. Such a focus would combine insights from critical security studies, postcolonial literature, and EU studies, and further advance our understanding of the pluralization and globalization of homeland security and defense.

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This thesis has illustrated important reconfigurations of public power and the emergence of multiple sites of rule beyond the state. It has pointed to the development of a pluralistic and market-driven security environment in Europe, where different non-state actors exist alongside public authority. Security governance is increasingly beyond the state in the sense that it is embedded in complex constellations that rearticulate public/private relations. But, security responsibilities have also been diffused upwards to European networks of security professionals and bureaucrats. Each development, in different ways, obscures lines of transparency and answerability and gives rise to new questions about long-standing problems of democratic authorization, legitimacy, and equality (see also Loader and Walker, 2007). The commodification of security has profound consequences for who or what is worthy of security and has the potential to reinforce the boundaries between social outsiders and those with “the loudest voices and largest pockets” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, 144). By comparison, the Europeanization of security – to the extent that it follows the principle of the "fait accompli" that makes opposition and argument useless – unfolds by and large in highly technocratic and opaque governmental settings that empower strongly organized interest groups, such as the security and defense lobby.

There is ample evidence of wrongdoing by the state in the name of security and it would be naïve to view “public” security as an a priori value. But, while the role of the state in declaring states of exception and illiberal, exceptional measures in the war on terror is covered extensively, much less is known about the implications of the commercialization and Europeanization of security. This thesis has zoomed in on the assemblages that are
emerging under the heading of EU “internal” or “civil” security, knitting together commercial firms and EU networks of bureaucrats. To some extent, these alliances emerge in, and are mobilized by, contemporary threat imaginaries and their speculative futures. We have seen, for example, how the objective of strengthening public/private relationships in the context of the European “civil” security market has been closely linked to an understanding of threats as increasingly dynamic and non-linear. At the same time, the partnerships that are forged between the European Commission and the European security and defense lobby are to a great extent steered by economic considerations and imperatives. For these actors, a key strategy has been to emphasize the expectations and promises associated with homeland security market development and to propose a market-based approach to European security integration. Again, this is why in the thesis I have avoided the privatization terminology and referred to the marketization of security instead. This is also why the agenda of “desecuritization,” advocated by much of the critical security studies literature as an important strategy for critiquing security politics, cannot apply (see e.g. Waever, 1995). This strategy of un-making security problems or securitizations does not have to be introduced into this field by a critical observer. That is to say, it is already there, as it has been adopted and developed by the security experts that I have studied in this dissertation. More than on desecuritization, my critique has been based on a strategy of deconstructing security, leading me to ask how something is what it is rather than what it means (or why it is what it is) (Campbell, 1998, 5).

Another means of critiquing the commercialization of European security in the context of changing conceptions of risk has been the conscious use of the term “homeland security.” While “homeland security” has been almost entirely absent from European political debates much has been gained from using this term. Homeland security usefully counters the seemingly more neutral concepts of internal or civil security and raises profound questions about European security, citizenship, community, and political identity that are not captured by these other two terms. Adopting the concept of homeland security has been a critical intervention that has allowed me to re-politicize EU security integration and to examine the scope and effects of the innovations and commercializations that are set in motion by the emergence of the EU homeland security market.
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102. Here, I follow Pawlak (2009, 39) who argues that, although the pillars have formally disappeared, “[the] maintained fragmentation of the EU’s external policies between Community and CFSP pillars suggest that there are still many opportunities for inter- or intra-institutional politics.”


104. The Group of Personalities on defense research has been formed in the first half of 2015, comprising sixteen high-level security officials and industry chairmen. Comparing the list of the current members with that of the first Group of Personalities of 2004, the current team consists of a completely new group of people (with the exception of former Prime Minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt). At the same time, the general balance remains the same: much like the first group, the current Group of Personalities is heavily dominated by corporate interests and by some of Europe’s largest security and defense firms (i.e. Indra, Saab, Airbus, BAE Systems, Finmeccanica). Indra and the two participating organizations for applied research – TNO from the Netherlands and Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft from Germany – have also been among the most active contributors to the EU’s framework for civil security research. Geographically, the group further demonstrates a clear dominance of Europe’s key defense-industrial states, i.e. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, complemented with (research) officials from Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland.