Beyond immigrant ethnic politics?

Organizational innovation, collaboration and competition in the Los Angeles immigrant rights movement (1980-2015)

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CHAPTER 6. BEYOND THE LOS ANGELES MODEL? UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRANT WORKER ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH A HYBRID RESOURCE-BASED MODEL

Abstract
This paper offers a starting point to explain the emergence, consolidation, and fragmentation of the Los Angeles immigrant workers rights movement over the last three decades. While traditional accounts highlight labor unions and private foundations as supporters of immigrant workers’ organizations and multi-ethnic collaboration, the role of such institutions fails to account for the rise and fall of a key coalition, the Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Worker Organizing Network (MIWON). Inspired by ecological theory and Olson’s collective action theory, we contend that organizational collaboration is shaped by 1) forces that spur competition between organizations, 2) complementarity and alignment of organizational goals, and 3) ideologically grounded moral incentives that sustain collective action. With qualitative data from in-depth interviews and organizational and public archives, we elaborate how these three dimensions’ changing configuration underpins shifting rationales for organizational collaboration within a group of ideologically similar organizations.

Keyword: Immigrant Organizations; Coalition-Building; Organizational Competition; Social Movements; Organizational Ecology.

From Ethnic to Immigrant Working-Class Mobilization? An Assessment of Los Angeles ‘Exceptionalism’

Over the last few decades, Los Angeles has proven to be a major hub of leftist immigrant activism in the United States. Local immigrant organizations, often organized in multiethnic coalitions, have conducted a remarkable number of successful campaigns addressing diverse issues including unionization and labor conditions, access to healthcare, voting rights, legalization and federal immigration reform, and many more (Milkman, Bloom, and Narro 2010; Voss and Bloemraad 2011; Nicholls 2013; Fine 2006). Researchers have observed the resurgence of class as a key organizing principle within those organizations. Several groups have centered their action on workplace issues, and formulated rights’ claims in the public sphere, mostly in terms of social and economic rights (Milkman, Bloom and Narro 2010; Chung 2007; Fine 2006; Nicholls and Uitermark 2016). While certainly not renouncing other identities – race, ethnicity, gender – organizations have mainly defined their memberships and constituencies in terms of

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class, publicly claiming to represent the “low-wage immigrant workers” across the city (Fine 2006; Milkman, Bloom and Narro 2010; Chung 2007).

This situation presents an intriguing empirical puzzle, with broad implications for understanding urban politics in the US. Observers have long recognized that immigrants tend to mobilize politically through ethnic channels and identities, rather than along class lines (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Katzenelson 1981; Mollenkopf 2014). Collective action, particularly through non-profit community organizations, advocacy groups, or hometown associations, generally remains within the precinct of ethnic and racial boundaries (Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008; Chung, Bloemraad, and Tejada-Peña 2013). Trends in LA seem to confound these conventional assumptions because of the prevalence of long-term inter-ethnic and class-based alliances, solidarities, and identities. Working-class immigrants continue to identify as ethnics from different regions and countries, but in parallel, many also belong to bigger struggles organized on class-based affiliations and ideologies. This paper addresses this puzzle by explaining the trend and assessing its potential to fundamentally change traditional patterns of ethnic politics in the city.

So, how have scholars explained the case of LA? Observers have generally accounted for the “Los Angeles model” by pointing to three main factors (Milkman, Bloom and Narro 2010; Milkman, 2006; Franck and Wong 2004; Pastor 2001b; Pastor and Prichard 2012). First, a thick concentration of undocumented working-class immigrants became employed in mostly unprotected low-wage sectors of the highly segmented LA economy, which steered immigrant political mobilization towards workplace issues. Second, labor unions gave firm support to multiethnic economic organizing, which manifested in the leadership of immigrant-friendly progressive labor unions such as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the Hotel Employees International Union (HERE), as well as the revamped LA County Federation of Labor (LA Fed) under the guidance of Miguel Contreras.162 Third, networks formed between labor, immigrant, community, and faith organizations, which ensured mutual support and minimized competition over scarce resources while facilitating the attainment of common goals.

These different explanations point to important factors but they do not identify the mechanisms responsible for solidarities across groups. When they do point to explanatory mechanisms, they often highlight the important roles played by labor unions. Immigrant-friendly union leaders opened some unions to accommodate the concerns of immigrants, encouraged important investments in immigrant rights campaigns, and supported building cross-sectoral (alliances around a broad range of issues. Just as important, unions were hearty and forceful advocates of a “social and economic justice” frame, which has assumed great prominence in LA’s progressive politics. However, early on in immigrant organizing, during the late 1980s and 1990s, labor unions and the

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162 In 1996, as a former United Farm Workers (UFW) and HERE organizer, Contreras was the first Latino elected as secretary-treasurer of LA Fed and became a driving force in local politics (Milkman 2006; Franck and Wong 2004).
powerful Los Angeles County Federation of Labor had at best an indirect role in stimulating cooperative relations between key leftist immigrant organizations. These immigrant organizations included the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA), the Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance (KIWA), the Instituto de Educación Popular del Sur de California (IDEPSCA), and later the Pilipino Workers Center (PWC). Unions certainly reshaped the general political environment of LA and they participated in several large campaigns. Yet, there is scant evidence that unions played a direct role during these groups’ startups or in shaping their relational dynamics or class-based organizing rationale. Others have argued that a handful of private philanthropies played a key role by supporting those groups in their infancy, particularly when leftist immigrant organizations lacked widespread public legitimacy (Pastor and Prichard 2012). Foundations, especially Liberty Hill, were instrumental in seed-funding all the organizations in this case study. This kind of support also encouraged multiethnic collaboration among the organizations. Still, there is no reason to expect that a single funder’s encouragement to collaborate will necessarily produce profound change in actual organizational strategy (Kohl-Arenas 2016).

These explanations cannot account for how different immigrant organizations began to invest important resources in interethnic and working-class collaborations early on. A persuasive explanation of inter-organizational collaboration requires identifying the underlying factors that spurred collaboration at the outset of immigrant workers mobilizations, as well as worked to sustain or weaken it over the years. The central questions we therefore pose are: what conditions have been responsible for encouraging interethnic and class-based cooperation between immigrant organizations in LA? And how have their dynamics of collaboration changed over time?

To answer these questions, we find it worthwhile to integrate existing literature that emphasizes an organizational perspective. Drawing on ecological theories of organization (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Minkoff 1997; Soule and King 2008; Vermeulen 2013; Ingram and Simons 2000) and parts of Olson’s (1971) theory of collective action, we can better understand dynamics of collaboration across these organizations. In doing so, we pay particular attention to 1) the forces that spur competition between organizations, 2) the complementarity and alignment of organizational goals, and 3) the ideologically grounded moral incentives that sustain collective action.

We use LA’s Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Worker Organizing Network (MIWON) as a window into the general relational dynamics between immigrant organizations in the city. MIWON was a coalition of five prominent LA immigrant organizations: CHIRLA, KIWA, PWC, IDEPSCA, and the Garment Worker Center (GWC). It was established in 2000 with the two-pronged aim of strengthening immigrant worker organizing and engaging in broader immigrant rights advocacy at local, state, and national levels. The organizations under research have worked together in many different ways, and MIWON
reflects the culmination of this partnership. Our case study of the coalition serves as a
gauge of the overall health of organizational relations in LA.

While the focus is LA, our intention is to develop an explanation for local
relational dynamics potentially applicable elsewhere. We find similar immigrant workers
organizations in Chicago, Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, and San Francisco. Some
relations between these cities’ organizations have moved in the direction of LA, while
others have not. By developing a more refined theory to understand relational dynamics
in LA, we are in a better position to examine whether the mechanisms we identify here
explain those in others cities as well. This move towards generalization will allow us to
better assess if and how the “working class” turn in immigrant and ethnic politics is
durable or a historical accident that stems from a unique confluence of factors in one
unique place and time: LA in the 1990s and 2000s.

As for the structure of the paper, first we introduce our theoretical framework.
Second, we present our data sources and methodology. We then introduce our case st-
udy, describing the evolution of inter-organizational collaboration across immigrant worker
organizations over three distinct historical phases. Last comes the conclusion, discussing
the broader empirical and theoretical implications of our study.

Collaboration between Ideologically Similar Organizations: A Hybrid Organizational
Approach

The density-dependent model provides a theoretical springboard to understand
collaboration among social movement organizations (Minkoff 1997; Soule and King 2008;
Vermeulen 2013). The model’s basic assumption is that organizations in any given
organizational population – that is, sharing key organizational structures, ideological
orientation, goals, and missions – rely on the same key resources to exist (Hannan and
Freeman 1989). As such, organizations tend to respond similarly to environmental forces,
causing those in a given population to be in a constant state of interdependence. This
interdependence takes one of two forms: competition or collaboration. The key to
understanding levels and forms of collaboration and competition between similar
organizations, following the density-dependent model, is to evaluate the amount of
interdependence between them. Recent ecological studies on ideology (Barnett and
Woywode 2004; Simons and Ingram 2004; Vermeulen 2013) have found that
organizational interdependence is highly contingent on similarities and dissimilarities
among organizations. Interdependence and resource overlap are particularly acute across
organizations that are ideologically similar because they tap the same resources. Among
social movement organizations, the overlap in potential funders, activists, and volunteers
has proven to be especially significant (McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992;
Vermeulen 2013). If these organizations draw from the same member pool, resource
overlap will increase, spurring intense rivalries among them and making collaboration
more difficult. Social movement organizations also recruit new members primarily through the social networks of their existing members (Popielarz and McPherson 1995; McPherson and Rotolo 1995). Membership of voluntary associations may differ according to traditional demographic variables such as age, sex, and ethnicity. However, other characteristics may also be at stake, such as a person’s ideological orientation (whether left-wing or right-wing, for example) and degree of religiosity (Vermeulen 2013). Ideology also influences other forms of resource overlap, such as external funding sources, political allies, institutional access, and public support (Minkoff 1995).

Competition is therefore likely to be higher among organizations that are ideologically similar because their similarity increases forms of resource overlap. At the same time, like-minded organizations are also expected to cooperate with each other to achieve shared goals. The more similar these organizations are, the more we expect to see esprit de corps, which leads to higher levels of collaboration (Barnett and Woywode 2004; Soule and King 2008). Ideologically similar organizations often strive for similar goals, and they may need each other to achieve them. Collaboration is conducive to strategies such as coalition politics, resource sharing, and the formation of umbrella organizations. Collaborations of this kind permit organizational forces to achieve common goals (Minkoff 1997; Simons and Ingram 2004). To distinguish between competition and collaboration among similar organizations is to recognize that although both produce predictions of interdependence, each form relies on distinct mechanisms. Collaboration looks to goals; competition looks to resources (Simons and Ingram 2004). With so many kinds of resources for voluntary organizations to tap—from the institutional to the political (Singh, Tucker, and Meinhard 1991)—overlap among organizations will have varying outcomes. Most studies find that when there is substantial overlap in membership base—one of the most crucial resources for voluntary organizations—competition will dominate and ideological commonality will only increase this. At such a point, ideological esprit de corps swiftly erodes, as even subtle differences in ideology threaten shared resource bases. Thus, in reality, ideologically similar organizations are primarily competing with each other for limited overlapping resources instead of collaborating with each other for common goals (Minkoff 1995; Soule and King 2008), and competition is indeed most intense among organizations that are most ideologically alike (Vermeulen 2013).

For social movements to collaborate, for instance, in forming coalition networks, there must be some level of similarity, similar ideological orientation, and common interest but no major resource overlap. Collaboration can then take either direct or diffuse form. Direct collaboration occurs when, for example, organizations with complementary capacities cooperate for the benefit of both. Diffuse collaboration occurs when collaboration among organizations with similar characteristics leads to the institutionalization and legitimation of a particular organizational field, either through codification of shared organizational templates, practices, and procedures or the
incubation and support of new like-minded organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Minkoff 1995; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Suchman 1995). If successful, pioneering organizations may therefore widen their own pool of available resources, while at the same time paving the path for additional actors to enter the very sector they helped create (Suchman 1995). In turn, this process may simultaneously increase organizational density and overall competition (Hannan and Freeman 1989).

Common interests and low levels of resources are themselves rarely sufficient for explaining collaboration, due to free-riding and subsequent self-interest among activists and social movement organizations. Olson (1971) argues that we need to look through a cost-benefit lens to understand collaboration in small groups. He (pp. 34-35) notes how especially in small groups that provide collective goods, such as those among a coalition of immigrant workers right organizations, collaboration can be successful without coercion. This happens when at least one group member perceives the gain from having the network and the collaboration as exceeding the total cost of the collective good. Olson also explains how in smaller groups marked by memberships of unequal size (e.g. – membership size, but also resources, support networks, etc.) there is the greatest likelihood that a collective good will be provided. In those instances, since the most powerful member is likely to benefit most from the group effort, it will also be willing to pay all or most of the cost. Moreover, successful coalitions must overcome the calculated self-interest of members by developing group solidarity and a moral commitment to the group. This entails the fusion of personal and collective interests (Jenkins 1983). Collaboration among ideologically similar social movement organizations can be explained by this combination of, on the one hand, a small group network with a larger, more powerful organization having largely overlapping personal and network goals and, on the other, development of a collective solidarity and moral commitment to the overall collectivities in whose name the network acts.

Accordingly, we would expect collaboration between organizations when there is 1) ideological similarity, 2) goal compatibility and complementarity, 3) little overlap in resources (money, labor, legitimacy), and 4) overlap between the particular interest of one of the more powerful organizations in the group and the collective good. In this situation, benefits of joining the network will, for most members, exceed costs. Should this not be the case, collaboration could still take place for as long as disadvantaged members have developed a strong moral commitment to the collective, be it based on trust and solidarity, multiple obligations, or the ideological desirability of coalition goals. By contrast, the literature predicts rivalries and competition when ideological commonalities exist, significant resource overlaps are present, and gains for network members do not exceed costs of starting or maintaining the network. Under such circumstances, esprit de corps, trust, and solidarity swiftly erode. Commonalities in such a context can compel these organizations to cooperate on short-term and time-sensitive projects (e.g. circulating a
petition) though they have little or no interest in investing in larger-scale campaigns or long-term partnerships.

This paper adds to the literature in at least three ways. To begin with, we provide a framework to systematically understand the relational dynamics of cooperation among ideologically similar organizations within a single metropolitan area. By doing this, we can better explain the factors driving interethnic cooperation, or lack thereof, on the basis of class solidarities. Second, we expose processes of cooperation and competition that take place both inside and outside an organizational population. Most ecological studies on ideology have centered on cooperation and competition between distinct yet ideologically similar organizational populations as aggregates (Barnett and Woywode 2004; Simons and Ingram 2004; Vermeulen 2013). Such studies assume that these dynamics exist by identifying correlations between density – the number of existing organizations in a population – and founding and disbanding rates. However, researchers have less examined how organizations within the same population collaborate and compete with each other as a result of ideological tensions, or how those inter-organizational dynamics may trigger a process of organizational change (in activities, vision, goals, structure) that eventually drives the organization towards another organizational population. As such, we focus on actual mechanisms of collaboration by taking into account the emergence, development, and slow disappearance of a coalition in which ideologically similar organizations have collaborated to achieve common goals. We bring in ecological theories on the political behavior of immigrants and ethnic groups and combine them with one of the key features of Olson’s model of collective action. This theoretical approach provides the analytical toolbox to explain the shifting relations between diverse immigrant organizations. It allows us, furthermore, to understand how organizations representing different ethnic groups collaborated at one period of time but later drifted.

Methodology

To conduct this study, we endeavored to map five MIWON organizations’ trajectories, specifically examining their ideologies, goals, and resource pools. We understood these organizations – CHIRLA, IDEPSCA, KIWA, PWC, and GWC – to represent an emerging population of immigrant worker organizations characterized by similar practices, structures, and goals. Our selection of these organizations came after exploratory fieldwork, including formal interviews with key informants involved in the LA labor and immigrant activist scenes as well as informal conversations with local researchers and observers of the organizational landscape. Supported by findings in our review of the

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63 Positive correlations for founding rates indicate stronger collaborative dynamics, whereas negative correlations indicate stronger competitive dynamics. For disbanding rates these directions are in the opposite direction – negative correlations indicate stronger collaborative dynamics and positive correlations indicate stronger competitive dynamics.
existing academic literature on the topic, our conversations revealed how relevant these organizations were for local urban politics in terms of leadership, taking original and innovative approaches, and relative success vis-à-vis achievement of organizational goals. We therefore decided to analyze those organizations and the coalition they formed as a starting point from which to understand the broader immigrant urban politics of LA.

Inspired by different streams of organizational literature, we conducted our analysis along three key dimensions: ideology, goals and resources. We followed Simons and Ingram (1997: 784) in conceptualizing ideology as a “set of beliefs about how the social world operates, including ideas about what outcomes are desirable and how they can best be achieved.” We contend that ideology affects how individuals and organizations understand social reality, but also guides action (Simons and Ingram, 1997; Wilson 1973). Political ideologies therefore play a crucial role in shaping the identity of an organization, as well as defining its rationale for existence, organizational mission, and structure. At the same time, because ideological principles must be applied to everyday reality, organizations and their staff must translate them into concrete, potentially attainable organizational activities and objectives. Organizations with very similar ideologies may therefore sharply differ in their daily operations.

Resources give organizations the means to carry out their operations and survive. Here we draw on the analytical scheme developed by McCarthy and Zald (1977), which identified types of resources and audiences. The scholars distinguished between two general types of resources: money (grants, donations, funds) and labor (mainly time and commitment of individuals). To this we add legitimacy: the ability of an organization to justify its right to exist and operate within a given normative framework (Meyer and Scott 1983; Gnes and Vermeulen, see chapter 4 of this manuscript). So conceptualized, legitimacy is a symbolic resource. As for audiences, we draw on McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) categories of constituents (providers of money and labor to the organization) and beneficiaries (those who directly benefit from the achievement of a particular organizational goal). While those two categories may overlap, this is not always the case. We suggest that even when they do not overlap, both beneficiaries and constituents are crucial for organizations. If constituents are vital to organizations largely because they provide material resources, beneficiaries are an important source of legitimacy vis-à-vis third parties, as they often provide the most powerful justification for an organization’s existence and backing its appeals for support (Beetham 2013).

To collect this type of data, we relied on four source types: archive material from the aforementioned organizations, qualitative interviews from key informants, IRS 990 US Federal Tax Return Forms (1990s-2013), and other case studies. The bulk of the archive material consists of grant applications, correspondence, and other documents that MIWON organizations supplied to the Liberty Hill when applying for funding (1990s-

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164 The literature covering LA’s leftist immigrant organizations is quite vast, and it continues to grow (see e.g. Milkman, Bloom and Narro 2010; Chung 2007; Fine 2006; Nicholls 2013; Nicholls and Uitermark 2016).
To complement this information, we consulted the public archives of KIWA (1993-2006) as well as the MIWON coalition itself (2000-10) and the Sweatshop Coalition (1995-2004). All those archives, with the exception of the latest Liberty Hill grant files (2006-2014), which are still hosted by the foundation, are freely available at the Southern California Library in LA. We conducted 16 exploratory interviews with a number of key informants, all of whom were current or former staff of the organizations in our study. Interviews centered on individuals’ biographies, organizational work, and perceptions of organizational missions, activities, and objectives. We collected IRS 990 forms for each MIWON organization, which specified its annual finances and main funding sources. Given the availability of such material, we drew on previous case studies for additional insights into the internal workings of some of the organizations.

To analyze organizational ideologies, we focused on mission and general goals (rationale for existence, problems constructed and addressed, types of claims put forward); structure (volunteer-based, membership-based, staff-based, participatory, hierarchical); scope of action (service-oriented, advocacy-oriented, organizing-oriented, hybrid); and the criteria in defining and self-identifying membership (class-based, ethnic-based, gender-based, etc.). We considered ideology as both an individual and organizational feature. When necessary, we indicated the role of specific individuals in shaping the overall ideology of the organization. We applied a similar methodology to analyze concrete organizational goals, though zoomed in on specific activities, projects and programs within given periods.

To analyze resources, we attempted to map the extent of key groups’ contribution to organizational operations. Those groups included the organization’s staff (paid or unpaid) and affiliated activists and volunteers; membership and affiliated groups; organizational networks and coalitions; individual donors and public and private funders. We also endeavored to map whether each audience contributed key material resources (constituents) or mainly assumed a legitimating function (beneficiaries). Financial resources included fiscal information (reflected in revenue and expenses streams; sources of income, particularly from government institutions, foundations, or donations); organizational structure (non-profit status, staff size, salaries); board members (names, including who among them voted, and affiliations) and staff (names and positions). The analysis of material resources included mapping the resources mobilized through a number of organizational interactions, such as joint projects and campaigns; joint events and activities; participation in coalitions and alliances; incubation and fiscal sponsorship; technical or logistical assistance to or from other organizations, associations and institutions; different types of endorsements.

Combining those analytical approaches and data sources proved fruitful, but we recognize two potential limitations of our approach. First, in opting for a qualitative study of a single coalition rather than of the entire organizational population of immigrant groups (or of organizations catering to immigrants or engaged in cross-cutting advocacy
work over the given period), we consciously chose to favor depth over breadth. Although this approach limits the applicability of our claims to the trajectory of these specific organizations, we argue that much is to be gained from a thorough, in-depth understanding of the relationship between ideology, goals, and resource configurations in a small-scale case study. We see two main advantages to our approach. They will be discussed in the conclusion, but for now we highlight 1) an opportunity to better understand the relation between collaboration and competition, which is largely assumed in macro-studies of organizational populations, and 2) the ability to grasp how dynamics of collaboration, internal organizational change, and changes in the external resource environment are all inextricably linked and impact each other in a circular fashion. Moreover, despite examining just five organizations, we did consider their interaction with others belonging to alternative organizational populations, such as labor unions, advocacy organizations, and community organizations. Second, in relying on documents that were mostly produced by the very same organizations, and often for very specific purposes (foundation grants, for example), we acknowledge that those products also emerge from an exercise in ‘framing’ for particular audiences. And yet, the parallel analysis of five organizations within the same field allowed us to triangulate information in many instances. When available, we used public information (newspaper articles, reports, interviews) and previous literature to complement our analysis.

Phase 1 (1990s – late 1990s): The Dawn of an Innovative Immigrant Worker Movement

Organizations and Ideologies

Between the 1980s and the early 1990s, a handful of leftist organizations began to take up immigrant rights advocacy in LA. Mainly comprising first- and second-generation immigrants from different countries, those organizations made workers’ rights, legalization, and social and economic justice the guiding principles of their activity. CHIRLA, IDEPSCA, and KIWA, the oldest MIWON members, were among such pioneering organizations. Their founders and early staff were influenced by different streams of socialist political ideologies, including theology of liberation and popular education (IDEPSCA), “Third World” Marxism (KIWA), and a combination of more moderate American laborism (CHIRLA’s initial core including a mix of labor unions and community and religious groups leaders). To their turn, the emergence of these organizations paved the way for the development of like-minded groups, such as PWC and GWC, which joined the MIWON coalition.

Although established in different years within different social and geographical contexts, the organizations all adapted a form of Marxist class analysis as a basic principle to orient organizational action. They focused on the most disadvantaged segment of the immigrant population – day laborers, garment workers in sweatshops, domestic workers,
undocumented immigrants, restaurant workers, inter alia – and on redressing their economic exploitation with the workplace as key site of intervention. This class-centered analysis, applied to the US context and its history of racial and ethnic discrimination, exposed institutional racism as a key factor underpinning the economic exploitation of most of the immigrant population. Moreover, it underscored the role of gender and sexism in confining immigrant women to the bottom of the US labor market and to particular work niches (e.g. domestic work, care, garment sector).

All these organizations – though CHIRLA, IDEPSCA, and KIWA as most notable among them – imposed themselves onto the progressive political landscape of late 20th-century LA. This came as the result of two important factors. They had the ability to revitalize “community organizing” through a mix of innovative tactics such as direct action, political education, and community-wide protests (Chung 2007; Patler 2010). And they made a fateful decision to intervene in economic sectors (e.g. day labor, restaurant work) and geographic areas (e.g. immigrant neighborhoods) where few progressive political organizations, including labor unions, were active (Kwon 2010; Patler 2010; Fine 2006). Regarding the first point, it is worth mentioning that organizations drew on a mix of experiences ranging from Alinsky-based “community-organizing” (Alinsky 1971) to transnational activism (Louie 2004) as well as immigrant unionization tactics as shaped by SEIU’s Justice for Janitors campaign during the 1980s (Fisk, Mitchell, and Erickson 2000). However, in applying the lessons of these experiences to the mobilization of particular immigrant communities, they also drew on their own cultural sensitivities and understandings (language included) as well as their knowledge of immigrants’ countries of origin. For this reason, as concerns the second point, those organizations were uniquely positioned to intervene in geographical areas, work sectors, and communities, whereas unions and mainstream civil society organizations were initially uninterested and then unequipped to do so.165 While researchers have analyzed this dynamic mostly from the point of view of unions and their sustainability, we stress that unions’ historical

165 Fine (2006) and Tait (2016) find that that most unions have a murky history when it comes to including immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities in both their rank and file and leadership. Unions traditionally adopted an anti-immigrant stance – particularly against undocumented immigrants – out of concern for their alleged role in eroding salaries and working conditions. According to Tait (2016), the conscious decision to bar immigrants from joining unions had two major consequences. First, it preserved unions as primarily white, male, conservative organizations, generally more concerned with the protection of existing privileges and rights than the development of inclusive organizing campaigns. Second, it left them completely unprepared and unequipped to deal with immigrant populations, both in sociocultural and linguistic terms (a point reiterated by Fine). Milkman and her colleagues (2000a; 2006), who specifically focus on immigrants and unions in California and Los Angeles, emphasize that certain unions – particularly those connected to the AFL branch – engaged in several high-profile immigrant workers campaigns. Those included the organizing drive of Latino workers in the LA manufacturing sector (Zabin 2000) and in construction (Milkman and Wong 2000), as well as the famous SEIU Justice for Janitors (J4J) campaign (Fisk, Mitchell and Erickson 2000; see also Waldinger et al. 1998). However, with the exception of J4J, as the authors themselves recognize, input for mobilization in those campaigns mostly came from immigrants themselves rather than from unions. Moreover, putting the question of union’s interest in organizing immigrants aside, it is worth noting that union officials in Southern California expressed little interest in materially supporting immigrant worker organizations. For this reason, immigrant worker organizations developed more in parallel to the mainstream labor movement rather than as a direct emanation. See chapters 2, 3 and 5 for more discussion of this topic.
disengagement left a significant representational void that immigrant worker organizations began to fill.

Established in 1984 as an informal coalition of modest local community groups, IDEPSCA is the oldest organization we analyzed (see chapter 3 for additional information). Located in the Greater LA Area city of Pasadena, by and large run by Central American and second-generation Mexican immigrants, it became a formal organization in 1991. Its stated core mission was (and still is) education, in the widest sense possible, of the growing pool of exploited immigrant workers living in the region. Projects, such as La Escuela de la Comunidad, were the vehicle to achieve educational and political goals. La Escuela offered a broad range of courses including English-as-a-second-language, Spanish literacy, and computer literacy. Educators drew heavily from the work of Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire (1996[1970]) and his “pedagogy of the oppressed.” This method stressed that educators needed to draw upon the experiences of their “oppressed” students, thereby raising their political consciousness (Añorve, 2009). IDEPSCA members were also inspired by liberation theology, grassroots Catholic Marxism, and the Chicano movement. The educational curriculum dealt with themes such as discrimination, racism, and sexism, but also more practical topics such as wage theft, minimum wage, overtime, and work solicitation on street corners. The more abstract themes would “provide the text to analyze... issues,” and through this methodology “make people think critically on the issues and collectively... make decisions toward the solution of problems, [all]... in the context of the social, economic, political and cultural reality”. Raul Añorve, a Mexican educator who founded the organization, and Pablo Alvarado, an El Salvadoran teacher, were key figures in infusing IDEPSCA with those ideas and orienting its action specifically around day laborers, the most vulnerable immigrant population living in LA.

Initially, CHIRLA followed a somewhat different path. It was established in 1986 as a coalition of advocacy organizations, religious groups, and a handful of progressive labor unions. Although the coalition board included prominent figures, such as Father Luis Olivares, a local activist minister linked to Liberation theology, its ideological orientation was more moderate than IDEPSCA’s due to the coalition’s far-reaching institutional links with local mainstream labor unions and advocacy groups. Unlike IDEPSCA or KIWA, CHIRLA was established by an ad hoc grant from the Ford Foundation. Its stated purpose was to ensure fair implementation of the Federal

166 Interview with Raul Añorve, 9 June 2014 (herein cited as ‘interview with Añorve’).
168 Escuela de la Comunidad grant application to Liberty Hill Foundation (p. 4), 31 August, 1993, box 43/folder 12, LHFR archive.
169 Interview with Pablo Alvarado, 8 April 2015 (herein cited as “interview with Alvarado”).
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) by facilitating the legalization process of undocumented immigrants and providing information to immigrant workers about workplace rights in the US (Patler 2010). While CHIRLA’s work as a staffed coalition mainly centered on service coordination and legal referrals, a turning point was the decision to become its own organization around 1993 (Patler 2010). In detaching the coordinating structure from its members, CHIRLA staff decided to push for self-sustainable, autonomous organizational development. The organization’s core work, already channeled in the direction of workers’ rights and legalization for undocumented immigrants, focused more decisively on organizing economic sectors such as day labor and domestic work. CHIRLA’s work in this area was, similar to IDEPSCA’s, filling a void in economic sub-sectors where unions were not actively involved, at a time when the LA County Fed was seen, at best, as an ‘enigma’ due to its ambiguous attitude towards immigrant organizing. CHIRLA played an important role, notably in its domestic work emphasis, in shedding light on the plight of immigrant women on the American labor market. The mid-1990s also marked the organization’s decision to hire a significant portion of staff from immigrant communities (including undocumented immigrants) and from the very work sectors it was trying to organize. This was a way to strengthen the organization’s connection with day-to-day issues of the local immigrant community’s most vulnerable members (Patler 2010). People like organizer Antonio Bernabe were crucial in sustaining CHIRLA’s day labor project, bringing their own experience and knowledge of the sector (and the people working in it) to the service of the organization.

KIWA was founded in 1992 as the Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates and renamed the Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance in 2005 by Roy Hong and Danny Park, two South Korean-born activists. The organization had strong ties to the labor and pro-democracy movement of 1980s South Korea, particularly the one branch of the movement leaning more in the direction of Marxist ideology, and to the more progressive wing of the labor union scene in the US (Louie 2004). Hong and Park viewed class and race as inherently intertwined in a capitalist structure that not only kept immigrants and, more broadly, people of color trapped in low-wage sectors, but also pitted them against each other (see chapters 3 and 5 of this manuscript). Rather than emphasizing commonalities based on origin or ethnicity, they highlighted shared class interests among the lowest segments of the immigrant constituencies KIWA established itself in Koreatown, an area west of downtown LA that constituted an ethnic economic enclave of predominantly Korean businesses though with Latino immigrants as the majority of residents. KIWA argued, with reason, that an inability to understand the local socioeconomic dynamics prevented unions and other mainstream organizations,

170 Interview with Victor Narro, 11 June 2014 (herein cited as “interview with Narro”).
171 Interview with Narro.
172 CHIRLA grant application to Liberty Hill Foundation, 1 December, 1994, box 50/folder 2, LHFR archive.
173 Interview with Antonio Bernabe, 4 June 2014 (herein cited as “interview with Bernabe”).
including mainstream advocacy groups, from getting involved in the area. KIWA’s staff was initially composed of 1.5- and second-generation immigrants of Asian background (Chung 2007). Yet, as the organization planned a campaign in the restaurant sector (1996-99), it also began hiring organizers who were employed in that very industry.

With the partial exception of CHIRLA, at least during its period as a coalition, the three organizations had modest organizational and financial capacities. They were mainly staffed by volunteers and had limited equipment and facilities. Their budget was restricted, relying on individual donations as well as funding from a handful of local private philanthropies. There were two main reasons for the constrained financial capacity. First, the strategy of combining service provision with relatively radical political advocacy and grassroots organizing flagged the organizations as highly political. That cut them from institutional sources of funding such as government grants and certain private funding streams, but also from the financial support of local immigrant elites or politically moderate individual donors. Second, in building their memberships, the organizations targeted a constituency mainly composed of undocumented immigrants employed in low-wage sectors of the economy. This population had few means to afford substantial membership dues. In this respect, particularly in their early phase, the organizations embodied a typical activist-driven social movement organization whose power ultimately rested on the ability to mobilize different constituents for particular public actions (pickets, rallies, demonstrations, boycotts, petitioning). Supportive social groups were rarely directly affected by the organizations’ goals, as their members were often middle-class, well-educated students of immigrant background (Louie 2004; Chung, Bloemraad, and Tejada-Peña 2013; Patler 2010). Moreover, some organizations also had difficulty providing working-class immigrants with significant resources (in terms of time and finances), and the immigrants were unwilling to support their broad ideological orientation. KIWA, for one, struggled to effectively reach out to Korean low-wage workers in Koreatown since its portrayal in the immigrant community as a “communist” organization evoked comparisons with the North Korean regime (Kwon 2010).

Growing Collaboration

These three organizations began to collaborate with each other and plan ever-expanding ambitious campaigns. The dynamic was enabled by four key sets of circumstances. First, LA’s simultaneous richness and fragmentation allowed the organizations to cater to non-overlapping beneficiaries and rely on support networks of activists and volunteers.

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174 KIWA grant application to Liberty Hill Foundation (p. 3), 31 August, 1993, Box 45/folder 11, LHFR archive.
175 Interview with Margarita Ramirez, 20 May 2014 (herein cited as “interview with Ramirez”). See also Pastor and Prichard (2012).
176 In their correspondence with foundations, organizations repeatedly expressed their intention to establish membership dues. Those attempts were largely unsuccessful, according to correspondence between Liberty Hill’s grant manager, who was generally concerned with the organizations’ unsustainable relationship with the foundation, and the entries of the organizations’ annual budgets.
Second, the different organizations realized not only that their concrete objectives and strategies were complementary, but also that their actual attainment would depend greatly on pooling knowhow and resources from all organizations. Third, a great sense of trust developed among the different groups, their relationships buttressed by inter-organizational circulation of staff. Fourth, the collaborations were fairly loose and unstructured, being based on concrete, grounded objectives that responded to individual organizational priorities and minimized wasting of resources on non-relevant activities while ensuring a mutual benefit among participating organizations.

IDEPSCA was firmly anchored in Pasadena and linked to its community. It relied on a support network of ‘Chicano’ and Latino militants who were active in the area and targeted beneficiaries who were both ethnically defined (immigrants of Central American and Mexican origin) and sector-defined (day laborers in construction, gardening, and related activities). CHIRLA had a similar ethnic orientation but its scope was wider in terms of geography (LA metropolitan region) and work sector (day laborers, but also domestic and garment workers). This also allowed CHIRLA to draw on a pool of activists and volunteers that was different from IDEPSCA’s. KIWA, instead, was firmly rooted in the neighborhood of Koreatown, and mostly attracted Asian-American staff, activists, and volunteers. Of the three groups, and largely because of its founders’ previous experience with American labor unions (namely SEIU), it had the strongest ties with unions, occasionally collaborating in campaigns spearheaded by organized labor. Unlike CHIRLA and IDEPSCA, KIWA held activities that mostly targeted workers in ethnically mixed, Koreatown-based industries, such as subcontracted painting, dry cleaning, restaurants, and supermarkets.

CHIRLA and IDEPSCA enjoyed effective synergy when it came to the issue of day labor. The organizations combined IDEPSCA’s popular education approach with CHIRLA’s more comprehensive advocacy strategy to fight anti-solicitation ordinances in LA County. CHIRLA’s strategy towards day laborers was also shaped by IDEPSCA as Alvarado, mentioned earlier, was hired as CHIRLA’s lead day labor organizer in 1995 and made popular education a cornerstone of the day labor project. The two organizations intensified their partnership when the City of Los Angeles gave CHIRLA the right to manage two job centers in North Hollywood and Harbor City (Dziembowska 2010). While CHIRLA was in charge of the administration of the centers, IDEPSCA took up the tasks of leadership development and popular education among the workers. The two organizations replicated this division of labor in 1997 when they co-established an independent Association of Day Laborers. If IDEPSCA acted as fiscal sponsor to the association and its staff provided the educational resources to help members develop analytical thinking and leadership skills, CHIRLA provided most of the administrative support through its projects (Dziembowska 2010). This allowed the two organizations to

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177 Interview with Bernabe.
maintain their own unique traits, but also to develop a mutually beneficial relationship. Moreover, the CHIRLA-IDEPSCA partnership proved financially fruitful for both organizations, as they gradually took over management of more day labor centers across the city in the late 1990s. This allowed them to receive large government grants for the management of centers, and then to hire additional staff (Fine 2006).

At a time when no other local similar organizations existed in the LA context, CHIRLA approached KIWA to discuss forming a strategic partnership. CHIRLA’s leadership envisioned that collaboration would allow both organizations to grow, to ensure effective resource sharing for campaign support, and to eventually gain greater leverage over both opponents (private employers and local institutions) and competitors (namely unions). KIWA and CHIRLA forged close relationships from the mid-1990s onwards, specifically around the issue of garment work. In 1995, KIWA intervened with other Asian advocacy organizations to assist Thai workers who had been enslaved at, and later freed from, an El Monte sweatshop. Ever since, KIWA stayed involved in the garment workers industry (Kwon 2010). When it became clear that El Monte was not an isolated case, KIWA and other organizations encouraged the workers to mobilize to expose complicity between the sweatshops and the retailers. KIWA and CHIRLA, among others, went on to establish Sweatshop Watch, an LA-based statewide coalition that assumed a leading role in the anti-sweatshop campaign. CHIRLA was also an early supporter of KIWA’s restaurant campaign in the Koreatown restaurant industry (1996-99). CHIRLA employee Victor Narro, then director of its Workers’ Rights Project, served as a key liaison between advocacy and community groups (Narro 2010).

The creation of other like-minded organizations, such as the Association of Day Laborers, was one of the most visible effects of the cooperation between IDEPSCA, CHIRLA, and KIWA. GWC and PWC, organizations to join MIWON later on, also emerged from this activist milieu and the same ideological orientations. KIWA and CHIRLA were among the main driving organizations supporting the establishment of GWC in 2000, as the two organizations (together with the Asian Pacific American Legal Center, APALC) staffed the GWC formation committee under the coordination of Sweatshop Watch. Narro, at the time director of Sweatshop Watch, and KIWA organizer Paul Lee were among the handful of individuals who led the work of the committee. Familiar with different ethnic communities, KIWA and CHIRLA could bring in different yet complementary organizational approaches. Whereas CHIRLA was more experienced in advocacy strategies that targeted local public institutions, KIWA was much more experienced in confrontational direct-action campaigns, particularly when it came to

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178 CHIRLA’s staff attended training sessions and claimed to have been deeply influenced by this approach (interview with Narro; interview with Bernabe). IDEPSCA, instead, relied on CHIRLA for legal referrals and for administrative support (interview with Añorve).
179 Interview with Narro.
180 KIWA, Thai CDC and APALC grant application to Liberty Hill Foundation, 1 September, 1995, box 50/folder 4, LHFR archive.
private businesses. GWC therefore benefitted from both perspectives. It adopted a combination of organizational principles that included legislative advocacy and case management as much as direct-action campaigns to pressure sweatshops and retailers to comply with labor regulations.\(^{182}\) GWC kept crucial differences from its incubators. It specifically targeted a multiethnic (mostly Latino and Chinese) constituency of low-wage workers in the garment industry, addressing a work-based and ethnicity-specific immigrant constituency that neither KIWA nor CHIRLA could properly serve with their staff and resources (Archer et al. 2010).

In a similar fashion, KIWA and (to a lesser extent) CHIRLA also strongly supported establishment of PWC in 1997. Two of its founders, Jay Mendoza and Aquilina Soriano-Versoza, came directly out of the Summer Activist Training that KIWA started holding in 1992, first alone and then from 1994, with the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations (NCRR) and the Thai Community Development Center (TCDC). Those trainings, while relatively superficial in terms of content and commitment, were successful in laying the foundation of an Asian American “workerist” activist milieu that extended beyond KIWA and the older generation of militants. Practically, KIWA briefly acted as fiscal sponsor of PWC and hosted the organization on its premises, while CHIRLA contributed to paying initial staff costs. Ideologically speaking, PWC was fairly similar to KIWA, CHIRLA, and the future GWC. It was established by a combination of young Filipino-American college graduates and an older generation of Filipino leftist activists with firsthand experience in the mid-1980s pro-democracy movement in the Philippines.\(^{183}\) PWC embraced a pragmatic version of “Third-World” Marxism that resonated with the experience of KIWA founders.\(^{184}\) As with KIWA, the focus would not be so much on armed struggle or proletarian revolution, but rather on an incremental struggle for workers’ rights and political reform. PWC staff learnt the basics of wage theft litigation and workplace advocacy from KIWA organizers.\(^{185}\) At the same time, PWC maintained crucial differences with the other organizations. Its constituency of low-wage immigrant workers were largely Filipinos employed in the domestic and homecare sector (Ghandnoosh 2010).

This first phase was therefore characterized by high levels of collaboration and synergy between the organizations. Besides having broadly similar ideologies and missions – social and economic empowerment of the poorest segments of the immigrant community – organizations also articulated compatible concrete objectives that would be better attained by working together. Limited financial resources restricted their ability to achieve some goals, yet their competition was checked by an activist-driven, contentious

\(^{182}\) “Garment Worker Center. Five Years of Workers Organizing in the Fight for Social & Economic Justice”, GWC annual fundraising booklet, December 2, 2006 (herein cited as “GWC 2006 fundraising booklet”).

\(^{183}\) Interview with Aquilina Soriano-Versoza, 13 June 2014 (herein cited as “interview with Soriano-Versoza”); interview with Lolita Lledo, PWC organizer, 6 June 2014 (herein cited as “interview with Lledo”).

\(^{184}\) PWC application to Liberty Hill Foundation, 1 March 1997, box 64/folder 4, LHFR archive.

\(^{185}\) Interview with Lledo.
orientation and ability to target different beneficiaries and tap into non-overlapping sources of support. Such conditions encouraged the organizations to engage in highly productive interactions that gave rise to some of the most important campaigns of this period.

**Phase 2 (early 2000s to mid-2000s): The Heyday of MIWON**

*Collaboration and Organizational Convergence*

Between 2000 and 2001, MIWON became officially established as a formal coalition. It brought together, from 2001 to 2007, CHIRLA, KIWA, PWC, and GWC, from 2005 onwards, IDEPSCA. MIWON embodied a first attempt to formalize alliances between five membership-based, class-oriented immigrant advocacy organizations. It was also marked the first attempt to create a common space where the membership of each organization, largely composed of undocumented immigrants employed in low-wage sectors of the local economy, could interact with the other participating groups and also partially direct political campaigns and projects according to their needs and interests (Osuji 2010).

MIWON’s formation initially consolidated relations across the organizations, strengthening the compatibility of their goals and the added value of horizontal, collaborative campaigning. In fact, MIWON first took shape on May 1, 2000, as CHIRLA, KIWA, and PWC united to support a KIWA campaigns in Koreatown’s restaurant industry. Participating members envisioned MIWON as a way to provide mutual support for each other’s campaign, but also to expand and develop their membership groups. Throughout the early 2000s, MIWON collectively supported an impressive number of campaigns launched by its individual members, providing each organization with a core base of supporters and access to the external support networks of the other groups – namely, organizational allies, volunteers, and staff. As a new generation of activists took leadership positions in the organizations, relations of trust and camaraderie were forged during intense campaigning and continued to underpin inter-organizational ties.

Consequently, not only did organizational ideologies remain similar, but their concrete objectives stayed overall compatible and continued to foster inter-organizational collaboration. In fact, organizations also became more and more alike. MIWON members shared a lot of organizational features by the early 2000s. One in particular was

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186 In spite of that, IDEPSCA had been closely involved in all major MIWON activities ever since the constitution of the coalition.

187 For example, during the early and mid-2000s, Xiomara Corpeño (CHIRLA organizer), Elizabeth Sunwoo (KIWA organizer during the early 2000s and MIWON coordinator, 2004-2007), Max Mariscal (KIWA organizer during mid-2000s) and Strela Cervas (former PWC policy officer and PWC representative to the MIWON coalition during mid-2000s) developed a strong friendship that remains strong to the dates of the interviews. Interview with Strela Cervas, 1 June 2014 (herein cited as ‘interview with Cervas’); Interview with Elizabeth Sunwoo, June 1, 2014 (herein cited as ‘interview with Sunwoo’); Interview with Xiomara Corpeño, 10 June 2014 (herein cited as ‘interview with Corpeño’).
participatory, quasi-autonomous immigrant-based membership organizations. After IDEPSCA’s Asociación de Trabajadores del Día de Pasadena was established in 1994-95 and CHIRLA’s Domestic Workers Association was established in 1996-97, KIWA and PWC followed with their respective Restaurant Workers Association of Koreatown (RWAK) and Association of Filipino Workers (AFW). Despite not having its formal association, GWC also had a membership structure that included garment workers. In MIWON’s narrative, those organizations were crucial because they provided the rank-and-file resources for the coalition’s mass-based campaigns, but also symbolically legitimized the coalition’s claim to truly represent the plight of low-wage immigrant workers for different bundles of rights (labor rights, civil rights, cultural rights, etc.).

In the first half of the 2000s, all MIWON organizations were primarily engaged in immigrant workers organizing. Their campaigns tended to rely on a combination of direct action, grassroots mobilization, and support from a variety of local activist and community groups, which the coalition itself helped mobilize.

CHIRLA addressed immigrant rights advocacy, launching a comprehensive legalization campaign that would draw on the resources of its immigration and citizenship project, welfare reform project, and workers’ rights project. They were carried out at the local level in a comprehensive fashion, with topics addressing access to healthcare programs and education, the elimination of employers’ sanctions, and greater labor protection for immigrant workers. MIWON members offered strong support of its landmark campaigns, such as the driver’s license campaign (2001-03) endeavoring to secure California licenses for undocumented immigrants and the California household worker campaign (2004-06) to achieve statewide legislation protecting domestic workers.

IDEPSCA continued its work on popular education and literacy with a renewed emphasis on the capacity-building of day labor groups. The organization heavily supported development of the Association of Day Laborers in Pasadena at the end of the 1990s. Together with CHIRLA, it was instrumental in the creation of National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), which developed out of the association and remained under CHIRLA’s fiscal sponsorship until 2008. IDEPSCA also got directly involved in the management of additional day labor centers across the city, including the newly formed Pasadena Job Center, as well as similar ones in Cypress Park, Hollywood, and Harbor City. Although not an official MIWON member then, IDEPSCA continued to maintain strong ties with CHIRLA on day labor and undocumented immigrant issues, particularly through its major involvement in the driver’s license campaign.

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188 CHIRLA, KIWA, PWC MIWON draft grant application, ca 2000-01 (p.1), box 15, KIWA archive (herein cited as “MIWON 2000-01 draft grant application”).
190 Interview with Alvarado.
Following its successful restaurant campaign, which had significantly improved the working standards in Koreatown’s restaurant industry, KIWA moved on to more ambitious goals. The organization sought to reform the Koreatown supermarket industry and establish the first independent immigrant union in the area. Though the famous Assi Market campaign (2001-03) failed, it mobilized the organization, market workers, and allied groups – particularly other MIWON members – in an effort to pressure markets to improve their practices in other ways (Kwon 2010).

Like KIWA, PWC maintained a workplace focus throughout most of this period. In the early 2000s, PWC relied heavily on the support of MIWON organizations to carry out campaigning. Its work in the healthcare and caregiving sector largely mirrored that of KIWA, particularly with respect to how the organization combined case management, local advocacy, and direct-action organizing that often targeted businesses owned by members of the same immigrant community – for example, Filipino immigrants who owned homecare agencies (Ghandnoosh 2010). However, PWC’s strongest partner was CHIRLA, since both organizations had similar (though ethnically different) workplace-based memberships in the caregiving sector.

GWC, most recently founded, first acted with very little capacity, veritably operating with a “2.5”-staff membership and very limited financial resources. However, particularly thanks to the support of an expanded MIWON network (which included APALC as well as Sweatshop Watch), the organization was able to engage in its famous Forever 21 campaign between 2001 and 2004.

Member organizations took MIWON as an opportunity to develop a common platform on immigration issues – namely, support for the legalization of undocumented immigrants. This objective was shared by all groups since it was perceived to be tied to the concrete needs of the beneficiaries of each organization: day laborers or domestic workers; Latino, Korean, or Filipino immigrants. Groups such as KIWA and, to a lesser extent, PWC saw MIWON as a coalition that should primarily act at the local level, including a major component of workers’ rights advocacy and grassroots organizing. While the coalition was supposed to act as a “hub” for the organizations “to have a unified platform and stand around immigration issues and workers issues,” it was also expected to “fuel more membership” to each organization through public campaigning. For this reason, MIWON and its members also began to get heavily involved in immigrant rights campaigns at the local level, particularly by supporting legalization for undocumented

192 Interview with Cervas.
193 GWC 2006 fundraising booklet.
194 The three-year campaign began with sit-ins and picketing outside Forever 21 shops in LA – the retailer was found guilty of having stock made in abusive sweatshops – and later turned into a nationwide boycott. For more information, see Archer et al. (2010).
195 Interview with Sunwoo. Interview with Soriano-Versoza.
196 Interview with Sunwoo.
immigrants (who represented a large part of their membership). In 2001, the coalition pressured the LA City Council to endorse and adopt its immigrant rights platform (Osuji 2010). Building on the experiment in Koreatown in 2000, MIWON also consolidated its flagship campaign, an annual May Day immigrant march, on the occasion of International Workers’ Day. The May Day march grew over the years, managing to attract hundreds of thousands of people during the historical 2006 rallies (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). By assuming a leading role over the demonstrations, MIWON secured its position as the backbone – and leading coalition – of the LA immigrant rights movement.

The downside of this process was that MIWON demanded a relatively high level of commitment from participating organizations, their staff, and their membership groups. Unlike the previous phase, when collaborations were relatively loose and unstructured, the incipient formalization of collaborative relations coincided with MIWON’s development. Moreover, the coalition’s attempts to develop an organizational structure of its own led to tighter internal integration, seen at different levels. This was done at the structure and organizational level, by creating a number of bodies comprising organizational staff and members as well as a consensus-based model for coalition decision-making; at the membership level, by designing trainings open to all the members of each organization; at the campaign level, by creating a system where organizations were to commit to heavy support of each other’s work as well as common campaigns. Organizations were therefore expected not only to endorse a campaign of another MIWON member, but also to devote staff time to strategy discussion and mobilizing their own networks of support; to mobilize their own members to attend rallies and demonstrations; and to allocate organizational resources to support campaign logistics. While this dynamic explained the very success and visibility of the campaigns launched by MIWON members during those years, it also gradually came to place a burden on them. Organizations needed to devote a considerable part of their time and resources to “network-building” instead of concentrating on their direct beneficiaries.

Sticking Together despite Diverging Goals and Resource Overlap

As MIWON’s importance and visibility grew, the goals of the coalition began to shift as well, coming to embrace a more prominent advocacy role at state and federal levels. CHIRLA played an important role in this turn, becoming increasingly imbricated in national immigrant rights coalitions such as the Center for Community Change (CCC)’s National Campaign for Jobs and Income Support (NCJIS) and the Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM) (Patler 2010). As the coalition developed, to ensure that no


198 Interview with Sunwoo; interview with Corpeño.
organization would dominate the coalition, MIWON had adopted a “modified consensus-building” decision-making strategy. That is, approval of all major programmatic and political decisions would be on the condition of full consensus, while less important decisions (such as on media messaging) would require only a majority vote. The most resourceful organization of the coalition was, by far, CHIRLA, as exemplified by its staff capacity, external connections, financial resources, and its role as the most visible and vocal group in the public debate and in the media. CHIRLA was able to sway MIWON’s direction to reflect the new national focus because the coalition largely relied on CHIRLA’s organizational structure, knowhow, and connections. In 2004, a former KIWA staff member was assigned to coordinate the network, which was also officially hosted on KIWA premises, though CHIRLA retained MIWON’s fiscal sponsorship and managed its funding. Thus, despite MIWON’s elaborate system of democratic decision-making, CHIRLA gained considerable dominance in shaping the coalition’s position and goals.

Given the gradual disconnect between the coalition’s national aspirations and the local rootedness of the member organizations (CHIRLA was an exception), we would expect incentives for collaboration to quickly wane. As mentioned, not only had organizational activities become more similar, but their tightening integration also led to increasing resource overlap in both financial and labor terms, as activists themselves began to recognize. From a financial point of view, CHIRLA realized that incubating like-minded organizations, such as GWC, helped undermine their own chances of accessing local funds for workplace and workers’ rights projects. If MIWON itself was supposed to coordinate fundraising efforts among participating organizations, groups such as CHIRLA and KIWA had staff on the GWC steering committee and were expected to support the organization’s fundraising strategy towards the same foundations they were tapping.

Executive Summary, MIWON 2007-10 Strategic Plan.

All respondents acknowledged that CHIRLA was by far the most resourceful organization of the coalition at any time of MIWON’s progress. Moreover, the archive documentation we collected contains dozens of clippings about immigrant rights issues as covered in a variety of local, state, and national newspapers. They include several quotes from Angelica Salas, Victor Narro, and other CHIRLA personnel, often side by side with quotes from other national organizations, such as MALDEF, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), SEIU, or the National Council of La Raza (NCLR).

In minutes of a KIWA meeting, dated February 8, 2004, its staff noted an internal discussion regarding the management of MIWON funding, which at the time was mainly handled by CHIRLA, being the coalition’s organizational fiscal sponsor. KIWA staff argued that it would make more sense to divide the money among member organizations as soon as it was received from the foundations, and also suggested they contact PWC and GWC staff to make sure they supported their stance before approaching CHIRLA about the matter. See author unknown, “Quarterly SP Retreat Feb. 2004“, minutes, 8 February, 2004, box t/folder 8, KIWA archive.

Interview with Soriano-Versoza. The PWC director argued that a major flaw of MIWON was its inability to develop “its own kind of machinery” to move forward as a truly collective stance. This weakness left a void that was filled by CHIRLA’s own structure.

Interview with Narro (in Patler 2010: 81).

KIWA and CHIRLA staff were involved in GWC’s fundraising strategy through Sweatshop Watch and as members of GWC’s governing board. Victor Narro was also appointed as GWC’s treasurer and was one of the main liaisons with local funders. See author unknown, “Minutes of the Board of Directors of Sweatshop Watch” meeting minutes, 8 December, 2000, box 13/folder 9, KIWA archive.
IDEPCS, also gradually became a funding competitor as it followed CHIRLA’s trajectory in developing its own staff and organizational structure. These organizations were applying for financial resources from a limited and overlapping funding pool. From a labor point of view, as organizations constantly pooled their own resources (including staff, volunteers, and membership associations) and provided access to their external networks of support (including local politicians, community leaders, and other organizational allies) for large scale-campaigns, they also found themselves competing for the time and commitment of similar groups. Moreover, an all-encompassing emphasis on undocumented immigrants at large – which was primarily seen as a “Latino” issue in the public sphere – also risked diminishing the visibility of groups. These included KIWA and PWC, which had emerged within an Asian-American activist milieu and whose raison d’être mainly rested in their specific role as progressive spokespersons of specific smaller ethnic communities (Koreans, Filipinos), work sectors (restaurants, markets, healthcare, nursing), or geographical areas (Koreatown).

The coalition’s goals diverged from those of member organizations despite the increased resource overlap. Given these conditions, it is surprising that MIWON continued to be fully operative up until at least 2006-07, and even expanded its coalition-based activities around the mid-2000s. Beyond campaign-related actions, the most notable of these activities was the School of Education, Empowerment and Determination (SEED), which promoted yearlong trainings in leadership development, campaign work, and advocacy (2006-07). SEED was designed for the most politically active members, with the aim of developing “leaders” who would ideally be major players in successive campaigns and mobilizations. MIWON’s membership-based bodies aside, this school signified an important moment in encouraging a class frame of its ethnically very heterogeneous membership. So, how can we understand the emergence of this dynamic?

While it may be impossible to provide a definitive answer, we argue that three combined factors were crucial in keeping the coalition together. First, CHIRLA’s strategic internal organization changed, causing shifts in its internal priorities and influencing MIWON’s direction. Second, for its legitimacy in the eyes of funders in state and national policy circles, CHIRLA thus depended on the continued existence of MIWON. Third, other organizations were relatively weak vis-à-vis the political climate surrounding immigration of the mid-2000s.

To elaborate on these factors, around the mid-2000s, CHIRLA began moving away from workplace-based projects and its most intense coalition commitments at the local level. While CHIRLA had always included legislative advocacy within its organizational activities, it was only between 2004 and 2005 that the organization officially renounced local workplace organizing in favor of two other core activities: state and

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205 During the early 2000s, Liberty Hill simultaneously funded all five organizations with annual grants ranging between $15,000 and $35,000. Other key foundations included the Needmor Foundation, New World Foundation, and Abelard/Common Counsel Foundation.
federal legislative advocacy on issues affecting immigrant communities (particularly immigration reform and labor rights, but also access to education for youth); and electoral mobilization targeting the Latino immigrant population. Political considerations may have played an important role in steering the organization to a full embrace of immigrant rights advocacy, particularly at a time – the mid-2000s – during which alternative immigration reform bills were fiercely debated in Congress. Draconian restrictive measures, such as the infamous Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act, were also being discussed (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). Moreover, a change of leadership and the departure of older staff linked to worker organizing also contributed to the revised strategy.

However, broader resource considerations also weighed in on the decision of CHIRLA’s management. This move was highly influenced by the City of Los Angeles’s decision to not renew CHIRLA’s contract to operate day labor centers across the city in 2004. This was a traumatic blow to the organization because city subsidies constituted a significant portion of the overall organizational budget (Patler 2010). Furthermore, unlike other MIWON organizations, CHIRLA ever since its inception developed a vast network of allies at both state and federal levels. As powerful national organizations such as the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the Center for Community Change (CCC), and the SEIU began to coordinate national efforts to lobby for federal immigration reform, CHIRLA was positioned to become their main LA representative. During those years, CHIRLA co-founded and contributed staff to the Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR) (2005-07), the California Table for Immigration Reform (2009-11), and the new FIRM (2007-15). CHIRLA’s advocacy role became even more pronounced, having spearheaded the California Domestic Workers Bill of Rights campaign (2005-13). The organization also began to focus on civic engagement, naturalization, and voter registration, particularly through coalitions such as the statewide Mobilize the Immigrant Vote (MIV) and the national We Are America Alliance (WAAA). In doing so, CHIRLA therefore gradually transitioned from being a social movement organization, whose operations broadly depended on militant mobilization, to an institutional advocacy organization, whose activities relied more on access to substantial financial resources and connections to key organizational allies. It was a decision that created internal tensions among the staff and sparked controversy with other organizations; however, organizational leadership judged it consistent with CHIRLA’s original focus on immigrant rights (particularly in terms of

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206 “Liberty Vote!” CHIRLA grant application to Liberty Hill Foundation, 31 August 2006.
207 H.R. 4437 – also known as the Sensenbrenner Bill, for its sponsor in the House of Representatives, Wisconsin Republican Jim Sensenbrenner – proposed to increase fortification of the US-Mexico border and further criminalize undocumented immigrants as well as anyone assisting them.
208 Angelica Salas became CHIRLA’s executive director in 1999 and, as of 2016, still holds the role. Both Victor Narro and Pablo Alvarado left the organization sometime between the late 1990s and early 2000s. While Narro went on to support other organizations and then join the UCLA Labor Center, Alvarado founded NDLON between 2000 and 2002, shortly after serving as its director and still in that position as of 2016.
legalization and access to citizenship) and underscored the organization’s aspiration to influence the institutional political process from within, even if that meant ‘getting their hands dirty’.

As for the second factor, although CHIRLA scaled up involvement in state and federal policy circles, its involvement in coalitions, such as MIWON, remained crucial. MIWON was highly successful in presenting itself as a collective of immigrant-led, membership-based political organizations, which had actual legitimacy in local immigrant communities. Unlike most Washington, D.C.-based advocacy and policy groups, CHIRLA could therefore claim strong moral legitimacy by virtue of its connection to the daily reality of most immigrants. Local grassroots legitimacy could be used as symbolic capital to enhance CHIRLA’s positioning within Washington, D.C.’s elite advocacy circles and the emerging national immigrant rights coalitions. As the organization reshaped its local operations, particularly by abandoning support for its workplace-based membership groups, CHIRLA deemed it important to maintain, at least for the short term, a tight connection to LA and the local struggles for immigrant rights. MIWON provided such a platform, especially after the tremendous success of the immigrant rights marches, which gave CHIRLA nationwide visibility. According to its staff, CHIRLA’s influence in both LA and DC greatly depended on its ability to be seen as a ‘convener’ of local grassroots immigrant organizations in Los Angeles – and be perceived as a trusted coalition leader – as well as on its capacity to effectively bridge the gap between the local and national scales. For this reason, CHIRLA considered MIWON important because it allowed the coalition to present immigration reform as an issue that not only concerned Latin American immigrants, but also the growing Asian immigrant communities. In practical terms, CHIRLA also relied on the support of organizations such as KIWA and PWC because they had legitimacy in their respective ethnic and geographic communities. Although the other groups remained significantly smaller, CHIRLA needed

209 Interview with Narro; interview with Corpeño (both expressed a similar concept). See also Ochoa (2005).


211 CHIRLA staff argued that the loss of the centers was furthermore important in driving organizational change because it practically removed the most effective space to organize immigrants around work niches. Although organizers such as Bernabe were initially re-assigned to organize day laborers at street corners, CHIRLA’s organizing strategy soon focused on the mobilization of legal residents and households, particularly for legislative or electoral purposes. Interview with Bernabe; interview with Alvaro Huerta, 4 June 2014 (herein cited as “interview with Huerta”).

212 Interview with Narro. Corpeño argued that CHIRLA’s convening and leadership role was also important at the local level, because it allowed local immigrant organizations to partner with LA County Fed from a stronger bargaining position.
them to periodically tap their beneficiaries, constituents, and organizational allies to ensure large turnouts at immigration rallies and demonstrations.

Finally, despite MIWON increasingly failing to address the goals of the other organizations, several reasons prevented them from leaving the coalition. The particular political climate – including the fact that most beneficiaries of each group would be deeply affected by changes in federal immigration policies – was a moral imperative for every organization to continue supporting the network and provide resources for immigrant rights mobilizations, even when organizations did not fully agree with CHIRLA’s political line.213 The stakes for IDEPSCA’s day labor and undocumented beneficiaries were very high. Organizations such as KIWA and PWC proved particularly loyal. For KIWA, we suggest this was, at least to an extent, because the organization had at that point been greatly weakened by its dragging, ultimately failed, unionization campaign, and was exploring alternative options of organizational change. In this sense, the ability to coordinate MIWON through one of its own staff likely provided KIWA the visibility and public legitimacy it urgently needed to restructure the organization. For PWC, we note that its main beneficiaries were healthcare and domestic workers, and that pertinent state legislation was being discussed at the time. CHIRLA had become a crucial partner by incorporating PWC in its campaign to pass the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights in California. We suggest that those overlapping participations were also important for generating multiple commitments. GWC was instead in a particular position. On the one hand, it remained morally indebted to both CHIRLA and KIWA, which supported GWC during both inception and landmark garment workers campaign. On the other hand, the organization began to rethink its organizational model after the Forever 21 campaign, moving in the direction of a membership-led structure and rejecting professionalization.

This second phase was therefore characterized by very intimate, productive collaboration. In the early years of the coalition, such high-quality collaboration was made possible by completing a process started the decade before, as MIWON’s formalization brought together organizations sharing very similar and compatible, yet sufficiently diverse, organizational structures, ideologies, and goals. However, partly due to dynamics triggered by this very process of collaboration, MIWON gradually began to shift its goals and nationalize its scope under the influence of CHIRLA, its most prominent organization. As MIWON organizations and close affiliates started competing for a limited pool of financial and labor resources, and the coalition goals grew more detached from the other organizations’ day-to-day priorities, the coalition became a political tool for legitimizing CHIRLA’s new national advocacy role. Still, MIWON’s position remained pivotal. The moral imperative to support immigration reform, overlapping commitments, and the relative weakness of the other organizations can help us understand why.

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213 Interview with Danny Park, November 5, 2014. Interview with Sunwoo. Interview with Cervas.
Phase 3 (Mid-2000s to Early 2010s): Organizational Drift

Changing Political Context, Changing Organizational Priorities

The 2006 immigrant rights marches marked the high point of the MIWON coalition. The following year, after police violence ensued on the annual May Day march, MIWON and its flagship activities started losing momentum. GWC abandoned MIWON for capacity reasons, as the organization could not devote staff time to the coalition any longer. While the remaining organizations strategized a plan that reaffirmed their commitment to MIWON’s internal infrastructural development and immigration reform campaigns, MIWON effectively downplayed the inter-organizational cooperation that supported each organization’s areas of work. In 2009, the coalition ceased having its single paid staff position and soon after stopped applying for funding, organizing training, and designing common campaigns. In the years that followed, organizations continued gathering as MIWON exclusively came to plan the May Day march. As of 2016, the coalition still exists, and its fiscal sponsorship has transitioned from CHIRLA to Community Partners, an external organization, and PWC. Coordination of the march is now in the hands of other groups, such as the May Day Coalition, which includes CHIRLA and KIWA as well as LA Fed and SEIU.

Considering the developments recounted thus far, how do we explain the demise of MIWON in this third phase, particularly after the coalition so effectively mobilized people and organizations around the plight of undocumented immigrants in the previous years?

In this last section, we offer a tentative explanation for this outcome. We see two major factors at play. First, CHIRLA’s national advocacy role consolidated and the organization came to depend less and less on MIWON, notably after the resounding success of the 2006 marches and the failure to achieve federal immigration reform between 2006 and 2007. Second, the remaining organizations experienced more and more resource and beneficiary overlap, which came in light of the growing popularity of the worker center model and the involvement of several labor unions in immigrant organizing. While CHIRLA’s success as a national player dampened its interest in keeping the coalition alive and lessened the remaining organizations’ imperative to remain committed, competitive pressures urged them to concentrate on their internal restructuring. To improve their competitive positioning for resources, MIWON members accelerated the strategic adaptation of their goals and moved to differentiate their organizational structures.

The year 2006 witnessed unprecedented waves of immigrant rights mobilizations across the US, with LA as the epicenter of the demonstrations (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). Activists demanded a halt to mass deportations of undocumented immigrants, contested the restrictive provisions of draconian anti-immigrant bill H.R. 4437 (which had already
been passed in the House of Representatives in December 2005), and pressured Congress to instead provide amnesty and a clear path to citizenship for the over 11 million undocumented immigrants residing in the country. Ever since late 2004, a wide coalition of community-based, religious, labor, business, and advocacy organizations at the national level, including CHIRLA, had partnered with Congress senators to propose a bipartisan bill that would include these provisions. The resulting Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA, S. 2611) was passed in the Senate in the midst of the demonstrations in May 2006, though did not reach the House of Representatives floor and was therefore never enacted. If demonstrations were successful in making the plight of undocumented immigrants highly visible in the US political debate, as well as in preventing H.R. 4437 from becoming law, they were unable to secure the passing of CIRA or its subsequent 2007 revision, the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act (S. 1348).

Those external events certainly played a role in threatening the long-term viability of MIWON as a grassroots coalition designed to sustain mass mobilizations. The unique circumstances of 2006 – on March 25, LA experienced the largest demonstration taking place that day in the whole country, with over half a million-people marching through its downtown for immigrant rights – could hardly be replicated in the immediate years (Watanabe and Becerra 2006). In 2007, the shelving of H.R. 4437 and dim prospects for a progressive immigration reform produced a dramatically lower turnout for the May Day march. Moreover, as violence erupted during the demonstration, police authorities and organizers – including MIWON groups, notably CHIRLA – blamed each other for how the protests were handled. For MIWON organizations, these developments suggested the coalition had already reached its high point, having simultaneously fulfilled and failed its goals as reframed by CHIRLA. Inability to sustain 2006’s epic demonstrations throughout 2007 and 2008, as well as the conviction that immigrant advocacy groups needed to get more involved in federal policymaking, convinced CHIRLA that a local grassroots coalition – MIWON – had fundamentally lost its raison d’être, for both practical and legitimating purposes. KIWA’s internal organizational turmoil, discussed below, and the related departure of MIWON’s coordinator contributed to eroding mutual trust between groups.

CHIRLA continued its transformation to become a national advocacy organization, accentuating mainstream political engagement through electoral mobilization, naturalization campaigns, and legislative lobbying by participating in

214 The first attempt was the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act (S.B. 1033), also known as the Kennedy-McCain bill, which was never voted on.
215 Interview with Sunwoo. Interview with Cervas.
216 Interview with Corpeño.
217 Although she officially became MIWON’s coordinator only in 2004, Elizabeth Sunwoo had been involved with MIWON groups as part of KIWA ever since the creation of MIWON. Respondents have pointed to her ability to facilitate relationships among the different groups, but also to the importance of her role as coalition organizer and coordinator to reduce the workload of the staff of each group.
grand-scale national coalitions. Though still relatively small compared to national advocacy groups and labor unions, CHIRLA’s shift allowed it to expand and further differentiate from the other MIWON members. By concentrating primarily on immigration legislation, CHIRLA could tap into large state and nationwide foundations that begun to prioritize comprehensive immigration reform.

CHIRLA increased the range and quality of its financial supporters, which included the California Wellness Foundation ($200,000 in 2006; $300,000 in 2007; $225,000 in 2010), the Marguerite Casey Foundation ($300,000 in 2006; $200,000 in 2009), and the New York-based NEO foundation (between $17,000 and $187,000 annually during 2009-13). These same foundations had been much less interested in funding immigrant workers’ organizing (Kohl-Arenas 2016), but had a strong interest in making resources available for moderate immigration reform, electoral education and civic engagement efforts (Morari, Athanasiades, and Pankaj 2015; Nicholls, Uitermark, and van Haperen 2016). CHIRLA therefore was able to recover from its severe financial setback in 2004 and double its budget from $1.2 million in 2005 to $2.5 million in 2012. In the early 2010s CHIRLA also established CHIRLA Action Fund, its own 501(c)(4) branch. This move allowed the organization to further diversify its pool of funders and expand its operational scope, as it was able to directly access foundation money available for legislative lobbying on immigration reform. Moreover, CHIRLA’s strengthening relations with national advocacy organizations, such as the Center for Community Change, allowed it to tap into new information and enhance its organizational and mobilization capacities. These connections also ushered the organization into high-level political negotiations and meetings with leading figures in Congress and the White House (Nicholls, Uitermark, and van Haperen 2016). A presence in elite national politics enhanced its reputation among state and regional political elites, further reducing its dependence on MIWON to generate large numbers at its demonstrations. Thus, CHIRLA’s growing emphasis on immigration reform legislation yielded access to flourishing financial, organizational, and political resources. This inflow allowed the organization to expand in numbers and political influence in local, state, and national political arenas. The CHIRLA-led MIWON, during the mid-2000s, reflected this transition: the organization was not robust enough to implement its new national agenda on its own, still needing the infrastructural and symbolic backing of local allies in MIWON. Once the organization was able to consolidate itself, MIWON became a redundant structure, having outlived its value.

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218 Interview with Huerta. Unlike 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4) organizations are not subject to regulations regarding limitations in political lobbying, and is allowed to endorse or oppose political candidates, or donate money or time to political campaigns.

219 For example, CHIRLA Action Fund received 100,000 $ from the Atlantic Philanthropies between 2013 and 2014 as member of the Alliance for Citizenship (A4C), a national immigration reform coalition (Morari, Athanasiades, and Pankaj 2015). Nevertheless, compared to major national advocacy groups, CHIRLA still received a very small fraction of the funding provided by large philanthropies (Nicholls, Uitermark, and van Haperen 2016).
Growing Competition and Organizational Differentiation

The simultaneous success and failure of immigrant rights mobilizations lifted a sense of urgency in the MIWON coalition. At the same time, while CHIRLA was clearly moving in a new organizational direction, the remaining organizations had to confront the fast-changing organizational landscape of LA.

Besides internal tensions, already having risen from resource-sharing within the coalition, organizations were facing potential competition from similar organizations and external ones, namely labor unions. Encouraged by the success of the immigrant worker organizing model, more non-union organizations had, ever since the early 2000s, begun to organize immigrant workers and draw on the repertoire of MIWON organizations. As of early 2006 in California, Fine (2006) identified 29 active immigrant worker centers, 11 of which were in the LA area. This list did not include hybrid organizations, such as the South Asian Network (SAN), which was established in 1990 and explicitly included workers’ rights campaigns starting in the early 2000s (see Leavitt and Blasi 2010). Nor did Fine’s list account for sectoral workers’ organizations that emerged from organizing efforts, such as CHIRLA’s Domestic Workers Association, KIWA’s Restaurant Workers Association of Koreatown (RWAK) and Immigrant Workers Union (IWU), or the SAN-sponsored Los Angeles Taxi Workers Alliance (LATWA), a worker-led organization of immigrant taxi drivers. More organizations continued to emerge throughout the mid- to late 2000s and early 2010s, such as the CLEAN Carwash Campaign (under the initial fiscal sponsorship of KIWA), the Filipino Migrant Center (in Long Beach), and the Restaurant Opportunities Center of Los Angeles (ROC-LA). We believe that the worker center model was fostered by pioneering MIWON organizations and their relative success in achieving concrete organizational goals and building a multiethnic activist milieu. Frequent staff circulation between organizations also encouraged fast diffusion and adoption of the worker center model.

Paradoxically, the success of MIWON’s members also challenged them because it spawned similar organizations competing for overlapping resources. The new organizations and projects competed for staff, volunteers, and the still scarce private funding sources available for immigrant labor organizing. At the same time, bigger changes in the orientation of the national leadership and general union policy had a hand in labor unions becoming more committed to supporting immigrant rights (including those of undocumented immigrants) and organizing immigrant workers (Milkman 2006). In terms of advancing workers’ rights, it was certainly positive that local unions were more open to including immigrants within their leadership and rank and file as well as organizing immigrant-based workplace campaigns. For single immigrant organizations came the challenge of restructuring relations with competitors in their particular sectors and geographical areas – as exemplified by the tensions between KIWA and the United

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220 Interview with Ramirez; interview with Narro.
Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) over who should acquire the Koreatown market workers as members. Unions’ broader involvement in immigrant rights also spurred labor unions to invest in campaigns transcending workers’ rights and addressed themes such as legalization, naturalization, and voting engagement. This greater role of unions among immigrants has now become the norm in immigrant rights mobilization, at local and national levels. Since the early 2010s, MIWON’s flagship event has been taken over by labor, being chiefly organized and coordinated by LA Fed. The federation’s investment in immigration presented a direct challenge to MIWON’s organizations, which found themselves competing not only for members and trained staff, but also for positioning as the legitimate representative of immigrant workers in LA.

If waning moral obligations prompted KIWA, PWC, GWC, and IDEPSCA to gradually divest from MIWON, growing resource competition compelled them to strategically adapt to this environment or risk organizational demise. This sparked organizational differentiation. Single organizational trajectories were, however, quite different from each other, being noticeably shaped by the internal life and unique traits of each group.

IDEPSCA, in striking contrast with CHIRLA, remained solidly anchored at the local level. Although the organization continued working on education and literacy across the city, IDEPSCA transformed into a service-provider organization that was almost entirely dependent on government grants. The organization’s time and energy were spent more on managing worker centers for day laborers and less on political organization. As the number of centers grew in the 2000s, IDEPSCA more often hired outside center managers with little political experience or connection to its popular education tradition. Day-to-day management of the day labor centers did not diminish the organization’s commitment to local coalition building, workers’ rights, and organizing. However, reliance on government subsidies and concentration on management issues contributed to organizational inertia, which inhibited the ability to change and adapt.

To worsen matters, the rising prominence of NDLON and CHIRLA bred resentment within IDEPSCA. Unlike CHIRLA, which had been cultivating alternative ties to state and national organizations ever since its inception, IDEPSCA had not developed such networks, nor could it secure new ones at local or state levels. IDEPSCA’s difficulty in obtaining foundation grants, as well as its generally limited private funding base (mostly

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221 Between 2001 and 2003, KIWA launched a unionization campaign at Assi Market, a Korean-owned supermarket in Koreatown, with the intent of setting up the first independent immigrant-led union in the area. According to the account cited in Fine (2006), which was confirmed in interviews with KIWA former staff, UFCW was willing to support KIWA’s campaign as long as it concluded with affiliating the newly formed union to the local UFCW branch. Once KIWA refused, UFCW allegedly tried and failed to force the market workers to sign UFCW union cards. Nevertheless, the tensions between KIWA and UFCW created a rift in relations between immigrant worker organizations and local unions.

222 “Liberty Hill Foundation Fund for Change 2013 proposal assessment tool,” 27 June, 2013. In their evaluation of IDEPSCA’s grant proposal, Liberty Hill staff noted that the organization struggled to increase its membership base, produce visible social change (organizing and winning significant campaigns) and fundraise effectively.

223 IDEPSCA’s revenues continued to grow until 2009, though it relied heavily on local government grants for the management of day labor centers, which drained most of the organization’s resources.
composed of local Californian funders), has since threatened the organization’s viability altogether.

While IDEPSCA stalled, KIWA undertook important changes. It decided to abandon its more ambitious, aggressive strategies in the mid-2000s. The organization realized that it lacked sufficient power to leverage large employers to improve working conditions. Between 2005 and 2007 – partly to recover from the previous failure of the unionization campaign, which had also threatened its financial viability – KIWA strategically reframed its market campaign as part of a larger citywide living wage and “fair share” campaign (Kwon, 2010). Through this, it successfully pressured a handful of Korean supermarkets to improve labor conditions and wages. This period marked KIWA’s turn to softer, less costly advocacy tactics, as the organization negotiated wage deals with markets in the spirit of neighborhood development being supervised by the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA). It also signaled KIWA’s intention to explicitly adopt a spatial approach in defining its membership, as the organization’s beneficiaries became the residents of Koreatown rather than the low-wage workers employed in the area. As KIWA’s worker membership organizations, IWU and RWAK were left with no organizational support, and had disbanded by 2006. KIWA moderately grew its structure and diversified its sources of income. It also diversified its activities and support networks all the while remaining anchored at the local level and strengthening its unique connection to the geographical area of Koreatown. After a stint of focusing on gentrification and public development in the late 2000s, KIWA has since embraced a more holistic advocacy approach that includes issues such as affordable housing, labor legislation, and executive actions around immigration.

Like CHIRLA’s transition, this move was rather controversial, and led to an internal split where half of the staff – the one more connected to worker organizing – distanced itself from the organization. In a reinvention of its prior role as a workplace organizer, KIWA has since joined a number of large, union-led citywide and statewide coalitions, where the organization plays more of a supportive role.

In a similar fashion, PWC has transitioned to follow a more advocacy-based model. Still, it has maintained a strong workers’ membership structure. The organization also went through moderate growth, but its budget remained half the size of KIWA’s and less than one-fifth of CHIRLA’s as of 2012. Unlike the other organizations, especially CHIRLA and KIWA, PWC’s private funding base remains anchored in California and tied to small grants.

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224 KIWA’s revenues, despite some ups and downs, continued to increase until 2013, occasionally hitting the $1 million mark but generally stabilizing around an average of $800,000 over the last few years.
225 Interview with Max Mariscal, former KIWA organizer, 1 June 2014; interview with Sunwo; interview with Park. After the resignation of part of the staff, the remaining leadership argued that this transition would allow KIWA “to reassess [its] organization’s needs and increase salaries to attract candidates with more experience that will reinvigorate KIWA and the new affordable housing campaign.” See “Final Report to Liberty Hill Foundation”, report (p. 61), 3 April 2008.
226 Those include, for example, the Los Angeles Coalition Against Wage Theft and the California Fair Paycheck Coalition.
227 Unlike the other organizations, especially CHIRLA and KIWA, PWC’s private funding base remains anchored in California and tied to small grants.
largely done by Latino and Filipino immigrants – gave the organization the opportunity
to tap into a growing network at state and federal levels from 2005 onwards. PWC’s
partnership with CHIRLA, which first bloomed from a common goal in organizing
domestic workers, evolved to address policy issues. PWC had joined a coalition to pass a
bill that would improve the working conditions of homecare and domestic workers.\textsuperscript{228}
Around this time, PWC also began building its own national network by joining the Direct
Care Alliance, a countrywide network of “caregiver associations, consumers and
concerned providers and other advocates.”\textsuperscript{229} As more intense campaigning resumed
around 2009 – with statewide legislative efforts intertwining with attempts to pass a
federal act to lift a minimum wage exemption in domestic work – PWC completely
adjusted its local organizing campaigns to fit more general state and federal campaigns on
improving domestic work legislation. The organization joined statewide and national
colleations, such as the California Household Workers Coalition/Domestic Workers
Coalition, the Southern California CARE Council, and the National Domestic Workers
Alliance (NDWA). PWC helped found and coordinate all three coalitions at the local level,
under the leadership of CHIRLA and SEIU. The National Domestic Workers Alliance
now has over 60 affiliate organizations. PWC thus adapted by using its local niche as
leverage within growing state and federal level advocacy campaigns.

GWC has followed a less linear trajectory. Its inability to improve organizational
capacities or develop strong membership groups during its first years led the group to
downscale activities after 2004 (Archer et al. 2010). It proved incapable of effectively
supporting MIWON’s organizational activities and unable, and probably also unwilling,
to engage in larger-scale advocacy. GWC favored bottom-up strategies of worker
organizing and political education (Archer et al. 2010). Its organizational development
began to stall in the late 2000s. Unlike CHIRLA, KIWA, and PWC – groups whose
ideological orientation similarly changed from radical socialism and unionism to more
mainstream political liberalism and pluralism – GWC maintained a more activist stance,
which was also seen as being in contrast with MIWON’s overall position on immigration
reform.\textsuperscript{230} The organization continued underscoring the need to enable workers to
advocate for their own rights before both employers and local labor enforcement
agencies. Internally, GWC stressed the importance of building an effective workers’
leadership while simultaneously developing a participatory model of consensus-building
among the staff and the membership (Archer et al. 2010). GWC decided to abandon the
MIWON coalition in 2007, although it was probably the organization that suffered the
most from losing the support network. Its organizational trajectory between 2010 and 2012
was difficult to reconstruct, though GWC has since attempted to change strategies and

\textsuperscript{228} PWC first got involved in legislative advocacy during the campaign for the passing of the Household Worker Equity Bill, A.B. 2536 (vetoed by then California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2006).


\textsuperscript{230} Interview with Sunwoo; interview with Corpeño.
hire experienced organizers to restructure its operations and move towards professionalization. Similarly to KIWA, it has embraced cross-sector issues such as wage theft and minimum wage, joined alliances, such as the LA Coalition Against Wage Theft, and formed partnerships with external researchers to support future advocacy campaigns. Nevertheless, its operational scale and political impact has remained very limited.

Unlike CHIRLA, KIWA, and PWC, but similar to IDEPSCA, GWC’s over-reliance on a single organizational resource (in this case, MIWON organizations and other close allies) and its initial unwillingness to adapt have caused dramatic downscaling and stalling.

In sum, the third phase was characterized by rising non-interest in collaboration by MIWON organizations and the coalition’s eventual demise. We singled out two major factors that set the condition for this dynamic and triggered MIWON members’ further organizational change. The events of 2006 and 2007 lessened the importance of the coalition for CHIRLA’s bid to become a national immigrant rights organization while removing the strong moral incentives for the other organizations to heavily commit their resources. Relational drift was accelerated by lack of support from the coalition’s most powerful organization, coupled with growing resource overlap not only within MIWON organizations, but also newly emerged groups and labor unions. Each organization, however, responded to these dynamics in different ways.

CHIRLA was the organization that reinvented itself most dramatically. In the process, it embraced a more mainstream “integrationist” approach to immigrant rights advocacy. On the other end of the continuum, IDEPSCA was unable and uninterested in innovating the organization, and GWC’s maintenance of a strong class-based, worker organizing model, seemed rooted in the desire to maintain its original organizational mission and ideological principles. KIWA and PWC fell somewhere in between, struggling to adapt their organizational machinery in the face of greater competition while maintaining a connection to their original base. For KIWA, the change resulted in abandoning more radical and innovative organizing, while for PWC it meant stretching organizational capacities to maintain both local organizing and legislative campaigns. The differentiation between organizations has not necessarily devolved into open conflict. Instead, the organizations came to drift slowly away from collaboration and disinvest in MIWON as a vehicle for collective action.

Conclusion and Discussion: A Way Forward to Understand Dynamics of Collaboration and Competition

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231 “Interim Grant Report”, GWC grant report to Liberty Hill Foundation, 4 March 2013. In order to develop a new organizational strategy, GWC formed a transition team that included former director and co-founder Kimi Lee and other experienced organizers. Marissa Nuncio, former Sweatshop Watch program coordinator, became executive director in 2013 and remains in that position as of February 2017.

We opened this paper with a discussion on traditional organized forms of immigrant political engagement in the US, which observers have long seen as primarily ethnicity-based. We argued that LA’s recent history of immigrant mobilization, characterized by intersectional, multiethnic, and workplace-oriented alliances, provides a fascinating counter-case to those commonly held views. However, we also suggested that previous assessments of LA’s “exceptionalism” (Milkman 2006; Milkman, Bloom and Narro 2010) cannot completely account for how interethnic collaborations are developed, sustained, and negotiated over time.

Using the MIWON coalition as a case study, we argued that strong collaboration among coalition members was motivated not only by local foundations or unions. Such external organizations certainly played a role, but not in spurring and deepening collaborations. Rather, collaborations developed under conditions of ideological similarity, the alignment of organizational goals, and the non-overlap of scarce resources. More generally, we showed how we can better understand dynamics of inter-organizational collaboration in relation to 1) the forces that spur competition between organizations, 2) the complementarity and alignment of organizational goals, and 3) the ideologically grounded moral incentives that sustain collective action. Common ideology may be a double-edged sword: it makes organizations likelier to support each other’s goals and to compete for the same resources. However, goal compatibility and organizations’ strategic ability to maintain alternative pools of support and target different beneficiaries not only enable long-term collaboration, but also make it desirable because it is effective.

In our qualitative study of the MIWON coalition and its member organizations, we outlined three different chronological phases. The first saw the emergence of a new group of leftist organizations sharing an ideology of immigrant workers’ empowerment. During this period, class-based interethnic coalitions among immigrant organizations developed. Cooperation prevailed over competition thanks to goal complementarity and non-overlapping resources, which at this time were mostly time and labor by staff, activists, and volunteers. This period cemented solidarity and trust among activists, paving the path for the formalization of the coalition and its more ambitious campaigns.

The second phase was characterized by strong collaboration under conditions of largely overlapping resource pools and high ideological similarity. If MIWON initially developed to fulfill the mutual needs and objectives of each organization, it gradually aligned to fit the organizational priorities of CHIRLA, the most powerful and resourceful organization in the coalition. In altering its focus from workplace organizing to immigrant rights advocacy, CHIRLA continued to invest heavily in MIWON. This was a way to maintain a foothold in LA immigrant politics, while at the same time legitimizing its new national role as the representative of Southern California’s immigrant communities. The political climate surrounding immigration in the mid-2000s – which placed a moral duty on all groups to act – as well as multiple binding commitments between the same
organizations across different coalitions, were instrumental in keeping the other organizations on board, particularly KIWA and PWC.

The third phase was characterized by the waning of the coalition, relational drift, and organizational change. We singled out two major factors that set up this dynamic and triggered MIWON members' further organizational change. The political events of the mid-2000s concerning immigration reform lessened the coalition's importance for CHIRLA, which was in the midst of transforming into a national immigrant rights organization. Mitigated urgency for immigrant rights mobilizations also lifted the strong moral incentives for the other organizations to heavily commit resources to sustain the coalition. CHIRLA's weakening coalition leadership, coupled with growing resource overlap within the broader resources environment, accelerated relational drift and organizational differentiation. Each organization, however, responded to these dynamics in its own way.

We believe our qualitative case study significantly contributes to organizational theory and social movement literatures. As for the former, we suggested a combination of ecological approaches with an adaptation of Olson's theory of collective action. Our focus on a handful of organizations and the micro-dynamics of their interaction allowed us to finely trace the processes and mechanisms that underpin collaboration or weaken it. This approach, while unable to systematically account for the competitive forces and resource dependencies that shape entire organizational populations, which characterize ecological studies, helped us investigate how competition is inextricably linked to dynamics of collaboration and internal organizational change. Largely because of methodological constraints, collaboration and competition have been largely assumed in ecological theory rather than empirically researched. However, as we showed in this paper, strategic organizational decisions and collaborative relations are both affected by the resource environment, but it is the decisions that spur dynamics shaping types and levels of available resources in a given context. In the spirit of this proposition, we therefore strived to integrate field and population approaches within an analysis that retains organizational agency and recognizes the ability of organizations to challenge, alter, or reproduce external conditions (Sewell 2005; Clemens and Cook 1999). We argue that our findings require a more sophisticated reading of traditional resource-dependency theories, particularly since they suggest that changes in the configuration of available resources are neither per se nor alone sufficient to modify inter-organizational dynamics or initiate organizational change.

As for social movement theory, we are well aware that resource mobilization theorists have long emphasized the importance of different types of resources and infrastructures to explain movements' emergence and success (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). Moreover, Zald and Ash (1966) famously alerted us to the complex transformative process of social movement organizations as they navigate and weigh the trade-offs that come with institutionalization. However, we argue that social movement
theorists, along with labor and non-profit researchers, must pay more attention to how rationales for collaboration are inextricably linked to those of competition, and how those rationales change over time. As we have seen, ideological similarities can lead to collaboration only under specific conditions, which are to a large extent shaped by the surrounding environment. At the same time, the changing configuration of available resources over time does impact both internal organizational responses and collaborative dynamics in myriad ways.

Our study is a small-scale analysis of how organizations, particularly those representing disempowered groups, such as immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities, confront constraints and opportunities in their operational environments. We began the paper by suggesting that the types of interethnic and working-class coalitions emerging in LA depart from normal ethnic and racial politics in US cities. Forces in LA joined to produce conditions that favored interethnic collaboration centered on a strong class identity. The robust collaborations lasted for over a decade. This certainly departed from traditional ethnic politics. However, as the ecological terrain evolved, the strong ties that made the city into an organizing model weakened. CHIRLA, MIWON’s most prominent organization, concentrated more and more on immigration reform and Latino voter mobilization. This organization’s value for the bigger political landscape became its capacity to politically mobilize a specific ethnic group, Latinos, in one of the most important gateway cities of the US.

While we examined one particular coalition of immigrant organizations in LA, we contend that our study provides useful tools to analyze the trajectory of similar immigrant organizations in other US urban contexts, particularly Chicago, Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, and San Francisco. Furthermore, this study has important implications for immigrant organizations themselves. In assessing the best course of action for any given time, organizations should consider the costs of maintaining their founding ideologies and organizational goals. They should determine in how far they can remain loyal to their early constituents and beneficiaries in view of organizational survival needs and hopes for successes in other activity areas.

We need more research for a deeper understanding of how organizations establish and sustain collaboration while eschewing competition. At the macro-level, a study comparing the broad organizational populations of immigrant organizations and labor unions may be able to assess the comprehensive constraints and opportunities structuring the two organizational fields. At the micro-level, a study of the internal organizational processes may shed more light on how organizations specifically construct their role in relation to other groups. Ideally, it would also reveal how tensions and alternative views among participants shape trajectories of organizational change in response to external factors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at: the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), during the regular session of the Labor and Labor Movements section in Seattle, WA, on 20 August 2016; a workshop hosted by the ‘Migration, Integration, Transnationalization’ Research Unit of the WZB Center in Berlin, Germany, on 19 October, 2016. We are greatly indebted to a number of people for their insightful comments and suggestions, which have significantly improved the quality of this paper. We are particularly thankful to Ruud Koopmans, Irene Bloemraad, Richard Alba, Els de Graauw, Ines Michalowski. Special thanks to Margarita Ramirez (the Liberty Hill Foundation), and Michele Welsing (Southern California Library) for granting us access to their archive and guiding us through the material, as well as to current and former staff of MIWON organizations for their help in carrying out the research.

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Note: This table includes data gathered from two different sources of organizational annual budgets prepared in the context of grant applications. Ex 990 US Federal Tax Return Form. Where data was not available we indicated N/A.