Reconceptualizing Authoritarianism

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Editorial Board Note
Kelly M. McMann

Introducing the Symposium and a Research Agenda
Marlies Glasius, University of Amsterdam

The resurgence of authoritarianism in most Arab countries after the uprisings of 2011 has led to a renewed empirical interest in authoritarian rule, with attention shifting from what causes authoritarianism to how it is sustained today. Robert Kaplan and Dafna Rand have recently put forward “postmodern autocrats” who fear public opinion, rely on social media and consult elites, and Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman discern a “new authoritarianism” based on manipulating information rather than on mass violence, whereas Steven Heydemann sees a “decisive shift in governance” in the MENA region. But this renewed empirical interest has not come with renewed attention to the conceptual category of authoritarian rule. If authoritarian rule is done differently, operating in a changed context, is it still the same phenomenon, to be studied in the same way, as the military junta’s and people’s republics of the past, or do


This symposium invites us to move away from an understanding of authoritarian regimes in terms of what they lack, as opposed to what democracies have, a provocation that impels us to think beyond the specific mechanisms of autocratic management. It enjoins us to resist self-satisfaction and moral superiority as we compare authoritarian and democratic dynamics; it demands instead that we consider the uncomfortable proposition that these regime types may not be as different as we think they are.

The chronic exclusion of large populations in the United States from the basic privileges (if not always rights) of citizenship, like the subjugation of colonized peoples by European powers, suggests that the distinction between democracy and dictatorship may be more equivocal than most comparisons acknowledge. In this “neoliberal” era of global capitalism, moreover, any neat distinction is vulnerable to the effects of new forms of market mediation, which

1. Thanks are owed especially to Michael Dawson, Sofia Fenner, Marlies Glasius, Daragh Grant, Rohit Goel, Ellen Lust, John McCormick, Jennifer Pitts, Don Reneau, Dan Slater and the participants of the June 2014 seminar on authoritarianism at the University of Amsterdam for thoughts on earlier versions of this essay.
In this piece I argue that the approach of democracy studies to the subject of authoritarianism is too narrow, because it does not consider the possibility of authoritarianism occurring within a democratic regime. What exactly is the distinctive approach of democracy—and democratisation—studies to the subject of authoritarianism? At the expense of some generalisation, I would say that their distinctive approach consists in three features. First is a definition. This is not so much a definition of authoritarianism as such, but of the authoritarian regime or system, which is defined negatively, through the lack of some feature necessary to a democratic one. So Andreas Schedler lists seven mutually reinforcing conditions for a democratic election, failure to achieve any one of which defines a system as authoritarian.1 And Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way list four central features of democracy, the subversion of one or more of which defines a regime as authoritarian.2 It is significant that in these and many other articles the terms “authoritarian”, “autocratic” and “non-democratic” are used virtually interchangeably. I shall argue below that this definition by opposition fails to get to the heart of what is distinctive about authoritarianism.

A second feature of the approach from democracy studies is a typology of authoritarian regimes, often according to their degree of distance from full democracy. So Larry Diamond distinguishes between competitive authoritarian regimes, hegemonic electoral regimes, and politically closed authoritarian ones.3 These last (sometimes called “full authoritarianism”) reject all electoral competition, while the first two are differentiated by the degree to which electoral competition is subverted, or merely distorted, compromised, or managed in some way. As Diamond admits, these distinctions constitute degrees along a spectrum of distance from democracy, and assigning countries to a particular category of authoritarianism is a matter of fine judgement.

LIKE OIL AND WATER? AUTHORITARIANISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Andreas Schedler, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C.

At first sight, authoritarianism and accountability look like oil and water. They won’t mix. Political accountability, we are inclined to think, is something that happens in democracies, while autocracies are places of opacity, oppression, arbitrariness, and impunity, that have no use and no tolerance for accountability. In the workshop from which this symposium developed, Marlies Glasius identified low accountability as a core property of authoritarian regimes.

While intuitively appealing, this conceptual proposal needs to be qualified. In this essay, I introduce five qualifications: 1) Authoritarian regimes are defined by the absence of free and fair elections, which implies the absence of electoral accountability (or, at least, its structural weakness). It does not imply, however, the absence (or weakness) of all forms of political accountability. Quite to the contrary, authoritarian regimes tend to operate as dense systems of accountability. Everybody is subject to accountability, with one exception: the supreme ruler.2) While authoritarian regimes are unlikely to show high levels of governmental accountability, democracies may operate at low levels of accountability. Authoritarian and democratic regimes do not differ necessarily in their practices, but in their infrastructures of accountability. 3) As I proposed elsewhere, accountability involves answerability, which is, the obligation of power holders to inform about their decisions (transparency) and to explain them (justification). Authoritarian regimes may contain traces of answerability. 4) Accountability also involves enforcement, which is, the capacity to punish power holders for their errors and offenses.2 Authoritarian regimes can contain limited institutional mechanisms for punishing dictators. 5) Though not subject to firm institutional mechanisms of accountability, dictators do face violent threats of removal by state agents or societal actors. In a limited

1. My present discussion of authoritarianism involves two initial simplifications. First, by conceiving authoritarian regimes as a broad residual category, defined by the absence of democratic elections, I treat political regimes in dichotomous terms. On electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism as intermediate regime types, and on the “essentially contested” nature of the boundary that separates them, see chapter three of Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). Second, I assume that the ultimate decision power in authoritarian regimes lies in the hand of a single person, which I call the ruler or dictator. Genuine collective leadership, I believe, is exceedingly rare in authoritarian regimes.

Authoritarianism, Democracy and Repression
Todd Landman, University of Essex

The triumphalism after successive waves of democratization has turned to challenges of democratic consolidation and a renewed interest in the quality of democracy. The Arab Spring brought renewed excitement about the prospects of democracy in a region that had long seemed impervious to such changes. Subsequent developments in the region, however, along with the pervasiveness of authoritarian tendencies across old and new democracies, and the recalcitrance of authoritarianism in many parts of the world suggest that the field of comparative politics must not lose sight of the study of repression and coercion.

To frame the need for a much larger reengagement in this field of comparative politics, I present a series of eight stylized facts on repression with illustrative empirical referents. I argue that coercion and repression are common across all states democratic and authoritarian alike, the use of repression varies considerably across different types of authoritarian states, and the use of repression by authoritarian states varies over time. The challenge for systematic research on the contours of authoritarianism is to capture both the within-case and between-case variation in the use of repression.

1. All states use coercion

The formation of modern states from smaller sets of political communities, clans, tribes and other aggregations has historically involved the consolidation of authority and ability to monopolise the use of force, coercion and repression. This process and understanding of coercion, and by extension repression, has been most notably expressed by Max Weber, but has appeared in the literature more generally on state formation and the rise of citizenship. For Robert Bates, the ability for a larger authority with the capacity to exercise violence over smaller component units provides economic benefit, since fewer resources within the smaller units are required for purposes of defence if a larger authority provides security. The story of European state formation follows this logic and combines the extension of rights protection over time, which are variously contested, negotiated and, mediated through peaceful, and at times, violent struggle. For contract theory inspired


From the Editorial Board, continued

From the Editorial Board, continued

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can become more free in terms of deciding on their own futures. Many challenges remain, and thus the study of dictatorships and of those who seek to prevent democracy from spreading is as important as studying positive developments.

This issue of the newsletter seeks to reconceptualize authoritarianism by tackling fundamental questions: to what extent are the features scholars have claimed to be distinctive to authoritarianism, such as social control and repression, also evident in democracies, Lisa Wedeen and Todd Landman ask, respectively. Conversely, to what degree can “democratic” characteristics, such as accountability and legitimacy, be found in authoritarian regimes? Andreas Schedler examines accountability while David Beetham and Dr. Wedeen consider legitimacy. Another line of inquiry asks to what extent political authoritarianism is bound to countries or also exists transnationally and subnationally. Pedro Ramos Pinto examines the transnational angle, and I investigate the subnational one.

The contributors first tackled these questions in a seminar held at the University of Amsterdam in June of last year. The convener of the seminar and guest editor of this issue, Marlies Glasius, introduces each of the essays in greater detail and situates them within a larger project she and colleagues are undertaking, entitled Authoritarianism in a Global Age: Controlling Information and Communication, Association and People Movement. We appreciate Dr. Glasius’ willingness to share some of the initial fruits of her project with us.

We hope and believe that this set of essays will help us to better conceptualize authoritarianism and thus more effectively investigate its manifestations, causes, and consequences.

Forthcoming issues of the newsletter will examine internet politics, the role of legislatures in stabilizing authoritarian regimes, and democratization and conflict. We hope you will find those issues as exciting as the present one.

On Behalf of the Editorial Team,
Kelly M. McMann
we need new approaches?

We redressed the dearth of contemporary conceptual work on authoritarian rule in a seminar at the University of Amsterdam (UvA) on 5–6 June 2014. The seminar marked the kick-off of a five-year project Authoritarianism in a Global Age: Controlling Information and Communication, Association and People Movement at the UvA. (See project website: aissr.uva.nl/authoritarian-global).

The over-arching question of the project is: how is authoritarian rule affected by and responding to globalisation of information and communication, association, and people movement? In the seminar, scholars of authoritarianism reflected on whether authoritarian rule is something besides the residual other of democracy, considered to what extent it is characterized by durable features or varies in time and space, and whether it makes sense to think of authoritarianism at levels other than the sovereign state. This symposium presents revised versions of some of the “thinkpieces” presented at the seminar.

The most common, and little debated, definition of authoritarianism remains “a national regime type that fails to organize free and fair elections.” And, proponents of a Dahlian rather than minimalist Schumpeterian version would add, “that fails to guarantee the rights necessary to enable elections to be free and fair.” But today, authoritarian regimes operate in a democratic age, causing many supposedly authoritarian regimes to organize and manipulate, yet occasionally lose, elections. Other regimes such as Iran or Venezuela heavily repress the enabling rights, but nonetheless offer the electorate a meaningful choice between alternatives.

At the same time, this is also a global age, in which democratic regimes hold free and fair elections but important areas of policy-making are placed beyond the reach of these elections through inter-state agreements (such as NAFTA or the Eurozone), or outside accountability mechanisms through the dictates of an international organization (such as the IMF or NATO). Finally, concurrent with the trend towards supranational decision-making, there is increasing evidence of the geographic unevenness of democratic elections and respect for rights within states.

A more conceptual focus on contemporary authoritarianism reveals three interlinked problems with the dominant conceptualisation of authoritarianism: the fact that it is a residual rather than a substantive definition; its reification of elections as sole touchstone to arbitrate the division between authoritarian and democratic systems; and its exclusive focus on the state as the locus of authority in an age of globalization, decentralisation and overlapping competencies. The contributions to this Symposium all address one or more of these three flaws, opening avenues towards a reconceptualization of authoritarianism that gives greater validity and social relevance to the concept in its contemporary context.

The Contributions to This Symposium

The six brief articles in this Symposium each make a distinctive contribution, and speak to each other in different ways, but they can be thought of as three pairs. David Beetham and Lisa Wedeen critically revisit the conceptualization of authoritarianism: the classification of authoritarianism and democracy as mutually exclusive regime types, drawing attention to latent authoritarianism within established democracies. Pedro Ramos Pinto and Kelly McMann highlight the temporal and spatial variation within the authoritarian regime type, allowing us to see them as continually evolving and uneven, and containing hints as to where and when democratization and de-democratization originate. Andreas Schedler and Todd Landman help us think beyond the residual character of authoritarianism, and the preoccupation with elections, towards a more substantive definition, looking at the specific character that, respectively, accountability and repression take on under authoritarian rule. Schedler and Landman take as their points of departure that there is no fundamental difference between democracy and authoritarianism when it comes to levels of accountability, or levels of repression. Instead, Schedler sees authoritarianism as lacking an accountability infrastructure that democracies possess, but this does not imply that citizens in democratic contexts can and will always be calling their rulers to account. Landman argues that democracies lay greater claim to legitimacy for their repression than authoritarian systems.

Wedeen in turn disputes this, pointing to both conceptual and epistemological problems with using legitimacy as the dividing line between regime types. The greater normative legitimacy of democracies, Wedeen argues, rests on shaky, contested ground, whereas sociological legitimacy (i.e. consent) poses an epistemological problem because it mistakes an “ex-ante psychological orientation of conformity” for a “post-facto acceptance...by the voter.” Moreover, she contends, the contemporary manifestation of global capitalism appears to be generating new mechanisms of social control, which are common to both systems of rule.

This is in keeping with the notion of a convergence between the formerly opposite poles of democracy and authoritarianism under the influence of “the increased globalization of the world economy under capitalist structures.”

Another interpretation could be that economic globalization is not just causing convergence, but also eroding both authoritarian and democratic rule in its familiar, twentieth century, nationally-embedded form, giving rise to new forms of governance that we can apprehend under the rubric of authoritarianism or democracy only by re-examining these categories.

The examples Beetham provides in his piece also allude to an association between de-democratisation and neoliberalism. Like Wedeen, he moves away from authoritarianism and democracy as mutually exclusive national regime types, but he takes a different approach to characterizing the distinctiveness of authoritarianism. He distinguishes authoritarianism from authoritarian regimes, and defines the former as “a mode of governing which is intolerant of public opposition and dissent” and which works through repression and exclusion, but without, at least at first, interfering with free and fair elections. He calls attention to the governing project of such modes of governing, i.e. the ideological motivations behind it, because this will help us predict where the repressive and exclusionary tendencies will be concentrated: on the opposition found most threatening to the project. The focus on authoritarianism as a possible mode of governing within formally democratic electoral systems allows us to spot trends of de-democratisation and possible re-democratisation before they flip into a change of regime type. Thus we could for instance have recognized the Rajapakse government in Sri Lanka (2005-2014) as an authoritarian mode (on Beetham’s metrics), that was halted by the surprise victory of the opposition’s common candidate.

The contribution by Ramos Pinto, a historian, helps us recognize the limitations of political science’s static and statist understanding of authoritarianism. His answer to the question “what explains authoritarian survival?” is “authoritarian evolution and adaptation.” Hence the study of authoritarianism should prioritize the dynamics of change over time rather than taxonomy. He also suggests a more substantive understanding of the variation between authoritarianism and democracy, reminding us of Charles Tilly’s somewhat forgotten historic model, which contains not just the two familiar metrics of electoral choice and civil rights (or in Tilly’s terms, consultation and protection), but two others as well: breadth, or the extent to which citizens are actually reached and included by the state (bringing to mind O’Donnell’s brown and blue zones) and equality of treatment. In relation to the statist charge, Ramos Pinto draws attention to the untold history of authoritarian diffusion and learning: the transnational circulation of ideas, technologies, expertise and experts, for instance but not exclusively, between authoritarian regimes in what could be called the “Latin Atlantic” between 1930 and 1980.

McMann reflects on wider lessons from the one exception to the national and residualist orientation of political science research on authoritarianism: the burgeoning research on subnational authoritarian enclaves. Whereas Beetham and Ramos Pinto have drawn attention to temporal variation within what is ostensibly one regime type, McMann focuses on spatial, and indeed spatial-temporal variation. While there is an increasing body of work on how subnational authoritarian enclaves function, which is just beginning to move away from the “easy target” of federal states, we still know very little about whether democratic enclaves in authoritarian states are viable. She derives three lessons from the subnational literature for the study of authoritarianism more generally. First, she counsels us not to be over-focused on what happens in the capital, but instead, to think of a regime as the sum of its parts. On that basis, the United States, for instance, should be counted as an “anocracy” in Polity’s terms or “partly free” according to Freedom House for most of the twentieth century due to the lack of free and fair elections in the South. But beyond such crude labels, Tilly’s metrics of breadth and equality might provide a better basis for classifying such mixed regimes. Second, the variation need not be static: democratisation and de-democratisation may initially be subnational processes, which become national via diffusion as much as via intervention from the capital. The relation between China and Hong Kong has been a particularly eye-catching recent case of this tension. It can still turn into either a tolerated subnational democratic enclave, or an instance of forced subnational de-democratisation. Third, the initially most obvious difference between subnational and national authoritarianism, sovereignty, may actually be less important in the real world than political scientists have made it. On the one hand, while a state at the central level may have legal authority to intervene in the affairs of
a subnational enclave, it may not in fact have the capacity to do so. In the other hand, states in the international system may have formal sovereignty, but as Colonel Muammar Gaddafi most recently found, the weaker ones are not insulated from foreign intervention aimed at regime change. Conversely, democratic tolerance of authoritarian entities also occurs both at the international level and within states.

Schedler applies his own classic conceptualization of accountability, originally developed to help gauge the quality of democracy, explicitly to authoritarianism, finding a much more complex relation than might be expected. He deviates from the previous writers (thereby conforming, in fact, to the dominant paradigm in the literature) in that he does take as his point of departure that democracy and authoritarianism are mutually exclusive national regime types. But while electoral accountability may be lacking, he shows us that authoritarian regimes do have various mechanisms of accountability, especially upward and horizontal accountability, with only the dictator largely exempt. In their practices, they do not necessarily do much worse than some democracies. The difference lies in the extent to which there is an accountability infrastructure, which is much weaker, but not altogether absent, in authoritarian contexts. For Schedler, although many other institutions may flow from them, this infrastructure in democracies still begins and ends with free and fair elections.

Landman posits that repression is a crucial element of all statecraft, but unlike Wedeen he believes that legitimacy for repression is what sets off democracies from authoritarian systems; this legitimacy is made up of representation, accountability, executive constraints and underpinning legal systems together. Still, Landman sees more parallels than differences between regime types in how repression fits within a broader spectrum of means of control. Overt repression gets used in crisis times, when stability is challenged, but gives way to consensus and bureaucratic government in calmer times. He also discerns variation not just in the level of repression but in its institutionalization, i.e. the extent to which it is arbitrary or systematized. This relates to the point about state capacity, or Tilly’s breadth, also made by McMann. Yet, problematizing his own pinpointing of legitimacy as the difference between democratic and authoritarian use of repression, Landman ends his contribution by drawing attention to international cooperation—between formally democratic and authoritarian states—in repression. The most comprehensive and alarming phenomenon in this respect has been what the Rendition Project has justly termed the “global rendition system.”

A Research Agenda

Together, these contributions begin to show us the contours of a new research agenda that would develop the concept of authoritarianism in two directions: first, to give it more substance, focusing on what authoritarianism is and does, rather than what it lacks or fall short of; and second, to enable application of the concept to systems of governance other than states. This dovetails neatly with some of the empirical work on which the researchers in the Authoritarianism in a Global Age project have embarked. Jos Bartman focuses on repression within subnational uncompetitive systems, whereas Kris Ruijgrok considers the relationship between new virtual tools for exercising and circumventing surveillance and repression, and protest behavior. Taking up transnational aspects of authoritarian rule, Emanuela Dalmasso, Adele del Sordi, Marcus Michaelsen and Aofei Lv are investigating (1) how different authoritarian states organize cooptation and repression of overseas citizens, (2) how, paradoxically, authoritarian states cooperate at the supranational level to achieve a more nationally controllable global Internet architecture and (3) how authoritarian and democratic states collaborate in the war on terror, and how anti-terrorist cooperation affects our classifications.

A reconceptualization of authoritarianism should provide a yardstick by which to judge claims such as the one that “the World Bank is authoritarian,” in a more meaningful way than concluding either a) that the World Bank is not a state, so the term does not apply, or b) the World Bank does not hold free and fair elections, hence the characterization is correct. If we think of authoritarianism as a substantive rather than a residual term, we should develop positive indicators that help us recognize it. While going beyond elections, we should be able to distinguish authoritarianism from neopatrimonialism and corruption from lack of state capacity or from shortfalls in the rule of law.

Personally, I think that both denial of downward accountability (or perhaps, as Schedler insists, the absence of an accountability infrastructure) and the violation of human rights most intimately connected to such denial of accountability should be core ingredients of such a redefinition. My own thinking on this point is not completed, and certainly not ready to move to operationalization. But there are literatures that can help with defining authoritarianism in these directions. Conceptual research on transnational accountability has developed criteria for judging when there is an accountability

5. www.therenditionproject.org.uk
relationship between power wielders and potential accountability holders, or in other words ascertaining who, in a given case, might constitute the demos of particular decisions.6 Discerning such a relationship is a prior step to determining what obligations accountability entails, and recognizing whether it is being denied. Human rights scholars (and even some human rights jurisprudence) are clearing a path towards recognizing rights violations by systems of governance other than the state.7

Objections to a reconceptualization in both more transnational and more substantive directions may raise doubts as to whether it would ever lend itself to operationalization. But this may just be a matter of investing more time and effort. The social world is complex, and requires complex concepts. Let us make the comparison to democracy studies here, and call to mind just how long it has taken for more sophisticated efforts to assess the quality of democracy to be developed and how complex some of these measures have become. There are several decades and many efforts between the eight criteria for democracy developed by Downs or the two dimensions with eight institutional guarantees developed by Dahl, and recent projects such as the guide to assessing democracy developed by Beetham et al. or the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.8 The former discerns four categories in which democracy should be assessed, with fifteen over-arching questions, leading to 75 actual questions. Moreover, it still gives flexibility to in-country assessors as to what to compare themselves to, and it refuses to aggregate the components. The V-Dem project, a work in progress, distinguishes seven principles of democracy, consisting of 30 interlocking components, generating a total of more than 400 indicators.

In the face of these developments, does it still make sense to reduce the experience of authoritarianism to a dummy variable, or even a single aggregated scale such as Polity or Freedom House? I am hopeful that eventually, the effort to reconceptualise may actually facilitate the development of a quality of authoritarianism scale, perhaps not at the level of sophistication of the democracy measurements cited, but better than the residual measures than we currently have. Such a scale should reflect the core commitments of the reconceptualization, specifically that authoritarianism is not a shortfall, but a particular form of governance and that systems of governance other than the state can be authoritarian.

For now, the intention of this symposium is to raise a debate, and to encourage scholars of authoritarianism to give more thought to what they believe authoritarianism is, before jumping to investigating what causes, erodes, or sustains it.

Marlies Glasius is Professor of International Relations at the University of Amsterdam. Her research focuses on authoritarianism, global civil society, international criminal justice, and human security.

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generate important mechanisms of social control common to both systems of rule.

My objective here is thus two-fold. First, although authoritarian regimes are more blatantly intolerant of dissent than democracies, these brief remarks invite consideration of the comparative efficacies of authoritarian versus democratic modes of control. Second and relatedly, I want to explore certain elements that authoritarian regimes and democracies have in common. Neither regime type tolerates much dissent that falls outside its respective definition of what counts as “loyal opposition,” although democracies’ strategies of social control are often more subtle and insidious. In the U.S. historically, anarchist movements, communist ideas and organizations, and civil rights or anti-war activists have mounted foundational challenges to the regime. At the beginning of the uprisings in the Arab world, to take an especially vivid contemporary example, foundational threats came from crowds demanding the toppling of regimes. In both cases, dissent deemed sufficiently dangerous to status quo stability was treated as intolerable, and then targeted by strategies of preemptive cooptation, infiltration of so-called subversive organizations, and at times violence and outright elimination.

Snuffing out the dissent that breathes life into radical oppositional politics may be easier for liberal democracies, which rely not only on brutal forms of coercive control such as maximum security prisons and capital punishment, but also on a plethora of market-oriented dramas in which pleasure “payoffs,” debt worries, promises of upward mobility, and appeals to individual responsibility work to generate attachments to the system even when that system no longer affirms the well-being of those who remain invested in it.² Authoritarian counterparts usually repress without the same degree of seductive efficacy democracies enjoy, in part because autocracies tend on average to be poorer. And, in this market-dominated era, it is not unusual for autocrats to become brazen predators, treating nation-states like family tax farms, without the redistributive commitments of 1950s authoritarianism, which provided significant social support to citizens. It would remain a mistake, however, to overdraw regime-type distinctions by ignoring the relevant dynamics of socio-political reproduction common to both.

In the contemporary period, we have seen strategies of control based on obedience, whether in Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia or the Middle East, give way in varying degrees to the discipline of market mechanisms. Here novel modes of what Althusser called interpellation—new ways of ‘hailing’ citizens, of constituting selves invested in novel forms of political domination and participation—emerge across what seem to be authoritarian and democratic divides. The disciplinary effects that may have originated in the market orientation of modern democracies—the endless cultivation of consumerist desire, driving ambitions for upward mobility, even the proliferation of philanthropic organizations that champion citizen empowerment by affirming the limits of citizens—have become to a serious extent independent of regime type. New forms of contestation are brought into being by these same market generated effects, including the sort of millennial commitment that has propelled young men from as far afield as, say, Belgium, to go to Syria to fight on behalf of an ill-defined Islamic state, motivated presumably by conditions of alienation that traverse regime difference. Commonalities of autocracy and democracy in the current era of consumer capitalism are captured compellingly in Slavoj Zizek’s reading of John Carpenter’s 1988 film, They Live.³ The hero in the

³Slavoj Zizek calls the film, in a moment of unfortunate hyperbole, “one of the neglected masterpieces of the Hollywood Left,” a film attentive to class conflict that offers a “true lesson” in the study of ideology, Zizek, “Denial: The Liberal Utopia,” film, John Nada (Spanish for “nothing,” as Zizek amusingly notes) is a homeless laborer who finds work on a Los Angeles construction site. A coworker takes him to a local shantytown to spend the night. While being shown around, Nada observes strange behavior at a small church. Investigating the next day, he discovers boxes of sunglasses hidden in a secret compartment in the wall. When he tries on a pair, he sees that a billboard for the company Control Data, which used to read, “We’re creating the transparent computing environment,” now displays the single word, “OBEY.” Another advertisement depicting a woman in a red bikini with a wave breaking over her, no longer urges the viewer, “Come to the… Caribbean,” but simply says, “MARRY AND REPRODUCE.” Paper money bears the phrase “THIS IS YOUR GOD.” Unlike the rose-tinted variety, these glasses force the wearer to see, literally, the black-and-white truth. It turns out that signs all around the city enjoin people to “consume,” “buy,” and “conform.” Moreover, they say to people, “do not question authority.”

Nada’s sunglasses may block the sun, but they allow us to bear having our eyes opened to the glaring appearance of “dictatorship IN [a] democracy.” Seeing dictatorship in democracy offers an antidote to the self-satisfactions and sense of superiority that has informed some diagnoses of authoritarianism, ones that position the West as the model and also, for some, the rescuer. The film demands recognition of the authoritarian compulsions within nominally democratic systems.

Seeing the light in this way has implications for our research agendas. We need to counter a variety of scholarly predilections (at least in political science). I have in mind the penchant for privileging elections in circumstances where electorates are themselves cowed and choices significantly constrained; for http://www.lacan.com/essays/?page_id=397, last accessed 11 April 2015.
celebrating the freedom we find in the United States, with the largest number of incarcerated people in the world; for failing to unpack theoretically the proliferating euphemisms that signal their opposite—such as “no child left behind,” or homophonic groups calling for “human rights,” “tea parties” in which the point of representation is to try to do away with taxation, or judicial arguments that in the name of racial equality reproduce the conditions of racial oppression. In addition to noting the way such misleading political language resembles the more blatantly fictitious claims of authoritarian rule, we also need to think about the institutional mechanisms operating in democracies, which effectively discourage the very dissent we admonish autocracies for combatting more overtly. Demonstrations in the United States against the war in Vietnam achieved the magnitude they did in large part because of the draft. Looking back from our point of view in the present, the effect of the demonstrations was not to do away with the military industrial complex, but to prompt a new system of military recruitment, and as a result, to encourage the cessation of sustained protest against militarism. Authoritarian regimes are more likely to continue to conscript and punish—an unabashedly cruel and arguably less effective way of managing populations.

To summarize thus far, before thinking of authoritarianism as fundamentally other to democracy, we need to consider the mechanisms of social control through which people in both systems are interpellated into systems of risk, pleasure, and quiescence. Although the Cold War occasioned some of the most flagrant instances of intolerance for dissent on the part of “democratic” regimes, the subsequent rise of neoliberal capitalism since the end of the Cold War has allowed institutionally disparate regimes to rely on novel and similar market-based tools of control. An emphasis on social control also enables us to chart processes of power that are insinuating and yet fundamental, bridging the divide between regimes that adhere to procedural democracy and those that might be termed “second-generation” autocracies. This is not to argue that there are no persistent differences or that differences are politically unimportant. Drawing attention to market orientations toward the “good life,” as Lauren Berlant urges us to do, nevertheless permits us to see how citizens in both regime types can be, in Zizek’s example of Nada, coerced to conform, slumber, fail to question authority, and obey. Market liberalization also seems to be structuring the terms within which much protest takes place. Demonstrations against austerity measures or the ways in which political organizing can be increasingly likened to “branding” make a visionary oppositional politics rare because it is now so difficult to imagine alternatives to capitalism. And strategies perhaps coincident with but importantly somewhat distinct from the market, as in the example above about ending the draft after Vietnam, have also helped reproduce militarism without as much risk to American lives which is what at one time generated conditions for far-reaching, profound rebellion.

A tempting counter argument to the one above might call on Weber’s exceptionally influential typological distinctions in *Economy and Society:* that is, whatever the apparent similarities, authoritarian and democratic regimes tend to rely on different types of legitimacy. But Weber himself recognized that legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic forms could be blended in actual regimes, which in truth rely on a variety of proceduralist, personal, and fetishized powers to reproduce their rule. The predilection of Weberians to call authoritarian regimes “neo-patrimonial” or “traditional” does a disservice to the legal-rational dimensions of autocratic rule (including cynical deployments of the rule of law) while also foreclosing considerations of how personal connections turn the “revolving door” of government-business relations in nominal democracies, guaranteeing that regulators and regulated are often one and the same.

Moreover, as important as the term legitimacy was to Weber, it is beset by a number of problems, both conceptual and ethical, which social scientists continue to reproduce. A key problem is the way Weber’s attempt to render legitimacy, in Hanna Pitkin’s words, a “pure label, neutral with respect to the speaker’s position and commitment” winds up obscuring the difference between what is lawful, exemplary, and binding and what is commonly considered lawful, exemplary, and binding. The result can be troubling, for in failing to take on “the commitment and responsibility implied in the word’s signaling functions,” social scientists using the term have seemed to suggest that even a regime as oppressive as Nazi Germany’s can be deemed legitimate because the system was often considered to be lawful and binding. Social scientists assume the position of an outside observer looking in, and legitimacy really comes to be “so-called legitimacy” or what informants, subjects, respondents, natives call legitimacy. As Pitkin writes: "it is as if Weber has defined ‘red’ to mean ‘having the status of being considered red’, or ‘false’ to mean ‘having the liability of being considered contrary to truth.’” In at least one passage, Weber explicitly makes this equation himself, apparently without any sense

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5. Consider Chief Justice John G. Roberts’ famous sentence from his 2007 opinion that limited the use of race to achieve integration in public schools in the U.S.: “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Thanks are owed to Jennifer Pitts for reminding me of this example.

of the slippage. He writes that the state “is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate violence (i.e. violence considered to be legitimate).” To put it differently, Weber takes a term whose signaling functions were legal-ethical (based on an external standard) and makes them sociological (based on what is locally, or in a specific historical epoch, considered to be appropriate), and in doing so produces a host of problems for social science.

Of course Weber did not invent this redefinition out of whole cloth. The term “legitimacy” whose Latin etymology and ongoing uses refer to law and legality offers no external standard that is objective or independent of context. Indeed, even “red” relies on some agreement about how we make reference to colors, how variations in light are distinct from each other in terms of what we call them, as Pitkin surely knows. More importantly, the critique may not get at the tensions in the very concept of “legitimacy” prior to Weber, the ways in which its associations with law have always made it suggestive of a universal standard and its parochial instantiations—where the question of say, the Law or natural law or the law of nations is itself tethered to parochial laws or local statutes. Despite these caveats, what remains relevantly troublesome for our purposes here is two-fold: first, that a concept signaling normative standards can be made to seem neutral, thereby masking the scholar’s convictions and the responsibility of judgment these commitments entail. Second, that for Weber (and for many who use his notion of legitimacy) state sovereignty in particular is elided with ethical notions of the good. In a social scientific version of the old adage, “might makes right,” might is at once the state (in all of its coercive glory) and people’s presumed endorsement of it.

These ethical concerns are amplified by methodological ones. Defining legitimacy as “being considered binding” begs the questions: On whom? By whom? By what means can the researcher know what people consider binding, or which populations do so? Few researchers who invoke legitimacy pose such questions or see them as thorny. For those accustomed to conducting opinion polls, such questions might seemingly be answered by simply asking people—but that just takes us back to the ethical dimension of the problem, the collapse of moral authority into public opinion.

Finally, the conceptual and methodological problems bedeviling legitimacy come to be intertwined with an epistemological problem: Scholars understand subjects as considering a government or a law legitimate if they act as if they do. This conflation of legitimacy with manifest obedience, which might signal acceptance, acquiescence, consent and/or, indeed, outward obedience, is troublesome for research on any political regime. In the context of studying authoritarian regimes, the problem with thinking in this way may be particularly stark. Such studies often fail to distinguish between public dissimulation of loyalty or belief, on the one hand, and real loyalty or belief—however that might be measured or determined—on the other. That all citizens are capable of reproducing a regime’s formulaic slogans, for example, tells us mainly that the regime is capable of enforcing obedience on the level of outward behavior. This insight is not meant to imply that citizens under autocratic rule cannot be devoted to the regime, attached to even its flagrant fictions, however little they may believe in them, and active in various forms of what Jean Comaroff has aptly called “fascism lite.”

The easy identification of legitimacy with consent is problematic for our understandings of democratic order as well, because the conflation tends to mistake the willingness of people to conform with the trappings of majority rule, thereby confusing an ex-ante psychological orientation of conformity for a post-facto acceptance of that standard by the voter. Social scientists who attempt to focus on democratic legitimacy by treating it in terms of electoral procedures likewise neglect issues central to the maintenance of contemporary political order—issues of apathy and despair, for example, or the ways in which democratic regimes also rely on potent mechanisms of coercive control.

In this sense, the problem is not that social scientists are too normatively disengaged, but rather that they are not sufficiently aware of their normative commitments. Strategies used by autocratic regimes to cultivate obedience and manage subversion may appear especially blatant and brittle, but unwitting normative commitments stand in the way of needed work on the forms of temporally specific socio-political regulation common to autocracies and democracies alike. Generating a language that at least acknowledges discomfiting homologies across regime type may help to make clearer the stakes in the analytic distinction—forcing us to confront and analyze the gap between scholarly idealizations and the troubled worlds to which they refer.

Lisa Wedeen is the Mary R. Morton Professor of Political Science and the College and the Co-Director of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory at the University of Chicago. Her works include Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (1999).
Beetham, continued
(continued from page 2)

A third distinctive feature of the democracy studies approach is an analysis of transition, in particular of which types of authoritarian regime are most likely to transit to a democratic one, as opposed to remaining stably authoritarian or collapsing into another authoritarian regime. Here more qualitative typologies of authoritarian regime are needed, not ones based solely on their distance from democracy. So Barbara Geddes distinguishes between personalist, military, and single-party regimes; and she shows from comprehensive country data that military regimes are the most fragile and single-party regimes the most enduring, with personalist regimes falling somewhere in between the two.4 Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell combine these distinctions with Diamond’s “distance from democracy” criterion to arrive at a five-fold typology of autocratic (i.e. authoritarian) regimes: monarchy, military, no-party, one-party, and limited multi-party. They conclude from comparative regime data that the one most likely to transit to democracy is “a limited multi-party system without a dominant party.”5

Now I do not wish to deny the value of these approaches to authoritarian regime analysis from a democracy perspective. Yet their starting point, of defining an authoritarian regime by the absence of some key democratic feature, seems to me inadequate. Not all deviations from democracy make a political regime authoritarian (consider, for example, limitations on the suffrage, the gerrymandering of district boundaries, or other deviations from “free and fair” electoral practice). Moreover, if we are to take the term authoritarianism as our subject, rather than “authoritarian regime,” then it is possible to envisage it occurring in a democratic political system. My definition of it would be a mode of governing which is intolerant of public opposition and dissent. Such a mode of governing is likely to occur whenever rulers believe that public opposition will unduly limit either the extent of their power or the prospects for its perpetuation. It is a reasonable assumption that all rulers, in whatever kind of system, dislike limits on their power and wish to ensure its durability. Yet a shift to authoritarianism only happens where rulers see public opposition as a major threat to the extent or continuation of their power, and believe that they can work to undermine it with relative impunity. We do not have to assume that they are necessarily motivated by a desire for power for its own sake, much less that their actions stem from an “authoritarian personality.”

It is enough that they believe that their governing project, whatever that happens to be, is essential to the country, and that it requires them to remove potential limits on the extent or duration of their power. (They may of course be mistaken in these beliefs).

It follows that an authoritarian mode of governing is possible within a democratic system, though it only remains democratic so long as elections are genuinely “free and fair”, and formal civil and political rights are respected. Margaret Thatcher’s government would be one example. After the election of 1983 her rule became increasingly authoritarian as she moved to demobilise all sources of opposition—within the trade unions, local authorities, cultural institutions, the civil service, the cabinet, and her own party. She achieved this through a combination of repression (the trade unions) and exclusion—exclusion from positions of influence of all those who were “not one of us.” She would have seen this as necessary for what became her governing project: to drive through a neo-liberal agenda on a largely sceptical electorate. Authoritarianism is not hostile to all forms of freedom as some claim, only ones that can hinder or frustrate its governing project. As Andrew Gamble has ably shown in his book The Free Economy and the Strong State, a neo-liberal agenda is only possible where the state enjoys a decisive concentration of power, both to neutralise sources of opposition and to deal with the consequent social unrest.6 As a Chilean friend of mine remarked with some amazement, what in Chile required the Pinochet dictatorship to achieve, in Britain could be carried out within a formally democratic system. But the ejection of Mrs. Thatcher from office in 1990 at the hands of her own ministers under the prospect of electoral defeat showed that the integrity of the electoral system was still respected.

Other more contemporary examples of authoritarianism within a democracy would be those of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India (or more precisely his time as chief minister in the state of Gujarat). I have read numerous journal and newspaper articles describing their mode of governing as “authoritarian.” We are all familiar I am sure with Erdogan’s treatment of opposition and dissent in Turkey. Here is what one Indian academic writes about Modi’s method of governing in Gujarat, from which he deduces how he can be expected to govern India as a whole: “It involves a form of capitalism which promotes and incentivises big business, keeps wages low and suppresses workers’ action, represses popular movements and cracks down on dissent.”7 The governing project of both premiers is in fact similar, and can be described as “breakneck capitalist development combined with a strong element of religious revivalism.” Other examples of authoritarianism within a genuinely competitive electoral regime would be the administrations of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki in Iraq and Mohamed Morsi in Egypt,

both devoted to securing hegemony for
their mode of Islam by means of the
repression and exclusion of dissenting
forces.

What is meant by “exclusion” in this
context? What makes authoritarian
exclusion different from an established
process in some democracies whereby
an elected government has the right to
change the personnel throughout the
administration on taking up office, to the
exclusion of opposition sympathisers? The
difference is that this is a rule-governed
process, which has the consent of all
political actors. Authoritarian exclusion,
by contrast, is not based on rules or
consent. It seeks to render dissenters
impotent by denying them access to any
influence on the political process; it even
goes so far as to define them as non-
legitimate players in the country’s affairs
(as, for example, Margaret Thatcher
categorised the striking miners and even
the opposition Labour Party itself as “the
enemy within”). It is no coincidence that
strongly majoritarian democratic systems,
with no effective separation of powers
between executive and legislature, are
particularly prone to a “winner takes all”
mentality, and vulnerable to authoritarian
deformations. And this has particularly
fateful consequences in countries divided
by relatively permanent identities based
on language, religion, or ethnicity, as the
examples of Iraq and Egypt demonstrate.

These significant examples allow us to postulate what are the typical
circumstances in which an authoritarian
mode of governing can take place within
an impeccably democratic electoral
regime. It requires a combination of push
and pull. The pull factor is an ambitious
governing project which requires for its
success the disabling if not the suppression
of those social forces that stand in its way.
It is this project that explains the social
oppositions which have to be disabled.
The push factor is a political situation
in which the rulers do not have to worry
about any electoral price or penalty to be
incurred by their authoritarianism because
the electoral opposition is either weak or
divided, or both, and there is therefore no
compelling need for interference in the
integrity of the electoral system. That was
the situation of Thatcher after 1983; of
Erdogan, as the most recent local elections
results in Turkey show; and of Modi in
Gujurat, and then with the stunning
national electoral victory and the disarray
of the Congress Party in India. Morsi and
Maliki both felt themselves secure enough
that they could only be removed by extra-
constitutional intervention, domestic and
external respectively.

Of course authoritarianism within an
impeccably democratic electoral regime
can be regarded as exceptional, and
also time-bound. In most countries the
disabling of opposition by government
is only possible where limits on that
opposition are effectively institutionalised,
through formal restrictions on civil
and political rights (particularly the
freedoms of expression and association),
subordination of the judiciary to the
executive, or manipulation of the electoral
process, or a combination of all three.
Usually these three forms of institutional
constraint are found together, as even
elections which appear to be formally
“free and fair” within the electoral period
cease to be so if the opposition
is constantly hampered in campaigning
or its key personnel are charged with
offences of doubtful validity. It is these
institutionalised constraints which turn
an authoritarian mode of governing into
an authoritarian regime.

So in summary I would argue that the
relation between authoritarianism and
democracy is not exhausted by an
antithesis between the authoritarian
regime and the democratic one, as
the writers summarised on the first
page assert. It is perfectly possible for

authoritarianism to take place within a
democratic system where the conditions
I have outlined above exist. Most of the
examples I have given relate to political
systems at the national level, though
relatively autonomous regions may also
show the same features, as the example of
Modi in Gujarat demonstrates. This leads
me to a final question: what implications
does my analysis of authoritarianism have
for the study of authoritarian regimes?
Some brief points will suffice:

• It makes better sense to define
authoritarianism as I have done as
intolerance of opposition or dissent,
rather than by the particular institutional
instrumentalities through which that
intolerance is realised, because these
instrumentalities may well vary from
one case to the next, and lead to
insoluble disagreements about how
authoritarianism should be defined.

• We should pay attention to the substance
of authoritarianism rather than just its
procedures or instrumentalities—to what
I have called its governing project—
because this may well help us understand
which forms of opposition are likely to
be seen as most threatening, and what
the instrumentalities are that can best
demobilise it.

• Finally it suggests the possibility
of a fruitful comparison between
authoritarianism in democratic and non-
democratic systems, in which the former
stand out as not requiring infringements
of electoral integrity to ensure continuance
of the governing project, while the latter
can only ensure its continuance through
various forms of electoral malpractice or
suppression.

David Beetham is Emeritus Professor of
Politics at University of Leeds. The second
edition of his book The Legitimation of
Power was published in 2013.
even as regimes continue to retain their essential authoritarian nature.

Thinking historically about globalization also directs our attention to the shifting position of nations in a global system and the changing nature of the flows and interactions between them, so that we can say that global processes affect states differentially according to their location: migration, for instance, raises distinct challenges for labor-exporting countries and for those which are importers of labor, as discussed below. Equally, challenges facing regimes differ according to their place in broader geo-strategic systems such as the global Cold War—Cuba's relationship to the USSR was naturally distinct from that of Albania's. The variability across time and space of the influence of a particular type of globalization on any regime, authoritarian included, means that their responses will be equally diverse.

Highlighting issues of change, variability, and the importance of context are some of the means by which historians can contribute to the way the social sciences engage with the more abstract concepts of authoritarianism and globalization. Yet, the historical perspective's ambition to map the particular and historians' aversion to generalization can, if taken to an extreme, result in the kind of project satirized in Umberto Eco's essay on the difficulties of creating a 1:1 map of the world.

Focusing on what regimes do, rather than what they are, is a way out of this problem of perspective, allowing us to relate the ideal types of political science to the critical issue of change dear to historians. Historical sociologists, more than historians tout-court, have been particularly attentive to the historicity of regime forms. While Barrington Moore's foundational work in this area focused more on the origins of authoritarianism than its evolution or nuances, the challenge of accounting for dynamics of change has been taken up in two extensive bodies of work that take a global perspective on such themes, those of Michael Mann and Charles Tilly. The latter's relational regime model offers a particularly useful framework with which to approach the issue of authoritarian evolution in a global context. Tilly's model sees both authoritarian and democratic regimes as variations on a spectrum combining at least four areas of relationship between states and populations:

a) the degree of inclusivity of the 'citizen' category (breadth)

b) the extent to which citizens are equal/unequal in relation to both each other and treated as such by the state (equality)

c) the degree to which citizens are protected from arbitrary action from the state (protection)

d) the extent to which there are mechanisms of binding consultation (consultation)

At any one point in time a given regime can be characterized by how it conducts each of these relationships—how inclusive it is and the terms of that inclusion, comprising both issues of distribution and legal process; and the extent to which it is responsive to interests and demands of its population.

The particular arrangements of each regime depend on its historical trajectory, on the balance of forces between social actors within it, and on the capacity of the state to enforce its authority. All of these factors are, naturally, liable to be influenced by external factors that could come under the heading of globalization, from war to trade to environmental change. At some point when a given regime conducts these four types of relationships towards the 'more' end (more breadth, more equality, more protection and more consultation) we begin to describe them as democratic. Yet the boundary between authoritarianism and democracy conceived in these terms is fluid, and nations can de-democratize as well democratize while remaining in the zone of authoritarianism.

The temporality inherent in Tilly's model is particularly useful when considering the responses of authoritarian regimes to the challenges of globalization; in adapting to them regimes may become more inclusive or responsive in one area as a means of securing legitimation (both external or internal), whilst preserving authoritarian power in other areas. The model is also neutral as to causes—being more of a dynamic typology than a theory of regime types and change—which also allows us to use it in an open-ended way to develop and compare multiple causal hypothesis and broader theories.

The paragraphs that follow explore some of the ways in which we can use Tilly's model to think historically about the effects of globalization on authoritarian regimes. Yet, a word of warning—this cannot be taken as a comprehensive survey of History's engagement with the questions of authoritarianism and of globalization, both extensive subjects of scholarship. Not even of the


3. This model is presented in a number of his works, but perhaps most succinctly in Charles Tilly, Democracy (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.11-15.
field of the history of authoritarianism and globalization which, although much smaller, is still wider than this short essay allows. Instead, as a way of example it explores two topics within globalization—internationalism and global migrations—seldom considered but relevant to contemporary authoritarianisms.

Authoritarian Internationalism
Nationalism was a key axis for authoritarian legitimation and political mobilization in the 19th and 20th centuries, as it was for liberal, civic nationalism. It was also a political language that became quickly global, aided by the reach of European empires. But while nationalism is today understood as a transnational phenomenon, we have been perhaps slower at exploring the history of authoritarianism in a similar light. The universalism of democracy and the diffusion of democratic constitutionalism are well-rehearsed topics, but the way in which authoritarian regime forms have crossed national boundaries and been adapted and transformed into local contexts is less well studied—with the possible exception of work on global dimensions of communism and international socialism. Examination of the question of what could be called “authoritarian internationalism” has been rare.

Like other states, authoritarian regimes have had to negotiate their position and exchanges in a globalizing world. To do so, internationalism—understood as “an idea, a movement, or an institution that seeks to reformulate the nature of relations among nations through cross-national cooperation and exchange”—is not a strategy available exclusively to liberal regimes. The ‘top-down internationalism’ of the Cold War, where

the international order of the two power blocs was of critical importance in creating, supporting and (in some cases) transforming authoritarian regimes in their orbit has been the subject of recent syntheses that also draw attention to the capacity of the periphery of the Cold War to influence developments in the “core.”5 But of increasing resonance in a multipolar world are cases of “horizontal internationalism” between authoritarian regimes. On one hand, this describes diplomatic and political interactions between regimes on a more even plane than the vertical influence of the global superpowers, as in the cases of the mid-20th century non-aligned movement or pan-Africanism. On the other, it also describes a much broader transnational circulation of ideas, policies, and expertise between authoritarian states.

This second mode of horizontal internationalism is as critical as the first when thinking about authoritarian adaptation and long-term survival. One area provides an apt example encompassing both issues of transnational diffusion and regime transformation—authoritarian social policy. A recent survey shows how, globally and historically, non-democratic regimes have most often been the first to introduce welfare systems in their territories. These

This describes both diffuse circulation of ideas and transnational diffusion and regime transformation—authoritarian social policy. A recent survey shows how, globally and historically, non-democratic regimes have most often been the first to introduce welfare systems in their territories. These

My own current research explores the transnational circulation of ideas, technologies, expertise and experts between authoritarian regimes in what could be called “Latin Atlantic” between 1930 and 1980—Brazil, Argentina, the Iberian countries and Italy (until the fall of Mussolini). Regimes in this transnational political and social space suffered significant transformations in this half century that took them through various forms of state-society relations that would be difficult to pin down to even rather sophisticated models of regime-type—personalism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, military

include healthcare, pensions and other forms of social insurance or protection. The introduction of social policies by authoritarian regimes can expand the category of citizen, by covering new populations (Tilly’s dimension of breadth); it can alter the internal dynamics of relations between citizens (equality). Of course, authoritarian welfare systems can, and often are, used to generate new types of inequality, even as they include a broader proportion of the population and, in some cases, ameliorate the overall impact of social deprivation. For instance, authoritarian welfare systems can help legitimate and sustain authoritarian regimes, establishing clientelistic relations with that Partha Chatterjee has termed “political society” as opposed to the western liberal ideal of a “civil society.”7

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dictatorship, or populist presidentialism. It would be easy to get tied up in categorization and periodization of regime types without acknowledging fundamental continuities and evolutions in these regimes. One of the evolving features of these regimes was their construction of systems of welfare and economic management that, aside from specificities of regime type, evolved to condition state-society relations and social inequalities throughout the middle of the 20th century, shaping legacies that have endured beyond democratization. Elsewhere I have argued that the development of systems of social citizenship combining influences from fascist corporatism and from international organizations partially account for the persistence of the Iberian authoritarianism in the second half of the 20th century.9

The key question my works follow is how the production of a form of authoritarian internationalism in this period shaped the evolution of the political regimes that connected to these global processes. The welfare regimes of countries in the “Latin Atlantic” have often been noted for their structural similarities. But the origins of these similarities lies not in a primordial shared culture, but in the way in which the countries in question were embedded in multiple global networks, not all of which were “authoritarian.” Besides the authoritarian internationalism mentioned above, they were also shaped in interaction with North America and Europe powers, or with international organizations, from the United Nations to the World Health Organization. Critically, however, these regimes engaged with them as authoritarian regimes albeit at a time (perhaps like now) when international organizations placed a low premium on democracy as a condition for membership or as a necessary part of development.

Authoritarianism and Global Migration

Another topic linking the evolution of authoritarian regimes to transnational processes is global migration. In my own area of expertise, three features appear relevant. There is no doubt that Southern European dictatorships of the twentieth century relied on emigration as an escape valve for social tensions in their countries. Officially illegal, migration was nevertheless tolerated as way of relieving unemployment and rural poverty and a welcome source of foreign currency in the form of remittances. Migrant communities (Portuguese in Brazil, Italians in Brazil and Argentina) were also important in supporting the kinds of transnational authoritarianism discussed above by creating local “chapters” devoted to the dissemination of authoritarian ideology. Yet, at the same time emigration was not without its risks: it was in some ways an exercise in “exit,” in Albert Hirschman’s sense of the term, that also revealed the failure of the regimes to address the problems that provoked. Migration is also rarely a one-way ticket, and returning migrants bring with them ideas, information, and expectations that can also be a challenge to authoritarian regimes.

Migration within and into nations controlled by authoritarian regimes is another important area to consider, namely bringing large populations under the jurisdiction of states that deny them the status (and rights) of citizenship. We can observe this in the contemporary Gulf States, but also in the Chinese hukou system of registration. Created in 1958 as a tool of development planning, hukou was a system that established categories of citizens with differentiated entitlements, in this case between rural and urban populations, and tied them to local systems of state provision. (Benefits were more generous in the urban areas so as to reward managerial and skilled working-class workers). In the last twenty or so years, the explosion of rural to urban migration, tolerated and necessary, but not officially sanctioned, has left millions in the grey area of not being officially local citizens of the areas they moved to, and therefore unable to access welfare, housing, the legal system, and at the mercy of the authorities who often deport large groups back to the provinces when they become troublesome. In this case, Tilly’s dimensions of breadth and equality of citizenship came into play. Inequality, initially designed by the Communist Chinese state to incorporate and gain the loyalty of professional and managerial groups, was overtime transformed into a system with different functions. After a rapprochement with the West in the 1970s, when China entered the global economy and re-directed its efforts towards export-led growth, the hukou was used to ensure that a growing industrial labor force would place only limited demands on the state by excluding them from more generous ‘urban’ rights. At the same time hukou was a means to control the industrial labor force, since troublemakers could always be removed from cities on account of not possessing the required residence permit, even as millions around them were tolerated for the sake of staffing China’s booming economy. China has also recently announced sweeping reforms to the hukou system, which will make it easier for many to access urban citizenship, especially in smaller, mid-sized cities.10 These measures were to


a large extent driven by the fear that growing inequality would undermine the regime’s legitimacy, but even as China expands the breadth of its most inclusive mode of citizenship and seeks to generate a degree of equality, party rule remains an untouchable feature of the regime, at least for the time being.

Closing Remarks
Looking at past instances of authoritarian internationalism or how longer histories of migration have affected authoritarian regimes are not a way to diminish the novelty of the challenges posed by contemporary processes of globalization. Yet neither does looking to the past interaction between local powers and global processes offer ready-made models for their future development. But this exercise does help us understand the genealogies of present-day authoritarianism and how their nature has been influenced by past forms of engagement with global processes. And, this may offer clues as to the ways they do so in the present. Perhaps most importantly, it directs our attention to the evolution of regimes in response to challenges—both internal and external—and towards analytical tools sensitive to such processes of change.

units of a country? At a certain threshold of territorial non-consolidation, a national political regime requires a different label. For example, a national political regime in a country with democratic enclaves in half its subnational units deserves a label different from the label for a national political regime in a country with no democratic enclaves.

While this refinement seems logical, it is unclear how pressing it is because we do not know how common enclaves are. Subnational democratization studies have found undemocratic enclaves in countries with national regimes typically labelled democratic, democratizing, or hybrid. They have not searched for democratic enclaves. An obstacle to the study of democratic enclaves has been the conventional wisdom, espoused for example by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, that a democratic enclave could never exist because an authoritarian national leader would crush it. Yet scholars, including Jennifer Gandhi, Beatriz Magalon, and Andreas Schedler, have shown that democratic institutions can exist within authoritarian national regimes and can contribute to their endurance. Perhaps the same is true of democratic territorial enclaves; however, currently we do not have relevant evidence.

Information about undemocratic enclaves has been limited too, in their case, by the small number of countries studied. Most of the work has been done in large countries with, at the time, federal systems of government—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and the United States. There are also single studies of other large federal countries, India and South Africa, and two small, unitary states, Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines. As a result


additional information about the existence of enclaves will clarify the importance of refining authoritarian regime typologies. More information is on the horizon from studies that use the case study approach in other regions of the world, such as Africa and Southeast Asia, and from the Varieties of Democracy project (https://v-dem.net/), which includes subnational indicators of democracy for countries worldwide.

**Similarities in Subnational and National Authoritarianism**

At first glance authoritarian enclaves would be far removed from each other: a democracy versus a dictatorship. Yet scholars—such as Alfred Stepan, and more recently, Juan Linz, the father of authoritarianism as an independent variable—argue that authoritarian enclaves are embedded in democracies. Linz advocates the existence of both authoritarian and democratic enclaves in otherwise democratic countries. He observes that “the political consequences of local electoral systems: Democratic change and the politics of differential citizenship in South Africa” Comparative Politics 33.3 (2001), 295-313; John T. Sidel, “Economic Foundations of Subnational Authoritarianism: Insights and Evidence from Qualitative and Quantitative Research” Democratization 21.1 (2014), 161-184. Maya Tudor and Mark Ziemul, “Subnational Democratization in Pakistan: Can Local Governments Demand Democratic Change?” in Multiple Arenas: Territorial Variance within Large Federal Democracies, Eds. Laurence Whitehead and Jacqueline Behrend.

However, other scholars have noted that authoritarianism can exist even within democracies. For example, Jennifer Gandhi, Beatriz Magalon, and Andreas Schedler, have shown that democratic institutions can exist within authoritarian national regimes and can contribute to their endurance. Perhaps the same is true of democratic territorial enclaves; however, currently we do not have relevant evidence.

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establish one. Incidentally, this thinking has led some of these researchers to avoid the term “authoritarian” enclave and use “undemocratic” or “hybrid” instead.

The existence of truly authoritarian enclaves is, however, an empirical question that requires study of many countries. We know full authoritarian subnational regimes have not existed at the provincial level in Argentina or state level in Mexico in recent years, based on Gervasoni’s and Agustina Giraudy’s work. But, it would be unwise to generalize from these relatively similar countries and time periods.

The logic for why a truly authoritarian enclave cannot exist assumes that a national government has the capacity or can appear to have the capacity to dismantle subnational authoritarian regimes. This assumption may be sound for established states with developed capacity and party systems that national leaders can harness to ensure democracy, but does the assumption hold for new states and those where parties are absent or weak? Might some of these states be as weak as the international community in addressing authoritarianism? Moreover, many studies have found that hybrid subnational regimes are in national leaders’ interests to maintain. It is plausible that a fully authoritarian subnational regime would be in national leaders’ interest too, as we have found, foreign dictators are often in democratic countries’ interest. On the other hand, we may find that truly authoritarian enclaves were more common in first and second wave democracies when the practice of government leaders introducing democratic institutions in order to appear to meet international norms was less common.

The implication of this line of reasoning is that national and subnational authoritarian regimes might not be so distinct that studies of one type cannot inform studies of the other. Currently, there seems to be little to no interaction across the two areas of research. Exploring theories and evidence about the origins and maintenance of authoritarian regimes at one level might improve our understanding of authoritarian regimes at another level.

Democratization of Authoritarian Regimes
Despite their primary focus on the maintenance of subnational regimes, studies of subnational democratization have highlighted a few factors contributing to their erosion, namely the interests and capacity of the national government. Scholars have argued that a local crisis that challenges the national government’s interests can encourage the government to intervene in the affairs of an enclave. Of course, the national government must have the capacity to do so. Thus, it is likely that the extent of subnational democratization within authoritarian states depends on the capacity and interests of the national government.

A national authoritarian regime that has little control over a subnational unit is unlikely to be able to halt its democratization, and a national authoritarian regime that has little control over many subnational units is unlikely to be able to stem a wave of subnational democratization. Even if a national authoritarian regime has the capacity to quash subnational democratization, it might be in its interest to allow democracy in at least some units. Subnational democratic institutions and processes might assist national authoritarian leaders, just as national democratic institutions have been shown to do.

The focus on maintenance among scholars of subnational democratization has meant that we do not have studies that directly examine the limits to subnational democratization within authoritarian states. To date, any attention to change has been attention to the democratization of authoritarian enclaves, rather than democratic enclaves as precursors to the democratization of national authoritarian regimes. A few published studies have examined how national intervention and diffusion can democratize particular authoritarian enclaves; however, this work has been limited to a few countries—Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and the United States. These studies aim to explain the collapse of individual authoritarian enclaves, not the complete democratization of a country’s territory, which may or may not be identical processes. Current research expands the focus to examine how subnational variation in democracy was overcome, specifically during the first wave. Other research-in-progress will examine the extent to which subnational political liberalization results in national political openings. This work should illuminate the issue of limits to subnational democratization within authoritarian states.

In conclusion, our understanding of authoritarianism can benefit from existing and future research on enclaves. Work on enclaves can help refine the concept of authoritarianism, illuminate how it works subnationally and nationally, and provide insight into how authoritarian regimes democratize.

Kelly M. McMann is Associate Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. Her publications include Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia (2014) and Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (2006).


sense, some of these threats may count as instruments of accountability. The rest of the essay elaborates on each of these points.

1. Varieties of Authoritarian Accountability

Authoritarian regimes are often arenas of extensive accountability. Most of it runs from higher to lower levels of hierarchy. Regime agents hold citizens accountable (citizen accountability). The governing elite hold state agents accountable (agent accountability). Rulers hold their elite allies accountable (elite accountability). All three forms of vertical, top down accountability can be massive enterprises. Think of Joseph Stalin’s Gulag, that devoured ordinary citizens, lower-level officials and party agents as well as top members of the political elite. Or of contemporary China, which invests huge administrative and technological resources to keep citizens, state officials, party agents, and elite members on a short political leash.

The position that seems to be exempt from demands of accountability, the one and only in authoritarian regimes, is the peak of power. In the ideal-typical authoritarian regime, all actors are subject to oversight by the dictator. But the dictator himself is not answerable to anybody and not punishable by anybody. Accountability to the dictator, in which the supreme ruler acts as agent of accountability, is a basic principle of authoritarian governance. By contrast, accountability of the dictator, in which the authoritarian ruler acts as addressee of accountability (and which I will refer to as “dictatorial accountability”), is exceptional.

Authoritarian rulers tend to fancy themselves as being subject to transcendental forms of accountability: answerable to higher entities, like God or history, yet free from any obligations to account for their actions to their earthly subjects. Reflecting rulers’ sovereign freedom from accountability, political as well as academic debates on dictatorial accountability usually refer to ex post accountability to which former, not acting, dictators are subject. Acts of transitional justice typically apply to regime actors after their fall, when their capacities of extortion are insufficient to prevent justice from being pursued, but sufficient to prevent it from being pursued fully.

Contemporary authoritarian rulers also face international demands of accountability. External accountability is often mild and elusive. Nevertheless, it does oblige rulers to respond to uncomfortable questions from international actors and renders them liable to certain forms of punishment through international sanctions. Still, neither posterior nor external demands of accountability alter the fundamental freedom from domestic accountability dictators tend to enjoy during their terms in office.

2. Variance of Democratic Accountability

While democracies and autocracies are unlikely to coincide at the high end of the accountability scale, they may find themselves together at its low end. In all democracies, chief decision makers take unaccountable decisions for which they are never held accountable: decisions nobody ever learns about, decisions nobody ever asks about, harmful decisions they get away with without punishment. In all democracies (or at least in all I know), critical observers complain about multiple deficiencies of accountability. Their complaints are incisive, persistent, and often dramatic. They complain about things like imperial presidencies, prime ministerial dominance, rubber stamp legislatures, overpowering bureaucracies, technocratic insulation, patriarchal collusion, failures of electoral accountability, and a long etcetera.

The point is quite simple: democracies vary among themselves as well as within themselves — across governments, state institutions, policy fields, and levels of governance — in the degree of accountability they practice. They are not, by definition or by nature, systems of high accountability. Far from actually guaranteeing accountability, they only afford structural opportunities for accountability. In contrast to authoritarian regimes, they contain the institutional infrastructure that permits holding public officials accountable, such as constitutional divisions of power, judicial independence, agents of oversight, civic liberties, and party and media pluralism. Yet institutions do not act, only actors do. Unless citizens, voters, opposition actors, journalists, judges, and other agents of accountability act upon the institutional opportunities they are granted, democracies can very well settle into routines of low accountability.

In sum, what distinguishes authoritarian from democratic regimes are not their low levels of accountability, but their weak opportunities for governmental accountability. Nevertheless, even though structural opportunities for holding dictators accountable are weak, they are not entirely inexisten. Even dictatorships may contain traces of dictatorial answerability and punishment.

3. Authoritarian Answerability

The typical tyrant who unleashes his fury against all messengers of bad news creates an atmosphere of submissive silence in which none of his allies or subordinates dares to pose uncomfortable questions or introduce uncomfortable facts. Nervously attuned to the delicate imperatives of dictatorial correctness, everyone collaborates in suppressing anything that might irritate the irascible tyrant.

Needless to say, such silence is a less than ideal breeding ground for political answerability. Fear of arbitrary power prevents subjects from raising critical questions; the arrogance of secure power prevents the dictator from listening and answering to critical questions, should they happen to arise. The twin question is then: Under what conditions does authoritarian governance allow subjects to formulate critical questions about political decision-
making? And what are the conditions that oblige rulers to listen and respond to them?

The core structural condition of political criticism is rather obvious: liberty. To the extent that authoritarian regimes engage in violent repression of dissidence, they inhibit its expression. To the extent that they grant civil liberties, such as freedom of expression and freedom of association, they permit irritating facts and opinions to enter the public sphere. Yet, holding rulers to account involves more than the liberty of asking them nasty questions. It involves their obligation to respond.

The structural conditions that create such an obligation are less clear. Authoritarian rulers usually do not respond to critical questions by providing reasoned public answers. They respond with silence, disdain, fury, or hollow rhetoric. At best, they react by adjusting their actual policies to public demands. But responsiveness is not answerability. The former can be done by stealth, without providing public justifications. The latter demands a public exchange of arguments. It denies rulers a monopoly of truth, which is harder to accept than tactical changes of policy course.

Intuitively, authoritarian rulers should be willing to publicly inform about their actions and defend them in the face of criticism if one of two conditions holds: a) State agents, such as military juntas, royal councils, legislatures, or courts, are capable and willing to modify or revert decisions taken by the ruler. b) Societal actors, such as firms, labor unions, or mass movements, are capable and willing to block, slow down, or erode the implementation of decisions taken by the ruler. Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court under Mubarak exemplified the former,3 taxing elites in Southeast Asia’s post-independence autocracies the latter.4

In theory, rational rulers should be answerable to such countervailing powers. They should strive to inform them about their decisions and to persuade them that they merit support. In practice, however, we know very little about dictatorial answerability to either formal or informal veto players. To the extent that it takes place within secretive decision-making bodies, such as politburos or security councils, we cannot know about it. Only in rare cases, like the Chilean military junta under Pinochet, in which these collective bodies record their deliberations and preserve their records for posterity, can we trace their internal dynamics.5 To the extent that processes of dictatorial answerability take place within the public sphere, we can reconstruct them through analyses of public discourse. I am not aware, though, of any such empirical reconstruction.

4. Authoritarian Punishment
Genuine accountability requires the capacity to punish misbehavior. To what extent are authoritarian rulers subject to punishment for misconduct in office? Do authoritarian regimes foresee institutional venues for fining, jailing, or dismissing the dictator? Usually, they do not have any institutions that could even establish the difference between good and bad dictatorial conduct in the first place. The ideal—typical dictator is free to judge everybody else, but is himself beyond judgment. The same applies to punishment.

Many contemporary autocracies include formal venues for removing the supreme ruler, such as legislative impeachment procedures. Even the lifetime Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for instance, can, on constitutional paper, be removed by the Council of Experts. Yet, as a rule, these impeachment procedures lie dormant in normal times and get activated only in moments of crises. If such formal rules exist, one tends to think, they must serve some purpose. Up to now, though, in the comparative study of authoritarianism, we have not paid them much attention. With one major exception: authoritarian multiparty elections.

In democracies, elections are the core institution of political accountability. While not guaranteeing effective accountability, democratic elections do guarantee the structural possibility of effective accountability. To hold democratic rulers accountable, voters can either punish them at the ballot box (if they are unhappy) or reward them (if they are happy). Under authoritarian conditions, electoral disapproval is constrained by electoral manipulation, while voter approval is observationally equivalent to manipulative self-approval by the regime. Does the authoritarian manipulation of elections thus preclude any possibility of electoral accountability?

Electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular multiparty elections that expose the chief executive, the so-called dictator, to the risk of removal from office. His risk of losing office through authoritarian multiparty elections is lower than his counterfactual risk of losing office through democratic elections. That is, after all, the point of authoritarian manipulation: reducing electoral risks.6 These risks nevertheless are significantly different from zero. While hegemonic regimes are almost immune to electoral alternations in power, about a fifth of elections in competitive regimes lead to decisive defeats of the ruling party.7

7. See Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty,
Against the odds and despite their limits, authoritarian elections do seem to work, to some uncertain extent, as mechanisms of dictatorial accountability.

5. Accountability by Violence

Authoritarian rulers live under the perennial threat of violence. Should we comprehend the violent threats they face as informal instruments of dictatorial accountability? Should we conceive generals who launch a coup attempt as agents of “horizontal” accountability, or guerrilla fighters who assault the presidential palace as agents of “vertical” accountability, to borrow Guillermo O’Donnell’s terms? To what extent do violent attempts to topple the dictator constitute punishments for his policies?

Often violent campaigns against the dictator are simple means of competition for power in which one ambitious man strives to replace another. Or they are strategies of warfare in which one social group strives to replace another. Neither personal competition nor warfare are mechanisms of accountability. In competitive struggles, competitors do not judge their mutual behavior, but measure their abilities. One wins, the other loses, and that’s it. The victor does not hold the loser accountable, but triumphs over him. In warfare, enemies do not strive to influence each other, but destroy each other. Accountability presupposes some common ground, some shared criteria for judging political behavior. Battles between enemies are not disputes over the appropriateness of political decisions, but confrontations between actors who deny each other recognition as political interlocutors.

Even when violence is motivated by political grievances against the dictator, it may not primarily aim at his policies, but at his very position as a dictator. Democrats who take the arms against him do not want to replace him by another, more benevolent dictator, but by a democratically elected head of government. They do not want to hold the dictator accountable, but to end dictatorship. Striving to abolish an office is one thing, striving to hold the office holder accountable another.

Finally, even in those cases in which rulers anticipate violent actions as potential punishments for their conduct in office, they have ample leeway in neutralizing these threats: they may silence their carriers (repression), they may strive to convert them into unthinking supporters (propaganda), or they may buy them individually (cooptation) or collectively (policy concessions). Even if they come to fear violent punishment, they may still manage to hold on and escape it. And even if they do suffer punishment, it would be hard to conceive it as anything other than an impoverished form of accountability that renounces the critical public dialogue that characterizes democratic accountability.

Conclusion

The preceding reflections allow us to describe the relationship between authoritarianism and accountability more precisely. Authoritarian regimes are defined by the absence of certain institutions, not by the absence of certain practices. They lack, above all, democratic elections, but can nevertheless experience restricted forms of electoral accountability. Rather than defining authoritarian regimes tout court as systems of low accountability, we should conceive them as systems that preclude effective opportunities for holding rulers, the supreme agents of authoritarian accountability, accountable. Formal as well as informal mechanisms for making them answerable to critics and for punishing them for their conduct in office are either absent or structurally weak. Whether authoritarian regimes practice other forms of accountability is an empirical question, not a conceptual one. As a matter of fact, they are likely to institutionalize multiple forms of vertical accountability that render subordinate actors accountable to their political bosses. Very often, though, these will be lopsided practices that privilege the punitive dimension of accountability (enforcement) over its deliberative dimension (answerability).

Andreas Schedler is Professor of Political Science at CIDE in Mexico City. His most recent book is The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (2013, paperback edition 2015).
by Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan*, individuals sacrifice their own liberty in exchange for protection from the state. This notion of protection requires the authority, capability and resources to use repression as and when it is needed.

Repression is thus a crucial element of all statecraft; however, the key difference between democratic and authoritarian states is the question over the legitimate use of repression, where democracies lay greater claim to legitimacy based on representation, accountability of leaders, constraints on executives, and legal systems for upholding individual rights and freedoms. It is precisely around the question of legitimacy over the use of coercion and repression that authoritarian states differ. While they claim authority for its use, they struggle to claim legitimacy.

2. Repression is one form of coercion

State use of coercion can be explicit or implicit. Democratic states tend to use implicit coercion as periods of democratic foundation or transition have established ground rules and consensus around democracy being the “only game in town,” and the need for overt use of force declines through a period of democratic consolidation. Democratic states also establish bureaucratic mechanisms that embody the coercive power of the state, which over time develops into compliance and societal peace. When challenged, however, democratic states may resort to the outright use of force. Notable examples of repressive response under democracy include the Kent State conflict in the U.S. or the police responses to mass demonstrations, such as the miner strikes in the U.K.

A similar dynamic is evident in authoritarian states. Early periods of authoritarian consolidation may well involve the use of overt repression but with time, the need for such repression subsides and a culture of compliance or “mass passive acceptance” ensues and can see long periods of authoritarian rule in which coercion is primarily implicit and covert. The development of security bureaucracies and the state police apparatus maintain the presence of threat and coercion that compels compliance in ways that do not require batons on the streets. This understanding of mass passive acceptance was used by Juan Linz to describe the Franco regime in Spain once it had consolidated its authority after the Spanish Civil War. Such an understanding could also apply to China, where there is a well-developed security bureaucracy and large number of state agents as well as mass acceptance of the regime.

Like democracies, however, when challenged, authoritarian states of this nature will deploy repression in a calculated way, where the cost of violence is weighed against the threat to the stability of the state. The Chinese response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations provides a suitable example in which violent repression was used definitively, and the prolonged clashes and encounters in Hong Kong in 2014 suggest that the government calculations in Beijing weighed international reaction against using enough repression to defeat social mobilisation for free elections.

3. Repression evolves under periods of authoritarian rule

This is a significant variant and expansion of the previous point. Early years of authoritarian consolidation may use more overt forms of repression as well as more violent forms of repression. With time, however, the use of repression can become more targeted, varied and less violent while producing the same impact of social control. For example, in the early period of the Augusto Pinochet regime in Chile, the security forces engaged in extra-judicial killings, disappearances, exile, mass arrest, and arbitrary detention; whereas outright killings dominated the period between 1973 and 1976. As the regime matured and developed its security apparatus (most notably through the Directorate of National Security, or DINA), the use of killings as a strategy declined, while the use of arbitrary detention and torture remained. The decline in the resort to outright violence suggests a consolidation, professionalization and bureaucratization of repression that achieves mass compliance over time. Although the case of Chile in the 1980s shows that, even after over 10 years in power, the regime had to declare a state of siege and exercise emergency powers after the outbreak of widespread protests and demonstrations.

4. Repression can be privatized

This point does not relate to private violence, private militias, or the existence of death squads, which in my view represent a significantly different set of primarily non-state actors, but rather the phenomena where the intense use of intelligence, security forces, and the sheer arbitrary nature of state repression creates a total sense of fear and distrust in the populace. Repression is thus something that transcends the public-private divide in ways that atomise society and make individuals retreat within themselves. Repression carried out to this extent can lead to family members informing against one another or creating circumstances in which family members and networks of friends and family are unwilling to discuss anything that would be remotely construed as political. This notion of the privatisation of repression can be found in Guillermo O’Donnell’s observations of life during the Dirty War in Argentina in which he deploys many of the ideas found in Albert Hirschman’s *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty and Shifting Involvements*. In this


5. See http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/
way, repression becomes unseen yet known and is thus highly corrosive of the fabric of society.

5. Repression varies by type of authoritarian state
The work of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan on types of authoritarian states and Neil Mitchell on principal-agent models of governance and the use of force suggest that repression will vary considerably across different kinds of authoritarian states. For Linz and Stepan states range from authoritarianism to sultanism and vary across different dimensions including (1) the degree of pluralism, (2) strength and nature of ideology, (3) level of mobilization, and (4) type of leadership. The configuration of these different dimensions within different authoritarian states will be related to the different deployment of repression. These different dimensions also map well onto Mitchell’s three types of leaders (or principals): (1) the tolerator, who is opposed to the use of violence in the face of threat, (2) the opportunist, who is willing to use repression in a measured fashion to respond to threats, and (3) the inquisitor, whose overriding ideology makes him or her engage in extreme levels of repression in a more blanket approach. These three ideal types interact with the agents who are responsible for carrying out repression and whose motivations, interests, and levels of information differ significantly from those of their leaders. The varied combinations of principals and agents in the face of diverse threats thus produce great variation in both the use and severity of repression, and a differentiation of regimes necessary for a comparative politics of authoritarianism.

The combination of regime type and principal-agent relations varies greatly across what have been broadly defined as non-democratic states. Less institutionalised and more personalised and charismatic authoritarian regimes are more likely to engage in arbitrary and extreme forms of repression, while more institutionalised and less personalised authoritarian regimes are more likely to engage in less arbitrary and more systematic forms of repression.

6. Repression is a toolkit
In “The Game of Torture,” Leonard Wantchekon and Andrew Healy argue that torture is used for gathering information and securing social control. For them, torture is rational and is part of a larger toolkit of statecraft available to leaders, to be deployed by the opportunist, described above. (The tolerator would not use torture and the inquisitor would use it for non-rational purposes). Even though torture may be carried out by agents who are motivated by rational interests to carry out orders within larger institutional frameworks or sadists who simply enjoy meting out pain on individuals, the assumption of their model is one in which torture is a means to an end. Repression being a means to an end suggests that it is a toolkit for leaders and

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<th>Level of personalistic and charismatic leadership</th>
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<td>Arbitrary and less extreme forms of repression</td>
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This continuum or scale of repression as a toolkit in many ways underpins the political science approach to studying and measuring repression. Indeed, the standards-based scales of civil and political rights, such as the political terror scale or the David Cingranelli and David Richards human rights dataset (CIRI), specify coding cut-off points according to the degree to which repressive practices are systematic and widespread. Such a determination of the systematic nature of repression also features in the various reports filed by U.N. actors under the auspices of the Special
Procedures of the international human rights regime.

7. Some forms of repression are sequential
Not only does a state have a continuum of repressive tools at its disposal, but also many sets of repressive acts actually occur in sequence. For example, a victim of multiple human rights violations may be detained arbitrarily, tortured while in custody, and then assassinated or disappeared. The severity of violation increases sequentially over time, which ultimately results in the death or disappearance of the victim. This understanding of the sequencing of violations must be taken into account when conducting any empirical analysis of repression using either events-based or standards-based data. Less extreme forms of repression, however, may proceed alongside this sequence of more extreme forms of repression. Intelligence gathering, spying, and censorship can all be in place, while a sequence of detention, torture, and assassination commences. The combination of everyday forms of repression and social control alongside sequential uses of state terror makes for a complex landscape of repression for empirical analyses, the methods of analysis for which continue to be developed and refined.

8. Repression can be internationalised
The final stylised fact I provide concerns the internationalisation of repression, where it transcends borders as states either pursue their own national security doctrine within the jurisdiction of other states (e.g. the Letelier assassination in Washington D.C. by the Chilean DINA) or in collaboration with other states (e.g. Operation Condor in the South American states of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil). The post 9/11 use of extraordinary rendition under the auspices of the War on Terror harks back to the Condor Years in the Southern Cone and has seen alliances between democracies and autocracies in the pursuit of terrorists. Available data on flights that took place during the most intense period of rendition suggest that between 54 and 138 states were involved in extraordinary rendition. The practice includes arbitrary detention, torture in transit, and then torture while in captivity in the destination country. The much awaited Senate report on torture under the George W. Bush administration shows that at least 20 cases of torture of terror suspects led to no actionable intelligence, and that the practice was in fact used between 2001 and 2009, where 119 people were illegally detained of whom over 40 were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.10

As the world continues to see the persistence of authoritarianism alongside new democratic developments, the comparative study of repression needs to be sensitive to the varied and nuanced ways in which repression is used by different regimes, the way in which it evolves over time, and how it must be seen as a crucial element of all statecraft. It is the legitimacy, accountability, and oversight of the use of repression, however, that differentiate the use of repression in democracies and authoritarian states.

Todd Landman is Professor of Government and Executive Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Essex. He is author of Studying Human Rights (2006) and Protecting Human Rights (2005).”
Call for Applications:
The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) of The University of Sydney is announcing a call for applications to the project’s 2016 EIP Visiting Fellowship cohort. EIP is seeking senior academics and graduate students to work on data and publications of the project over a minimum three-month period. The application deadline is Tuesday, June 30, 2015.

NEWS FROM MEMBERS

Claire Adida, assistant professor of political science, University of California, San Diego, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort published “Religious Homophily in a Secular Country: Evidence from a Voting Game in France” in the April 2015 Economic Inquiry. In an effort to determine which dimension of homophily drives association, the article introduces an experimental game designed to expose subjects to diverse partners to determine which dimension dominates.

Adida also published “Do African Voters Favor Coethnics? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Benin” in the April 2015 Journal of Experimental Political Science. In which she examines the extent to which ethnicity shapes political support for politicians by measuring the independent effect of coethnic cues in boosting support across coethnic groups.

Gerardo Berthin, senior democracy and governance associate, Tetra Tech International Development, published “Youth Participation in Local Governments: Initial Evidence from Latin America” in the September 2014 Social and Economic Studies Journal. In a special issue dedicated to youth and development, Berthin focuses on analyzing youth political participation in the Latin American local space.

Jason Brownlee, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, Tarek Masoud, associate professor of public policy, Harvard University, and Andrew Reynolds published The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford University Press, 2015). The book accounts for the full range of variance in the success of Arab democratic movements and examines the deep historical and structural variables determining the balance of power between incumbents and opposition in the region.

Melani Cammett is now a professor of government at Harvard University. She also recently co-authored the fourth edition of Political Economy of the Middle East (Westview Press, 2015) with Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury. This new edition includes new chapters: one charting the growth of oil economies, another reviewing the growth of the private sector and its effects in the region, and a third focusing on the rise of “crony capitalism.”

Jeffery Conroy-Krutz, assistant professor of political science, Michigan State University, and Devra Moehler, assistant professor of communication, University of Pennsylvania, published “Moderation from Bias: A Field Experiment on Partisan Media in a New Democracy” in the April 2015 Journal of Politics. Theorizing that partisan media may cause moderation in postliberalization settings, this article examines evidence of moderation by cross-cutting broadcasts on Ghanaian tro-tros (commuter minibuses) featuring live talk-radio from progovernment, pro-opposition, politics-neutral, or noreadio conditions.

Michael Coppedge, professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, presented a paper co-authored with Staffan I. Lindberg, professor of political science, University of Gothenburg, and Lucía Tiscornia entitled, “Varieties of Democratic Diffusion: Colonial Networks” at a meeting of the International Studies Association in New Orleans, LA in February and at the Kellogg Institute of the University of Notre Dame, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), and Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City in April. In their paper, the authors examine the net effect of colonial rule on the pace of democratization for both colonizing countries and colonies and former colonies.

Javier Corrales, Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Professor of Political Science, Amherst College, and Michael Penfold published the second edition of Dragon in the Tropics: Venezuela and the Legacy of Hugo Chávez (Brookings, 2015). The book includes two new chapters and a reworked chapter devoted mostly to Venezuela’s political economy and government-opposition relations after Chávez. Corrales also published “The Authoritarian Resurgence: Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela” in the April 2015 Journal of Democracy, in which he argues that Venezuela’s turn toward greater authoritarianism occurred through autocratic legalism: the state’s use, abuse, and disuse of law to disempower veto players. Finally, Corrales published “LGBT Rights and Representation in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Influence of Structure, Movements, Institutions, and Culture” as a policy paper with the University in North Carolina-Chapel Hill LGBT Representation and Rights Research Initiative in April 2015.

Ana Lorena De La O, associate professor of political science, Yale University, published Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America: The Quiet Transformation (Cambridge
University Press, 2015). The book examines governments' initial decisions in adopting conditional cash transfer programs and whether such programs in Latin America are or are not insulated from political manipulations.


**Jonathan Fox**, professor of international service, American University, will publish “Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?” in the upcoming August 2015 *World Development*. The article reinterprets empirical evidence of the impacts of social accountability to make the distinction between tactical and strategic approaches to promoting citizen voices to improve public sector performance.

**Vladimir Gel'man**, professor of political science, European University at St. Petersburg, and Finland Distinguished Professor, University of Helsinki, published *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015). The book explains how and why Russia failed to become a democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union while analyzing the causes and consequences of its authoritarian drift. He also published “Political Opposition: A Troubled Transformation” in the March 2015 *Europe-Asia Studies*.

**Agustina Giraudy**, assistant professor of international service, American University, published *Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity within Democratic Countries* (Oxford University Press, 2015). The book analyzes subnational undemocratic regime (SUR) continuity in Latin American states, and concludes that SURs not only differ among each other but that they also maintain different relations with the federal government.

**Paul Goode**, University of Bath, will be senior lecturer of Russian politics beginning in Fall 2015.


**Guy Grossman**, assistant professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, published “Renewalist Christianity and the Political Salience of LGBTs: Theory and Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa” in the April 2015 *Journal of Politics*. The article argues that the rise of political saliency of LGBTs is closely related to two recent political processes: the rapid growth of Pentecostal, Evangelical, and related Renewalist or Spirit-filled churches and a democratization process leading to heightened political competition.

**Mary Alice Haddad**, associate professor of government, Wesleyan University, edited *NIMBY is Beautiful: Cases of Local Activism and Environmental Innovation Around the World* (Berghahn, 2015) with Carol Hager. The book analyzes Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) protests from around the world and their effect on broader political, social, and technological change.

**Ray Kennedy** is now senior electoral expert with the United Nations Development Programme in Papua New Guinea, supporting preparations for the May elections in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

**Maria Koinova** has been promoted to Reader at Warwick University.


**Calvert Jones** will become assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland-College Park in August of 2015. She published “Seeing like an Autocrat: Liberal Social Engineering in an Illiberal State” in *Perspectives on Politics* (Vol. 13, no. 1). The article uses an ethnographic study of Persian Gulf elites and discovers that personal and emotional experiences can influence the way elites act, challenging assumptions of rational self-interest. Jones also published “Exploring the Microfoundations of International Community: Toward a Theory of Enlightened Nationalism” in the December 2014 *International Studies Quarterly*.

**Eileen McDonagh**, professor of political science, Northeastern University, was awarded the Best Comparative Policy Paper Award by the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) for her


Cas Mudde, associate professor of international affairs, University of Georgia, won the Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, given for “outstanding accomplishments in research and teaching.” Awardees come from all areas of the social sciences, the humanities, and the natural sciences and are nominated by German scholars. Mudde will spend the next three summers conducting research in Berlin with German scholars.

Katsuo Nishikawa is now associate professor of political science at Trinity University. His paper with Kiku Huckle, “Can Places of Worship Help Politically Socialize Immigrants?,” presented at the 2014 Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, won the 2014 Western Political Science Association Best Paper in Latino Politics Award.

Pippa Norris, McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Government, Harvard University, edited a book entitled Contentious Elections—From Ballots to Barricades (Routledge, 2015) in which she and contributors compare alternative theoretical frameworks explaining the causes of contentious elections and apply those insights to understand cases of global comparisons.

Olukunle Owolabi, assistant professor, of political science Villanova University, was been awarded a visiting fellowship at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame for the spring 2016 semester, where he will work on a book manuscript entitled “The Colonial Origins of (Under) Development, Dictatorship, and Democracy: West Africa and the West Indies in Comparative Perspective.”

Marc F. Plattner, vice president for research and studies, National Endowment for Democracy, led a seminar on “Is Democracy in Decline?” at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, where he was based as a visiting fellow in April 2015. The talk was based on his January 2015 Journal of Democracy article, “Is Democracy in Decline?”

Yvette Peters, post doctor, University of Bergen, published “Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation” in the third issue of the 2015 West European Politics with Sander Ensink. The article uses time-series data to examine political responsiveness to different socioeconomic classes in European democracies.

Jenny Pribble is now an associate professor of political science and international studies at the University of Richmond.

Rachel Beatty Riedl’s Cambridge University Press book Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa (2014) was awarded the Best Book Award by the African Politics Conference Group of the American Political Science Association. In addition, she was awarded a Fulbright Scholar grant to conduct research on “Religious Political Engagement in Francophone Africa” and will be based at Sciences Po Bordeaux, France for the academic year 2015 - 2016.

Raul Sanchez Urribarri, lecturer, La Trobe University, co-convened the international workshop “Informal Networks in Non-Western Judiciaries” with Alexander Stroh and Bjoern Dressel at the Australian National University in Canberra from March 25 to 27. The workshop brought together leading scholars of judicial politics in Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa and offered a comprehensive picture of the role of judicial networks in comparative perspective across regime types.


Michael Seeburg, assistant professor, University of Southern Denmark, was awarded the Frank Cass 2014 Award for Best Article by a Young Scholar in Democratization for his article, “Mapping Deviant Democracy,” published in Democratization (Vol 21, no. 4). The article uses a large-N analysis to identify democracies whose development trajectories defy expectations and therefore deserve closer study.
Landry Signé is now an assistant professor of political science at the University of Alaska at Anchorage. He was bestowed the 2014 Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in Teaching for his “exceptional commitment to advancing student achievement,” and the 2014 Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in Academic Research and Creative Activity for his “outstanding and significant impact in the field of study and to the University of Alaska Anchorage.” Landry also received the Claude Masson Award from the government of Quebec. He was recently invited to discuss his research at the Wharton Business School, Cornell University, the World Policy Conference (South Korea), and Atlantic Dialogues (Morocco). Signé published “Intérêts, stratégies des acteurs et innovation politique en Afrique” in the most recent Recherche Politique et Sociétés.


Siroky received a $980,000, four-year grant from the National Science Foundation to study “Interdisciplinary Behavioral and Social Sciences” with Carolyn Warner and Steven Neuberg.


Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Lund University, will publish “Linking Genes and Political Orientations: Testing the Cognitive Ability as Mediator Hypothesis” in the forthcoming Political Psychology with Sven Oskarsson, David Cesarini, Christopher T. Dawes, James H. Fowler, Magnus Johannesson, and Patrik K. E. Magnusson.

Teorell and Bo Rothstein, August Röhss Chair in Political Science, University of Gothenburg, will also publish “Getting to Sweden, part I: War and Malefaseance, 1720-1850” and “Getting to Sweden, part II: Breaking with Corruption in the Nineteenth Century” in the forthcoming Scandinavian Political Studies.

Teorell will spend the academic year of 2015-2016 as a Fernand Braudel Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

Gunes Murat Tezcur, associate professor of political science, Loyola University Chicago, published “Catholic and Muslim Human Rights Activism in Violent Internal Conflicts” in the March 2015 Politics and Religion. The article offers the first comparison of human rights activism by religious organizations in civil wars. He also published “Soft-Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East” in the January 2015 Foreign Policy Analysis with Sabri Çiftçi. The article shows the importance of religious identity in shaping foreign policy views and the limits of democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool. Finally, he published “Violence and Nationalist Mobilization: The Onset of the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey,” in Nationalities Papers (Vol. 43, no. 2).


Matthew S. Winters, assistant professor of political science, University of Illinois, published “The Challenges of Untangling the Relationship between Participation and Happiness” in the February 2015 Voluntas with Ashlea Rundlett. The article discusses panel data methods for studying changes in
individual life satisfaction related to changes in political participation.

Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brown University, also published “Political Corruption and Partisan Engagement: Evidence from Brazil” in the January 2015 Journal of Politics in Latin America. The article provides evidence that voters may be more likely to identify with an opposition party in surveys if they have heard information about corrupt members of mainstream parties.

Joseph Wright, associate professor, of political science, Pennsylvania State University, published “Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival” in the Spring 2015 International Organization with Abel Escriba-Folch. The article argues that personalist dictatorships are less likely to democratize if they are being prosecuted for human rights abuses, though more institutionalized dictatorships are not. He also published “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival” in the April 2015 British Journal of Political Science with Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes and “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa” in the January 2015 Journal of Politics with Simone Dietrich.

Jon-Sung You, senior lecturer of Asia and Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, published Democracy, Inequality, and Corruption: Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines Compared (Cambridge University Press, 2015). The book explores how inequality increases electoral clientelism, bureaucratic patronage, and elite capture through cross-national quantitative analysis and a comparative historical investigation of three East Asian Countries. You and Stephen Haggard also published “Freedom of Expression in South Korea” in the January 2015 Journal of Contemporary Asia, in which they identify abuse of criminal defamation as a major contributing factor for the country’s declining freedom of the press and Internet.

NEW RESEARCH

Journal of Democracy

The April 2015 (Vol. 26, no. 2) Journal of Democracy features clusters of articles on “The Authoritarian Resurgence” and “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” as well as individual case studies on Burma, Mozambique, and East Asia.

“Transitional Justice and Its Discontents” by Duncan McCargo

The impulse to have crimes against humanity investigated and punished, like the impulse behind “truth and reconciliation” commissions, is understandable. But legalism cannot supersede the hard and messy work of politics.

The Authoritarian Resurgence

I. “Forward to the Past in Russia” by Lilia Shevtsova

Even if Vladimir Putin were to lose his grip on office, the ‘Russian system’ might only wind up exchanging one form of personalized power for another in its endless search for self-perpetuation.

II. “Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela” by Javier Corrales

Why do some hybrid regimes remain stable over time, while others become more authoritarian? Venezuela’s autocratic turn has been driven by the ruling party’s declining electoral fortunes and by a foreign policy that has shielded it from international scrutiny.

III. “Iran’s Paradoxical Regime” by Abbas Milani

Iran’s authoritarianism is more flexible and more durable than its detractors would hope, yet more fragile and endangered than its defenders claim.

IV. “Iran Abroad” by Alex Vatanka

The Iranian regime has sought to recast conventional principles of human rights and political participation by forging alliances with like-minded regimes and by broadcasting its narrative to an international audience.

V. “Saudi Arabia’s Anxious Autocrats” by Frederic Wehrey

Saudi Arabia’s vast oil wealth sustains the antidemocratic policies that a nervous royal regime uses to fend off the threats and problems that confront it.

Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement

I. “Beijing’s Broken Promises” by Michael C. Davis

China has gone back on its well-documented vow (and solemn treaty obligation) to allow Hong Kong genuine universal suffrage. Abrogated commitments and fake democracy are not the path to a thriving Hong Kong that feels at home within the People’s Republic of China.

II. “The Protests and Beyond” by Victoria Tin-bor Hui

The demonstrations of late 2014 captured the world’s attention with their scale, passion, and resourcefulness, but in the end were unable to move dug-in local and national authorities. Yet time is still on the side of the demonstrators.

The Freedom House Survey for 2014

“A Return to the Iron Fist” by Arch Puddington

In a year marked by escalating terrorism, the use of more brutal repression by authoritarian regimes, and Russia’s annexation of a
neighboring country’s territory, the state of freedom worsened significantly in nearly every part of the world.

“Patching Things Up in Mozambique” by Elisabete Azevedo-Harman

Although elections take place on schedule in Mozambique, they are of dubious quality, and the most recent one was held amid an uneasy peace following renewed outbreaks of civil strike. Major new gas and mineral finds promise a shot at greater prosperity, but also hold the threat of a “resource curse.”

“Millennials and East Asia’s Democratic Future” by Yun-han Chu and Bridget Welsh

East Asia’s millennials have grown up in an age of rapid socioeconomic progress, allowing them to become better educated, more urbanized, and more technologically connected than previous generations. Will they use their collective power to become agents of democratic change?

Democratsation

The Volume 22, no. 2 (2015) issue of Democratization features articles on China’s foreign relations, ethnopopulism in Africa, Nigeria, Montenegro, the Pacific Islands, and Macedonia.

“Islamism and the State after the Arab Uprisings: Between People Power and State Power” by Frédéric Volpi and Ewan Stein

“Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria” by Jamie Allinson

“Back to the Future: The Arab Uprisings and State (Re)formation in the Arab World” by Adham Saouli

“Globalization, Democratization, and the Arab Uprising: The International Factor in MENA’s Failed Democratization” by Raymond Hinnebusch

“Conclusion: Agency, Context and Emergent Post-Uprising Regimes” by Raymond Hinnebusch

SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

African Affairs, Vol. 114, no. 455, April 2015

“Land Grabbing and NGO Advocacy in Liberia: A Deconstruction of the ‘Homogeneous Community’” by Kieran Gilfoy


“Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China” by Yiqing Xu and Yang Yao
New Research

*American Political Science Review, Vol. 109, no. 1, February 2015*
“Does Electoral Competition Exacerbate Interethnic or Interpartisan Economic Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Market Price Bargaining” by Kristin Michelitch

“Competing for Transparency: Political Competition and Institutional Reform in Mexican States” by Daniel Berliner and Aaron Erlich

*Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 48, no. 1, March 2015*
“Why Is Interregional Inequality in Russia and China Not Falling?” by Thomas F. Remington

“Key Sectors in the Post-Communist CEE Economies: What Does the Transition Data Say?” by Henryk Gurgul and Łukasz Lach


“Selections before Elections: Double Standards in Implementing Election Registration Procedures in Russia?” by Håvard Bækken


“Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Origins of Eurocommunism” by Cezar Stanciu

*Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. 8, July 2015*
“(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents: Patronage and Political Careers in Mexico” by Yann P. Kerevel

“Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists: Cabinet Ministers and Social Welfare Reform in Parliamentary Democracies” by Despina Alexiadou

*Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. 5, April 2015*
“Does Welfare Conditionality Reduce Democratic Participation?” by Sara Watson

*Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, no. 3, April 2015*

“Former Military Networks and the Micro-Politics of Violence and Statebuilding in Liberia” by Anders Themnér

*East European Politics, Vol. 31, no. 1, 2015*
“Where Do Parties Go When They Die? The Fate of Failed Parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary 1992–2013” by Elisabeth Bakke and Nick Sitter

“The Europeanisation of Interest Groups: EU Conditionality and Adaptation of Interest Groups to the EU Accession Process in the Republic of Macedonia” by Lidija Hristova and Aneta Cekik

“The Exploitative Function of Party Patronage: Does It Serve the Party’s Interest?” by Clara Volintiru

“Foreign Ministries and Limits to Organisational Learning in Central Eastern Europe” by Karolina Pomorska

“The ‘Party of Power’ as a Type” by Nicklaus Laverty

“Appearances Are Deceptive: Credibility of the Russian Election Commission” by Ivan Jarabinski

“Governing the Governors: Legitimacy vs. Control in the Reform of the Russian Regional Executive” by Helge Blakkisrud
Comparative Democratization

Vol. 13, No. 2                                                                               June 2015

New Research

“Media Framing in Religious–Secular Conflict in Turkey and Israel” by Matt Evans and M. Selcan Kaynak

“How Politics-News Parallelism Invigorates Partisanship Strength” by S. Nechama Horwitz and Lilach Nir

“Rising Regional Powers Meet the Global Leader: A Strategic Analysis of Influence Competition” by Sung Eun Kim and Johannes Urpelainen

“Regional Sanctions against Burundi: The Regime’s Argumentative Self-Entrapment” by Julia Grauvogel

“Formalising Land Rights Based on Customary Tenure: Community Delimitation and Women’s Access to Land in Central Mozambique” by Randi Kaarhus and Stefaan Dondeyne

“Militant Islamists or Borderland Dissidents? An Exploration into the Allied Democratic Forces’ Recruitment Practices and Constitution” by Lindsay Scorgie-Porter

“The Battle for Zimbabwe in 2013: From Polarisation to Ambivalence” by Julia Gallagher

Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 57, no. 1, Spring 2015
“The Second Wave of Incorporation in Latin America: A Conceptualization of the Quest for Inclusion Applied to Argentina” by Federico M. Rossi

“The Disarticulated Movement: Barriers to Maya Mobilization in Post-Conflict Guatemala” by Manuel Vogt


Middle East Policy, Vol. 22, no. 1, Spring 2015
“Oil, Secession and the Future of Iraqi Federalism” by Philippe Le Billon

“Syrian and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict and Cooperation” by Till F. Paasche

“Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey: Temporary Marriage?” by David Romano

“The Foreign-Policy Tools of Small Powers: Strategic Hedging in the Persian Gulf” by Yoel Guzansky

“Turkey’s Counterrevolution: Notes from the Dark Side” by Jeremy Salt

“Preference for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties among Exclusive-Nationalists and Authoritarians” by Kris Dunn

“Closed-List Proportional Representation in Russia: The Fates of Former District Deputies” by Bryon Moraski

“Alone or Together? How Institutions Affect Party Entry in Presidential Elections in Europe and South America” by Jae-Jae Spoon and Karleen Jones West

“Do Political Parties Matter for Turnout? Number of Parties, Electoral Rules and Local Elections in Brazil and Bolivia” by Carew Boulding and David S Brown
SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES


AFRICA


ASIA


EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION


LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN


MIDDLE EAST


COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL


**APSA-CD** is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the V-Dem Institute and the International Forum.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg or Melissa Aten.

**Editorial Board Members**

**Executive Editor**

**Staffan I. Lindberg** is professor of political science and heading the V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg; is one of four principal investigators for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research Fellow at the Quality of Government Institute. He is author of *Democracy and Elections in Africa* and editor of *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?*, and has also worked on women’s representation, political clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships.

**Members**

**Kelly M. McMann** is an associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve University and the Varieties of Democracy project manager for subnational government. She currently is conducting research on how democracy develops within countries, initially by examining contemporary cases in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union and historical cases in Europe. Her earlier research focused on corruption and activism and has been published in the books *Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia* and *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*.

**Eitan Tzelgov** is a post-doctoral fellow in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. He studies legislative institutions and political parties. His dissertation, awarded the Carl Albert Award by the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association, examines the strategic use of parliamentary speeches by the legislative opposition.

**Yi-ting Wang** is a post-doctoral fellow in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her work primarily focuses on legislative institutions and politicians’ accountability strategies with an emphasis on questions of conditions for democratic stability. Her dissertation addresses how and why legislative committees differ in their abilities to exert policy influence across democracies. Her current project explores the consequences of different legislative capacities to participate in law making and monitor the executive for the quality of democracies.

**Brigitte Zimmerman** recently obtained her PhD from the University of California, San Diego and is currently a post-doctoral fellow in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her research agenda examines accountability institutions in consolidating democracies, with a geographic focus on sub-Saharan Africa. In her dissertation, she analyzed the strategic responses of political officials to anti-corruption interventions, documenting patterns of corruption substitution through extensive fieldwork. Other current research addresses discrimination in petty corruption, incumbency advantage in diverse institutional contexts, the political economy of FDI and foreign aid, and the ethics of field research.

**Managing Editor**

**Melissa Aten** is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.

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*The International Forum for Democratic Studies*

*1025 F Street, NW, 8th Floor*

*Washington, DC 20004*