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Jaffe, R.

DOI
10.1080/13621025.2015.1005941

Publication date
2015

Document Version
Final published version

Published in
Citizenship Studies

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Download date: 25 Dec 2022
Between ballots and bullets: elections and citizenship in and beyond the nation-state

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(Received 25 May 2014; accepted 8 September 2014)

This article approaches electoral acts and performances as central sites for the negotiation of citizenship relations. I argue that, in order to understand how these relationships are shaped, we must attend to governmental actors beyond the nation-state, from trade unions to criminal organizations. Focusing on the case of Jamaica, I show how non-state actors have come to play a central role in hybrid forms of governance, shaping citizens’ allegiances to multiple, overlapping political communities. How are campaigning and voting affected by such multiple allegiances? What new understandings of citizenship can we develop if we take the role of non-state actors in the electoral process seriously? I suggest that we should study elections as a site where citizenship – understood here in its broad sense of membership of a political community – can develop both within and beyond the nation-state.

Keywords: elections; Jamaica; trade unions; organized crime; hybrid governance

Introduction

Immediately after the date of Jamaica’s 2011 national elections had been announced, the streets of Kingston, the island’s capital, began to sprout signs of the political contest. Supporters of the two main parties would go out in public wearing their party colors – green for the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), orange for the People’s National Party (PNP) – to assert their allegiance. Campaign motorcades rushed through the streets, honking their horns, with supporters hanging out the windows, ringing bells and blowing horns. Flouting the country’s political code of conduct, party activists sought to demarcate electoral turf by spray-painting party graffiti on walls and hanging up green or orange flags on lampposts and buildings. On a major public road near an uptown ‘ghetto’ neighborhood, activists hung up a large orange banner exhorting passersby to ‘Vote PNP’. To the side of the banner the person responsible had painted ‘Spanglers’ in large letters – a reference to a criminal gang that had long been associated with the PNP. Meanwhile, whenever buses carrying JLP supporters passed by, shouts of ‘Shower! Shower!’ would echo through the air; their party slogan is a reference to the Shower Posse, a JLP-affiliated gang.

The entanglement of criminal organizations and political parties in Jamaica comes out clearly around election time, both in campaigns and on election day itself. This entanglement offers new perspectives on the relationship between elections and citizenship. In this article, drawing on 12 months of fieldwork in Kingston,1 I explore how electoral acts and performances can be central sites for the negotiation of citizenship relations and the articulation of citizenship agendas. I argue that, in order to understand

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how these relationships and agendas are shaped, we must attend to governmental actors beyond the nation-state, from trade unions to criminal organizations. Recent scholarship emphasizes that populations and territories are governed not so much by states, as through governmental assemblages that connect a range of state and non-state actors. Such hybrid forms of governance necessarily impact the ways that citizens understand themselves as part of multiple, overlapping political communities. How are campaigning and voting affected by allegiances to gangs and other non-state actors? What can we learn about structures of rule and belonging if we take the role of these non-state actors in the electoral process into account? Can we understand elections as doing more than merely affirming citizens’ relations to the state? I suggest that we should study elections as a site where citizenship – understood here in its broad sense of membership of a political community (Leydet 2011) – can develop both within and beyond the nation-state.

This article begins with a discussion of recent anthropological research on voting and electoral politics and of interdisciplinary research on hybrid governmental assemblages, exploring the contributions of these fields to citizenship studies. I connect the understanding of elections as a site of citizenship practice to recent research on non-state governmental actors. Next, I discuss two eras in Jamaica’s electoral history, focusing on the ways in which multiple governmental actors sought to produce a specific type of political subject. The first section focuses on pre-independence voting, and shows how the formation of the two main political parties was entangled with that of the labor movement. This entanglement informed specific ideas of what constituted a good Jamaican citizen, but it was also central to the development of violently expressed partisan political identities. This history foreshadowed the emergence of so-called garrison politics in postindependence Jamaica. Garrison politics is a type of electoral turf politics that is achieved through communal clientelism and that has relied on brokers known as ‘dons’. These dons, inner-city neighborhood leaders who are often involved in criminal organizations, have longstanding connections to Jamaica’s two main political parties. The associated entanglement of criminal organizations, political parties, police and bureaucrats produces a specific type of political subject. In the ‘garrison communities’ where dons’ authority is strongest, voting behavior is affected by a mix of deeply felt party-political loyalty (known as ‘political tribalism’) and the sometimes violent pressure exerted by dons and their organizations. While this kind of political clientelism has been documented in numerous cases, there has been little reflection on how it affects the central citizenship experience of voting.

Elections and citizenship

Within classic perspectives on citizenship, such as those set out by T.H. Marshall ([1950] 2013), the right to vote and the right to stand for election form a central element of citizenship. These approaches take these political rights and electoral competition to be at the core of democratic citizenship. Such perspectives evince liberal conceptions of citizenship that focus on the individual citizen, whose personal status as a member of the political community entails a bundle of rights and responsibilities (see Schuck 2002). However, voting entails much more than an individual right or a singular, personal act. Elections are also important sites for the negotiation of collective belonging to political communities such as the state. Indeed, the act of voting is a key symbolic moment for the performance of citizenship: citizens enact their allegiance to the political community by asserting their democratic right to determine how and by whom they will be governed. The symbolic significance of this political act makes it an important site for anthropological
explorations of citizenship. Citizens perform and enact their relationship to the state through the act of voting, and more broadly through their participation in electoral politics. Approaching the electoral process from an anthropological perspective can demonstrate the broader salience of voting and electoral politics to citizenship studies. This perspective entails understanding elections not only as a political right that is part of the formal-legal ideal of citizenship; it also involves approaching elections as performances that reflect, reproduce and contest the state–citizen relationship as it is experienced in everyday life.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, most anthropologists interested in politics and the state have tended to leave the study of elections to political scientists, focusing instead on other forms and sites of politics. Elections have received limited anthropological attention; prominent collections of readings in political anthropology (Vincent 2002), the anthropology of the state (Sharma and Gupta 2006) and the anthropology of citizenship (Lazar 2013) include remarkably few discussions of the electoral process. More recently, however, a number of anthropologists have begun to engage in ‘electoral ethnography’, focusing on the practices and meanings associated with electoral processes in sites across the world. Rather than seeing voting as a neutral technology of democratic citizenship that has a single, universal meaning and effect, they explore the variety of ways that different actors interpret and appropriate the electoral process and how this affects citizenship.

Bertrand, Briquet, and Pels (2007) demonstrate how earlier communitarian, public forms of voting were displaced by the technology of the secret ballot, with liberal conceptions of politics framing this individual expression of political opinion as the only legitimate expression. Within such perspectives, they argue, the secret ballot is seen as enabling the development of modern, rational individual citizens whose political choice is freed from the various sociopolitical relationships (ethnic allegiances, religious ties, patronage relationships, etc.) in which they are embedded. This privileging of a singular, specific form of voting not only indicates the prevalence of a particular citizenship agenda, one that privileges individual voting behavior over other collective forms of political action. It also points to the form of technological determinism that underlies the assumptions of many organizations promoting democratization: ‘the medium – the secret ballot – is often taken to produce the message – free individual political choice’ (Bertrand, Briquet, and Pels 2007, 5). In fact, as various authors studying democratization have noted, introducing electoral competition does not automatically displace other forms of political relationships, such as authoritarianism or patronage (Paley 2002; Arias and Goldstein 2010; Koster 2012). The electoral process can easily accommodate forms of political choice that are not necessarily free or individual – an empirical reality that challenges liberal imaginations of citizenship as the relationship between autonomous individual citizens and the state.

The collective nature of voting comes out clearly in ethnographic studies of corporate clientelism. Rather than seeing clientelism as the straightforward manipulation of passive poor, recent studies have pointed to the possibilities that electoral bargaining can offer for collective agency and the formation of citizenship. Lazar (2004), for instance, shows how the clientelism that characterizes Bolivian election campaigns offers a means for marginalized indigenous citizens to negotiate their relationship with the state both instrumentally and affectively. Working in the city of El Alto, Lazar found that residents of low-income urban zones understand the impersonal, ‘rational’ workings of delegative electoral democracy as antithetical to their interests. To render what they see as unrepresentative politics more responsive, they act collectively to develop direct relationships with politician-patrons. In so doing, they enact a form of citizenship that is more collectivist and emotional than formal models might imply.
In contrast to the assumptions of liberal political philosophers, such electoral ethnographies show that voting always involves more than just individual political rights and that the expression of political preferences and opinions is rarely free and autonomous. This does not necessarily diminish their importance to political subjects. Working in rural India, Mukulika Banerjee found that while the most disadvantaged citizens have a realistic view of the limited impact their vote can make, they still enthusiastically support and participate in the electoral process. She argues that precisely those people ‘living in semi-forgotten corners of the nation’ feel that voting provides an ‘opportunity to prove one’s membership of the nation and confirm one’s status as a citizen’ (Banerjee 2007, 1560). For many marginalized citizens, voting is not necessarily a way to change specific policies or to endorse a specific political ideology, but neither is it a fully instrumental votes-for-goods transaction. Rather, participation in elections is seen as a dignified means of asserting belonging to the modern nation, of narrating and performing a relationship of mutual obligation.

The relevance of elections to citizenship studies, then, lies not only in their centrality to political rights but also in the fact that they are important symbolic moments in which political community is shaped and experienced. Electoral campaigns and the act of voting are moments that allow citizens to imagine and perform their relationship to the state. They are also moments when specific citizenship agendas are communicated by governments, political parties, brokers and citizens themselves. Voters may be interpellated as free-thinking rational individuals, as duty-bound group members, or as emotional subjects connected to with politicians through kinship-like relations.

Research that has studied the role of elections in relation to citizenship in this broader sense has tended to assume that the political community in question is the state. However, the nation-state is by no means the only significant player in the formation of political community. A range of authors emphasize that government and politics are not necessarily located in the state, and urge us to study more closely the role of non-state governmental actors (e.g. Trouillot 2001; Nugent 2004; Sassen 2006; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). In the context of neoliberal globalization, specific attention has focused on how governance is increasingly achieved through networks or assemblages of state, corporate and voluntary actors. However, there are many historical precedents for this type of co-rulership. As Thomas (2011, 6) notes, ‘the regulatory, disciplinary, biopolitical, and distributional practices of governments throughout the Americas (and beyond) have often been suffused with and enacted by extra-state, non-state, or quasi-legal entities’.

To what extent, and how, do hybrid governance arrangements affect the relationship between citizens and the state? What types of political subjectivities and citizenship agendas emerge as governance is achieved through assemblages of state and non-state actors? In the sections that follow, I consider the role that non-state governmental actors play in the electoral process, focusing specifically on the role of trade unions and criminal dons. While elections are commonly understood as connecting citizens to the democratic state, I draw on different periods in Jamaica’s history to show how they are sites for the experience and negotiation of political community both in and beyond the state.

Shaping pre-independence electoral subjectivities

As a British colony in which the majority of the population of African descent had been enslaved until Emancipation in 1838, Jamaica had a very restricted franchise until the mid-twentieth century, with the right to vote and the right to stand for election largely restricted to light-skinned land-holding elites. Universal suffrage was only granted in 1944, nearly
20 years before Independence in 1962. The decision to transfer power to local leaders followed the emergence of the nationalist movement and severe labor unrest throughout the British West Indies in the 1930s. The labor rebellions were at the basis of the formation of Jamaica’s first political parties and trade unions in the 1940s and 1950s. The rise of these parties and their leaders was entangled with the development of the labor movement. The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU), led by Alexander Bustamante, formed the basis of the JLP. The founder of the PNP, Norman Washington Manley, was involved in the development of the Trades Union Council (TUC), later superseded by the National Workers Union (NWU).

The JLP and the PNP, which remain the two main political parties today, both sought to educate the new electorate into their new status as franchised citizens through union activities. The middle-class, light-skinned (‘brown’) union and political leaders sought to instill a sense of political consciousness and political agency amongst the darker-skinned (‘black’) working poor (see Hintzen 1997). The PNP and its union partners in particular distributed political literature and organized study groups throughout the island, with the aim of inculcating a nationalist desire for independence, a sense of the rights and duties of citizenship, as well as a socialist sensibility (Thomas 2004, 53). While the brown men who led the unions depicted the black laboring classes as in need of political education, unionization arguably channeled the workers’ struggles into a form of organized protest that was politically legible to the colonial government.5

As in other contexts,6 these early understandings of citizenship gained shape through the entangled relationship of the labor movement with party politics: the relationship between many citizens and the state was mediated through the union. The political education initiatives of the 1940s and 1950s were informed by ideological motives, including notions of uplift and emancipation. However, the connection between party loyalty and union benefits also meant that the relationship had clientelist elements from early on, with union supporters standing to gain access to employment if their party won. This entanglement of political and union allegiances meant that early citizenship agendas propagated by the pre-independence state also reflected a mix of interests. Normative framings that prescribed what values, attitudes and behavior were appropriate for Jamaicans en route to independence were strongly influenced by the concerns of the labor movement and its middle-class leadership. As Thomas (2011) shows, for instance, in the mid-twentieth century such citizenship agendas emphasized the need for ‘traditional’ nuclear families with male breadwinners, in order to guarantee the reproduction of industrial labor.

The relationship between electoral politics and unionism also meant that BITU–TUC rivalry, which took on violent forms in the streets of Kingston in the 1940s and 1950s, quickly blured into party-political violence. As identification with the interests of a trade union formed the basis for party-political identities, the willingness of labor movement activists to fight for the economic benefits associated with the dominance of their union became difficult to distinguish from a willingness to use violence to achieve a party-political victory. While it is well-known that political tribalism and garrison politics turned the streets of downtown Kingston into urban battlefields in the 1960s and 1970s, the earliest elections were also already marred by violent and sometimes deadly conflicts between PNP and JLP supporters (Sives 2010).

Violence, collective political identities, and – perhaps equally important – a sense of excitement and fun came out in an account of these early elections by Mr Douglas,7 an 83-year-old gentleman from West Kingston whom I interviewed together with my research assistant Romeo Dennis. Mr Douglas recalled the 1949 elections vividly, and
told us how he had left Kingston to attend an election rally in the rural parish of St Elizabeth, where the campaign took place in a festive atmosphere. Despite the rivalry between the JLP incumbent Cleve Lewis and his PNP challenger Edward Vivian Allen, the competition was expressed in good fun and through musical battles rather than actual violence, while alcohol always contributed to the high spirits. ‘I never forget it’, he told us, describing the rally and the JLP supporters’ attempts to discourage their opponents through music. He began to sing: ‘Tell them Lewis, no enter the election contest, tell them Lewis, no enter the election contest. We have no gun, we have no revolver, JLP is the rock of Gibraltar. Tell them Lewis, no enter the election contest!’ The PNP supporters would respond in kind, Mr Douglas explained, singing derogatory songs as well. ‘We would get a kick out of it!’

Mr Douglas experienced these early elections as a form of political festivity, which offered Jamaicans a sensory, serious-but-fun form of engagement with the new political structure. While these recollections are mainly happy memories, the reference to guns and revolvers in the JLP supporters’ campaign song indicates that party-cum-union violence and intimidation were a background presence during the 1940s elections. A number of factors served to train Jamaican voters into not only a national but also a party-partisan sense of political community. In addition to instrumental factors, such as the economic benefits that could accrue to union members/party supporters, the violent clashes between supporters hardened the boundaries of party-political belonging. However, beyond these economic and coercive factors, the festive atmosphere and embodied sensation of these early electoral practices and performances were conducive to the experience of both national and partisan belonging.

The early pre-independence election campaigns were part of the initial production of what we might call ‘electoral subjectivities’. During these moments, the newly formed political parties and trade unions used structured political education drives to mobilize colonial subjects to see themselves as rights-bearing democratic citizens and workers. The entanglement of the labor movement and party politics, and the intertwined mobilization of labor and the electorate, can be seen as an early instance of hybrid governance. Through this entangled arrangement, a new population of voter-citizens developed an allegiance to the emergent nation as well as to the party and the union. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, this form of hybrid governance and the allegiances it produced began to change, with criminal leaders taking over the role of union leaders in terms of political mobilization and co-rulership.

Garrison politics, political tribalism and donmanship

By the late 1950s, loosely organized political gangs with access with firearms had emerged on the scene in Kingston. However, electoral violence grew in significance following Jamaica’s independence from Great Britain in 1962. During the Cold War, the two main political parties were distinguished through ideological opposition, with the PNP promoting democratic socialism and Cuba, and the JLP aligned with US capitalism. In the 1960s and 1970s, both the JLP and the PNP constructed new housing schemes in inner-city neighborhoods. Party-affiliated ‘area leaders’ helped ensure that loyal political supporters were allocated housing within these new developments, and forcefully persuaded those residents who supported the ‘wrong’ party to leave the neighborhood. The often violent forms of party-political cleansing resulted in neighborhoods that were homogeneous in terms of party-political loyalty. Both the JLP and the PNP distributed weapons to their local area leaders – who would later become known as ‘dons’ – to defend and expand
their party’s electoral turf. Given their function as fiercely protected political fortresses, these areas became known as ‘garrison communities’ and the associated form of neighborhood-based clientelism as ‘garrison politics’.10 During elections, these inner-city areas became Cold War battlefields between armed PNP and JLP supporters, culminating in the 1980 elections when electoral violence resulted in nearly 800 deaths.

In recent decades, electoral violence has decreased significantly, as politically connected area leaders began to focus on criminal competition rather than ideological warfare. As dons gained independent access to money and weapons, in part through their involvement in the transnational drugs trade, their role within garrisons shifted from brokers to co-rulers. The dons currently exist in an uneasy symbiotic relationship with politicians, colluding rather than competing in the governance of inner-city neighborhoods (Jaffe 2013). As Harriott (2008, 17) notes, ‘Organized crime groups may establish their own quasi-governmental administration in some localities . . . but they do not contest for control of the political administration as an independent force that is external to the political system’. In this section, I discuss how forms of citizenship related to this hybrid form of governance emerge around elections.

Elections are obviously key moments in maintaining the system of garrison politics: party-loyal dons integrate inner-city residents into the political system while policing their electoral turf. Marcia, a JLP politician in her thirties, told me about her first experience with voting, growing up in a PNP-affiliated garrison community:

Eighteen years old and I’m going to vote now and I said, ‘Yes, I’m going to exercise my right to vote!’ I felt so excited and I got up early in the morning and I said to two ladies that lived in my lane . . . ‘I’m going to vote, you coming with me? I’m going to exercise my franchise to vote.’ And I’m not going to lie to you, I didn’t know who I was going to vote for, I just knew that I was going to vote. And I went up to [the polling office] and some men in orange asked me where am I going, I voted already . . . I never forget it.

She explained that the men in orange were representing the PNP. I asked whether the men knew her personally.

Well, yes, I guess, they say I vote already so I say ‘What, no, I haven’t voted!’ He say ‘Yeah man, go to your yard, you vote already.’ I was so angry that the women that I came with had to physically take me out and say ‘No, Marcia, no.’ Because of course you know it could get ugly. And I cried. It was tears of rage.11

Marcia’s description of her initial excitement at being an 18-year-old exercising her right to vote for the first time illustrates the strong affective and performative meaning attributed to elections – voting inaugurates a young person’s relationship to the state as an autonomous adult. However, the reality of garrison politics, and the hybrid governing structure of local area don and political party, reshape this relationship. The PNP’s ‘men in orange’ mediate citizens’ relationship to the state by channeling it through the party and the party-affiliated criminal gang, disciplining neighborhood residents’ political preference to fit within this partisan-criminal political community. In Marcia’s case, this disciplining backfired as her frustration with garrison politics fed her desire to become a politician and align herself with the forbidden green party, the JLP. In many other cases, however, the don-mediated partisan loyalty that garrison residents are taught from birth is extremely strong.

This fierce form of partisan loyalty is known as political tribalism, a form of political identity connected to either the PNP or the JLP. These loyalties are expressed and reinforced by a range of visual and verbal symbols, or public identity markers, including specific colors, images, hand signals and slang. PNP supporters wear orange, call each other ‘Comrade’ and signal their party allegiance through a raised fist, while green-clad
JLP supporters known as ‘Labourites’ make a V-sign. These ‘tribal’ identities are reinforced through the territory of the garrison neighborhoods, where political graffiti and murals depicting the party leaders mark the physical borders of the community (Jaffe, Rhiney, and Francis-Rhiney 2013).

Political tribalism is what makes garrison politics more than a neighborhood-based form of collective clientelism. It is intrinsic to the production of electoral subjects whose voting behavior may be less instrumental than it is affective. This became evident to me during a focus group discussion I held in 2012 with a group of gang-affiliated young men from a West Kingston PNP garrison neighborhood. They were explaining to me their relationship to their political representative, and proved very articulate in their analysis of how electoral politics worked to their disadvantage. They expressed a feeling of being what they called ‘shortchanged’. By this they meant that while they were more or less the PNP’s ‘mother garrison’, they received very little in return for their vote. One participant, Roshawn, pointed out that their loyalty was not being rewarded, even though their MP had recently moved to a position within the cabinet that would allow him to direct construction work and jobs to his own constituency:

He’s at Ministry of Works right now, that’s where more [construction] work should come in to the communities. So that means he’s still not effective, he’s not doing an effective job, because if he’s changing one point to a next point where he’s Minister of Works that means more work should go on in his community and there is no work going on!

Another young man, Damion, chimed in: ‘We are being shortchanged . . . we’re not getting the real results from him, the help that the community needs, employment, sanitary convenience and all of them things affect we’. To clarify the point, I asked the men whether, given that they had been a PNP area for a long time, they were wondering why the community was not in a better state. Damion explained that it was actually disadvantageous to be known as a fully loyal PNP community; neighborhoods that were known to be contested electoral turf received much more attention:

If you reside on a battleground it can go either way, you will get the full support of the party. But we are predominant PNP stronghold, we’re gonna get shortchanged owing to the fact that they know that we won’t change our political allegiance.

A third participant, Barry, concurred: ‘Through him know that, him just abuse the situation, through him know we are die-hearted PNP’.

As they narrated it, it was actually exactly because they were a hardcore PNP area that they were not receiving any attention in terms of jobs or development projects. Contested areas could expect a lot of attention from politicians, whereas the electorally safe garrison areas would vote for the right party anyway. I asked them whether they felt that if half of them suddenly started to vote JLP, they would get more attention, more jobs and more money. Couldn’t they leverage their vote a little more to get the MP’s attentions, and threaten that they were going to vote JLP next time? This idea was rejected immediately. ‘But is that something that is impossible!’ Damion exclaimed. ‘Impossible!’ two other participants interjected as well. ‘He knows that we could never vote JLP. We just couldn’t do it, we are PNP to the bone. Plus if we were even to suggest switching it would cause too much tension in the community’.

Even as inner-city residents are fully capable of understanding how garrison politics work to their disadvantage, the deeply felt identifications produced over the decades keep them tied unhappily into the same system. For ‘die-hearted’ supporters, voting – for the right party – is not so much a political right as it is a political duty. Their expressions of unconditional support indicate their experience of partisan belonging as something
essentialist and involuntary. Being PNP is a form of political subjectivity that is experienced as a territorial, emotional and an embodied condition (to the bone, die-hard). As residents of a PNP garrison neighborhood, just thinking of voting for the JLP is a hurtful proposition. In addition, Damion’s reference to ‘tension in the community’ underscores the continued threat of violence that is entangled with party loyalty.

The nah switch (won’t switch) mentality expressed by the young men from West Kingston was also evident during the campaigns leading up to the December 2011 national elections. One of the main issues during the electoral debates was the incumbent JLP government’s handling of the extradition of the island’s most prominent don, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, in 2010. The party – and in particular Bruce Golding, who had stepped down as Prime Minister and party leader shortly before the elections – had come under attack for first, trying to prevent the JLP-affiliated Dudus from being extradited to the US, and then, killing over 70 Jamaican citizens in an ‘incursion’ to capture him. Nonetheless, the JLP still had many passionate supporters. The morning after a major ‘Labourite’ (JLP) rally where the new party leader and incumbent Prime Minister Andrew Holness had made an appearance, I met a JLP supporter named Keesha. She had attended the all-night rally and was still dressed up in a green shirt, sporting green hair extensions and green nails. We got into a discussion about the position of the JLP and I asked her whether she felt comfortable voting for the party in the wake of the 2010 incursion. She vehemently rejected the idea that this could influence her voting behavior: ‘Me love my party bad! Me a go vote Andrew! Me would vote Bruce! Even if it were a rat, me would vote Labour!’ Like the PNP stalwarts, Keesha saw the act of voting as more than a duty – this was an expression of unconditional love, an affective, enduring relation to the political.

The night before, I had bumped into a cavalcade of buses waiting to leave for the JLP campaign rally. Inside the buses, there were mostly green-clad women, leaning out of the windows and putting on a show for passersby, waving green flags and leafy green branches, shouting ‘Shower! Shower!’ and making the V-sign. While most of the female campaigners waited inside the buses, outside on the street masked green men lounged about, drinking white rum (see Figure 1). I asked one of them why he was hiding his face. ‘Don’t be afraid’, he told me, ‘It’s just a style, just an election thing ... Normally you can’t do this because 5–0 [the police] will come catch you!’ Later that evening, I saw the buses rush past on their way to the rally. They were quite a spectacle in the otherwise quiet night as they flew by, horns honking and lights blinking, with people leaning out the windows, ringing bells and again shouting ‘Shower! Shower!’

As noted in the introduction, electoral campaigning demonstrates the entanglement of criminal–political forms of authority and political belonging. ‘Shower!’ has become the uniform slogan associated with the JLP – the shout rings out from buses, at campaign rallies, as a greeting between green-clad supporters on the street. However, the word refers directly to the Shower Posse, the international criminal gang that was run by Dudus’ father, Jim Brown, the so-called ‘don of dons’. The Shower Posse members were JLP stalwarts, acting as criminal–political enforcers in and beyond their home base in the West Kingston garrison of Tivoli Gardens. While the etymology of the political rallying cry ‘Shower’ is undisputed, these origins do not inform its use directly or consciously. When I asked people about the use of the term, both JLP and PNP supporters would recognize its posse roots, but tell me that ‘when we say “Shower” now it just means JLP’. However, as the symbolic link between a criminal organization and a political party, the term cannot ‘just’ refer to the JLP. In repeatedly shouting out a gang name in a range of contexts, these
green-clad supporters produce and reproduce their allegiance to party leaders and criminal organizations, to political community both in and beyond the state.

Throughout my fieldwork in downtown Kingston, I was struck by the inseparability of dons and politicians, not only in their governmental practices but also in how residents represented and related to ‘the state’. The entanglement of these governmental agents has become almost intrinsic to imaginations of the state. This was also clear in May 2010, when hundreds of mainly female West Kingston residents demonstrated peacefully in front of the Jamaican parliament in protest of the JLP government’s decision to extradite Dudus, the island’s most powerful don. Their destination, the house of parliament, was clearly not coincidental. The protest was directed at the democratically elected parliament, in defense of a leader whose authority was rooted in various sources but not in democracy. Were these protesters enacting their democratic citizenship rights, and performing their relation to the Jamaican state, by partaking in a longstanding tradition of somewhat rowdy but generally peaceful citizen protests? Or were they undermining the rule of law and the legitimacy of Jamaica’s democratically elected government by protesting the extradition of a man who later pled guilty to serious drugs and arms-trafficking charges? I argue that they were doing both: the political rally recognized and reinforced different types of authority and allegiance simultaneously, demonstrating the entangled character of residents’ political subjectivities.

Figure 1. Jamaica Labour Party supporter, 2011 election campaign. Photograph by Rivke Jaffe.
Conclusion

In this article, I have sought to demonstrate how a closer, ethnographic examination of the electoral process can shed new light on how citizenship is experienced, imagined and performed. A number of anthropologists have begun to explore how elections offer citizens an opportunity to enact their relationship to the state. My purpose in this article has been somewhat different, as I have attempted to demonstrate that what elections reveal goes beyond engagement with formal politics and statist citizenship. What is revealed about the political, when we look at elections through different eyes? I have argued that the entanglement of the state with other governmental actors – from more established institutions such as political parties and trade unions to less formal structures of criminal authority – compels us to view elections as sites for negotiations of political community both in and beyond the state. Approaching elections from this perspective can help us understand how citizens engage with and are engaged by these different, entangled governmental actors.

Lazar (2012) and others have discussed the role of non-state actors such as trade unions in ‘mediated citizenship’. Mediation implies that such actors (which might include criminal organizations, churches, NGOs or social movements in addition to unions) function as brokers between citizens and the state. In the cases described in this article, unions and – even more clearly – criminal organizations moved from being clientelist brokers to becoming state-like governmental actors. As the discussion of colonial and postcolonial elections in Jamaica illustrates, the role of non-state actors has gone beyond mediating people’s relationship to the state as they assume a more direct governmental role, shaping specific forms of political subjectivity and producing specific types of voter-citizens. In the cases described, voting becomes a central part of a citizenship agenda that proscribes a specific type of electoral behavior. In pre-independence Jamaica, trade unionists framed the political norms, values and behavior they deemed necessary for transforming Jamaicans from colonial subjects to independent citizens. In present-day inner-city neighborhoods, ideas about what behavior is appropriate for members of the political community are framed not only by formal rulers but also by party activists, dons and gang members. However, these less formal actors do not operate separately from the Jamaican state. Entangled as violent labor mobilizations and organized crime have been with formal political actors, they enable a form of political community both within and beyond the boundaries of the state.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Romeo Dennis and to Victor Cummings for their extensive support during different phases of the fieldwork, and am also thankful for the help provided by the Peace Management Initiative and Horace Levy in organizing the West Kingston focus group mentioned in this article. Many thanks also to Anouk de Koning, Martijn Koster and Deborah Thomas for providing helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Funding

The research on which this article draws was funded by an NWO (Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) VENI grant for the research project ‘Between the Street and the State: Crime and Citizenship in Kingston, Jamaica’ [grant number W01.70.100.001].

Notes

1. This fieldwork was conducted over five years in the period 2008–2012. I carried out ethnographic research in several inner cities throughout Kingston. In addition to this
neighborhood-based research, I conducted focus groups with former gang members from inner-city neighborhoods in West Kingston, and held numerous interviews with politicians, policy-makers, bureaucrats, NGO workers, businessmen, police and a number of smaller dons.

2. These assumptions are also implicit in scholarly definitions of citizenship that hold ‘that political rights are the core and soul of citizenship, because they bestow agency’ (Taylor 2004, 214). Such definitions suggest that political agency follows rather than precedes the technology of voting.

3. See Gay (1998) and Auyero (2001) for related arguments on clientelism in Brazil and Argentina, respectively.

4. These restrictions became even more severe when Jamaica became a Crown Colony in 1865 following the Morant Bay Rebellion.

5. I am grateful to Deborah Thomas for pointing this out.

6. For instance, in the well-known relations in Europe between trade unions and working-class parties (see Ebbinghaus 1995).

7. Like all other names of interviewees in this article, this is a pseudonym.

8. Interview, August 2012.

9. This shift from union leaders to criminal leaders as mediators and co-rulers is connected to a number of processes that took place in the late twentieth century. The Jamaican economy moved away from agriculture and import substitution industrialization and working-class Jamaicans increasingly found employment in the informal and sometimes illegal economy. The informalization of much of the Jamaican workforce contributed to the diminishing clout of organized labor, which coincided with the increasing economic and political influence of criminal organizations engaging in transnational drugs smuggling. The dons who led these criminal organizations came from very different socioeconomic and ethnroracial backgrounds than the union leaders, perhaps reflecting the shifting position of ‘subalterns’ within the political system following independence (see also Gray 2004).

10. For detailed discussions of garrison politics, see Figueroa and Sives (2002) and Gray (2004).


12. The mobilization of women in public support of non-state leaders such as Dudus, but also in support of state leaders such as in the case of the JLP rally described above, may be understood against the background of longer histories of working-class Jamaican women’s political agency. Reflecting on women’s political leadership in urban public space in the nineteenth century, Sheller (2012, 75–76, emphasis added) notes that ‘their special economic and social position as a link between town and country, between markets and fields, and between the state and the families it tried to control, all … enabled networks of women to facilitate crucial flows of information and to orchestrate collective action through the female-dominated spaces of the market’. While women’s participation in protests and resistance has continued to be informed by such an intermediary position, this same linking position has also made it attractive for both state and non-state leaders to attempt to harness their public presence in performances of political allegiance.

References


