Place-making around high-speed railway stations in China

Dai, G.

Citation for published version (APA):
Dai, G. (2015). Place-making around high-speed railway stations in China
The rapid expansion of the High-Speed Railway (HSR) network in China generates leapfrog urbanization on the urban periphery in the forms of ambitious blueprint plan around the mega hubs. Nevertheless, most of the station areas and spatial extension lack “place quality”. The place-making process of such HSR-new-towns is treated as a multi-actor arena, in which dilemmas are solved under particular institutional arrangement. This research pursues the “how” question in relation to the power games among government, market and civic actors, as well as the way they impact the spatial outcome. It unfolds the decision-making process of four collective action problems: location choice, spatial and infrastructural integration, functional diversity, and sustainability. It argues that even under the government-led, pro-growth rational in China, the variations of institutional arrangement can subsequently contribute to achieving specific place quality in HSR megaprojects. Three cases are investigated: the Wuhan-Yangtze-hu new sub-center around the Wuhan Railway Station, the Nanjing South New Extension around the Nanjing South Railway Station, and the Shanghai Hongqiao Business District around the Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub.

The research was conducted at the Urban Planning Group, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies (GUIO), Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG), and the Amsterdam Institute of Social Science Research (AISSR), University of Amsterdam (UvA). It benefits from the financial support of the China Scholarship Council (CSC).

Guowen Dai obtained the B.E. and M.Sc. of Urban Planning and Design at the School of Architecture, Southeast University, China. Trained as an urban designer, her main research interest is to unfold the institutional and governmental diversity during urbanization, particularly mega-projects.
PLACE-MAKING AROUND HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY STATIONS IN CHINA

GUOWEN DAI
PLACE-MAKING AROUND HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY STATIONS IN CHINA

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom
ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel
op vrijdag 20 november 2015, te 12.00 uur

door

GUOWEN DAI

geboren te Jiangsu, China
Promotiecommissie:

Promotor: Prof. dr. W.G.M. Salet University of Amsterdam
Copromotor: Dr. J. de Vries University of Amsterdam

Overige leden: Prof. dr. P. Ho Delft University of Technology
Prof. dr. J. Woltjer University of Westminster
Prof. dr. W. M. de Jong Delft University of Technology
Prof. dr. ir. L. Bertolini University of Amsterdam
Prof. dr. R. Ronald University of Amsterdam
Dr. S. J. H. Majoors Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences

Faculteit der Maatschappij - en Gedragswetenschappen

This research has benefitted from the financial-support of China Scholarship Council (CSC) and the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), University of Amsterdam (UvA).

Design and Layout: Guowen Dai
Cover image: Guowen Dai
Print: Ipskamp Drukkers

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, by photocopying, electronic, mechanical, recording, or any other means, without prior written permission from the author (dgw1983@gmail.com).
# Contents

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

**CHAPTER 1**

Introduction 5

**CHAPTER 2**

Why High-Speed Railway Stations Continue China’s Leapfrog Urbanization? The Institutional Parameters of Urban Development 31

**CHAPTER 3**

Institutional Anatomy of Chinese HSR-oriented Development: Nanjing South Station Area 57

**CHAPTER 4**

The Impact of Policy Networks on the Urbanization around High-Speed Railway Stations in China: The Case of Wuhan 85

**CHAPTER 5**

Place-making in Shanghai Hongqiao Business District: An Institutional Capacity Perspective 115

**CHAPTER 6**

Conclusions 145

**APPENDIXES**

Appendix-I: Glossaries 164
Appendix-II: Trajectories of Three Cases 168
Appendix-III: List of Documents 172
Appendix-VI: List of Figures and Tables 182
Appendix-V: List of Actors 185
Appendix-VI: Indexes of Chinese HSR Stations 189
Summary (EN) 195
Samenvatting (NL) 205
摘要 (CN) 215
Acknowledgement

When this PhD journey is finally approaching the end, it becomes more difficult than I thought to write up a decent acknowledgement. Everything flashes back.

“What is your fascination?” This was the very first and also ultimate question that my promoter Prof. Willem Salet has kept asking me. Educated as an urban designer in China, I felt confused to witness the difficulties to realize a “brilliant” urban design. That’s why I chose to study the social complexity of urbanization when facing the possible chance of applying support from the Chinese Scholarship Council. Yet, full of excitement and curiosity, I haven’t thought of the potential uncertainty when stepping into the 12-hour’s flight to a foreign country. Well, the helplessness has indeed grabbed me for a while. But I’ve never doubted my decision, for this trajectory indeed has been a journey of finding and redefining myself.

First and foremost, my sincere gratitude goes to my promoter Willem Salet and my co-promoter Jochem de Vries. I still remember the very first handshake with Willem, firm and warm, in his Bauhaus-style G-building office. The enthusiasm in his introduction of the newly established discussion group, “Dream-team”, and the upcoming academic events immediately dragged me out of the confusion and helplessness to the “real business”. The cheerfulness went on for the discussions in the following years with the scenic background of the Nieuwe Prinsengracht canal out of his balcony. He has always been able to give insightful and direct suggestions, some of which took me a while to fully digest. Jochem has tolerated my ignorance in social science and patiently led me towards a more socially constructivist perspective. He offered inspirations by raising many challenging questions, which pushed me to think critically and argue logically. I also really appreciate that both of their supervision went much beyond the academic interaction and extended to the conversations at the Coffee Company, at their homes, on the cycling trip in Houten, and on the long High-Speed Railway trips across China, etc.

My acknowledgement naturally extends to the “dreamers” and “PUMAers”, the colleagues in the Urban Planning Group. Due to the shared research topic, Prof. Luca Bertolini has inspired me so much in sense of giving generous feedbacks and suggestions. Stan Majoor (and Daniela Wullers) and Prof. Leonie Janssen-Jansen have showed my way out of the confusion, when stepping into this whole new world from the very beginning. Ren Thomas has shown me the true spirit as a “lady planner” and the joy as a heartfelt researcher. In the Chinese context, all of the following persons would be my “academic family” (Tong-men), including Anita Blessing, Marco te Brömmelstroet, Paul Chorus,
Sebastian Dembski, Jan Duffhues, David Evers, Mendel Giezen, Lucas Harms, Rivke Jaffe, Thijs Koolmees, Melika Levelt, Bas Hissink Muller, Nick Smit, Caroline Uittenbroek, Rick Vermeulen, Michel van Wijk, and Ching-wen Yang, etc. This literal interpretation, “academic family”, actually explains so much, for their companion have triggered my progress day-by-day.

The Department of Human Geography, Planning, and International Development in UvA has provided a rather easy-going atmosphere. I still remember Rene Boer’s welcoming board when he picked me up from Schiphol on the very first day. The corridor talks with colleagues, like Prof. Robert Kloosterman, Bart Lambregts, Prof. Sako Musterd, Prof. Jan Nijman, Prof. Arnold Reijndorp, Prof. Richard Ronald, and Dick Schuiling, might generate inspiring ideas for me. And I’d like to express my special thanks to Puikang Chan, Marian Hamann, Marianne Heelsbergen, Barbara Lawa, Guida Morais e Castro Ermida, and Joni Haijen, who have solved my endless questions.

The lovely officemates shared the most memories with me: Wendy Tan has always been such a reliable and warm-hearted companion, either on the research or in non-academic life. I feel blessed to have witnessed Els Beukers’ “upgrading” process from a PhD candidate to a mother. Federico Savini has impressed me in so many ways by his passionate drum performance, self-disciplined work routine, and sharp argumentation in “Dream-team” discussion. Moreover, I’ve also enjoyed the causal chats with De-jung (Doreen) Chen, Koen Raats, and Enrica Papa, either on the (only) balcony of N-building, in our second-hand couch, or in the sunshine of Pizzabakker. Having the chances of moving offices, I also experienced several different arrangement of other unforgettable roommates: Wouter van Gent, Reijer Hendrikse, Josje Hoekveld, Sabine Meier, Andrew Switzer, etc.

Luckily, our offices were not arranged according to disciplines, so that I could enjoy cross-field communications with Marco Bontje, Willem Boterman, Oana Druta, Emma Folmer, Michela Guerini, Bart Sleutjes, Annalies Teernstra, etc. De-jung (Doreen) Chen opened my eyes to such a colorful world of couchsurfing from the anthropological and sociological perspective. Xu Zhang and Jing Zhou not only shared their fresh update about urban geography development in China, but also greatly helped in organizing the Urban China Study Seminars. The discussion also extended to the parties at Rowan Arundel or Tara Saharan’s living rooms, to Federico’s band show on music festival, as well as my yoga lessons with Monica Skórska or Anna Glasmacher. It’s a bit pity to have missed Guowei Lv’s trajectory in UvA, for we shared some research interest.
Apart from the UvA colleagues and friends, the training, workshops, and other social events enlarged my academic network. I feel rather lucky to have met Xiang Chen, Fangfang Cheng, Can Cui, Laksmi Darmoyono, Jianxi Feng, Pu Hao, Jinghuan He, Hong Hu, Wei-ju (Astor) Huang, Xu Huang, Xinchuan Liu, Xiaoli Lv, Rui Mu, Bogdan Stamoran, Yuting Tai, Huiqi Yan, Lijing Yang, Jun Ying, Shuhai Zhang, and Guohua Zeng. The conversations with Astor during reading group, BBQ, and many other occasions have inspired and encouraged my research a lot. There have been very precious chances to have face-to-face discussions with the researchers bearing the names that frequently show up in my references, including Prof. You-tien Hsing from University of California at Berkeley, Prof. Klaus Kunzmann from Dortmund University of Technology, Prof. Jixian Wang from Hong Kong University, Prof. Fulong Wu from University College London, and Prof. Bing Zhang from the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design. Besides, Ms. Yawei Chen and Prof. Martin de Jong from the Delft University of Technology, and Ms. Jiayan Liu from Tsinghua University have improved my work with their insightful comments. I am also grateful to my highly esteemed reading committees: Prof. Luca Bertolini, Prof. Peter Ho, Prof. Martin de Jong, Dr. Stan Majoor, Prof. Richard Ronald, and Prof. Johan Woltjer.

This research would never come into shape without the help of many teachers, friends and even strangers during the fieldwork. My previous promoter during graduate, Prof. Jin Duan from Southeast University, offered the most selfless and vital help from his network for my fieldwork. Besides, Prof. Wei Dong, Shijie Sun, Prof. Chenghui Wang, Prof. Xiao Wu, Prof. Jianqiang Yang and Qian Zhang offered their support for the workshops that I co-organized with the Faculty of Architecture in the Southeast University. Yongqiang Zhang from Wuhan Land Resource and Urban Planning Bureau provided the precious connections to the local planners and key actors in the Wuhan case. Interviews with Prof. Jiang Wu and Prof. Wujun Liu impressed me with their enormous knowledge and deep understanding of Shanghai Hongqiao case. Mr. Fengjun Yin from the Headquarter of Nanjing South Extension answered my detailed questions with patience. And the conversations with Runqing Shao, Song Ji, Ming Yin, and Jing Tang from the Southeast University gave me vivid details of the process of Nanjing case. Xiaoxi Hui, from Beijing University of Technology, surprised me by such a vivid introduction of Beijing historical city to the Dutch students during their field trip in China. And Guus Verduijn amazed me with his understanding of Utrecht's history, stories, and planning. Besides, I was very fortunate having met those anonymous interviewees, to whom I might not have the chance to express the thankfulness face-to-face after this research.
Living in a completely different environment can be exciting but also sometimes lonely. My thankfulness particularly goes to the friends in daily life. Yang Song has been my first call when in emergency, and the great chief when my stomach was longing for the Chinese cuisine. I have enjoyed so much in common with Doreen and Astor, not only language and food, but also values in life. The experiences on our holidays (with Julie Huang or Ching-wen Yang) will stay fresh. Qiu Li’s explorative companion has made my first year in Amsterdam easier and more exciting. I also share the memories of hotpot/BBQ parties with Tiexi Chen, Hai Hu, Kaikai Jing (and Ikhide Aligbeh), Bei Li, Chao Li, Hairong Li, Jianan Li, Fangbing Liu, Lei Liu, Xiaolong Liu, Xinchuan Liu, Zhongyu Lou, Difei Lu, Ding Qi, Wei Quan, Yifan Shi, Zhe Sun (and Xiaojun Xu), Fangyong Tang, Tong Wang, Xiang Wang, Mengxiao Wu, Cihua Xu, Yadong Xu, Bo Yan, Qiang Yang, Si Yin, Zhiwei Zhan, Duanyang Zhang, Ying (Jenny) Zhang, Jing Zhao, Fujin Zhou, Hao Zhu, etc. Luckily, my friendship with Xue Hou has continued from Amsterdam to Beijing. The same situation also applies to many others, including Longyuan Chen, Fengkui Ju, Xirong Li, Meng Sun, Wenqian Yu, Ling Zhang, Liying Zhang, Yunuo Zhang, Zhen Zhang, and Guohua Zeng (and Jie Yu). The friendship in the neighborhood of Molukkenstraat and Science Park has made Amsterdam my second home.

Gladly, my social network of undergraduate (and even high school) also expanded to the European continent. I share the time zone as well as life reflections with Linhui Bao, Shuaishuai Ho, Yafei Liu, Yu Lu, Mingzhu Xie, and Ying Yin.

Last but not the least, I would like to dedicate my gratitude to my beloved husband. Although we only shared the first 11 months in the Netherlands, Yanjing and I have made through all the years of long-distance and eventually became life companion in Beijing. His pure love and reflective spirit has made my life full of inspirations and motivations. Not to mention the surprise-visit all the way from China or the tailored-made birthday cake...

The deepest gratefulness goes to my parents: The distance from Nanjing to Amsterdam might have departed us for a while, but it brought my heart even closer to yours than ever. 亲爱的爸妈, 南京阿姆虽相隔万里，却让我心与你们格外亲近！

June 2015
Beijing, China
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction

Outdoor dancing at Wuhan Railway Station, Photo: Author, 2011
Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction

Lingering under the streamlined roof of the brand-new Wuhan Railway Station, one would be amazed by its magnificent scale (114602m²) and avant-garde architectural design. It might remind passengers of some works of star architects in Europe, such as the Euralille by OMA (1994) or Liège-Guillemins Railway Station by Santiago Calatrava (2009). However, unlike the urbanized landscape of European nodes, the Wuhan Railway Station is surrounded by construction sites that used to be farmland or brownfields. Located 18 km from the city center, the planned urban functions of the railway station are yet to be realized.

This is not a unique case. It represents almost all of the generation of High-Speed Railway (HSR) stations in Chinese cities on the HSR network. These stations are usually located on the urban periphery and planned to develop into “integrated transport hubs,” which in this case means transport megaprojects that combine at least three public transportation modes (following the definitions of MoHURD, 2014 and NDRC, 2013). This is described by the local governments and planners as the “HSR-oriented development”. In order to stimulate and maintain domestic growth, the Chinese government launched the financial crisis-induced initiative of investing 40 trillion CNY into infrastructure construction and urbanization since 2008. The rapid “Great Leap Forward” of the HSR network offers a striking illustration. Within less than one decade, the network has already covered 10,000 km of HSR (by December 2013) and is planned to reach 18,000 km by 2020 (Figure 1-1). Meanwhile, ambitious blueprint plans and policy supports have been initiated to stimulate spatial development around such hubs.

Nevertheless, the reality has not always gone to plan. In Europe and Japan, HSRs might generate high passenger capacity, efficient energy use, increasing trade and knowledge exchange, time gains for business travel, and economic integration and relocation (Albalate & Bel, 2012; Blum, Gercek, & Viegas, 1992; Blum, Haynes, & Karlsson, 1997; Vickerman, 1997). And indeed, China’s HSR network has had these sorts of impacts. However, the spaces around these new HSR stations often lack the same urban qualities, despite the fact that official policies aspire to place-making. In the real world of policy implementation, I am mainly dealing with aggregate, collective, or corporate actors who are institutionally constituted. Although, for example, Transit-Oriented-Development (TOD) is repeatedly mentioned by local governments, in China the plans actually go against the essential idea of compact urbanization in the TOD, particularly with regards to walkability, density, livability, vitality, and function mix. Unlike the redevelopment of (old) central stations in Europe and
Failure to produce place quality is not accidental in these urbanization strategies, for they originated from the pro-growth rationale of Chinese urbanization. It is here that I locate the conceptual relevance of this dissertation. Most of the current research concerning HSR development in China concentrates on its spatial impact. I am interested in the role of the institutional conditions and the decision-making processes. Outcome-focused studies include, for instance, the impact on accessibility (Luo et al., 2004; Zacharias & Tang 2010; Feng et al. 2013; Cao et al., 2013; Wang et al. 2013) and on economic development, such as tourism (Shi & Sun, 2008; Wang & Zou, 2010; Wang et al., 2012tp; Wang et al., 2012db), and the property market (Zheng & Kahn, 2013).
The realization of HSR also changes the spatial structure of the city (Duan, 2009; Wang & Long, 2009; Wang, 2011; Tang et al., 2011; Dai & Cheng, 2011; Yin et al. 2014), as well as the immediate station area (Zheng & Du, 2007; Hao, 2008; Li & Zhang, 2011; Zong et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2012). However, the interactions of actors under the influence of the institutional settings that produce these different urban environments are seldom subjects of research (Ye & Tang, 2010). The decision-making process is constituted by the institutionalized capabilities and the preferences of the actors. According to the European experiences, the mega-corridors to be formulated along the HSR infrastructure require cross-territorial spatial governance (de Vries, 2008; Riot, 2014; Vickerman, 1997). Besides, the gradual shift in the public value trade-off along China’s HSR development also bring forward the importance of institutional perspective, that is, from regional infrastructure equity and safety, to economic growth and speed, and to organizational efficiency and cooperation (Mu et al., 2015). It is the power games among central and local governments, market, and citizens in multi-actor and multi-level contexts of governance that trigger urbanization and economic restructuring around the hubs.

This study will not only attend to the spatial outcomes (the impact) but also on the “how” questions related to the input conditions and the process. It necessitates a more process-oriented perspective (Reusser et al., 2008), a thorough consideration of the conditions and the creation of qualitative aspects of development strategies, and in-depth analysis of specific process (Bertolini, 1999). We will address the underlying institutional mechanisms and the decision-making processes of the spatialization of the new railway stations. Thereby, this research takes an institutional approach to urban planning (Salet & Faludi, 2000) with a particular emphasis on the ways in which actors act from specified positions. The core focus of the research is to explore the cross-level dynamics among strategic actors in policy processes of place-making around integrated transport hubs under the institutional conditions of the Chinese pro-growth setting.

**High-Speed Railway Oriented Development**

**Place quality around transport nodes**

To study the “place quality” in Chinese HSR oriented development, the primary step is to identify the concept in a general sense. Urban studies literature has provided a wide range of interpretations of the general concept of “place”. They vary in emphasizing physical, social-cultural (Jacobs, 1961; Lefebvre, 1991; Tuan, 1977), or economic-geographic dimensions (Florida, 2003; 2005; Glaeser,
2011; Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006). There has also been an increasing interest in sustainable urbanization and its resilience (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2010), low-carbon development (Skea & Nishioka, 2008), and the green urban economy, also being a crucial element of urban quality.

With regards to place quality in integrated transport hubs, particularly railway stations, it has the dual values of both “node” and “place” (Bertolini, 1996tm; Bertolini & Spit, 1998). The node value refers to the connectivity of the hub and its potential for physical human interactions, while the place value concerns the intensity and diversity of activities and the degree of actual realization of the potential for physical human interaction. Accordingly, Kloosterman and Trip (Kloosterman & Trip, 2006; Trip, 2008; 2007) define the general variables of “quality of place” as: diversity, integration, and public space, and the indicative elements of quality of place work at particular scales. Trip (2007) concludes with ten indicators of spatial quality in railway station areas, based on the perceptions of actors, which include: architecture and applied building materials, urban design, integration into the city, real estate program, location of functions, quality of functions, functional integration, public space, third spaces, and the role of HSR. Other non-morphological interpretations, namely urbanity, in megaprojects outside traditional contexts (Majoor, 2009; 2008) are also considered to be essential, such as: specialization and interchange, diversity and freedom of choice, urbanity as civic exhibition, and the principle of connectivity and accessibility (Salet, et al., 2012).

Intriguingly, very few of those relevant concepts have been the subject of academic investigation in the Chinese context, not to mention in the realm of transport mega-hubs. The “place quality” attracts more academic attention in the redevelopment of historic downtowns or the separation of workplace and residence in metropolises. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, China is still under undergoing extensive and rapid urbanization, during which economic growth is much more appreciated than spatial quality. Second, the railway station areas in China have been traditionally regarded as the most chaotic places in the cities. Their image was that of being relatively dull, dirty, unsafe, and awash with cars, buses, and taxis.

Therefore, studying the place quality in HSR-oriented development cannot be conducted by simply transplanting the analyses and theories from international contexts. Building on the aforementioned research and being aware of the Chinese context, I operationalize place quality of integrated transport megaprojects in the following key components of research:
• Location;
• Infrastructure and spatial integration;
• Functional diversity;
• Sustainability.

I do not intend to literally evaluate them as such, but I attempt to understand the actor interactions and institutional mechanisms nested in the policy processes.

**Chinese urbanization with dual institutional characteristics**

To understand the reason for the neglected place quality in such megaprojects, it is crucial to take into account the dual institutional characteristics of Chinese urbanization: the coexistence of a centralized top-down regime and local regimes that are aptly named “growth machines.”

On the one hand, land and space are “commodified” (Lin & Zhang, 2014; Su, 2014; Xu et al., 2009; Zhou & Logan, 1996), and thus urbanization is strongly promoted by local pro-growth coalitions (Zhang, 2001b), which operate as corporations (Oi, 1992). Diverse forms of self-governance emerged in response to deficient centralized governance, such as the first village that operationalized the “household contract responsibility system” in 1978 (Xia, 2000), or the self-organized “property owner association” in the gated community of a metropolis (Zhu, 2013). Built upon a pro-growth rationale, the “land revenue system” (Zhang 1999) has been criticized as the main culprit for emerging urban problems, such as the real estate bubble, violent demolition during land acquisition, massive production of new towns without local identity, and environmental deterioration (Zhang, 2001a; Zhang, 2000; 2001b; Zhu, 2013). On the other hand, the centralized interventions have never been out of view, and have even been reinforced in recent decades to some extent (Lin, 2002). The “de-planned reform itself was largely planned, while decentralization was initiated by a heavily centralized decision system, not by local entities” (Zhang, 2002, p. 304). Governmental actors, inevitably, play the dominant roles. Therefore, the Chinese economy is often typified as a “Socialist market economy” (He & Wu, 2009; Liew, 2005; Zhang, 2013; Zhu, 1999), for it is not a pure market economy as defined in the original Western context.

These dual institutional characteristics have a strong influence on the outcomes of urbanization. It becomes clear that HSR oriented development is just one of the waves of leapfrog urbanization in China, similar to the Economic Development Zones in the 1990s or the university towns and the so-called
Socialist New Villages in the 2000s. Yet, compared to the other waves, the arena of HSR-oriented development shows more intriguing cross-level interactions due to the strong involvement of central government, created by the central intervention in combination with the entrepreneurial intention aiming to “invent” local growth poles. Therefore, this calls for the particular focus on actor interaction in the institutional landscape.

**Research Design and Methodology**

**Conceptual framework**

The motivation driving this research is to investigate the phenomenon of HSR-oriented development from an institutional perspective with an interaction-oriented focus (Scharpf, 2000). In other words, the emphasis of the study is to unfold the conditions and pathways of spatial policy-making rather than investigating the wider impact of these policy interactions on society. I want to open the black box of the decision-making process and rather than focus on quantitative impact studies (Gerring, 2007). The research strategy deals with the processes that (more or less successfully) pave the way to specific “place qualities.” The conceptual framework is presented in Figure 1-2, which treats the policy process as a multi-actor action arena to solve key collective action problems of place quality under particular institutional arrangement.
To unfold the actor interactions of HSR-oriented development in the dual institutional setting of China is not an easy task. Several cornerstones of institutionalism provide the theoretical equipment for this research. Actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf, 1989; 1991; 1993; 1997) presents an analytical order for the complex and protracted processes of decision-making. This rational-choice approach differs from its counterparts in paying explicit attention to the dynamics of decision-making processes. The historical institutionalists, for instance, consider institutions as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy with path dependency (March & Olsen, 1984; 2004), management of uncertainty, and the crucial role of strategic interaction (Hall & Taylor, 1996). But for the sake of our research question I are not just interested in historically established institutions but rather in the way they interact with the dynamics of human agency. This is why I select the paradigm of rational-choice institutionalism: it treats the “institution” as the sanctioned rules that affect the cost and benefit analysis of actors according to their own capabilities and orientations, while dealing with series of sets of collective action dilemmas (Dugger, 1995; North, 1990; 1991; Williamson, 1981; 1983; 1998). Its major theoretical concepts will be operationalized for use in the context of HSR-oriented development. The “policy problem” will be operationalized into 4 sets of key collective action dilemmas: location, integration, diversity, and sustainability. The institutional arrangement contributes as the setting that structures the conditions of “actors’ orientations and capabilities”. The focal units of analysis are the “policy games” dealing with collective action problems in the “action arena” (Ostrom, 2005).

One thing needs to be clarified in more detail, which is that spatial policy processes of HSR-oriented development cannot be simply formalized into a pure policy game (Ostrom, 2005), because of the material and physical context. Especially since urban megaprojects tend to involve complex and multiple (rounds of) inter-connected decisions over a long timeframe (Majoor, 2008) and facing multiple levels of governance (Salet & Thornley, 2001). To rationally analyze these processes I enrich the model of research with the concept of the “action arena” (Ostrom, 1990; 2005; Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 1993). It adds the exogenous variables (biophysical/material conditions, attributes of community, and rules) that affect the situation and thus the process. The “material exogenous variable” in HSR-oriented development refers to the position in the network of mobility and economy, including the station’s position in the HSR network, the distance to the existing city center, and the city’s ranking in the regional economy, etc. However, in order to keep the
analytical focus on the institutional arrangement, the conceptual framework tries to reduce the abundance of independent variables. Therefore, the study treats the physical variable as a fixed context variable. This has implications for criteria of case selection, which will be discussed in the ensuing section.

Building on insights of policy networks (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992; Carlsson, 2000; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004), I will distinguish three types of actors: the government, the market, and civic (society). Government actors include the state (ministry), province, municipality, district, and sub-district (jiedao); market actors refer to the city investment corporation, real estate developer, enterprise, and bank; and the civic (society) actors include residents, NGO, NPO, etc.

Research question and hypothesis

The research objectives are to illustrate the process of the spatial development around mega transport hubs, analyze the actor interactions, and finally, investigate the institutional conditions that shape the process and outcome. The main research questions are thus raised:

**How do the institutional arrangements shape the actor arena of spatial development around mega transport hubs (particularly the High-Speed Railway stations) in China, and to what spatial outcomes with regard to place-making does this lead?**

In a methodological sense, the research can be characterized as explorative. However, the conceptual model keeps the attention focused on the above-mentioned aspects. It is thus not a completely open exploration but directed by a sensitizing concept. I do not intend to establish a new theoretical model that is universally applicable to achieve spatial quality within different institutional arrangements; rather, it is essence an explorative study (Gerring, 2007). Nevertheless, the research is guided by an initial idea about how the present Chinese polity relates to efforts of place-making, i.e., that the government-led, pro-growth institutional context in China raises difficulties in achieving place quality in megaprojects with regards to HSR-oriented development. The sub-questions are proposed as follows. The first two sub-questions operationalize the policy problem, while the third concerns the spatial outcome. The last three deal with the causal mechanisms of the policy processes.

Policy problem:
1) What are the key collective action problems during the decision-making process?

2) What planning responses are made in the spatial development around the HSR hubs?

Spatial outcome:

3) What are the spatial outcomes around the HSR hubs, with regards to the key components of spatial quality (location, integration, diversity, and sustainability)?

Policy process:

4) What are the preferences and capabilities of actors from the government, market, and society? And how do they constitute different actor constellations?

5) How do actors interact with each other in the games of key collective action problems?

6) How does the institutional arrangement affect the interaction modes and thereby the eventual spatial quality?

Casing: single-case and cross-comparison

Driven by the research questions, this manuscript uses the case study research design, which provides the suitable method for the empirical research within its real-life context (Yin, 2009). The fundamental step of case study is “casing” – “a research operation and a methodological step, which can bring operational closure to some problematic relationship between ideas and evidence, between theory and data” (Ragin & Becker, 1992, p. 218).

This research is built upon the logic of “most-similar” research design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970), and combines the multiple single-case study with cross-comparison. Each single case study has its research question and complete storyline, and they progressively build upon the former one with different but related theoretical concepts. Meanwhile, the cases fulfill the requirements for cross-case comparison (Gerring, 2007). In addition, due to its explorative nature, this research adopts the strategy of “informed/selective explorative case study” (Bryman, 2012). In other words, it is neither purely deductive from a well-set theory nor solely inductive from the empirical data. To be specific, the case in the second paper touches upon collective action problems that
are elaborated upon in other cases, which are chosen mainly because of their neutrality in the sense of spatial quality and the richness of accessible empirical data. Then, the research moves onto the further exploration in two contrasting cases, which presents the negative and positive spatial outcome of “place-making”. The spatial boundary of all cases is the surrounding area that has been included in the urban planning, which usually includes three rings, including the core station area or initiating area, station area, and the new urban extension or district around the hub. This research focuses on the first two rings, while taking the third ring into consideration. The period during which the case studies were conducted was October 2010 to December 2012.

The case selection is based on the following criteria. First, the case should be a crucial position in the national railway network, which potentially enables the hub area with both place and node value. Yet, following the “most-similar case strategy”, the physical exogenous variables of the chosen cases, that is, the hub’s location within the HSR network, distance to existing city center, and city’s ranking in the regional economy, should be similar. Second, by specifically focusing on place-making around HSR stations – and in other types of major urban projects – a similar set of actors (governmental/market/society) was included in the analysis for each instance. Therefore, the first two criteria already exclude most second-tier cities and small towns. Out of all the hubs elaborated in Appendix I, I choose only the ones that are at the intersection of at least two national HSR corridors. (However, this does not imply that the spatial quality in smaller cities is less relevant.) Third, the case needs to be in a relatively advanced stage. Since the subject is spatial quality, it requires a certain extent of physical implementation and daily use. The hub needs to be put into operation and the spatial development around it should be, at least partly, realized according to plans. Last and the most practical, the empirical data, such as government archives, regulations, policies, and plans, should be either open to the public or accessible to the author. The key actors in the policy process should be accessible for interviews. Hence, the following three cases are selected (Table 1-1): The new South City Extension around Nanjing South Railway Station, the Yangchun-lake Sub-center around Wuhan Railway Station, and the Shanghai Hongqiao Business District around the Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub. (The trajectories of each case, including the critical junctions and phases, can be found in Appendix III.)
## Chapter 1: Introduction

### City Index (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wuhan Yangchun-lake Sub-Center</th>
<th>Nanjing New South Extension</th>
<th>Shanghai Hongqiao Business District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population(^1)</td>
<td>9.79 million</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>23.03 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total land(^2)</td>
<td>8494 km(^2)</td>
<td>6587 km(^2)</td>
<td>6340.5 km(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Region</td>
<td>Wuhan Metropolitan Region (hinterland)</td>
<td>Yangtze-River-Delta Region (coastal area)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Project Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hub</th>
<th>Usage Status</th>
<th>Distance to City Center</th>
<th>Planned Passenger Transport Modes</th>
<th>Area(^3)</th>
<th>Planning Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wuhan Railway Station</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>12 km to Wuchang center</td>
<td>HSR &amp; regular rail (20 tracks &amp; 11 platforms); 2 metro lines; city bus; inter-city bus; car;</td>
<td>3.48 km(^2) - 11.03 km(^2)</td>
<td>New city sub-center, new city southern extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanjing South Railway Station</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>12 km to center (Xinjiekou)</td>
<td>HSR &amp; regular rail (28 tracks &amp; 15 platforms); 2 metro lines; city bus; inter-city bus; car; bicycle;</td>
<td>6 km(^2) - 32 km(^2) - 66 km(^2)</td>
<td>New city sub-center, new city southern extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Hongqiao Transport Hub</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>24.1 km to Renming Square</td>
<td>Aviation; maglev (plan) HSR &amp; regular rail (30 tracks &amp; 16 platforms); 4 metro lines; 2 light rails; city bus; inter-city bus; car;</td>
<td>4.7 km(^2) - 27 km(^2) - 86 km(^2)</td>
<td>International integrated hub</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Planning Objective (Regulatory Zoning Plan)

| Planned Program      | Core area (2\(^{nd}\) ring): 24.5% housing 3.65% commerce & finance 1.6% leisure & culture 2.8% sports 4.52% office & business 14.3% green space 3.9% industry | Core area (1\(^{st}\) ring): 30.4% housing 2.7% commerce & finance 1.3% leisure & culture 1.9% education & research 7.6% office & business 9.1% green space | Core area (1\(^{st}\) ring): Housing (mixed with hotel) 56.3% office & business 12.1% commerce & finance 17.4% hotel 8.4% convention & exhibition 4.8% leisure & culture |

---

\(^1\) The population here refers to the actual residential population, not the registered population ("hu-kou"). The statistic comes from the 6th National Population Census, 2010.

\(^2\) The total land area here refers to the municipal boundary (from Statistic Yearbook).

\(^3\) According to the particular plans of the cases, the projects are often divided into 2-3 rings: core area, station area, and new extension.
Outline of the Book

This dissertation is based on a series of papers that are published, forthcoming, or submitted to international peer-reviewed journals. Each chapter sheds light on a different part of the research questions, yet they rest on the same conceptual framework in the previous section. As the Figure 1-3 shows, Chapter 2 starts with the pilot study on six cases, and outlines the theoretical foundation of this dissertation, which focuses on the institutional parameters that trigger the leapfrog urbanization around transport hubs. Chapter 3 presents the explorative research of the collective problems in the first single case study, the south urban extension around the Nanjing South Railway Station. Chapter 4 zooms in the action arenas, which unfold the impact of policy networks on spatial quality. Furthermore, Chapter 5 moves onto the “positive” case, which shows the institutional capacity that enables the emergence of a policy network. Finally, Chapter 6 compares three cases and gives the concluding remarks.

![Figure 1-3. Reading guide of the book, Source: author.](image-url)
Chapter 2: Why High-Speed Railway Stations Continue China’s Leapfrog Urbanization: Institutional Parameters of Urban Development?

This chapter has been published as a paper in the China City Planning Review, 22(1), 49–59. (co-authored with Prof. Dr. Willem Salet and Dr. Jochem de Vries).

Research questions:

What are the planning responses to the arrival of HSR in Chinese cities? What are the institutional conditions that frame these responses?

Abstract:

An ambitious HSR program is under construction in China and the network soon will overtake its counterparts in Europe. Reflecting on HSR projects undertaken in European cities, the authors explore the conditions for place-making qualities of six new HSR station areas in China. The superb inter-city connectivity of the new infrastructure nodes raises a lot of expectations about the economic and social potential of the station areas, but the examples in Europe thus far are very differentiated. With regards to the attraction of economic activities, usually the existing differences between different economic regions are reproduced rather than shaping completely new conditions. Also, the expectations of developing completely new integrated urban centers around stations in the urban periphery are rather ambitious. The paper questions the planning responses to HSR development in Chinese cities and investigates the institutional conditions that frame these responses. The authors explore how the plans for Chinese HSR station development account for their objectives and reflect on the potential of the station area planning by investigating the institutional parameters of urban development.

Chapter 3: Institutional Anatomy of Chinese HSR-oriented Development: Nanjing South Station Area

This chapter is a paper currently under review at an international peer-reviewed journal (co-authored with Dr. Jochem de Vries and Prof. Dr. Willem Salet).

Research questions:

What are the key collective action problems in HSR station area development? How are actor constellations framed in dealing with collective action problems? What are the institutional conditions that influence these collective action problems?

Abstract:
Chapter 1: Introduction

The explosive development of China’s cities generates a large number of collective action problems that require policy integration via the negotiation of different interests. The spatial development around HSR stations is particularly relevant. The contemporary institutional edifice of the “Socialist Urban Entrepreneurialism” is highly complicated by the following paradox: on one hand, the traditional unitary structure of governmental organization has transformed into a multi-actor system (involving many governmental and non-governmental agencies in urban development decision-making). On the other hand, styles of policy-making are still nested in hierarchical and functionally patterned routines. As a result, the challenges of collective actions around stations, which refer to the location choice, mobility integration, and urbanity making, are stalemated by inter-actor conflicts. The authors argue that successful collective action has to be sought in non-hierarchical solutions to conflicts. The case of Nanjing’s urban extension around one of China’s strategic nodal HSR stations is analyzed as an explorative case. As conclusions, the generic institutional conditions are identified.

Chapter 4: The Impact of Policy Networks on the Urbanization around High-Speed Railway Stations in China: The Case of Wuhan

This chapter is published in the Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 33(3), 533–551. It gives insights into the second case, the Wuhan Yangchun-lake Sub-center around the Wuhan Railway Station.

Research questions:

How do the multi-dimensional actor relations in policy networks impact the urban extension around HSR stations in China? Correspondingly, three sub-questions will be answered: How can the policy networks be identified? What sort of coordination problems do they create for the policy games? What implications for urban governance can be drawn in order to improve conditions for better coordination?

Abstract:

This paper addresses the nationwide impulse of using new HSR stations to catalyze urban extension of Chinese cities. It aims to unfold four modalities of actor relations in the process of urbanization around the HSR stations, i.e., the vertical intergovernmental relations, the horizontal intergovernmental relations, the government-market relations, and the government-society relations. By introducing the policy network perspective, the paper demonstrates how the particular policy networks in China shape the actor relations in the policy games, and correspondingly impact on the outcomes of such urban policies.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The case of the new sub-center in Wuhan is taken as an in-depth case study. The paper identifies key policy networks as the institutional settings. It analyzes the role of such policy networks in the key policy games: location choice, infrastructure integration, functional diversity, and environmental and public space quality. Finally, as a consequence of the policy network, the characteristic coordination problems are characterized that yield the policy games of urbanization. These coordination problems concern: the tension between central and local competences of decision-making, the cross-jurisdiction separation, the over-dominant role of governments and their opportunist behaviors, and finally the lack of public participation.

Chapter 5: Place-making in Shanghai's Hongqiao Business District: An Institutional Capacity Perspective

This chapter is under revision at an international peer-reviewed journal. It investigates the third case, Shanghai Hongqiao Business District around the Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub. (co-authored with Dr. Jochem de Vries)

**Research questions:**

Under what institutional settings does the Hongqiao development take place, and how does (a lack of) institutional capacity impact on the outcomes of place quality, with regards to diversity, integration, and sustainability?

**Abstract:**

The pro-growth, state-led institutional setting in China makes it easy to build infrastructure and physical space. Nevertheless, despite the aspiration to create the qualities often associated with place-making, many urban developments around new HSR hubs lack essential urban qualities. This paper uses the idea of institutional capacity to explore the conditions that, in the Chinese context, might contribute to place-making. The Hongqiao Business District, developed around a new HSR/airport hub in Shanghai indicates that the emergence of a policy network of municipal, sub-local (districts and sub-districts), decentralized, and privatized actors provides more favorable conditions for place-making than in other comparable cases in China.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

This chapter compares the three aforementioned cases and addresses the concluding remarks. As indicated in the methodology section, each case represents one particular type of institutional arrangement. The cross-case comparison is focused on the way different institutional arrangements frame
actor interactions and thus leads to different outcomes of place-making. The comparative unit is the causal mechanism and the policy games in key collective action problems: location choice, integration, diversity, and sustainability. Built upon the empirical research, this section comes to the final conclusions as well as reflections for future research.

References


Chapter 1: Introduction


Interseience.


Zhang, J. (2013). Marketization beyond Neoliberalization: A Neo-Polanyian Perspective on
Chapter 1: Introduction


CHAPTER 2

WHY HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY STATIONS CONTINUE CHINA'S LEAPFROG URBANIZATION?

The Institutional Parameters of Urban Development
Construction of Guangzhou South Railway Station, Photo: Author, 2011
Chapter 2: Institutional Parameters
WHY HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY STATIONS CONTINUE CHINA'S LEAPFROG URBANIZATION?

The Institutional Parameters of Urban Development

ABSTRACT

An ambitious program of High-Speed Railway (HSR) is under construction in China and already soon the network will overtake its counterparts in Europe. Reflecting on experiences in Europe, the authors explore the conditions for place-making qualities of six new HSR station areas in China. The superb inter-city connectivity of the new infrastructure nodes raises a lot of expectations about the economic and social potential of the station areas, but the experiences in Europe thus far are very differentiated. With regards to the attraction of economic activities usually the existing differences between different economic regions are reproduced rather than shaping completely new conditions. Also the expectations of developing completely new integrated urban centers around stations in the urban periphery are rather ambitious. The paper questions the planning responses to HSR development in Chinese cities and investigates the institutional conditions that frame these responses. The authors explore how the plans for Chinese HSR station development account for their objectives and reflect on the potential of the station area planning by investigating the institutional parameters of urban development.

KEY WORDS

High-Speed Railway, Urban Megaproject, Institutional Parameters, Spatial Reconfiguration, China

Introduction

It is not exaggerated to use the label “HSR heat” to characterize the nation-wide wave of China’s High-Speed Railway (HSR) network construction. International observers are impressed by the program of 16 thousands kilometers new railway construction until 2020 which overtakes the complete efforts of the European and Japanese pioneers over the last fifty years. One of the driving forces behind this ambitious program is the national government’s top-down intervention to stimulate domestic production and consumption after the financial crisis in 2008. Above all, there is a macro-economic agenda behind the expansion of HSR infrastructure. In addition, to these policy rationales associated with HSR development the program raises concerns about the spatial contextualization of infrastructure in processes of urbanization. The interrelationships between infrastructure and spatial structure are a critical factor in the development of cities. This certainly is the case in Chinese cities, where spatial configurations rapidly change.

Therefore, in this paper, we are particularly interested in the interrelationships of the station area in China. The experiences in Europe show that a good match between infrastructure and spatial organization is not self-evident (Hall & Hass-Klau, 1985; Van den Berg & Pol, 1998; Bertolini, 1998). The outcomes often turn out to be disappointing compared with the expectations at forehand. In Europe, the construction of HSR and the development of station areas is a complicated matter, in particular when these lines cross urbanized areas. Usually, it is the changing social and political context that makes the establishing an infrastructure project so complex. Typically, large projects start as single purposed macro-economic infrastructure projects but gradually grow into multi-purposed ones because of the emerging tensions between economic, environmental and spatial urbanization claims (Salet et al., 2012). This complication certainly is observed when the construction of “major routes” enters the urbanized parts in European countries, such as the new construction of the Train de Grande Vitesse (TGV) in France (Hall, 2009), the recent extension between Brussels and Amsterdam in the Randstad of the Netherlands (Priemus, 2007; De Vries, 2008), and the recent eastern route of London towards the European continent (Hall, 2009).

While the infrastructure planners initially were thinking of straight connections, those concerned with urban environment brought in a wider range of objectives responding both to the negative effects of the routes (raising alternatives to protect the environment, or specific qualities of landscapes or patterns of the built environment) and to the alternative positive effects of
the routes (cities lobbying to get connected to the new networks or getting their major economic concentrations directly connected). Obviously, the policy games of enriching the matching potential of infrastructure and spatial organization are even more intricate in the development of the station areas. If more interests are at stake, negotiation and exchange of different interests will be needed in order to enable a recombination of options.

The characteristic problem of these projects is that they often are started as single purposed economic endeavors of infrastructures but then appear to be organized too closed to enable adaptations. The decision-making process is often not open and not sophisticated enough to address issues of complexity and uncertainty. Eventually, however, the planners in Europe learned in the hard way: neglecting the complexity and the need of adaptive attitude, persisting on the initial logic of single purposed goals, and responding on contestation by hierarchical decisions resulted often in even more delay, long during stalemates and not seldom in overt conflict (Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Majoor, 2008, Salet & Gualini, 2007; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Priemus, 2007). Gradually, taking an open attitude and taking complexity on board is rewarding not only resulting in better management, but also in deliberate outcomes and recombination of different options. Developing HSR stations and station areas without deliberate spatial contextualization and without explicitly thinking about improving the quality of place and other interests, becomes rare in Europe.

Another characteristic problem in Europe regards the extremely high expectations of local governments. The prospect of getting connected to the European HSR network raises expectations of high economic growth with local planners. On top of the economic prospects, public facilities are required and local decision-makers often also tend to expect a high potential of social, cultural and ecological development at the strategic station areas. Completely new urban centers are designed around the strategic nodes of infrastructure. Some findings stand out in the European experiences thus far. New nodes of infrastructure usually do not change the regional economic patterns in a structural way (Pol, 2002; 2008). Of course, it will never hurt a city to get better connected, but the economic development usually rather reproduces the existing economic position of these places in regional or national systems. The existing disparities may even be increased (Vickermann et al., 1999). The city of Lille in France is an interesting example. After the connection with the “channel tunnel” coming from London, the connection with Paris to the southeast, and the northern connection to Brussels (Belgium), Lille became one of the best interconnected nodes in the European HSR network. With the international
star architect Rem Koolhaas’s work of an integrated multiple function space around the station, Lille takes profit of its better accessibility but not as much as was expected at forefront. Parts of the new offices are still empty. The social and spatial meaning and the spatial quality are a bit disappointing because of the disruptive dimensioning. Besides, in other French cities, the direct connection attracted many knowledge workers to Paris and Brussels instead of fostering local growth (Sand, 1995). The same might happen with the new central station area in Rotterdam (The Netherlands), which expects to attract new economies but most probably will lose knowledge workers to Amsterdam (Trip, 2008). New, future economy will not be attracted just by accessibility to a fast speed railway network rather the existing economic centers may take profit of this additional connection.

Obviously, since China has a different historic, social, political and institutional background, the above-mentioned problems are not expressed in the same way here. However, the same dilemmas of coping with complexity and the uncertainty of emerging properties are underlying in the context and will be expressed in their own way. Even when the projects are realized very fast, it does not automatically mean that conflicts or latent conflicts of interest are solved or brought into the improved quality of place and the contextualization of station development. Rather, it is likely that suboptimal outcomes will require new rounds of decision-making in order to improve spatial quality. To recapitalize the main argument: Referring to experiences in Europe, we wonder how Chinese cities cope with the challenges and dilemmas of HSR station area development. What are the expectations of HSR station area development? How are the aspirations made plausible? How is the station area development contextualized in existing urban spaces, is it integrated in city centers and second order type of urban centers or is it situated in the urban periphery? How are the aimed activities related to existing activities in the city? This paper assumes that complications in the planning of station areas can only well be explained when institutional conditions are well understood. Furthermore learning from each other’s policies requires a thorough understanding of the institutional conditions that shape decision-making and the implementation process. Therefore, in order to investigate the plausibility of local planning strategies we will intensely analyze the patterns of institutional incentives. Institutional analysis is very helpful in investigating how policy choices are conditioned by social forces and systematic power (Hsing, 2010). The paper explores the planning and policy responses for the potential station area development exemplified by six existing nodal cities along the HSR corridors in China. In short, the research question is:
What are the planning responses to the arrival of HSR in Chinese cities and what are the institutional conditions that frame these responses?

The New Generation of HSR Railway Station Area in China

Since the first dedicated passenger line operated in 2007, the opening of 2298-km’s Beijing-Guangzhou line on 26 December, 2012 made the Chinese HSR network the largest one in the world. It connects not only the three megacity-regions: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta, but also other fast growing metropolitan regions in the hinterland (Figure 2-1). It is vitally changing the geography of China, and altering the positions of “connected” cities in the hierarchy. It is therefore explicable that every involved city considers its connection to the network as a window of opportunity to launch comprehensive plans for station areas. For a good understanding of the cases it is necessary to raise the specific social and economic conditions and planning approaches in China (Zheng & Du, 2007): The HSR construction takes place in a context of explosive urbanization, contributing to expansion and spatial reconfiguration of cities. The rapid growing Chinese urbanization rate will give a continuing impetus for railway travel demand, as urban life and economy are expected to create increased long distance mobility. Besides, Chinese station areas are usually sub-divided in multiple rings. This idea can loosely be compared with European experiences, where station areas show a three-ring pattern based on the radius of services provided: ranging from services with a national and international scope close to the station to services for local and regional use farther away (Schutz in Pol, 2002). It should be noted that scale of developments in China usually is much larger than in Europe and therefore the rings are of a different size. In China the widest ring often refers to the “HSR new town/district”.

This study focuses on six station areas, which are junction stations that locate at the crossroad or terminal of multiple HSR-lines. This selection leaves aside intermediate stations, terminal stations at the end of just one line and stations in cities that rank relatively low in urban hierarchy. Furthermore, the overview has been dependent on the availability of material to allow an assessment of the plans for the station area. This made it impossible to include cities such as Zhengzhou and Changsha, which would ideally spoken have been desirable, and implies that the selection is limited to Beijing South, Tianjin West, Shanghai Hongqiao, Nanjing South, Wuhan and Guangzhou South. Every station area has been paid a site visit, the plans for these areas have been analyzed and in addition interviews have been conducted.
Figure 2-1. Conceptualized HSR network in China by 2020

Beijing South Railway Station

Beijing South Station is the only station that is in a central location (Figure 2-2). It is one of the two stations within the urbanized area of Beijing served by HSR. It stands out of the other cases, because it shows the arrival of a HSR connection did not necessarily lead to a chance for regenerating existing environment. It is a redevelopment of the Yongding Gate station, which is seven km from Tian'anmen Square. For years, very few spatial planning for this station area has been implemented, besides some specific plans, such as Project Plan of Public Facilities in Beijing South Station Area (2007). In the early version of city regulatory plan, Beijing aims at maintaining the existing situation around the station and enhancing its connection to central part. Until the 12th Five-year Plan, the potential of this area in Beijing's industrial re-structure has been recognized. At the end of 2012, the State Council approved to build Beijing's second international airport in Daxing, which is more south to the South station. This railway station area is planned to be more accessible from the new airport and inner city by the new metro line. Therefore, it can be qualified as the case under the transformation from pure mega infrastructure project to a possible juncture for spatial development.

Figure 2-2. Location of Beijing South Railway Station, Source: author.
**Tianjin West Railway Station**

As one of the four major stations in Tianjin, the rhetoric of the plan for the West Station is strongly based on “smart growth” and sustainability. It is drawn from the vision in the City Master Plan, in which Tianjin is portrayed as an international port city, an economic center in northern China, and an ecological city (Figure 2-3). However, these goals are not very clearly elaborated and predominantly seem to imply a focus on the introduction of the service sector, especially in the area of leisure and the creative economy, and a focus on a great leap forward in public transport. Tianjin’s current growth pole is the Yujiapu CBD at the new eastern coastal district (“Bin-hai-xin-qu”). Plans for the west station explicitly aim to balance investments to the other end of the “dumbbell” structure, by developing the third sub-city center (7 km to the city center). The old west station is moved and redeveloped into railway museum. The urban design of the new station area is typical for HSR station area’s throughout China, with the cluster of skyscrapers connected by a visually open axis dominating the plan. The plan for the initiating area, which is 1.26 km², provides three million square meters of floor space. And the plan for the 10-km² core area will add 15 million square meters of floor space, almost half is dedicated to housing (Plan for Sub City Center around Tianjin West Station Area, 2009). The program foresees a relatively large proportion of the floor space to be dedicated to housing compared with the plans for the other stations.

![Figure 2-3. Location of Tianjin West Railway Station, Source: author.](image-url)
Shanghai Hongqiao Railway Station

Hongqiao Station locates in the western periphery of Shanghai (Figure 2-4). The surrounding areas are covered with counties, city villas, private foreign schools, and small industries. It is the only integrated node that connects international airport, HSR, (possible) maglev, and four other transportation modes in China. It has an ambitious program for spatial development, adding 1.7 million square meters of floor space in the core area and 6.5 million square meters of floor space in 27-km² station area (Regulatory Plan Of Shanghai Hongqiao Station Area, 2009). It is divided into four rings: In the largest ring of 86-km², its focus on “headquarter economy” has given it the vision of “the next Lujiazui” (Central Business District). They aim at a similar economic profile that is international high-end trade and commercial business, logistics and exhibition. But Hongqiao promised not to replicate the image of Lujiazui because of the 48-meter airport height restriction. The promotion of “low-carbon” development as a leading idea in the plan provided a new centerpiece for the plan. This has implications for urban design and planning regulations. The urban design is characterized by low-density and small-scale block, giving space to pedestrians over cars, providing opportunities for green energy use, and energy-saving architecture design. Planning regulations are formulated more resilient in order to enable selecting environmentally friendly as well as high-tech and R&D companies over others in the later stage of industrial restructuring.

Figure 2-4. Location of Shanghai Hongqiao Railway Station, Source: author.
Nanjing South Railway Station

The Nanjing South Railay Station is located 12 km south of the city center (Figure 2-5). It aims to develop a completely new city center and is meant to contribute to transforming Nanjing from a mono-centric to a polycentric city. It originally started as a plan for the core station area, aimed at attracting “headquarter economy.” Later on it was integrated in the city master plan, combining different related developments, which included the redevelopment of a military airport and some other existing high-tech science parks. This is in correspondence with the idea that the impact of the new station is on the scale of the city as a whole and is not only relevant for the direct environment of the station (Duan, 2009). In the core area of 6.6 km², space is destined for development, including housing, public facilities (focusing on offices and businesses), green areas and no industry (Regulatory Plan of Nanjing South Station Area, 2010). The largest ring, the “South New Extension”, caters for both local and regional demands, which covers 66 km² for a population of 732,000 (Strategic Plan of Nanjing South New Extension, 2010). The large proportion of housing shows the determination of municipality to address local urbanization demand. In the urban design a monumental axis and the building of skyscrapers are given vision. However, the core of “south new extension” is outside of the core station area. As a part of the plan considerable space is reserved for industry, but not in the vicinity of the core station area.

Figure 2-5. Location of Nanjing South Railway Station, Source: author.
Wuhan Railway Station

Because the present Wuhan merged from three separate municipalities ten million inhabitants, it has a history of polycentric development. Its inner position within China makes it an extremely strategic node on both transportation and economic networks (Figure 2-6). The Wuhan Railway Station is located outside the city, which is 12 km away from Wuchang center, 17 km away from Hankou center, and 22 km from Hanyang center. Clearly influenced by the city’s master plan (City Master Plan of Wuhan, 2010), the plan for the station area foresees to add a new city sub-center. The program for the core area consists of 11-km² land to provide housing for a population of 100,000 people. On the other hand, retail, leisure, catering and offices take rather small proportion, which is an indication of aiming for local sub-center development (Regulatory Plan of Wuhan Station Area, 2010). The creation of an artificial lake and modern leisure facilities along its water banks is a reflection on the image of Wuhan as a “city of lakes”. The large proportion of green land also holds the promise of a livable built environment compared to the other station areas. Furthermore, the plan uses the idea of double cores: one center aimed at local services and another aimed at the head quarter economy. This concept might avoid that a failure to attract headquarters would jeopardize the efforts of making a sub-center for local use.

Figure 2-6. Location of Wuhan Railway Station, Source: author.
**Guangzhou South Railway Station**

Guangzhou South Railway Station is located in a rural area at the southern city fringe. It is a different case that is meant to perform a strategic role in regional integration. It is 17 km away from Guangzhou Zhujiang new center, and 18 km from Foshan city center (Figure 2-7). The plans for the core station area cover 4.5 km$^2$, and the overall area covers 36 km$^2$ providing housing for 352,000 people (Regulatory Plan of Guangzhou South Station Area, 2011). It is planned as an integrated transportation hub in southern China, a modern service center for business and trade, and spatial integration node for Foshan and Guangzhou ("Guang-fo-tong-cheng"). The emphasis on TOD strategy from more regional strategic perspective enables this area facilitated with sufficient transfer between different transportations from the very beginning. Another difference is that housing claims a small proportion of the land. This is indicative for the edge-city characteristics of this area as opposed to the desire elsewhere to establish a general new city center. Noteworthy, the actual spatial development around the station opened in 2009 is lagging behind the expectations. The hotel and catering facilities that should support the commercial and business functions in the station area are of a lower standard than aimed for.

*Figure 2-7. Location of Guangzhou South Railway Station, Source: author.*
Key Characteristics of New HSR Station Area

Comparing the six cases, they clearly share the next four specific characteristics.

Peripheral location

Except for the Beijing South Station, all other stations locate at the urban periphery. The stations themselves also symbolize the lack of using the station as an integrator of urban space. They follow a standard design, which functionally and architecturally comes close to the traditional design for airports (Figure 2-8). The design is centered on strictly separating incoming and outgoing passengers and quick transport away from the station. The stations are often spatially isolated and only interconnected (or expected to become interconnected) with regional or national (rather than local) transportation networks. In Europe and Japan, it usually appeared to be a problem to fully integrate the peripheral station areas in urban development: they are usually developed just as infrastructure projects. However, China is a different story. The periphery of Chinese cities is characterized by a fragmented morphology of urbanized areas and green fields. In the next section we will explore the plausibility of urban development in these peripheral locations by investigating the underlying institutional conditions.

![Figure 2-8. Photo of HSR station in urban periphery (2012), Source: author.](image)

Huge volume of program

On the local level, the size of developments are on a much larger scale than in Europe or Japan, where projects are limited to what in China is referred as the initiating or core station area. While the largest urban projects of Europe (such as the London Docklands or La Defense in Paris) amount to floor space development of two to three million square meters, multiple volumes are common in the Chinese core station areas. Without much ado developments are simply positioned as an additional sub-center of the city, often referred to
as “HSR new town or district” (Figure 2-9). Majority of the core station areas are planned to facilitate high-rises and monumental axis. Although most of the projects are positioned as part of an urban strategy in the city master plan, not much reference is made to the ways in which the new centers are complementing or possibly competing with existing centers. Besides this positioning in the local context, we also look into how the projects are embedded on the regional level. The plans investigated in this research do not show explicit consideration of the spatial dynamics that take place in neighboring cities in the same HSR corridor, which could be of influence on the feasibility of plans for individual cities.

![Figure 2-9. Illustrations of HSR station area, Source: relevant urban plans & designs.](image)

**Supply side approach**

The planning approach can be qualified as an inside-out approach dominated by design principles and strict zoning regulations. The urban contextualization is usually framed as the opportunity of creating a new “sub-city center” in the existing spatial structure. The content of the investigated plans seems to be very much driven by design and regulation (zoning) oriented planning as opposed to forms of interactive or communicative planning. None of the plans shows clear signs of a reflecting on demands in local society. Furthermore, the planning processes do not indicate that they are the product of wide ranging discussions. They are essentially planner’s project framed by local and national political ambitions. This is also facilitated by the locations that are chosen, which might minimize and localize the amount of resistance. The designs of the different areas show remarkable commonalities, as most of them give prominence to grid structure with a central axis extended from HSR station towards a solid cluster of skyscrapers. In general those areas are regarded as a city icon and gateway for the city. Interesting enough, there have been a few attempts to emphasize the “flexibility” in order to respond to the potential uncertainty and risks resulting
from unknown demand side variables. One way to do this is to create a new land use category, namely “reserved land” which allows for different types of land-use.

**Political discourse on spatial quality**

Although most plans give the impression of straightforward promotion of economic growth, also issues of “sustainability”, “scientific development (Kexue-fa-zhan-guan)” or “harmonious society (He-xie-she-hui)” are creeping up as a reflection of the present political discourse. Those abstract discourses are made more concrete through introducing concepts such as ecological industry, more livable public space, smart energy use, green architecture design, creative economy, and public transport system, etc. These reflect an ongoing political discourse on the national level initiated in top political circles around the ideas of a “harmonious society (2006)” and “scientific development (2007).” In general, all local governments are influenced by these discourses and adjust local agendas accordingly, but mainly on a general level. In present stage of construction it is difficult to see whether the concepts will be elaborated to an operational level on which they influence the plans significantly.

**Institutional Parameters Guiding Spatial Extension around HSR**

Exploring the HSR stations and station areas currently under construction in China, we learned that the planning aspirations are even more ambitious than the counterparts in Europe. The expectations are higher both with regards to the economic growth and to the realization of spatial quality. And, to make the challenge even more topical, most new HSR stations are planned in the urban periphery. The “HSR new towns” are characteristic for this round of leapfrog urbanization in China. Obviously, urbanization in China has its own backgrounds and trajectories of growth. The pressure of economic and social growth of cities is exceptionally high in China, already for decades, and the shape of urbanization is developing a unique morphology, which is not comparable with the extensively decentralized American city-regions or with the compact European city-formations. Characteristic is the huge size of urbanized space but unlike American cities still combined with the effective political power to prevent sprawl over non-urbanized regions. Furthermore, it is highly intensified urban space with concentrations of high-density land use over larger urban space than that can be found in Europe. The third characteristic is the highly regulated system of transportation. The combination of the urban explosion and the regulating hand of the government produced the unique shape of Chinese metropolis.
The shaping of the overall spatial patterns, however, is not optimized. Cities tend to neglect considerable parts of the existing urban spaces, both in suburban districts and in old industrial and residential urban districts. New development leaps forward via spectacular extensions such as new university towns, theme parks, high-tech zones, new peripheral industrial zones, and residential areas. The outcome of this “hopscotch” style of urbanization is both new development and also more marginalized areas. The development of HSR stations and station areas seems to follow these patterns. In order to explore the above-mentioned challenges in the typical Chinese context, the institutional mechanisms of the urbanization motor must be investigated. We consider the following institutional parameters:

**State-led centralized urbanization**

Typically for the Chinese way of urbanization is that it is mainly state led. There are three major national policies providing preconditions for local urbanization: the Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the National Land Management Planning, and the urban and rural planning. The former two set up the general goals for the third one. Infrastructures plans are made mainly according to the Five-year Plans. In this sense, the cities are not autonomous in pursuing the land policy. The national government invested 4000 billion RMB into infrastructure and urban construction facing financial crisis, which synchronously stimulated the bubble of domestic construction. Furthermore, various quotas and indexes delineating the boundaries of local action space are issued. The local spatial planning has to obey requirements from the national strategic thinking and land management, in particular the index with zoning regulation with “binding indexes” and the “forecasting indexes.” In the recent land-use planning round (2005-2010) in particular sustainability requirements have been added (Cai et al., 2009). Correspondingly, all of the spatial plans, including HSR station area plans, need to be adapted into the official planning system, and be in line with the top-down guidelines. That is why station area development in China cannot be regarded as independently decision-making projects as those in Europe.

**Land ownership and transfer system**

Since the introduction of market economy, the economic value of land has been fully recognized in China. The role of land is crucial in the institutional fabric of urbanization. The 1982 Constitution “recognized two kinds of land ownership: urban land is the property of the state while rural land is collectively owned by villagers” (Zhang, 2000, p. 129). With additional amendments, the
1988 Constitution “legalized the separation of land ownership from land use rights, and it also allowed the transfer of land use rights for a fixed period of time” (Zhang, 2000, p. 129). As a result, land is commoditized but not privatized (Hsing, 2010). Therefore, just as Yeh and Wu argue (1996), a land market has been created and land use rights entered the market. The state – in particular the municipality – takes profit in the process of land right transfer.

Land right transfers in the urban periphery are especially profitable for cities. The city takes the role of land transfer agency. The price scissors between low compensation fees to farmer collectives and the leasing of the land are often contested. By changing the destination into commercial construction land, the city takes profit of the transfer, the leasing fees, the taxes on new economic activity and the revenue from central government (Zhu & Zhang, 2009). The large profits for municipalities are considered as a vehicle act as profit machine of urban development. The municipality has a monopoly position. Farmers, who own and use land, are not entitled to arrange direct land transactions on agreed prices with developers but depend on the city. This mechanism is a key incentive of the hopscotch style of urbanization happening around HSR station areas.

**Official appraisal mechanism**

A further drive for leapfrog urbanization and pro-growth attitude of the cities is the institutionalization of political credits. As Zhang (2002, p. 492) indicates, “the Central Government judges the performance of local officials based on two criteria: political conformity to the Central Government and achievements in local economic development”. The achievements of economic development are one of the key factors of officials’ political credits, which is indispensable for political promotion. First of all, the Gross Domestic Product is the key indicator for establishing the performance of cities and therefore of politicians. All expenditure is taken into account to contribute to rapid economic growth, sometime regardless of its efficiency or environmental costs (Abramson, 2006). Mega infrastructure and industrial projects, including HSR station areas are already significantly contributing to the GDP by simply being realized, because they represent enormous investments (Zhu & Zhang, 2009). Secondly, local politicians are also concerned with promoting the image of a successful city. The key point is that it should be visible and self-evident. HSR station area development fits to the official appraisal requirements, because of its magnificent scale, its eye-catching architecture and its representation as a symbolic landmark or gateway of city. Thirdly, a new HSR district can provide a relatively visible platform to promote central government’s political goals, such as a “harmonious
In China only the Ministry of Railway (MoR) is responsible for the formulation of the railway network planning, the implementation and evaluation of railway, and the management/regulation of state-owned railway property. Oddly enough, it is independent of the Ministry of Transport, and is known as the most enclosed “kingdom” left by the formal Socialist Planned Economy. As the main decision-maker, it takes two variables as the criteria: one is the technical index, such as turning radius of train and the geological conditions of land. The other one, we consider as the deeper causality, is that the cost of demolition along corridor and station areas should be as low as possible. In addition in some cases the MoR chooses its routes according to those trajectories that would provide the best chance to obtain more land. This is a crucial factor explaining why the most station location choices decided by the ministry attempts to avoid city center location.

The locations of station are the outcome of negotiations between MoR and local municipalities. The position of municipalities with respect to the station location is ambivalent. On one hand, most municipalities prefer the connection nearer to the city center, which is better to support inner city redevelopment. On the other hand, fast growing cities are in need of capital for development and in search of land transactions. At the urban fringe lower compensation rates are applicable and there are more possibilities for large scale and lucrative developments. The first consideration is usually brought in negotiation with the MOR, but the most common outcome is that the municipality compromises (well aware of its second consideration) and comes to certain agreement with the ministry. Despite the municipality’s inner conflict with interests concerning the inner city, the opportunity of a new round of “land enclosure” and spatial reconfiguration is attractive. At the end, the creation of a “HSR new town/district” appears as a win-win situation.

Central-municipal government relationship

The intergovernmental relationships further explain the local “pro-growth system” around HSR station area. The national government tightens the boundaries of municipal governments but simultaneously takes profit of local growth. Alarmed by the wide protests on the excessive expropriation of collective land and the low compensation fees to farmers, the national government started a series of contractive land policies that urged the municipal
government to introduce a rational land-use control (Cong & Wei, 2009). The local government, on the other hand, has the most important task to foster economic growth and has become dependent on the sources of land income. By expansion of residential or commercial construction the local government generates income via land revenue rather than taxes. However, the impact of this institutional incentive is differentiated over cities because municipalities may decide to decrease taxes in order to attract investment to station areas. Because of “the overwhelming public ownership of production” (Zhang, 2002, p. 483), the property tax had only token meaning in China for a long period until the collection of real estate tax started in January 2011, which is similar but still different from the property tax in western countries. Therefore, the “land-revenue system” is a strong incentive for local governments to lease out as much land as possible and therefore acts as a driver of promote HSR new town.

**Municipality–district government relationship**

Although the municipality has a monopoly position in the transfer of land, the other public sectors on the local level, namely the urban districts and sub-districts (“jie-dao”) also matters. “Infrastructure projects are mainly a municipal responsibility, land leasing is initiated by both the municipal and district governments” (Zhang, 2002, p. 485), and residence demolishment such as land clearance for the HSR line are basically under the control of district government and implemented by sub-districts. Therefore, district government has emerged as a key player in shaping community landscape in the urban morphology. While municipal planners are responsible for the plans of station area, the districts are of great influence on the realization of the plans. As a result the urban space around the station ultimately realized, could be different from the original plans.

**Physical planning tradition**

Plans for large-scale developments, such as station areas, are made by planners raised in the tradition of physical planning and urban design in China. As a consequence the focus is on the creation of the physical built environment, perfect composition and aesthetics. Therefore many plans lack institutional reflection on stakeholder interests, a clear conception of the public interest, the economic aspects of plans and issues concerning the time sequence of developments.

Considering the full set of institutional incentives, we conclude that the leapfrog style of urbanization in China is not a matter of incident. It is the
structural outcome of organizing the process of urbanization as a plan-led system - with a key role for the (namely local) government as monopolists in the land system - and of using the development of land as a profit mechanism on behalf of the government, generating in this way new seed money for further growth. As long as the economy continues growing and cheap land can be acquired, the system may survive but it takes a strong mortgage on the assumption of continuous growth. In the meantime, the social, the spatial and the environmental qualities of urban growth are exposed to the pressure cooker of precipitated and biased growth.

Conclusions

The paper shows that an institutional analysis is important to understand the reasons behind urban development around station areas. The cases of the Chinese HSR station areas may be unraveled by following the institutional incentives to profit making (follow the money). The mechanisms of profit making explain why the station sites appear at the urban periphery and why the construction of brand new HSR core station areas even on these places might attract additional investment on concentrated residential development and commercial activities. Development of these places is not improbable because of the low costs of taking it under construction and the financial and political profits for the government, even when economic growth will simply move from other sites in the city. In contrast to Europe, the institutional conditions of the Chinese model of urbanization contain non-market type incentives in support of developing “places out of place”. On the positive side, the institutional pattern appears to be effective in times of growth (albeit in a selective way). On the negative side, a very robust style of urbanization is promoted by these conditions, polarizing the metropolitan landscape in spaces of excessive growth and spaces of marginalization. The institutional incentives accommodate fast and wild development but generate the need of new rounds of urban planning to mitigate the social, spatial and environmental qualities of the city.

References


CHAPTER 3

INSTITUTIONAL ANATOMY
OF CHINESE HSR-ORIENTED
DEVELOPMENT

Nanjing South Station Area
Chapter 3: Nanjing South New Extension

View from Nanjing South Railway Station, Photo: Author, 2012
Chapter 3: Nanjing South New Extension
INSTITUTIONAL ANATOMY OF CHINESE HSR-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT?
Nanjing South Station Area

ABSTRACT
The explosive development of China’s cities generates a large number of collective action problems that require policy integration via the negotiation of different interests. The spatial development around High-Speed Railway (HSR) stations is particularly relevant. The contemporary institutional edifice of the Socialist Urban Entrepreneurialism is highly complicated by the following paradox: on one hand, the traditional unitary structure of governmental organization has transformed into a multi-actor system (involving many governmental and non-governmental agencies in urban development decision-making). On the other hand, styles of policy-making are still nested in hierarchical and functionally patterned routines. As a result, the challenges of collective actions around stations, which refer to the location choice, mobility integration and urbanity making, are stalemated by inter-actor conflicts. The authors argue that successful collective action has to be sought in non-hierarchical solutions to conflicts. The case of Nanjing’s urban extension around one of China’s strategic nodal HSR stations is analyzed as an explorative case. As conclusions, the generic institutional conditions are identified.

KEY WORDS
High-Speed Railway; Urban Entrepreneurialism; Actor Constellation; China.

Dai, G., De Vries, J., & Salet, W., 2014, submitted to an international peer-reviewed journal)
Chapter 3: Nanjing South New Extension

Introduction

Managing urban growth is undoubtedly one of the great challenges in China today. The rapid expansion of a large number of metropolises is a key characteristic of China’s modernization process in recent decades (Abramson, 2011; Gaubatz, 2001; Lin, 2001; Wu & Phelps, 2008; Xu & Zhu, 2001; Yang & Chang, 2007; Zhao & Zhang, 2001). Furthermore, after the first stages of unadulterated urban growth, present efforts of policy coordination now aim to integrate objectives of social and ecological sustainability in the processes of economic transformation. New policies must address a variety of problems, such as the massive loss of fertile agricultural land, the increasing spatial mismatch of housing and jobs, the emergence of new patterns of social segmentation (Douglass et al., 2012; Fan & Grossman, 2001; Wang et al., 2009; Yuan et al., 2003; Zhang, 2008), the reorganization of urban system (Zhang, 2008), the problems of selective accessibility in the rapid expansion of transit networks in and between cities (Shen, 1997; Yang & Gakenheimer, 2006; Zhao et al., 2009), the loss of places with special historical value (Abramson, 2011; Yang & Chang, 2007), and a lack of environmentally sustainable urban development (Chiu, 2008; Huan, 2007; Yuan et al., 2003).

This paper addresses the actual challenges of urban transformation in China by focusing more specifically on the urban development that has been triggered by the High-Speed Railway (hereafter HSR) network. By 2011, the Chinese HSR network was already the largest in the world and will develop into a 16,000 km network connecting the three megacity-regions as well as other inland metropolitan areas in China (Ministry of Railways, hereafter MoR, 2008). The realization of this network will likely have a major impact on the cities that will be connected. Although the current population densities of many Chinese cities are still comparatively low (Chen et al., 2008), the idea of compact development has not yet been favored by local governments. This impact of HSR, namely the new town development around stations, is thus closely linked to the core issues of managing urban growth in China today.

In addition to this social-spatial transition, China’s institutions are in a process of change. Urban planning – seen as collective action to establish collective goals and to overcome the numerous social dilemmas that are inherent to urban transformation (Scott, 2014) – has to deal with a highly dynamic object and institutional context at the same time. Characteristic of the institutional change is the dual process of decentralization and marketization that has introduced a multiplicity of new actors and a differentiation of responsibilities in the urban development arena. Formally, the state is still overwhelmingly powerful with
regard to land use, but in practice it is misleading to assume that the state forms a coherent unit acting on the basis of single capabilities and a single agenda. In fact, the relevant actor constellation consists of a range of public, semi-public, and private agencies and powerful individuals with diverging goals, which has been labeled as a “fragmented authoritarian state” (Mertha, 2009). Paradoxically, formal planning styles and actual policy practices are still nested in the “central rule” routines and technical sector policies of command and control. As a result, this contributes to the inability to address collective action problems and even leads to the “chaos” of Chinese cities (Wei, 2005). This paper builds on the assumption that urban development in China can be explained by uncovering its specific institutional parameters (Dai et al., 2013). After establishing the rules and social codes that drive relevant actors in the urban development process, we can establish what forms of collective action – “planning” – are most suitable and which institutional conditions require adaptation. On the basis of the development of Nanjing’s South Station area, this paper aims to learn and develop further hypotheses on the changing institutional anatomy of urban development in China.

Urban development around HSR stations to a large extent epitomizes the problems of urban transformation in China. Many of the collective action problems associated with managing urban growth come to the fore in the urban development of HSR stations and their direct surroundings. They play a key role in local governments’ policies of urban competition. In most cases new stations are high impact decisions and are located outside or on the edge of existing cities, therefore raising a wide variety of issues. How does the new transport node fit into the existing transport network? What does the development do in terms of the urban fabric of the city? Does the program for the area support goals of social integration or does it establish new patterns of segregation? The speed of development and the planning style adopted in many cases raises questions about the adaptive capacity of these area developments. Furthermore, the multi-billion CNY investments associated with the development of the HSR network make it imperative to develop the related urban activities in such a way that societal benefits are optimized. “The effects of the HSR on the territory are not mechanical and fixed at forehand, and much depends on whether actors undertake adequate strategies.” (Tang et al., 2011, p. 417). Using the HSR project to the benefit of city re-structuring and balance of the uneven regional development (Fan, 1997) in Chinese metropolitan area is one of the ways to get the most out of these huge investments.

The argument of the paper is that a thorough knowledge of the conditions
that guide the key actors with stakes in urban collective action problems should be a precondition of planning. Considering that China’s social organization is in transition, that it has strong idiosyncratic characteristics, and that it amounts to an increasingly complicated institutional edifice, it is a daunting task to explore the institutional conditions of urban transformation, which is being done increasingly (Chen, 2012; Han & Wang, 2003; He et al., 2010; Lash, 2009; Tang et al., 2001), and even more so to formulate solutions to these problems. In its description of the conditions that structure typical urban collective action problems in Chinese cities, the paper shows that inter-actor coordination is as much a key issue in Chinese urban development as it is elsewhere despite the dominance of the Chinese state and its very hierarchal structure. Our working hypothesis is that the inter-actor conflicts in a non-hierarchical way can provide an explanation of the different ways in which collective action problems are dealt with.

Problems of Collective Action in Chinese Urbanization

In this paper, HSR station area development is conceptualized as being the result of a constant stream of decisions made by actors. The so-called “Socialist Urban Entrepreneurialism” (SUE) (Wu, 2001; Yu & Zhu 2009; Wu & Phelps, 2011) or “State Capitalism” (Huang, 2001) is raised to demonstrate the nature of “growth coalition” in post-Social China (Zhu, 1999). Collective action problems arise when the incentives that these individual actors experience conflict with collectively defined goals, which incline actors to opt for actions that undermine collective benefits. A variety of incentives can motivate actors to go their own way instead of contributing to overarching collective goals. Actors can assume that collective goals will be achieved anyway, allowing them to pursue other benefits without contributing to their realization (freeriding). A lack of trust or assurance among actors can also lead to fear that an actor will be the only one to contribute to collective goals with other actors profiting without making a contribution (Ostrom, 1990). Actors can also prefer the short-term benefits of individual preferences to long-term benefits of collective goals. Facilitating collective action can have different forms, such as imposing desired behavior through hierarchy, collaborative joint-decision making, or adapting the market mechanism (Scharpf, 1997).

Viewed from this perspective, urban planning is a means to establish collective goals and overcome the social dilemmas that are associated with collective action in urban contexts. As Scott (2008, p. 760) puts it: “planning can … best be understood as a set of socially and politically determined practices
directed to the remediation of specific forms of dysfunctionality in urban space, and these dysfunctionalties arise when urban development would be purely market-driven. In addition to remediating forms of social and ecological urban disorder, planning and urban policy are also instruments for proactive economic intervention “to secure economic gains that would fail to emerge in the absence of collective action” (Van den Berg & Pol, 1998; Wang & Lin, 2011; Scott, 2008, p. 765).

As a logical result of the perspective sketched above, understanding Chinese urban development and planning requires knowledge of the collective action problems that exist in Chinese cities and the actor constellation that is involved. Below we will briefly discuss the different aspects of collective action problems in the Chinese context, based on existing literature on urban development. First, we will provide an overview of the collective urban development goals that seem to be hampered by social dilemmas in the Chinese context. Second, the role of actor constellations, including their incentive structure and powers, will be discussed.

What characteristics of collective action problems associated with Chinese urban development, and with HSR stations in particular, are brought to the fore in the literature? First of all, the scalar complexity leaps to the eye (Table 3-1). At the national level, the development of the HSR network is assumed to have considerable impact on the geography of China and, therefore, choices on routes and stops are important decisions in the process of securing economic gains that would fail to emerge in the absence of collective action (Tang et al., 2011; Scott, 2008). Further, Chinese cities are part of large megacity-regions such as the Yangtze-River-Delta that are strengthened by the development of the HSR network. Complementarity and competition between cities in these mega urban regions are clearly issues that play a role on this scale level (Bertolini & Spit, 2005; Bonnafous, 1987; Blum et al., 1992; Blum et al., 1997; Xu & Yeh, 2005; Duan, 2009). On the city scale, the location choice of these stations and the complementarity of the spatial development program vis-à-vis other developments in the city-region are part of a variety of collective action problems. As these stations are often located in the periphery of cities (Zheng & Du, 2007; Dai et al., 2013) they reinforce the typical hop scotch urban development of Chinese cities, causing concern about overall city structure: its pattern of social segmentation, its spatial structure (Van den Berg & Pol, 1998; Wang & Lin, 2011), its economic structure (Tang et al., 2011), and its transport system. Furthermore, these HSR station areas are generally seen as lucrative spaces for development so the supply of land for development is driven by great
expectations of financial gain, which can lead to oversupply of certain urban functions in the planned new extension area. At the level of the core station area, challenges for collective actions exist with regard to establishing a vibrant urban development that is capable of absorbing future changes in demand (Bertolini & Spit, 1998; Duan, 2009). The integration of the station in its surroundings in order to mutually reinforce their development is another challenge at the local level (Wei, 2005; Zheng & Du, 2007; Trip, 2008). A particular challenge in this respect is integrating the train station with other systems of transportation. This paper will focus primarily on the issues that play on the city level and below.

Table 3-1. Collective action issues in HSR-oriented development in China. Source: author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Selective development HSR network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megacity-region</td>
<td>Complementarity and competition between cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Location choice and urban program vis-à-vis existing city (region) and other planned developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New urban extension</td>
<td>Creating a vibrant, heterogeneous, and adaptive urban environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core station area</td>
<td>Integration of station building with the urban fabric, and integration of HSR with other transport systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to understand success or failure in solving the related collective action problems it is necessary to understand which actors hold key powers in deciding these issues, what interests they have, how they perceive their situation, and how their mutual relationships are shaped. The conceptual framework used to perform this task is largely derived from Ostrom's (1990) evolution of institutions for collective action and Scharpf’s (1997) actor-centered institutionalism. According to Scharpf (1997), “we need to relate individual behavior … to the appropriate individual or social unit of reference on whose behalf action is taken and from whose perspective intentional choices can be explained”. In Chinese society the number and diversity of such relevant “units of reference” have increased considerably in the last decades, as the dominance of central government and “dan-wei” work units has been supplemented with other forms of social organizations. China’s transition “can best be understood as a triple process of decentralization, marketization and globalization” (Wei, 2005, p. 201). The transition process has created a new and highly dynamic actor constellation. This actor constellation can only partly be understood by applying the traditional vocabulary – such as public versus private – used in planning research. As a result of the increasingly diverse actor constellation, urban planning in China has become increasingly complex than a technical
Decentralization has given local governments a key position in the land market and has shifted the fiscal system, previously dominated by the central government, to one of tax sharing (Wu & Zhang, 2007). This has resulted in a critical role for local governments in the phenomenal economic growth in post-Mao China (Hsing, 2010). It is important to note that local government is multi-layered with units such as municipalities, districts, and sub-districts. Marketization has led to the abolishment of some command and control planning principles (Wei, 2005). Chinese planned economy has a long tradition in which the state determines what and how much the population needs. The more the market is involved, the less these top-down allotment mechanisms for food, industry, and population work. As a result, the complicated mix of market versus hierarchical principles characterizes the transition of Chinese society.

Actor-Centered Institutionalism assumes that actors operate rationally and engage in strategic interaction to fulfill their preferences. Actors include the rules in their calculation of what is the most effective course of action, the so-called “logic of consequence” (Schön, 1983; March & Olsen, 2004; Giddens, 1984). In order to establish what is most effective, consequences are measured against the preferences of the actor that is the unit reference of an individual. These preferences are based on the self-interest of the particular (corporate) actor. The way self-interest is defined by a particular actor is strongly influenced by their set of cognitive and moral templates, but is likely to also be guided by a desire for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth (Salet et al., 2012; Scharpf, 1997). Urban growth is clearly in the self-interest of Chinese municipalities because it contributes to the strengthening of the – financial and power - position of that municipality. Nevertheless, actors also act according to normative obligations that they are assumed to follow. If not, actors will at least have an inclination to rhetorically convince others that their behavior is in accordance with the norms that they are assumed to serve, even despite overriding motives of different sorts (Schön & Rein, 1994). As result, Chinese municipalities, at least according to theory, will not – completely – ignore their role as guardians of the public interest despite their overwhelming financial interests in urban development.

Further to moral templates, actors are guided by cognitive templates that provide standard ways of defining problems and standard ways of solving those problems. This is particularly notable in areas where a specific group of experts, such as engineers or planners, play a dominant role in framing problems and solutions. Understanding urban planning in China therefore requires insight in the dominant views and routines of Chinese planners. The latter touches upon what has been called the logic of appropriateness, in which individuals follow
“internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right or good, without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility” (March & Olsen, 2004, p. 3). Regardless of the importance of the rationalist paradigm for actor-centered institutionalism, it cannot be ignored that actors act intentionally as well as according to “habits” based on custom, tradition, and culture. “The routines of decision-making are nestled in customs, conventions, formal rules and patterns of social norms” (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 1989, which is cited in Salet et al., 2012, p. 6). It can be concluded that in order to understand the role of different actors in Chinese urban development, a simple reference to a desire to grow, to increase autonomy, and for self-preservation will not suffice as a satisfying answer. A wider variety of motives stemming from a diversity of conditions must be included in the analysis.

If the purpose of planning is perceived as overcoming urban collective action problems, a precondition is a thorough knowledge of the conditions that guide the key actors with stakes in these problems. As stated above, the purpose of this paper is to obtain insight on the conditions that structure and solve the urban collective action problems associated with HSR development under the SUE. In order to get the institutional sights, the research questions have been addressed:

**What are the key collective action problems in HSR station area development?**

**How are actor constellations framed in dealing with collective action problems?**

**What are the institutional conditions that influence these collective action problems?**

**HSR-Oriented Development in Nanjing**

The case of Nanjing South Station is chosen because it seems to be representative for most HSR station area developments in other Chinese cities are in the urban fringe under similar conditions. Nevertheless, representativeness is not the major concern as this paper is mainly explorative in nature. The city of Nanjing was the former capital city of ten Chinese dynasties (from 229 AD to 1949) and is now the capital of Jiangsu Province. Located in the Yangtze River Delta, it exemplifies the rapidly growing large coastal cities of China. The municipality covers 6587 km$^2$ and the inner city covers 2753 km$^2$ (2011). In terms of GDP the city ranks sixth within the Yangtze Delta (2007), and it hosts 8 million residents (6th National Population Census in 2010). The municipality is sub-divided in 11
districts (sub-municipal administrations). As a former imperial capital, cultural history plays a more important role in Nanjing's development. This may explain why Nanjing has remained relatively compact and less radically modernized in its inner city, despite its rapid growth in recent years (Luo & Wei, 2006). The old version of the City Master Plan (1991-2010) aims to turn Nanjing from a monocentric into a polycentric city. This is to be done primarily by developing new towns and other urban extensions for around 2.3 million inhabitants. Most of them are based on the original counties next to the inner city of Nanjing. The new City Master Plan (2007-2030) establishes clearer future visions on scale and functions for the planned sub-city centers and new towns.

The new South Railway Station (Figure 3-1) is expected to be the growth pole of the southern urban fringe of Nanjing city. It is 12 km from the historical city center, and locates on the territory of three districts. It is a twenty-eight-platform railway node, where two HSR passenger lines (Beijing-Shanghai and Shanghai-Wuhan-Chengdu) and one non-HSR freight line (Nanjing-Wuhu) meet. Based on the concept of “zero-distance transfer”, urban and regional transportation are integrated three city metro lines, inter-city bus station, and multiple city-bus stops, as well as parking space at the same spot. Previously, the 6-km² area directly surrounding the station was covered with a mixture of farmland, low-end industry, and rural housing. And it is now target with the focus on high-end office and business development. Its urban design is characterized by a 1.5 km green axis connecting the station with the city river and is surrounded by 100 m-tall high-rise buildings. The 32-km² and even 66-km² area around it, the New South Extension, is planned to be a new sub-center of the city. It is expected to encompass a variety of public facilities and ultimately to accommodate 733,000 residents.

The paper covers the process from the earliest discussions on location choice in 1986 till the actual station area development in 2012. To conduct the case study, fieldwork has been done in three stages. The first period lasted from October 2010 to February 2011, when Nanjing South Station was still under construction. The second round was from June to July 2011, during the period when the station was put into operation. The third visit on spot was done in November 2012, when surrounding land was awaiting for investment and construction. The methods used in this research are mainly qualitative. Perceptions and intentions of actors, and the reconstruction of the process are mainly drawn from interviews to key actors and anthropological methods during internship in major bureau. Document analysis on policies, regulations and plans has been used to establish ambitions, the distribution of
responsibilities, and formal distributions of power.

Key Collective Action Problems of the New South Extension

The process can be structured according to three subsequent episodes in which important decisions were made. First, the decision from the national level to include Nanjing in the HSR network triggered a struggle between national and local actors over where to place the main HSR station (1991-2003). The second episode (2004-2009) contains the design process for the station, its immediate surroundings, and the urban design – blueprint – for the new sub-center around the station. This design process takes place within a context of high dynamism on the southern edge of Nanjing. The third episode, from 2009 onwards, starts with the opening of the station and the implementation of the plans, where design ideals met reality. Correspondingly, three problems of collective actions arise from the station opening: location choice, mobility integration, and urbanity making. First, deciding where to place the HSR station can be an outcome that is in line with the interests of one single powerful actor,
or one that serves the interests of multiple actors. The second issue concerns the infrastructure integration with other transportation modes. Third, the design and programming of the surrounding area is determined by whether to develop it into a mono-functional node or a multi-functional urban place. In discussing the three collective action problems, we will focus on conflicts between different actors, their preferences and orientations and the way they are embedded in institutional conditions, and the way interactions have taken place.

**Location choice**

The debate over where to locate Nanjing’s HSR station began with the revision of the City Master Plan in the 1990s. The debate quickly headed for a deadlock as the two major actors – the MoR and the Municipality of Nanjing - had different preferences regarding the route for the new line. MoR is responsible for planning and implementing the China-wide railway network, and it has been known for its non-alignment with other actors. While formally part of the national bureaucracy, it operates with great independence and is therefore one of the last enclosed kingdoms left by the Socialist Planned Economy. Its behaviors are driven by both the individual preferences for less technological obstacles with a more modern image, and the normative orientations for efficient implementation of railway infrastructures and therefore less mixed-functions. This can be reflected in the different preferences of station location depending on local context. In the case, MoR preferred to construct a route along an existing line through the Nanjing (Central) Station, as this could avoid the geologically unstable zone, require less removal of existing environment, and strengthen the existing nodal function of the old station. The municipal government, on the other hand, viewed the incoming HSR through the lens of urban expansion and preferred a location on the southern edge of the city. It saw the construction of a new station as a golden opportunity to steer urban development. A location on the southern edge would have multiple advantages according to the municipality. To capitalize on the arrival of the HSR, the municipality would want to promote development on a large scale in order to benefit from the cheap land acquisition. Initiating development around the existing main station would be more complicated and expensive than developing in a low-density area on the southern fringe. However, MoR’s control of all the necessary resources limited the municipality’s ability to guide the location choice in its preferred direction.

Only when Nanjing’s role on the national railway network was strategically changed did the new south location become a real option. The critical juncture to turn the conflict into consensus was the national initiative to construct the
east-west HSR corridor, which connects the coastal area with the Chinese hinterland. In the new plan, Nanjing would become a node in the network instead of being merely a regional terminal. Therefore, the new South Station became the preferred option for MoR. The interaction between MoR and the municipality changed from a hierarchical towards a cooperation game.

**Mobility integration**

The integration of different transportation methods was conducted through rather structural network among actors. The discussion focused on the topics of integration with other transportation networks, the intersection of railway with roads, and the competition for infrastructure construction sites. The overall development task was separated in two trajectories that corresponded with responsibilities of different actors: the station building and railway facilities fell under the responsibility of the MoR, while the rest, including all the other transportations and the whole South Extension, were the responsibility of Nanjing municipality. The MoR’s concern was to create an efficient space that was capable of processing large streams of rail passengers in order to show political achievement. Furthermore, the Minister of MoR expected to earn public credit by showing that he is tackling the widely reported chaotic situations that were symbolized by the frenzied mass travel around Chinese New Year. Therefore, the MoR used to persist the idea of separating the railway from the local road and metro systems. The airport model of radically separating incoming and outgoing passengers and limiting station access to train passengers was the preferred option. However, the municipal government insisted to integrate all transportation networks within the same space. The MoR holds the preference to build the station as a node of not only regional but also local urban transport networks.

The MoR has virtually all the relevant powers, namely land ownership and money, in order to construct the station building according to their own philosophy and limited mission. Nevertheless, the fact that the municipality of Nanjing is one of the shareholders of Beijing-Shanghai HSR Corporation Ltd. brought substantial leverage for Nanjing in the power game. This is an exceptional situation, as usually only provinces or directly-controlled municipalities can be shareholders. In addition, some problems were solved by Transportation Department of Jiangsu Province through the communication with Ministry of Transportation on the national level. In addition, there are indications that the municipality offered some sort of financial and/or land compensation to the railway actors in return for the integration of functions into the station building. Generally speaking, the outcomes of the network were
rather successful. This is rather striking because this has not taken place in many other HSR station areas in China. For instance, the interchange between railway and metro station was shorten from a 2-km horizontal distance to a two-story vertical transfer.

Creating urbanity

The making of urbanity is the third and most complex collective action challenge. Urbanity can be differentially interpreted according to the contexts. Embedded in Chinese context, the major conflicts of urbanity in this case were over whether to develop the station area as a mono-functional “node” or a multi-functional “place”. The planning of the station area, led by municipality, was characterized by a top-down design approach. The process started with an international urban design competition in 2006, which did not provide specific guidance on the detailed program but rather a loose vision of “creating a new sub-city center”. The proposed plans were, on one hand, strongly inspired by international best practices; on the other hand, they were based on superficial prognoses based on existing demographic, economic, and geographic statistics. After the competition, a local consortium was chosen. The main appeal of the plan was the pedestrian-friendly street plan and the small size of building blocks, and a more flexible implementation strategy. The process received an interesting boost in 2008: with the appointment of new General Secretary of the CCP, the most powerful urban politician in China, a flagship plan was proposed to integrate the station area with the neighboring project into one “New South Extension”. The General Secretary expected it to consist of three new sub-centers in the “golden triangular spatial structure” and strengthen Nanjing’s competitive position vis-à-vis other cities. It was also taken to establish the political prestige of new municipal government.

Nevertheless, while the plan making process was characterized by blueprint planning, the implementation of creating urbanity clearly showed that urban development in China is as much an inter-actor coordination game as it is elsewhere in the world. Figure 3-2 shows the organizational structure during implementation. The challenges are distinguished on three scopes: the integration of commercial and retail space in the core area, the emergence of initiating development in the 32-km$^2$ area, and the contextualization with existing urban environment in the 66-km$^2$ area.
First, the station building and railway facilities in the core area (6 km$^2$) are the responsibility of railway actors, the Nanjing Railway Investment and Construction Ltd. Co (hereafter NRIC). It is a public financing platform, which represents the municipality since governments are not allowed to participate in the market. It mortgaged the land with a group of banks, cleared the land, and invested in the necessary infrastructure. Afterwards, the NRIC will organize the public bidding among real estate developers and lease land for the projects. In other words, the making of urbanity in the core station area depends on game balancing the limited orientations and capabilities of NRIC and municipality. The railway actors’ preferences on pure transport space conflicted with ambitions of local urban development actors, as the latter wanted to integrate the station into the urban fabric and boost local economic growth. As for the outcome, the mixed functions on this scale were only partly achieved. The space within the station is monotonous and mundane, with the exception of a few fast-food restaurants and souvenir shops on the second floor. Since the municipality has the underground land ownership, it succeeded in adding one whole floor of commercial functions connecting with the metro system.
Second, the New South Extension Office was established in order to keep the 32-km² area in line with the overall goal of the city. It is expected to bring together relevant political bureau and experts from the municipal bureaucracy, and conduct land acquisition. However, despite being regulated as the most powerful actor, in practice the office only holds the project approval rights in the larger area excluding the core station area. The supply-sided process puts enormous pressure on the development to proceed at tight agenda and puts the risks of development solely on local government and the banks without the broader perspective of market needs. In addition, the potential risk brought by global financial crisis and the Chinese real estate bubble would result in the enclave development of more preferable locations instead of the direct surroundings of the station. As a result, the new development is indeed emerging in a distance from station, while the core area is witnessing stagnation.

Third, as to the 66-km² area, the actor constellations are more hybrid. The three districts have considerable options in favor of their own development ambitions, which would lead to frustration of the New South Extension. The Jiangning District, strategically located between the city center and airport, is therefore an attractive location for many functions. Moreover, one planned new town within its jurisdiction makes it a serious competitor for office and business against the New South Extension. Since the major part of the New Extension is within the territory of Jiangning District, who has control over residence demolition and land clearance, it can impede development around the station to support its own growth pole. Meanwhile, another district, Yuhuatai, is concentrating on promoting the “Nanjing Software Valley”, which may also compete with New South Extension in attracting functions such as research and development. In addition, the interests of civic actors are also complicated. This area is currently home to different functions that, according to the present plans, might be removed. It includes re-located residents after regeneration of inner city, the self-organized automobile accessory industry, and some low-end and small-scale industries. Residents are relatively powerless, while automobile accessory shops are seeking channels to negotiate with governments. As the outcome of mainly hierarchical administration, this area is witnessing the collage of mono-functional core area and multi-functional new extension. To summarize, the characteristics of the aforementioned collective action problems are elaborated in Table 3-2.
Although the development of the New South Extension is in still progress, some issues can already be addressed. Below, the generic institutional conditions of the SUE will be reflected upon with reference to the research questions.

Supply-driven actor coalitions with stakes involved

The structure of the supply-driven actor constellations only involves actors with stakes. The evidence in this case shows that it seems likely to produce sub-optimal outcomes in creating urban quality in the station area. The MoR prefers the easiest, but not necessarily the most affordable, way of operationalizing infrastructures in order to gain bureau interest and show political achievement. The local governments drive for profit as a major motive of urban expansion.

Technical rationality in hierarchical styles of planning

There is the dominance of technical rationality in hierarchical styles of planning (MoR’s technical rationality and blueprint character of urban design). This blueprint for future development is inflexible. It has a tendency to produce a standardized urban space because architect planners, who tend to follow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Action Problems</th>
<th>Involved Actors</th>
<th>Actor Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location Choice</td>
<td>MoR</td>
<td>- Interaction outcome: Periphery;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal government</td>
<td>- Interaction mode: From hierarchy towards cooperation game;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Integration</td>
<td>MoR</td>
<td>- Interaction outcome: Successfully integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Station Construction Office</td>
<td>- Interaction mode: Constructive network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanity</td>
<td>Municipal government</td>
<td>- Interaction outcome:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New South Extension Office</td>
<td>Mono- functional core area and multi-functional new extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Railway Investment Corporation</td>
<td>- Interaction mode: Hierarchical administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real estate developers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planners/designers/architects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
international fashions and are oriented towards catering to the political and public draw of modernization. While friction emerges between this mode of plan making and its subsequent implementation, it is important to note that urban planning reproduces the established hierarchical patterns of policymaking. This hierarchical planning perfectly fits the tradition of command and control by the state, and in accordance with the entrepreneurial urbanization as a profit-making machine (He and Wu 2009). Furthermore, it seems to match the political culture that sees strong leadership as an important characteristic. The grand visions of the planner are an excellent tool for the politician that wants to show decisiveness.

Inter-organizational conflicts between urban and transport actors

There is a lack of institutional capacity to facilitate the negotiation of inter-organizational conflicts. The hierarchical approach is strongly based on the idea of one government being able to provide for society’s needs. It ignores that, in fact, the Chinese urban polity has become more pluralistic and that collective goals – which are at least rhetorically professed – require the coordination of actions and integration of the preferences of different organizations. Nevertheless, the case shows some incipient forms that might be promising. While the problems of location choice and the urbanity making show a lack of constructive interaction, the problem of mobility integration interestingly seems to be an example of a successful integration of interests. Two factors seem to play a role: first, a mediator role is fulfilled by the province; second, the municipality gains leverage vis-à-vis MoR by being a shareholder in the HSR consortium, and by doing so is breaking through the hierarchical relationship.

Inner-bureau conflicts among multi-scalar governments

The different preferences and orientations of multi-scalar governmental actors have favor in their own development ambitions. The risks of frustrating the plans seem to have been underestimated. The district governments, referred to as the “Socialist land masters” by Hsing (2006, p. 578), are competing with municipal government, who have the “organizational capacity to discipline the fragmented units” and “moral capacity as social protectors, and market regulators to maintain legitimacy” (Hsing, 2006, p. 575). Furthermore, the lack of information exchange and actor cooperation leads to the mistrust and competition between district governments.

Missing linkage between government and market

We also see the trend of the increasing role of non-governmental and private
actors outside the state bureaucracy. This might suppress latent conflicts in the initial stages of location choice, which could lead to conflicts in later stages and result in missed opportunities for more optimal solutions in overall welfare terms. The case indicates that the role of private investors is relegated to the end of the “production process” of the built environment.

**Silence of special civic actors**

The special interests of civic actors are so complicated that they are underrepresented in the game. Despite resistance to the relocation policy from the automobile accessory shops, they still will be relocated in the near future. This is possible due to the fact that the majority of the land that the shops occupy is collectively-owned farmland, which the municipality can legally expropriate. This would also happen to the small industries and rural residents, which fulfill dynamic functions for the city of Nanjing. Their interests, which are not represented in the process, could have contributed to a more varied urban environment. From the perspective of social justice and urban diversity, this can be considered a loss.

**Authoritative role of key politicians**

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that public opinion or the interests of powerless groups are by definition ignored in the present system. This leads to one final insight drawn from this case: the effect of incentives offered to politicians on urban development. On the one hand, the political incentive system leads to a typical payoff for civil servants. As Zhang indicates (2002, p. 498), demonstrating good political performance and meeting the desires of higher governments are the real concerns of local leaders because their jobs come from superior officials rather than from local elections. Good performance is predominantly based upon achieving economic growth, although the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) proposed a change in the development paradigm to pursue sustainability and social justice. The language of urban design can be instrumental in creating an aura of success. This mechanism also contributes to what could be called “the bigger, the better” reasoning. On the other hand, it is interesting that governmental actors are also eager to show in symbolic ways that they are responsive to social problems, such as the efficiency of railway in Chinese New Year. It is seen in calls to create the “harmonious society”, as stated by the former General Secretary of CCP Hu Jintao, or “China Dream”, as stated by the current General Secretary of CCP Xi Jinping. Apparently, times are changing in this respect but it is embryonic thus far.
Conclusions

Following the working hypothesis that the institutional capability to solve interactor conflicts in non-hierarchical ways might be crucial to understanding the outcomes of collective action challenges in China’s urban development, we found – at the case level - evidence of this expectation. There is no doubt about the multiplication of both governmental and non-governmental actors that are involved in the local processes of development. There is also ample evidence of their conflicting interests, and the increasing challenge of achieving collective action in these asymmetric arenas of decision-making. The new pluralism of organization is not matched with adequate institutional capacity to use the conflict solving models of mediation and conflict resolution. In the case of Nanjing, we found evidence of a prevailing hierarchical approach and its limitations to responsiveness, and the bound decision-making of actors that hampers coordinated action.

The above gives insight in the institutional conditions that structure decision-making on three key collective action challenges. The prevailing dominant role of public actors amounts to supply-side planning, which is unable to deal with changes in circumstances such as those stemming from the global financial crisis. The functionalist decision-making and architectural/physical design-oriented master planning are preferred. We also found a lack of institutional capacity to facilitate inter-organizational coordination between urban and transport actors, and the inner-bureau conflicts among multi-scalar governments. Furthermore, the empirical investigation also revealed additional explanatory potential through the missing communication between government and market, as well as the civic actors. The key political leaders play a pivotal role in the urban development process. The motives of these officials are based on the system of incentives more or less purposively designed by the Chinese state and CCP, but interestingly enough also on how they will be judged in the public eye. The latter reflects embryonic signs of transition that may foster a more open style of decision-making.
References


Chapter 3: Nanjing South New Extension


Yuan, W., James, P., Hodgson, K., Hutchinson, S. M., & Shi, C. (2003). Development of Sustainability Indicators by Communities in China: A Case Study of Chongming County,


CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF POLICY NETWORKS ON THE URBANIZATION AROUND HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY STATIONS IN CHINA

The Case of Wuhan
Chapter 4: Wuhan Yangchu-lake Sub-center
THE IMPACT OF POLICY NETWORKS ON THE URBANIZATION AROUND HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY STATIONS IN CHINA

The Case of Wuhan

ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the nationwide impulse of using new High-Speed Railway (HSR) stations to catalyze urban extension of Chinese cities. It aims to unfold four modalities of actor relations in the process of urbanization around the HSR stations, i.e. the vertical intergovernmental relations, the horizontal intergovernmental relations, the government-market relations and the government-society relations. By introducing the network perspective, the paper demonstrates how the particular policy networks in China shape the actor relations in the policy games, and correspondingly impact on the outcomes of such urban policies. The case of the new sub-center in Wuhan is taken as an in-depth case study. The paper identifies key policy networks as the institutional settings. It analyzes the role of such policy networks in the key policy games: location choice, infrastructure integration, functional diversity, and environmental and public space quality. Finally, as a consequence, the characteristic coordination problems are characterized that yield the policy games of urbanization, which concern respectively: the tension between central and local competences of decision-making, the cross-jurisdiction separation, the over-dominant role of governments and their opportunist behaviors, and finally the lack of public participation.

KEY WORDS

Policy Networks, Coordination, Governance, High-Speed Railway, China.

Introduction

Although China has undergone a tremendous urbanization in the past three decades, the attendant arises of social conflicts and political tensions are changing and slowing down the pro-growth agenda. Problems concealed in the interactions among governmental actors and between public and private actors are challenging the routines of urban expansion. Two paradoxical notions must be taken into account to better understand this transition. First and foremost, it is necessary to pay attention to the tendency of recentralization in the ongoing context of decentralization. Although decentralization has significantly enhanced extensive urbanization, it is now facing the resurgence of state strategies to control the articulation of scale. Here emerges the interplay between trends of decentralization and territorialization and counter-trends of recentralization and hierarchization (Xu & Yeh, 2009). The rescaling of statehood (Li & Wu, 2012) in China's spatial administrative hierarchy has been observed through various studies (Ma & Wu 2005; Chen, 2007; Shen, 2007; Su, 2011; Yang & Li, 2014). The impulse of local leaders to push for decentralization creates a counter-movement towards the concentration of territorial power (Hsing, 2006a). Secondly, the horizontal interaction also matters, both within public jurisdictions and between government-society relationships. Within public jurisdictions, various types of regionalization (Li & Wu, 2012; Li et al., 2014) or territorialization (Shen, 2007; Wei, 2012; Zhou et al., 2010) are taking place. The boundary between government and society is blurred by the overwhelming neoliberal transformation of the land market and the property circulation (Wu, 2008; Zhu, 1999; 2005).

Facing both recentralization and decentralization, the horizontal support from governmental agencies, market actors and civic actors at local level becomes as crucial as the state intervention in the urban megaprojects of national significance. The linkage between the vertical/horizontal actor relations and the spatial impact on urban megaprojects has not yet been fully investigated. As such, the ambitious urbanization around High-Speed Railway (HSR) stations offers vivid cases for study.

As one of the major stimulations for the domestic economy in the post-crisis era, the state government launched a four-trillion-CNY investment into infrastructure and urbanization since 2008. As of 2012, the HSR network has already become the longest in the world. Unlike the redevelopment of central stations in Europe and Japan, most of China’s new stations are located on average about 10 km from the city centers and have airport-style designs (Chen & Wei, 2013; Dai et al., 2013). For local governments, the most favored strategy is to use
the HSR station to catalyze extensive urbanization and economic restructuring. However, the projects are often overly ambitious while not devoting enough to strategic reflection and resilience on the long term (Duan, 2009; Ye & Tang, 2010). Although the functionalism of their spatial layout and their large volume of programs are often claimed to support Transit-Oriented-Development (TOD), these extensive HSR urbanizations actually go against the essential advantages of urban density, with particular concerns of walkability, diversity, livability, vitality, and mix-function (Cervero, 1998; Dittmar & Ohland, 2003). In many cases, they turn out to be just another strategy of extensive urbanization or even urban sprawl.

What is the rationale of policy processes behind this style of leapfrog urbanization (Dai et al., 2013)? As the prevailing literature does not yet address it very much, it is time to rethink this nationwide issue. This paper adopts the theoretical lens of Policy Networks Theory (PNT), which enables the author to gain insights into the multi-dimensional relations. I will investigate the impact of dynamic institutional governance of policy networks on the process of urbanization. The research question is thus raised:

How do the multi-dimensional actor relations in policy networks impact the urban extension around HSR stations in China? Correspondingly, three sub-questions will be answered: How can the policy networks be identified? What sort of coordination problems do they create for the policy games? What implications for urban governance can be drawn in order to improve conditions for better coordination?

This paper is part of a larger research project into different urban extensions around HSR stations in China. Here, I will focus on the particular findings in the case of the Wuhan Railway Station. The case selection was made according to three criteria: First, it should contain multi-dimensional coordination in practice. The station area is planned to be a new city sub-center. The project demands both vertical (state) intervention and horizontal (local) policy support. Second, it should have certain generality for other relevant cases. Although Wuhan city is not considered as a first-tier city, such as Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou, its urbanization practice is highly relevant for other megacities because of the tremendous transport significance, city scale, and economic development. It locates at one of the most strategic nodes in the national transport network, it covers 8494-km² land and it produces the GDP of 56367 CNY per capita (6th National Census, 2010). Third, the key actors and documents should be accessible. Since the population of interviewees was difficult to target in advance, the author followed the “snowballing” strategy.
(Goodman, 1961) starting from personal academic network and then extending to local practitioners.

Fieldwork was conducted from October 2010 to February 2011 and from January to February 2012. The study uses social science methods of policy network analysis, combined with field observations and extensive desk research. The primary sources include 14 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with local officials, transport planners, urban planners, urban designers, representatives of station architecture, and developers. Other first-hand sources of information are based on policy documents, archives, plans and publications about the case. Online media reports from newspapers and dialogues on social media sites are also taken into account.

The paper is structured according to the sub-questions: Next section explores the perspective of multi-dimensional governance and identifies four major modalities of actor relations in Chinese governance literature. Next, after introducing the Wuhan case study, the policy networks and the institutional settings will be investigated in order to analyze what impact they have on the policy games with regards to four major issues of HSR urbanization in Wuhan. Finally, I will reflect on the outcomes and consider the characteristic problems of policy coordination in current processes of urbanization.

**Identifying Modalities of Actor Relations**

The Policy Network Theory would seem to appropriately support the examination of the sets of formal and informal institutional linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared interest in public policymaking and implementation (Rhodes, 2007). A substantial body of literature has addressed the network perspective in the Western context as it moved from a descriptive “metaphor” of the state-society relation, to attempts to formulate models categorizing actors’ interest relations, to the governance perspective of networks as inter-organizational relationships, and then to the “managerial” approach. Two schools can be distinguished: the interest intermediation school and the governance school (Marsh & Smith, 2000). The interest intermediation school understands policy networks as power-dependent relationships between the government and interest groups in which resources are exchanged (Dowding, 1995; Jordan, 1990; Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Marsh & Smith, 2000; Rhodes, 1990; 1997; Richardson & Jordan, 1985). This school is criticized for lacking explanatory rigor for the transformation of policy networks (Blom-Hansen, 1997; Börzel, 1998; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992).
The governance school stresses the complexity of the decision making involved in achieving policy outcomes. Starting from inter-organizational research (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978), it focuses on the networks involving policy initiatives and implementations, and on reconstruction and improving the networks and policy process (Kooiman, 1993; Marin & Mayntz, 1991), and addresses the deliberation process between actors (Klijn, 2008; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012).

Indeed, we are aware of political differences in different countries: though policy network perspective originates from the “Westminster-style” democracy in United Kingdom, the federal democracy in America, or other European polities. And the Chinese context has its own features, such as “the role of the Chinese Communist Party, the importance ascribed to hierarchy, the dislike of structure, transparency and initiative, the value of personal relations and personal networks” (Zheng et al., 2010, p. 413) and “guan-xi” (Groenleer et al., 2012). Nevertheless, despite its limitations in capturing the different political and administrative systems, it does not mean the network perspective is useless for understanding the practice in China. On the contrary, it generally helps debunk “the idea that all decision making in China is top-down” and that “the Chinese system is fundamentally different from other multi-party polities” (democratic systems with a bottom-up civil society) (Zheng et al., 2010, p. 414). Still, it makes sense to use the analytical distinctions of the network approach. I will follow the general conditions of the aforementioned governance school because of its distinction of inter-organizational dimensions of governance. This enables the author to investigate the main modalities of actor relations. Since whether these actor relations might be controlled by proactive management remains to be discovered in the empirical analysis of policy games in the case study, I focus in the first instance on the analytical aims.

There is a substantial body of literature on the inter-organizational dimensions of governance in China, which do not necessarily use the network perspective. They can be categorized in four modalities of actor relations: vertical intergovernmental (central-local), horizontal intergovernmental (cross-jurisdiction), government-market, and government-society. Adopting the contemporary terminology in Chinese politics, the vertical intergovernmental system is called “tiao”, while the horizontal system among bureau or territorial authorities is called “kuai”, (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Cartier, 2004; Ma, 2005; Hsing, 2006b).

First, the central-local relation has been intensively explored with the focus on decentralization. The “local” in this paper refers to the constellation of governments on province, prefecture (municipality), county (district), and
township levels. The relevant research provides differentiated perspectives. Some (Donnithorne, 1981; Shue, 1988) take the structural approach, emphasizing the formal organizational distribution of resources and authority between the center and provinces. The procedural perspective, on the other hand, views the central-local relation as the function of discrete strategic interactions between actors to achieve consensus with regard to particular sets of policy issues (rational calculation). This “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) “asserts that policy made at the center becomes increasingly malleable to the parochial organizational and political goals of various vertical agencies and spatial regions charged with enforcing that policy” (Mertha, 2009, p. 996). Additionally, advocates of the cultural approach (Pye, 1981; 1992; Solomon, 1971) indicate the importance of proper understanding of the Chinese culture in order to better explain the nature of political alliances, expectations of political behavior, attitudes towards authority relations, and the fundamental strength of political organizations. Zheng proposes a “de facto federalism” (2006; 2007), referring to “a relatively institutionalized pattern which involves an explicit or implicit bargain between the center and the local” (Zheng, 2006, p. 107). Whatever perspective is taken, the consensus is that although economic decentralization has given local government sufficient autonomy and power, the central government still retains considerable control (Edin, 2003).

Second, the horizontal relations between governmental jurisdictions are much less studied. It is argued that the legal forms (i.e., laws, regulations, and contracts) often considered as just the “beginning of business” for bargaining among actors is a must during the enforcement and implementation of policy (Zheng, 2006; 2007). Cross-jurisdictional relations in urban studies are mainly mentioned at the level of regionalism and metropolitan governance (Xu & Yeh, 2013). Several strategies have reappeared in China since 2000, including regional coordinated development, inter-city regional association, functional area policy, and experimenting with province-leading-county administrative reform (Li & Wu, 2012).

Third, the neoliberal tendency in urban policy triggers more uncertainty and diversity in government-market/society interaction. “Local state corporatism” (Oi, 1992; 1995) describes the critical role of the municipality in government-market relations since the late 1990s. Local governments view the enterprises within their administrative purview as the diversified component of a larger corporate whole, and treat themselves as the equivalent of a board director or chief executive officer. This entrepreneurial spirit evolves forward and enables the local governments to participate even more actively in the market.
Municipalities introduce the institutional arrangement of business into land management, and link the external environment of competition and the internal mechanism of ownership responsibility (Wu, 2003; Zhu, 2004; Zhao, 2002; 2005).

Last, but not least, the government-society relation mainly concerns public participation. The current participation in the urban realm remains superficial. The common efforts include the publishing of urban plans (both online and in reality) and the involvement of experts (Zhu, 2012). Actually, such practices only exist in the cases of regeneration and gentrification of urbanized areas and environmental protection. In the former circumstance, the struggle for a right to participation (He & Chen, 2012) lacks of formal institution. The local civic actors are (forced to be) engaged in this agenda and show their “civic territoriality” (awareness) through “conscious cultivation and struggles (protests)” (Hsing, 2006b). As to the environmental issues, public participation has gradually shown the emergence of advocacy coalition (Han, 2013). Yet, the general policies remain limited to the form of complaint systems (hotlines and digital communication), pilot studies, or information disclosure by the government (Kostka, 2013). The institutionalization of information transparency and the sanctioning of environmental violations are still difficult to persist over time (Li, 2012).

To summarize, the state of governance studies in China reflects the dynamic nature and paradoxical changes of the four distinguished modalities of actor relations, indicating the transitional stage of the governance context within China. The urban extension around the HSR in Wuhan offers a vivid empirical illustration of the impact of this transition and its inherent tensions. In this case study, I will first describe in more detail the institutional setting of policy relations in order to investigate their influence on the policy games of the most substantial issues of urbanization.

**Wuhan Railway Station Area: Arena for Multi-dimensional Interactions**

As the capital of Hubei Province, Wuhan was merged from three counties on the banks of the Yangtze-River and occupies the geographical center of China. In the latest City Master Plan (2010-2020), Wuhan’s position has been raised to that of a “core city in central China,” playing a more important economic and social role in the nation. The population has reached 9.94 million in 2010 within an area of 8494 km² and is estimated to reach 11.8 million by 2020. Wuhan holds a
strategic position within the national transportation network and is planned as one of the four national conjunction nodes (Mid & Long-term Railway Network Plan, 2008). Its passenger railway network consists of three stations. While the two existing stations were named after former counties, the naming of the new station after the municipality shows its symbolic and strategic importance. Wuhan Railway Station is located peripherally on the third express ring, which encompasses the urbanized area (“main city district” in Figure 4-1). It is 12 km from Wuchang center, 17 km away from Hankou center, and 22 km from Hanyang center (centers of the former counties). The station is consists of 20 railway tracks and 11 platforms serving both HSR and regular railway lines. The architecture covers 107,000 m$^2$ of buildings and 114.2 ha of land (Figure 4-2).

The spatial planning of the station area aims to build a new sub-center (out of three sub-centers in Wuhan) out of a relatively un-urbanized area (Figure 4-3). The site currently (2010) consists of farmland and garden (54.8%), polder and lake (8.7%), industrial land (8.9%), rural housing (15.3%), and urban housing (4.6%). Following regular procedures, international competitions for architectural design (2004) and urban planning (2006) were held in order to gain innovative insights. The selected urban plan follows the idea of building two functional centers (local and regional) that are composed of high-rise office, hotel, and housing, and one central lake park as public space. From 1995 until January 2012, the planning process involved 13 official plans and research projects. According to the latest Regulatory Zoning Plan (2010), 20.38% of the station area will be reserved. The new program will include 23% urban housing, 25.6% green space, 14.4% public service, and 3.9% industry.
Figure 4-2. Photo of Wuhan Railway Station (2012). Source: author.

Figure 4-3. Artist vision of Wuhan Railway Station area. Source: Comprehensive Plan for Wuhan Yangchun-lake Sub-center, 2007 (from official website of Wuhan Land Resource and Planning Bureau: http://www.wpl.gov.cn/pt-4-7-70-0.html)
Policy Networks as Institutional Settings

In order to analyze the policy games with regards to the urban extension around the Wuhan Railway Station and the problems of coordination in these policy games, I firstly have to unfold the institutional settings, i.e. the policy networks that condition the differentiated strategic behaviors of actors in the games.

What are policy networks? They are the more or less stable contextual conditions within which separate games about urban policy decisions take place (Klijn et al., 1995). PNT scholars, especially the governance school, have developed several ways to identify the characteristics of networks as the (formal and informal) institutional settings for the games (Klijn, 1995; Klijn et al., 1995). According to them, policy networks can be characterized by the actors, their relations, the existing distribution of resources, and the prevailing rules. Building on Ostrom’s typology (1990; 2005), rules may be categorized into arena and interaction rules (Klijn, 2001; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The arena rules provide a handle to determine the nature of the network, defining the social practices and distinguishing the important matters from unimportant ones (Klijn, 2001). It includes rules with regards to the position of actors, the reality (and identity) of the situation, and the rewards for certain activities. The interaction rules have a more procedural character and regulate actors with regard to what is (and not) allowed in a network. They include access and exit rules (Klijn, 2001; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Following the aforementioned characterization, four key policy networks are identified in this case (Table 4-1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Networks</th>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Network</td>
<td>(Former) Ministry of Railways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Railway service)</td>
<td>Wuhan-Guangzhou HSR Corp. Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial governments (Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional subordinate railway actor: Wuhan-Region Railway Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Railway Station Construction Command Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Network</td>
<td>Wuhan municipal government (represented by Wuhan Land Reserve Center,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Urban public service)</td>
<td>Wuhan City Investment and Development Company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wuhan &amp; Wuchang Railway Station Area Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other public departments (Wuhan Metro Corp., Wuhan Bus Corp.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local governments (2 districts &amp; 9 villages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Network (Real estate)</td>
<td>Private developers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State-owned developers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Network</td>
<td>Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass media and internet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-1. Involved actors in the policy networks. Source: author.
• a. The governmental network (railway service);
• b. The governmental network (urban public service);
• c. The market network (real estate);
• d. The civic network.

a. The governmental (railway) network

The reason to distinguish the railway actors from the other governmental network is because of its unique institutional characteristics. It refers to all actors that deal with the planning, construction, and operation of railway infrastructures. Most actors demonstrate the bureaucratic identity. Due to the rationale of the Socialist planned economy, the railway system is monopolized by the (former) Ministry of Railways (MoR), which is wholly separate from the Ministry of Transport (MoT). This inefficient, hierarchical, and enclosed institution has been criticized for years. Despite several attempts of institutional reform, the MoR still holds a dominant role in route planning, station location, investment, and construction of railways. Railway actors are positioned in a strict administrative organization under vertical accountability. As the typical “Socialist land master” (Hsing, 2006a; 2010), the regional subordinate railway actor, Wuhan-Region Railway Bureau, mainly carries out tasks assigned by the superior railway agency. At the project level, Railway Station Construction Command Office (“Zhi-hui-bu”), was founded to keep the construction in line with plans. Once the task is accomplished, the office will be dismissed. The reward rules of the railway actors differ on various levels: For the MoR, it is considered as a political achievement and normative responsibility to facilitate the passenger flow during the Chinese New Year. That is why MoR is eager to promote technology innovation, network expansion, and transport accessibility (though the ticket system is still heavily criticized). Yet, for the Wuhan-Region Railway Bureau, the rewards are different, this bureau has interest in gaining profit from the non-railway functions (such as parking, retail, etc.) on its own land.

The access and exit to the railway network is rather exclusive. The information and knowledge circulates within the networks. Besides the hierarchical interaction pattern within the MoR, negotiation also exists between MoR and local governments. One notable thing in this case is the exceptional importance of the provincial government as a powerful mediator, due to the founding of the Wuhan-Guangzhou HSR Corp. Ltd. In order to relieve the financial burden, it was the first time that the state-owned railway construction was co-conducted by the MoR (51% share) and three provinces in the corridor.
b. The governmental (urban public service) network

This network concerns the actors that are involved in building public urban facilities, such as culture and art, entertainment, sport, education, health, industry, and transport infrastructure (except railway). The use of GDP growth rate as the key indicator of political performance also encourages local governments to pursue economic growth and spatial expansion, an achievement rewarded by political promotion. And the 1994 tax-sharing reform generated the pragmatic identity of governmental actors to gain profit from land transfers. They are hierarchically positioned and gain monopoly power by owning the land of the station area (excluding the station). The Wuhan Land Reserve Center expropriated the land from the two districts and nine villages, which were put in a rather weak position. The Wuhan City Investment and Development Company provided the financing platform by mortgaging land to banks and investing the loan into the public facilities construction (sewage, electricity, etc.). As subordinated actor of this company, Wuhan & Wuchang Railway Station Area Management Office was established to mediate the horizontal cooperation for the urban development around the station. Besides, the other municipal departments are in charge of separated public transport arrangements, such as Wuhan Metro Corp. and the Wuhan Bus Corp. The only sources of power districts and villages still have stems from their administrative capabilities for land clearance and resident replacement.

The access rule of interaction in the urban network in this case is rather exclusive. Although the basic principle is “government-led, market-operated,” the hierarchy still leaves limited room for information and knowledge exchange. Citizens are nearly excluded from the policy process.

c. The market (real estate) network

This network refers to the actors who develop the real estate projects. They rely heavily on the improved accessibility brought by the HSR station. For instance, the OCT Ltd. (‘Huaqiao City’), known as a successful state-owned developer in thematic tourism and real estate, sets its feet into the sub-center development with its latest flagship project. Besides the developers, several state-owned factories/enterprises were also involved, whose influence on the spatial outcome differ considering their economic contribution to the local GDP. These actors demonstrate a pragmatic and opportunistic attitude. They pursue commercial housing and retail development as a standard spatial product. Little attention is paid to social housing for relocating the existing villagers and the dormitory-style residences associated with work units.
Officially, access to this network is rather open for market bidding. But in this particular case, the access rule shows semi-exclusiveness and semi-transparency. Since the governmental network holds the dominant position in land development, the developers are keen to position themselves in the primary land market (land acquisition) rather than in the secondary land market (land bidding and property construction). And the information provision is limited, pending the developer’s relationship with the government. Negotiation thus becomes a must. The developers tend to bond their interests with the municipality so that they can participate earlier in the process and gain a better competitive advantage at market.

d. The civic network

The civic network is generally weak, including residents, NGOs, as well as the mass media and Internet. The public participation of urbanization is limited to the public consultancy of the draft planning scenario without de facto modification. The environmental issues demonstrated the only exception, aiming to maintain the accessibility and the sharing of natural resources and public space. The actors share the normative packages but keep a discrete identity. The actors are positioned within a loose horizontal relation when environmental and public space quality is challenged. There is not much evidence of a formal organization for expressing civic opinions. The reward rule is more severe than the other three policy networks. In case of success, the environmental issues and the civil rights will gain publicity and awareness. Otherwise, the network would be blocked by the local government to avoid controversy.

The network is relatively inclusive and open for debate but still subject to local government censorship. The actors who have shared cognitions may organize themselves into a temporary advocate coalition for common demands, such as environmental protection. Information and knowledge is actively exchanged among citizens in online communities. Two informal exchanges can be identified in this case: the media monitoring of governmental scandal on environmental issues, and the participatory performance art project inspired by media exposure.

Key features of policy networks

Three features of the policy networks stand out. First, actors within the governmental policy networks hold the dominant power. Second, even within governmental networks, actors’ perceptions and goals differ because of the
vertical-horizontal ("tiao-kuai") institutional settings. Third, the rationale can be characterized as a supply-side approach. Actors in both governmental and market networks are keen to gain profit from railway operation and land value increases, in order to balance the fiscal burden of infrastructure construction. Lastly, as the end-users of space, the civic network employs only a few resources or power.

**Analysis of the Policy Games in Station Area**

This section investigates how the rules of the involved policy networks impact the policy games. They focus on the challenges and progress of four major issues of project development. There were two crucial moments in the period between 1990 and 2012: the official approval for the Beijing-Guangzhou Passenger-Dedicated HSR in 2004, and the official decision to build a new sub-center around Wuhan Station (City Master Plan of Wuhan, 2010). Three phases can be identified: the decision making for the station location and the spatial planning for the surrounding area, the infrastructure construction, and implementation of the spatial plans and the station operation. I have identified four crucial issues in the urbanization around the HSR station and position them in temporal-scalar coordinates (Figure 4-4): the location choice, the infrastructure integration, the functional diversity, and the environmental and public space quality.

**Figure 4-4. Policy games in Wuhan railway station area. Source: author.**
Policy game 1: location choice

Choosing the station location was a fundamental issue. The collective action challenge was whether to build a new central station or a new peripheral one. Two sets of rules were at play in this dilemma: the rules of the railway network and those of the urban service networks. The debates started with the revision of the city master plan in the 1990s and intensified during the planning of the new Beijing-Guangzhou HSR. The MoR proposed a plan ("west proposal") to jointly use the old Beijing-Guangzhou Railway corridor throughout the city center to minimize the costs of demolition and replacement. However, the Wuhan municipality preferred a more peripheral proposal ("east proposal") for the sake of future urbanization (interviews). First, cutting through the existing urbanized area would leave many inefficient and fragmented land parcels and ownership. Second, the west proposal was rather close to an area rich in landscape and cultural resources, such as lakes, universities, museums, hotels, and resorts. The station and its traffic would strongly affect the quality of the environment. Third, the eastern part of Wuhan was considered as the favored location for the knowledge economy and R&D industry. The municipality preferred to reserve space for future urban expansion towards the east (interviews). Furthermore, the municipality already expected to use the railway station to provide a growth pole for city restructuring. The impasse lasted for years until the external scenario changed: a new national HSR corridor, the Shanghai-Wuhan-Chengdu Line, was planned, and it was planned to go through the city outskirts. The "east proposal" was reappraised, and located the new station at the northern periphery, avoiding both the existing urbanized area and the ecologically sensitive area, which was the main concern of the municipality. This provided the breakthrough for Wuhan and MoR to come to a final agreement (Location Report of Wuhan Railway Station, 2004). It also managed to fulfill MoR's preference of low construction costs. Additionally, the peripheral location might even attract more regional passengers from surrounding cities than the central location, which was also favored by MoR (interviews).

To summarize, the interactions took place during early stages and on too high level to involve more local actors. The railway network acted as the hierarchical decision maker. Nevertheless, despite the rather impeded communication channels outside the railway network, the joint interests of actors in these two networks appeared to provide adequate negotiation space. The municipality of Wuhan appealed to the province of Hubei to act as an intermediary to bargain with the MoR on the issues of location choice and land acquisition along the rail corridor. This proved to be the only way to come to the seemingly win-win agreement. The nodal importance of Wuhan in the national railway network
Policy game 2: infrastructure integration

Infrastructure integration was the main issue in the second phase. The collective action challenge was how to achieve transfer accessibility with other modalities of transportation within the station and the connectivity between the station and other parts of city. It mainly involved the railway and urban networks. The integration of infrastructure had not yet been sufficiently addressed: Two metro lines that had been planned earlier than the station but were not put into use until three years after the station began operating. The one-hour bus ride to the city center was apparently not preferable, thus increasing private commuting traffic and less attractiveness to urban activities. And the other transport facilities were located outside (but next to) the station. This problematic situation is due to segregation of land ownership: The Wuhan-Region Railway Bureau owned the ground level of the station, the Wuhan Metro Corp. owned the underground land, the Wuhan Bus Corp. owned the land next to the station, and the Wuhan City Investment & Development Corp. was in charge of the land surrounding the station area. The Station Area Management Office manages the immediate area around the station. The Office could have played a more proactive role, but already soon the municipality re-obtained its power and limited it to daily management of station plaza.

To summarize, the infrastructures were not integrated enough. It is due to the non-cooperative horizontal intergovernmental interaction between the railway network and the urban service network. The problematic coordination at the local level reflects the segregation between the MoR and the MoT at the national level. The differentiated accountability mechanisms bring difficulties to actor coordination: On the one hand, the Wuhan-Region Railway Bureau followed the vertical (“tiao”) command from MoR and was not necessarily responsible to the requirement for integration with local transport. On the other hand, the local transport authorities rarely depended on the MoT but relied more on being consistent with municipal commands. In this sense, it is easier to understand the difficulty of transport integration.

Policy game 3: functional diversity

The collective action challenge in this game was whether and how to integrate
mixed urban functions in the station and station area. This issue has gradually entered the scopes of both the railway and urban networks but still has room for improvement.

Regarding railway network, the MoR favored mobility efficiency. As a result, the retail and recreation functions in the Wuhan Station were restricted to small convenience stores, bookstores, souvenir shops, and pedlar carts. Interestingly, owning the land stimulates and empowered the Wuhan-Region Railway Bureau to profit from non-transport functions. That has led to a de facto functional mix. It was implemented without collaborating with urban actors. For instance, during the construction of the station, there were suggestions from the railway actors to add more retail space to the waiting hall and the underground metro floor (interviews). They were eventually vetoed because of the extra costs that would be required to change the architecture design (e.g., the unqualified smoke and oil ventilation system). The local railway actor therefore sought other alternatives: restaurants with diverse food choices for the passengers but without local planning authorization were built under the highway entrance ramp. Another example was the functional change of the railway office building. It was originally designed as office space and (partly) rented out as a profitable hotel later.

The actors in the urban service networks, aware of the “illegal” situation, were not motivated to cooperate or intervene (interviews). Because of the separate land ownership, the taxes of the restaurants or hotel in the station would go to the administration of the railway network and thus not contribute to urban revenues. Therefore, instead of promoting functional integration within the station, urban actors preferred the planning of diverse functions on their own land outside the station. Once the municipality re-obtained its land ownership and planning authority midway in the process, it directly took part in attracting real estate and recreation projects, with a particular preference for the flagship project that will bring considerable economic return and branding landmarks. This is the OCT Thematic Park and housing project, which will be discussed in the next section.

To summarize, the Wuhan Station area has not shown much progress in functional diversity because of the missing cross-sectorial coalition and the poor horizontal coordination among actors at the local level. The planning procedure was still very much driven by physical design and regulation-oriented planning as opposed to interactive and communicative planning or market prediction. However, the zoning plan has begun to address the issue of mixture and compatibility of urban functions by establishing new mixed land use codes
Policy game 4: environmental and public space quality

Given Wuhan's unique geography and rich ecological resources, its citizens have traditionally been more sensitive to environmental and public space qualities than other cities. Besides the bottom-up attention, there has been increasing top-down political pressure to the local government indicating more preference to sustainable urbanization. The Wuhan metropolitan area was thus set up as a national innovation pilot area for the “Resource-saving and Environment-friendly Society” initiative (2008). The collective action challenge was how to protect the natural environment and maintain accessibility of public space. This issue was mainly reflected in concerns about ecological sensitivity around East Lake Park. About 5.6 km\(^2\) of the Wuhan station area falls within the boundary of the national East-lake Park. The dilemma first manifested when the OCT Thematic Park and housing project were reported for illegal land expropriation, forced demolition, privatization of lakeshore, and lack of information during construction of the south station area. One local newspaper exposé (2010) led to a wave of media attention and public outcry that soon flooded online forums and social networking sites. The developer denied the report, claiming that no part of the protected scenic area would be affected. But further examination revealed that more than 67 ha of East Lake’s water area would be impacted. With the mediation of the municipality, the OCT was compelled to add more freely accessible public facilities on the lakeshore to the project plan, such as the art museum and concert hall. Meanwhile, subsequent reports on violent demolition and environmental consequences were censored by local authorities (Lin, 2013). In response, a participatory art project entitled “Everyone’s East Lake” was initiated in 2010, inviting participants, citizens, and artists to express their concerns through performance art along the lakeshore. It was re-launched in 2012. However, despite the civic protest, the municipality was determined to implement the project (interviews). They considered it as the branding of the new sub-center, and therefore made great efforts in attracting the project to locate at the current site from the very beginning. In order to guarantee implementation, the developer compromised by reducing the privatization of the lakeshore and adding more public cultural facilities in the project plan (interviews). The OCT Thematic Park began operating in 2013, and the associated housing project and resort hotel are under construction.

To summarize, this game mainly took place through bottom-up and horizontal coordination at the local level. Since the judicial system is still dependent on the administrative system, the media played an important monitoring role
in public interest and triggered public debates. When public interests were jeopardized, online protests and participatory art became the channels available for civic actors to express themselves. Although the centralized system prevents such bottom-up behavior, the voice of the public was heard and addressed. The bottom-up self-awareness from citizens in this case made the government (passively) intervene and pushed the private project towards a more publicly accessible direction. Nevertheless, civic opinions still need an institutionalized channel for expression.

Reflections: Coordination Problems

The interactions in the four key policy games have shown that this case of HSR-led urban extension takes place in a relative vacuum of pro-active coordination. This section will reflect on the coordination problems in a more general way by referring to the four modalities and the corresponding network rules that lead to them. I would like to share the next observations:

Central-local tension

Most fundamentally, this case confirms the bidirectional rescaling of the statehood in post-reform Chinese urbanization, which is the resurgence of recentralization and continuity of decentralization, as many researchers have discovered (Li et al., 2014; Ma, 2005; Shen, 2007; Su, 2012; Yang & Li, 2014). First, there is no obvious evidence of the weakening of vertical linkages – the state is definitely not as “hollowed out” as some Western PNT researchers have observed (Rhodes, 2007). Second, the province and municipality seem to confirm the notion of a “de facto federalist” (Zheng, 2007) capability to bargain with the powerful MoR on the location and routes of the station. This bidirectional rescaling in the central-local relation is shaped by the arena and interaction rules: the hierarchical position rule of the railway network brings efficiency in location choice, infrastructure implementation, and integration. Hubei province’s share of the regional HSR Corp. empowers it with the unique position to negotiate for local interests with the central actor. However, the exclusive access to information and decision-making during the interaction results in insufficient functional diversity and environment protection. The local urban actors have to struggle through the “fragmented” policy process under the “authoritarianism” (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) for a better urban environment and also for their own interests.

Cross-jurisdiction segregation
As a consequence of the arena rules, the non-cooperative cross-jurisdiction relations are rooted in the different positions of the actors. Land ownership matters. The vertical accountability of railway network conflicts with the horizontal accountability of the urban service network. This generates difficulties in creating infrastructure integration and functional diversity. Compact use of space and mixed urban functions, especially commercial space, are not preferred in the decision-making logic of the railway actors at the national level. Nevertheless, this case also shows the possibility of matching the profit-making interest of the local railway bureau with the municipality’s interest in multi-functions for further coordination. Regarding the interaction rules, a platform or coalition for information provision, knowledge exchange, and coordination is lacking. The Station Area Management Office did not fulfill its original task to intermediate the interaction processes due to the exclusive access in land ownership and the information sharing from the municipality. This differs from other HSR cases in China, for the others are given more unitary administrative power in station area development. Besides losing land ownership to the municipality, two districts were rather excluded from the policy network and games, except for land clearance and villagers’ relocation.

**Over-dominant role of the governments and opportunist behaviors**

The shortcomings of the government-led, supply-side approach of “state entrepreneurialism” (Duckett, 1998) are gradually arising. From the arena rules perspective, this case shows the over-dominant position of the public sector over the market. The municipality is both a rule-maker and a participant in the game of station area development. The involvement of railway actors enhances the monopoly position, and therefore excludes the possibility of market competition. Even the key developer in the Wuhan case, OCT Ltd., is a State Owned Enterprise. From the interaction perspective, the rent-seeking behaviors of both governmental actors and developers are pervasive. Developers have the opportunist tendency to bond their interest with governments. This led to the unstoppable implementation of the controversial real estate project. There is a lack of a formal institution or informal coalition for government and private actors, such as Public-Private-Participation.

**Lack of public participation**

This case exemplified the active engagement from citizens and the emerging civil society in public issues. The protest against the privatization of the lakeshore illustrates a possible means of bottom-up public participation, including media monitoring, online protests, and a participatory art project. It indeed echoes,
as demonstrated by academia, the “popular-pressure model” that is forceful enough to change the policy agenda setting (Wang, 2008). Nevertheless, this is only one possible outcome. In the other key policy games, the dominate position and reward rules of governmental networks are bound to minimize the interest of civic network, although both governmental and civic actors seem to share some appreciation for sustainable urbanization. The contradictions between normative preference and strategic interest have already been shown in three other key policy games. Therefore, in order to gain more convenient railway station location, more integrated infrastructure and diverse functions, it thus calls for an institutionalized channel for public participation.

Conclusions

This paper applies the network perspective to the new urban extension around Wuhan Railway Station and explores the impact of policy networks on the problematic interactions during the policy games. This case has its generalizability to other HSR cases in that it vividly shows the four modalities of actor coordination in typical Chinese institutional settings. The main findings show: 1) a bidirectional rescaling of the statehood, in the sense of re-strengthening vertical linkages and growing power of local government through decentralization in the HSR urban extension; 2) the cross-jurisdiction coordination problems result from conflicts between the vertical accountability of the railway network and the horizontal accountability of the urban service network, due to the separated land ownership; 3) the government's role dominates the market's and leads to opportunist behaviors on both sides; and 4) the government-society relation still lacks an institutionalized channel for sufficient public participation that can involve the currently absent civic interest groups. Therefore, it comes to the conclusion that a more open and collaborative approach better able to intermediate the multi-dimensional coordination – the network governance – is needed.

Furthermore, what implications can be drawn with regard to the urban governance in order to change the institutional settings for better coordination? In general, network restructuring is more fundamental but time consuming. Thus, initiatives can start from progressively changing the arena rules and interaction rules of networks. For instance, adopting entrepreneurial experiences to change the reality, position, and reward rules would be one good strategy, such as PPP. This has been more common in property-led urban redevelopment (gentrification) (He, 2012; He & Wu, 2005) at the local level, but much less common in infrastructure megaprojects, except for metro and
highway construction (Mu et al., 2010; Mu et al., 2011). The attempt to realize regional governance through more autonomy in financing and constructing HSR in the Pearl-River-Delta (Xu & Yeh, 2013) is one example of changing the interaction rules.

This case study touches the underlying ideas, values and consensual knowledge of actors during the policy process, without further elaborating them culture-specifically. Some researches have been exploring the Chinese characteristics in the policy-making (De Jong, 2012; 2013). Further research questions could address the institutional capacities (Healey, 1998) underpinning the guidance of complex strategic urban projects (Salet, 2008; Salet & Gualini, 2007) towards better place-making in the Chinese context.

References


CHAPTER 5

PLACE-MAKING IN SHANGHAI HONGQIAO BUSINESS DISTRICT

An Institutional Capacity Perspective
Chapter 5: Shanghai Hongqiao Business District

Massive delay of HSR at Shanghai Hongqiao Station, Photo: Author, 2011
Chapter 5: Shanghai Hongqiao Business District
PLACE-MAKING IN SHANGHAI'S HONGQIAO BUSINESS DISTRICT

An Institutional Capacity Perspective

ABSTRACT

The pro-growth, state-led institutional setting in China makes it easy to build infrastructure and physical space. Nevertheless, despite the aspiration to create the qualities often associated with place-making, many urban developments around new HSR-hubs lack essential urban qualities. This paper uses the idea of institutional capacity to explore the conditions that, in the Chinese context, might contribute to place-making. The Hongqiao Business District, developed around a new HSR/airport hub in Shanghai indicates that the emergence of a policy network of municipal, sub local (districts and sub-districts), decentralized, and privatized actors provides more favorable conditions for place making than in other comparable cases in China.

KEY WORDS

Institutional Capacity, Megaproject, Place-making, High-Speed Railway, China.

(Dai, G., & De Vries, J., 2015, submitted to an international peer-reviewed journal, under revision)
Introduction

The metaphor of “crossing the river while groping the stones” vividly describes the institutional uncertainty that is part and parcel of the Chinese reform, from a planned to market economy during the past thirty-five years. This transition concerns a double shift in powers and responsibilities: from central government to local and regional governments (“decentralization”) and from government to (quasi) private actors (“privatization”). Consensus exists that, political and institutional changes lag behind economic development, which results in social tensions and economic problems. This general characteristic of Chinese society is epitomized in the increasing tension between centralized governance and decentralized development in the megaprojects in Chinese cities. The development around High-Speed Railway (hereafter HSR) stations, which, is often driven by speculation, provides a case in point.

The rapidly expanding HSR network started in 2008 with the Long and Mid Term Plan for National Railway Network (MoR, 2004; 2008). By December 2013, after only one decade, more than 10 thousand km of HSR—with new lines designed for speeds above 250 km/h and upgraded lines up to 220 km/h—have been put into operation (with an extra two-thousand-km under construction). The corridors connect not only three mega-metropolitan regions, but also the less-developed hinterland city-regions. The stations are expected to be catalysts for (“leapfrog”) urbanization, i.e. the development of isolated new towns that are both detached from existing urban areas and that lack the liveliness and local signature of the existing city. The station areas are usually characterized by an airport-style design: efficient infrastructure arrangement, magnificent station plaza, and often an extremely ambitious programme for real estate development (Budd & Hirmis, 2004; Dai et al., 2013).

The institutional setting in China makes it easy to build infrastructure and physical space, but has difficulties in creating a vibrant urban environment around transport hubs. This setting is characterized by centralized political mechanisms on the one hand, and local government “growth machines” (Molotch, 1976) or urban entrepreneurialism (Hsing, 2010; Wu, 2003; Yu & Zhu, 2009) on the other hand. The centralized planning of rail infrastructure and stations contributes to the isolated development in the urban periphery. The urban entrepreneurial model implies that local governments show rent-seeking behavior from land acquisition. The quick and large revenues from land-leasing are more attractive than long-term tax income (such as property tax), and play an important role in municipal revenues (Zhang, 2001). Consequently, in many cases real estate development is taking place in speculative ways and without
realistic views of societal demand. Therefore, so-called “ghost” environments emerge without urban vitality. Furthermore, the current urban entrepreneurial model favors segmented urban development, such as large shopping malls, gated communities, large office blocks, and industrial zones (Hsing, 2010). The Ministry of Land Management Act (1986) led to the establishment of local bureaus of land management that make annual land-use plans, issue permits for land conversion etc. In the 1998 Land Management Law, municipalities became the exclusive representatives of the state exercising the right to transfer land and profit from its commercial use. Strongly influenced by Western and especially American planning, the main doctrine implicated that land yielding the highest rent should be used for activities that generate the highest market value. Furthermore a characteristic of this strategy is in the separation of functions, or “modernist” zoning. “In short, in the city rational project, municipal governments adopt doctrines of efficiency, centrality, and spatial sorting embodied in the capitalist land-use planning to strengthen their position against socialist land masters in competition for premium urban land.” (Hsing, 2010, p. 40) (Socialist land masters are state organizations such as the army and state enterprises, which are not de jure owners of the land, but for historic reasons are de facto landowners.)

Since the majority of HSR station area megaprojects are driven by the current urban entrepreneurial model and centralized planning of stations and railways, many lack the vitality and spatial quality that is desired from urban development. It raises questions about if and how better place quality can be realized under the conditions of the Chinese urban development model. It is assumed that the complex process developing a vibrant urban environment requires the input of many different resources. The wise investments in different sorts of real estate and infrastructure that are needed to create an urban environment require the financial resources, expertise and property and development rights of different types of actors. The premise that underlies the exploration in this paper is that the current Chinese urban development model – centralism in some areas and radical decentralization in other areas – has problems bringing the range of resources together that are needed to create an environment that is usually associated with urbanity, i.e. it lacks the institutional capacity to create place quality. The aim of this paper is to explore the conditions that contribute, or might contribute to place-making in the Chinese urban context. Institutional capacity, defined as the relational, political and knowledge resources that are needed to create place quality, acts as a search light for uncovering these conditions.

The plans for Shanghai Hongqiao Business District (hereafter Hongqiao
BD) have shown explicit commitment to place-making. As highlighted by the marketing slogan, “Trading Hongqiao, Smart Hongqiao, Low-carbon Hongqiao, Business District, and Urban Complex”, it is expected to be a new urban extension with a livable and sustainable environment around an integrated transport hub. It therefore provides an interesting case to examine the extent to which these ambitions are realized and which institutional conditions contributed to these aims.

This research combines fieldwork and desk research on secondary data in a single-case study. Semi-structured interviews with actors, including urban planners, aviation managers, and researchers were conducted. A content analysis is conducted on planning documents, policy documents, regulations and annual reports, until late 2013. Most of them are accessible through public web portals of relevant governmental agencies and enterprises.

The paper is structured as follows: It begins by explaining the conceptual framework, indicating the relationship between institutional capacity and place-making in urban megaprojects. The second section proceeds with introducing the case study: Shanghai Hongqiao BD. It gives the background and the chronological account of events focused on the process of place-making with regards to the diversity, integration, and sustainability. In the discussion section, attention is paid to the relational, political, and knowledge resources (the institutional capacity) that facilitates place-making. This is followed by conclusions in the last section.

**Conceptual Framework:**
**Institutional Capacity and Place-making**

In order to analyze the decision-making process, a conceptual framework is developed (Figure 5-1). It takes the centralized pro-growth institutional settings in China as the given context, and tries to unfold the particular way that institutional capacity (independent variable) impacts on the place quality (dependent variable) in an urban megaproject around a transport hub.

![Figure 5-1. Analytic framework of institutional capacity building in megaproject, Source: authors.](image_url)
Place-making in megaprojects

What is place quality, or, urbanity, in a general sense? We use the two terms as interchangeable. The literature provides a range of interpretations of the concept, varyingly emphasizing physical, social-cultural, and economic-geographic aspects. In the architectural and physical planning tradition, the place quality is narrowly defined as physical properties of the environment. Lynch (1960) for example mentions “paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks”, as the elements of the “image” or identity of place. In this vein, Siena is identified with its world famous plaza, and Amsterdam is associated with its canals. The physical tradition of place emphasizes the uniqueness of the physical environment as space that provides identity and facilitates communication. Since the 1960s, theories of place have moved towards a social-cultural direction. As a result, the concept is becoming more than a mere reference to the aesthetic or cognitive experiences of the built environment. It now includes an “urban way of life” of which Jane Jacobs’ (1961) classic text about street life in American cities discusses. For Lefebvre (1991), urbanity is about encounter - the meeting of difference, of strangers in the city, and it is about everyday life and play. Later on, Florida (2000; 2003) comes to highlight the specific importance of the “creative class” for cities, and the opportunities for interaction that cities provide for this class (Florida, 2003; Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006; Kloosterman & Lambregts, 2001) from an economic-geographic perspective. To the interpretation of “place”, Hsing (2010) adds political identity, i.e. “civic territory”, which includes the physical layer as the “location”, the social layer as the “locale” relations, and the cognitive layer as a “sense of place”. Besides the physical, social-cultural, economic-geographic, and political dimensions, there has also been a growing interest in issues of “sustainable development” (1987), “the resilient city and community” (Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2009; Vale & Campanella, 2005), and “low-carbon society” or “green urban economy” (Department for Business, 2003; UN, 1992; 1997), as crucial elements of urban quality.

Building on these traditions, this paper investigates the place quality of megaprojects around transport hubs using both the physical and social-cultural interpretations. The term “urbanity” seldom appears in planning documents, but is loosely associated with or elaborated into concepts like high density, diversity, mixed use, or cultural vitality (Lees, 2010). This paper proposes three dimensions of “urbanity”: diversity, integration, and sustainability. In the social-cultural tradition, high diversity of urban functions and activities is seen as an important feature of urbanity. Therefore, urban environment is characterized by mix of function on a low level of scale and public space that is actively used.
by different user groups. Secondly, physical tradition indicates the importance of the connection between new environments and existing urban contexts, such as embeddness in the transport system, spatial continuity of the built environment between original city and new extensions, and interdependent urban functions. The social-cultural tradition calls for some continuity of community identity, implying the combination of the values and interests of the existing neighborhood with those of the new users. Lastly, sustainability is also considered, as an important variable for spatial quality because in both Chinese practice and in academic debate, it is seen as condition sine qua non for urban development. This paper will examine the place-making process according to these three variables: diversity, integration and sustainability.

**Institutional setting of HSR megaprojects**

In China decentralization is initiated and implemented by the national government (and not by local entities) (Lin, 2002; Zhang, 2002). This process is characterized by three features: First, local governments have obtained more discretionary powers in area urban development. As a result, Chinese urbanization has been characterized with “growth coalitions” (Zhang, 2001; Zhu, 1999), where local interests seek financial gains from their assets, and are strongly motivated to capture profits that can be made from urban growth. Second, more room is created for the market to invest in real estate. Third, community organizations are still largely excluded from decision-making. This new situation calls for an institutional capacity to deal with the interdependencies between actors that have emerged.

However, despite the typical Chinese institutional conditions, current research on the HSR urban megaprojects gives rather limited attention to these conditions and their effect on the place quality of station areas. Most work has focused on the impact of the HSR on accessibility (Xu & Zhang, 2004; Zacharias & Tang, 2010; Wang et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2013) and economic development in areas such as tourism, creative industry, property market (Zheng & Kahn, 2013), and spatial structure of the city (Duan, 2009; Wang & Long, 2009; Tang et al., 2011; Dai & Cheng, 2011; Wang, 2011; Yin et al., 2014) and has also focused on the immediate station area (Zheng & Du, 2007; Hao, 2008; Li et al., 2011; Zong et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011; Li & Zhang, 2011; Ding et al., 2012).

Only some relevant research into the institutional settings and the interactions between actors that produce different urban environments of such megaprojects has been conducted. Such research has brought different insights to the fore. First, central government still plays a dominant role in infrastructure planning,
construction, and in operations. The financial support for infrastructure construction mainly comes from (national state owned) bank loans, governmental bonds, and a small amount through Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) (Wang et al., 2012). Some studies see this centralized planning and funding as advantageous because it facilitates the quick implementation of HSR projects (Chen & Zhang, 2010; Takagi, 2011). Other studies criticize the monopolistic power of central government (mainly MoR) over the decision-making because it leads to a separated development between infrastructure and the urban context (Chen & Zhang, 2011; Wang, 2012), causing problems such as leapfrog urbanization. Second, the government-centered tradition in urban planning leads to physical blueprint planning, which leaves little room for strategic planning, flexibility and long term perspectives. This results in blue print master plans that are carried out at dazzling speeds. These plans often lack the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, and do not allow for an urban environment where layers of time are put on top of each other. Third, there is no formal institutional framework that facilitates horizontal networking, which implies that coordination between different municipalities have to be established through ad hoc collaborative arrangements (Xu & Yeh, 2013). This is often non-committal, and leads to competition between municipalities. Furthermore, non-governmental actors have little formal possibilities for claiming a stake in the decision-making process. It should be concluded that in general, little institutional capacity exists for cooperation between key-actors in HSR- megaprojects in Chinese cities.

Institutional capacity

As a concept in social science research, institutions are used in different meanings. In this paper we define them as the “rules of the game” (Ostrom, 2005) in a society that determine the nature of social interaction by framing the way we identify and look at problems, prescribe possible solutions, and determine the rights of individual actors (North, 1991). Much research deals with social dilemmas that arise in the organization of collective action (Ostrom, 1990). Transferred to the realm of urban studies, the concept is often used in conjunction with communicative (Forester, 1982; 1987; 1989) and collaborative planning (Patsy Healey, 1998; Patsy Healey, 2003; Innes, 1995; 1996; Sager, 1994). According to those theorists, “qualities of places” are the outcome of multi-actor games (Patsy Healey, 1998, p. 1534). Drawing inspiration from Innes and Booher's (2010) work on the three dimensions of institutional capital (intellectual, social and political), Healey argues that for sustainable place-making, collaborating actors rely on institutional capacity of three dimensions: knowledge resources, relational resources and mobilization capacity (Cars et
al., 2002; Healey, 2003). Knowledge resources (intellectual capital) not only consists of formalized scientific bodies of knowledge available to actors, but also includes so-called “practical knowledge”, or local knowledge developed through experience and information about the local situation present among stakeholders in a particular arenas (Healey, 2008; Patsy Healey, 2013). “Important is not only the existence and availability of knowledge also its acceptance by members of the network” (De Vries, 2008, p. 51). Relational resources often referred to as “social capital”, consist of issues such as sufficient appreciation of each other’s interests, mutual trust, the existence of procedures for mutual consultation, and communicative skills (Healey, 1998). Mobilization capacity (Barry, 2012), or political capacity concerns the material and legal resources, such as land-ownership, development rights, and funding needed to create place qualities (Healey, 1998; De Vries, 2008).

The relational resource refers to both the informal social interaction between agencies and formal relational structures among them. Relevant relationships are: central-local governmental relations, horizontal relations between local government agencies, public-private relationships, regional cooperation (inter-cit relation), and the public participation system. First, the current hierarchical coordination mechanism encourages local and regional governmental actors to establish results that please party leaders. Urban construction has become a key method of local state building (Hsing, 2010). Meanwhile, “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lees, 2010; Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) also creates space for local autonomy and loopholes for bargaining in the so-called “local state corporatism” (Oi, 1995). Second, the major problem of the multi-layer network of actors in HSR development lies in regional cooperation (inter-city relation) (Wang et al., 2012). Bad coordination between local governments, leads to competition between different station areas in different municipalities. Bad coordination between governmental agencies carries the risk of incoherent development of station areas. As a matter of standard practice, a project company will be set up for the development of the station area, through which the Ministry of Railways (hereafter MoR) and the local governments meet to negotiate and decide on critical issues. MoR and local governments negotiate about their respective shares in this project company. This informal process that largely takes place behind the scenes (Xu & Yeh, 2013) is important because the division of shares has immediate impacts on outcomes of the planning and realization process. Third, the relations between government and private actors are characterized by a dominance of the public sector, as private actors in general only are given a role in the last stages of development. Private investors have expressed an interest in investing
in railways (Luger, 2008) - which might lead to a more pro-active railway actor towards station area development – but their role thus far has been limited, owing to MoR’s monopoly in line construction and service operation. Fourth and lastly, it echoes Zhang’s (2002, p. 479) point that, since governmental officials are “not directly elected but are rather assigned through a complicated political system, (although, formally, national and local legislators are elected)”, civil society or community power is “still in its early stage in terms of public participation and involvement in local affairs”.

The political resources that need to be mobilized include land ownership and development rights, financial resources, and planning authority and regulations. Land development rights (Zhu, 2004) are fundamental variables that frame the capabilities of actors during the process of urban development. The Constitution (1982) recognized land development rights as a commodity, and allowed the transfer of land use right, although public ownership remained unchanged (Zhang, 2002). Another material resource includes financial means. In the area of rail infrastructure, MoR is still regarded a monopolistic power that derives its financial resources from central government (Wang et al., 2011). As to the built environment, investment is often conducted by a municipally owned, so-called “city investment and construction company”. Its operation procedure follows: land acquisition, land mortgaging, public facility construction and land leasing.

The knowledge that is used in the process of urban development can be subdivided into three types: local knowledge, expert knowledge and process knowledge. First, the actors on the local level, who live in an area or who are involved in governance or business, usually have more local knowledge through their day-to-day experience of a place (Healey, 1998). Self-organized, quasi-participatory decision-making structures (Zhang, 2002) are emerging in Chinese cities and rely on local knowledge of actors. But, formal rights of civil-society to participate in planning processes are limited. Second, expert knowledge from urban planners, academics, and other experts appears to have become more important over the last couple of years through the introduction of expert group consulting. It is important to note that these groups are under strong influence of local governments, and are ways for local governments to maintain control over debates on urban development when they are confronted with critical opposition (Zhang, 2002). Furthermore, their lack of rail expertise reinforces the local government’s reliance and dependency on technical support from the MoR. Third, knowledge about the planning and development process is important in order to effectively participate as a stakeholder. In general, the process in such megaprojects is not always transparent for all stakeholders.
The proceeding section will examine the empirical evidence of Shanghai Hongqiao BD. The following questions will be addressed:

*Under what institutional settings does the Hongqiao development take place, and how does (a lack of) institutional capacity impact on the outcomes of place quality, with regards to diversity, integration, and sustainability?*

**Planning Shanghai Hongqiao Business District**

**Background**

The new Hongqiao BD will be developed around the Hongqiao Transport Hub (HSR, airport, local and regional transport) at Shanghai’s western fringe. It is the only transport hub in China that integrates local, regional, and international connections in the area (24.1 km to Renming-Square [downtown], 27.5 km to Lujiazui CBD, 23.3 km to Shanghai [Central] Railway Station, and 61.1 km to Pudong International Airport). It is easily accessible from the city center and new towns through multiple bus connections (19 bus lines and 31 inter-city bus lines), 4 metro lines, and 3 national HSR corridors. The hub’s passenger flow in 2013 has reached 250 million. The whole business district concerns an urban redevelopment covering 86 km². The core area around the train station and airport (4.7 km²) will consist of a mix of functions, such offices, hotels, cinemas, shopping malls, and some housing (Figure 5-2). This development takes place in a “tabula rasa” situation, concerning the vacated grounds of the airport. The wider urban redevelopment takes place in a situation of existing urban use, such as urban villages and towns and manufacturing industries. As a result, new development is partly replacing existing land use, filling in unused land and incorporating existing buildings. The development of Hongqiao BD covers the territory of four urban administrative districts (“qu”) and six rural administrative towns (“zhen”).

In 2004 the decision was taken to establish a new High Speed Railway station in the west of Shanghai and to turn Hongqiao domestic airport into an international airport. At that time the area around the airport (and future station) resembled what has been described as Zwischenstadt, postsuburbia or citta diffusa. At that time many manufacturing companies were located in the area; most them basic manufacturing such as the cloth industry, and some high end manufacturing, such as ICT. In the area, one of the first National Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZ) in Shanghai was established in the early 1990s as part of the first wave of economic reform. This economic activity attracted a lot of young migrant workers (without “hukou”) from all
over China. They found residence in existing villages, which became denzified “urban villages”, and in scattered apartment buildings. In the four districts migrants make up more than half the population. Because of this, it makes the area relatively “young” compared to the ageing population in the rest of Shanghai. The area faces competition from industrial development elsewhere in the Yangtze-River-Delta (YRD) and Shanghai, which risks a relocation of industry to other parts of the region. With cheaper land, labor, and policy support, manufacturing industries are gradually moving to second-tier cities in the YRD. At the local level, Shanghai’s economy changes from export-import manufacturing towards knowledge-focused and creative industries. In the area, different rural towns of around 50,000 inhabitants existed and gradually became part of the wider urban fabric. As a result, its residents then became commuters to the wider Shanghai urban region; however, the towns were able to keep their own (spatial and social) identity. A further characteristic of the area is the fact that it is home to many foreign consulates. This implies that services for the international community, such as international schools, private hospitals, and upmarket residential areas are also located here. Altogether, until recently the area has developed largely without planning from the municipal government.

The process of planning and developing Hongqiao BD can be subdivided in three phases (Table 5-1). The governance process moved from being led by central government via a municipal led project planning process to a quasi-collaborative approach.

Figure 5-2. Spatial settings of Shanghai Hongqiao BD, Source: authors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crucial Event</th>
<th>Key Policy/Regulation/Plan</th>
<th>Crucial Institutional Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>a. Institutional change of the Shanghai Aviation Authority</td>
<td>Research on Maglev Technology (Key Project in National High-Tech Research &amp; Development Plan), which saved 8 km of land to the west of the airport and provided a new policy for transport integration</td>
<td>a. Detachment of governmental and enterprise duties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>a. Founding of Shanghai Eastern Air Group (merged from two other aviation companies, October); b. Operation of Shanghai Maglev Demonstration Line (December);</td>
<td>a. Approval for Feasibility Report on Shanghai-Hangzhou Maglev (SC &amp; NDRC, March), which indicated the starting construction of maglev railway between two airports in Shanghai; b. Founding of Hongqiao Hub Construction Office (May); c. NO. 863 HTRDP - Maglev research project (National High-Tech Research &amp; Development Plan), which firstly proposed to integrate all infrastructures as an alternative scenario; b. New Master Plan of Hongqiao Airport, which saved 8 km land to the west of the airport and provided possibility for transport integration;</td>
<td>b. Corporation between railway aviation actors in an unified and consistent construction agenda for infrastructure;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>a. Protest to Shanghai-Hangzhou Maglev at city center; (February), which led to postpone of construction till present;</td>
<td>a. International competition on Conceptual Plan for Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub (result in Structural Planning (Jan-Feb)); b. Regulatory Plan for Hongqiao Hub &amp; Surrounding Area (December)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5-1a. Process of institutional capacity building of Hongqiao BD (1980-2008)**

(Note: MoR - Ministry of Railways; NDRC - National Development Reform Commission; SC - State Council; SRIC - Shanghai Rainbow Investment Corporation;)

**Chapter 5: Shanghai Hongqiao Business District**
### Phase II, Centralized Implementation (Infrastructure construction and spatial planning)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crucial Event</th>
<th>Key Policy/Regulation/Plan</th>
<th>Crucial Institutional Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>a, Founding of BD Management Committee (October) - start of spatial development of Hongqiao BD;</td>
<td>g, Hongqiao BD Regulations (January);</td>
<td>a, Engagement of Minhang district in core area development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a, Founding of the new Xinhuang Street-office (January);</td>
<td>h, Regulatory Plan &amp; Urban Design for Hongqiao BD Core Area (May);</td>
<td>g, Establishing the legitimacy and responsibility of Management Committee;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b, Operation of Hongqiao Airport Terminal-2 (March) - gain local accessibility to Southeastern Asia;</td>
<td>i, Regulations on BD Low-Carbon Construction (July);</td>
<td>j, Change SRIC’s role from public facility provider to property developer;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c, Operation of metro line 2 (passing through Hongqiao Railway Station) - gain regional accessibility to other part of Yangtze-River-Delta;</td>
<td>j, Shanghai DRC NO. 007 Policy (December);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d, Operation of Shanghai-Nanjing HSR, Hongqiao Railway Station, ITH main architecture (July), and Shanghai-Hangzhou HSR (October) - gain regional accessibility to other part of Yangtze-River-Delta;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e, First land lease of BD core area (4.7 km²) (September);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f, Extension of metro line 10 to railway station (November) - gain local accessibility to northeastern Shanghai, eg. Jiangwan New Town;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Phase III, Decentralized and Quasi-collaborative Governance (Spatial development & infrastructure operation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crucial Event</th>
<th>Key Policy/Regulation/Plan</th>
<th>Crucial Institutional Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>a, Operation of Shanghai-Beijing HSR (June), which represented final implementation of Hongqiao ITH (space for maglev station is reserved);</td>
<td>c, Twelfth-Five-Year Economic &amp; Social Development Plan for BD (November);</td>
<td>a, Official involvement of Qingpu district into spatial development by co-establishing West-Hongqiao;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b, Founding of West-Hongqiao BD Management Committee (February);</td>
<td>d, BD Master Plan (86 km²) ; Regulatory Plan for China Exhibition Center; Redevelopment Plan for BD East Zone (November);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>a, Founding of Hongqiao BD Management Committee (March);</td>
<td>c, Regulatory Plan and Urban Design for North &amp; South Zone (January);</td>
<td>a, Separation of responsibilities: from “Construction Office” to “Management Committee”;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b, Complete land lease of BD core area (4.7 km²) (November), which indicates active responses from real estate market;</td>
<td>d, Regulations of the Specific Development Funds of BD (March), and its Detailed Guidelines (July);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>a, Operation of the central system for cooling, heating and power (October), first implementation of sustainable initiative;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b, First enterprise settles in (November);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes: SRIC - Shanghai Rainbow Investment Corporation)
Phase I, 1980s-2005, centralized decision-making and negotiation

The first plans for Hongqiao BD started with location choice for the Maglev and HSR. Since the 1980s, the location choice for these transport modes has been subject of discussion. Decision-making was essentially the prerogative of central government (MoR). Nevertheless Shanghai municipality managed to influence the decisions about the Maglev and the HSR station in such a way that they complemented the agenda of the municipality, including the desire to realize a second international airport. In 2002, the Shanghai Airport Authority (SAA) was transformed from a national agency to a local semi-public company. This led to important changes in the incentive framework of this organization. As a national actor it was merely an instrument for the implementation of national airport plans. After decentralization the airport authority was forced to find ways to raise their own revenues, through amongst other things real estate and retail development.

Altogether, negotiations between the national government, the SAA and the municipality strayed the decision-making process from the MoR’s preferred direction. The Hongqiao Airport Master Plan (2005) proposed to reduce the distance between runways from 1700 m to 365 m, and in doing so, saved 7-km$^2$ of land. This created the possibility to integrate the new HSR and Maglev station with the airport terminal. As a result MOR revised its decision on the location of the HSR-station in favor of the airport location. Contrary to many other cases in China (Li et al., 2011; Xu & Yeh, 2013) in this case, interaction between key-actors led to the integration of transport modes – and subsequent development opportunities around the airport terminal and railway station. The negotiations were facilitated by different factors. First, the city of Shanghai has traditionally taken an autonomous position vis-à-vis the national government. Second, the World EXPO 2010 that took place in Shanghai provided the municipality with leverage vis-à-vis the national government for which the success of the exhibition was crucial. Third, the changed role of the airport authority motivated them to seek cooperation with the other actors.

Phase II. 2006-2010, project planning for the core area

During this phase, led by central government and the municipality of Shanghai, transport infrastructure was planned and constructed. Winning the hosting right of the 2010 World EXPO placed extra political pressure on local government to build the infrastructure required to make this event a success. Therefore, almost all infrastructures were completed on time (except maglev inter-city line), and this aspect motivated the Shanghai municipality to go into
They created what can be best described as a massive project planning agency, i.e. a temporary organization aimed at comprehensive planning and implementation. Firstly, as the key collective actor, the Business District Management Committee, was founded and legitimized to take charge of spatial development for the whole district; 23 municipal departments delegated organizational units to this new actor. An investment corporation, namely Shanghai Rainbow Investment Corporation (SRIC), organizes and coordinates the actual spatial development in the core area. It is a public-owned enterprise that functions as the municipal financial platform for investment and construction. Furthermore, three temporary construction offices were established. They include a HSR Station Construction Office, an Airport Construction Office, and a BD Construction Office. They have since been dissolved once their tasks were fulfilled.

The approach followed is quite typical for planning urban megaprojects in China (Dai et al., 2013): the municipal government takes the lead, establishes a dedicated project organization, and engages in comprehensive planning and implementation. The approach enabled the implementation of the plan – as a blueprint – for the core area according to its intentions. Particularly, this ensured that different systems of infrastructure – rail, road, airport, bus and metro – are physically well integrated. Comprehensive planning and implementation was made possible by the fact that the core area was treated as a tabula rasa situation, and the development rights – irrespective of land ownership – were brought under the umbrella of the management committee.

An innovative aspect of the project, compared to similar urban projects in China (Chen & Zhang, 2010; Li et al., 2011), concerns the PPP. The investment corporation, in which the municipality, the airport authority and (semi) private developers participated, made sure that that profits from developments such as hotels and office buildings were used to pay for unprofitable developments such as public space. Usually in China there is no clear link between benefits and costs at the project level, because profits contribute to the general budget of municipalities and other state organizations. The existence of PPPs contributed to greater engagement by individual actors within the development of the core area as a whole. For example the airport authority, which had to deal with many unprofitable functions, became interested in the quality of public space since that could contribute to the development of, profitable, retail.

Furthermore, important for the development of the core area has been an emphasis on sustainability, brought forward through slogans such as “low-carbon economy” and “smart city”. Concretely this comes down to the realization of
“green buildings” (green roofs, energy – air, heating and light – recycling), low or zero emission transportation (monorail, shuttle buses and bicycles), and the attraction of cultural and “creative” - non-polluting - industries. The main incentive for a sustainable strategy comes from central government. In the past local (or regional) GDP growth was the main benchmark for measuring success of local politicians by national politicians. Lately sustainability complemented GDP growth as a key criterion in the Chinese political appraisal system (Liu et al., 2014; Chien, 2013). The use of sustainability as a trademark of a development project is strongly incentivized by the idea that this gives municipalities a competitive edge over other municipalities for central governmental financial support. The EXPO 2010 propagated the idea of a “low carbon city”, and subsequently eight areas in Shanghai were designated as pilot spaces for the low-carbon urbanization, including the Hongqiao BD.

From a place-making perspective, planning for the core area brings different things to the fore. The planned development is relatively mixed, consisting of offices, hotels, leisure and cultural facilities, and public parks. In addition, a lot of attention has been paid to public space. For example, a panorama terrace was built in an airport-terminal, it currently attracts many passengers and non-passengers alike. The airport terminal is well integrated in the wider urban tissue. Public transport and related facilities, especially the metro stations and underground space, directly connects it with the immediate urban functions. Sustainability has a clear stamp on the plan. From a place-making perspective a negative feature of the HSR-station is its characterization of the traditionally common image of railway stations as mono-functional places. By the end of November 2013, the core area and immediate surrounding environment around the hub had been fully leased to developers, including almost all the large real estate tycoons on the Chinese market.

**Phase III, 2011-2013, the emergence of a quasi-collaborative network**

During this phase, the Hongqiao hub was put into use, plans for the core area were implemented, and plan making for and the development of the areas outside the core of the Hongqiao BD was taking place. The municipality shared responsibility for planning and development with sub-local governments (the districts and sub-districts), which is uncommon in these types of urban development projects. This included the establishment of new sub-local governments. In addition to the planning powers that these governments were given, in Shanghai – as opposed to other cities – sub-local governments are allowed to collect revenues from enterprises that they own and share in tax revenues. This made sub-local governments much more active agents for urban
transformation than they would be otherwise; these districts take the lead in making plans for their territory, as opposed to districts in other cases that would be more passive and wait for others – developing parties – to take the initiative. In the latter situation this often results in mono-functional developments. Additionally, the Management Committee established a shared sense of direction by emphasizing that the area was competing and losing to other places in the YRD region, with regard to manufacturing, and that sustainability offered a change to make a distinction between Hongqiao and other developments in the region. It seems that in Hongqiao, plans for sub-center’s have the ambition to embed them in the overall strategy for the Business District. For example, the realization of a national exhibition center motivated the Qingpu District to start the West-Hongqiao Cultural Industrial Park, aimed at the same target group as the exhibition center. Furthermore, sub-local governments tried to distinguish themselves from other places, and in doing so is creating diversity for the whole of the Hongqiao BD. For example, Minhang District launched a development agenda for building an international medical center aimed at attracting “medical tourism” and it developed an international education center under the ambition of becoming a “global campus”. Changning District promoted cultural facilities, such as Shanghai International Dancing Center and Hongqiao Art Center, as well as fashion industries. Notwithstanding this movement towards diversity and complementarity, competition between districts has not been completely eradicated, as for example Qingpu and Changning Districts compete with each other to attract similar international trading companies.

**Discussion: The Emergence of a Policy Network**

This section discusses the planning of Hongqiao BD through the lens of institutional capacity and its relationship with establishing diversity, integration and sustainability. In section two, three different types of resources were described – relational, political and knowledge resources – that are needed to establish place quality. The Hongqiao case clearly illustrates the double shift in powers and responsibilities discussed in the opening of this paper. The municipality plays a key role in the development, and in the case of Shanghai the municipality in its turn has devolved powers and responsibilities towards sub-municipal governments. A key actor – the airport authority – has been transformed into a (semi) private actor and through the establishment of a PPP room is given to (semi) private actors to participate in the early stages of the planning process. It has to be noted that the dichotomy public-private in the China is not unproblematic. In our analysis the term (semi) private actors is used to refer to actors that are primarily driven by a market logic as opposed to a
hierarchical logic, irrespective of whether the legal status makes it a public actor or not. Despite the shift in powers and responsibilities, the central government remains an important actor in this urban megaproject. The characteristics of the Chinese polity with its particular appraisal system guarantee that local officials will always keep an eye upwards the hierarchy in determining their course of action. The MoR as a (national) state actor very much determines its own course of action. Taken all together, political resources have spread over more and diverse actors and forms of interaction between these actors also diversified. As result the case provides insights in how this different dimensions of institutional capacity in the Chinese context relate to the creation of place quality. For the empirical analysis, different resources enabling institutional capacity are operationalized (Table 5-2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relational Resources</td>
<td>Central-local government relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horizontal relations between local governmental actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public-private (commercial actors) relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public participation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Resources</td>
<td>Land ownership and development right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning authority and regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Resources</td>
<td>Process knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expert knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5-2. Different resources for institutional capacity in Hongqiao BD, Source: authors*

**Relational resources: towards diversification of relationships**

Three types of relationships can be distinguished in this case: hierarchical relationships, negotiation relationships and the project partnerships. At the risk of stating the obvious in this case, hierarchical relationships do play an important role. Decentralization by no means implies that central government has become an obsolete factor. The case does indicate, however, that the nature of this hierarchical relationship varies and this influences the characteristics of development. First, in the example of MoR, a state agency guided first and foremost by national political objectives is directly active in the area. Because
it is hierarchically positioned above the other parties, it is not forced to take
the interest of actors into account. As a result, although the train station is
physically connected, it is relatively isolated from the rest of the development
in the Hongqiao BD. The train station forms a strong contrast with the airport
terminal, which is well embedded in its urban surroundings. As a decentralized
actor, the airport authority experiences different incentives. Second, a
different type of hierarchical intervention concerns the national government's
sustainability agenda that aims to steer the Hongqiao BD in the direction of
sustainable development. In this situation the hierarchical intervention leaves
room for local actors to formulate an abstract goal into concrete measures,
which can then be integrated into the overall ambitions of the area, and
therefore obstructs any obstacles towards integration and diversity. This is in
accordance with the idea that arguably, China's one party system has been able
to effectively promote green energy in a top-down-manner (Horesh, 2013). The
fact that sustainability on the local level is promoted by hierarchical steering -
it might even be seen as a pre-condition for it - is not typical for China (Homsy
& Warner, 2014; Van Rijswich & Salet, 2012). Even if a central norm is not as
open or multi-interpretable as sustainability is, it can provide enough room
for maneuvering. The urban appearance – high density in small blocks - of
Hongqiao has been greatly helped by the legislation that buildings cannot be
higher than 48 meters, as result of airport safety regulation. In order to realize
enough floor space it became inevitable to realize density horizontally instead of
vertically.

The negotiations about the location of the railway station ultimately lead to
a solution that, from a place-making perspective, is superior to the alternative
because it enabled the ability to combine the development of the station with
other urban development ambitions of Hongqiao. This episode sheds light
on the conditions that give local actors bargaining power vis-a-vis powerful
Chinese state organizations. First, for different and partly historic reasons
Shanghai has a more independent position relative to the national state. It holds
the unique position as one of the four ‘Direct-controlled Municipalities’ in
China. Furthermore, as a global center it is an important showcase of China’s
achievements in the world and therefore the successful organization of an event
such as the EXPO is of great importance to the national state. Therefore, the
state is dependent on the local government as a key actor. The decentralization
of the Shanghai Airport Authority turned this actor from a state agent into a
local actor; as a result it became the perfect mediator between the state agent
MoR and the local government.
Building a vast project partnership that is given the power to decide on development rights is not uncommon in Chinese urban development projects. What makes the Hongqiao case stand out is the use of a value capturing model (Wu, 2010) in order to support the realization of unprofitable development: all facilities in the core area are categorized into four types, depending on whether they are profitable or not, and whether they can be separately constructed or not. In order to make profit, this model motivated the SAA to support more functions in addition to the original plans, such as the development of an underground shopping floor. Nevertheless, the scale and time span of the whole Hongqiao BD (outside the core area) is unsuitable for a project planning approach. In this case a more strategic way of operating is emerging, in which sub-municipal actors (districts and sub-districts), were motivated – not forced – to act in line with the overall vision for Hongqiao made by the municipality. Characteristic of this approach is that it introduces the storyline of “the area losing its competitive edge relative to other areas in the region” and giving the districts a stake in the development of Hongqiao as a whole (see next section).

Political resources: decentralization contributes to local embedding

With the latter deduction the analysis moves to the distribution of political resources, concerning land ownership, development rights, financial resources, planning regulations etc. In the construction of the hub, the land development rights were detached from the fragmented land ownership among the MoR, the airport, and the metro company. It made it possible to integrate the hub as a whole based on the actual use of the passengers during transportation and other urban activities. In the spatial development, by encouraging districts to become shareholders of the underground space development in core area and the energy supply system for the whole BD, they became more interested in the success of Hongqiao as a whole. Therefore, they are more inclined to view the development program for the district in relation to the whole Hongqiao development. The pro-active attitude to urban development of districts is also encouraged by the financial incentives that the tax system provides, in deviation from regular practice in China. Districts are allowed to keep part of the tax revenues of companies located in their territory. That guarantees part of the revenue stays within the district territory and thus brings in incentives for local actors. Besides, a BD Development Funds’ subsidizes aids in attracting green and creative industries.

Nevertheless, while urban development in Shanghai takes form in a more pluralistic polity than before, the local population still largely lacks political resources. Opportunities for public participation are practically non-existent,
particularly for the migrant population. As result the incorporation of socially disadvantaged groups will not manifest; a characteristic of an urban environment where “chic and shabby” cohabit, will not be part of Hongqiao. The new development will be in line with the “increased divergence between greater urban wealth as well as greater urban poverty” (Gu et al. 2014), which is typical of China’s urban development since the 1990s.

**Knowledge resources: openness, transfer of knowledge and visual support systems**

What is striking about the Hongqiao project is the level of information provision, including process information, expert experience, and local knowledge. The relevant plans, key policies, latest land transfer, and even the government budget are almost completely and bilingually accessible to the public, which is extraordinary in Chinese megaprojects. In addition, a monthly brochure – “Hongqiao Business” – contributes to providing such information to the public. This extensive and factual communication (beyond the usual marketing talk) establishes an image of transparency and openness that attracts potential investors (Liu, 2010).

Furthermore, as a key player, the SAA used its experience with PPP from the development of Pudong Airport to establish an innovative cooperation in Hongqiao. By developing computerized 3D-models, which showed the outcome of different development scenarios, municipal planners were better equipped to judge whether proposals from investors contributed to the urban environment that was aspired in the plans. The model not only checks the regular indicators (height, density, land use, etc.), but also inspects public space, continuity of pedestrian systems, small block sizes, functional mixes, etc. It directly contributes to place-making in such urban megaprojects.

Finally, the stronger involvement of sub-local governmental actors (districts and sub-districts) contributes to the use of their local knowledge.

**Conclusions**

Whether, and to what extent the Hongqiao BD will produce urban place quality remains yet to be seen. This case only allows the establishment of what extent plans and physical developments contribute to urban vitality as we have defined it. The plans and the physical environment might be seen as necessary pre-conditions for place-making, but are by no means sufficient conditions. The actual use by people and businesses will determine whether Hongqiao
will become a high quality place. Furthermore, Hongqiao can be considered to be what is called an extreme case (Yin, 2009) or outlier case, which has certain characteristics that are not encountered to such an extent in the wider population, i.e. the specific position of Shanghai within the Chinese state and the unique governmental culture within the municipality of Shanghai – with more decentralization and openness to non-governmental actors than in the most parts of China – it creates different, and arguably, more favorable conditions for creating place quality. This case study might not allow us to draw general lessons. Nevertheless, as a contrast to other mega-urban projects, this case allows us to gain insight into deviating conditions of institutional capacity that seemingly relate to issues of place quality.

First and foremost, we conclude that mechanisms for value capturing in order to support unprofitable development, has contributed to investment in public space, and creates opportunities for development – retail for example – that contribute to a greater mix and more liveliness in the area. Secondly, by allowing districts to benefit more from development and by turning them from stakeholders into – sometimes literally – shareholders of the larger urban development, they are more inclined to realign their own development with those of the greater whole. Third, a culture of negotiation that departs from accepting mutual interdependencies instead of a hierarchal top-down implementation of state plans increases changes of integration, as exemplified by the story of the location of the railway station. Fourth, from a knowledge resource perspective, the openness attempted in the Hongqiao case contrasts with the often opaque processes of planning in China; it seems that this fosters trust among third parties and therefore increases the chance of investors from different backgrounds to invest in urban development, and as result, contributes to more diversity.

(Note: The appendices regarding the plans, policies, regulations, reports and other archives are available on request. The official websites also have provided the empirical data.)

References


**Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux.** Ashgate Pub Ltd.


Chapter 5: Shanghai Hongqiao Business District


Wu, F. (2003). The (Post-) Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai’s


CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 6: Comparison and Conclusion

Construction of Nanjing South Railway Station, Photo: Author, 2011
CONCLUSIONS

The previous chapters have unfolded the complexity and dynamics of decision-making on HSR-related urban development in contemporary Chinese cities from actor-centered institutional perspective. This chapter first systematically summarizes the cross-case findings. Next, conclusive remarks will be made. Moreover, some reflections on the relevance and limitation of the research will be given.

Cross-Case Comparison

The assumptions put forward at the start of the research about how the present Chinese polity relates to efforts of place-making are partly confirmed and enriched by the empirical evidence: the government-led, pro-growth rational appears to cause a number of difficulties with “place-making.” However, there are also surprising exceptions in which urban qualities are realized. I will discuss both sorts of findings in this concluding chapter. Before coming to the conclusions, a comparative insight into the three different practices allows us to arrive at a more systematic discussion. The comparison includes two parts: 1) the different institutional arrangement as the settings for action arena, and 2) the action arenas where actors interact and eventually lead to different outcomes of collective actions.

Settings: institutional arrangements

The three case studies consistently affirmed the structuring role of the general institutional parameters proposed in the pilot study (Chapter 2) as sensitizing concepts. However, the precise institutional arrangements that shape the orientations and capabilities of actors appear to differ in each in-depth case study. The next table summarizes the institutional arrangements in more detail (Table 6-1): They include the relations among governmental actors (central-municipal, municipal-local, and cross-jurisdictional), the involvement of market actors (holders of the land development right, specific coordinative actor/coalition), and the involvement of civic actors (public participation and knowledge and information exchange).
Table 6-1. Actor positions in the three institutional arrangements, Source: author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wuhan</th>
<th>Nanjing</th>
<th>Shanghai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governmental Actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central-municipal: Central government dominates infrastructure planning;</td>
<td>- Central-municipal: Infrastructure planning partly decentralized from MoR to municipality;</td>
<td>- Central-municipal: Infrastructure planning partly decentralized from MoR to municipality and local aviation actors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Municipal-local: Spatial development dominated by municipality; No district/sub-district involvement;</td>
<td>- Municipal-local: Spatial development dominated by municipality; Partially involvement of district;</td>
<td>- Municipal-local: Spatial development was decentralized to district &amp; sub-district;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cross-jurisdictional: Dominated by railway actors; No platform for coordination;</td>
<td>- Cross-jurisdictional: Dominated by railway actors; No platform for coordination;</td>
<td>- Cross-jurisdictional: Platform for coordination among railway, aviation &amp; urban actors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market Actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Holders of land development right: Monopolized by municipality;</td>
<td>- Holders of land development right: Monopolized by municipality;</td>
<td>- Holders of land development right: Public-Private-Partnership (PPP);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Specific actor/coalition: No mediator for spatial development and governance;</td>
<td>- Specific actor/coalition: Two new actor coalitions for land development and spatial governance;</td>
<td>- Specific actor/coalition: Several specific coalitions and new actors to mediate spatial development and governance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic Actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Public participation: Emergence of bottom-up coalition from civil society;</td>
<td>- Public participation: No civic involvement;</td>
<td>- Public participation: Emergence of bottom-up coalition from civil society;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Knowledge &amp; information transfer: Enclosed information system;</td>
<td>- Knowledge &amp; information transfer: Enclosed information system;</td>
<td>- Knowledge &amp; information transfer: Open access to information, respect for local knowledge;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1) Yangchun-lake sub-center around Wuhan Station

This case confirms the working hypothesis, and can be considered as a “negative case” with regard to place-making. It illustrates the typical centralized, government-led institutional arrangement. First, the central government, i.e., MoR, clearly dominated the central-municipal relation. The municipality only had the role of advisor during preparations. Additionally, there was no involvement of the local district or sub-district during the spatial planning and development. As a result, the municipality dominated municipal-local relation. Very little cross-jurisdictional coordination between railway actors, metro actors, and other urban development actors could be found, since there was no such platform or agency for it. Only the Railway Station Square Office was founded to take charge of daily facilities maintenance on the station square. Its power in mediating the inter-organizational coordination was extremely limited, as was its ability to interfere with land development. Second, with regard to the market actors, there was no specific actor or coalition of actors to involve market actors. The only relevant agency is the City Investment & Construction Corp., which was not interested in creating place-quality in this particular project. Third, the most unexpected finding is that a bottom-up coalition emerged from civil society to protest against the destruction of environmental quality. However, there were no formal institutional channels for public participation and the whole process was not transparent.

As the outcome of such a centralized, government-led institutional arrangement, the Wuhan case shows inadequate place quality. Hierarchical decision-making resulted in the location at the fringe of the city transport network and morphological territory. The lack of a coordinative agency for infrastructure integration played a role in the absence of a public transport connection and the mono-function of the hub. The bottom-up public participation demonstrated the attention on the environmental sustainability.

2) New South Extension around Nanjing South Railway Station

This case represents another type of setting in which central government dominance is combined with a collaborative arrangement. First, the MoR played a dominant role in the central-local relation, while some decision-making was decentralized towards the level of the municipality. This was due to Nanjing’s unique role of being the only municipality that was a shareholder of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR Corp. Ltd. As to the municipal-local relationship, the municipality played a dominant role in leading spatial planning and development. Nonetheless, the districts were only partially involved in the
form of developing some sub-projects such as a district industrial park for high-tech enterprises. Though a new coordinative agency/actor (i.e. the Construction Headquarter) was founded, it did not fully fulfill its designated task of cross-jurisdictional coordination. Second, from the perspective of market involvement, the development process was still pre-dominantly led by the municipality, just like the Wuhan case. Yet, what made it different was the separation of the entrepreneurial (market) role and governmental role of the aforementioned coordinative agency. The right of land development was given to a new semi-public corporation (i.e. the Railway Investment & Construction Corp.). That gave room for the participation of market actors. In comparison to the Wuhan case, this separation (although at a preliminary stage) showed an effect on limiting the public actors’ monopoly, and started to maintain its role as a public-service-provider. Lastly, the process showed very little public participation. There only emerged a bottom-up coalition from civil society.

As a result, the Nanjing case has shown outstanding place quality in the sense of location choice and infrastructure integration. Because of the negotiation between the railway agency and the municipality, the location echoed the direction of the city’s future spatial extension, although being far away from the existing center. The coordinative agency has focused its contribution on the inter-organizational coordination of infrastructure integration, which resulted in better accessibility of public transportation. But there still remains much room for improvement in terms of functional diversity and sustainability, particularly in the core area.

3) Hongqiao Business District around Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub.

The Shanghai case can be considered a “positive case,” which partly refutes our initial expectations. In this case, decision-making was further decentralized, market actors were involved to a greater extent than usual in China and cooperation was facilitated. First, this is reflected in the arrangement of governmental actors: the conditions with regards to the policy process granted the municipality a more important role than usual. The Shanghai government played a proactive role in influencing the location choice and the integration of transport modes by negotiating with the MoR and the airport authority. The decentralization of the Shanghai Aviation Authority gave it an entrepreneurial identity and motivated it into an active coordination with other actors. Furthermore, the municipal-local relationship was much less hierarchical than in the other two cases. The district and the sub-district were given certain autonomy in determining spatial development. The megaproject was localized
by dividing it into sub-projects which were more embedded into the districts’ own development agendas. There was a platform for cross-jurisdictional coordination among railway, aviation, and urban development actors. Second, a PPP was introduced with regard to land development, particularly in the core area. New actor coalitions were thus formulated. Among them, there was an obvious separation of the entrepreneurial role (i.e. Shanghai Rainbow Investment & Construction Corp.) and the governance role (i.e. Hongqiao Business District Management Committee). The separation was much clearer than in the Nanjing case. Third, with regard to the civic actors, the case shows an emerging bottom-up coalition from civil society in the protest against the maglev line. Furthermore, the appreciation of knowledge transfer made the policy process more adaptive to the local development agenda. Openness and transparency, such as the easy access to the latest information, fostered trust among third parties and therefore increased the opportunities for investors from different backgrounds to invest.

As a consequence of this decentralized, coordinative, and semi-collaborative institutional arrangement, the Shanghai case is endowed with more spatial quality than the former two cases. Although also located at the periphery, the inter-organizational coordination made it easily accessible from the other part of the city, the country, and even the world. Further, it is conveniently integrated with all modes of transportation. The hub and the core area are facilitated with diverse urban functions, due to the involvement of public private partnerships. In addition, the case demonstrated that top-down attention on environmental sustainability has started to become a form of local branding for the core area of this very case.

**Action arenas: interaction modes in collective action problems**

The different institutional arrangements go along with differentiated modes of interaction with regard to the collective action problems in the cases (Table 6-2). As described in Chapter 1, this study operationalizes “place quality” into four key components:

1) location, 2) infrastructure integration, 3) functional diversity, and 4) sustainability.
The location choice plays a cardinal role in all cases. Inevitably, hierarchical direction dominates the decision-making of such national infrastructure projects. In most small cities, municipalities have to accede to and follow the MoR's proposal. However, the empirical study of three cases also demonstrates an unexpected capability of municipalities to bargain with the MoR. The most crucial factor is their mutual interest by choosing the peripheral location. On the one hand, the MoR has the preference for minimal construction costs and technical feasibility. On the other hand, the municipalities prefer to take the HSR hub as an opportunity for land acquisition, spatial reconstruction, and suburbanization. The large amount of (public-owned) land leases has proved to be the quickest way of profit-making in the Chinese local governments’ urban growth machine. Since municipalities have the executive capabilities of clearing land and relocating the residents, the MoR has to take the localities preferences into consideration to a certain extent. That provided the necessary room for negotiation. As a result, the win-win agreements for locating new stations were always urban outskirts (redeveloped central stations are not applicable in this argumentation). Moreover, compared to Wuhan, Shanghai and Nanjing gained more bargaining power as the official stakeholders of the relevant HSR corridor.

**Infrastructure integration**

The main interaction mode is “bargaining under hierarchy.” This particularly contributed to the infrastructure integration in the Nanjing and Shanghai cases. Nanjing, as the only municipal shareholder in the Beijing-Guangzhou HSR Corp., benefitted from this position in the negotiation on several relevant issues. For instance, its strong objections necessitated the MoR to lift up the railway tracks to an elevated level in order to avoid interruption of city road traffic. Moreover, the plan for a metro connection was also changed and better
integrated into the underground floor of the railway station. In the Shanghai Hongqiao case, the marketization of aviation actors engaged them in convincing other actors (especially the MoR) to integrate all transport modes within one hub. The Wuhan case is much less integrated due to the missing cross-jurisdictional coordination.

**Functional diversity**

The interaction modes differ from hierarchy to network-coordination, or even project partnership (PPP). The determining factor seems to be who owns the land and how the land is developed. Generally speaking, the railway actors own the station land and prefer the pure transportation function, while the local governments own the surrounding (and underground) land and pursue urbanity. Interestingly, the Shanghai and Nanjing cases have shown a few more concerns with regard to the key-component diversity. Both municipalities have chosen to compromise by placing the commercial and retail functions in an underground facility. However, the diversity of the whole development still remained limited. The Shanghai case is distinct because of the introduction of a public private partnership strategy. The costs of unprofitable facilities in the megaproject were balanced with multiple profitable functions. That greatly contributed to bringing in diverse urban functions.

**Sustainability**

The new policy paradigm of sustainability by the central government created a growing awareness of sustainability and resilience in the mainstream urban policies of China. The concept is interpreted as environmental or ecological sustainability. Hierarchical planning and implementation remains the most important way in which this policy is delivered. There is a risk that – as long as the political appraisal system is still nested in a pro-growth rational – the local governments will use sustainability mainly as a niche to compete with others. The Nanjing case did not show prominent concern for sustainability issues. Nevertheless, the Shanghai and Wuhan cases exemplify an increasing engagement from civic actors and the emerging civil society in environmental issues. In the Shanghai case, the residents protested in the streets to express their objections to the maglev’s possible radiation. The Wuhan case illustrated more sophisticated means of public participation in the protest against privatizing of the city lakeshore. The new civic initiatives include organizing media coverage, online protests, and a participatory art project. The residents, journalists, and artists started to build up a new coalition.
Conclusions

The conclusive remark can be addressed: even under the current Chinese pro-growth conditions, the different cases vary in their institutional settings and subsequently in the extent to which place-making is successful. The differentiation of institutional conditions enables new policy games and processes of coalition building. Conditions that seem to contribute to place-making include the following:

- The decentralization of decision-making to local governments;
- The coalition building for cross-jurisdictional coordination;
- The distinction of the entrepreneurial (market) and the governmental roles of key actors;
- The capacity of project partnerships to capture and allocate value;
- The involvement of civic actors.

I will explain these conditions in more detail:

Decentralization to municipality, district, and sub-district

The study reveals that in these megaprojects with a large urban, regional, and – to a certain extent – even national significance, decentralization of decision-making is still vital for place-making. The decentralization to the municipal level has been extensively investigated. On top of this, the study highlights the crucial role of sub-municipal local actors (district and sub-district). Although these actors are generally still excluded from decision-making on the location choice of the HSR station and on sustainable urban development, they do play an important role in pursuing integration or diversity. They have the knowledge of local needs and the executive capabilities to conduct actual projects. Thus, those ambitious plans for HSR station area development and the associated urban extension could be divided into sub-projects that fit more with the existing local development agenda. Given the strong position of the municipality, the more district and sub-district are involved, the better place quality might be created.

An interesting point is that stakeholders can be made shareholders. By allowing districts to benefit directly from spatial development and turning them from stakeholders into shareholders of the larger urban development, they are more inclined to realign their own development with those of the greater whole. The case of Nanjing demonstrated how stakeholders changed into this proactive
Coalition for cross-jurisdictional coordination: Recognizing the interdependence

Coordination problems among horizontal governmental actors are quite universal in urban megaprojects. The “horizontal actors” here refer to those on the similar administrative levels but from different sections and jurisdictions, who usually have conflicting interests. The specific feature of HSR-oriented development in China roots in the conflicts between the separated accountabilities of the railway hierarchy (tiao) and the local urban network (kuai). It is crucial to establish actor coalitions of mutual interdependency instead of a hierarchal top-down implementation of state plans. That could increase the meaning of negotiation and improve chances for cross-jurisdictional coordination and policy-making, and thus lead to a better place quality.

Distinguishing the entrepreneurial (market) and the governmental roles of key actors

The key coordinative actors in the three cases significantly differ in the sense of their capacities of spatial governance, which resulted in different outcomes of place quality. They include the Railway Station Square Office in Wuhan, the Construction Headquarter in Nanjing, and the Hongqiao Business District Management Committee in Shanghai. In particular, the latter two have shown the ambiguous roles between a developer (game-player) and a governmental agency (rule-maker). In other words, they have the monopoly right in land development on the one hand, and the administrative power in planning and providing urban services as a governmental agency on the other hand. Being both rule-maker and game-player enhanced their monopoly in the action arena of place-making. Nevertheless, studies have discovered the initial attempt to extract the entrepreneurial role from the coordinative actors. The clearer the separation, the less monopolist the coordinative actors are. Thus, a more transparent action arena proved to be more attractive for market investment.

Project partnerships enabling value capturing

The study shows that the project partnership between transportation and urban development actors functioned as an effective mechanism for value capturing in order to support unprofitable parts of the development. This partnership manages to bridge the fundamental barriers for implementing integrated land-use and transport development, and thus to contribute to investment in public
spaces and create opportunities for multiple urban functions. Special attention must be paid to the unique preferences and orientations of the railway agency.

**Involvement of civic actors**

This study also shows the emerging engagement of collaborative coalitions and civil society. However, whether the bottom-up protest is forceful enough to change the policy agenda remains in doubt. As long as the governmental actors hold the dominant position and profit from land revenue, the impact of civic networks is not self-evident. It thus calls for an institutionalized channel for public participation. Besides, the local knowledge of the district and the sub-district level could be more appreciated, which would contribute to a better understanding of local needs and thus more embedding in the existing local development agenda. The information accessibility and transparency also greatly contributes to the openness and transparency of the policy process.

**Questions for Further Research**

This research investigated whether and how under the existing institutional arrangements the policy processes in the urban megaprojects around HSR stations produced new qualities of urban spaces. It focused on the arenas of dynamic action. The study highlighted the importance of taking an institutional perspective on the policy processes, rather than focusing directly on policy outcomes. The findings revealed that the existing institutional conditions are far from ideal and need urgent change. However, change may go fast in China. Some of the conclusive remarks already have shown the relevance of the study, considering the latest national policy initiatives on institutional change since late 2013. For instance, the project partnership, which has proved to be contributive for spatial quality in the Shanghai case, has officially been promoted by national policy for the first time (The Suggestions on Accelerating the Reform of Fiscal and Investment Institutions in Railway Constructions, State Council, August 2013). It encourages the railway and market actors to formulate PPP as the new way to fund railway and station area development. Its supporting policy (State Council, August 2014) further indicates breaking the core institutional barrier for integrated and diverse land-use around transport hubs, that is, the fragmented land ownership among railway actors and municipalities. Another relevant example is the organizational change of the MoR. It was dissolved into the National Railway Administration (a governmental actor) and the China Railway Corporation (an entrepreneurial actor) (the 1st Plenary Session of 12th National People’s Congress, 14th March 2013). That echoes the institutional condition regarding the separation of entrepreneurial and governmental...
identities.

The actual change of institutional conditions emphasizes the relevance of institutional analysis but much more research will be needed to understand the complex institutional web of public and private relationships of urban development in China. The underlying research was limited in various ways, underpinning in this way the questions for further research. First of all, I decided for analytical reasons to focus on the dynamic policy processes under consolidated institutional conditions, neglecting in this way the simultaneously changing institutional landscape in reality. Relevant questions for further research may focus first of all on the opportunities for and barriers of institutional change. As a consequence of the analytical model, I could give more detailed attention to the dynamic change of actor preferences and capabilities and the policy games in the arenas of decision-making. However, these processes are also processes under construction and tend to change fast in the context of urban China. For this reason, questions for further research should also actualize the findings on the policy processes since 2013. It is important to be aware of the fact that the field was rapidly changing during the study. Along with the implementation of facilities, some critical remarks, such as the ones on infrastructure integration, might be already invalid under the most recent adaptations.

Further limitations are the consequences of the research design. I have attempted to find a balance between the inductive (“exploratory”) and the deductive (“falsifying” and “confirmatory”) methods (Gerring, 2007). On the one hand, it builds upon a series of explorative case studies while on the other hand, these studies were informed by and focused on sensatory concepts under the umbrella framework of institutionalism. This selection enables the drawing of some conclusions, naturally excludes other potential research focuses aside from institutions. This also goes for the selection of case studies. In order to keep the cases “most-similar” and comparable, the medium-sized cities and towns on the HSR corridors are excluded in this study. There might be a lack of generalizability for other variations of HSR-oriented development.

Last but not the least, for the sake of external validity, it would be very interesting to focus further research on a comparative study between Chinese and international cases. This study has only touched on European and Japanese examples in the literature review. These differentiated institutional arrangements could provide vital input for policy games among actors. That could be the direction for the future research.
References


APPENDIXES
Station Square of Nanjing (Central) Station, Photo: Author, 2012
Appendix I: Glossaries (in alphabetical order of Chinese terms)

1) “He-xie-she-hui” (和谐社会): the Harmonious Society

It is the political strategy of CCPC which was firstly raised in the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 16th CCCPC on 19th September 2004. And it was extensively elaborated in the report of the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 16th CCCPC on November 2006, “CCCPC’s Decisions on Building the Socialist Harmonious Society”《中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定》(http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/4932424.html). The core slug is to archive “democracy, justice, honesty & kindness, stability and order, vibrant, and harmony with environment”.

2) “Gao-tie-xin-cheng” (高铁新城): HSR new town

New towns, or real estate development, that are stimulated around HSR stations and along HSR corridors. Most of them are peripheral located.

3) “Jing-ji-kai-fa-qu” (经济开发区): Economic Development Zone (EDZ).

It was started in the 1980s, and prevailed in the 1990s-2000s. It is considered as the first waves of urban expansion driven by the neoliberal policies.


The concept was firstly raised up in the Report of the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 16th National Congress of CCP in October 2005, “CCCPC’s Suggestions on Making the Eleventh Five-year-Plan”《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议》(http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-10/18/content_3640318.htm). It elaborated that resource conservation and environment protection should be persistent as fundamental national policy. That is the first time the so-called “eco-civilization” (Sheng-tai-wen-ming) is promoted, which refers to the goal of establishing a resource-saving and environment-friendly industrial structure, growth mode and consume mode. At the same year, the National Development and Reform Commission approved the Wuhan metropolitan area and Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan metropolitan area as the experimental district.


A national strategy, which was firstly proposed in the Central Economy Conference in December 2004. And it was officially promoted in the Report of the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 16th National Congress of CCP in October 2005, “CCCPC’s Suggestions on Making the Eleventh Five-year-Plan”《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议》(http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-10/18/content_3640318.htm). It emphasizes on the re-nurturing of industrialization and urbanization towards the rural area and agriculture.

6) “Da-xue-cheng” (大学城): University Town.

A nation-wide strategy, which was booming during the 1990s. It started with universities’ requisition of large land at rural area, and the relocation (part of) the educational and academic functions outside of downtown. That caused sub-urbanization around existing urban area.

7) “Wu-nian-ji-hua” (国民经济和社会发展规划纲要五年计划): Five-Year-Plan

The namely Strategic Plan for National Economy and Social Development. Chinese government
started to make this mid and short term plan every five years since 1953.


Adopting the contemporary terminology in Chinese politics, the vertical intergovernmental system is called “tiao”, while the horizontal system among bureaus and territorial authorities is called “kuai”. They are left from the Socialist Planned Economy.


It refer to the mechanism that the local governmental reply on gaining revenue through land acquisition and transfer. It is strongly driven by Urban Entrepreneurialism, which operates the city as a growth-machine.


This concept was proposed in the “National Plan for New Urbanization (2014-2020)” 《国家新型城镇化规划 (2014-2020)》(http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2014-03/16/content_2640075.htm) in March 2014 by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). It represents the new paradigm change of urbanization trajectory in China. The emphasis changes from economic growth to social cohesion, from land urbanization to population urbanization, from city urbanization to regionalization, as well as the institutional reform.

11) “Zhi-xia-shi” (直辖市): Directly-controlled Municipality

The administrative hierarchy in China is a dualistic system, which distinguishes urban and rural systems. Both systems consist of three tiers: province, (urban) municipality or (rural) county, (urban) district or (rural) town, and (urban) street or (rural) village. The only exception is the four “Direct-controlled Municipalities” whose administrative hierarchy are equivalent to sub-province. They are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing.

2, Abbreviations (in alphabetical order of English terms)

1) C-Train (城际铁路): the Inter-city (HSR) Line, the third type of Chinese HSR. It has multi-stops and more frequent departures in shorter distance. It aims to improve the mobility within the high-density metropolitan area, such as Yangtze River Delta Region, Pearl River Delta Region, and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region.

2) CBD (中央商务区): Central Business District

3) CCP (中国共产党): The Chinese Communist Party

4) CCCPC (中国共产党中央委员会，简称：党中央): Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

6) **CRC** (中国铁路总公司): China Railway Corporation (http://www.china-railway.com.cn/)

7) **CRH** (和谐号), “Railway of Harmony”, Chinese Railway High-Speed. Yet, there are several confusing categories of HSR in Chinese definition. According to the code of railway lines, the Chinese HSR can be divided into three categories as shown in the items 1), 8), 9), & 10).

8) **D-Train** (动车): the HSR line between cities with the speed between 200-300 km/h, which is another type of Chinese HSR. However, it is actually only a technical concept of referring to the train sets with independent power carriages. There are several generations based on the different technical updates, from CRH1 to CRH5.

9) **G-Train** (高铁), the namely “Ke-yun-zhuan-xian” (客运专线), the Passenger Dedicated Line. According to the MoR's definition, it is regarded as the “real” HSR in the National Mid and Long-Term Railway Network Plan (2008). It is dedicated for the point-to-point fast connection in long distance with the speed around 300-350 km/h.

10) **HSR**: In the broader definition, it refers to the High-Speed Railway. This research follows the general definitions by the European Union, that is “the new railway lines designed for speed above 250 km/h and upgraded lines for speed up to 200 or 220 km/h” (http://www.uic.org/spip. php?article971). In a narrow (contextualized) definition according to MoR, it refers to the G-Train.

11) **Hongqiao BD** (虹桥商务区): Hongqiao Business District

12) **Hongqiao ITH** (虹桥综合交通枢纽): Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub


15) **MoR** (铁道部): (former) Ministry of Railways, which was divided into the National Railway Administration (NRA) and the China Railway Corporation (CRC) on the 14th March 2013.


18) **NEC** (全国经济普查): National Economic Census. It was started from 31st Dec 2004, and is planned to conduct twice in every decade (on the year with “3” and “8”). The second one is 31st Dec 2008.

19) **NPC** (全国人口普查): National Population Census. It was started from 1953, and is planned to conduct once every decade. The latest one is the 6th with the ending point on 1st Nov 2010.

20) **NRA** (国家铁路局): National Railway Administration (http://www.nra.gov.cn/)

21) **PPP** (公私合作伙伴): Public-Private-Partnership.

22) **PRD** (珠三角洲): Pear-River-Delta.

23) **TOD** (公共交通导向发展): Transit-Oriented Development.

24) **YRD** (长三角洲): Yangtze-River-Delta.
APPENDIX II

TRAJECTORIES

OF THREE CASES
## Case 1: Nanjing New South Extension around Nanjing South Railway Station

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>South station was re-chosen as the main HSR terminal in Nanjing instead of old central station</td>
<td>Layout of foreshadowing: final decision of infrastructure which directly influence spatial development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>“South New Extension” was written into the new revised City Master Plan of Nanjing (2007-2020)</td>
<td>‘Golden triangle structure’ was raised by Zhu, General Secretary of CPC in Nanjing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/2008</td>
<td>03/2009</td>
<td>Symbolic advocate: official affirmation of the “South New Extension”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/2010</td>
<td>Establishment of construction headquarters of South New Extension</td>
<td>Institutional innovation: establishment of new coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1. Critical moments in the trajectory of Nanjing case. Source: author.
Table 7.2: Critical moments in the trajectory of Wuhan case. Source: author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09/1997</td>
<td>MoR's approve on Wuhan Railway Network Plan</td>
<td>Decision on plan and construct Tianxing Island Bridge and the new Wuhan Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/2004</td>
<td>Official approve by MoR and NDRC (the first agreement between province, municipality and MoR was reached on 26/09/2003)</td>
<td>Final decision-making on Beijing-Guangzhou HSR route and periphery location of Wuhan Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Official approve for City Master Plan of Wuhan (2006-2020) by State Council</td>
<td>Firstly establishing the planned role of Yangchun-lake sub-center, in order to form multi-centered metropolitan area in Wuhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Integration of five plans after the international competition of urban planning and design</td>
<td>Plan for Yangchun-lake sub-center settled down and the future vision began to take shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2009</td>
<td>OCT Co. Ltd. won the land with the function of housing, entertainment &amp; tourism in the bidding by 4.3 billion RMB</td>
<td>Official involvement of Wuhan OCT project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>NO. 863 HTRDP - maglev technology proposed to locate the maglev terminal station in Shanghai next to the west of Hongqiao Airport, and to move the (already) chosen new HSR station from Qibao to Hongqiao.</td>
<td>It is the very first time to propose the possibility of integrating the maglev, HSR, and airport at the same site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The nation-wide localization of airport administration.</td>
<td>It provided the institutional applicability for integration of all transport infrastructures in Hongqiao area, and the marketization of Shanghai Airport Authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2005  | New Master Plan for Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport          | - It saved 8 km$^2$ of land to the west of Hongqiao Airport, by reducing the distance between new and old runways from 1700 m to 365 m;  
- It also proposed to integrated all transport modes under the roof of one mega architecture for the first time;  
- It systematically presented the opportunity and necessity of building BD around this hub. |
|       | Shanghai Municipality signed the agreement after meeting with the MoR about accelerating Shanghai railway construction | It is the official agreement between Shanghai municipality and MoR on building an integrated transport hub including HSR, metro, bus, taxi and aviation. |
| 2010  | Successively implementations (on time) of Hongqiao Airport Terminal 2, Hongqiao Railway Station, and metro line 2 & 10. |                                                                                                                                              |
APPENDIX III

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Policy / Plan / Report / Publication
Case 1: Nanjing New South Extension around Nanjing South Railway Station

A. Plan


New Extension.


B. Policy


Appendix III: List of Documents

C. Report

D: Website
Case 2: Wuhan Yangchun-lake Sub-center around
Wuhan Railway Station

A. Plan

B. Policy

C. Report
Appendix III: List of Documents


D: Media


E: Website

E2-2. Railway Department of Wuhan (Region), http://www.whrailway.cn/
Case 3: Shanghai Hongqiao Business District around Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub

A. Plan

A3-10. Shanghai Planning and Land Resource Bureau & Hongqiao BD Administration. (2010). Detailed Regulatory Plan for Core Area (primary phase) of Hongqiao BD.

B. Policy

Appendix III: List of Documents

Vol. 1.


B3-9. Shanghai Hongqiao BD Management Committee. (2012). Regulations of the Special Development Funds for Shanghai Hongqiao BD.


C. Report


D. Publication


E: Website


E3-5. Railway Department of Shanghai (Region), http://www.shrail.com/


Appendix III: List of Documents

Figures

Figure 1-1. National railway network plan in China by 2020
Figure 1-2. Conceptual framework
Figure 1-3. Reading guide of the book
Figure 2-1. Conceptualized HSR network in China by 2020
Figure 2-2. Location of Beijing South Station
Figure 2-3. Location of Tianjin West Station
Figure 2-4. Location of Shanghai Hongqiao Station
Figure 2-5. Location of Nanjing South Station
Figure 2-6. Location of Wuhan Station
Figure 2-7. Location of Guangzhou South Station
Figure 2-8. Photos of HSR stations (2010)
Figure 2-9. Illustrations of HSR station area
Figure 3-1. Spatial settings for Nanjing South Extension
Figure 3-2. Organizational structure of Nanjing South Extension
Figure 4-1. Spatial settings for Wuhan Railway Station
Figure 4-2. Photo of Wuhan Railway Station (2012)
Figure 4-3. Artist’s vision of Wuhan Railway Station
Figure 4-4. Policy games in Wuhan railway station area
Figure 5-1. Analytic framework of institutional capacity building in megaproject
Figure 5-2. Spatial settings of Shanghai Hongqiao BD
Tables

Table 1-1. Basic index of three cases
Table 3-1. Collective action issues in HSR-oriented development in China
Table 3-2. Characteristics of the collective action problems
Table 4-1. Involved actors in the policy networks
Table 5-1. Process of institutional capacity building of Hongqiao BD (2009-2012)
Table 5-2. Different resources for institutional capacity in Hongqiao BD
Table 6-1. Actor positions in the three institutional arrangements
Table 6-2. Interaction modes of collective action problems in three cases
Table 7-1. Critical moments in the trajectory of Nanjing case
Table 7-2. Critical moments in the trajectory of Wuhan case
Table 7-3. Critical moments in the trajectory of Shanghai case
APPENDIX V

LIST OF ACTORS
Case 1: Nanjing New South Extension around Nanjing South Railway Station

**Governmental actors**
- Nanjing Municipal Government
- Yuhuatai District Government
- Jiangning District Government
- Qinhuai District Government
- Nanjing Urban Planning Bureau
- Nanjing Transport Bureau
- Railway Department of Shanghai (Region)
- Construction Headquarter of Nanjing South Railway Station
- Construction Headquarter of Nanjing Honghua Airport
- Construction Headquarter of Nanjing New South Extension
- Management Committee of Nanjing New South Extension

**Market actors**
- Nanjing Railway Construction and Investment Co. Ltd.
- Investment and Construction Co. Ltd. of Nanjing New South Extension
- Nanjing Metro Co. Ltd.

**Civic actors**
- (none)
Case 2: Wuhan Yangchun-lake Sub-center around
Wuhan Railway Station

Governmental actors
Wuhan Municipal Government
Hongshan District Government
Qingshan District Government
Wuhan Land Resources and Planning Bureau
Wuhan Transport Bureau
Railway Department of Wuhan (Region)
Construction Headquarter of Wuhan Railway Station
Construction Office of Wuhan Railway Station and Supporting Facilities

Market actors
Wuhan City Construction and Investment Co. Ltd.
Wuhan OCT Group Co. Ltd. ("Huaqiao City")
Wuhan Metro Co. Ltd.

Civic actors
(Artists, citizens, etc.)
Case 3: Shanghai Hongqiao Business District around
Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub

**Governmental actors**
Shanghai Municipal Government
Minhang District Government
Changning District Government
Qingpu District Government
Jiading District Government
Xinhong Sub-district Government
Shanghai Planning and Land Resources Management Bureau
Shanghai Airport Authority
Railway Department of Shanghai (Region)
Management Committee of Shanghai Hongqiao Business District
Construction Headquarter of Shanghai Integrated Transport Hub

**Market actors**
Shanghai Rainbow Investment Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Jiushi Co. Ltd
Shanghai Maglev Transportation Development Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Hongqiao Economic & Technological Development Zone Development Co. Ltd.
Linkong Economic Park
Shanghai West-Hongqiao Business Development Co. Ltd.

**Civic actors**
(Citizens, etc.)
APPENDIX VI

INDEXES OF CHINESE HSR STATIONS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Index (as of 2013)</th>
<th>Station Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Population¹ (million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>21.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>14.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shijiazhuang</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix VI: Indexes of Chinese HSR stations

### Yangtze-River-Delta Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Population (10^4)</th>
<th>Land Area (ha)</th>
<th>Station Area (km²)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shanghai</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Hongqiao</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai South (Center)</td>
<td>Renew</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Shanghai Hongqiao BD: 86 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai (Central) (Center)</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Shanghai South Station Area: 2.77 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nanjing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanjing (Central) (Center)</td>
<td>Renew</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanjing South</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Nanjing New South Extension: 66 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanjing Xianlin</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hangzhou</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangzhou City (Central)</td>
<td>Renew</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangzhou East</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Hangzhou New East Extension: 2.7 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suzhou</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzhou (Central) (Center)</td>
<td>Renew</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzhou Industrial Park</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Suzhou Industrial Business District: 1.5 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzhou North</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Suzhou North Station Area: 1.81 km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pearl-River-Delta Region
### Appendix VI: Indexes of Chinese HSR stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Railway Length</th>
<th>Railway Stations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guangzhou</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Central)</td>
<td>7,743,419</td>
<td>119,279</td>
<td>Guangzhou (Central) Renew 7 7 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guangzhou East (Center) Renew 7 12 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guangzhou South 20 New 15 28 Guangzhou South Station Area: 38 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>4,402,864</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guangzhou North 44 Renew 4 6 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shenzhen</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luohu (Central)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shenzhen Luohu (Central) Old 12 22 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shenzhen Futian (Center) New 4 8 Shenzhen Futian Sub-center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shenzhen North 10 New 11 20 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shenzhen East 13 New 4 11 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>4,274,677</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shenzhen West 20 Renew -- -- Shenzhen Qianhai Development Zone: 15 km² Shenzhen Guangming LID³ Station Area: 3.4 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangming-city</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shenzhen Guangming-city 35 New 2 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingshen</td>
<td>4,250,290</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shenzhen Pingshen 42 Renew 4 8 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inner China**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>29.70</td>
<td>82400</td>
<td>Renew 10 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongqing Central</td>
<td>42795</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongqing West</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>15 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuhan</td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>8494</td>
<td>New 11 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hankou</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuchang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhengzhou</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>7446.20</td>
<td>(No plan) Zhengzhou East Station Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhengzhou Central</td>
<td>68070</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhengzhou East</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>16 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi'an</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>10108</td>
<td>Old 6 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi'an Central</td>
<td>56871</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi'an North</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>18 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changsha</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>11819.50</td>
<td>(No plan) New Changsha Station Area: 29 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changsha Central</td>
<td>99570</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changsha South</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>13 (No plan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Others**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Land Area</th>
<th>Province, Region</th>
<th>Development Status</th>
<th>Station Type</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Calculation Method</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ha'erbin</strong></td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>53840</td>
<td>49565</td>
<td>(Center) Old</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ha'erbin West</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.12 km²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shenyang</strong></td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>12948</td>
<td>86850</td>
<td>(Center) Renew</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shenyang North</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Renew</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shenyang South</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dalian</strong></td>
<td>5.914</td>
<td>13237</td>
<td>110600</td>
<td>(Center) Renew</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dalian North</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dalian North CBD: 14 km²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qingdao</strong></td>
<td>8.96</td>
<td>11282</td>
<td>89797</td>
<td>(Center) Renew</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Xuzhou</strong></td>
<td>10.07³</td>
<td>11258</td>
<td>51714</td>
<td>(Center) Renew</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Xuzhou East</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8.7 km²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ji'nan</strong></td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>8177.21</td>
<td>74728</td>
<td>(Center) Renew</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(No plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ji'nan West</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26 km²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Most of the population in this table refer to the permanent resident population ("chang-zhu-ren-kou"), which are calculated as of the end of 2013 according to the Annual Statics Books.
2. Here refers to the registered population with "hukou".
3. LID: Low Impact Development.
4. Being located in a multi-centered city, the Wuhan Railway Station is actually 12 km from Wuchang center, 17 km away from Hankou center, and 22 km from Hanyang center.
5. Here refers to the registered population with "hukou".
Place-making around
High-Speed Railway Stations in China

The rapid expansion of the High-Speed Railway (HSR) network in China generates leapfrog urbanization in the periphery of cities. This new style is different from the European or Japanese development of station areas in city centers. Instead, ambitious blueprint planning and policy supports have been initiated to stimulate spatial development around those hubs in former farmlands. Nevertheless, most of the developed station areas and spatial extension thereof lack “place quality”, despite aspirations of official policies towards “place-making”. These developments are cut off from the local context, lack room for public activities and communication, and allocate mono-functions. In other words, the space is produced but not urbanized.

Failure to produce place quality in new town developments around HSR stations is not an accidental effect of the pro-growth rationale behind Chinese urbanization strategies. While most research concentrate on the spatial impact of HSR stations, this study pursues the how questions in relation to the underlying power games surrounding Chinese development agendas. This necessitates a process-oriented perspective, a thorough consideration of the conditions and the creation of qualitative aspects of development strategies, and in-depth analysis of the processes of HSR station area development. Therefore, an institutional actor approach with particular emphasis on the ways in which actors interact under institutional conditions is taken. The approach and perspective chosen to address failures in producing place quality raises the theoretical and practical relevance of this study. Guided by an initial observation about how the present Chinese polity relates to efforts of place making, i.e. that the government-led, pro-growth institutional context in China makes it difficult to install place quality in megaprojects with regards to development around HSR stations, the main research question developed is;

How do the institutional arrangements shape the actor arena of spatial development around mega transport hubs (particularly the HSR stations) in China, and to what spatial outcomes with regard to place-making does this lead?
Developing New Towns around High-Speed Railway Stations in China

The conceptual framework developed treats the place-making process as a multi-actor arena in which key collective action problems can be solved under particular institutional arrangement. It aims to open the black box of decision-making process instead of simply focusing on quantitative impact studies. Several keystones of neo-institutionalism provide the necessary theoretical equipment. The analytical steps taken are to first identify the place quality and the associated collective action dilemmas, then unfold the action arenas where actors interact, and finally to investigate the institutional conditions that (more or less successfully) pave the way to achieving specific “place quality”.

Place quality

Urban studies literature has provided a wide range of definitions on the concept of “place quality”. These vary from emphasizing physical, social-cultural, economic-geographic to ecological dimensions. In the context of megaprojects, especially transport hubs, “place quality” is operationalized in this study as being related to the four components of location, (infrastructure and spatial) integration, functional diversity and sustainability. These components provide the key sets of analytical units for collective action problems.

Action arena

The “action arena” consists of actors (the government, the market and civic actors), how they formulate into “actor constellations” according to their own capabilities and orientations, and their interaction modes while dealing with a series of policy games. The arena presents the analytical order for the complex and lengthy processes of decision-making, treating the institutions as the sanctioned rules that affect the cost and benefit weighing of actors resulting in the spatial outcome.

Institutional arrangement

In order to compare the conditions that structure actors’ orientations and capabilities, “institutional arrangement” is distinguished in this study as three domains. They include the relations among governmental actors (central-municipal relation, municipal-local relations, and cross-jurisdictional relations), the involvement of market actors (land development right, specific coordinative actor/coalitions), and the involvement of civic actors (public participation and
knowledge and information transfer).

**Three Different Illustrations of Action Arenas**

This study combines the cross-comparison of three single-case study to answer the main research question. Each single-case study tackles a part of the research question and has a complete storyline. The case studies progressively build upon the former one with different but related theoretical concepts to ensure construct validity. Three cases are selected: The new South City Extension around the Nanjing South Railway Station, the Yangchun-lake Sub-center around the Wuhan Railway Station, and the Shanghai Hongqiao Business District around the Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub. They share the general institutional parameters of the pro-growth rational of Chinese urbanization, while the precise institutional arrangements that shape the orientations and capabilities of actors differ in each case. The case studies were conducted from October 2010 till December 2012.

**Wuhan Yangchun-lake new sub-center**

The Wuhan case can be considered as a negative case of place-making. The hub was located at the fringe of the city transportation network and the territorial municipal area. The lack of public transportation connection isolated it from both the immediate built environment and the city center. The planned built environment has a clear functional layout but lacks functional diversity. Yet, the attention spent there on environmental sustainability makes it a worthwhile case.

This Yangchun-lake sub-center case illustrates the typical centralized, government-led institutional arrangement. First, the central government, i.e. Ministry of Railways (MoR), clearly dominated the central-municipal relations. The municipality only had an advisory role during the policy preparations. Besides, there was no involvement of the district or sub-district at the design and development stages of the spatial plan. As a result, the municipality solely dominated the municipal - local relationships. Findings indicate that there was very little cross-jurisdictional coordination among actors since there was no effective platform or coalition for it. For example, the Railway Station Square Office was founded to take charge of facilities maintenance but has limited powers in mediating the inter-organizational coordination for integration or to interfere in the diverse stakes in land development. In addition, There was no specific actor or actor coalition to involve market actors. Lastly, despite being no formal institutional channels for public participation, the most unexpected
finding is that a bottom-up coalition emerged from civil society to protest against the destruction of environmental quality.

**Nanjing south new extension**

The Nanjing case shows outstanding place quality in both location choice and infrastructure integration. The hub is oriented to the city’s future spatial expansion. It enjoys high public transport accessibility from the existing center and offers convenient transfer ability among other transportation modes. However, the need for large improvements in functional diversity and sustainability, particularly in the core area, still remains.

This case represents another type of institutional arrangement in which central government dominance is combined with a collaborative arrangement. First, the MoR played a dominant role in the central-local relations while some decision-making was decentralized towards the municipal level. The municipality dominates the municipal-local district relations by leading spatial planning and development. The districts were only partially involved in some sub-projects. Although a new coordinative actor (coalition) was founded, it only contributed to the cross-jurisdictional coordination for infrastructure integration but not for the other components of place quality. In addition, the municipality still pre-dominantly led the development process. Yet, what made it different was the separation of the entrepreneurial and governmental roles of the coordinative actor: the task of land and property development was extracted to a semi-public corporation. That gave room to the participation of market actors. This separation of roles (although at primary stage) has shown certain effect on limiting the public actors’ monopoly. Lastly, the process showed little public participation with only one bottom-up coalition emerging from civil society.

**Shanghai Hongqiao Business District**

The Shanghai case can be considered a positive case endowed with more place quality than the former two cases. Although located at the periphery, it is easily accessible from the other parts of the city, the country and even the world with public transport. Multiple modes of transportation are conveniently integrated for transfer. The hub and the core area enjoy functional diversity. Interestingly, the top-down attention for environmental sustainability has started to become a form of local branding.

This positive outcome in this case is due to the more decentralized,
coordinative and semi-collaborative institutional arrangement. First, this is reflected in the arrangement of governmental actors: the conditions with regards to the policy process granted the municipality a more important and substantial role. The Shanghai government played a pro-active role influencing the location choice and the integration of transport modes by negotiating with MoR and the airport authority. The decentralization of the airport authority gave it an entrepreneurial identity and motivated it to set up an active coordination with other actors. Furthermore, the municipal - local district relationship was much less hierarchical. The districts and the sub-districts were given more autonomy in determining spatial development, by dividing the megaprojects into sub-projects which were more embedded in the districts' own development agenda. A platform for cross-jurisdictional coordination among railway, aviation and urban development actors existed. In addition, a public-private partnership was introduced for land development, particularly in the core area. Amongst the new actor coalitions formed, there was an obvious separation of the entrepreneurial and the governmental roles. Lastly, the case shows an emerging bottom-up coalition from civil society joined in the protest against the maglev line. The appreciation of knowledge transfer made the policy process more adaptive to the local development agenda. Openness and transparency fostered trust among third parties and increased the opportunities for investors from different backgrounds.

Institutional Conditions for Place-making around HSR Stations

Formulation of spatial development along the HSR corridors in different institutional settings requires cross-territorial governance. It is the power games played amongst the central and local governments, markets and citizens in multi-actor and multi-level contexts of governance that trigger urbanization around these hubs. The traditional government-led, pro-growth rational in China causes a number of difficulties with place making around the HSR stations. However, this study finds surprising exceptions in which place quality is partly realized. It proves that even under the pro-growth conditions, the variation of institutional arrangement can subsequently determine the extent of “place qualities”. To conclude, the institutional conditions those contribute to place making include:

Decentralization of roles to municipality, district and sub-district

The more decentralized the decision making process, the better the place quality that might be created. The involvement of the municipality has been extensively investigated during the negotiation with railway actors at these HSR station area
developments. The cases also highlight the crucial role of the sub-municipal actors (district and sub-district). Although they are generally still excluded from decision-making on the location choice and on sustainable development, they do play an important role in pursuing integration or diversity. They have the knowledge of local needs and also have the executive capabilities. Thus, by subdividing the ambitious plans in projects that fit more with the existing local development agenda thereby allowing districts to benefit directly from spatial development, the decentralization turns them from stakeholders into shareholders. The local interests are more inclined to realign their own development with those from a higher level.

Coalition for cross-jurisdictional coordination

Coordination problems among horizontal governmental actors are quite universal in urban megaprojects. The “horizontal actors” here refer to those on the similar administrative levels but from different sections and jurisdictions, who usually have conflicting interests. The specific feature of HSR-oriented development in China have roots in the conflicts between the separated accountabilities of the railway hierarchy (“tiao”) and the local urban network (“kuai”). It is crucial to establish actor coalitions, or even a new actor, of mutual interdependency instead of a hierarchal top-down implementation of state plans. That could increase the meaning of negotiation and improve chances for cross-jurisdictional coordination, and thus lead to a better place quality.

Distinguishing entrepreneurial and governmental roles of coordinative actor

A key coordinative actor (coalition) for spatial development is strongly needed in such power games, which only exist as the “Construction Headquarter” in the Nanjing case and the “Management Committee” in the Shanghai case. Their capacities of governance differ significantly which is reflected in the outcome of place quality. Both show the ambiguous roles between being a profit-driven developer and a governmental agency dealing with public goods. In other words, the key coordinative actors in the studied cases have the monopoly right in land development on the one hand, and the administrative power in planning and providing urban services as a governmental agency on the other hand. Nevertheless, studies have demonstrated the initial attempt to extract the entrepreneurial role from governmental. The clearer the separation, the less monopolistic the coordinative actors are.

Project partnerships enabling value capturing

The study shows that the project partnership between transportation and urban
actors functioned as an effective mechanism for value capturing in order to support unprofitable parts of the development. This partnership manages to bridge the fundamental barriers for implementing integrated land-use and transport development, and thus to contribute to investment in public spaces and it creates opportunities for urban functional diversity. Special attention must be paid to the unique preferences and orientations of the railway agency.

**Involvement of civic actors**

This study also shows the benefits to “place quality” with increasing engagement of collaborative coalition and civil society. However, whether a bottom-up protest is forceful enough to change the policy agenda may be doubted. As long as the governmental actors hold the dominant position and profit from land revenue, the impact of civic network is not self-evident. It thus calls for an institutionalized channel for public participation. The local knowledge of the district and sub-district level could be better appreciated, which would contribute to a better understanding of local needs and thus more embedding in the existing local development agenda. The information accessibility and transparency also contribute significantly to the openness and transparency of the policy process.
Placemaking rond hogesnelheidslijnstations in China

De snelle uitbreiding van het hogesnelheidslijn (HSR) netwerk in China heeft geleid tot een wildgroei van verstedelijking in de stedelijke periferie. Deze nieuwe stijl van stationsgebiedsontwikkelingen is anders dan de Europese of Japanse versie van stationsgebieden binnen de stadscentra. In plaats daarvan is de ruimtelijke ontwikkeling van voormalige voor landbouw bestemde grond rond die hubs gestimuleerd door ambitieuze blauwdruk planning en brede beleidssteun. Ondanks de aspiraties van het officiële beleid om placemaking te realiseren, ontbreekt er ruimtelijke kwaliteit in het merendeel van de ruimtelijke uitbreiding van de ontwikkelde stationsgebieden. Deze ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen zijn vaak afgezonderd van de lokale context, hebben een gebrek aan ruimte voor publieke activiteiten en communicatie en zijn vaak mono-functioneel. Met andere woorden, de resulterende ruimte is geproduceerd maar niet verstedelijkt.

Het gebrek aan ruimtelijke kwaliteit rondom HSR-stations is geen toevallig effect van de pro-growth rationalisering achter de Chinese verstedelijkingsstrategieën. Terwijl het meeste onderzoek zich concentreert op de ruimtelijke impact van HSR-stations, streeft deze studie naar de hoevragen met betrekking tot de onderliggende machtsspelletjes rondom de Chinese ontwikkelingsagenda's. Dit vereist een proces-georiënteerd perspectief, een grondige afweging van de institutionele omstandigheden en het proces van het creëren van kwalitatieve aspecten binnen ontwikkelingsstrategieën, en vraagt tevens om een in-depth analyse van de processen achter HSR-stationsgebiedsontwikkeling. Daarom wordt hier gekozen voor een institutionele aanpak van actoren met de nadruk op de manieren waarop deze actoren met elkaar omgaan onder bepaalde institutionele voorwaarden. Om het gebrek aan ruimtelijke kwaliteit aan te pakken is hier bewust een keuze gemaakt voor deze aanpak en dit perspectief en om daarmee ook de theoretische en praktische relevantie van deze studie te verhogen. Uit een initiële observatie van hoe het huidige Chinese staatsbestel zich inspant om placemaking te realiseren, bijvoorbeeld hoe de door overheid geleide pro-growth institutionele context in China het moeilijk maakt om ruimtelijke kwaliteit te installeren in megaprojecten met betrekking tot de ontwikkeling rondom HSR-stations, is de centrale onderzoeksvraag als volgt ontwikkeld:

Hoe is de actor arena van de ruimtelijke ontwikkeling rondom mega vervoersknooppunten (met name de HSR-stations) in China vormgegeven
door institutionele arrangementen en wat voor ruimtelijke uitkomsten met betrekking tot placemaking zijn daaruit afgeleid?

**Nieuwe Steden ontwikkelen Rondom HSR-stations in China**

Het conceptuele kader van deze studie beschouwt het placemaking proces als een multi-actor arena waarin de belangrijkste collectieve actieproblemen kunnen worden opgelost door bijzondere institutionele arrangementen. Het doel van deze studie is om de zwarte doos van het besluitvormingsproces open te stellen in plaats van de conventionele focus op kwantitatieve impactstudies. De bouwstenen van het neo-institutionalisme zorgen voor de nodige theoretische apparatuur. De genomen analytische stappen zijn als volgt: het identificeren van ruimtelijke kwaliteit en de bijbehorende collectieve actie dilemma’s vindt eerst plaats, gevolgd door het openstellen van de actie arena’s waarin de actoren elkaar tegenkomen en een wisselwerking hebben en uiteindelijk worden de institutionele voorwaarden die (met meer of minder succes) de weg vrijmaken voor het bereiken van specifieke ruimtelijke kwaliteit onderzocht.

**Ruimtelijke kwaliteit**

Het concept van ruimtelijke kwaliteit heeft veelvoudige definities binnen de urban studies literatuur. Deze variëren van het benadrukken van fysieke, sociaal-culturele, economisch-geografische tot ecologische dimensies. In het kader van megaprojecten, vooral voor verkeersknooppunten, wordt ruimtelijke kwaliteit geoperationaliseerd als gerelateerd aan de volgende vier componenten; de locatie, (infrastructureel en ruimtelijk) integratie, functionele diversiteit en duurzaamheid. Deze componenten vormen de bouwstenen voor het analyseren van de collectieve actieproblemen.

**Actie arena**

De actie arena bestaat uit actoren (de overheid, de markt en maatschappelijke actoren), hoe ze samen een actoren constellatie vormen op basis van hun eigen mogelijkheden en richtingen en hun modes van interactie tijdens het spelen van een reeks van beleidsspellen. De analytische orde voor de complexe en langdurige processen van besluitvorming is weergegeven door de actie arena. Hier worden instituties beschouwd als de gesanctioneerde regels die invloed uitoefenen op de kosten -en batenoverwegingen van actoren die leiden tot ruimtelijke uitkomsten.

**Institutionele arrangementen**
Om de voorwaarden van de kunde van actoren en hoe ze zich oriënteren te kunnen vergelijken in deze studie, worden institutionele arrangementen beschouwd in drie verschillende domeinen. Het eerste domein is de relaties tussen overheidsactoren (centraal-gemeentelijke relatie, gemeentelijke-lokale verhoudingen, en juridisch gekruiste relaties), de tweede is de betrokkenheid van marktpartijen (grondexploitatie rechten, specifieke gecoördineerde actoren coalities), en als laatste de betrokkenheid van maatschappelijke actoren (publieke participatie en kennis-en informatieoverdracht).

**Drie Voorbeelden van Actie Arena’s**


**Wuhan Yangchu-lake Nieuwe Sub-center**

Deze casus in Wuhan kan worden beschouwd als een negative case van placemaking. De hub is gelegen aan de rand van het stedelijke transportnetwerk en het bebouwde gebied van de gemeente. Dit gebied is afgezonderd van het stadscentrum en de omliggende bebouwde gebieden door het gebrek aan openbaar vervoersverbindingen. De geplande leefomgeving heeft een duidelijke functionele indeling, maar ontbeert in functionele diversiteit. Toch is het een waardevol voorbeeld door de hoeveelheid aandacht voor ecologische duurzaamheid die er is besteed in de plannen.

De Yangchu-lake Nieuwe Sub-centre casus is een typisch voorbeeld van overheid geleide ontwikkeling met gecentraliseerde institutionele arrangementen. Ten eerste, de centrale overheid in de vorm van het Ministry of Railways (MoR, Ministerie van Spoorwegen) speelt een dominante rol
binnen de centrale-gemeentelijke relaties. De gemeente had slechts een adviserende rol tijdens het beleidsadvies voorbereidingsproces. Er was bovendien geen betrokkenheid vanuit de buurt of wijk tijdens de ontwerp-en ontwikkelingsstadia van het ruimtelijk plan. Hierdoor is de gemeente uitsluitend leidend bij de gemeentelijke - plaatselijke relaties. Bevindingen geven aan dat er zeer weinig kruis-juridische coördinatie is geweest tussen actoren, aangezien er geen effectief platform of coalitie in voorkwam. Bijvoorbeeld, de Railway Station Square Office is opgericht om de leiding te nemen in facilitair onderhoud maar heeft slechts beperkte bevoegdheden in het bemiddelen van de inter-organisatorische coördinatie voor integratie. Ze kunnen weinig betekenen voor de diverse aanwezige ruimtelijke ordeningsbelangen. Er was bovendien geen specifieke acteur of acteur coalitie om marktpartijen effectief te betrekken. Het was onverwacht dat er ondanks het ontbreken van formele institutionele kanalen voor publieke participatie een bottom-up coalitie is voortgekomen uit het maatschappelijke middenveld om tegen de vernietiging van de milieukwaliteit te protesteren.

**Nanjing South Uitbreiding**

De Nanjing South Uitbreiding casus toont uitstekende ruimtelijke kwaliteit in zowel locatiekeuze als integratie van infrastructuur. De locatie van deze hub is gericht op de toekomstige ruimtelijke uitbreiding van de stad. Het heeft een hoge bereikbaarheid voor openbaar vervoer met het bestaande centrum en biedt veel multimodale mogelijkheden voor een overstap naar andere vervoerswijzen. Ondanks deze voordelen blijft de noodzaak voor grootschalige verbeteringen in functionele diversiteit en duurzaamheid in het centrale gebied nog bestaan.

De Nanjing casus is een voorbeeld van het type institutionele arrangement waarbij de centrale overheid domineert in combinatie met een samenwerkingsverband. Ten eerste, de MoR speelde een dominante rol in de centrale - lokale verhoudingen terwijl sommige besluitvormingen gedecentraliseerd werden naar het gemeentelijk niveau. De gemeente domineerde de gemeentelijke - lokale wijkrelaties door ruimtelijke ordening en ontwikkeling te leiden. De wijken werden slechts gedeeltelijk betrokken bij een aantal deelprojecten. Hoewel een nieuwe coördinerende acteur (coalitie) werd opgericht, nam de coalitie alle coördinatie voor infrastructurele integratie voor zijn rekening maar andere componenten die bijdragen aan ruimtelijke kwaliteit werden genegeerd. De gemeente bleef nog steeds dominant in het ontwikkelingsproces. De scheiding van de ondernemende en bestuurlijke rollen van de coördinerende acteur maakte deze casus anders: de taak van vastgoedontwikkeling werd uitbesteed aan een semi-overheidsbedrijf. Dat gaf
ruimte voor de deelname van marktpartijen. Deze scheiding van rollen (alleen in de eerste fase) heeft zeker invloed op de beperking van de monopolie van publieke actoren. Tenslotte, het proces toonde weinig inspraak met slechts één bottom-up coalitie vanuit het maatschappelijke middenveld.

Shanghai Hongqiao Business District

Het Shanghai Hongqiao Business District kan worden beschouwd als een positieve casus met veel meer ruimtelijke kwaliteit dan de eerste twee casussen. Hoewel gesitueerd in de periferie is de locatie gemakkelijk bereikbaar vanaf de andere delen van de stad, het land en zelfs vanuit de hele wereld met de openbaar vervoersystemen. In deze locatie zijn er meerdere vormen van vervoersmogelijkheden geïntegreerd voor een makkelijke overstap voor de reiziger. De hub en het centrumgebied geniet functionele diversiteit. Er is interessant genoeg top-down aandacht voor ecologische duurzaamheid en die aandacht werkt steeds als een vorm van lokale branding.

De positieve resultaten in deze casus zijn gevolg van de in vergelijking meer gedecentraliseerde, coördinerende en semi-samenwerkingsverband institutionele arrangementen. Ten eerste, de rangschikking van overheidsactoren geeft dit aan doordat de gemeente een steeds belangrijkere en substantiële rol kreeg tijdens het beleidsproces. De Shanghai overheden speelden een proactieve rol om de locatiekeuze en de integratie van vervoerswijzen te beïnvloeden door hun onderhandelingen met het MoR en de luchthavenautoriteit. De decentralisatie van de luchthavenautoriteit leidde tot een meer ondernemende identiteit en motiveerde hun actieve coördinerende aanpak met andere actoren. Bovendien was de gemeente - lokale districtrelatie veel minder hiërarchisch. De wijken en buurten kregen meer autonomie bij het bepalen van ruimtelijke ontwikkeling, door het verdelen van de megaprojecten in deelprojecten die meer ingebed waren in de eigen ontwikkelingsagenda van de wijken. Een platform voor kruis-juridische coördinatie tussen de spoorweg, de luchtvaart en stedelijke ontwikkeling actoren kwam te ontstaan. Er werd daarnaast en publiek-privaat samenwerkingsverband ingevoerd voor de ruimtelijke inrichting, met name in het centrum. Onder de nieuw gevormde actoren-coalities was er een duidelijke scheiding van de ondernemende en de overheidsrollen van actoren. Ten slotte werd in deze casus een voorbeeld van bottom-up coalitie gevormd vanuit het maatschappelijk middenveld, verenigd in het protest tegen de magneetzweefbaan. De waardering van kennisoverdracht maakte het beleidsproces meer adaptief voor de agenda van lokale ontwikkelingen. Openheid en transparantie bevorderde vertrouwen tussen derden en verhoogde de kansen voor beleggers met verschillende achtergronden om deel te nemen.
Institutionele Voorwaarden voor Placemaking rondom HSR Stations

Formuleren van ruimtelijke ontwikkeling die verschillende institutionele instellingen kruisen langs de HSR corridors vereist cross-territorial governance. Het is een machtsspel tussen de centrale en lokale overheden, markten en burgers in een context van multi-actoren en multi-level governance die de verstedelijking katalyseren rond deze hubs. Het traditionele, door overheid geleide pro-growth rationeel in China veroorzaakt een aantal problemen voor de placemaking rond de HSR-stations. Echter, deze studie heeft verrassend genoeg uitzonderingen gevonden waarin ruimtelijke kwaliteit wel gedeeltelijk wordt gerealiseerd. Het bewijst dat zelfs onder de pro-growth omstandigheden de variatie van institutionele arrangementen de omvang van de ruimtelijke kwaliteit kan bepalen. Tot slot, de institutionele voorwaarden die bijdragen aan placemaking zijn onder andere:

Decentralisatie van taken naar de gemeente, wijk en sub-district

Hoe meer gedecentraliseerd het besluitvormingsproces, hoe beter de ruimtelijke kwaliteit die kan worden gecreëerd. De betrokkenheid van de gemeente is uitgebreid onderzocht tijdens de onderhandelingen met de spoorweg-actoren op deze HSR stationsgebiedsontwikkelingen. De casussen benadrukken ook de cruciale rol van de deelgemeentelijke actoren (district en sub-district). Hoewel deze actoren over het algemeen nog steeds zijn uitgesloten van het besluitvormingsproces over de locatiekeuze en op duurzame ontwikkelingskeuzes, spelen ze nog steeds een belangrijke rol bij het nastreven van integratie of functionele diversiteit. Zij hebben kennis van de lokale vraagstukken en hebben ook de taak voor het uitvoerende van deze behoeften. Dus door de ambitieuze plannen op te kavelen in projecten die meer passend zijn bij de bestaande agenda van lokale ontwikkeling, kunnen wijken meer direct profiteren van de ruimtelijke ontwikkeling. De decentralisatie van het proces verandert ze ook van belanghebbenden naar aandeelhouders. De lokale belangen zijn meer geneigd naar decentralisatie om hun eigen ontwikkeling af te stemmen met die vanaf een hogere niveau.

Coalitie voor coördinatie over juridische grenzen heen

Coördinatieproblemen tussen horizontale overheidsactoren zijn vrij universeel te vinden in stedelijke megaprojecten. De horizontale actoren hier verwijzen naar die actoren die op de soortgelijke bestuurlijke niveaus functioneren vanuit verschillende sectoren die meestal tegenstrijdige belangen hebben. De specifieke
Samenvatting (NL)

Kenmerken van de HSR-georiënteerde ontwikkeling in China zijn geworteld in de conflicten tussen de gescheiden verantwoordelijkheden van de spoorweg hiërarchie ("tiao") en het lokale stedelijke netwerk ("Kuai"). Het is cruciaal om actorencoalities, of zelfs een nieuwe onafhankelijke actor vast te stellen in plaats van een hiërarchische top-down implementatie van staatsoverheid te plannen. Dit zou de betekenis van onderhandeling verhogen en de kansen voor coördinatie over juridische grenzen heen verbeteren en leiden tot een betere ruimtelijke kwaliteit.

De ondernemende rol en de overheidstaken van coördinerende actor onderscheiden

Een belangrijke coördinerende actor (coalitie) voor ruimtelijke ontwikkeling is zeer nodig binnen het bovenstaande machtsspel. Binnen de Nanjing casus bestaat die alleen als de Construction Headquarters en in de Shanghai casus als Management Committee. Hun bestuurlijke capaciteiten verschillen aanzienlijk van elkaar en hebben een effect op het realiseren van ruimtelijke kwaliteit. Beide organisaties delen een dubbelzinnige rol in het proces als een winst-gedreven ondernemer en tegelijkertijd als een overheidsinstantie die met publieke goederen moet omgaan. Met andere woorden; deze coördinerende actoren hebben het monopolie op grondgebruik handelingen aan de ene kant en de bestuurlijke macht in de planning en het verstrekken van stedelijke diensten als een overheidsinstantie aan de andere kant. Toch hebben de bevindingen een eerste poging om de ondernemende rol van de overheidsrol van de ondernemende rol te onderscheiden getoond. Hoe duidelijker de scheiding, hoe minder monopolistisch de coördinerende actoren zijn.

Projectpartnerschap maakt waardecaptatie mogelijk

Het onderzoek toont aan dat de projectpartnerschap tussen transport en stedelijke acteurs functioneerde als een effectief mechanisme voor de waardecaptatie om onrendabele delen van de ontwikkeling te ondersteunen. Dit partnerschap slaagde erin om de fundamentele barrières voor de uitvoering van geïntegreerd landgebruik en transportontwikkeling te overbruggen. Daarmee draagt de partnerschap bij aan de openbare ruimtelijke investeringen en schept het kansen voor stedelijke functionele diversiteit. In het bijzonder moet er aandacht worden besteed aan de unieke preferenties en oriëntaties van het Spoorwegbureau.

Betrokkenheid van maatschappelijke actoren

Dit onderzoek geeft ook aan dat de voordelen voor de ruimtelijke kwaliteit
zijn te vinden in de toenemende betrokkenheid van collaboratieve coalities en de deelname van het maatschappelijke middenveld. Er kan echter wel worden getwijfeld of een bottom-up protest krachtig genoeg is om de beleidsagenda te veranderen. Zolang de overheidsactoren de dominante positie behouden en de inkomsten van grondgebruik innemen is de impact van het maatschappelijke netwerk niet vanzelfsprekend. Het vraagt dus om een geïnstitutionaliseerd proces voor inspraak. De lokale kennis van de wijk en het sub-district niveau moeten beter worden meegenomen. Deze kennis zal bijdragen aan een beter begrip van de lokale vraagstukken en dus meer inbedding in de bestaande lokale ontwikkeling agenda’s. De toegankelijkheid van informatie draagt ook bij aan de openheid en transparantie van het beleidsproces.
中国高速铁路站点地区的场所营造

近年来中国高速铁路迅速扩张，极大地带动了线路沿线跳跃式的城市化。与欧洲或者日本城市的旧城老站不同，中国的高铁站点多选址于城市边缘区甚至农田。政府组织编制了大量的规划蓝图和支撑政策，以期通过综合枢纽站点带动周边经济的发展。但是即使这些官方政策鼓励“场所营造”，很多已建成的站点地区还是缺乏“场所品质”。这些枢纽地区开发往往与本地文脉相割裂，且功能单一，缺少公共活动和交流的空间。换句话说，这些空间只是被生产出来，而没有真正的“城市化”。

中国高铁枢纽地区在场所品质上的缺失并非偶然。这与其城镇化进程中不断追求增量发展的宗旨一脉相承。其他与高铁相关的研究往往集中于其对于城市空间的影响；而本研究则关注该地区规划建设的过程以及其中的权力博弈。这就需要采用一种过程导向的、关注制度条件的研究思路，以便更深入分析高铁站点地区开发过程。基于此考虑，本研究采用了以行为主体为中心的制度主义（Actor-Centered Institutionalism）视角，尤其侧重于关注在制度条件限制下的行为主体间的互动。该视角能帮助我们探究场所营造失败的原因，也构成了本研究的理论价值及现实意义所在。一般在政府主导、重增量发展的宏观背景下，在高铁枢纽等大型基础设施周边中营造场所感本身就非常困难。基于这样的理解，本课题旨在挖掘以下核心研究问题：

在中国城镇化背景下，制度环境如何影响（以高铁站点为代表的）综合交通枢纽周边空间开发的利益主体博弈过程？
该过程又是如何在空间上影响枢纽地区场所感的塑造？

聚焦中国高铁新城开发

本研究将场所营造的过程看成一个多主体的博弈领域（multi-actor arena）。各主体在不同的制度条件制约下，共同解决集体行为问题。换言之，研究重点不在预测高铁对城市空间的定量影响，而是希望能够打开规划决策过程这个“黑箱”。新制度主义为本研究框架提供了重要的理论工具：首先明确“场所品质”（place quality）的概念及其相关的集体行动困局，之后解析利益主体互动的行动领域，从而研究归纳促成场所品质的一系列制度条件。
场所品质（场所塑造）

相关文献对于“场所品质”的定义广泛，各有侧重，涉及物质环境、社会文化、经济地理、甚至生态等不同维度。在大型基础设施尤其是交通
枢纽中，场所品质往往与四个重要要素有关：站点选址、空间和设施整合、功能多样性、可持续性。这四个要素为我们提供了基本的分析单元。

行动领域

“行动领域”主要由以下要素组成：行为主体（各级政府主体、市场主体以及公民）；主体根据自身能力及目的所组成的同盟（actor constellation）；以及面对不同政策问题时，主体间博弈互动的模式。以行动领域为分析对象，可以将纷繁复杂的决策过程逐步剖析，从而研究制度条件是如何影响主体做决策时所考量的成本受益原则，又如何反映在建成空间中。

制度环境

为了研究影响行为主体目标和能力的条件，研究将制度环境划分为如下三个组成部分：政府主体之间的关系（中央与地方政府、市级政府与区县政府、以及跨部门关系）；市场主体的参与度（土地所有权与开发权、协调主体或者组织），以及公民主体的参与度（公共参与度、信息透明度和传达渠道）。

三种不同类型的制度环境

本课题涵盖了三个案例研究。每个案例分别基于相关但不同的理论概念，均有相对独立的研究线索，并逐步递进的回答了核心问题。这三个案例分别是：南京火车南站周边的南部新城副中心、武汉火车站周边的杨春湖副中心，以及上海虹桥综合交通枢纽周边的虹桥商务区。通过案例比较，我们发现在相似的城镇化政策的宏观背景下，不同的制度环境塑造了不同的行动主体的目标及能力。案例调研于2010年10月到2012年12月期间完成。

武汉杨春湖副中心

武汉杨春湖副中心可以被视为塑造场所感较不成功的案例。武汉火车站位于城市交通网络及行政范畴的边缘，公共交通的缺乏使其隔绝于周边环境。上位规划的空间布局虽十分清晰，但功能分区过于明确，缺乏多样性。然而，公众对于环境可持续性的关注使它成为一个颇具研究价值的案例。该案例代表的是一种典型的传统制度环境，即：中央集权、以行政指令为主导。首先，中央政府（即铁道部）显然在中央与地方关系中占主导地位，武汉市政府只在选址过程中起到一定的顾问作用。而区政府和街道则完全没有参与决策，市政府完全主导了规划建设。研究结果表明，因为缺乏有效的协调主体或平台，各利益主体之间很少有跨部门协
作。作为唯一的协调主体，火车站广场办公室的成立是仅仅为了负责广场设施维护，但在跨部门协调及土地开发等关键问题上权责有限。其次，该案例并没有成立专门的主体、平台或者联盟，以对接市场需求。但是，公众参与成为本案例独有的制度特色。尽管公众参与没有以正式的形式制度化，但武汉民众却以一种意想不到的自下而上的方式（艺术抗争等）联合抗议对于公共空间品质的破坏。

南京南部新城

南京南部新城在区位选址和交通换乘整合上都表现较出色，且其定位为整个城市未来空间拓展带来了动力。它拥有较好的公共交通可达性，与现有城市中心连接方便，并提供了多样高效的换乘方式。然而，它在功能多样性和环境可持续性上仍亟待改进，尤其是其核心区的过于依赖功能主义分区，缺乏多元混合。

该案例代表了制度环境的第二种类型：中央行政主导与合作相结合。该类型具有以下特征：首先，虽然铁道部在央地关系上仍然十分强势，但由于南京市作为京沪高铁公司的参股方之一，站点选址问题被下放延伸到市一级。但在市级与区县政府的关系上，市政府主导着开发进程，把控着城市空间规划和发展；区政府在站点选址、设施整合、以及空间规划上，均并无决策权，只是部分参与了一些子项目。第二，虽然在该案例中，南部新城建设指挥部（后发展为开发管理委员会）是一个重要的协调主体。但是它的主要角色，是促成了交通设施一体化中的跨部门协调，对于场所品质的其他组成部分并没有发挥太大的协调作用。然而，这个案例与众不同之处在于将协调主体的企业角色与行政角色的分离，即：将土地开发的任务从管委会的职能中剥离出来，交由一个铁路集团控股的公司（南京铁路投资公司）全权负责。这给了市场一定程度的参与空间。这种政企分离的形式虽然尚处于初级阶段，但还是显示出了在限制公共主体垄断中的作用。第三，整个过程中公众参与程度较低，只有少量自下而上的活动出现。

上海虹桥商务区

相比前两个案例，上海虹桥商务区可被认为是一个场所品质相对较高的正面案例。虹桥综合枢纽综集成了多种交通模式，旅客换乘便捷高效。虽然地处城市核心区的外围，但它与上海其他片区、乃至与中国和世界其他主要城市的交通联系都十分便捷。此外，虹桥商务区（尤其是核心区）大力倡导功能混合多样——这在其他高铁新城（区）中都较为少见。值得关注是，近年来才被逐渐重视的低碳可持续理念也被打造为虹桥商务区的特色，在同类案例独树一帜，形成了本地品牌。

虹桥案例之所以能取得这种相对积极的成果，主要是由于其制度环境中权力更加下放，更注重协调合作。这代表了本研究的第三种制度环境。首先，上海市政府在规划决策过程中表现出更重要和更实质性的影响力。
市政府与铁道部、上海机场集团谈判协商多年，在站点选地址和交通设施整合的问题上，起到了非常积极主动的推动作用，从而最终达成一致，将高铁、新机场、地铁、磁悬浮整合在一个建筑综合体中。第二，各区政府和街道办事处被给予了更大的空间开发的自主权。具体而言，虹桥商务区被分为了诸多子项目，其中各区政府和新成立的新虹街道办都发挥了重要的主导作用，使得这些子项目既不违背大虹桥的发展战略，又能嵌入到各区自身发展计划中。第三，构建一个能协调铁路、航空和城市等不同主体的跨部门平台至关重要。作为主导建设开发的主体之一，申虹公司以公私合营（PPP）的进行核心区土地开发，在中国同类枢纽开发中做出一个颇具创新性的尝试。主要缘由，也是因为其控股主体上海机场集团于90年代市场化，因而促使其以企业的身份，更有动力去积极协调其他各方，从而实现利益最大化。各行动主体依据各自利益相互联盟合作，且其中大部分都将企业职能和政府职能明确区分开来。第四，在反对磁悬浮铁路的事件上，此案例亦初步显示了公民社会自下而上的联合力量。本例中，对本地知识的看重，使得决策过程能更加机动的契合当地发展计划。而信息的开放和透明则增进了第三方对项目开发的信任，从而得以激活市场，吸引了不同背景的投资者参与建设。

高铁周边地区开发的制度条件

研究表明，无论制度环境如何迥异，高铁沿线的新城（区）开发均需要跨行政界线、跨层级、跨部门的管治和协调能力。由于牵涉主体多样、层级繁杂，中央政府、地方政府、市场（乃至公民）任何一方都难以独断决策；只有通过反复权力博弈，才能逐步推进枢纽地区的开发建设。显然，传统的以行政指令为主导、侧重增量发展的思路，已经给高铁站点的场所营造带来了不少困难。但是，本研究也发现：即使在重增量求增长的宏观背景下，制度环境的些许变化，均可以在一定程度上影响甚至决定高铁新城（区）的场所品质。简言之，研究总结出以下五个有助于营造场所感的制度条件：

适当放权于地方政府

案例证明，规划决策过程越是权力下放，往往越能带来更好的空间品质。在这些高铁枢纽片区开发的案例中，市级政府在与中央铁路部门协商博弈中所起的作用尤其值得关注。此外，这些案例也凸显出区级政府以及街道级办的重要作用。虽然一般而言，在选址和可持续发展的问题上，低层级的政府部门仍然被排斥在核心决策圈之外；但是在整合基础设施以及推进功能多样性中，起到了相当重要作用。他们比其他主体更了解当地发展需求（即所谓“本地知识”），且具有贯彻执行的能力。因此，权力下放能有效使区县级政府（乃至街道办）有参与感，使其从普通的利益相关者升级变为息息相关的“股东”，更愿意调整局部利益使之
与更高层级规划保持一致。行之有效的方法之一，就是这种把宏大的基础设施项目进行切分，成为符合本区既有发展规划的子项目，从而使区域可以直接参与空间开发，并从中获益。

跨部门横向合作

政府部门间的协调问题在城市大型基础设施项目中尤为突出。这些“横向主体”指的是那些行政级别类似、但分属不同部委或辖区、且通常有利益冲突的政府部门，中国的高铁枢纽地区开发中的种种问题，正是根源于铁路部门纵向的层级结构（“条”）和地方城市横向的关系网络（“块”）之间的矛盾。为更好的协调各方利益，建立跨部门的合作平台（甚至另起炉灶，筹备建立新的利益主体）至关重要。起核心是要建立起主体间相互依赖的利益关系，而不是靠层级化的自上而下的行政指令行事。这种跨部门合作能促进利益共享，从而创造更好的场所品质。

协调主体的政企分离

在空间权力博弈中，建立一个协调主体（或联盟）是非常必要的。这样的主体在三个案例中分别以“建设办公室”、“建设指挥部”、“开发管理委员会”的不同组织形式存在。他们的管治能力迥异，并最终反映在场所品质上。在南京和上海两个案例中，其协调主体作用突出。但其角色定位略为模糊，徘徊于逐利的市级开发平台和提供公共产品的政府机构之间。换句话说，这些协调主体一方面具有垄断性的土地开发权，另一方面则有作为政府机构提供的城市公共服务的行政义务。研究中的案例已经初步出现了从政府角色中剥离企业角色的苗头。这样的政企分离越清晰，越能避免协调主体的垄断。

引入公私伙伴关系以增值收益

本研究还表明，在交通主体与城市公共服务主体之间建立起公私合作伙伴关系（PPP），能够有效补贴的空间开发成本中非营利部分的投入。由于土地与交通开发原本分属不同利益主体，这种合作伙伴关系可以从根本上消除制度壁垒，以实实在在的利益分红来划分空间开发权，从而实现真正意义上的土地利用与交通发展一体化。在此基础上，可以解决公共空间开发的投资平衡问题，从而使开发主体更有余力和动力去关注打造公共空间的品质，创造更加多元混合的可能。尤其值得关注的是铁路部门相对独立于其他部门的利益偏好。

引入公众利益

本研究还表明，中国社会不断自发涌现环境保护组织，公民社会（civil society）也逐步觉醒，这对于提升城市场所品质也有帮助。武汉案例就是一个正面案例。当然，单纯自下而上的抗议活动是否足以撼动城市建设决策还是个疑问——只要政府拥有土地开发权，并继续土地财
政中受益，那么公民网络的影响力就仍相对较弱。因而需要建立一个制度化的渠道，使得公众能直接参与此类大型基础设施规划建设的决策过程。此外，区级及街道级部门充分了解本地需求，也需要在此类开发建设和得到更多的重视，使得这种大规模开发能更好的嵌入到当地发展框架中。另外，信息公开和透明度也直接影响了政策制定和落实过程。