Murder in Maumere: postcolonial citizenship
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door

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Mevrouw de Rector Magnificus,
Meneer de Decaan,
Leden van het Curatorium van de Bijzondere Leerstoel Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis van Zuidoost Azië,
Geacht bestuur van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde,
Beste collega’s, familie en vrienden.

Ik begin met een nogal triest verhaal.

Jan Djong expired from his wounds in the jail of Maumere on Tuesday, 1 March 1966. Maumere is a small town on the north coast of Flores, an island in eastern Indonesia. It then had a population of just 2,000. Jan Djong was 48 years old. He had been the rural district’s most energetic politician. After his arrest late in January or early in February 1966 he had been beaten, then paraded around the sweltering little town on foot together with some other prominent figures. They had stripped him of his clothes. The drawstring on his underpants had been removed, so they kept dropping. From time to time during the month that followed, the detainees were frog-marched in line from the jail behind the police station to the local military office two kilometres eastwards for interrogation. Out in the morning, back in the afternoon. Told by their mocking tormentors to sing and dance along the way, the bruised men managed only a pathetic stagger. Eventually, feeling the end was nigh, the Catholic Jan Djong asked his jailers for a pastor to make his confession and receive the extreme unction. They refused. One of them urinated in his face. They buried him in the jail grounds. Djong’s torturers had been civilians, Catholic local men like himself, officials in various government departments. They all knew each other. After this, about 800 others were rounded up around the rural Sikka district. Trucks converged from all directions on the huge hole in the ground prepared in the middle of the coconut plantation belonging to the Catholic mission of Maumere. They were all murdered without interrogation.
What is this a case of?

Political murder is unfortunately everyday news. Jan Djong’s story in 1966 could have come from the Cairo police station last August detaining Muslim Brotherhood members, or from Pakistan, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Post-colonial and post-authoritarian polities have seen a lot of violence.

Seen from the outside, we tend to say either that these societies are deeply divided, or that their state institutions are weak, or both. Populations divided by tribal allegiances have low reservoirs of trust. Civil society is weak. Pride in one’s own clan stifles the culture of tolerance that citizenship requires. Highly plural societies quickly move to the brink of civil war if the strong hand from above is relaxed. Precisely that strong hand is removed in post-colonial or post-authoritarian situations. Illegitimate and ineffective state institutions, meanwhile, are unable to channel the explosions of dissatisfaction created during the anticolonial struggle. Society becomes ungovernable.

There is clearly a lot right with this view from the outside. But a lot is wrong with it as well. Two things seem most obviously wrong. One is that it tends to produce authoritarian recommendations. Samuel Huntington’s name is forever linked with the idea that strengthening state institutions must take priority over inviting broader public participation. The generals who took over in Indonesia in 1965 found this idea only too appealing. It was they who were directly responsible for the death of Jan Djong. Egyptian generals think the same way today.

The view from the outside seems wrong on a deeper level as well. Its language is entirely negative – a weak state, a deeply divided society. It is an analysis in terms of what a country is not. This produces barren, censorious analysis. If that is all we can offer by way of explanation, how much do we really understand about these societies?

Most of my colleagues are anthropologists, and they always try to take the inside view. They ask ‘What do people themselves say?’ An excellent question. Today I want to take you with me to listen to Jan Djong’s story from the inside.

What did they say?

We go back more than twelve years before the grisly scene with which we started, to 19 June 1953. I was one year old in Rotterdam, Jan Djong was 36. Death was far from his mind. The little town of Maumere was a strip of low buildings about three kilometres long on the north coast of central Flores. It
had become part of the Republic of Indonesia three years earlier; it was capital of the administrative district called Sikka. Almost half its workers were military and civil servants. The other half worked in trade and small industries that served the town’s agrarian hinterland – mainly coconut oil processing. In colonial times Maumere had been the seat of the Raja of Sikka. The Dutch appointed such ‘traditional’ kings as a money-saving alternative to modern governance. They thought the kings would be popular, but in reality the kings behaved in deeply autocratic ways increasingly out of step with democratizing times. The Republic of Indonesia had maintained the hereditary Raja of Sikka, but only as an interim measure; his very existence contradicted its ideals.

Jan Djong was angry. During the Japanese occupation, he had risen to the position of village head. But after the Japanese defeat in August 1945, the Raja had sacked him from this position. He began to agitate against the Raja. And in 1953 he organized a ‘demonstration.’ He got the idea from a young man called Sentis da Costa, a student of law in the big city of Makassar, a day’s sailing away. Sentis da Costa was home on holidays and he liked Jan Djong’s chutzpah. The demonstrators included students from a high school in Maumere administered by the Raja of Sikka. It was the first demonstration ever held in the town. The young people bought cheap coconut-leaf mats at the old markets just east of the Maumere town centre, cut them in two to save money, and painted their slogans on them with whitewash. The Latin came from Sentis da Costa’s law classes.

Motto: Regnat Populus (= the People rule)
Eliminate the raja
Where the raja is, there is colonialism
Where the raja is, there is slavery
Demokrasi + raja = nearly 0

What did these demonstrators want? It seems very clear. They wanted to be citizens in a state that also belonged to them. That was an exciting, radical thought. The Dutch colonialists had not encouraged ideas about citizenship. Nor had the Raja of Sikka. Many Maumere townsfolk thought the demonstrators displayed shocking insubordination. The Revolution in Java had passed Flores by. But these young people wanted the rights that only citizens have anyway.

Demands by citizens of newly freed nations to participate in their state have grown enormously since then. They are what created the Arab Spring. Today it is no longer possible to imagine a world in which citizens do not demand participation. Governability issues have become more complex, and
the temptation is strong to apply the Huntingtonian recommendation. Yet we rarely study citizenship in post-colonial countries; and that could explain why we find it so difficult to understand.

**Postcolonial citizenship**

Let’s be honest. Citizenship ideals among uneducated people in a remote and poor little coconut town, 60 years ago – ‘a bit hard to take seriously’ – this is the sophisticate’s reaction. ‘They may have talked about citizenship, but did they really know what it meant? Were they ready for it? Culturally, politically, economically?’ And yet the whole Republic of Indonesia – born in blood through the revolution of 1945-1949 – was the outcome of a citizenship struggle by millions of poor people. It inspired the farmers and students in sweaty little Maumere too. Eric Wolf pointed out in his book *Europe and the people without history* (1982) that the entire world has been integrated for centuries now by the dynamics of capitalist markets and modern states. I have a nice illustration of that. One of Jan Djong’s later tough-guy lieutenants, a man they nicknamed ‘Crazy Alo,’ sported an imitation of Patrice Lumumba’s goatee beard. Lumumba was the handsome martyr of the Congolese independence struggle in 1961 – think *The Poisonwood Bible*. The desire to be a citizen is one of the most basic political drives in such an interconnected world.

A more thoughtful reason why we may hesitate to speak of citizenship in the case of Jan Djong is that citizenship is an inherently normative and moreover a western concept. We do not wish to impose our values on others. A nice sentiment, but I have two things to say to that. First, nearly all the concepts we use in political discussion every day are normative – democracy, human rights, accountability, legitimacy. Even the word ‘state’ is a normative concept by suggesting that nations should be ruled through an impersonal institution. All these concepts are intertwined. ‘No citizenship without rights,’ said Hannah Arendt. If we refused to use these words we would have nothing to say. My second objection to the normative objection is that Jan Djong would certainly have agreed with Hannah Arendt. Eric Wolf’s global interconnectedness also means that ideas and norms travel – especially empowering ones. Living in Maumere does not disqualify someone from joining in.

OK, so we can talk about citizenship if Jan Djong wants to talk about it. But still it is a problem. If we are not careful the same thing will happen with ‘citizenship’ as happened to our discussion of civil society or the state in post-colonial situations, namely that Indonesians fall short of the norm. How can we avoid once more discovering simply ‘a cluster of absences’?¹
Before we can address that question we need a little more clarity on what the word citizenship means. There are libraries full of books about this, but I hope a simple one-line definition and two footnotes are enough for now. Central to all definitions of citizenship is that it refers to a relationship between a person and a political community. That’s the one-line definition. The key word is *relation*. The first footnote is that the relationship is characterized by mutual rights and obligations. In other words, it is some sort of social contract that is enforceable and realized in a manner devoid of personal considerations. The second footnote is that the relationship is activated by the role this person plays in the political life of that community. That is, it concerns everyday interactions, and not just fine ideas.

So how can we avoid the trap of preconceived ideas when we turn to study postcolonial citizenship? ‘Relationship’ is the key word in the definition. Citizenship in a postcolonial country is a matter of empirical observation, not simply one of definition. We need to study relationships in the field. We should examine them historically and anthropologically. So if we accept that Jan Djong and his friends wanted to be citizens in a republic, we should ask: What did they mean by that? What practices did they develop to pursue that ideal? What relationships did they form as a result of it? The answers are not there unless we go and ask. Citizenship studies is an empirical science – you need to be able to speak the local language.

**The demonstration**

Let us return to the story with these critical insights in mind. Johanes (‘Jan’) Djong was born in 1917 in a beautiful village in the hills to the southeast of Maumere. Tall megaliths for the ancestors were set amid large neat houses decorated with paintings. The Dutch had taken control of the area only 30 years earlier. In the year Jan Djong was born, just two Dutch officials represented the central government in Sikka. (A dozen or so Dutch nuns were scattered around the villages as well). Instead of introducing an impersonal modern state, the Dutch had appointed rajas who already had some influence in the area. They did this in most areas outside Java. The rajas’ subjects remained largely without rights. The whole of central Flores was put under the Raja of Sikka. Indirect rule was cheap.

Within a decade, the Dutch had determined that copra was the answer to the lack of surplus being produced by the region’s subsistence economy. Autocratic rajas forced villagers to plant coconuts. Coconut taxes paid for
roads and new settlements. The rajas also facilitated a network of new Catholic schools.

Jan Djong’s home village lay in a neighbouring little kingdom called Kangae. Low-level warfare between rival territories was endemic, and Dutch intervention had at first triggered fresh and more intense episodes of violence. In 1900 fighting broke out between Sikka and Kangae. To appease the Kangae, the Dutch resident in 1902 raised the status of its ruler to that of Raja. But the following year the Kangae attacked their Sikka neighbours again. A warrior named Mo’ang Teka raided Sikka territory in protest against tributes Sikka was still demanding. The melee turned into a civil war; many villages were burned to the ground. Teka and ninety men armed with rifles entered Maumere. Once the Dutch had reestablished order in town, they sent Captain Christoffel, notorious from pacification campaigns around the archipelago, into the hills to put down the revolt at its root. The Raja of Kangae was dismissed and power was centralized in the hands of the energetic Raja of Sikka, Don Thomas Ximenes da Silva. Safe in the knowledge the Dutch would back him against any protest, he appointed equally autocratic heads in all the villages to collect his taxes. Most were his relatives. The Kangae elite felt dispossessed.

Anyone who wanted change inevitably had to defy a monolithic system of raja and church. That is what Jan Djong was facing. The demonstration on 19 June 1953 was an important moment. It introduced one of the central rituals of modern citizenship to the little town of Maumere. ‘The demonstration’ may have been invented in the nineteenth century by the Irish Liberator, Daniel O’Connell. It is a non-violent expression of the people’s sovereignty, a legitimate form of protest in a law-abiding democracy. Sentis da Costa had suggested to Jan Djong that a good alternative to anarchic burning and bashing was ‘a modern demonstration, like in Makassar.’

Jan Djong’s demonstration in 1953 was consistent with a growing demand for a government in which everyone had equal rights. In fact lots of respectable Catholic civil servants in central Flores were talking a language of ‘revolt’ about this time. Most of their outrage was directed against the raja’s privileges. Even culturally isolated Flores had realized that the Republic of Indonesia did not approve of hereditary rajas wielding unaccountable power. Vice-President Mohammad Hatta had said during a flying visit to the region in 1952 that ‘landlords’ were ‘the chief obstacle to progress in this country.’ Land was communally owned in Flores, but so-called ‘landlords’ (tuan tanah) did control its usage, and that control was a feudal privilege. A local Catholic news magazine published critical articles on landlords. A young post office
worker wrote: ‘Get rid of this ancient custom of landlords!’ Another wrote: ‘Eliminate feudalism in Flores!’

The demonstration was an informal institution to express a popular demand. Note that word – informal institution. Anyone who begins to study citizenship in a postcolonial society will come across lots of informal institutions. When people say that ‘state institutions are weak’ in postcolonial or post-authoritarian societies, they usually mean there are lots of informal institutions. An informal institution has been defined as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official.’ The demonstration is an informal institution. Most of those taking part in that first one had some idea what it was supposed to be, yet nowhere was there a law formally regulating it.

One of our key questions will be: How do these formal and informal institutions relate to each other? Too often we assume that informal practices undermine the formal ones and are thus responsible for the low marks postcolonial citizenship gets. But, as we shall see, this assumption is by no means always justified. Sometimes the two work broadly towards the same ends. Certainly that seems to be the case here.

Or was it? For not everyone in Maumere agreed that that demonstration was a modern, non-violent expression of popular sovereignty. The popular talk of ‘revolt’ already conveyed something of the bloodlust of the Revolution from Java. Even Sentis da Costa himself seemed a little unsure. When the young law student addressed the crowd in front of the Sikka government office on that day, he found himself steering a middle course between Daniel O’Connell and Mo’ang Teka. ‘Be peaceful,’ he told the hundreds of peasant and student demonstrators, ‘you can punch people, but don’t kill them.’ The town trembled. To many residents, the ‘demonstration’ looked more like tribal warfare. They shut their doors and stayed inside. Raja Thomas decided Jan Djong was no Liberator but simply a new Mo’ang Teka, and escaped to sea in a prahu for the day. The demonstration was a hybrid institution – neither wholly modern nor wholly traditional. One scholar has called it a ‘twilight institution.’

And well the Raja of Sikka may have panicked on that day. The burning and bashing that Sentis da Costa warned Jan Djong against had been a reality before The Demonstration. Jan Djong’s anger had been smoldering for at least five years. In 1948 he and some others had led another rowdy protest on the outskirts of Maumere. A bridge had been burned. Police fired shots to regain control. The Raja – who was both ruler and judge in those days – had
no trouble seeing that protest as a flare-up of a fight that had lain dormant since the 1920s. He had sentenced Jan Djong and the others to six months prison.

Nor did the 1953 ‘demonstration’ mean that Djong had abandoned violence and become a follower of Daniel O’Connell. Several years of lawlessness ensued in which roving bands of villagers burned and robbed. This came to be known as the ‘scorched earth’ period (*bumi hangus*). Jan Djong must have been involved in at least some of it, because in 1957 he was sentenced again, this time by a modern court. He got three years prison for encouraging violence.

There were other informal institutions as well. We only have time to sketch the barest details of three of them. Just enough to ask the question: How do the informal and the formal institutions of citizenship relate to each other? Does one weaken and undermine the other, or could they also work together for good?

**The ethnic organization**

Another informal institution was the ethnic organization. This too was a mix of old and new. In between demonstrating – June 1953 was not the last – and half encouraging a bit of burning and bashing, Jan Djong became a politician. The Raja of Sikka died suddenly of a heart attack in May 1954, and republican institutions soon began to fill the void. That included an elected local assembly, and professional bureaucrats with legally limited mandates. Political parties were poorly developed in the 1950s. Djong’s main organizational instrument was an ethnic organization named Kanilima. This name was an acronym from the three former kingdoms in the hills around Maumere that had lost their autonomy to the Raja of Sikka in the 1920s – Kanga’e, Nita, and Lio-Maumere. Kanilima was a rural coalition against the elite in Maumere township. The ‘ethnic’ representatives that belonged to it did not claim aristocratic descent – they were emerging middle class officials and politicians like Jan Djong. Their complaint, too, was modern. They started it because they felt Raja Thomas was depriving them of state scholarships and bureaucratic jobs. Their protest met with success. The principle of ethnic representation was soon formalized. Jan Djong became an assembly member on behalf of the Kanga’e kingdom, now renamed the Kanga’e ‘ethnic group.’ The group also won control over the copra-funded junior high school over which it had demonstrated in 1953. The novel idea that public matters such as finance and education should be run by elected assemblies had been widely accepted as
superior to an aristocrat’s prerogative. Peace returned to the Sikka region, for a while.

The demonstration and the ethnic organisation are two examples of informal institutions that helped to link the state with society. At a time when the formal state was developing quickly, they gave strategic shape to that broad arena between the new republic, based in Jakarta, and everyday politics in the small towns and villages of central Flores. Partha Chatterjee has fruitfully called this arena ‘political society’. Informal institutions helped create mutual recognition between state and society. They established a kind of public authority that was more open and accessible to ordinary citizens than before. Of course violence was a problem. But in principle these were not violent institutions. They were more inclusive than exclusive. Anyone could participate in a demonstration. Everyone from the hill country was entitled to feel themselves represented by Kanilima.

The slush fund

So how did things go so badly wrong in Maumere? We now skip ahead to 1959. The next two informal institutions emerged in the context of increasing polarization. When Jan Djong was released from prison by presidential pardon, he reentered the political arena. He had lost none of his feistiness, but he no longer enjoyed the same preeminence. From then on a long series of small-town factional manoeuvres, like a slow chess game, saw him gradually losing more moves than his opponents, until that horrible day in 1966 when he was finally checkmated.

New informal institutions emerged in sync with formal ones. More government administration came to town, an elected assembly, more military, more church, and (above all) more money from copra. All these formal institutions were of great interest to the little middle class elite in and around Maumere. Their appearance unleashed fresh battles for control. The rivalry was between an elite in town – ‘ethnic’ Sikka and close to the Catholic Church – and village-based elites from out of town. Jan Djong led the latter.

The Copra Foundation had both a formal function as a development fund, and an informal one as a slush fund. Formally speaking, it was part of the Jakarta government’s affirmative action plan to provide economic opportunities for indigenous Indonesians. Nationalization and the state-owned corporation were the two central elements in that strategy. Flores only had coconuts, so the Copra Foundation was the key thing. It was run democratically
through a host of layered committees. The proceeds were used to improve education and other good things.

At the same time, it became a slush fund that every local politician had to get their hands on. Local bosses used it to buy loyalty and support. Corruption scandals began to erupt as each clique tried to eliminate their rivals. The slush fund and its associated patronage and corruption scandal was one of the most important informal institutions to emerge at this time.

We don’t have time for the details, but at first Jan Djong’s rural coalition did well in the copra fund. He owed his success to an alliance with a powerful, well-educated patron who ran most of the state-controlled economy in the Sikka district. But over time Djong’s factional patron lost more and more battles with his town-based rivals, and eventually he was transferred out to Jakarta. Now without protection, Djong became easy prey for his former patron’s rival. This rival removed Jan Djong from the political circuit by appointing him to an administrative position in the village.

The youth group

The final key twilight institution of this era was the ‘youth group.’ Late in 1962 the cabinet in Jakarta hinted that national elections might be held the following year. This set off a flurry of competitive party activity in the regions. All the political parties began recruiting villagers, through their various daughter organizations.

Jan Djong was increasingly shut out from the Maumere establishment. He tried to maintain his authority by recruiting young men into youth groups in the village. He joined no political party, but was friends with leaders in both the secular national party PNI and the communist party PKI. Unfortunately he had little to offer except old stories of heroic resistance to the raja and vague promises of economic aid from the Soviet Union.

His town-based rivals, by contrast, had all the mobilizational resources of the Catholic Church at their disposal, also out in the countryside. A young German priest arrived and settled near Jan Djong’s village. The priest wrote later about this period: ‘A new authority must be formed.’ He became Jan Djong’s nemesis. He brought with him real Western money. He handed out scholarships for Florinese to study in Java. And his young people started to confront Jan Djong’s guys.

Behind the tests of strength rippled real muscle. Crazy Alo, of the Patrice Lumumba beard, was Jan Djong’s tough lieutenant. The German priest had one too, a man whose house had been burned down earlier by Djong’s thugs.
Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations grew louder and more aggressive. The police got involved. Some houses were burned down again, horses were stabbed. The German priest rode his motorcycle with a military escort as pillion.

**That chilling moment**

I hope you are still with me, because the story is about to take a dramatic turn. Here factionalism transforms into murderous pogrom. Without this turn, the rivalry would have been bitter, the intrigue merciless, but the factional fights would have see-sawed inconclusively. Eventually Jan Djong would have retired to his ancestral farm in the village to nurse his past glories. No, the fatal transformation did not come from the informal institutions of society – which remained relatively inclusive. It came from the formal institutions of the state.

On 1 October 1965 an event occurred in Jakarta that quickly led to regime change. A small group of military plotters linked to the communist party general secretary kidnapped several army generals. The kidnapping went wrong, and in the backlash the anticommmunist General Suharto seized power. He immediately launched a crackdown on the communist party, ordering his troops to kill or jail millions of cadres throughout the archipelago. It became one of the major pogroms of the twentieth century. But the military needed local civilian allies to identify and bring in the victims. This meant exploiting small-town factionalisms like those in Maumere, deepening them immeasurably: a highly exclusionary strategy.

In February 1966, the military commander in Maumere started pressuring the town’s political establishment to join him in condemning to death all their opponents, among whom were communist party members and sympathizers. At first they refused, saying death sentences were none of their business. On the evening of 27 February, the major forced the town’s political leaders to gather at his official residence. Doors were locked. Armed soldiers stood around the room. An icy feeling crept over the civilians as the names of 24 ‘suspects’ were read out. The room long remained silent. Then someone said: ‘We have to wipe out all those communist people down to their roots, no one should be forgiven.’ This was the moment, one of them later wrote anonymously, ‘that Catholic leaders started losing their grip, or to put it more strongly they had already abandoned Catholic principles.’

That very night those named were executed. Two days later the town heard that Jan Djong and someone else, the former prosecutor, had been murdered.
in the jail. The trucks began to roll in from the villages of Sikka district. It took over a year before the pogrom ended. At least 800 were dead.

**Postcolonial citizenship studies**

Thus ended the first experiment in postcolonial citizenship in Indonesia – with the destruction of all citizenship rights owed to a considerable portion of the public in every town and village in the country. But it was not the end of citizenship struggles in Indonesia. There have been many more people like Jan Djong, women as well men, and they have not all come to a sticky end. Some are winning their fights for rights even today. Universal healthcare, for example, is rapidly becoming a generally recognized citizen right in Indonesia today. Millions of people living in postcolonial countries around the world want to be citizens rather than passive ‘populations’ – why do we find that so difficult to understand?

Surprisingly enough, postcolonial citizenship studies are a new area of inquiry. One program of research has just started here in the Netherlands – most of its researchers are here today. I don’t know what we will learn, but I do expect we will increase understanding of state-citizen relations in much of the world, in two ways.

Firstly, postcolonial citizenship studies offer an ‘inside’ view, the view from below as it were. They bring ordinary people back into studies of the state. Conventional studies of civil society and liberal democracy too often describe the activities of an upper middle class and the institutions in which they are at home. By observing the actual relations ordinary people build with state institutions, postcolonial citizenship studies help avoid the ‘cluster of absences’ of conventional citizenship studies. They should help us react a little less smugly next time we see someone on TV in a god-forsaken place say they wish to be citizens of their state.

Secondly, postcolonial citizenship studies help us break out of a log jam that the ‘outside’ view has caused with its insistence that only formal institutions matter. Focusing instead on that large but poorly understood ‘twilight’ zone between the state and society should lead to surprises. Informal institutions are not always as bad for genuine citizenship as we had thought. Indeed, is formal institutions such as the military can be far more problematic. Informal institutions abound in all polities with low formal institutional capacity and poor economic development – which is in fact most of the world. They embody perhaps the authentic postcolonial citizenship.
Only close fieldwork can produce real insight here. I hope to use this chair to support teaching and research into the poorly charted yet everyday ways in which citizens in postcolonial countries assert their wish to participate in their state. Highly mobile ideas are part of the mix, and that is why I am lucky to be part of the Moving Matters group at this university. The group is interested in the mobility of people, goods and ideas across borders.

Thank you


De vrije geest van Wim Wertheim, één van mijn intellectuele helden, waait nog steeds een beetje door de gangen van de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Geesteswetenschappen Decaan Edward de Haan, Afdelingshoofd Jan Rath, en vooral de altijd opgewekte Moving Matters groep onder leiding van Mario Rutten en Willem van Schendel – zo’n ontvangst als jullie mij hier geven is voor deze oud-natuurkundige, een groentje in de sociale wetenschappen, nauwelijks te bevatten.

Een woord aan de eHumanities groep – ons gezamenlijk onderzoek over Indonesische elite netwerken met behulp van de computer kwam vandaag niet ter sprake, maar ik geniet er van.

Mijn oude vader en moeder in Australië, mijn broer en vier zussen in die regio – vandaag vertegenwoordigd door onze zoon Ben – ik moet even slikken als ik bedenk wat jullie mij hebben gegeven. Aan mijn ooms en tantes, neven en nichten in Nederland – in de stralen van jullie bewondering voel ik me bijna een echte professor.

Our third culture kids Ben and Rosie – our annual visits are too short, but I always come away from our weekly skype sessions with optimism renewed. And then Helene, my wife of 37 years and still the love of my life. You are proud of your husband, and that makes me proud too. Together we will travel to one more exotic destination, tie on our running shoes once more, and look forward to one more opera.
Akhir kata, kepada kawan-kawan di Indonesia saya ucapkan banyak terima kasih. Too numerous to name, my Indonesian friends never stop challenging me to dare to hope for more. It is your world, still one of more have-nots than of haves, that inspires my work in Amsterdam. Merdeka!

Ik heb gezegd.
Notes