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Ascription and identity. Differences between first- and second-generation Moroccans in the way ascription influences religious, national and ethnic group identification

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we investigate the impact of ascription on the process of identity formation of first- and second-generation Moroccans in Western Europe. We look at the general discursive context and levels of perceived acceptance amongst Moroccan migrants, and see how these factors influence three relevant dimensions of identifications. We distinguish between ethnic group identity, religious identity and national identity, and use recently collected data on first- and second-generation Moroccans in five European countries (EURISLAM 2011. Integrated report on survey analysis. Brussels: ULB). Our analysis shows that our measures of identity are correlated to elements of ascription. The second generation appears less affected by elements of ascription. Particularly in identifying with the country of settlement, second-generation Moroccans appear more impervious to external influences than the first generation.

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Introduction

In this paper, we empirically explore the influence of what we call ascription on the process of (ethnic) identity formation for first- and second-generation Moroccans. In identity formation, ascription is the way in which outsiders define groups and instil a certain value or ‘groupness’ to categories. In our analysis, we operationalise ascription on both the macro and micro levels, looking at the general discursive context on Islam and Muslims, and the acceptance that Moroccan immigrants perceive personally.

Van Heelsum (1997, 2013) has shown that perceived negative opinions strengthen the tendency to identify as a member of an ethnic group. Such relationships are also identified by other studies and the effect of ascription on the ethnic identity of immigrants is akin to what others have dubbed reactive ethnicity (Jenkins 2008; Rumbaut 2008; Portes 1999). Rumbaut, for example, claims that:

dthis process of forging a reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived threats, persecution, discrimination, and exclusion is not uncommon. It is one mode of ethnic identity formation that highlights the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity. (2008, 110)
We explore this issue empirically for Moroccan immigrants in five Western European countries: France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. We use a three-fold measure of identity: (i) identification as Moroccan, meaning Moroccans as an ethnic group; (ii) identification as Muslim, meaning the religious aspect of identification; and (iii) national identification meaning the identification with the country of settlement, so German, Dutch, etc. In addition to the influence of ascription on these three different elements of (ethnic) identity, we also consider how these elements interrelate and what differences exist between generations. Our research questions are therefore: (i) How are ethnic group identity, religious identity and national identity correlated? (ii) How does ascription influence the process of identity formation? and (iii) What differences are there in the process of identity formation between first- and second-generation Moroccan immigrants?

To analyse these questions empirically we use data from a specially designed cross-sectional survey and a media content analysis. To add some depth to the results of our quantitative analysis, we will add some extracts from interviews with transnational Moroccan families that have settled across Western Europe. All data were collected for the EU 7th framework project EURISLAM.

Ethnic identity formation: a dynamic process

A widely cited author in the field of ethnic identity formation is the British psychologist Jean S. Phinney. Her definition of ethnic identity covers a wide array of factors and consists of claims of common shared ancestry of a similar culture, race, religion, language, kinship or place of origin within the context of a group (Phinney 2003). She maintains that ‘ethnic identity is a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity or sense of self as a member of an ethnic group’ (2003, 63). We are interested in this dynamic nature of ethnic identity. We analyse it as the multidimensional construct that Phinney identifies, and in addition look at the influence ascription has on this construct.

Within the process of (ethnic) identity formation, the migration context plays a pivotal role. It seems easy to assume that the dynamic and multidimensional nature of ethnic identity becomes especially heightened in the migration context. Potentially high social and cultural differences between immigrant and native populations can manifest themselves in clear or strong boundaries between both, and instil a certain understanding of ‘groupness’ in society. For such reasons, migration has historically been seen as one of the prime driving forces in the formation of ethnic groups (Weber 1978).

However, contemporary definitions of ethnic identity point to the fact that the importance of the migration context should not be overstated. In his pioneering work on ethnic boundaries, Barth (1969) introduced ethnic groups and boundaries as stratified phenomena that exist in both homo- and heterogeneous societies. Barth took a common anthropological conceptualisation of ethnic groups as biological, cultural, communicative and interactive units, and added much more focus on the interactive dimension of groups and the maintenance of ethnic boundaries between them. Fundamental to Barth’s approach is the conceptualisation of ethnic groups as an organisation of social life, where ethnic identity and the maintenance of ethnic boundaries guides social interactions within and across groups. Biological and cultural factors play an important role in the definitions of ethnic groups, but Barth warns us that we cannot assume that a one-to-one
relationship between ethnic groups are wholly determined along biological/cultural fault lines. For ethnic categories,

the features that are taken into account are not the sum of “objective” differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant; [...] some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied. (Barth 1969, 14)

Although influential, Barth’s constructivist approach has been criticised for focusing too much on the maintenance of ethnic boundaries whilst downplaying the importance of the actual ‘cultural stuff’ that they contain (Wimmer 2008). At its core, this critique questions the agency or choice in the formation of ethnic identity. Such a critique might be even more relevant in the migration context simply because what constitutes ‘immigration’ is precisely the prevalence and maintenance of well-defined boundaries that are perhaps not always so voluntary, not even over consecutive generations. Vasquez, for example, illustrates that for some third-generation Mexican-Americans gender and race intersect and produce a specific racialization that limits the ‘optional or symbolic nature of ethnicity’ (2010, 49).

Despite some differences between these more essentialist and constructivist approaches, they share the conviction that ethnic identities are defined in relation to others. How one self-defines is strongly influenced by the opinions of those whom one considers part of their ‘own’ group (in-group) as well as those whom they consider members of the out-group. The optional or voluntary nature of ethnic identity will likely depend on the position of relative power that groups and individuals hold. In terms of interactions within and between groups, claiming a certain ethnic identity suggests being a particular kind of person, leading to defined avenues of actions and judgements based on the chosen form of identification. Boundary setting between groups determines where the differences between groups lie and what form of interactions are appropriate within or between them (Barth 1969).

The process of identity formation is dynamic in the sense that the subjective belief of being part of a certain group, which has a certain reasoning about a common origin, descent and history, is determined by wider social and material circumstances, cultural meanings and historical conditions (Verkuyten 2005, 80). Ethnic identity should not be considered as static because it can be redefined when circumstances change. For example, a Moroccan immigrant arriving in the Netherlands in the 1970s might have first been primarily interested in work and the adventure of moving to a new country. However, after having lived in the new context for some years, his Moroccan and Islamic roots might become more pronounced aspects of his identity.

Ethnic group identities and religious identities are only two of the many social identities that people use to define themselves in relation to others. We assume that such identities are not static or mutually exclusive (Tajfel and Turner 1986). This implies that the formulation of an (ethnic) identity is not an evolutionary or singular process. Cultural, religious and other contextual elements exist alongside one another, interchangeably taking precedence. From an academic viewpoint, it is therefore less fruitful to look only at the fault lines of ethnic identities, that is, to identify particular ‘ethnic groups’. Brubaker (2002) suggests that we go beyond such ‘groupism’ and look at ethnic identity as a social process and a fundamental way of organising social life. Instead of taking the
relationship between ethnic categories and groups for granted, we should be interested in examining ‘the political, social, cultural and psychological processes through which categories get invested with groupness’ (Brubaker 2002, 169).

Within this process, a central point of interest in our paper is how ascription affects the formation of identities; in other words, how external factors foster identification with ethnic, religious and national-group categories. With regard to Moroccan immigrants in Western Europe, we look in particular at the influence of public discourse, particularly on immigrant and religious (Islamic) related issues (Koomen and Van Heelsum 2013; Vanparys, Jacobs, and Torrekens 2013). A negative public discourse might cause diminished feelings of acceptance amongst immigrants, thereby reinforcing their identification as a separate (ethnic) group. Identity construction forms the basis for who is considered part of the majority population in society (Slootman 2014, 40). According to Slootman, the upsurge of the term ‘autochthony’ as a basis for belonging is based on dualistic ideas of primordiality: rights are claimed by those born in the country and immigrants are excluded (Geschiere 2011; Slootman 2014). The stigmatisation of Muslims only provides further distinctions with regards to Moroccan immigrants, setting them aside as both ethnic and religious outsiders.

A negative public discourse can have direct and indirect effects on the identification of immigrants. Directly it might influence immigrants’ feeling of belonging, and indirectly it might diminish the acceptance of immigrants as fellow citizens among the national majority, thereby worsening the treatment of immigrants. Direct and indirect effects of ascription are likely to affect individual immigrants differently depending on their socio-economic status and relative position of power. For example, people with lower levels of education, those who are unemployed, or those with lower self-esteem, might suffer more from negative attitudes and internalise them more in their self-definition.

**Ethnic identity: aspects relevant for first- and second-generation Moroccan immigrants**

We expect the process of identity formulation to follow a similar pattern for both first- and second-generation immigrants. We do however expect some differences in the impact and importance of certain factors. A major and obvious difference between the generations is that second-generation Moroccans were born in the European countries of our study. They nearly always possess the nationality of their birth country and any autochthonous status ascribed to them is highly subjective. It is likely that identification with the European country is more important to them and that the second generation puts different accents on their multidimensional identity. Traditionally, the literature on the integration of immigrants assumes that feelings of belonging to the immigrant group diminish over consecutive generations in the absence of any inhibiting factors (see Slootman 2014 and the ERS Review edition 2014 for an overview of theories). Recent research comparing first and second-generation immigrants also found stronger feelings of national belonging amongst the second generation in many West European countries (Schneider et al. 2012, 292). In line with this, we focus on both the identification as Moroccan and the national identification with the country of settlement and see how these two correlate.

Schneider et al. (2012) remark that even if second-generation immigrants feel perfectly at home, the social discourse tends to emphasise ‘ethnic descent’ in most Western
European countries. This puts the second generation in a contradictory situation. It can be disconcerting for second-generation youngsters when people around them ascribe general characteristics to them that are stereotypically attributed to their parent’s ethnic group. It becomes even more problematic when such stereotypes are informed by an overall negative public discourse on immigration and immigrants. Negative attributes can be ascribed to specific groups or to immigrants in general, depicting the phenomenon and the presence of immigrants in a society as somehow problematic. Problems that the second generation encounter can range from relatively innocent remarks such as ‘of course you are not used to the cold’, to discrimination on the labour market, or even xenophobic or racist attacks. It is not difficult to imagine that irritation or anger about this ‘othering’ can lead to diminished feelings of belonging and identification.

Allport (1954) lists 14 reactions he observed amongst people dealing with prejudice. A common aspect in such reactions is a reformulation or renegotiation of certain identity elements. In the case of second-generation Moroccans, this for example includes: (i) over-stressing positive cultural characteristics of the Moroccan group; (ii) denying any similarity with Moroccans and only stressing cultural characteristics of the country of birth; or (iii) any other combination of denying certain specific aspects or stressing others. For instance some Moroccan youngsters in the Netherlands stress an alternative ethnic identity as ‘Amazigh’ (Berber) to escape the negative connotation of Moroccan and Muslim identities (Van Amersfoort and Van Heelsum 2007). How one reacts depends on individual circumstances and interactions. Compared to first-generation immigrants, the second generation have more choices and there is a certain contextual fluidity in how they incorporate different dimensions in the formulation of their identity. They can, for instance, choose to retain cultural and language aspects in one situation whilst downplaying them in others. How this is done will depend on the way they cope with outside views in relation to categories to which they self-identify.

As we mentioned, besides ethnic and national-group identification, a third element that we cannot ignore in our analysis is the religious element of ethnic identification. Besides ethnic and national categorisations, religion is one of the most important aspects of identity for Moroccan immigrants of all generations. Research among immigrants generally shows that a religious identity is a highly valued part of their heritage. In the case of Muslims, ethnic group and religious identification are often highly intertwined (Slootman 2014). Phalet, Fleischmann, and Stojčić (2012) illustrate how Turkish immigrants in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden actively fuse these elements together. They report how Turkish parents put a lot of effort in transmitting religious practices to their children. Muslim parents worry that their children will secularise and not become ‘good Muslims’ when growing up in a predominantly Christian or secular environment. Young Muslims that grow up in Europe are on the other hand sometimes quite critical of their parents’ knowledge and interpretation of Islam and so read up on it or follow lectures in an effort to become more knowledgeable than their parents (De Koning 2008).

Some prefer defining themselves in religious terms, as a Muslim, because it does not stand in contradiction to their place of birth and is, in comparison, seen as intellectual and of more consequence. With regard to young British Pakistanis, Jacobson (2009) indicates that many prefer a religious identity as a Muslim over identification as Pakistani or Asian. Jacobson identifies specific ways in which her respondents distinguish between being a Muslim and being Pakistani or Asian. First, being Pakistani or Asian is ‘perceived
as a matter of attachment to a set of traditions or customs that are non-religious in origin and are associated with the minority group (Jacobson 2009, 240). Secondly, ‘one’s religious identity as a Muslim signifies belonging to a global community and, indeed, commitment to a set of doctrines which asserts the intrinsic equality of men across all boundaries of ‘race’ and nationality’ (Jacobson 2009). The universal and intellectual nature of Islam lets it serve as a viable, accountable, and above all pliable form of identification for young British Pakistanis. An important element that Jacobson does not consider fully, however, is that the preference for a Muslim identity is likely influenced by external opinions. Public discourse on Pakistanis and Muslims instils a certain value to these categories that can become especially meaningful in the process of identity formation. In line with Brubaker (2002, 2004), we assert that identification with a national, religious, or ethnic group becomes relevant only in relation to a larger ‘meta’ debate about the nature and meaning of such categories.

We assume that the negative effect of ‘othering’ and the public discourse on Muslims in Europe affect the process of identity formation and that this is different for first and second-generation Moroccan immigrants. In Western Europe, Connor (2009) has shown that Muslim immigrants exhibit more religiously pious behaviour when they live in regions that are less welcoming towards immigrants. As political issues, immigration in general and the presence of Muslim immigrants in particular have become increasingly problematised in many Western European countries (Shadid and van Koningsveld 2002; Saeed 2007). Slootman (2014) states that for second-generation Moroccans and Turks, a negative public debate has caused a blurring of religious and ethnic identities, meaning that, for example, being Moroccan equals being Muslim. We therefore expect that the second generation will have a stronger religious identification and a lower direct identification with the Moroccan community.

**Method and operationalisation**

With the EURISLAM data, we can operationalise several elements of identity formation to answer three main research questions: (i) How are ethnic group identity, religious identity, and national identity interrelated? (ii) How does ascription influence the process of identity formation? and (iii) What differences are there in the process of identity formation between first- and second-generation Moroccan immigrants? We use and combine three EURISLAM data sets: (a) a cross-sectional survey; (b) a media content analysis; and (c) interview data from focus group discussions with transnational immigrant families in Western Europe.

The survey and the media content data cover six European countries: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Switzerland. The survey data cover issues of identity, religion, social contacts, attitudes and perceived cultural distances. In each country a representative sample of Turkish, Moroccan, Pakistani and ex-Yugoslavian Muslim immigrants was interviewed. As a control group, a similar number of non-immigrant respondents (between 250 and 300 observations per group per country) were interviewed. The selection of respondents was based on an objective criterion. We recognise the problem that we fall back into a dualistic operationalisation of ethnic groups that is in itself based on an ascription category, namely (parental) county of birth, but it seems that one cannot reasonably avoid this. The interviewers asked people who are objectively
identified as Moroccan about their subjective identifications. All subsamples were exclusively surveyed with CATI interviewing (see EURISLAM 2011 for more details). For this analysis we used a subsample of 1192 Moroccans in five of the six survey countries. We excluded the UK from our analysis because of a critical wording issue that severely compromises the comparability of one of the main identity questions. Our subsample of Moroccans includes both the first generation born in Morocco, and the second generation, who were born in one of the survey countries and have at least one Moroccan parent. We grouped immigrants who arrived in one of our survey countries before the age of sixteen (the 1.5 generation) together with the second generation. As they arrived before or during their teenage years, we assumed that the 1.5 generation followed some education in one of the survey countries and had been socialised to some degree in that country. Overall, this makes the 1.5 generation more comparable to the second generation than to first-generation Moroccan immigrants, who have been educated and socialised solely in Morocco. About half of the Moroccan respondents belong to the first generation, and there are slightly more women than men in the sample. The age of the respondents lies between 17 and 91 years old and averages at 40. Most of the respondents are in work and had received 11 years of schooling on average.  

The media content data consist of claims about Islam/Muslims, or claims by Muslim actors, that have been coded. In each of the survey countries, five major newspapers with nationwide coverage were selected and articles were sampled from those newspapers using certain keywords, such as Islam and Muslim. Articles were sampled from 1999 to 2008 (for more detail see Tillie et al. 2013). Table 1 gives an overview of the data taken from the survey and the media content analysis.

The interview data consist of transcribed focus group discussion and individual interviews with transnational families. In the sample definition, a transnational family is a family that has at least one household unit in a minimum of three of the survey countries. The blood ties between households are at least that of first cousins. Families are of ex-Yugoslavian, Moroccan, Pakistani or Turkish descent. Again, we only considered

| Table 1. Descriptive data from survey and media content analysis. |
|----------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Variable/question         | data source: [s]survey; [m] media content | Obs. | Mean  | Std. dev. | Min value/code  | Max value/code |
|----------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Identity               |          |          |                  |                  |
| To what extent do you see yourself as Moroccan? [s] | 1158   | 4.075  | 0.964          | 1 (not at all)  | 5 (very strongly) |
| To what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim? [s] | 1157   | 3.865  | 1.009          | 1 (not at all)  | 5 (very strongly) |
| To what extent do you see yourself as Dutch/German/Swiss/Belgian/French? [s] | 1170   | 3.441  | 1.208          | 1 (not at all)  | 5 (very strongly) |
| Ascription             |          |          |                  |                  |
| To what extent do people of non-immigrant origin regard you as Dutch/German/Swiss/Belgian/French? [s] | 1140   | 3.125  | 1.185          | 1 (not at all)  | 5 (very strongly) |
| Position of newspaper claim towards Muslims/Islam [m] | 1192   | 0.085  | 0.154          | −1 (anti-Islam/xenophobic) | 1 (pro-Islam/anti-racist) |
| Control variables       |          |          |                  |                  |
| Generation [s]          | 1192   | 0.489  | 0.500          | 0 (first generation) | 1 (2nd and 1.5 gen.) |
| Gender [s]              | 1192   | 1.517  | 0.499          | 1 (male)        | 2 (female)        |
| Age [s]                 | 1184   | 39     | 13.738         | 17              | 91                |
| Years of education [s]  | 1069   | 11     | 4.130          | 0               | 18                |
| In employment (≥12 hours/week) [s] | 1191 | 1.410  | 0.492          | 1 (Yes)         | 2 (No)            |
| How many acquaintances do you have from the non-immigrant national majority [s] | 1192 | 0.085  | 0.154          | 1 (almost) none  | 5 (nearly all)    |
interviews with Moroccan families and family members. The interviews focused on questions of immigration, in particular the diverse experiences of settling in different European countries and the impact these experiences have on the identity of the respondents (for more detail see Statham and Bolognani 2012).

We operationalise identification with three indicators from the survey data, and ascription with two indicators, one from the survey and one from the media content analysis. In accordance with Phinney (2003), we consider multiple dimensions of identification and correspondingly use three variables from the survey data: identification as a Moroccan (item 1) for the Moroccan ethnic element; identification as a Muslim (item 2) for the religious element; and national identification (item 3) for the identification with the country of settlement. We operationalise ascription using the survey question ‘to what extent do people of non-immigrant origin see you as Dutch/German (item 4)?’

Furthermore, we added the mean tone of public debate from the media content analysis (item 5). This measure reflects the mean tone of the debate surrounding Islam and Muslims. The score was created by individual coding of random sampled newspaper articles that contained instances of political claim making (see Giugni and Cinalli 2010) towards Islam, or by Muslims themselves. Each instance of claim making received a score that gives an indication or relative position of the claim. Claims could be negative, neutral or positive towards Muslim groups, individuals or Islam in general. By averaging the scores across all claims, we obtain a raw but helpful overall indicator of the discursive context surrounding Muslims and Islam in each country. To better measure the impact of this discursive context on the individual and to avoid just measuring country differences, we have included the frequency with which the respondents in each country consume news media in the national language(s). We have weighed the discursive context with media consumption in such a way that respondents who more frequently consume news media in the language of the country of settlement have a higher score, assuming that any particular public debate has a higher impact on them.

National, religious and ethnic group identification

The descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that the overall identification as a Moroccan is stronger than national identification with the country of settlement or the religious identification as a Muslim. A paired t-test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean identification as a Moroccan \([M = 4.079, \text{SD} = 0.963]\) and the national identification with the country of settlement \([M = 3.448, \text{SD} = 1.206, \text{conditions}; t(1143) = 12.701, p = .000]\). The means for identification as a Moroccan \([M = 4.083, \text{SD} = 0.956]\) and identification as a Muslim \([M = 3.864, \text{SD} = 1.005]\) also differ significantly from each other \([\text{conditions}; t(1126) = 6.757, p = .000]\).

In Figure 1, we plot our three elements of identification for the different generations. For the sake of simplicity, we regrouped the questions’ five item answering scale so that those who strongly or very strongly identify appear above the horizontal axis and those who do not, hardly, or only somewhat identify with these dimensions appear below the axis. The figure shows that the second generation identify more with the country of settlement (national identification) and as Muslim (religious identification), but identify less as a Moroccan (ethnic group identification). One-way ANOVA tests confirm that the group means between generations are statistically significant for the identification as a Moroccan
$F(1, 1156) = 6.49, p = .011$ and for national identification $F(1, 1168) = 38.37, p = .000$.

For the identification as Muslim, the different group means are not significantly different from each other $F(1, 1155) = 2.46, p = .117$.

A correlation matrix in Table 2 shows the relations between the three aspects of identification. The coefficients indicate that respondents who identify more as a Moroccan also identify more as a Muslim. For the first generation, a higher identification as a Moroccan also correlates with a weaker national identification. The identification as Muslim shows a similar pattern. For first-generation Moroccan immigrants, there is a negative correlation between identification as Muslim and national identification, indicating that those who identify more as Muslim identify less with the country of settlement. For the second generation, the correlations between the ethnic group and national identification and between religious and national identification are not statistically different from zero. This suggests that, in comparison to first-generation Moroccan immigrants, ethnic group and religious identification are relatively independent from national identification. The second generation appears to identify in a more oblique way, having a much stronger sense of national belonging with only a small increase in ethnic group identification.

**Identity formation and ascription**

In a further step, we can control for other background characteristics of our respondents and look at the influence of ascription on our three elements of identification. We ran

**Table 2. Correlation matrix.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify as Moroccan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify as Muslim</td>
<td>0.364***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with country of settlement</td>
<td>−0.070**</td>
<td>−0.167***</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify as Moroccan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify as Muslim</td>
<td>0.245***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with country of settlement</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *$p \leq .1$.*  
**$p \leq .05$.**  
***$p \leq .01$.**
separate binary logistic regressions, with ethnic group, religious and national identification as dependent variables. The dependent variables were coded dichotomously in the same way as in Figure 1. Strong, positive identification is juxtaposed against other, less than strong, levels of identification. We calculated average marginal effects for our regression estimates to limit potential biases due to unobserved heterogeneity (Mood 2010). This makes our results more comparable across subgroups (generations) and models. We calculated pooled models that contain both generations and models that look at each generation separately. We have included the other identification variables in the models to see if they remain correlated whilst controlling for other factors. In addition, we have included our two measures of ascription and control for gender, age, educational background, employment status and the number of acquaintances respondents have with the non-immigrant majority. In Table 3, we report the predicted probabilities for each generation separately to give a clearer overview of each distinct pattern.

In comparison to the correlation matrix, the results of the regression analyses show that the correlation between religious and ethnic-group identification remains strong. In contrast, however, the correlation between national identification and ethnic-group identification disappears and is not statistically different from zero for both first- and second-generation Moroccans. The same applies for the relationship between national identification and religious identification. Here too, the relationship with the identification with the country of settlement disappears once we control for ascription and other individual characteristics. Overall, this indicates that national identification is a relatively independent dimension of identification that can exist alongside both strong and weak Moroccan or Muslim identifications\(^2\). With regard to Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, Verkuyten and Yildiz come to a similar conclusion and state that 'there is no strong evidence that a strong Turkish or Muslim identity is clearly contradictory or antagonistic to Dutch national identification' (2007, 1460). The following quote, taken from the EUR-ISLAM interview data, shows how identification as a Moroccan and national identification coexist in the life of one respondent:

### Table 3. Logistic regressions (average marginal effects).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Morocco 1st</th>
<th>Morocco 2nd</th>
<th>Muslim 1st</th>
<th>Muslim 2nd</th>
<th>National 1st</th>
<th>National 2nd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification as Moroccan</td>
<td>.277***</td>
<td>.178***</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>−.038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification as Muslim</td>
<td>.235***</td>
<td>.192***</td>
<td>−.027</td>
<td>−.053</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identification</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>−.031</td>
<td>−.023</td>
<td>−.041</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascription</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived acceptance</td>
<td>−.013</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>−.033</td>
<td>−.026</td>
<td>.171***</td>
<td>.082***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.022)</td>
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<td>(.025)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public discourse × media consumption</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.283**</td>
<td>.364**</td>
<td>.382***</td>
<td>.487***</td>
<td>.259*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.156)</td>
<td>(.130)</td>
<td>(.175)</td>
<td>(.120)</td>
<td>(.174)</td>
<td>(.141)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>423</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Std. Err. in parentheses. Controls: gender, age, educational background, employment status, and weak social ties, included in all models.

\(^*p \leq .1\)

\(^{**}p \leq .05\)

\(^{***}p \leq .01\)
I find it very difficult to say where I belong. My home is the Netherlands. I get homesick whenever I have spent a few weeks in Morocco. I depend very much on the Netherlands. I don’t leave the country without a kilo of cheese with me. I am very used to my privacy. I don’t like the social control in Morocco. I don’t like to take everybody’s needs into consideration and I don’t feel like adapting to everybody else’s priorities. This is my home, but as soon as I arrive in Morocco and sniff the air, I know that I belong. It is as if I arrive where I belong—where part of me belongs at least—but I couldn’t live there. When do I feel most Moroccan? People tend to say I am a half-blood or double-blood. You are Moroccan, but you are very Dutch too. So I am both: Dutch-Moroccan. It is all mixed up: I can be at a very Moroccan party and behave and feel very Dutch.

A more positive tone in the debate on Muslims in the papers is related to a stronger identification with all three dimensions (Table 3). Ethnic identification (as a Moroccan) seems least affected by this kind of ascription. The second generation only identifies less as Moroccan when they consume more news that reports negatively on immigration- and Islamic-related issues. For both generations, the public discourse and media consumption correlates with religious identification as Muslim. Greater media consumption and a more positive debate are associated with expressing a stronger Muslim identity. The same holds true for national identification. Both first- and second-generation Moroccans have a higher national identification when they consume more news that has an overall more positive stance towards immigration and Islam. Ascription is also identified in the interviews to have a ‘sizeable impact on the sense of [the respondent’s] identity’ (Statham and Bolognani 2012, 13). The following quote shows how a negative discursive and political environment influences a shift in identification. More specifically, the interviewee starts to question her multidimensional identity as a Dutch-Moroccan when faced with increasing negative attitudes in the press:

I never had the feeling that living in the Netherlands was problematic, until the shit hit the fan some years ago. It all began in 2000 or 2001. I think it started with 9/11, the reactions to that where enormous. Suddenly being Moroccan-Dutch became a problem. Then came Pim Fortuyn and things got even worse from then on. As I said earlier, I had always been proud of being Dutch. I thought the Netherlands were different, although of course, I realized that there were racists and everything wasn’t honky dory, it was still a lot better than anywhere else. Some things were unimaginable; you couldn’t imagine that the things that are said nowadays were to be said. There was discrimination, but it wasn’t out in the open, and whenever something racist was said it was frowned upon.

In addition to the public discourse and media consumption, perceived acceptance plays a significant role in national identification (Table 3). First- and second-generation Moroccans who feel more accepted also have a stronger national identification. Another fragment from the interview data shows how one respondent relates the importance of perceived acceptance in lowering her feelings of national identification:

The polarisation in the Netherlands was a major factor in my departure from the country. It didn’t give me pleasure to live there anymore [ … ]. Suddenly you were responsible for Bin Laden and for the deeds of young Moroccan delinquents. You were called upon to answer for all the problems that were identified with Muslims [ … ]. I suddenly realized that I was Moroccan, that I was a Muslim. I suddenly felt less inclined to behave as an integrated person. I felt as if I didn’t want to belong to a country that did not accept me for who I am. I have rights too. If you don’t want me, I don’t want you either. If you say I am Moroccan, I will be Moroccan, and I will be proud of it. I won’t feel ashamed because society wants me to. I had
always had the feeling that I was Dutch, but from then on, I decided that I didn’t want to prove myself. We all integrated naturally and suddenly the Netherlands wanted me to prove that I really was integrated, which made me rebellious.

Regarding differences between the generations, the pooled regressions reveal that the second generation has a lower ethnic-group identification and a higher religious and national identification. In addition, there is a significant difference between first- and second-generation Moroccans in the influence of perceived acceptance on national identification (Table 3, boxed). First-generation Moroccans are more sensitive to perceived acceptance and those who have a higher national identification are those who feel more acceptance as a fellow citizen.

**Conclusion and discussion**

To conclude, we return to the paper’s three questions: How are the three dimensions of identification related to each other? How are these dimensions affected by ascription? What are the differences between first- and second-generation Moroccans in this regard?

Relating to the first question, we conclude that the ethnic, religious and national dimensions of identification relate in a similar way as we saw in recent publications by Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007), Phalet, Fleischmann, and Stojčić (2012) and Slootman (2014). The ethnic (Moroccan) and the Muslim identity tend to merge among Muslims in Western Europe, whereas national identity is more easily influenced by factors in the receiving society. It seems a highly relevant conclusion that ethnic and religious identities are expressed in a parallel manner. These findings differ slightly from those of Jacobson (2009), who concludes that second-generation British Pakistanis often prefer a religious identity as a Muslim to an ethnic-group identity as Pakistani. We find that both first- and second-generation Moroccans show a tendency to relate their religious identity with their ethnic-group identity. In line with Jacobson (2009), we find that second-generation Moroccans have an overall stronger level of religious identification.

Secondly, we have shown that ascription, through public discourse, is positively correlated to identification, in particular religious and national identification (with the society of settlement). We find that negative reporting overall leads to diminished feelings of national belonging and lesser religious identification. In contrast to the expectation that Muslims in Europe who are frustrated with negative public debate openly stress a Muslim identity, we do not find any signs of such a reaction to a negative discursive context. Overall, ethnic-group and religious identification are not negatively but positively correlated to the tone of the debate and to perceived level of acceptance. Our results therefore identify ascription to be an important element in the process of identity formation, but one that instead of provoking a negative reaction, has a strengthening or dampening effect. Ascription has the strongest effect on national identification. Both the public discourse and perceived acceptance influence national identification. The interview extracts gave further illustration of the order of the two ascription variables: a negative media debate probably leads to a perceived lack of acceptance and this gives rise to certain irritations that have an effect on ethnic, religious- and national-group identification.

The most striking differences between first- and second-generation Moroccans are regarding national identification. Overall, the second generation show more resilience
here than first-generation Moroccans. The national identification of second-generation Moroccans appears to be affected less by ascription, indicating that the second generation is less likely to let a negative context weaken their national identification.

Our findings nuance the assumption of scholars such as Rumbaut (2008), who reason that reactive ethnicity mainly affects the second generation. Although we do not find a very reactive relationship, we do find that ascription affects first-generation Moroccans when it comes to their religious identification as a Muslim. Overall, the second generation seems more confident in having multiple identities and in coping with any negative effect of ascription. However, as the results from our regression analyses and the interview extracts show, public discourse and levels of perceived acceptance have a strong impact on the religious and national identification of both first- and second-generation Moroccans.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Compared to the national majority the Moroccan respondents are still undereducated and their levels of education appear similar to the other ethnic groups in the sample. Due to non-response in our telephone survey, it is likely that the sample is indeed slightly skewed to include the more educated.
2. These results are robust across the five different countries. Regressions for each country separately show similar results.

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