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THE REGULATORY CONSUMER:
PROSUMER-DRIVEN LOCAL ENERGY PRODUCTION INITIATIVES

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Key words
EU law, energy law, regulation, consumer, prosumer, energy market
Abstract

This paper analyzes whether and how EU law implements the public policy discourse in market regulation that addresses consumers in a new active role: not as passive beneficiaries of market regulation but as active or even pro-active market actors, who not only consume but may produce or even trade on markets. Consumers’ actions became key to the well-functioning of markets: they are entrusted to regulate markets and contribute to the competitiveness and the legitimacy of market processes. In the EU, consumers are expected to contribute both to EU market integration and to European society.

The question this paper addresses is whether EU law reflects this new regulatory capacity of consumers in market regulation. The relevance of this issue is that if this new regulatory role of the consumer is not matched with a corresponding legal framework, the mismatch between legal rules and consumers’ new role in market regulation may lead to regulatory ineffectiveness and legal uncertainty. If technological developments make this active consumer role possible and the consumers themselves want to fulfil it, there is in fact a gap between law and technological development, which can lead to the problem of ‘regulatory disconnection’. These problems are especially present in the EU energy sector, where technical developments such as smart meters, solar panels, decentralized energy storage enable a proactive role for energy consumers. Consumers are often prosumers of energy i.e. consumers who produce their own energy.

This paper critically analyzes current EU law on the (energy) consumers’ new role in market regulation. It analyzes normative EU law concepts and definitions of the consumer and examines whether the legal rules comply with the concept of the active regulatory consumer. The paper uses a case-study of the prosumer-driven local energy production initiatives and examines whether the energy consumers’ new role creates regulatory disconnection.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Market regulation in general conceived consumers as passive market parties in a weak bargaining position who were unable to discipline firm behaviour on the market. Accordingly, consumer laws and policies proactively intervened in markets by means of mandatory rules and aimed at redistributing the costs between contracting parties in order to restore bargaining power between them.

However, as global economic restructuring processes and technological changes expanded consumer markets, deregulatory policies began to address consumers as active market actors who hold relevant regulatory powers. The state’s protective role was rolled back and consumers were put in the driving seat of market regulation. Market regulatory policies assume that consumers have individual responsibility as active economic agents whose purchasing decisions are key to the well-functioning of markets: they, in fact, can regulate markets.

In the EU context the concept of regulatory consumer is communicated in public policies articulating consumer empowerment. Consumers are addressed as regulatory subjects who should contribute both to EU market integration and to European society.

The question this paper addresses is how EU law reflects this new regulatory policy and more specifically, whether and how EU law implements the regulatory capacity of consumers in market regulation. The paper maps and analyzes the definitions of the consumer and the normative concept of the ‘average consumer’ in EU law in order to establish whether and how EU law implements the development of consumers’ role in market regulation from a passive beneficiary to an active participating economic agent.

If there is a mismatch between legal rules and the new role consumers should assume in market regulation the problem of so-called regulatory disconnection could arise.¹ This eventually may result in a gap between technology, market conditions and legal institutions, as formulated in the institutional economics and in the law and technology literature streams.¹ Where the legal rules do not comply with the pace of market development as a result of e.g. technologic innovation, regulatory disconnection could result in stifling innovation.²

¹ Regulatory disconnection can arise due to technology progress, as well as due to the changes in behavior and attitudes catalyzed by a specific innovation. See Brownsword, R., Goodwin, M., (2012), Law and Technologies of the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK;
The risk of regulatory disconnection is especially present in the energy sector, where technological developments such as smart meters, solar panels, and decentralized energy storage (batteries) enable a proactive role of energy consumers. While consumers previously had a passive, consuming role, and were confronted with top-down determined energy supply options, services, and prices, they can now produce (a part of) their own energy and act as so-called prosumers. Their prosuming role is recognized as a positive and desirable innovation in multiple EU energy policy documents, as it contributes to such policy goals as increasing the share of renewables, improving security of supply and energy efficiency, as well as empowering the consumers.

This paper critically analyzes the energy consumers’ new role in regulating energy markets and thus whether they can indeed achieve public policy goals such as energy efficiency or sustainability. It examines the normative concepts and definitions in EU (consumer) law in order to establish whether these comply with the concept of the (pro)-active energy consumer or regulatory disconnection takes place. The paper uses a case-study of the prosumer-driven local energy production initiatives and examines whether energy consumers’ new role creates regulatory disconnection.

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3 Pront-van Bommel, S. (2010), De elektriciteitsconsument centraal?, in Pront-van Bommel, S. (ed.) (2010), De consument en de andere kant van de elektriciteitsmarkt, Centrum voor Energievraagstukken, Universiteit van Amsterdam, pp. 18-62

4 Energy Regulation: A Bridge to 2025. Conclusions Paper, ACER, Recommendation of the Agency on the regulatory response to the future challenges emerging from developments in the internal energy market, 19 September 2014

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Progress towards completing the Internal Energy Market, COM(2014) 634

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, Energy Union Package, COM(2015) 80 final

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers, COM(2015) 339 final

2. CONSUMERS’ NEW ROLE IN REGULATING ENERGY MARKETS

2.1. Transition to new European regulatory architecture

From the end of the 1990s a new set of consumer rules emerged in the European public utilities sectors as a result of market liberalization and accelerated EU integration. In these sectors the EU adopted a market-oriented approach in order to deliver public goods and services by activating competition and generating greater efficiency. While the nation states were ‘rolled back’, public utilities became integral part of the internal market. The (de)regulatory approach strongly focused on supply side market failures and primarily targeted competitive market structure by introducing specific regulatory frameworks that complemented existing competition rules and institutions.

The role and function of private consumers in the liberalisation process has been mainly neglected. This led to the late development of sector-specific consumer rules and consumer protection issues as elements of the EU liberalization. Nevertheless, consumers were given responsibilities to activate competition, to make decisions and enforce their rights in markets where previously they were dependent on the state. In fact, certain regulatory tasks that used to belong to the public law realm, have been allocated to consumers. Accordingly, the emerging consumer rules were based on public law goals of competition, market regulation and EU integration. This consumer law model mainly consists of regulatory law to complete the internal market and strengthen competition building a new ‘horizontal’ regime of consumer contract law.

As a result, regulatory goals and techniques changed and government’s position became decentred by shifting regulatory powers from the state to, among others, consumers. The new regulatory architecture de facto positioned consumers as regulatory subjects who actively contribute to market practices rather than as passive recipients of regulatory protection. Consumers became responsible for their own acts and they came to be seen as influential market actors who can directly regulate firm behavior and indirectly influence market performances. Public policies depict consumers as market actors who actively search markets, monitor firms and switch providers and who may even drive out dishonest,

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7 While this regulatory law addresses the consumers, it, in fact, transcends the internal relationship between producers or service providers and consumers to the external dimension of the well-functioning of markets. See Reich, N. (2011), Harmonisation of European contract law: with special emphasis on consumer law, China-EU Law Journal, 1(1-2), pp. 55-94. p.71

incompetent firms. In fact, regulators use consumers’ purchasing power and regulatory function as the source of justifying and legitimizing the market processes.9

This new ‘regulatory’ role of the consumer is present in various new regulatory architectures in the telecommunications,10 the energy market,11 as well as in many areas of the so-called sharing economy.12 Energy market represents a good illustration of how the new regulatory role of the consumers developed, how it is currently conceived in public policies and what kind of legal rules frame this development. The next section will briefly address the developments in the energy markets in recent years in order to explain the roles energy consumers may fulfill in this market.

2.2. Consumers in energy markets

The traditional energy system, in terms of its technical and market design, as well as its underlying regulatory framework, used to be organized according to the value chain from energy production, to transport, storage and then distribution both in the national and EU-wide markets.13 However, in recent years many developments have changed this structure. First, liberalization and EU market integration goal pushed the dynamics of the energy market towards a pan-European, harmonized and coordinated model.14 Second, the intensifying security of supply and climate change concerns triggered the emergence of renewable energy sources (RES) in the energy mix of the Member States.15 Thereby

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12 Sharing economy is defined as companies who deploy accessibility based business models for peer-to-peer markets and its user communities. This type of business model is not limited to specific industry sectors, because it can, in theory, act as a broker between consumers, for any consumer owned product or service. Whereas in the conventional situation consumers would buy products and become the owners, in an accessibility-based system consumers pay for temporary access-rights to a product. Business Innovation Observatory, The sharing economy, case study 12, EU, September 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/business-innovation-observatory/files/case-studies/12-she-accessibility-based-business-models-for-peer-to-peer-markets_en.pdf
13 Pront-van Bommel, S. (2012), Een redelijke energieprijs. De mythe van de marktwerking, Centrum voor Energievraagstukken, Universiteit van Amsterdam;
15 RES are usually produced in a more decentralized manner compared to traditional fossil energy sources. Combined with an increased level of energy-related awareness of the population, as well as technological progress and respective increasing affordability of technology, this creates a bottom-up pull in the energy market towards
the European energy market is subject to conflicting forces: push towards more centralization on European level, and at the same time pull towards more decentralization on national level. The effects of these developments on energy consumers and the energy consumption patterns in the local markets can be analyzed by studying the various roles energy consumers may adopt in markets. The role of so-called prosumers is especially important, as well as the broader implications of exercising such roles such as the so-called user-centered innovation. The various roles energy consumers may adopt in markets are analyzed in the next section.

2.2.1. The roles of the energy consumer

Whereas most products and services a consumer has some degree of choice whether to purchase it or not, she has much less choice in relation to energy. Energy is a basic necessity and therefore, most people are consumers of energy at least to some extent. Therefore, for the vast majority of the population some level of consumption is present. Respectively, it is more reasonable to classify consumers according to their consumption. There are a number of consumption patterns energy consumers could engage in, such as passive consumption, active consumption, responsible consumption, and prosuming consumption.

Passive consumption is the default option for energy consumers, which means that consumers do not actively participate in the market: they rarely change suppliers, do not actively engage in either energy- or cost-savings. In contrast, active consumption presumes active participation in the market and active interaction with the energy suppliers. This type of consumers actively investigate and compare the alternatives on the market, switch energy suppliers, insulate their houses to lower the energy bills, etc. The active energy consumption and active consumer participation in the market is meant to stimulate competition, generate more efficiency and more affordable energy prices.

The key element of active energy consumption is the ability of the consumer to make a reasonable and well-informed choice between energy suppliers. However, this competence could only be exercised in competitive markets with alternative suppliers. Consequently, the creation of a well-functioning energy market is a collaborative effort between the government and consumers. The former contributes

16 Von Hippel distinguishes between ‘user-centered innovation’ and ‘manufacturer-centric innovation’. In making this distinction, the author emphasizes the actors who innovate: he argues that there is currently a ‘trend toward democratization of innovation’, meaning that users of products/ processes/ services can innovate themselves in order to suit their specific needs, rather than rely on the manufacturers to do so for them. Von Hippel, E., (2005), *Democratizing Innovation*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA

17 This paper focuses only on the household and small commercial consumers, and exclude industries, as their energy consumption dynamics is rather different.

through market opening (e.g. unbundling the vertically-integrated undertakings, removing entry barriers for new market parties) and ‘steering’ market processes, while the latter contributes through the actual choice to make the switch.\(^{19}\)

Competitive energy markets are not only important for achieving lower energy prices, but also as a mechanism ensuring a sufficient level of security of supply and the stimulation of innovation.\(^{20}\) Therefore, whereas the primary motivation for the consumers to engage in active consumption is prudential (a better deal with the suppliers in terms of lower prices, improved service), moral considerations could also play a role.

It is so-called responsible consumption that goes further than active consumption and also takes public policy factors into account, such as the presence of the renewable energy sources (RES) in the energy mix of the supplier.\(^{21}\) This consumption pattern also makes a certain collaboration necessary between the government and the consumers: Whereas the government could take certain steps in the direction of achieving the European and national environmental goals (e.g. RES production subsidies, quota obligations for suppliers, energy efficiency programs), the effect of these steps would not reach its full potential without the consumers’ positive response, such as switching to suppliers offering (more) green energy, insulating their houses.

In sum, active and responsible energy consumption is essential for the realization of clean, reliable and affordable energy supply in the competitive environment where all the parties have the freedom of choice.\(^{22}\) In other words, such energy consumption contributes to all three pillars of the European energy policy- sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply.

\subsection{The energy prosumers}

Energy consumers act in response either to negative or to positive market developments. For example, if the quality or price of a product/service does not meet the expectations of the consumers, they can chose to exit the market fully or partially (contra-articulation) and produce their own product/service.

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^{19}\) Therefore switching behavior of the energy consumers is often seen as an important measure of assessing the energy market’s functioning and liquidity by the European and national policy-makers. See Pront-van Bommel (2010) (n 3)
\item \(^{20}\) Pront-van Bommel (2010) (n 3)
\item \(^{21}\) For example, whereas for 72% of consumers switching to a new supplier in 2013 in the Netherlands the price of energy played the main role, for 14% the choice for renewables was an equally important factor (in total 12.7% of consumers switched in 2013, and 55% in the past 10 years). See Energieia news item, ACM ziet geen toename aantal switchers vanwege ‘verliesaversie’ onder consumenten, 20 november 2014, available (for subscribers) at http://energeia.nl/nieuws/481664-1411/acm-ziet-geen-toename-aantal-switchers-vanwege-verliesaversie-onder-consumenten
\item \(^{22}\) Huygen, A. (2010), De consument en de (on)vrije elektriciteitsmarkt, in Pront-van Bommel, S. (ed.) (2010), De consument en de andere kant van de elektriciteitsmarkt, Centrum voor Energievraagstukken, Universiteit van Amsterdam, pp. 96-136
\end{itemize}
instead. An example of such contra-articulation in the energy market is consumers exiting the traditional energy supply model, and producing their own energy as a response to increasing prices or frequent interruptions of supply, and/ or as a response to environment protection concerns. If the consumers are satisfied with the product or service, they might enter the market and/ or take part in co-producing or co-designing the product or service in question (pro-articulation). An example of such response is installing the solar panels as the way of entering the market, and participating in a pilot project testing smart grids as the way of prototyping. While doing so consumers may innovate themselves in order to suit their specific needs and in fact engage in user-centered innovation i.e. introducing innovative technologies and market designs and develop new consumer behaviors.

An illustrative example of such user-centered innovation and of pro-active interaction of consumers with their market counter-parts- energy suppliers- are the energy prosumers. Prosumers are consumers who produce or co-produce (a part of) their energy demand. Energy consumers could engage in prosuming consumption either individually or collectively. An illustration of individual prosuming consumption is a household energy consumer who installed solar panels on her roof, and is using renewable solar energy for her needs, complementing it with electricity from the grid when own production is not necessary, and injecting it in the grid when the production exceeds demand. In such situation the energy consumer has a number of different, and yet simultaneous, roles: she is a producer, a consumer, and a supplier at the same time.

The energy production performed by the energy prosumers is referred to as ‘local production’. It is important to distinguish local production from decentralized production. Local production is individual-consumer driven, either as a single household or as a group- e.g. consumer collective.

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23 Reisch and Micklitz (2006) (n 6)
24 Pront-van Bommel (2010) (n 3)
25 Pront-van Bommel (2010) (n 3)
26 Von Hippel (2005) (n 16)
27 Pront-van Bommel (2010) (n 3)
28 Huygen (2010) (n 22)
29 Decentralized production includes production which is usually fed into distribution networks (as opposed to transmission networks traditionally used by the incumbent producers). It is usually driven by commercial parties, such as agrarian and farm producers, large organizations (e.g. hospitals), office parks. Netbeheer Nederland (2013), *Eindrapportage Netbeheer Nederland Onderzoek Decentrale Markten. De Proeftuin ‘Decentrale Duurzame Collectieven’. Van realisatie naar de toekomst. Energieke burgers, duurzaam decentraal en de betekenis voor de netbeheerders en netbeheer*, available at [http://www.netbeheernederland.nl/publicaties/onderzoek/](http://www.netbeheernederland.nl/publicaties/onderzoek/)
30 It is estimated that currently the Netherlands counts around 500 energy prosumers’ collectives. Such collective efforts of the energy prosumers can assume different formats, and range from a somewhat loose and sporadic cooperation e.g. regarding the collective procurement of solar panels for a number of household consumers in the neighborhood, to a much more structured and organized local sustainable energy cooperations, that, besides producing renewable energy, also supply it to its members. Not in all cases local energy production takes place
Besides the different roles individual energy prosumers may have, energy collectives could also play a role in the operation of energy networks, for example, by operating own private networks or through the operation of the local energy storage, either virtual (e.g. batteries in the houses, or in electric cars of the members of the collective) or physical.\(^1\) It is often not the prudential factors (e.g. lower prices, better service) that play the main role in the decision of the energy consumers to qualify them as prosumers, but rather moral considerations, such as contributing to the energy transition, strengthening the local economy and social cohesion in the local community or having more direct impact upon own energy supply.\(^2\)

Prosuming consumption contributes to all three objectives of the European energy policy: sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply. Moreover, the potential positive impact of the prosuming consumption pattern is seen as positive. First, it helps to realize the goals of renewable energy production and the energy efficiency at both national and European levels, as prosumption often involves measures towards energy savings as well as local sustainable energy supply (e.g. solar panels on the roofs, geothermal energy).\(^3\) Similarly, prosumers can play an important role in the functioning of local smart distribution systems and increasing the overall efficiency of these systems. By reducing the peak consumption through either energy efficiency or consumption flexibility the prosumers can achieve a reduced necessary peak capacity of the distribution system, which would consequently translate into lower total costs and hence increase social welfare.\(^4\) Thirdly, prosumers can also act as providers of flexibility (by consuming less/ producing more when there is a shortage; and consuming more/ producing less when there is abundance of energy in the grid), the need for which increases with the progressing rate of renewable and intermittent energy sources in Europe.\(^5\) Moreover, the energy prosumers - either individually or collectively - act as ‘seedbeds of innovation’ while engaging in user-centered innovation.\(^6\) Whereas the current share of local energy in the total energy mix is far from

\(^{1}\) Netbeheer Nederland (2013) (n 29)

\(^{2}\) Netbeheer Nederland (2013) (n 29)


\(^{4}\) Buist and Pront-van Bommel (2011) (n 13)

\(^{5}\) Such effect would be achieved due to the fact that the necessary infrastructure investments are socialized and subsequently recovered through tariffs. See Huygen (2010) (n 22)

\(^{6}\) Hakvoort and Huygen (2012) (n 33), Buist and Pront (2011) (n 13)

significant, this could change in the future as self-production of energy has all the characteristics of a disruptive innovation. Moreover, besides purely economic aspects described above, local energy production has important indirect effects, such as the independence of the consumers from large energy suppliers, often experienced by energy consumers as ‘anonymous’, the decrease in NIMBY sentiments for renewable projects, consumer empowerment and social cohesion.

These positive aspects of the prosuming role of consumers are recognized in numerous EU energy policy documents, and it is claimed that prosumption is a positive and desirable development. Under these circumstances regulatory disconnection between law and the innovation (prosumerism) would have negative consequences for the development of the innovation, as well as for the above-described EU policy goals to which this innovation contributes.

The above overview shows that energy consumer has a number of different roles. These roles are not exclusive in the sense that the same individual consumer could perform a number of roles at the same time. In these roles consumers contribute to the realization of public policy goals such as sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply of the EU and national energy markets. It is relevant that consumers are economically and legally capable of exercising these roles and the next section explains why.

2.2.3. The relevance of the energy consumers’ roles in regulating energy markets: User-centered innovation and regulatory disconnection

One way consumers can actively contribute to the competitiveness of energy markets is the user-centered innovation mentioned earlier in this paper. Prosuming consumption pattern is, in fact,
illustrative of the user-centered innovation that is currently materializing in the European energy markets.

Regarding the value of innovation, this paper follows the perspective of law and technology literature, namely that innovation is not inherently good, but rather could have a number of outcomes, ranging from benefit, to status quo, and to harm. According to this perspective, innovation is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. In other words, user-centered innovation realized by energy prosumers is instrumental to realize the goals on European energy policy and it should be evaluated in this context. Therefore, if energy prosumers for some reason cannot fully realize their role in the energy market, or encounter obstacles, user-centered innovation is hampered, which potentially has negative consequences for the realization of European energy policy goals.

User-centered innovation in the energy sector can be attributed to a multitude of factors, such as technology development, behavioural changes of technology users, as well as market, economic, political and regulatory aspects. All these factors are simultaneously shaping innovation and are being shaped by it: at any given moment in time, the institutional and market structures reflect a certain set of assumptions regarding technological developments, political, economic and social preferences. If one of these factors changes while the rest do not (e.g. innovation progresses, while the regulatory system stays behind), a discrepancy between them inevitably arises. This phenomenon is described as the situation when technology develops faster than the corresponding regulation, the latter falling behind, and is commonly referred to as ‘pacing problem’ in the US-originating academic literature. The same situation is referred to as ‘challenge of regulatory connection’ or ‘regulatory disconnection’ in the European-based scholarship, and it is commonly described as the widening gap between the current regulatory environment based upon the ‘technological landscape of the past’ and the occurring innovations revolutionizing this landscape. The challenge of regulatory connection can manifest itself

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43 Künneke, R. W., Groenewegen, J. P. M. (2009), Challenges for readjusting the governance of network industries, in Künneke, R. W. et al. (eds) (2009), The governance of network industries. Institutions, technology and policy in reregulated infrastructures, Cheltenham, UK and Nothampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar


45 Brownsword and Goodwin (2012) (n 1);

46 Bennett Moses (2013) (n 2)
in a number of ways, and namely: regulatory obsolescence, regulatory void or gaps, ambiguity in the application of existing regulations, and/or regulatory over- or under-inclusiveness.47

The challenge of regulatory connection is neither inevitable, nor inherently negative. First, many innovations fall within the scope of existing regulations.48 One could even argue that falling behind the technologic and socio-economic reality to some extent could be expected from regulation, due to its inherent goal of legal certainty.49 Whereas there is significant disagreement between the law and economics and the law and technology academic literature regarding the necessity and the ‘ideal’ means of addressing regulatory disconnection,50 there is a strong consensus regarding the idea that regulation should at least not stifle innovation.51 This common ground between the two academic streams is the basic assumption the current paper is built on, namely that the legal framework underlying consumers’ (pro)active role should not to restrict the flows of innovation. In other words, regulatory disconnection between innovation and respective regulation is not problematic as such, but only when it represents an obstacle for the realization of positive aspects of the innovation.

Consequently, a number of questions arises in relation to regulatory disconnection: how do we identify regulatory disconnection, and how do we decide that the identified regulatory disconnection is problematic? We assume that regulatory disconnection takes place when there is incoherence between policy goals (soft law) on the one hand, and hard law on the other hand. In other words, when reaching a certain policy goal by the means of an innovation is technically and economically feasible, as well as acceptable from the ethical and moral considerations, such innovation should be facilitated by the law. If it is not, there is regulatory disconnection. Such regulatory disconnection is problematic when it concerns an ‘endorsed’ innovation, approved as a positive development e.g. in policy documents.

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50 Generally speaking, law and economics literature assumes that action needs to be taken only when needed, and not as a rule, and hence there are no strong preferences regarding the exact timing of regulation in relation to innovation- it can take place both ex ante and ex post. In contrast, law and technology literature assumes that the mandate for intervention is automatic, and that the ‘optimal’ situation is for regulation to intervene at the very beginning stages of innovation (invention) and maintain that connection throughout the stages of diffusion and social impact. See Butenko, A., Larouche, P. (2015), Regulation for Innovativeness or Regulation of Innovation?, Law, Innovation and Technology 7 (1)
51 Ranchordás (2015) (n 49); Bennett Moses (2013) (n 2); Brownsword and Goodwin (2012) (n 1); Bennett Moses (2011) (n 47); Brownsword and Somsen (2009) (n 45)
Against this background the hypothesis of this paper is that there is currently a problematic regulatory disconnection between the energy prosuming trend in Europe and the respective legal framework. The legal rules should enable energy consumers to actively participate in markets. More specifically, regulatory disconnection may arise due to the fact that the present legal framework does not implement the various roles available to consumers in markets. In other words, while prosumers are already active on the energy market, this role is not implemented in any meaningful way in the current European or national energy law provisions. There is thus a regulatory gap, which impedes innovation and negatively impacts upon the EU energy policy goals.

In order to test the above-proposed hypothesis, the paper analyzes the following questions: Which normative concepts and definitions of the consumer are available in EU (energy) law? Do these normative concepts and definitions of the consumer correspond to the possible (pro)active roles of the energy consumers in the European energy market? In other words, is there a regulatory disconnection between the normative concepts of the consumer in EU law and consumers’ actual role they can fulfill in the energy markets? And if so, which implications this regulatory disconnection have for the prosuming trend in Europe?
3. THE DEFINITION AND THE NORMATIVE CONCEPT OF THE CONSUMER IN EUROPEAN LAW

The specific legal basis of energy law in primary EU law is now Article 194 TFEU, which sets out the main goals of the EU’s energy policy. However, even before the Lisbon Treaty and the implementation of Article 194 TFEU, energy law has considerably developed in secondary legislation. The legal basis for consumer protection was only laid down by the Maastricht Treaty, which contained a special Title IX on consumer protection. Article 129a became the most important provision in the Treaty with regard to consumer protection. While the Amsterdam Treaty made an important modification to the consumer Treaty rules in Article 153 EC, the major Treaty revision was brought by the Lisbon Treaty, which explicitly mentioned consumer protection as a shared competence between the EU and its Member States in Art. 4(2)(f) TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty has not brought any changes either in relation to the extent of the competence of the EU nor regarding the legislative procedure that is applicable in Article 169 TFEU. However, consumer protection needs to be taken into account in all areas of EU law and a high level of protection should be aimed at. Article 12 TFEU states that consumer protection is an overarching task and Article 114(3) TFEU demands a high level of protection in internal market legislation adopted based on this provision. Article 12 TFEU functions as a horizontal clause, which is echoed, in Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In fact, Article 12 TFEU forms a

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52 According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the main aims of the EU’s energy policy are to: ensure the functioning of the energy market; ensure security of energy supply in the Union; promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and promote the interconnection of energy networks. Article 194 TFEU makes some areas of energy policy a shared competence, signaling a move towards a common energy policy. Nevertheless, each Member State maintains its right to ‘determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply’ (Article 194(2)).


54 Article 129a, provided that the Community shall contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection through:

(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 100a in the context of the completion of the internal market;

(b) specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued by the Member States to protect health, safety and economic interests of consumers and to provide adequate information to consumers.”

55 Article 129(1)(b) recognised, for the first time, the Community’s power to act in order to protect consumers, independent of internal market concerns. While Article 129 1 (a) still referred to measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 (ex 100a), but Article 129 (1) (b) contained an independent legal basis.

56 Under this procedure, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers act as co-legislators. Adoption by the Council requires a qualified majority. The Lisbon Treaty introduces from November 2014 a new formula on weighing the votes. The legislative procedure that applied under Articles 114 and 169 TFEU is the co-decision procedure, post-Lisbon called the ordinary legislative procedure.

57 Article 12 TFEU reads “consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other Union policies and activities.” Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which determines that EU policies ought to ensure a high level of consumer protection, equally invoked by the Court.
constitutional basis to weigh the interests of consumers in the assessment of other EU policies, for example in possible infringements to competition law. In the field of consumer protection, secondary legislation in the form Directives form the main body of law and thus will form the basis for the analysis that follows.

In order to analyze the normative concept of the consumer in EU (energy) law, this section will first map and analyze the EU’s regulatory model of consumer protection and then analyze the secondary legislation and case-law on the definition and the normative concept of the consumer.

3.1. The EU regulatory model of consumer protection

Perhaps the most important characteristic of the EU law and policy concerning consumer protection is that it has developed as part of the internal market process with the goal of creating a level playing field for business. The original perception behind the EU consumer rules was that businesses needed a common set of rules in order to take advantage of the internal market. Accordingly, the harmonization of consumer rules was not an end in itself and consumers were merely regarded as the passive beneficiaries of free trade and market integration.

Thus, EU consumer law has been characterized as being instrumental and protective. It is instrumental, as its primary goal was to complete the internal market and this significantly influenced its protective function, shifting the European normative concept closer to free market mechanisms than social policy concepts. EU consumer protection has been characterized by a normative concept of a well informed and confident consumer and by the adoption of information provisions. These two key characteristics are analyzed in the following sections by examining how they correspond to the model of the active ‘regulatory’ consumer and the prosumer.

3.2. The definition and the normative concept of the consumer

The definition and the normative concept of the consumer that underlies the legal rules of market regulation has to correspond to the economic and technological reality of markets and the real-life

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58 For example, it was invoked by the General Court in Test-Achats, to stress that consumer protection is an interest that, by force of the Treaty, necessarily ought to be taken into account in the implementation of any EU policy and activity, including, therefore competition law. Case T-224/10, Association belge des consommateurs test-achats ASBL v. Commission, judgment of 12 October 2011, nyr, para 43.

59 Most of the directives were based on Article 114 TFEU and thus their stated rationale was to combat market fragmentation. Early directives regulated misleading advertising, doorstep selling, consumer credit, package travel, distance selling. See Weatherill, S. (1996), After KECK: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification, 33 Common Market Law Review 5, pp. 887–908

60 Micklitz, H-W. (2002), An expanded and systemized Community Consumer Law as alternative or complement?, EBLR, 13 (6), pp. 583-598.
behavior of consumers in order to guarantee well-functioning (energy) markets. Whether the
normative concepts of the consumer in EU (energy) law and policy corresponds to the new active roles
consumers can exercise in the energy markets is analyzed below.

3.2.1. The definition of the consumer
The definitions of the consumer vary across jurisdictions and across the different EU law Directives. It
has often been questioned, whether the definition should be widely or narrowly construed. The
narrow notion defines consumers as natural persons acting for purposes outside their trade, business or
profession. The wider concept defines consumers as natural persons acting primarily outside their trade. In other words, the wider concept relies on the distinction of what the primary capacity of consumers is for the definition of the consumer.

The definition of the consumer is relevant as it provides who can rely on consumer protection rules and thus it represents the underlying regulatory model.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently held that the definition of the consumer should be narrowly interpreted. The Consumer Rights Directive also implemented a narrow definition in Article 2 (1). However, the narrow definition is problematic in so-called mixed transactions or dual purpose contracts, where the contracting party acts both for professional and personal purposes, for example self-employed persons buy objects for both professional and personal

61 Künneke (2008) (n 1)


63 This definition can be found in the consumer sale, unfair terms, e-commerce, distance marketing of consumer financial services and payment services directives as well as in the new consumer credit directive. Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours (The Package Travel Directive) contains a broader notion extending the definition of the consumer to companies and business travelers as purchasers and users of travel services.

64 In Di Pinto the European Court of Justice interpreted, for the purposes of the Directive on doorstep selling, the notion of consumer in a narrower sense, noting that a trader canvassed with a view to the sale of his business is not to be regarded as a consumer protected by the directive and explained that the directive does not afford protection to legal persons even if they are in a position similar to that of a consumer. Case C-361/89 Di Pinto Judgment of 14 March 1991

use such as a computer.\textsuperscript{67} While the CJEU first held that even a minor connection with a persons’ profession\textsuperscript{68} excludes the transaction from the scope of the Doorstep Selling Directive’s consumer protection rules, later in \textit{Gruber}\textsuperscript{69} the Court ruled that if the business purpose of the transaction was negligible in the overall context of the supply, the person could rely on consumer protection rules.\textsuperscript{70} It is only the preamble to the Consumer Rights Directive that indicates that if the trade purpose ‘is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context’, a dual-purpose transaction should count as a consumer contract.\textsuperscript{71} Previously the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)\textsuperscript{72} opted for a wider concept of consumer:\textsuperscript{73}

Accordingly, the DCFR (I.–1:106(1).) includes mixed transaction in the consumer protection rules if it is concluded ‘primarily’ for non-professional purposes. Additionally, if the same contracting party can be treated both as a trader and as a consumer, they may rely on the consumer protection rules \textit{vis-à-vis} the other party who is a trader. However, this approach has not as yet been implemented in any binding EU instrument.

Mixed transactions are relevant for energy consumers, who may adopt various roles at the same time in the energy markets. Accordingly, the energy sector can illustrate the need for a wider notion of the consumer.

3.2.2. \textit{The normative concept of the consumer: the average consumer}

First, it should be mentioned that EU consumer law is, in fact, often narrowly defined and is limited to contract law, which only reflects the nature of the role a consumer may adopt in a specific transaction but may not account for broader regulatory objectives the consumer should contribute to, such as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Tonner, K., Fangerow, K. (2012), Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights: a new approach to European consumer law?, EUVR 02/2012, pp.67 - 81
\item \textsuperscript{68} C-45/96 Bayerische Hypotheken judgment of 17 March 1998
\item \textsuperscript{69} Case C-464/01 Gruber judgment of 20 January 2005
\item \textsuperscript{70} However, it stressed that the predominance of the private element is by itself irrelevant. According to the same ruling, a person cannot claim the status of consumer if they have negligently created the impression that they were acting in the course of a business (e.g. by using a company letterhead or address).
\item \textsuperscript{71} Directive 2011/83/EU (n 66)
\item \textsuperscript{72} In December 2007 the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), which has been prepared by academics, was published. The DCFR in many respects looks like a European Civil Code without family law, succession law and company law. It is clear that the Commission is not only proposing to improve the quality and structure of the present consumer acquis but at the same time it is aiming at the adoption of a ‘single, simple set of rights and obligations Europe-wide’, a horizontal instrument which in fact equals a European Code of consumer or contract law. The DCFR contains principles, definitions and model rules of European private law as distilled from the acquis communautaire of contract law and the private laws of the Member States. It covers both general contract law rules as well as specific ones such as rules of consumer contracts. DCFR is available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-law_en.pdf
\item \textsuperscript{73} ‘Any natural person who is acting primarily for purposes which are not related to his or her trade, business or profession’. Definitions are given in Annex 1, which is referred to in article I.–1:103 (1) of the DCFR (n 71)
\end{itemize}
energy efficiency. Second, while there are broader concepts that emerged in EU law such as the concept of consumer-citizen, which defines the consumer along various categories such as capable, influential, confident and even vulnerable, this paper will focus on the average consumer as a concept of EU law.

The normative concept of the EU consumer developed in the CJEU’s free movement case law. According to this jurisprudence EU law relies on the benchmark of an ‘average consumer’, who is a well-informed, reasonable and circumspect market actor. This concept puts the emphasis on consumers’ ability to process and use information and therefore it has given preference to rules that require information disclosure instead of intervention in the market. The Court’s perception was clearly expressed in a number of cases such as Pall Corp., Clinique, Mars and Procureur de la Republique v. X. In these cases the Court has condemned national rules for alleged consumer protection as being over-regulatory and relied on the ‘reasonably circumspect consumer’ who is able to process information and make informed choices. In these cases the Court defined the limits on the level of European consumer protection under Article 28 EC. In Gut Springheide the Court explained that ‘[…] in order to determine whether a particular description, trade mark, promotional description or statement is misleading, it is necessary to take into account the presumed expectations of an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect.’

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75 Case C-238/89 Pall Corp. v P. J. Dahlhausen & Co. [1990], ECR I-4827
76 In Clinique a German law prohibited the use of the name ‘Clinique’ on the grounds that it can mislead and confuse consumers so as to believe that it is a medical product and not a cosmetic one. The Court again found that the alleged consumer confusion did not justify the effects of the rule, namely the impediment on trade and the restriction of market communication. Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratories SNC, Case C-1315/92 [1994] ECR I-317
78 Case C-373/90 Procureur de la Republique v. X [1992] ECR I-131
79 In GB-INNO the Court was not convinced that a Luxembourg law was protecting consumers against confusion by prohibiting special offers of reduced prices stating the duration of the offer and the specification of the previous price. The repression of consumer information in the interest of consumers was clearly rejected by the Court. In Yves Rocher the Court affirmed the relevance of market or product-related information and condemned a provision of the German law on unfair competition prohibiting individual price comparisons, except where these were eye-catching. The Court stated that ‘…the prohibition in question goes beyond the requirements of the objectives pursued, in that it affects advertising which is not at all misleading and contains prices actually charged, which can be of considerable use in that it enables the consumer to make his choice in full knowledge of the facts.’ Case C C-126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v. Yves Rocher GmbH [1993] ECR I-2361 para 17
80 Weatherill (1996) (n 59)
See also C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG [2010] ECR I para 103
The concept of the average consumer has two functions in EU law: it defines to what extent national consumer protection laws can restrict the EU free movement rules and it draws the borderline between the rights and duties of private parties in B2C transactions.\textsuperscript{82} The average consumer is granted mandatory rights\textsuperscript{83} in order to regulate markets and realise the EU’s market integration goal. The CJEU developed a neo-liberal concept of the consumer by emphasizing consumers’ own responsibility in markets and the beneficial working of market forces such as freedom of contract and competition. This model is based on the idea that consumers should be able to make informed choices rather than government regulation defining that choice.

Moreover, it should be added that this EU concept of the rational, empowered consumer can conflict with the more protective standard of the Member States.\textsuperscript{84} This has been acknowledged first in Buet, which was the first case in 1989 where the Court has considered different categories of consumers and made reference to vulnerable consumers.\textsuperscript{85}

The EU law concept of the average consumer has been challenged from various perspectives in the last decade. The impact of the economic and financial crises in 2008 increased consumers’ exposure to financial risks and deteriorated consumer confidence and purchasing power. Furthermore, economic developments such as the widespread liberalization of certain sectors have significantly increased the amount and complexity of information consumers have to process when entering transactions in the global marketplace. As a reaction to these economic and social changes a new stream of economic theory has developed: behavioral economics, which challenges the concept of the rational consumer.\textsuperscript{86}

While neoclassical economics traditionally maintained the rational choice theory assuming that consumers are rational market players and they know best how to increase their welfare on the market, behavioural economics has challenged this theory. The empirical research from behavioural economics questioned both rational choice theory as a behavioural model and the legal regulatory framework of consumer protection: The behavioural economics insights into the decision making process of individuals prove that the predictions based on traditional rational choice theory often do not hold, as consumer decision making is affected by several biases and heuristics.\textsuperscript{87} Empirical research also shows that


\textsuperscript{83} Micklitz (2002) (n 60)

\textsuperscript{84} Micklitz argues that EU consumer law is market bound, in national law it is social policy bound. See Micklitz (2002) (n 60); Mak (2013) (n 82)

\textsuperscript{85} Case 382/87 Buet [16 May 1989] See para 13 of the judgment

\textsuperscript{86} A European Consumer Agenda - Boosting confidence and growth ... Consumer policy as an essential contribution to Europe 2020 COM(2012) 225 final

\textsuperscript{87} Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1979), Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263-292
consumers either do not use or only limitedly use the information at their disposal. The individual capacity for accepting and processing information can be emotionally controlled and as strongly influenced by environmental stimulants. In view of these arguments, information disclosure, one of the most preferred government interventions in consumer protection policy, needs to be reassessed in the light of behavioural biases.

3.3. Observations

This section has shown that the normative concept of the consumer as formulated by the CJEU in its interpretation of the average consumer, corresponds to the active consumer as described above in section 2. However, it does not encompass the capacity that consumer as prosumers may take and thus falls short of the proactive consumer concept. At the same time, the regulatory tools assisting the average consumer such as mandatory information disclosure in order to create more informed bargaining environment and more transparency, can also be questioned. There is a disconnection between the normative concept of the consumer as adopted in the EU law and the various capacities consumers could take in the energy market as energy prosumers. The following sections will analyze whether a similar disconnection is present in European energy law.

4. THE CONSUMER IN EUROPEAN ENERGY LAW

4.1. Electricity Directives

The First Electricity Directive\(^8\) of 1996 did not provide a definition of the energy consumer but used the term ‘customer’ instead. The latter referred to ‘wholesale or final customers of electricity and distribution companies’,\(^9\) and a final customer was ‘a customer buying electricity for his own use’.\(^1\) Household consumers would therefore fall under the definition of final customers. The concept of the consumer was that of a weak party.\(^2\)

The Second Electricity Directive\(^3\) went further in defining the energy consumers. However, it still used the term ‘customer’ and defined final customers as ‘customers purchasing electricity for their own use’.\(^4\) It also distinguished between household and non-household customers.\(^5\) Moreover, the Second Electricity Directive replaced the concept of the consumer as a weak party by the circumspect consumer concept:\(^6\) It contained an Annex on the measures of consumer protection, which referred primarily to the provision of clear and accessible information- this means that the consumer as market player is adopted as leitmotif in the Second Electricity Directive.

The Third Electricity Directive\(^7\) (which is the latest one and currently in force) echoes the Second Directive in its definition of the individual consumers as household customers. Prosumers were not included in the scope of either the Energy Directives, which could be explained by the fact that

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\(^8\) Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity

\(^9\) Directive 96/92/EC, Art. 2 (n 89), para 7

\(^1\) Directive 96/92/EC, Art. 2 (n 89), para 9

\(^2\) Directive 96/92/EC (n 88), Rec. 13 states that ‘for some Member States the imposition of public service obligations may be necessary to ensure security of supply and consumer and environmental protection, which, in their view, free competition, left to itself, cannot necessarily guarantee’, meaning that the consumer is a weak party needing protection, which would not take place in the absence of state intervention and therefore qualifies as market failure.


\(^4\) Directive 2003/54/EC (n 93), Art. 2, para 9

\(^5\) Household customers are ‘customers purchasing electricity for their own household consumption, excluding commercial or professional activities’, whereas non-household customers include ‘any natural or legal persons purchasing electricity which is not for their own household use and shall include producers and wholesale customers’. Directive 2003/54/EC (n 93), Art. 2, para 10-11

\(^6\) This is illustrated, among others, in Recital 4 of the Directive, which states that ‘the freedoms which the Treaty guarantees European citizens — free movement of goods, freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment — are only possible in a fully open market, which enables all consumers freely to choose their suppliers and all suppliers freely to deliver to their customers’, and Recital 20, which declares that ‘electricity customers should be able to choose their supplier freely’. Directive 2003/54/EC (n 93), Recitals 4 and 20

technologies which allow prosuming consumption were not widely available in the 1990s or later in 2000s.

The Third Electricity Directive includes both provisions for empowering circumspect consumers, and statements indicative of the presence of responsible consumers within the Directive discourse. It contains provisions strengthening the existing rights of the consumers and with regard to consumer empowerment- this indicates a stronger position of consumers as market players.98 Such provisions confirm the central role attributed to the access of energy consumers to information by the Directive. The transition to a different concept of the consumer is, however, less pronounced in this document in comparison to the previous Directive.

The objective of the Third Electricity Directive is the establishment of a competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable market. 99 This confirms the assumption that the European energy policy is broadening its scope as to include other aims besides competition and creation of internal market- for the realization of which responsible consumers are necessary.100 The Directive obliges Member States to set up dispute settlements as well as creating an independent mechanism (energy ombudsman or consumer body) to deal with consumer complaints and out-of-court dispute settlements.101 Annex I includes among others the obligation for electricity providers to set up transparent, simple and inexpensive procedures for dealing with their complaints. In particular, all consumers shall have the right to a good standard of service and complaint handling by their electricity service provider. These provisions contribute to the effectiveness of energy consumers’ interaction with their market counterparts- the energy suppliers, and as such represent a part of the empowerment, applicable to consumers as market parties.

Furthermore, according to Article 3(9), electricity suppliers must specify to final consumers the contribution of each energy source of the overall fuel mix and must give information on the environmental impact. As a result, the consumer is able to take environmental values such as the use of

98 Recital 50 states that ‘consumers should have access to their consumption data and associated prices and services costs so that they can invite competitors to make an offer based on those data’, and that ‘consumers should also have the right to be properly informed about their energy consumption’. Directive 2009/72/EC (n 97), Rec. 50; Moreover, the Directive indicates that ‘clear and comprehensible information should be made available to consumers concerning their rights in relation to the energy sector’. Directive 2009/72/EC (n 97), Rec. 52; Similarly, Article 3 of the document states that the Member States ‘shall ensure high levels of consumer protection, particularly with respect to transparency regarding contractual terms and conditions, general information and dispute settlement mechanisms’.

99 Directive 2009/72/EC (n 97), Rec. 6

100 Recital 1 of the Directive claims, in the same vein, that ‘the internal market in electricity […] aims to deliver real choice for all consumers of the European Union, be they citizens or businesses, new business opportunities and more cross-border trade, so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices, and higher standards of service, and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability’.Directive 2009/72/EC (n 97), Rec. 1

renewable energy into consideration when ‘regulating his own energy consumption’. Thus, the directive is an empowerment instrument in giving energy consumers the tools to take public concerns – environmental protection, climate change – into account when consuming. The consumer becomes responsible and the empowerment of the consumer relies heavily on providing sufficient information, which should enable consumer citizens to act responsibly. Thus, it could be said that the Directive expands the rights and possibilities of the active and the responsible energy consumers.

This analysis of the Electricity Directives leads to the conclusion that the dominant consumer concept has evolved from weak to active and to active/ responsible. At the same time, the concept of the consumer adopted in the Third Electricity Directive cannot be said to be that of the proactive consumer as the consumers are not encouraged to act as prosumers of energy on the market. More specifically, the Third Directive only refers to this possibility in its Annex and not in the legislative body of the Directive. Therefore, it could be concluded that whereas the dominant concept of the consumer has indeed evolved, the most far-reaching interpretation of this concept as incorporated in the Third Electricity Directive is still regarding the energy consumers as consuming rather than prosuming actors, as well as actors who are at the receiving end of market signals, as opposed to the sending end.

4.2. Energy Efficiency Directive

The Energy Efficiency Directive of 2012 has a more ‘progressive’ view on the energy consumers than the above discussed Directives. The Energy Efficiency Directive recognizes potentially active role of consumers in providing demand response as an important instrument for improving energy efficiency. Demand response significantly increases the opportunities for consumers to take action on consumption and billing information and thus provides a mechanism to reduce or shift consumption, resulting in energy savings in both final consumption and, through the more optimal use of networks and generation assets, in energy generation, transmission and distribution.

The Directive recognizes that ‘demand response can be based on final customers’ responses to price signals or on building automation’, and stipulates that ‘network tariffs and regulations [should] incentivise improvements in energy efficiency and support dynamic pricing for demand response

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102 Annex on the measures of consumer protection, by stating that ‘Member States shall ensure the implementation of intelligent metering systems that shall assist the active participation of consumers in the electricity supply market’. Directive 2009/72/EC (n 97), Annex

103 Moreover, in the same Annex the Directive stipulates that ‘at least 80 % of consumers shall be equipped with intelligent metering systems by 2020’. Directive 2009/72/EC (n 97), Annex


105 Directive 2012/27/EU (n 104), Rec. 4; Moreover, the Directive states that besides providing flexibility, energy consumers could play a role in the balancing: ‘subject to technical constraints inherent in managing networks, Member States shall promote access to and participation of demand response in balancing, reserve and other system services markets’. Directive 2012/27/EU (n 104), Art. 15, para 8
measures by final customers’. The range of instruments and policies to promote behavioral change may include fiscal incentives for consumers, access to finance, grants or subsidies, information provision, exemplary projects, and workplace activities.

The above provisions illustrate that the concept of the consumer embraced by the Energy Efficiency Directive is that of the proactive consumer who actively engages in the provision of flexibility to the market. However, the Directive does not explicitly refer to prosumers, who actively produce flexibility and balancing services and trade them on the market, as opposed to responsible consumers who simply respond to the market signals such as variable prices. Therefore, the Energy Efficiency Directive is much more forward-looking compared to the Third Electricity Directive, but it does not fully provide for the prosuming consumption pattern.

4.3. **Soft Law**

There have been a number of relevant soft law documents in the last year that incorporated relevant sections on the presuming pattern. One of these documents was ACER’s Conclusion Paper ‘Energy Regulation: A Bridge to 2025’, which published in September 2014 after a public consultation. This paper took a further step towards active and responsible market participation of the energy consumers, and, crucially, recognizes the potential of prosuming consumption. In addition the ACER Consultation paper forecasted that ‘consumers are likely, in many markets, to be charged on the basis of dynamic pricing for their consumption which will enable them to manage that consumption in ways which reduce their overall bill so that consumers can continue to receive reliable and affordable energy supplies when they require them’. The document also contained a number of suggestions regarding the empowerment of consumers, which is a good indicator that the dominant concept of the consumer is that of the prosumer, as it refers to empowerment of not only consumers as market parties, but also as citizens who have a say in shaping the energy market.

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106 Directive 2012/27/EU (n 104), Rec. 45
107 Directive 2012/27/EU (n 104), Art. 12, para 2a
108 Energy Regulation: A Bridge to 2025 (n 4)
109 Indeed, the paper accedes that ‘consumers may own and operate generation capacity connected to their commercial or domestic premises’, as well as that ‘consumers will increasingly also be electricity producers’. Moreover, the paper presents the view that energy consumers are taking an increasingly important role on the market for energy services: ‘smart technologies and new services will be available to manage the consumption of smaller customers (including domestic customers) in ways which may assist in, and reduce the cost of, network operation whilst also helping to reduce their own electricity bills’. Energy Regulation: A Bridge to 2025 (n 4)
110 Energy Regulation: A Bridge to 2025 (n 4)
111 Energy Regulation: A Bridge to 2025 (n 4)
Another document in 2014 was the Communication from the Commission on the Progress towards completing the Internal Energy Market,\(^{112}\) published in October 2014, largely echoed the above-discussed ACER’s Conclusion Paper. The Communication adopted the concept of the responsible consumer as dominant, and accepts that responsible consumers can also act as prosumers. Furthermore, the Communication recognized that the energy consumers could play a role in the market services, besides producing the commodity, as ‘well-functioning markets can [...] promote and reward flexibility and energy efficiency’\(^{113}\). It also stipulated the importance of the variable market-based prices: ‘if prices reflect the balance between supply and demand, and consumers benefit from the possibility to adjust their consumption patterns to price signals (demand response) the total cost of securing energy supplies can be lowered as the need for expensive peak generation and network capacity is reduced’\(^{114}\). This Communication provided a very progressive interpretation of the concept of the consumer.

In 2015 the Energy Union Package Communication from the Commission\(^{115}\) was released, which states that the proposed vision of the Energy Union is one ‘with citizens at its core, where citizens take ownership of the energy transition, benefit from new technologies to reduce their bills, participate actively in the market, and where vulnerable consumers are protected’\(^{116}\). This Communication acknowledges the role of the consumers in providing market services: for example, it states that it is essential to ‘enable full participation of consumers in the market notably through demand response’\(^{117}\). Moreover, the document recognizes the possibility of consumers acting as producers of energy by saying that ‘smart technologies will help consumers and energy service companies working for them to reap the opportunities available on the energy market by taking control of their energy consumption (and possible self-production), [which] will deliver more flexibility in the market and potentially reduce consumer bills’\(^{118}\). Thus, it is clear that the dominant concept of the consumer adopted in this Communication is that of the prosumers actively participating in both energy production and consumption, and the provision of market services, such as flexibility.

However, simultaneously to the above statements contained in the Communication on the Energy Union Package, the document acknowledges that information provision is still the preferred empowerment instrument\(^{119}\). This questions whether the concept of prosumer evident in this document is matched by

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\(^{112}\) Progress towards completing the Internal Energy Market (n 4)

\(^{113}\) Progress towards completing the Internal Energy Market (n 4)

\(^{114}\) Progress towards completing the Internal Energy Market (n 4)

\(^{115}\) Energy Union Package (n 4)

\(^{116}\) Energy Union Package (n 4)

\(^{117}\) Energy Union Package (n 4)

\(^{118}\) Energy Union Package (n 4)

\(^{119}\) For example, it says that ‘we have to empower consumers through providing them with information, choice and through creating flexibility to manage demand as well as supply’, as well as that consumers need to have
the appropriate support measures, because despite the statements contained in the Communication, concrete steps and proposals regarding prosumers are not found in the document.

The latest addition to the European energy policy is the so-called EU Summer Package, which focuses more explicitly on energy consumers and their role in the energy market compared to earlier documents. The Communication clearly states that energy consumers could not only produce energy, but also engage in flexibility provision to the market. Moreover, it emphasizes that the energy consumers should be given the option of accessing the market either directly or via an intermediary: ‘consumers across the Union should be free to choose their preferred form of active participation in energy markets, either directly or by delegating their energy decisions to reliable intermediaries and energy service companies, such as aggregators who will act on the consumer’s behalf’.

The accompanying Commission Staff Working document is also noteworthy, as it is, in fact, the first instance of European energy policy document where the term ‘prosumer’ is used and its definition (‘producers and consumers of renewable energy’) is presented. This document is also very clear regarding the importance of ensuring market access for prosumers.

‘understandable, readily-accessible information, user-friendly tools, and financial incentives for saving energy’. Energy Union Package (n 4)


121 For example, this package contains a Commission Communication ‘Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers’, and an accompanying document ‘Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption’, both of which address the changes in the consumer’s roles.

Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers (n 4); Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption (n 4)

122 The Communication indicates that ‘preventing consumers from self-generation and self-consumption reduces potential gains to them’ and represents an obstacle to energy consumers to fully benefit ‘from the ongoing energy transition’. Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers, p. 2 (n 4)

123 The document states that ‘the combination of decentralised generation and storage options with demand side flexibility can further enable consumers to become their own suppliers and managers for (a part of) their energy needs, becoming producers and consumers and reduce their energy bills’. Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers, p. 6 (n 4)

124 Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers, p. 4. (n 4) The document also states the steps to achieve a ‘thriving and functioning energy system’ include ‘providing consumers with possibilities to become active energy players and gain from action, for example adjusting and reducing their consumption as prices evolve, helping balance out renewable energy variability by embracing demand response or producing or storing energy’, as well as ‘providing consumers the option of participating in the market through reliable intermediaries, collective or community schemes’. Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers, p. 9-10 (n 4)

125 Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption, p. 2 (n 4)

126 It says, for example, that ‘consumers self-generating renewable energy should [...] not only be enabled and encouraged to adapt their consumption to the availability of their electricity production but also to offer flexibility to the wider energy system, including through aggregators’ Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption, p. 5 (n 4)
4.4. **Observations**

The above analysis shows that there is significant discrepancy between the dominant concept of the consumer as adopted in the hard and in the soft EU energy law. The Electricity Directives illustrate an obvious evolution of the consumer concept from a weak party to active and responsible consumer. However the Third Directive remains rather ‘conservative’ and does not address the prosuming role. The Energy Efficiency Directive adopts a more progressive view on the possible role of the consumers, allowing the possibility that the consumers would also provide energy market services. However, this Directive also does not provide for the prosuming role of the consumers.

In contrast, recent soft law documents present a rather far reaching concept of consumer: that of the prosumer and provider of market flexibility and demand response. However, all these documents are merely policy documents. Accordingly, it could be stated that there is a far better connection between soft energy law and the possible market roles of the consumers compared to the connection between such roles and the hard EU energy law. This significant discrepancy between the progressive policy provisions on the one hand and the conservative law on the other hand points to regulatory disconnection. This regulatory disconnection is problematic, because it could prevent prosumers from participating in the market on par with other market players (e.g. traditional energy producers) and thus fully realizing their innovative potential. In EU energy law prosumers still fall under the definition of consumers. This definition is, however, inadequate when applied to prosumers, as it only covers a part of their actual role. Thus, the prosumers are over-included in the definition of consumers (as this definition is too narrow for their new, broader role) and under-included in the definitions of producers and suppliers, as these definitions do not allow for the idea that a consumer could also produce/supply. In other words, there is an evident and problematic disconnection between the reality (broadened role of prosumers) and the law. Moreover, whereas the policy documents indicate progress towards better regulatory connection, they all mention information provision to the consumers as the main empowerment instrument, however, such approach is challenged by the behavioral economics, and might not be optimal to reach the empowerment goals.
5. CONCLUSIONS

In the evolving policy frameworks of market regulation consumers are to play an increasingly influential role. For the adequate functioning of markets a match is required between the normative concept of the consumer as adopted in the legal provisions, the underlying policy as well as the economic and technological roles for the consumers. However, they do not always have the corresponding legal rules which enable them to fully exercise their existing rights or even shape new ones. A well-functioning and technologically innovative market needs active responsible consumers who can exercise their purchasing power.

The problem this paper discussed was the possible gap between the legal framework and consumers’ active role in the current regulatory architectures. If there is a misbalance between the possible roles consumers could fulfill in markets and the normative concept reflected in the relevant legal framework, this could potentially lead to the so-called ‘challenge of regulatory connection’.

The goal of this paper was to critically analyze the concept of the regulatory consumer in EU law and policy. The regulatory consumer is the concept this paper used to describe consumers’ new role in market regulation. The essence of this role is the active position consumers take in markets when they search for information, enter transactions and find remedies. The paper examined various degrees of such activism through the example of the energy consumer. An active consumer may be reactive but s/he can also act proactively. A specific category of energy consumers are prosumers. Prosumers also produce goods and services in markets, moreover, when doing so they may even further innovation—this is user-centered innovation.

The paper analyzed how the regulatory consumer is perceived in EU law and policy and more specifically, how the normative concept of the consumer in EU law relates to the possible roles of the energy consumers on the energy market and to which extent is it possible for the energy consumers to act as prosumers under the European respective framework.

The paper proposed the following central hypothesis: whereas the European energy policy evolved similarly to the European consumer policy from the concept of consumer as a weak party to that as an active party, and then as a responsible party, it did not (yet) evolve as far as to encompass prosumers, as the far-reaching format of responsible energy consumption.

The paper examined the existing typology of the consumers in EU law, which has mainly developed in cases on free movement rules. This dominant concept of the circumspect, responsible consumer is, in fact, in line with active role envisaged for consumers in the new regulatory architecture. Even though the EU has expressed in its various policy documents a further move towards the empowered consumer, this concept does not encompass the proactive role of prosumers. The various Electricity Directives...
that shaped EU energy law in the last two decades show an evolution of the concept of the consumer, from a weak party to an active market party with elements of consumer-citizenship. Still, the concept of the prosumers is not present in any of the Directives. A shift to a more proactive role of the consumer is present the Energy Efficiency Directive. The Energy Efficiency Directive recognizes the role of the consumer regarding the provision of flexibility to the market in response to market demand and proper incentives, but does not fully encompass prosuming consumption, as it does not explicitly refer to prosumers, who actively produce flexibility and balancing services and trade them on the market, as opposed to responsible consumers who simply respond to the market signals such as variable prices. The analyzed EU energy policy documents are all non-binding soft law instruments, but they represent a progressive interpretation of the concept of the consumer: the prosumer who engages in energy market by prosuming both electricity and flexibility, and actively trading them on the market. This, however, leaves a significant discrepancy between the energy policy and the legal provisions of EU law. This is, in fact, a problematic regulatory disconnection for the following reason as EU law and specifically EU energy law has not yet adopted an appropriate and sufficiently encompassing concept of the (pro)active consumer. This role is, however, technically and economically already available to consumers in the energy market. This gap between the existing law and the policy actually points to a more important problem and that is the economic and technological reality, which remains ineffective for consumers due to the absence of the corresponding legal provisions. In EU energy law prosumers still fall under the definition of consumers. This definition is, however, inadequate when applied to prosumers, as it only covers a part of their actual role. Moreover, as consumer may not be able to proactively act in energy markets user-centered innovation may not be realized and thus technological innovation lags behind. A possible way of addressing the identified regulatory disconnection is broadening the definition consumers as to allow for the idea of prosumerism, as well as broadening the definitions of producers and suppliers in order to extend it to prosumers. Such solution would automatically extend the right to unrestricted and non-discriminatory market access available to all market actors also to prosumers and allow them realize the full effects of prosuming innovation.