Networks of Heterogeneous Expectations in an Asset Pricing Market
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The paper studies the effect of information networks on learning to forecast in an asset pricing market. Financial traders have heterogeneous price expectations, are influenced by friends and seem to be prone to herding. However, in laboratory experiments subjects use contrarian strategies. Theoretical literature on learning in networks is scarce and cannot explain this conundrum (Panchenko et al., 2013).

The paper follows Anufriev et al. (2014) and investigates an agent-based model, in which agents forecast price with a simple general heuristic: adaptive and trend extrapolation expectations, with an additional term of (dis-)trust towards their friends’ mood. Agents independently use Genetic Algorithms to optimize the parameters of the heuristic. The paper considers friendship networks of symmetric (regular lattice, fully connected) and asymmetric architecture (random, rewired, star).

The main finding is that the agents learn contrarian strategies, which amplifies market turn-overs and hence price oscillations. Nevertheless, agents learn similar behavior and their forecasts remain well coordinated. The model therefore offers a natural interpretation for the difference between the experimental stylized facts and market surveys.

**JEL Classification:** C63, D53, D83, D84, D85

**Keywords:** Financial Bubbles, Learning in Networks, Learning to Forecast, Herding Behavior
1 Introduction

In this paper, I study the effect of networks on learning in the context of a non-linear asset pricing market. I consider a model, in which the agents apply Genetic Algorithm (GA) to optimize a simple price forecasting rule. The agents learn whether to trust the observed price trend and the former trading decisions of their friends. The main questions of the paper are: how do networks affect individual behavior of the agents and the emerging aggregate market dynamics? Does the network facilitate convergence to the fundamental equilibrium? To what extent will the network promote coordination or herding?

One of the fundamental debates of contemporary economics is whether economic agents can learn rational expectations (RE), that is model-consistent predictions of future market prices. Among other evidence, experiments suggest that people use simple forecasting heuristics (Heemeijer et al., 2009; Hommes, 2011; Hommes et al., 2005). In the case of asset pricing economies, this leads to price oscillations that repeatedly over- and undershoot the fundamental (RE) equilibrium. Nevertheless, many economists question the empirical validity of such experiments, as these are based on economies with no or limited information flows between the agents. An informal (yet popular) belief is that in real financial markets the agents can share knowledge about efficient and inefficient trading strategies, and so an information network facilitates convergence towards RE.

Informal information sharing is indeed an important market phenomenon (Bollen et al., 2011; Nofsinger, 2005). Being closer to the core of an information network leads to higher profits (Cohen et al., 2008), but some researches have also argued that networks are a cause of herding (Shiller and Pound, 1989). The latter argument became popular after the 2007 crisis in the non-academic discussion1 and in behavioral economics (for example Akerlof and Shiller, 2010, refer to animal spirits as the driving force of financial bubbles).

Herding is understood as behavior such that individuals, facing strategic uncertainty, prefer to follow the ‘view of the others’ (the mood of their friends or general market opinion) rather than basing their decision only on individual data. In the context of financial trading, this can be a rational strategy for agents who are endowed with noisy information about the asset, which ‘averages out’ for the whole public (Park and Sabourian, 2011). An information network can further facilitate such herding (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011). However, herding can also lead to coordination on bubble paths if the individual information is correlated (Panchenko et al., 2013). This leads back to the two conflicting views on the rationality of financial agents, which can be associated with Keynes (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010) and Muth (Muth, 1961). How important is therefore herding for market stability, and is herding propagated by information networks? There is no clear answer neither from theoretical nor from empirical work.

From the RE perspective, market price should contain all necessary information about the stocks, hence perfect rationality rarely leaves room for herding or networking. The exception

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1Among other examples, Robert R. Johnson wrote in Financial Times (20/09/2009) that ‘managers might augment their existing strategies to avoid herding, over-reaction, regret aversion, and other behavioural biases that interfere with (...) effective implementation [of finance investment strategies].’
would be the case of significant private information (Park and Sabourian, 2011) or sequential trading (with the famous example of information cascades, see Anderson and Holt, 1997, for a discussion), but neither approach has a clear empirical motivation.

Alternatively, models that depart from rational expectations often investigate some form of social learning. The seminal paper by Kirman (1993) stands as the benchmark for the studies of economic herding (see Alfarano et al., 2005, for a more recent example and a literature review). In this ‘ant-model’, agents are paired at random and imitate each others choices with some exogenous probability, which leads to interesting herding dynamics. The problem with this approach, however, is that individual imitation is assumed as given, instead of being learned by the agents.

Another approach comes with the classical Brock-Hommes Heuristic Switching Model (HSM; Brock and Hommes, 1997), in which agents coordinate on price prediction heuristics that have a better past forecasting performance. A more general, agent-based counterpart of HSM comes with Genetic Algorithm based models of social learning (see Arifovic et al., 2013, for example and a good literature overview). This approach can explicitly account for learning (agents switch to better strategies), but does not fit our intuition of herding, which is understood as following others, instead of using similar trading or forecasting strategies (see Panchenko et al., 2013, for interesting discussion; see also Section 2.6).

Empirical studies give ambiguous results on the existence or importance of herding, with the main issue being that such behavior cannot be directly observed in market data. Chiang and Zheng (2010) show that the stock indices between industries are sometimes more correlated than the fundamentals would imply, which can be understood as a sign of herding. However, this effect is absent in Latin America and US data, and its interpretation is subject to debate. An alternative approach is to use experiments, where the information structure is controlled by the researcher, who can thus directly observe herding. This leads to a surprising result, however: experiments suggest that contrarian (understood as anti-herding) behavior is more popular than herding. Two such studies were reported by Drehmann et al. (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2009). This is important evidence, since both authors include professional traders in their experiments.

As a result, existence of herding (or contrarian) behavior in financial markets is not a clear-cut fact. Furthermore, it is not clear whether herding would bring economic agents closer to the rational outcome, or rather to volatile price dynamics (Shiller and Pound, 1989). In order to understand the empirical evidence, we require a theoretical inquiry into how herding or contrarian behavior may be learned. Furthermore, such a learning may depend on the structure of ‘information flows’, and thus we need to study it in a context of different information networks.

Recent years have seen a rising popularity of studies devoted to the agent interaction within networks. Probably the most famous example comes with the Siena model (Snijders et al., 2010), which offers a valuable insight into peer effects on the individual decision making. In the financial literature, researchers became interested in the balance sheet interconnections
of financial agents such as banks (Fricke and Lux, 2014; in’t Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014). Nevertheless, theoretical studies of networks in the economic literature typically focus on static environments (such as the mentioned balance sheet connections). Models with explicit learning and expectations formation are scarce, and tend to rely on simple behavioral rules of imitation, since adding realistic learning features into such models easily makes them analytically intractable (see Jadbabaie et al., 2012, for a discussion). An additional conceptual problem is that the RE models focus on an alleged fixed point of the postulated underlying learning process, while being agnostic about its dynamics. Therefore, if taken seriously in the context of networking in asset pricing markets, these models predict that networks, as was the case of herding, are relevant only in the presence of important individual information, like private signals about the fundamental price. This is difficult to defend without implicit assumptions on (bounds of) individual rationality.

To my best knowledge, Panchenko et al. (2013) (henceforth PGP13) are the only authors who conduct a full-fledged theoretical study of the effect of the information network on expectations formation learning in an asset pricing market. The authors use a HSM model to show that prices are not tamed by the presence of the network. Their interesting paper is however subject to some limitations. For example, the agents can choose between two forecasting heuristics, and are placed on a random network. As a result, it may be difficult to directly use their results for specific markets or experimental studies.

The goal of my paper is to investigate a much more involved learning structure. I will use the GA model proposed by Anufriev et al. (2014) (henceforth AHM14), which explains well the individual forecasting heterogeneity of Learning to Forecast experiments. This approach has two advantages: (1) I will work with a realistic, experimentally tested model that explains well financial bubbles and (2) I will obtain further insight into the original experiments: to what extent their results (such as the price bubbles) depend on the lack of networking. This model will also serve as an ideal benchmark for further asset pricing experiments with more involved information networks.

The GA model by Anufriev et al. (2014) is an agent-based model (ABM) based on the work of Hommes and Lux (2011). Its idea is that agents, who are asked to predict a price, follow a simple linear forecasting rule, which is a mixture of adaptive and trend extrapolation expectations. This rule requires specific parametrization, and each agent is endowed with a list of possible specifications of the general heuristic. The agents then observe the market prices and update the list of rules with the use of the GA stochastic evolutionary operators. For instance, if the market generates persistent price oscillations, the agents will experiment with higher trend extrapolation coefficients. Since the agents use the GA procedure independently, the model allows for explicit individual learning. Anufriev et al. (2014) show that the model replicates well the experimental degree of individual heterogeneity, as well as aggregate price dynamics.

In this paper I extend the GA model of Anufriev et al. (2014), to include an information network. Agents observe the past trading behavior of their friends and can learn whether to
trust it, just as they learn whether to extrapolate the price trend. The model by its ABM structure can evaluate the effects of different, also asymmetric, networks on price dynamics. Furthermore, the model explicitly accounts for individual learning, and so I can also study the formation of herding/contrarian behavior at the individual level.

The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 will introduce the theoretical agent-based model, describing a two-period ahead non-linear asset pricing market with GA agents and robotic trader, with GA agents forecasting prices conditional on past realized prices and trades of their friends. The third section will present the parametrization of the model, including the investigated network structures, and the setup of the Monte Carlo numerical study of the model. Section 4 will be devoted to small networks of six agents, with which I will highlight the emerging properties of individual learning and resulting price dynamics. The fifth section will move to large networks of up to 1’000 agents. Finally, the last section will sum up my results and indicate potential extensions.

2 Theoretical model

In this section I present the building blocks of the model: an asset pricing market with heterogeneous expectations and an information network. The model is based on the standard two-period ahead asset pricing market, used for example by Hommes et al. (2005). For the sake of presentation, most of the analytical results concerning the rational solution of the model are given in Appendix A.

2.1 Market

Consider $I$ myopic mean-variance agents who invest on a period to period basis. They can choose between a safe bond with a gross return $R = 1 + r$ (with $r > 0$), or a risky asset that in period $t$ can be bought at price $p_t$ and gives a stochastic dividend $y_t$. It is commonly known that $y_t \sim NID(y, \sigma_y^2)$. Then the expected return on a unit of the asset bought at $p_t$ is

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,t} \{\rho_{t+1}\} \equiv \rho_{i,t+1} = \mathbb{E}_{i,t} \{p_{t+1}\} + y - Rp_t,$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}\{\cdot\}$ stands for the individual expectation, which do not have to coincide with the (true) conditional expected value operator $\mathbb{E}\{\cdot\}$.

Denote the agent $i$’s expectation of the price in the next period $t+1$ as $\mathbb{E}_{i,t} (p_{t+1}) = p_{i,t+1}^e$. We assume that the agent perceives the variance of one unit of the asset return as a constant, $\text{Var}_t(\rho_{t+1}) = \sigma_a^2$. Conditional on the realized price in the current period $t$, the agent’s $i$ risk

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\footnote{One easily find $\sigma_a^2$ such that in the RE solution, the perceived and realized variances of the asset return coincide. Namely, $\sigma_a^2 = (1 + R)^2 \sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_y^2$.}
adjusted utility at period $t$ is given by

$$U_{i,t+1} = U_{i,t} + z_{i,t} \mathbb{E}_{i,t} \left( \rho_{t+1} \right) - \frac{a}{2} \text{Var}_t(z_{i,t} \rho_{t+1})$$

$$= U_{i,t} + z_{i,t} \left( p^f_{i,t+1} + y - R p_t \right) - \frac{a}{2} \sigma_a^2 z_{i,t}^2,$$

where $a$ is the risk-aversion factor. Hence, define agents’ $i$ optimal demand at period $t$ as $z_{i,t}$, which becomes a linear demand schedule of the form

$$z_{i,t}(p_t) \equiv \frac{p^f_{i,t+1} + y - R p_t}{a \sigma_a^2} = \frac{p^f_{i,t+1} + y}{a \sigma_a^2} - \frac{R}{a \sigma_a^2} p_t.$$

For simplicity I assume that the agents face no further liquidity constraints. Agents can take short positions, so $z_{i,t} < 0$ is viable.

The market operates in the following fashion. At the beginning of every period $t$, each agent $i$ has to provide her demand schedule $z_{i,t}$ (3). Notice that because the agents are asked for a demand schedule, they do not have to forecast the contemporaneous price $p_t$. Next to the agents’ demands, there is no additional exogenous supply/demand of the asset. The market clears if the following equilibrium condition is fulfilled:

$$\text{Demand}_t = \sum_{i=1}^{I} z_{i,t} = 0 = \text{Supply}_t.$$

Denote the average prediction of the agents of the price at $t+1$ as $\bar{p}^f_{i+1} = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} p^f_{i,t+1}$. Substituting the demand schedules (3) into the market equilibrium condition (4), we have that the realized market clearing price is given by

$$p_t = \frac{\bar{p}^f_{i+1} + y}{R} + \eta_t \geq 0,$$

where $\eta_t \sim NID(0, \sigma_\eta^2)$ is a small idiosyncratic price shock. The price cannot be negative, so it is capped at zero.

This market has a straightforward RE stationary solution such that $p^f_{i,t+1} = \mathbb{E}\{p_{t+1}\} = p^f$ with

$$p^f = \frac{y}{r}.$$

Without any additional assumptions, the model could explode even under Rational Expectations (RE). Following the experimental design of Hommes et al. (2005), I introduce a robotic trader to act as a stabilizing force on the market.

Robotic trader at period $t$ trades as if the next price would be at the fundamental, i.e. his price forecast is $p^f_{ROBO,t+1} = p^f$. He becomes the more active the farther the market is from $\bar{p}^f_{i+1}$.

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\[^3\] One can provide microfoundations for $\eta_t$ with additional supply shocks or demand of noise traders.
the fundamental solution. Define

\begin{equation}
    n_t = 1 - \exp\left(-\phi |p_{t-1} - p'|\right)
\end{equation}

as the relative trading share of the robotic trader, which depends on his sensitivity \(\phi\). Denote

\begin{equation}
    \hat{p}_{t+1} \equiv nt p^f + (1 - nt) \bar{p}_{t+1} = p^f n_t + \frac{1 - nt}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} p_{i, t+1}^e,
\end{equation}

that is \(\hat{p}_{t+1}\) denotes the ‘total’ market price expectations, averaged over the robotic trader and the GA agents. Then the actual realized price including the robotic trader becomes

\begin{equation}
    p_t = \frac{(1 - nt) \hat{p}_{t+1} + nt p^f + y}{R} + \eta_t
\end{equation}

which is a two-period ahead nonlinear price-expectations feedback system. Notice that the introduction of the robotic trader does not change the steady state RE solution, nor does it exclude a possibility of an explosive rational solution (see Appendix A for a discussion). Nevertheless, the stabilizing effect of the robotic trader will appear strong enough to prevent the model simulations from diverging.

2.2 Network

The agents are not fully isolated. Instead, they are positioned on an unweighted \textit{symmetric, irreflexive and a-transitive} information network \(I\). Let \(I_i\) denote the set of friends of agent \(i\) and \(\hat{I}_i \equiv |I_i|\) denote the number of her friends (or the size of her friend set \(I_i\)). Throughout the paper, I assume that for a particular market this information network is fixed and exogenous. A natural extension is to have the agents learn how to link with other agents. See Albert and Barabási (2002); Goyal (2002); Newman (2003) for a general introduction into networks and Bala and Goyal (2000) for endogenous network formation. In the next section I will discuss the specific networks used in the numerical simulations of the model.

Within the network, an agent cannot directly observe the price expectations of her friends, but she knows whether in the recent past they were buying or selling the asset. This resembles reality, where the market participants are likely to share only qualitative information (‘this stock is profitable, I just bought it!’). I emphasize that an agent \textit{cannot} see the contemporary trade decisions of her friends, and moreover \textit{agents have no private information} about the future price shocks \(\eta_t, \eta_{t+1}, \eta_{t+2}, \ldots\). Consider agent \(j\) and define

\begin{equation}
    m_{j,s} = \begin{cases} 
        +1 & \text{if } z_{j,s} > 0, \\
        0 & \text{if } z_{j,s} = 0, \\
        -1 & \text{if } z_{j,s} < 0 
    \end{cases}
\end{equation}

\[7\]
a simple sign function of her realized demand in period \( s \).

The agents have memory length \( \tau \) and consider the simplest possible index \( \text{Mood}_{j,t-1} \), defined as the average mood of agent \( j \) in periods \([t-\tau, t-1]\)

\[
\text{Mood}_{j,t-1} = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{s=t-\tau}^{t-1} m_{j,s}.
\]

For instance, if during the last \( \tau \) periods the agent \( j \) was always buying (selling) the asset, her index is +1 (−1). If she was more likely to buy (sell) the asset, her mood index is positive (negative) and so a positive (negative) index means that the agent \( j \) remained optimistic (pessimistic) about the asset profitability. A special case of short memory is \( \tau = 1 \) when the mood index becomes the sign of the agent’s \( j \) very last transaction at period \( t-1 \).

By assumption, the mood of agent \( j \) \( \text{Mood}_{j,t-1} \) is visible to all of her friends, that is agent \( i \) can access all \( \text{Mood}_{j,t-1} \) for which \( j \in I_i \). However, in order to study the effect of herding, I assume that the agents do not distinguish between their friends and instead rely on the mood of their peers, that is the mood index (11) averaged among all \( \hat{I}_i \) of their friends:

\[
\text{Peer}_{i,t-1} \equiv \frac{1}{\hat{I}_i} \sum_{j \in \hat{I}_i} \text{Mood}_{j,t-1} = \frac{1}{\tau \hat{I}_i} \sum_{j \in \hat{I}_i} \sum_{s=t-\tau}^{t-1} m_{j,s}.
\]

I will refer to (12) as the measure of agent \( i \)’s friends’ mood. It has a straightforward interpretation as the average mood of \( i \)’s friends. Hence if the agents learn to herd, their price expectations should depend positively on the peer mood.

### 2.3 Fundamental solution benchmark

We define the fundamental solution to our model as a rational expectations (RE) equilibrium, that is as a set of model-consistent demand schedules such that for every agent \( i \) at every period \( t \) it holds that \( p_{i,t+1} = \mathbb{E}_t \{ p_{t+1} \} \) (where \( \mathbb{E}_t \) denotes the (mathematical) conditional expected value). This is equivalent to \( \mathbb{E}_{i,t} \{ \rho_{t+1} \} = \mathbb{E}_t \{ \rho_{i,t+1} \} \), that is the expected returns on the asset are model consistent.

As already mentioned, the RE steady state solution is unique. Notice that the network has no effect on the RE solution. In fact, its presence or particular structure makes no difference on the behavior of the agents in equilibrium. Therefore, the RE framework gives a strong prediction that adding a network into a model will result in the same (long-run) dynamics. See Appendix A for a discussion.
2.4 Experimental and Genetic Algorithms benchmark

Our model is based on the experimental market investigated by Hommes et al. (2005), with almost the same parametrization (see later discussion). The authors report that the subjects follow price trend extrapolation rules and that the prices were unlikely to settle on the fundamental value, and often oscillated instead around the fundamental in an irregular fashion. Robotic agent prevented large bubbles, however. Hommes et al. (2008), who studied an experimental two-period ahead asset pricing market without the robotic trader, found their prices to explode instead of oscillating.

As discussed, AHM14 already investigate the model without the networks. They report that the GA agents learn to use trend following heuristics in a similar fashion to the experimental subjects. Furthermore, long-run simulations of the model revealed that it contains two attractors. The market could switch between settling on the fundamental steady state and oscillations of varying amplitude. A basic question is whether the introduction of a network will change this outcome, and in particular whether both attractors are robust against networks.

2.5 Price expectations and learning

Agents consider themselves as price-takers and so their task is simply to try to predict the next price \( p_t \) as accurately as possible, conditional on the market events and friends’ behavior until and including period \( t-1 \). The GA agents are not perfectly rational and instead rely on a simple rule of thumb, a linear heuristic of the form

\[
p_{i,t+1}^e = \alpha_{i,t} p_{t-1} + (1 - \alpha_{i,t}) p_{i,t} + \beta_{i,t} (p_{t-1} - p_{t-2}) + \gamma_{i,t} \Gamma_{\text{Peer},i,t-1}.
\]

The first two elements of the rule, adaptive and trend extrapolation expectations, come directly from the baseline GA model by AHM14. The new part of the above rule is the last term, the peer effect, which is a weighted sum of the moods of all friends of agent \( i \).

The linear heuristic (13) of agent \( i \) depends on the specific parameters chosen at period \( t \): the price weight \( \alpha_{i,t} \in [0,1] \), the trend coefficient \( \beta_{i,t} \in [-1.3,1.3] \) and finally the trust index \( \gamma_{i,t} \). The trust index \( \gamma_{i,t} \in [-1,1] \) can be interpreted as the importance agent \( i \) attaches towards her friends decisions. If \( \gamma_{i} > 0 \), agent \( i \) believes it is worth to follow her friends’ past trades, and that the past optimism of her friends signals the price \( p_t \) to increase even more than just due to current trend. Conversely, \( \gamma_{i} < 0 \) implies that the agent \( i \) behaves in contrast to her friends. In other words, \( \gamma_{i,t} > 0 \) means herding behavior, while \( \gamma_{i,t} < 0 \) implies contrarian behavior.\(^4\)

\(^4\)RE are a special case of (13). To be specific, with \( \alpha_{i,t} = \beta_{i,t} = \gamma_{i,t} = 0 \) and \( p_{i,t}^e = p^f_t \), every next forecast of \( p_{t+1} \) will also be equal to \( p_{i,t+1}^f = p^f_t \).

\(^5\)In the literature on heterogeneous price expectations, one can often find the label ‘contrarian’ in an alternative use, namely as a heuristic according to which a positive (negative) price trend means expected price decrease (increase). For (13), this means \( \beta_{i,t} < 0 \). In line with Anufriev et al. (2014), the agents in my
The specific value of the trust index $\gamma_{i,t}$ is multiplied by a sensitivity parameter $\Gamma$, which remains constant and homogeneous across agents. I use the multiplicative form of the herding/contrarian term, with these two factors separated, for the sake of an easier display and interpretation of the results.

The agents do not use the same heuristic over time. Depending on the market conditions, the heuristic (13) should be based on different parameters. For instance, in the periods of strong price oscillations, agents should switch from low or negative trend extrapolation to strong trend extrapolation. Furthermore, the goal of the paper is to identify circumstances in which the agents learn herding or contrarian strategies.

We follow AHM14 and model the time evolution of the heuristic (13) by Genetic Algorithms. This results in individual learning and heterogeneity of forecasting behavior, similar to the experimental findings. See AHM14 for a technical discussion and parametrization. The intuition of the model is the following.

The agents are endowed with a small set of different parameter triplets $(\alpha_{i,t}, \beta_{i,t}, \gamma_{i,t})$, which correspond to a small list of specific forecasting heuristics (13). At every period $t$, every agent chooses one particular heuristic $p_{i,t+1}$ to predict the next price $p_{t+1}$, according to their relative forecasting performance in the previous period. Next, the price $p_t$ is realized and the agents observe how well their heuristics would forecast $p_t$ in the previous period (conditional on the relevant past information set). Based on this information, every agent independently updates her heuristics using four evolutionary operators: procreation (better heuristics replace worse), mutation and crossover (experimentation with heuristic specification) and election (screening ineffectual experimentation). Afterward, the next period $t + 1$ starts and the procedure is repeated. See AHM14 for technical presentation.

2.6 Coordination versus herding

I emphasize the difference between coordination and herding. Herding (contrarian) means that the agents directly follow (contrast) the decisions of their friends, which in this model is embodied by relatively high positive (negative) values of the trust index $\gamma$. On the other hand, coordination is the similarity of agents’ behavior: in this context similarity of individual price forecasts and forecasting rules. I follow Heemeijer et al. (2009) and express this value as the standard deviation of the individual price forecasts, a measure of dis-coordination of the form

$$D_t = \sqrt{\frac{1}{6} \sum_{i=1}^{6} \left( p_{i,t+1} - \frac{1}{6} \sum_{j=1}^{6} p_{j,t+1} \right)^2} \in [0, \infty].$$

If $D_t = 0$, then all agents at period $t$ have the same forecast of the next price, while higher values of (14) imply larger dispersion of the contemporary individual price forecasts.

I will thus never use the term ‘contrarian’ in this sense.
It is easy to see that coordination and herding are two different things. Regardless of
the particular network, agents interact indirectly through the market price. Experiments and
previous work on the GA model by AHM14 show that such an indirect interaction can be
sufficient to impose a large degree of coordination in asset markets, even though the agents
cannot observe each other. One of the goals of this paper is to investigate whether herding
further can help coordination.

3 Monte Carlo studies

3.1 Parametrization of the model

Following the design of Hommes et al. (2005), the parameters are set in the following way.\(^6\)Regardless of the network, the gross interest rate is set to \( R = 1 + r = 0.05 \) and the dividend
to \( y = 3 \), which gives the fundamental price \( p' = 60 \). The standard deviation of the price
shocks in (9) is set to \( \sigma_y = 0.1 \), which implies that under RE the price should be normally
distributed and approximately in the \([59.75, 60.25]\) interval for 99\% number of periods. It will
appear that these small idiosyncratic price shocks play no significant role in the system.

The only difference with Hommes et al. (2005) comes with the parametrization of the
robotic trader. Recall the definition of the relative weight of robotic trader (7), which depends
on the sensitivity parameter \( \phi \). For instance, the robotic trader will take over exactly a quarter
of the market \((n_t = 0.25)\) if the absolute price deviation is

\[
|p_{t-1} - p'| = \frac{-\ln 0.75}{\phi}.
\]

Hommes et al. (2005) set \( \phi = 1/200 \), which means that the robotic traders takes over 25\% if
the price is close to the minimum allowed price \( p_t = 0 \) or the maximum allowed price \( p_t = 100 \).\(^7\)
In this paper I want to study the impact of the networks on market stability and hence I want
to scale down possible price oscillations. Hence, I set \( \phi = 1/104.281784903 \), which implies
that the robotic trader will take over a quarter of the market if the price will reach \( p_{t-1} = 90 \)
or \( p_{t-1} = 30 \), that is if it deviates from the fundamental by a factor of 50\% (100\% in the setup
of Hommes et al. (2005)).

The GA model requires parametrization in two respects. First, the specification for the
evolutionary operators I take directly from AHM14. In comparison with AHM14, the GA
agents in this paper optimize three parameters instead of two, because of the extra trust
index \( \gamma \). This parameter is associated with a gene of 20 bits, which is the same as genes
representing the two other coefficients of the agent heuristic (13).

Second, the GA agents can optimize the heuristic parameters only from a predefined in-

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\(^6\)All the simulations were written in Ox matrix algebra language (Doornik, 2007) and can be provided at
request.

\(^7\)Specifically, \( n_t = 25\% \) happens if the price deviation is \( |p_{t-1} - p'| \approx 57.5 \). There were two treatments
with \( p' = 60 \) and \( p' = 40 \), for which thus \( n_t \approx 25\% \) if the price hits \( p_t = 0 \) and \( p_t = 100 \) respectively.
terval (see AHM14, for a discussion). The price weight $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ has to span a simplex; the trend weight I take from AHM14 to be $\beta \in [-1.3, 1.3]$. I assume that all agents have their total herding/contrarian effect equal to 6 (in absolute terms), which corresponds to 10% of the fundamental price. This implies that the trust sensitivity is set as $\Gamma = 6$, given that the trust index has to be chosen from a unit interval $\gamma \in [-1, 1]$. Finally, the heuristic (13) is based on the mood index (11), for which I take memory $\tau = 5$.\(^8\)

### 3.2 Initialization

AHM14 note that the GA model is sensitive to initial conditions. First, the agents require some initial heuristics. Here I follow the authors and sample them at random. Second, the heuristics require past data from at least two periods, including the previous price forecasts itself. In my numerical simulations, the agents in the very first period always predict the fundamental price and only start using their heuristics in the second period, assuming no trend. Specifically

\begin{align*}
 p_{i,2} &= p^f = 60, \\
 p_{i,3} &= \alpha_i \beta_1 p_1 + (1 - \alpha_i \beta_2) p_{i,2} \\
 &= 60 + \alpha_i \beta_1 \\
 &\text{for every } i \in I,
\end{align*}

which implies that the market is initialized at the fundamental value (lest the price shock), $p_1 \approx p_2 \approx p^f$.

This may seem as a surprising design feature, since ABM’s are often used to study convergence. It will turn out that the model in this paper is inherently unstable. Indeed, if initialized in the fundamental, most likely it will diverge at some point!

### 3.3 Small networks of six agents

In the first part of my study, I will look at networks of six agents. This is the typical number of subjects in the LtF experiments, which can thus serve as a reference point for the following results. Furthermore, it is easy to trace the behavior of only six agents, while this number of nodes is sufficient to have networks with interesting properties, such as regular lattice or asymmetric positioning. I will therefore use these networks to gather basic intuitions of how the network structure and placement affects individual behavior, herding and coordination, before moving to large networks.

For six symmetric agents, one can arrange them on 108 different networks. For the sake of presentation, I focus on six specific: no network, circle, fully connected, two connected clusters, core-periphery and star. See Figure 1 for a visualization of these networks, and Table 1 for summary statistics.

\(^8\)See the next two sections for additional information on the robustness of the parameters $\Gamma$ and $\tau$. 

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The model with no network serves as a natural benchmark, a setting studied with the LtF experiments and by AHM14. The circle and fully connected networks are important to evaluate the network effect on price stability, coordination, learning and herding. The three other networks represent asymmetric positioning of the agents, which I will show to have an interesting effect on herding.\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Diameter</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Transitivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No network</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6667</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully connected</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two connected clusters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6889</td>
<td>0.4667</td>
<td>0.7778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core-periphery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7556</td>
<td>0.5333</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Star</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6667</td>
<td>0.3333</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Properties of the small networks used in Section 3, see Appendix D for definition.

In the later analysis the model turns out to be unstable in terms of the realized prices, but also in terms of individual coordination and strategies. In repeated simulations of the small networks of six agents, a clear median pattern will emerge, but individual simulations will exhibit oscillatory behavior. In order to understand these dynamics, I will focus on three types of evidence.

Every network will be simulated 1'000 times, based on the same price shocks \( \eta_t \),\(^10\) but on

\(^9\)Another interesting topic is whether clustering has any effect on individual coordination. I investigated three additional networks (with three and two symmetric clusters, and with four fully connected agents and two unconnected outsiders). However, these networks indicate that the clustering does not have any meaningful effect on the market, so for the sake of presentation I leave them out of the paper. The Monte Carlo results are available in the online supplementary material.

\(^10\)Because the price shocks are normally distributed with small variance, the simulation dynamics are largely
differently realized learning via different random numbers given to the GA procedure. Every market is simulated for 2′500 periods, including the initial 100 periods which can be interpreted as a learning phase. This offers two ways to represent the data.\footnote{It is impossible to have the same random numbers for learning, since in the model with no network the agents do not optimize the trust index. However, in all other five networks indeed all the agents optimize this coefficient, and their learning is based on the same set of random numbers.}

First, for each of the 1′000 simulated markets one can look at the realized statistics of that market (for periods 101 till 2′500, so excluding the learning phase), which I will refer to as long-run statistics. This gives a distribution of 1′000 long-run statistics, and one of particular importance is the distribution of the long-run market price standard deviation. The latter can be used directly as an indicator of market volatility.

Second, one can look at realized market variables across the 1′000 markets in a particular period. I will focus on the median and 95% confidence intervals (CI) and how they evolve over time. The variables of interest are price, dis-coordination measure (14) and the coefficients chosen by the agents to specify the forecasting heuristic (13).

Finally, the two above Monte Carlo (MC) measures show general patterns of market behavior. It will be clear that the model does not converge, hence it may be difficult to understand the emergent properties of individual learning based solely on this MC exercise. In order to interpret the results, I will also present some sample time paths of the realized market and learning variables.\footnote{The full results of the MC study for all 6 small networks, and three additional, three and two clusters and two outsiders, which include 330 graphs grouped into 77 panels, as well as tables for prediction correlation, constitute a 52 page supplement online material.}

3.4 Large networks

Large networks are empirically more relevant than the ones based on six agents. However, one can identify a myriad of possible and interesting large network topologies, inducing a need for a selection for the numerical study. I will base mine on Panchenko et al. (2013) and the above mentioned small networks. Specifically, I will focus on networks of size $I \in \{50, 100, 250, 500, 1000\}$, with 10 different architectures that range from regular lattice to small-world network. Due to the limit of the study, I will leave large-scale networks for future studies (cf. PGP13).

The non-regular networks are defined through a non-deterministic generating process (see below for details for random and small world networks). In principal one could obtain a distribution of results based on a repeated sampling of these non-regular networks. This in turn would be obtained by a proper MC exercise per every realized network (in line with the MC study for the networks of 6 agents). However, a single sample network of many agents (with 1′000 as the maximum market size in this paper) is already numerically involved, and difficult in terms of presentation. Furthermore, we will see that the behavior of sample large networks is consistent with the behavior observed in the MC study for the small networks. As independent from them.
a result, a full-fledged MC exercise could offer only little additional understanding. Instead, for every network size and architecture, I will focus on one sample realized simulation, with longer time horizon of 25’000 periods. I will present the long-run outcomes of these networks, including the distribution of trust and price stability.

I will study four regular networks, with architectures that are based on their 6-agent counterparts:

**No network** — every agent has an empty set of friends.

**Fully connected** — every agent is befriended with every other agent.

**Regular** — every agent has exactly 4 friends. This market can be represented by a circle such that every agent is linked with two agents to the left and two to the right.

**Star** — one central (or star) agent, who is connected to all other agents, whereas other edge agents are connected only with the star agent.

Random network with probability \( \pi_l \) is typically defined as a random graph, in which every two agents are linked with probability \( \pi_l \). Such an architecture is analytically tractable, and, relevant for my study, can offer a wide distribution of links between the agents. I will focus on two random networks:

**Random(4)** — sparse random with \( \pi_l \) set in such a way that on average there are exactly 4 links per agent, which gives the same density as for the regular network defined above.

**Random(16)** — dense random with \( \pi_l \) such that on average there are exactly 16 links per agent, i.e. with density four times larger than for the regular network defined above.

Empirical social networks often have characteristics of the so-called small world networks (SM): small density (few links between the agents), together with large transitivity ('cliquishness', high probability that a friend of my friend is also a friend of me), but also small characteristic path (average distance between the agents). In practice such networks look like semi-independent clusters that are connected with each other by infrequent 'bridge agents' (see the network in Figure 1d for a simplest example, in which agents 3 and 4 serve as such a bridge between two clusters). It is impossible to obtain networks with such properties through random graphs. Watts and Strogatz (1998) propose the following algorithm: start with a regular lattice network of \( K \) links per node and rewire every link with probability \( \pi_r \). Rewired networks based on well chosen parameters \( K \) and \( \pi_r \) have SM properties. In order to obtain networks of a similar density as the random ones, while maintaining a connection to the study of PGP13, I will use the following four rewired networks:

**Rewired(4, 0.01)** — on average four links per agent and rewiring probability of \( \pi_r = 1\% \).

This gives a SM network for the largest market \( I = 1'000 \).

**Rewired(4, 0.1)** — on average four links per agent and rewiring probability of \( \pi_r = 10\% \).

This gives a SM network for the intermediate market \( I = 100 \).
Rewired(16, 0.01) — on average 16 links per agent and rewiring probability of $\pi_r = 1\%$.

Rewired(16, 0.1) — on average 16 links per agent and rewiring probability of $\pi_r = 10\%$.

The representation of the realized non-regular networks for all five possible network sizes, together with a table of basic characteristics, is available in Appendix E.

4 Networks of six agents

This section consists of three parts. First, I will look on the model without a network (or an empty network). This is essentially the same setup as investigated by Anufriev et al. (2014). However, the authors had a different focus than this study, namely they considered four different LtF experiments and how the model is able to replicate the behavior of the subjects. I will supplement their investigation by an in-depth analysis of the emergent properties of the GA model for the two-period ahead asset pricing market, specifically what drives the coordination on the oscillatory prices paths and how does this link with the individual learning. Second, I will introduce two regular lattice networks (circle and fully connected; see Figure 1 for a visualization) in order to study whether the agents learn to herd or rather to contrast the behavior of their friends. Finally, I will consider three asymmetric networks (two connected clusters, core-periphery and star) in order to check if such asymmetries have any effect on herding, as would seem natural.

4.1 Benchmark model without network

Observation 1. Without a network, there are two types of attractors in the model: coordination on the fundamental price and oscillations around the fundamental.

In line with the findings of AHM14, I find that there are two possible outcomes in the model if there is no network. First, the GA agents can coordinate on the fundamental price and stay there (see Figure 2b for a sample market). This is a self confirming steady state, since if the price stays at the fundamental level, the forecasting rule (13) effectively reduces to forecasting the fundamental as well. The trend term $\beta$ is irrelevant and retains wide distribution centered around zero (weak trend following; see below for a further analysis). The price shocks $\eta_t$ are too small to push the agents from this equilibrium.

However, if by chance the agents were on average considering sufficiently strong trend extrapolation (sufficiently large $\beta$), then they can pick up a sufficiently large shock $\eta_t$ as a sign for price trend, outweigh the robotic trader and impose a regime of price oscillations (see Figure 2c for a sample market). This is again a self-confirming regime: if there is significant trend, agents effectively learn to follow it, which amplifies the trend despite the stabilizing effect of the robotic trader. We observe that across 1’000 simulations, slightly more than

$^{13}$Recall that the simulations for a specific network are based on the same series of price shocks but different realized learning.
50% of the markets slipped into significant price oscillations. This is visible in the bimodal distribution of the long-run standard deviation of the price, as visible on Figure 2a. It also corresponds to the results of Hommes et al. (2005), who report that among the seven experimental groups with $p^f = 60$, four exhibited oscillations, two monotonic convergence and one an intermediary case.

**Observation 2.** GA agents, without any direct link, can coordinate well by learning to follow the price trend, which can differ across time and between markets.

Disregarding the initial 100 periods, the predictions of GA agents are sharply correlated with an average correlation coefficient of (average from 1’000 simulated markets).\textsuperscript{14} Across the simulations, the median dis-coordination (14) remains low, below 0.1 (see Figure 3b for the median and 95% CI over time). Nevertheless, large outliers are possible and the upper bound of the 95% CI exceeds 2. This implies that the agents are typically well coordinated, but momentary breaks of this coordination occur from time to time.

The reason that the agents remain well coordinated despite no direct links between them is that they learn similar behavior, and so their predictions react to specific market condition (current price and price trend) in the same manner. This in turn is reinforced by the positive feedback nature of the market. For example, if the GA agents have similar optimistic price forecasts, the realized price will indeed be high and the agents have no incentive to change their behavior. If the prices remain stable, a specific parametrization of the forecasting (13) is in practice irrelevant. On the other hand, the median GA agent converges to the following strong trend rule

\begin{equation}
  p_{t,t+1}^e \approx 0.9p_{t-1} + 0.1p_{t-1}^e + 0.5\Delta p_{t-1},
\end{equation}

as presented at the bottom panel of Figure 3. Notice that this rule is similar to the median rule reported by AHM14 for the same market. In the unstable markets GA agents learn to coordinate on the price trend. The trend coefficient $\beta$ retains a wide distribution even towards period 2'500, including its upper 95% CI bound being far away from the median, which suggests that the specific trend is realized differently on different markets. Indeed, the

\textsuperscript{14}Specifically, correlation of predictions for any pair of agents across 1’000 markets is equal to 98.7%.
Figure 3: Monte Carlo study (1000 markets) of the GA model without network: time evolution of important market and individual variables. Median represented by a red line and 95% CI represented by blue lines. Notice that forecast SE is the squared difference between forecast and realized price.

long-run standard deviation of the unstable markets has a wide distribution, which means that different markets are unstable to a different degree, or the market instability (i.e. the specific price trend) changes over time.

**Observation 3.** In unstable markets, the robotic trader is responsible for the reversal of price trends (crashes of bubbles and reversals of crisis).

Regardless of whether the market was stable or not, its long-run average price has a degenerate distribution at approximately the fundamental level. Furthermore, the price oscillations are centered around the fundamental and 95% of times are approximately contained within the interval [45, 75], that is 75%−125% of the fundamental price (see Figure 3a). This corresponds to a relative weight of the robotic trader (7) \( n_t \approx 13.4\%\) at the peak of oscillations.

Consider again the unstable market presented in Figure 2c. Figure 4 displays a number of variables from that market in periods 1’001 till 1’025. Within these 25 periods, the market experienced one bubble, a subsequent crash, a period of crisis and then recovery towards a new bubble. The turning points of the bubble and crisis happened in periods 1’005 and 1’016 respectively (which means that one full cycle took around 20 periods, see Figure 4a). What caused these market turn-overs?

Throughout periods 1’000 – 1’025 the price shocks were not larger than 0.2 (i.e. their two standard deviation) in absolute terms. The cycle of bubbles and crashes arises endogenously, without a need for large exogenous shocks.\(^{15}\) Before the bubble turning point in period 1’006, GA agents used the highest possible trend extrapolation (Figure 4f) and remained well

\(^{15}\)Compare with standard RE models.
coordinated. Notice that in the period of bubble build-up, the agents undershoot the price, but slowly converge towards it. Indeed, their error approaches zero at the turning point (Figure 4e). It means that GA agents are ‘catching up’ with the bubble. This is possible, because they use a constant trend coefficient, whereas the actual price trend \((p_{t-1} - p_{t-2})\) loosens on its momentum (see Figure 4d for the price trend observed by the agents). The latter is due to the robotic trader: the more the bubble builds up, the more he becomes active (Figure 4c). The maximum price trend happens three periods before the turning point, after which the robotic trader becomes twice as active (with his relative weight increasing from around 5% to 10%).

At some moment, the robotic trader becomes influential enough to outweigh the GA agents and to halt the price trend completely.\(^{16}\) Specifically this happens in period 1’006, the last period for the price trend to remain positive (albeit already close to zero, see Figure 4d). GA agents do not realize that yet, but rather observe that in the past it paid off to follow the trend (indeed they just ‘caught up’ with the growing price) and so follow its latest observed value \(p_{1005} - p_{1004}\) (which is only mildly positive) when forecasting the price in the next period 1’007. On the other hand, in period 1’007 the robotic trader does not care for the price trend to have lost momentum. Instead he considers only the absolute deviation of the price from the fundamental and remains highly active. The total effect is that the realized price \(p_{1007}\) is slightly smaller than the previous price. GA agents momentarily realize that the strong trend following just lost its potency and start to experiment with lower coefficients \(\beta\) of (13)

\(^{16}\)This does not require a substantial negative price shock. Instead, it relies more on the decreasing price trend, growing weight of the robotic trader and the feedback coefficient in the price equation (9) being less than unity due to a positive interest rate.
for predicting price in the next period $p_{1008}$ (see Figure 4f). This results in a moment of dis-coordination (Figure 4b), and also means that the stabilizing effect of the robotic trader becomes even more important and the price starts to drop in a more pronounced way.

This does not lead the price to converge to the fundamental, what the robotic trader is trying to achieve. Instead, GA agents notice the downward trend and immediately follow it (chosen trend coefficients $\beta$ were diverging from their allowed upper bound of 1.3 for only two periods), which reinforces the crash. The market undershoots the fundamental value and a symmetric sequence of events happens around period 1’015.

**Finding 1.** Without a network, the market can be both stable and unstable. Instability occurs if GA agents learn to follow the current price trend, which generates a high level of coordination during the build-up of bubbles and crises. However, a constant price trend cannot be sustained forever because of the robotic trader. When the trend loses enough momentum, the GA agents experiment with their forecasting heuristics. As a result, a tipping point of bubbles and crashes emerges, in which agents are dis-coordinated before a price trend reversal, which renews coordination on extrapolating the reversed price trend.

These findings are not driven by the nature of the robotic trader per se, but by the fact that a stable price trend is unattainable because of the robotic trader. In real markets, a number of factors can have a corresponding effect of breaking up the price trends: liquidity constraints, regulations on prices (such as a maximum allowed price change in a day); and finally ‘common knowledge’ that bubbles cannot build up forever. If there is uncertainty of how exactly the price trend will be broken (for example because of strategic uncertainty, or because the legal constraints are imprecise), market participants find it easy to follow price bubbles and crashes, but are not that skilled at playing out the markets’ tipping points. The same mechanism emerges in my model as summarized in Finding 1. Just as in real life, the GA agents follow the market, which reinforces its growth, until it reaches its natural limit and despite the agents being overly optimistic, it starts to stagnate. The agents panic and the bubble bursts without the optimism it was built upon. A period of crisis thus emerges, when agents’ pessimism reinforces the price drop.

### 4.2 Contrarian strategies induced by networks

**Observation 4.** Networks have a destabilizing effect on the market.

Introducing any type of network into the model brings forth additional price instability. MC results for two regular networks, circle and fully connected, are presented in Figure 5. In comparison with the model without a network, coordination on the fundamental price does not constitute a likely attractor anymore. Only about 5% of the markets exhibit long-run price’s standard deviation close to zero for the circle network, and virtually none for the denser fully connected network (middle panel of Figure 5). On the other hand, in almost all markets price oscillations arise. Furthermore, these oscillations are stronger, implying larger
Figure 5: Monte Carlo study (1000 markets) of the GA model without network, circle and fully connected networks: time evolution of prices (median represented by a red line and 95% CI represented by blue lines); distribution of long-run mean prices and price standard deviations; sample realized prices for initial 500 periods.

Market volatility. The prices still fluctuate around the fundamental value, but the 95% CI of the realized price across time are approximately twice as wide as without network, specifically they constitute an interval close to \([30, 90]\), i.e. \([50\%, 150\%]\) of the fundamental price. This implies price oscillations, that start almost immediately (left panel of Figure 5). In the unstable simulations, typical price long-run standard deviation is also twice as large for both the circle and the fully connected networks than without network. Sample simulations (right panel of Figure 5) confirm that the price oscillations have a more pronounced amplitude.

Observation 5. Agents learn to use heuristics with strong price trend extrapolation, and also a contrarian attitude towards other agents. Despite the contrarian strategies, they remain well coordinated.

In the remaining of this subsection, I will focus on the fully connected network. Results for the circle network are essentially the same. The first observation is that just as was the case for the model without a network, the GA agents exhibit strong trend following behavior. Figure 6 presents the time distribution of the price weight \(\alpha\) and trend coefficient \(\beta\) chosen by the agents across 1'000 simulated fully connected markets. The median agent quickly converges to a strong trend following rule

\[
p_i^{t+1} \approx p_{t-1} + 1(p_{t-1} - p_{t-2}) - 0.9\Gamma_{\text{Peer}_i,t-1},
\]

which is slightly stronger in terms of trend following coefficient \(\beta\) than for the case of no
Figure 6: Monte Carlo study (1000 markets) of fully connected network: time evolution of heuristic (13) parameters chosen by the agents to forecast prices. Median represented by a red line and 95% CI represented by blue lines.

network (even though the 95% CI have approximately the same width). Notice furthermore that the weight on the previous forecast $1 - \alpha$ is close to zero, which is consistent with the findings of AHM14: large price instability induces learning of stronger trend, but also less ‘conservative’ behavior.

Interestingly, the agents learn contrarian rules with median $\gamma \approx -0.9$. If the friends of an agent were buying in the past (remained optimistic), she would decrease her price forecast. Figure 7 shows the 95% CI of the trust agent 1 puts into her friends and trust she receives herself over time.\footnote{Because the network is symmetric, the results for the other five agents are indistinguishable. This shows that the MC sample of 1’000 gives a sufficient picture of the model’s behavior.} The median agent quickly learns a strong contrarian heuristic and is furthermore distrusted by her friends. However, the 95% CI for both variables remain wide and approach zero from below, which means that the agents are still experimenting with the specific strength of the contrarian strategies. Indeed, at all time the agents seem to have similar trust coefficients $\gamma$, but there are periods of significant differences between them in their level of trust, as seen in the standard deviation of that variable between the agents (low median, but wide 95% CI, see Figure 7c). Finally, despite the contrarian behavior, GA agents remain well coordinated, as measured by the correlation of their price forecasts equal to 96.8%.

What is the reason for these two facts, and how are they connected with the increased price volatility?

**Observation 6.** \textit{Agents can only look at the past behavior of their friends, but the market is unstable. Therefore, trades that were optimal in the past are inconsistent with contemporary market conditions. As a result, observed mood of friends is ‘sticky’, which induces the agents to learn contrarian strategies.}

To study the reason of the contrarian behavior, I will focus on a sample cycle of boom and crisis presented in Figure 8, for one market with the fully connected network. We observe that this cycle is similar to the one from a sample market without a network, specifically the oscillations have similar period (but a higher amplitude, as discussed in Observation 4) and the timing of the bubble-crisis cycle is symmetric. During a build-up period of the bubble, the agents are ‘chasing’ the bubble with strong trend following rules, until the robotic trader
curbs the price trend. Afterwards, there is a small phase when the agents experiment with their rules, what together with the influence of the robotic trader causes a trend reversal, which is quickly picked up by the agents. The evolution of the trust index $\gamma$ is the opposite to that of the trend coefficient: it typically stays close to its lower boundary ($\gamma \approx -1$), but agents experiment with higher trust during the market reversals.

To interpret these results, the following lemma is useful (see Appendix B for the proof):

**Lemma 1.** Disregarding the price shocks, agent $i$ buys (sells) if her price forecast is higher (lower) than the average market expectation (8), that is if $p_{e,i,t+1} > \hat{p}_{t+1}$ ($p_{e,i,t+1} < \hat{p}_{t+1}$). Similarly, robotic trader buys (sells) if the average market expectation (8) is above (below) the fundamental price, i.e. robotic trader’s forecast. This implies that the GA agents and the robotic trader can buy (sell) even though they expect negative (positive) price trend.

This lemma follows from the two-period ahead structure of the market and has a simple interpretation. Consider a market at period $t$ with only two agents, no price shocks ($\eta_t = 0$) or robotic trader ($n_t = 0$). Let both agents expect the price to increase in the next period $t+1$ in comparison with the last observed $p_{t-1}$. Their demand functions (3) however depend not only on their expectations of $p_{t+1}$, but also on the contemporary price $p_t$, which follows the market clearing condition (4). If one agents is more optimistic about the next period (say $p_{e,1,t+1} > p_{e,2,t+1}$), then she will take relatively longer position. Because the market has to clear, she will buy the asset from the other agent, $z_{1,t} = -z_{2,t} > 0$. In a general case of many agents, price shocks and the robotic trader, the market clearing condition implies that a GA agent buys the asset if she is relatively optimistic, not if she is optimistic in absolute terms.

The important consequence of the lemma is that, because of the robotic trader, GA agents are likely to be buying (selling) the asset even after they realize a market reversal. For an illustration consider the sample network of six fully connected agents (Figure 8). In this market there was a bubble with a peak in period 1015, with a negative price trend afterwards. The agents realized that after observing $p_{1016}$ and their subsequent prediction $p_{e,1017}^1$ for price in period 1017 decreased in comparison with their previous forecast $p_{e,1016}^1$, but was still highly above the fundamental price. Agents noticed that the price gained a negative trend, but did
Figure 8: Sample market with fully connected network, periods 1’001 till 1’025. Realized market variables in these periods and individual forecasts (including the corresponding heuristic specifications) of price from these periods.

not expect it to fall to or below the fundamental price immediately. On the other hand, the robotic trader is always trading as if the next price will be at the fundamental level. As a result, the GA agents after the reversal of the bubble became pessimistic in absolute terms, but still optimistic relatively to the robotic trader. Figure 8i shows the sign of the robotic trades.\footnote{Notice that this is not the index based on five previous trade signs.} We observe him to take the short position until period 1018.

The construction of the market is that the agents forecast two-period ahead, and their information set spans until the previous period. This means that they form their forecast of $p_{1015}, \textit{i.e.}$ the peak of the bubble, based on the friends’ behavior until period 1013, which roughly corresponds to the moment when the price (following the previous crisis) surpasses the fundamental level and the GA agents finally become relatively more optimistic than the robotic trader and start to buy the asset. Furthermore, the peer effect is based on an index with a non-trivial memory (of 5 periods). We observe that the agents’ mood indices becomes positive only around the moment of the bubble burst (Figure 8g), that is the agents acquire reputation of full optimism when the market already crashes or is about to crash. This lag is
apparent in Figure 8h, which shows for every GA agents the mood index averaged between her friends she observes at period \( t \), that is averaged over friends and over periods \( t - 6 \) until \( t - 1 \), which she uses to predict the next price \( t + 1 \). The GA agents can trade quite efficiently, but their reputation is ‘sticky’ and hence reflects the past, not the contemporary market conditions. A contrarian attitude is therefore natural.

To what extent is this driven by the robotic trader? Because the robotic trader has such a firm belief about the next price, the GA agents are likely to take similar (long or short) positions once the market is far from the fundamental: their individual price forecasts remain heterogeneous, on ‘the same side’ (below or above the fundamental). On the other hand, without the robotic trader the GA agents would be more likely to trade in a more diversified fashion (some would buy, some would sell), and on average their reputation could be less ‘sticky’. Nevertheless, agents who have many friends would still likely observe ‘sticky’ mood (notice the difference between individual mood indices (Figure 8g) and the observed ones (Figure 8h)). Furthermore, even without the robotic trader the lag of the index mood is apparent (especially after the market reversals).\(^{19}\) It means that unless the price oscillations can take a relatively long period, the agents will simply never have time to acquire a positive (negative) mood index during the bubble (crisis) build-ups.\(^{20}\) Notice that the current model generates fast oscillations despite the stabilizing influence of the robotic trader. I leave it for future inquiries to study the robustness of this phenomenon in alternative market structures.

**Observation 7.** *Contrarian strategies add momentum to the trend reversal around the tipping points of bubbles and crises. Through interaction with agents’ strong trend following behavior, this causes price oscillations with larger amplitude.*

As discussed for the markets without a network, the reason for price trend reversals is that once the price diverges sufficiently away from the fundamental, the robotic trader halts its current trend. This causes dis-coordination and a tipping point: agents start to experiment with their heuristics, while the robotic trader insists on pushing the price back to the fundamental. Therefore, the prices turn around and agents quickly pick the new trend up, causing a new phase of the bubble-crisis cycle.

The contrarian strategies work in the same direction. For example, during a bubble build-up the agents slowly become optimistic. As discussed, this happens not fast enough to make the agents learn herding strategies, since the agents become fully optimistic close to the tipping point of the bubble. Thus their heuristics remain strictly contrarian, but the optimism build-up around the tipping point plays a crucial role in the bubble crash.

Once the robotic trader stops the price growth, we see in the price expectation heuristic (13) that the price trend becomes unimportant, while the negative \( \gamma \) trust index together with the newly established optimism among friends means that the agents are likely to forecast lower price (observed optimism times the contrarian attitude yields an additional negative element

\(^{19}\)Simulations, in which a cap on price change replaced the robotic trader as a stabilizing factor, also indicate strong contrarian behavior; this seems to be caused by the discussed lag of the mood index.

\(^{20}\)Sample simulations indicate that in this setup the specific value of the memory length \( \tau \) plays little role.
in the pricing forecast heuristic). Given the positive feedback between the predictions and price, the initial price drop is therefore more severe relatively to the case without a network, in which no such contrarian attitude can emerge.

One can observe this by comparing the first price drop after the bubble burst: \( p_{1016} - p_{1015} \approx -4.65 \) for the sample fully connected market (Figure 8a) is much larger than \( p_{1007} - p_{1006} \approx -0.67 \) for the sample no network market (Figure 4a), which results for a sharper decrease of the corresponding price forecasts. The increased (in absolute terms) initial trend after bubbles burst (or crises finish) makes the agents predict larger price change, which reinforces the size of the trend. This can be mitigated by the robotic trader only once the price deviation is sufficiently larger in comparison with the market without a network, which makes the realized oscillations wider.

Notice that this further confirms the discussed intuition of the contrarian strategies. Agents around the peak of the bubble (crisis) are considered optimistic (pessimistic). They also use contrarian strategies, which reinforces the market reversal (in contrast to the observed mood of the friends), and makes the contrarian attitude self-fulfilling.

The general conclusion about the network effect on the market is therefore only partially in line with the popular belief. The GA agents, if endowed with additional information about friends’ behavior, learn contrarian beliefs. This actually implies larger bubbles and crashes, while not disturbing the high level of forecasting coordination — the two phenomena that some economists would in fact associate with herding (Shiller and Pound, 1989).

**Finding 2.** In markets with a relatively fast bubble-crisis cycle, the history of agents’ trading decisions lags behind the contemporary market conditions. As a result, agents have an incentive to learn contrarian strategies. This has a negative impact on price stability. Because the agents’ reputation catches up with the market conditions just before the tipping point, the contrarian strategies imply that the turning points of the price cycle generates stronger price reversal. This larger initial price trend is in turn reinforced by the agents’ trend extrapolation behavior, which makes it more difficult for the robotic trader to stabilize the market.

### 4.3 Learning in asymmetric networks

**Observation 8.** An asymmetric position in the network has no direct effect on herding. Instead, agents with fewer friends experiment with relatively weaker contrarian strategies.

Intuition suggests that agents with a unique position in a network — like a center of a star network — should receive more attention and thus play an important role in coordination. However, my model predicts so only for some networks. Consider three networks: two connected clusters, core-periphery and star. In all of them, one can distinguish central and non-central agents with interesting asymmetric positions. In the two connected clusters, agents 1 and 3 belong to the same cluster, but agent 3 also links to the second cluster (see Figure 1d). In the core-periphery network, a reverse case holds: agent 1 lies in the core and links to a periphery agent, while agent 3 is such a periphery agent (see Figure 1e). The most
extreme is the situation of the star network, where agent 1 is the hub of the star, while agent 3 is a typical edge of the star (see Figure 1f).

Figure 9 shows MC results for the trust given by these agents across time. Again the 95% CI are wide (demonstrating erratic behavior of these networks), but there is a clear pattern in terms of the median agent across the simulations. Regardless of the network, the central agent is always likely to use strict contrarian strategies, just as was the case of the agents from regular networks. Non-central agents are also contrarian. However, their median trust index can be much larger: instead of a low $\gamma \approx -0.9$ for the case of the fully connected network, the median non-central agent 3 in star (core-periphery) uses a weaker contrarian $\gamma \approx -0.6$ ($\gamma \approx -0.75$).\textsuperscript{21} This is not the case for the non-central agent 1 in the two connected clusters network, who uses a strong contrarian strategy with $\gamma \approx -0.9$. This indicates that a more central position on its own does not guarantee higher levels of received trust.

What we observe instead is agents experimenting with relatively higher trust levels if they have fewer friends. Specifically, the edge agents in the star network, and the periphery agents in the core-periphery network, have only one friend; and their median trust level is visibly higher (even if still negative) in contrast to other agents.\textsuperscript{22} This result will be more apparent in the large networks, and has a natural intuition.

\textsuperscript{21}In practice this means that the agents have low typical value of $\gamma$, but are willing to temporarily experiment it to a larger extent than other agents.

\textsuperscript{22}One can see that as well by analyzing networks with small clusters, which are not presented in this paper.
In the setup of my model, the agents cannot distinguish between their friends and look only at the average sign of their friends’ mood. On the other hand, the agents remain heterogeneous (see the previous discussion): despite in general similar price forecasts, they can have quite different realized moods over time (see lemma 1). It means that a ‘popular’ agent (with many friends) often has to wait longer to observe ‘sharp’ consensus among her friends, whereas ‘unpopular’ agents are more likely to observe outliers, which can be useful around the tipping points. For instance, consider the sample fully connected network (Figure 8) and compare the sharply changing individual mood index (Figure 8g) with much smoother observed friends’ mood index (that is, the average mood index of five friends, Figure 8h). Therefore the agents with fewer friends are typically contrarian, but are also willing to experiment more when bubbles and crises regimes brake down.

A clear suggestion for future studies follows. First, the above reasoning does not have to hold when the agents can distinguish between their friends. Second, this is an important insight when studying models with endogenous network formation. Both issues demand further theoretical and experimental work.

**Observation 9.** Overall coordination is the same regardless the shape of the network, including whether it is symmetric or not.

Figure 10 presents the MC results for the stability of the three asymmetric networks: the two connected clusters, the core-periphery and the star, namely the 95% CI and median discoordination over time (top panel) and SD of the long-run prices over 1000 markets for each network. There is a clear pattern visible. No difference emerges in terms of coordination (which also looks like the coordination in any market with a symmetric network). However, across the three networks the star market is likely to experience higher long-run SD of prices, while the two other networks are much more similar. Furthermore, the star network never stays in the stable attractor, which can happen in the case of other asymmetric networks. This indicates that the star network generates unique dynamics in comparison with all the other non-empty networks, which yield more comparable results. We will see a similar pattern in the large networks.

**Finding 3.** In asymmetric networks, more herding can emerge. This is driven by the fact that agents with fewer links find it easier or more useful to experiment with relatively higher trust. With the exception of the unique dynamics of the star network, this does not influence the overall market stability or coordination.

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23 As a robustness check, I run some simulations where agent $i$ can attach different trust levels $\gamma_{i,j}$ to her different friends $j$. This does not seem to change the qualitative outcome of contrarian strategies being learned by the agents, but further studies should investigate this manner in a systematic fashion.

24 The typical correlation of the individual forecasts is also comparable between all considered networks and around 95%.
4.4 Profits and utility

Under RE, the expected profits are equal to zero. The intuition of this result follows from the arbitrage argument: the fundamental price $p^f$ balances the asset revenue (the dividend $y$ and the resale gain $p_{t+1}$) and the opportunity cost ($R_p$). Formally, under RE if $p_{t+1}^e = \mathbb{E}\{p_{t+1}\} = p^f$ for every period $t$ and disregarding the price shock $\eta_t$, the asset return (1) becomes

\[
\mathbb{E}\{\rho_{t+1}\} = p^f + y - R_p^f = y - r p^f = 0,
\]

where the last equality holds because $p^f = y/r$. This further implies that the individual demands (3) are also equal to zero, since $z_{i,t} = \rho_{i,t+1} / (a \sigma^2_a)$.

The GA model predicts price oscillations and forecasting heterogeneity. This, in contrast to RE, implies non-trivial trades and asset returns. Notice that furthermore the GA agents are maximizing a trade-off between the asset return and the risk. It is therefore important to understand the model profit and utility distribution.

Figure 11 shows the MC distribution of average profits for three networks, circle, fully connected and star, for the GA agents (left panel) and the robotic trader (right panel). Average

\[
\text{29}
\]
profit of agent $i$ is defined as

\begin{equation}
\bar{\pi}_{i,t} = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^{t} \rho_{t+1} z_{i,t}.
\end{equation}

Because the robotic trader has a constant price expectation and the market cycle is symmetric, his average profit quickly converges to zero, with narrow 95% CI. On the other hand, GA agents seem to be trading quite poorly: regardless of the network, their average profit quickly becomes negative (including the upper bound of 95% CI).²⁶

This does not mean that the GA agents are irrational, however. Their trading is dictated by aversion towards risk. The pricing equation (9) was defined under the assumption that the agents have myopic mean-variance preferences, trading conditional on their beliefs about the subsequent price. Therefore, the same utility based on the robotic trader’s decisions can be used as a reference point for the performance and learning efficiency of the GA agents. Specifically, I focus on the average realized utility

\begin{equation}
\bar{U}_{i,t} = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^{t} \rho_{t+1} z_{i,t} - 0.5 z_{i,t}^2.
\end{equation}

²⁶Notice that the profits in a given period do not sum up to the dividend, because I include the opportunity cost of the forfeit secure interest rate into the asset return. In fact, the total economic profit cannot be positive unless the market diverges to an infinite price, which resembles the transversality condition in the RE infinite time-horizon solution.
Utility of GA agents

Utility of robotic trader

Circle  Fully connected  Star

Figure 12: Monte Carlo study (1000 markets) with circle, fully connected and star networks: time evolution of average utility of the GA agents and the robotic trader (median represented by a red line and 95% CI represented by blue lines).

Figure 13: Sample unstable market without network: realized average profit and realized average utility of robotic trader (black line) and GA agents (green lines).

Figure 12 shows that the GA agents, regardless of the network, obtain much higher utility than the robotic trader. In fact, after around 1000 period the lower bound of the 95% CI of their average utility is higher than the median average utility of the robotic trader.

This observation has a simple interpretation. Because of his constant price expectations, the robotic trader has on average zero profit, but also takes extremely risky positions around the market reversals, i.e. when he also becomes the most active. GA agents forfeit part of the profit and hence increase their utility by avoiding excess risk. This is particularly clear for the case without networks. Figure 13 shows the evolution of average profits and utilities in the sample unstable no network, which was presented before in Figures 2c and 4. We observe
that initially the prices are stable, which corresponds to inactive robotic trader and individual trades and profits close to zero. However, once the market switches to the unstable attractor, robotic trader tries to push the price back to the fundamental, while GA agents follow price trends. As a result, the relative average profit of the robotic trader increases at the expense of his relative utility.

**Finding 4.** GA agents, in comparison with the robotic trader, obtain lower economic profits, but also higher utility. The reason is that instead of predicting the fundamental price, they follow the market cycle and thus avoid substantial risk.

## 5 Large networks

In this section I present the results for the sample simulations of the large network as a function of their size (with 50 to 1000 agents). I first show the aggregate dynamics and then discuss individual learning. One of the most important findings of this analysis is that the large networks (even with hundreds of agents) generate similar market dynamics as the small ones, which suggests that the specific network architecture or size is less significant than the existence of links between the agents in the first place.

### 5.1 Impact of the network on price stability

**Observation 10.** Network size has a stabilizing effect on the prices only for relatively small networks and past a certain threshold plays no significant role.

Figure 14 shows the long-run price SD of regular and non-regular networks (see section 3 for definition). In comparison with the networks of six agents, large regular networks are marginally more stable (with the markets without a network being the sole exception). For example, the star network of 50 agents has price SD equal to $SD_p = 15.657$ (Figure 14a), which is below the price SD for the bulk of star networks with 6 agents (see bottom right panel on Figure 10). Above 100 agents, however, the network size hardly has an effect on price volatility.

**Observation 11.** Specific network architecture (including its density) plays little role in price volatility, and is important only for extreme cases, namely no network markets and star networks.

Another interesting observation from Figure 14 is that, with the exception of markets without a network, the long run price SD is similar between the network structures (both regular and non-regular), as it is between networks of the same structure and different size (in fact it is difficult to distinguish individual networks in this Figure, since the relevant lines almost overlap). In all these cases, the price SD falls into a narrow interval $SD_p \in [14.5, 15.5]$, despite the networks having different density and other relevant measures. We will see below
that the reason for this is that the agents from different networks learn comparable behavior, especially in terms of price trend extrapolation.

As mentioned above, the exception is the no network case. It has price SD $SD_p \approx 8$ half in magnitude of other networks, which is consistent with the findings for the small networks. This shows that the contrarian behavior, absent in the case without a network, gives an additional momentum to the price trends, implying larger oscillations. The GA model without a network is nevertheless unstable in comparison with the RE benchmark, according to which $SD_p = 0.1 \ll 6$.

**Finding 5.** Specific network size and architecture has a negligible effect on price stability for large enough networks. The exception is the case without a network, which is more stable than markets with any type of a network.

### 5.2 Impact of the network on individual behavior

**Observation 12.** Regardless of the network size, agents focus on strong trend extrapolation rules. They continue to experiment with the specific trend coefficient and this learning does not settle down.

In almost all considered networks (both in terms of architecture and size), agents on average use high trend extrapolation coefficients with $\beta \approx 0.85$ (where the specific value does not seem to differ substantially between networks). Figure 15 gives the average $\beta$ for all networks and network sizes. Furthermore, there is no convergence. The SD of $\beta$ is close to 0.55 in all networks, consistent with the small networks outcomes: agents typically use very high $\beta$, but during market reversals they experiment with lower values of the trend extrapolation coefficient. A noticeable exception are agents from the no network markets of small size (up to 100 agents), who do focus on higher $\beta \approx 1$. It means that in the positive feedback type markets, specific network structure has little effect on the emerging trend following behavior.
Observation 13. Agents in general use strong contrarian strategies, regardless of the specific network architecture or size. However, the less friends an agent has, the more she is willing to experiment with relatively higher trust levels.

Across all networks, the average trust given by agents is low, with (roughly) $\gamma \in [-0.7, 0.9]$. Nevertheless, there is some variability across time and between agents, as seen in relatively high standard deviations of the relevant trust measures. Furthermore, the number of connected friends has a clear and negative effect on the trust level. The most striking illustration of this effect can be seen in the case of star networks, were the central agent (regardless of the actual network size) on average uses $\gamma \approx -0.8$, but the other agents prefer $\gamma \approx -0.3$, which is close to a neutral strategy (see Figure 16a).

In all other networks with a diversified number of friends per agent, more popular agents have lower average trust, though this effect becomes negligible once agents have more than a dozen of friends. Figure 17 shows the average trust index $\gamma$ for the sample non-regular networks, as a function of network size and agent’s number of friends. We observe that the effect of network size is small, but the number of friends is important. Furthermore, Figure 16b shows the average $\gamma$ as a function of the number of friends for these networks with 1’000 agents. The clear pattern is that the more popular agents have lower average trust index,
with a decreasing marginal effect of the number of friends. Another interesting observation is that there is little difference between the networks. Indeed, the lines describing this effect for different network architectures almost coincide on one hyperbola, and further MC would be likely to show that the relevant distributions of the trust index are indistinguishable.

Figure 17: Sample simulations of non-regular networks: average chosen trust index $\gamma$ of agents for different network size and number of friends.

I argue that the reason for this outcome is in line with Finding 3. Namely, as discussed in the previous section, the more friends an agent has, the smoother over time becomes the average friends mood she observes. As a result, it more closely follows the market cycle with a substantial lag. At any point, the mood index of many agents is more likely to represent the overall market mood in the past, before the latest market reversal. Therefore, the agent with more friends has a higher incentive to remain conservative, unwilling to experiment with strong contrarian attitude. The results for large networks are consistent with this interpretation.

Finding 6. Agents tend to use strong price trend extrapolation and contrarian heuristics. They experiment with the specific heuristic parametrization after the market reversals. Furthermore, agents with fewer friends are more likely to experiment with trust level, since they are more likely to observe outlier behavior.

To sum up, embedding the agents in a network has a strong effect on the aggregate outcomes: non-empty networks generate stronger price oscillations. However, specific network architecture is not important, because the emerging learning is similar between the networks.
6 Conclusions

In this paper I investigate a financial market, in which agents need to predict the price of an asset two-periods ahead. They are placed in a fixed information network, and use a simple general forecasting heuristic, which contains adaptive and trend extrapolation expectations, and an additional term of (dis-)trust towards friends’ past trading decisions. The agents independently optimize the specification of their heuristics by Genetic Algorithms. This gives a model of endogenous learning of price forecasting and herding/contrarian behavior. My main findings are: (i) networks destabilize the markets; (ii) the Genetic Algorithm agents learn to extrapolate the trend; and (iii) they learn to use contrarian strategies, because the observed pessimism/optimism of their friends lags behind the cyclical market dynamics.

Information networks play a crucial role for real financial investors, but it is not clear how they affect market stability and efficiency. From the perspective of the Rational Expectations framework, information flows can help the agents to converge to the fundamental equilibrium, but if the agents have no private information, networks should play no role in the equilibrium itself. On the other hand, many behavioral economists, in line with the popular opinion, identify networks as one of the reasons for herding and ‘animal spirits’, which enables the agents to coordinate on non-fundamental, self-reinforcing price oscillations. Here herding is understood as following the opinion of friends (or maybe the general market opinion) instead of ones private beliefs or information. Empirical investigations add a twist to the theoretical puzzle: market data gives no clear indication whether herding is a popular strategy, while experiments identify contrarian strategies as a more common behavioral pattern.

In order to shed some light on this puzzle, I design an agent based network model for a simple market of financial asset. Every agent can independently learn whether to follow the observed price trend and in addition, whether to trust the past decisions of her friends (increase or decrease price forecast, if her friends were optimistic). I investigate small networks of six agents to obtain basic understanding of such learning dynamics, and hence I study networks of fifty to one thousand agents with architectures ranging from regular through random to small world properties.

The main outcomes of the model are the following. First, information networks destabilize the market. Without information flows, the model exhibits two types of attractors, the fundamental solution and erratic price oscillations around the fundamental. Once the agents are positioned in an information network of any architecture or size, the stable fundamental steady state attractor disappears and market repeatedly over- and under-prices the asset in a smooth cycle of bubbles and crashes. Second, agents learn to extrapolate the price trend regardless of the network, which makes their price forecasts well coordinated. Third, despite the large degree of coordination in terms of realized price forecasts, agents learn contrarian heuristics. This is because the mood of friends, which the agents observe, is ‘sticky’: it represents past decisions that were made during a different part of the market cycle, and so are different from what is rational in the present. For example, after a bubble crashes, agents
should expect the price to decrease, but they remember their friends being optimistic just before the market collapsed. Fourth, the Genetic Algorithms (in comparison with the robotic trader) take less risky trading position, which implies lower profit, but higher realized utility. Fifth, the specific network architecture plays little role in market volatility (past network size of mere hundred agents) or emerging learning. The heuristics do not settle, since during market reversals the agents experiment with their specification. These dynamics resemble real markets: during bubbles and crashes financial agents just follow the current trend, but ‘panic’ around bubble/crash tipping points. Finally, agents with fewer links experiment with relatively higher trust during market reversals, as a natural consequence of the fact that they cannot distinguish between their friends.

The results of my model offer a good interpretation to many empirical and experimental findings. First, the agents learn contrarian behavior, in line with the findings from experiments. Second, the agents remain well coordinated despite the contrarian attitude, which explains why indirect measures for market data may (mistakenly) point towards herding. It also shows that the popular belief about herding (that it is a driving factor of price oscillations) may be wrong: coordination occurs despite agents’ lack of trust towards each other, since they converge to similar forecasting rules of thumb.

My investigation is based on the selection of two crucial elements: asset market and networks. These choices are independent from the Genetic-Algorithms-based learning itself. In principle, my model can be used for other financial regimes or information networks. Indeed, many of my results should be tested in other economic environments. For example, contrarian behavior emerges because the agents are not able to acquire reputation of optimism (pessimism) before the market bubble crashes (crisis ends). This relies on the fact that the financial market, which I have used, allows for relatively fast price oscillations. Furthermore, the outcomes of my simulations seem to be robust against specification of some key parameters of the model (including the allowed trust), nevertheless further experimental work could fine-tune the model or show its limitations. The model should therefore be thought of as a benchmark for future theoretical and laboratory inquiries.

References


A Rational solution

Proposition 1. The network $I$ has no effect on the fundamental RE solution.

Proof. Under RE, at every period $t$ the agents have homogenous price expectations, and by extension homogenous demand schedules (3) and realized demands. The agents know that and so can infer the realized demands (and the mood indices) of all agents in the economy. Since there is no private information, the information set of every agent is the same and publicly known, hence the network cannot provide any additional information. □

Proposition 2. Under Rational Expectations, the fundamental price (6) defined as $p_f = y/r$ is the unique stationary steady state such that the predictions are constant over time (in expected terms) and model consistent, namely $p_{t+1}^* = E_t\{p_{t+1}\} = E_{t-1}\{p_t\}$ for every period $t$.

Proof. Recall that the market clearing (9) gives the price $p_t$ as a linear function of price expectations in the next period

$$p_t = \frac{\hat{p}_{t+1} + y}{R} + \eta_t.$$  

In expected terms, model consistent predictions in a stationary steady state imply thus the predictions must be homogenous and solve the equation

$$p^* = \frac{p^* + y}{1 + r},$$

which implies $p^* = y/r$. □

Proposition 3. Explosive price paths are possible RE solutions in the model without additional constraints on the price. A price cap $\Pi > p_t$ reduces the set of RE equilibria to the fundamental solution.

Proof. Assuming model consistent predictions, agents are able to ‘guess’ the next price $p_{t+1}$ (less the random shock $\eta_{t+1}$). Thus, the market clearing equation requires

$$p_t = \frac{(1 - n_t)p_{t+1} + n_t p_f + y}{R},$$

where the share of the robotic trader $n_t$ is defined by equation (7). It is easy to see (cf. Hommes et al., 2005) that without the robotic trader, the prices could lie on an explosive path with growth rate $R$. However, the presence of the robotic trader implies that explosive paths have to grow even faster to ‘outweigh’ the robotic trader. Specifically

$$p_{t+1} = \frac{R p_t - (1 - \exp (-\phi |p_{t-1} - p_f|)) p_f'}{\exp (-\phi |p_{t-1} - p_f|)}.$$

Because this non-linear dynamic system is analytically cumbersome and furthermore discontinuous exactly at its steady state,27 I present the following proof of the system’s instability.

27Specifically, the robotic trader share $n_t$ is a function of absolute price deviation from the fundamental solution.
Recall that by definition of the fundamental solution, \( y = rp^f \). Consider now a case such that \( p_t > p^f \) and furthermore \( p_{t-1} \neq p^f \), which implies \( n_t > 0 \). It follows that

\[
(r + n_t)p_t > (r + n_t)p^f
\]

\[
[(1 + r) - (1 - n_t)]p_t - y - n_t p^f > 0
\]

\[
Rp_t - n_t p^f - y > (1 - n_t)p_t
\]

\[
p_{t+1} > p_t.
\]

Symmetric proof shows that if \( p_t < 0 \) and \( p_{t-1} \neq 0 \), \( p_{t+1} < p_t \). In words, if the price diverges from the fundamental equilibrium under model-consistent predictions for two periods \( t \) and \( t - 1 \) (disregarding the price shocks), then the agents predict that the price in next period \( t + 1 \) will diverge even more from the fundamental and in the same direction as it happened in period \( t \).

This implies that price time paths are monotonic for every period \( s \) subsequent from \( t - 1 \), \( s \geq t \). It is easy to see that in the limit the prices will diverge to infinity or negative infinity, since the term \( \frac{R}{1 - n_t} \) grows over time. Notice there is an infinite number of such explosive solutions.

The infinite price decline is impossible due to the natural non-negativity constraint. In a similar vein, infinite price growth is curbed if there is an additional price cap \( p_t < \Pi \).

\[\square\]

### B Proof of Lemma 1

**Proof.** Recall that the optimal demand of an agent \( i \) is

\[
\begin{equation}
\tag{26}
z_{i,t} = \frac{\breve{p}_{i,t+1} + y}{a^2} - \frac{R}{a^2} p_t.
\end{equation}
\]

In the same manner, demand of the robotic trader is simply

\[
\begin{equation}
\tag{27}
z_{ROBO,t} = \frac{p^f + y}{a^2} - \frac{R}{a^2} p_t.
\end{equation}
\]

Finally, the realized price setting the price shock to zero is

\[
\begin{equation}
\tag{28}
p_t = \frac{\hat{p}_{t+1} + y}{R} = \frac{(1 - n_t)\breve{p}_{t+1} + n_t p^f + y}{R}.
\end{equation}
\]

Substituting (28) into (26) we obtain

\[
\begin{equation}
\tag{29}
z_{i,t} = \frac{\breve{p}_{i,t+1} + y}{a^2} - \frac{R}{a^2} \frac{\hat{p}_{t+1} + y}{R}
\end{equation}
\]

\[
\begin{equation}
= \frac{\breve{p}_{i,t+1} - \hat{p}_{t+1}}{a^2}.
\end{equation}
\]
It follows that the demand of agent $i$ at period $t$ $z_{i,t}$ is positive only if the price forecast for period $t + 1$ of that agent is larger than the average (including the robotic trader) forecast of $p_{t+1}$, namely if $p_{i,t+1} > \hat{p}_{t+1}$. By extension, the robotic trader will also buy the asset if his prediction (which is the fundamental value) is larger than the average market prediction, that is if the average market prediction is below the fundamental.

\[ \square \]

C Equivalence of forecasting and trading peer bias.

In the model, I specified the peer effect and the corresponding herding/contrarian strategies as the bias to the price forecast. In this appendix I will show that this can be reinterpreted as a demand bias. To be specific, following AHM14 the agents in my model forecast the prices with adaptive/trend extrapolation rule (optimized with GA procedure) and hence trade optimally; however, they can also change their price forecast if they observe their friends to be optimistic/pessimistic, which is measured by the trust index $\gamma \in [1,1]$ in (13). I defined herding (contrarian) behavior as $\gamma > 0$ ($\gamma < 0$).

However, one may think that herding or contrarian behavior has nothing to do with price forecasting itself, but rather reflects an additional (possibly irrational) bias to the demand. In other words, the agent has a price forecast, which in our case is generated by the GA optimized heuristic, but in principle could follow any other model, ranging from fundamental to simple adaptive or naive expectations. The agent hence uses this forecast to compute the optimal demand and only then adds or subtracts an additional quantity to the demand if she follows herding or contrarian strategy.

To see that these two interpretations are equivalent, recall the forecasting heuristic (13). Substituting it into the optimal demand schedule (3) yields

\[
\begin{align*}
    z_{i,t} &= \frac{p_{i,t+1}^{e,Peer} + y - Rp_t}{a\sigma_a^2} \\
    &= \frac{\alpha p_{t-1} + (1 - \alpha)p_{i,t-1} + \beta(p_{t-1} - p_{t-2}) + \gamma \Gamma_{Peer_{i,t-1}} + y - Rp_t}{a\sigma_a^2} \\
    &\equiv \frac{p_{i,t+1}^{e,NoPeer} + y - Rp_t}{a\sigma_a^2} + \gamma \tilde{\Gamma}_{Peer_{i,t-1}},
\end{align*}
\]

where $\tilde{\Gamma} = \Gamma / a\sigma_a^2$ is a constant measuring agents’ sensitivity to the peer effect, $\gamma \in [-1,1]$ is the trust index as in the main body of the paper and

\[
    p_{i,t+1}^{e,NoPeer} = \alpha p_{t-1} + (1 - \alpha)p_{i,t-1} + \beta(p_{t-1} - p_{t-2})
\]

is the original adaptive/trend extrapolation forecasting heuristic from AHM14.

We can see that the demand written as (30) exemplifies the above mentioned interpretation: agents forecast the next price with the typical heuristic, which is agnostic to the friends’ behavior; but then the agents have an additional demand bias depending on the trust index
Consider now a GA model in which the agents use (31) to obtain price forecasts $p_{e,t+1}^e$ and hence use the herding/contrarian biased demand (30). Next, they update $\alpha$ and $\beta$ the parameters of the forecasting heuristic (31) and the bias $\gamma$ with the GA procedure, where the performance of a heuristic specification is measured in terms of logit transformation of the hypothetical utility (2). To be specific,

$$V_{i,h,t} = U_{i,h,t+1} + z_{i,t}(p_{e,NoPeer}^e) (p_{t+1} + y - Rp_t) - \frac{a}{2} \sigma_a^2 z_{i,t}(p_{e,NoPeer}^e)^2.$$  

Now define the realized return on the asset as

$$\rho_{t+1} = p_{t+1} + y - Rp_t.$$  

The demand function (30) with quantity bias is equivalent to the demand used in the paper (forecasting bias and no quantity bias), and so using (33) we can rewrite

$$V_{i,h,t} - U_{i,h,t+1} = \frac{p_{e,Peer}^e + y - Rp_t}{a \sigma_a^2} (p_{t+1} + y - Rp_t) - \frac{a \sigma_a^2}{2} \left( \frac{p_{e,Peer}^e + y - Rp_t}{a \sigma_a^2} \right)^2$$

$$= \frac{(p_{e,Peer}^e - p_{t+1} + \rho_{t+1})\rho_{t+1}}{a \sigma_a^2} - \frac{(p_{e,Peer}^e - p_{t+1} + \rho_{t+1})^2}{a \sigma_a^2}$$

$$= \frac{(p_{e,Peer}^e - p_{t+1})p_{t+1} + \rho_{t+1}^2}{a \sigma_a^2} - \frac{(p_{e,Peer}^e - p_{t+1})^2}{a \sigma_a^2} + 2(p_{e,Peer}^e - p_{t+1})\rho_{t+1} + \rho_{t+1}^2$$

$$= \frac{\rho_{t+1}^2}{2a \sigma_a^2} - \frac{(p_{e,Peer}^e - p_{t+1})^2}{2a \sigma_a^2}.$$  

It follows that the performance of the quantity-biased demand (30) is equal to a constant term minus MSE of the forecast-biased heuristics (13). Therefore, in practice the two models: in which the peer effect bias appears in the price forecast or directly in the demand, are equivalent, if one properly chooses the sensitivity parametrization of the logit transformation.

## D Definition of network properties

Consider $I$ agents, who are placed within an unweighted, symmetric and a-transitive network of friends $I$. First recall that degree between two agents is defined as the shortest path (sequence of linked agents) between them. The following measures are commonly used to describe the architecture of the network $I$:

**Number of clusters** I define cluster as a subset of the network such that (1) all the agents in the cluster are pairwise connected (there exists a path of a finite degree between them) and (2) none of the agent is connected with any agent that does not belong to the cluster. In some of the analyzed networks, the agents form ‘non-trivial’ subsets such that there is no link between them. On the other hand, these agents will still interact indirectly, through the market clearing price. **Diameter** Also denoted as the characteristic degree
or the longest path, simply measures what is the longest path between nodes in the network.\textsuperscript{28}

**Closeness** This measure is typically set as the average degree: how far away agents are on average. The drawback of the average path length is that it cannot properly cope with networks of disconnected clusters, and hence I will follow suggestion of Newman (2003) and use the closeness measure instead. First recall that the network is anti-reflexive, or that we disregard whether an agent is linked with herself or not. Instead, we are interested in what is the typical distance between the agent and the remaining \( I - 1 \) agents. Thus define

\[
Cl = \frac{1}{0.5I(I - 1)} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=i+1}^{I} d_{ij}^{-1},
\]

where \( d_{ij}^{-1} \) is the inverse of the shortest path length (degree) between agents \( i \) and \( j \), or 0 if these two agents are not connected. The closeness measure \( Cl \) is an index with a straightforward interpretation: if all the agents are connected (disconnected), \( Cl = 1 \) (\( Cl = 0 \)).

**Density** Denote the number of links between the agents as \( E \). Density is defined as

\[
DE = \frac{E}{0.5I(I - 1)},
\]

which is simply the ratio of realized to potential links: how dense the network is.

**Transitivity** Often described as ‘cliquishness’ or clustering, shows whether the nodes in the network form triangles (‘cliques’): friends of my friends are also friends of mine. Among many formal definitions of this measure, I follow Watts and Strogatz (1998) and specify transitivity as computationally efficient index of the form

\[
Tr = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \frac{\text{number of triangles connected to vertex } i}{\text{number of triples centered on vertex } i}.
\]

If the agents are always (never) connected with the friends of their friends, \( Tr = 1 \) (\( Tr = 0 \)).\textsuperscript{29}

Notice that (37) is a local, not a global measure. It shows how close are friends of friends, but not whether the network can be divided into significantly differentiated clusters of ‘sub-networks’. In order to avoid confusion I decided to adopt the name ‘transitivity’ instead of the widely used ‘clustering’.

\textsuperscript{28}Sometimes unconnected nodes are said to have path equal to infinity. I will define diameter disregarding such unconnected nodes.

\textsuperscript{29}Notice that if a vertex \( i \) is not a center of any triple, it cannot be a part of a triangle either. In such a case, the element in the sum would be a ratio of zero to zero. Instead, it is simply defined as zero.
(f) Network properties

Figure 18: Realized random(4) networks.

E Large networks characteristics
Figure 19: Realized random(16) networks.
Figure 20: Realized rewired(4, 0.01) networks.
Figure 21: Realized rewired(4, 0.1) networks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network size</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Diameter</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Transitivity</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.1977</td>
<td>0.01602</td>
<td>0.6808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Network properties

**Figure 22:** Realized rewired(16, 0.01) networks.
Figure 23: Realized rewired(16, 0.1) networks.