The course of co-option: Co-option of local power-holders as a tool for obtaining control over the population in counterinsurgency campaigns in weblike societies. With case studies on Dutch experiences during the Aceh War (1873-c. 1912) and the Uruzgan campaign (2006-2010)
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Martijn Kitzen
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‘What he now wanted to achieve was an aim the idea of which sprang from his humanity, from the noblest part of himself. What he now wanted to achieve was an ideal, the ideal of the Westerner in the east and of the Westerner who sees the east as he wishes to see it and as he could but see it.’
Louis Couperus, *The Hidden Force*

‘In the end, we are just passing through.’
Dutch Special Forces captain, July 2007
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