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The Nerve Centre of Political Networks?
The Burgundian Court and the Integration of Holland and Zeeland into the Burgundian State, 1425–1477

Mario Damen

All over Western Europe, late medieval princes offered aristocrats the opportunity to exercise important state functions. They did not hesitate to grasp these chances because in this way they could not only defend the rights and benefits of their lord but also promote their own interests. However, in the process of forming what is commonly called the Burgundian state – all the duchies, counties, lordships etc., which the Burgundian dukes from Philip the Bold to Charles the Bold succeeded in uniting in a personal union – the incorporation of the principal noble families of the different territories did not develop along the same lines. Werner Paravicini has noted that Burgundian, Picardian and Brabantine nobles dominated Philip the Good’s household, the court in its most narrow institutional definition. Conversely, the political integration of the counties of Holland and Zeeland in 1433 was not reflected in the composition of the household of the Burgundian duke. Paravicini explains the absence of nobles from Holland and Zeeland in the duke’s household by pointing to the enforced incorporation of the counties into the Burgundian state. Moreover, the nobles did not constitute a social and political block but were strongly divided into two rival political networks.¹

Rivalries between parties were a constant factor in the politics of the counties of Holland and Zeeland during the second half of the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. The two parties were the Hoeken and Kabeljauwen and consisted of nobles, countrymen and town-dwellers. Many authors have written on the political struggles fought out between the parties, though the debate continues over what they actually were. Wim Blockmans and Antheun Janse define them as political associations on a supra-local level connected to two or more rivals for princely power in the counties. Hence, these associations manifested themselves at times when a

dynastic crisis occurred. They then mobilised their blood relations and friends and clustered around the two rivals. When princely power was (re-)established the political groupings did not vanish but sought to accumulate as much power as possible at the different administrative levels, while respecting the legitimacy of the prince.2

If the household did not have the function of integrating the politically divided nobles of these counties, the question arises of whether the nobles were attached to the new dynasty in another way. To answer this, the definition of the court needs to be extended, as the editors of this volume have done, to a ‘social and political body focused on the prince but incorporating much of the elite of any given polity’. Philip the Good succeeded in using the existing antagonisms to come to power in Holland and Zeeland, and then incorporating the two rival political networks into new institutional structures. These networks, which were closely linked to the preceding prince John and to Jacqueline of Bavaria, were not integrated into the central institutions (household, Great Council and Golden Fleece) but were given material and juridical advantages and political power at a regional level in exchange for loyalty. In other words, the integration of the noble elite in Holland and Zeeland did not take place at the central level of the Burgundian state but at a regional level. Subsequently, in Holland and Zeeland the Burgundian court did not have a stabilising and integrating function, as was the case, for example, in Flanders. Here, not only the patron (the prince) brought together (groups of) clients but the most important among them also brought their own clienteles into the court. Economic capital (salaries, pensions, gifts) was continuously exchanged for social (services, loyalty) and symbolic capital (honour and prestige) to maintain these networks and clienteles.3

This chapter aims to analyse how the Burgundian dukes managed to control the political process in Holland and Zeeland and get a grip on the noble elites of the counties in the period 1425–77. The point of view is from ‘above’, from the Burgundian court in the sense of a central political institution focused on the prince. Despite the institutional differentiation, the Burgundian court still remained ‘the centre of political decision-making’.4 Therefore, the position of the duke’s lieutenant, the stadholder, as a central link between the court and the regional institutions, will be explored first. Then the question will be posed as to why the duke chose exactly those few nobles who were given a place in the main court insti-
tutions. The focus will be on two families, the Van Montfoorts, opposed to the Burgundian take-over, and the Van Borselens, supporters of Philip the Good. Finally, I will examine the attitude of subjects towards the activities of agents of the court in the counties.

The foundation of the incorporation of Holland and Zeeland into the Burgundian state was laid down in the double alliance of 1385 in Cambrai, where the male heirs of the Burgundian and Bavarian dynasties married each other’s sisters. When the Bavarian heir, William VI, died in 1417, the Burgundian duke, John the Fearless, was alert. At first he aimed at indirect control over the counties via the marriage of Jacqueline, William VI’s only child, with his nephew John IV, duke of Brabant. However, John of Bavaria, William VI’s ambitious brother and elect of Liège, threw a spanner in the works and succeeded in acquiring comital power in 1419. When John died in January 1425, and the formal heir John IV recovered the counties, the Burgundians finally got their chance. However, the take-over of power in the years 1425–33 met heavy resistance from Jacqueline and her clientele.5

The Stadholder

The Hague had become an important residence for the Bavarian dynasty, at least for Albert of Bavaria, but lost that function for the Burgundians. Holland and Zeeland were their northernmost territories and the town was not a regular stop on their itineraries. As the new duke was hardly ever present in The Hague, a governor, from 1448 onwards called stadholder, was appointed as his lieutenant. The stadholder acted as the chairman of the most important political and judicial institution of the counties, the council, and would prove to be the principal link between the regional and the central administrative apparatus. The council consisted of five to ten remunerated councillors and acted as the highest administrative and judicial institution of the counties. It was not a new institution but the continuation of the already existing comital council. With the prince and the court at a distance, the members of the council were no longer maintained by the prince in kind (food, clothes, housing) but were supported with an annual salary.6

Five of the six governors and stadholders appointed in Holland between 1428 and 1477 were ‘foreigners’, members of important noble lineages from Flanders or


Hainault. They were of crucial importance to the prince for their bilingualism (French and Dutch), expertise, reliability and impartiality. As the duke selected the stadholders from his Great Council they were supposed to guarantee an effective monitoring of the regional administrative machinery and act as a liaison for the prince and the central institutions.\(^7\) Moreover, they were all, bar one, members of the Order of the Golden Fleece, a select circle of important nobles from all Burgundian territories who had taken an oath of loyalty to the duke.\(^8\)

All foreign governors and stadholders had a special relationship with the duke or a high-ranked official at the court. The first two foreign governors, Roeland van Uutkerke (1428–30) and Hue de Lannoy (1432–40) were almost certainly appointed because of their excellent relationship with the duke. Van Uutkerke and de Lannoy were two of the most active councillors-chamberlain within the Great Council in the 1420s and 1430s. Besides, they belonged to the pro-English faction at the court and performed several diplomatic missions to England; de Lannoy even wrote two memoranda for the duke in 1436 in which he predicted the disastrous consequences of a war with England.\(^9\) Guillaume de Lalaing (1440–5), conversely, had good connections with Philip the Good’s wife, Isabella of Portugal, as he was her chevalier d’honneur, an important member of her household, from 1436 onwards. His daughters grew up at the court of the duchess and Guillaume made some important diplomatic missions at her request.\(^10\)

The appointments of Jean de Lannoy (1448–62) and Louis of Gruuthuse (1462–77) show how the change of dominant networks within the Burgundian state trickled down to lower levels in the administrative hierarchy. Jean de Lannoy was the son of the sister of the first chamberlain, Antoine de Croÿ. Most likely he was appointed thanks to the mediation of his uncle Antoine and former governor Hue de Lannoy, another uncle. After 1457 the Croÿ clan became very powerful at the Burgundian court. Charles of Charolais feared for his position and from that year onwards he tried to secure his succession in Holland by all means at his disposal. In fact, Charles was creating his own clienteles at all levels in the


\(^8\) *Les chevaliers de l’Ordre de la Toison d’Or au XVe siècle: notices bio-bibliographiques*, ed. R. de Smedt (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1994) nos. 4, 7, 42, 50, 61.


Burgundian administration. In 1462 the States of Holland urged Charles to reform the council and to diminish the number of councillors when they negotiated with him on new subsidies. Charles considered the reformation of the council as an opportunity to instal his own clients. Of course the stadholder, as the most prominent political figure in Holland and Zeeland, had to be someone he could rely on and that is why Jean de Lannoy had to be disposed of. Louis of Gruuthuse, a powerful nobleman from Bruges and one of Charles’ councillor-chamberlains, was appointed as stadholder. But that was not enough. In 1463 four members of Charles’ household, all Flemings, were appointed as councillors. When Charles came to power, first in 1465 as lieutenant-general of his father and then officially in 1467 as duke, the regional institutions in The Hague scarcely required his attention because he already had the right men in the right places. That is why the composition of the council hardly changed after 1463.

Against Burgundy: The Van Montfoorts

However, administrative reforms and the appointment of a stadholder were not enough to ensure a stable political climate in the counties of Holland and Zeeland. The leading noble families had to be taken into consideration in one way or another. I will show first how the anti-Burgundian family Van Montfoort was approached by the Burgundian dukes.

Jan and Lodewijk van Montfoort were the foremost members of the clientele of Jacqueline of Bavaria. Although the town and castle of Montfoort were situated in the ecclesiastical principality of Utrecht and were held in homage of the bishop, the viscounty (burggraafschap) was held from the count of Holland. Through a marriage alliance with the Polanen dynasty in the fourteenth century the Van Montfoorts became involved in the politics of the county of Holland. The brothers Jan and Lodewijk van Montfoort were active in the household of William VI and remained faithful to his daughter Jacqueline. Because of their solid financial position they were appointed as treasurers in the service of Jacqueline in 1417. A year later, this

14 For an extended analysis of the network of Charles of Charolais in Holland see Damen, De staat van dienst, pp. 311–33.
most important financial office in the counties was held by Lodewijk van Montfoort together with Jan van Vianen. Despite their financial power, they were not able to prevent John of Bavaria from winning the war against Jacqueline.\textsuperscript{15}

When John of Bavaria died in 1425, Jacqueline, supported by the Van Montfoorts, took up arms against Philip the Good who had leased the counties from John IV of Brabant. For three years a kind of guerrilla war rolled over Holland. The Van Montfoorts invested a considerable amount of money in the war against Philip the Good. According to the early sixteenth-century \textit{Divisiekroniek}, Jan van Montfoort answered Jacqueline in 1432 after she had requested a loan from him that ‘he had spent his good money in her service and lost it all’.\textsuperscript{16} On behalf of Jacqueline the Van Montfoorts negotiated with Philip the Good for a truce in Bruges in the spring of 1428. They realised that the only way not to lose their political influence was to come to an agreement with the Burgundian duke. This strategy succeeded in working matters out to their benefit.

In July 1428 peace was finally established at Delft and Jacqueline did not lose all her rights. The new council which was established, and which governed Holland and Zeeland in the name of Philip and Jacqueline, consisted of nine men. Six were to be appointed by Philip, three by Jacqueline. Jan van Vianen and Jan van Montfoort were two of them. Five years later Philip the Good awarded the Montfoorts 3,000 \textit{écus} (some 10,000 daily wages of a master mason) for so-called travel and labour costs made for the benefit of the Treaty of Delft.\textsuperscript{17} In this way Philip the Good wanted to win their favour so that they would convince Jacqueline of the necessity of a treaty. It was a well-known tactic to bribe the councillors of the opponent. Some years later Philip the Good would have the same experience, but this time to his disadvantage, at the Congress of Arras when his own councillors accepted bribes from the French king.\textsuperscript{18}

The Van Montfoorts were integrated in other ways. In November 1432 Jan was appointed councillor-chamberlain in the household of Philip the Good. However, this was probably only an honorary appointment as one looks in vain in the court ordinances for Jan’s name.\textsuperscript{19} In the same month his eldest son, Hendrik, married the...
daughter of Philip's first chamberlain, Antoine de Croÿ. When de Croÿ was appointed bailiff and receiver of Woerden, a border territory with the ecclesiastical principality of Utrecht, he assigned his son-in-law as his substitute. Jan, a son of Lodewijk van Montfoort, followed a similar path; in 1445, at the age of eleven, he entered Philip's household as a squire (écuyer) and later he married a lady from a lineage from Franche-Comté. In the same year Lodewijk van Montfoort himself was appointed a member of the Council of Holland. Although there is no certain proof that the prince acted as a 'marriage broker', appointments to privileged positions and alliances with loyal noble families created durable links between the duke and his adversaries. Hence, in the case of the Van Montfoorts the court, as an institution and as a conglomerate of loyal family networks, did serve as an instrument of integration.

Nevertheless, this strategy did not work out as Philip had planned. Time and again the viscounts of Montfoort would form coalitions with anti-Burgundian (and later on anti-Habsburg) elements. The family Van Montfoort was, for example, closely related to and shared political interests with the family Van Brederode, which was expressed in 1449 in an act of alliance in which they promised each other mutual political support. This solidarity was expressed in the handing over of offices in the secular and spiritual institutions of Holland and Utrecht. When in the years 1455–6 Hendrik van Montfoort supported the provost of the secular chapter of St Saviour in Utrecht, Gijsbrecht van Brederode, as a candidate for the bishopric of Utrecht, he defied Philip the Good who wanted his bastard son David on the bishop's throne. Because Woerden was strategically placed on the road from The Hague to Utrecht, Hendrik van Montfoort (and in consequence his father-in-law, Antoine de Croÿ) was dismissed as bailiff and receiver. However, just before the Burgundian army marched in the direction of Utrecht, the Van Brederodes and Van

commission has not survived. There is only a copy in F. van Mieris, *Groot charterboek der graaven van Holland, Zeeland en heeren van Vriesland*, vol. IV (Leiden, 1756), p. 1007. However, in an enfiefment of 27 April 1433 Jan is called 'onsen getrouwen raedt ende camerlinck' (our loyal councilor-chamberlain): NA, Archief Grafelijkheidsrekenkamer, Registers, inv. no. 2, fols 67v, 184r. See other examples in Janse, *Ridderschap*, p. 364.


21 AGRek, inv. nos. 156, fol. 18v; nos. 1849–1857.


24 M. J. van Gent, 'Prettijke saken: Huwen en Kabeljauwen in het Bourgondisch-Oostenrijksche tijdperk' (The Hague, 1994), pp. 67–70. Gijsbrecht van Brederode succeeded Lodewijk van Montfoort as a member of the Council of Holland in 1451. In 1460 the ever-absent Van Brederode designated Willem van Brakel, chatelain of the castle of Montfoort, as his substitute: AGRek, inv. no. 155, fol. 89v and no. 161, fol. 81r. This solidarity between the two families again became apparent in 1460 when Gijsbrecht van Brederode handed over his office as provost of the chapter of St Saviour to Lodewijk van Montfoort's son Willem: AGRek, inv. no. 154, fols 83v, 84v. See also M. Damen, 'Serviteurs professionnels et profiteurs loyaux: hommes d’église au Conseil et à la Chancellerie de Hollande-Zélande (1425–1477)', *PCEEB*, 38 (1998), pp. 128–9.
Montfoorts yielded to Philip the Good’s will and accepted David as the new bishop. Although Hendrik’s son Jan III van Montfoort was appointed councillor-chamberlain by Maximilian in 1477, he took up arms against the new prince in the 1480s when trying to protect his own interests both in Holland and in the ecclesiastical principality of Utrecht.  

An Ambivalent Attitude: The Van Borselens

The Van Borselens were one of the few noble families from Zeeland who traditionally could exercise influence at the court in The Hague. They had become the most powerful noble family of Zeeland for several reasons. Firstly, they were very wealthy, not only due to their extended landed property but also thanks to their commercial activities. They benefited from the economic boom of the isle of Walcheren as a spin-off from the development of the nearby economic centres of Bruges and Antwerp. The count of Holland was eager to have noble strongholds in the contested county of Zeeland; already in 1282 Wolfert I van Borselen received the seaport of Veere as a perpetual fief from Count Floris V. Moreover, the Van Borselen were shipbuilders and ship owners. Those ships could be used both for commercial and for military goals. However, they did not only construct ships. The lords of Veere especially built up an international family network through marriage alliances. It is not an exaggeration to say that those who had the Van Borselens on their side, controlled Zeeland.

John of Bavaria was aware of the crucial position the Van Borselens held in Zeeland and therefore he already favoured them at an early stage, when he was lord of the isle of Voorne. In the period 1419–25 he appointed at least six members of the Van Borselen family to his household and council. After his death the Van Borselens offered their services to the Burgundian duke, who was eager to integrate the maritime potential of the family into his armies. Already in January 1426, after the battle at Brouwershaven where Jacqueline of Bavaria suffered a terrible defeat, Philip the Good considered Zeeland as conquered. He appointed Frank II and Hendrik II van Borselen as captains and lieutenants of Zeeland. After the peace treaty of Delft they were to play a commanding role in the Council of Holland and Zeeland. Eventually, due to financial and political problems, Philip the Good leased

29 Van Mieris, Charterboek, IV, p. 833. However, J. Pavion, La politique navale des ducs de Bourgogne (1384–1482) (Lille, 1995), pp. 59–69 does not mention the Van Borselens when describing the maritime war between Philip the Good and Jacqueline of Bavaria.
out the counties in 1430 to Frank, Floris and Filips van Borselen. Of these three men Frank received the highest salary and he acted in the years 1430–2 as a governor.\textsuperscript{30}

Nevertheless, Frank’s loyalty to the Burgundian duke was not absolute. The secret marriage he arranged with Jacqueline of Bavaria in the summer of 1432 was a serious threat to Burgundian rule as it purported to be a combination of the leaders of opposing networks of Kabeljauwen and Hoeken. But the marriage was exposed and as a result Frank was thrown into prison and Jacqueline was forced to renounce definitively her rights to the counties. After Jacqueline's abdication he was released from prison and the couple settled on the isle of Voorne. Frank’s political role seemed to have come to an end.\textsuperscript{31}

However, Frank van Borselen was too important to be neglected politically by the duke. This becomes clear in 1445. In November that year Philip himself came to Holland to restore internal peace since in the preceding years the towns had been disturbed by renewed conflicts between Hoeken and Kabeljauwen. At both the central and the regional political level the rival networks were offered positions in order to accelerate the pacification of the counties. At the sixth chapter of the Order of the Golden Fleece of 12 December in Ghent, Reinoud van Brederode and Frank van Borselen, probably still considered as the leading figures of the networks, were inaugurated as new members. Fifteen years after the foundation of the order, they were the first representatives of the nobility of Holland and Zeeland to have a seat among the foremost nobles of the Burgundian territories.\textsuperscript{32} It cannot be a coincidence that only two weeks before this, the marriage contract was drawn up between the Hoeken leader Van Brederode and Yolande de Lalaing, daughter of the former stadholder Guillaume.\textsuperscript{33} Van Brederode could be appointed because he was now considered as integrated into a pro-Burgundian family; Guillaume de Lalaing, although accused of a pro-Hoeken policy in Holland, was a trustee of Duchess Isabel.

Frank van Borselen did not only gain influence at the Burgundian court in a formal way. He ensured that the nearest collaborators of the duke were favourably disposed towards him. From as early as 1437 he paid first chamberlain Antoine de Croÿ an annual pension equivalent to the daily wages of 1,800 master masons.\textsuperscript{34} The regime change at the Burgundian court was also reflected in Frank’s display of generosity. In 1465, the year in which the Croÿ clan fell out of the duke’s favour, the payment of Antoine’s yearly pension was ended.\textsuperscript{35} Instead, two trustees of Charles

\textsuperscript{31} Jansen, \textit{Jacoba}, pp. 95–8.
\textsuperscript{32} Van Gent, ‘\textit{Pertijelike saken}’, pp. 56–8, 64–5.
\textsuperscript{34} See, e.g., AGRek, inv. no. 5576, fol. 50r (1437–8); inv. no. 5577, fol. 38v (1439–40); no. 5579, fol. 47r (1455).
\textsuperscript{35} AGRek, inv. no. 5588, fol. 56v.
the Bold, his steward and chamberlain Guillaume de Bische, and his audiencier Jean Gros III, were granted respectively the equivalent of 600 daily wages and 150 daily wages of a master mason. They received less than Croÿ but they of course were lower in rank than the first chamberlain. Frank granted them the yearly allowance because of ‘services performed in the past, today and to be performed in the future’.36 Both courtiers were active in financial and other affairs on numerous occasions in Holland and Zeeland and this may have directed Frank’s choice.37

Frank did not only try to maintain good relationships with high court officials at the central level but he also had direct connections at the regional level of the Burgundian administration with the Council of Holland; from 1445 onwards he managed to occupy a permanent seat in this institution for one of his clients.38 Frank was one of the many nobles who were present occasionally in the council without occupying a formal position in the institution. However, from 1445 onwards unsalaried councillors were denied access to the council. The assignment of a ‘reserved’ seat in the council for one of Frank’s clients can be interpreted as a compensation for the loss of direct influence. The good relations Frank maintained with the first chamberlain will almost certainly have helped to promote the appointment of his clients.

Hendrik van Borselen, lord of Veere, also belonged to the kindred of the Van Borselen although he came from a different branch than Frank. He was renowned as ‘more powerful in the isle of Walcheren than the duke himself’, and followed more or less the same political path as Frank. His naval potential was crucial for the duke, not only for the conquest of Holland and Zeeland, but also for putting down the rebellion of Bruges in the years 1436–7. In Bruges, Hendrik had personal connections since he was married to Johanna van Halewijn, who came from an important Bruges patrician family. Moreover, she was related to Philip the Good’s chamberlain and governor of Holland, Roeland van Uurkerke.39 When Hendrik’s daughter Margaretha married the future stadholder Louis of Gruuthuse (also from Bruges), the formation of a genuine family network in the estuary of the Zwin, closely connected to the Burgundian dynasty, reached its zenith.

However, Hendrik did not forget to promote his own interests and those of his seigneurial town of Veere. The marriages of his son Wolfert to princesses, first the Scottish Mary Stuart, and later the French Charlotte de Bourbon, demonstrate this. It is significant that an alliance with Van Borselen was considered in those royal circles as an opportunity. Veere benefited from these marriages: the staple for Scot-

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36 AGRek, inv. no. 5590, fol. 63v.
38 Frank’s councillor Gillis van Wissenkerke was a member of the Council of Holland and Zeeland from 1445 to 1453. He was succeeded by Frank’s receiver Jan Ruychrock who in 1463/4 was replaced by Jan’s son Filips Ruychrock. See their biographies in Damen, De staat van dienst, pp. 292–7, 488, 497–8.
tish wool was established there and the town received a privilege from the French
king to stimulate trade with the French seaports. Hendrik was constructing his
own networks outside and even against the interests of the Burgundian duke. There-
fore, not surprisingly Philip the Good admitted Hendrik as a member of the Golden
Fleece only two weeks after his appointment as admiral by Charles VII of France.

The appointment of Hendrik’s son Wolfert VI as chamberlain of Charles the
Bold and as admiral of Holland, Zeeland, Artois and Boulogne, had the same objective: an attempt to integrate the Van Borselens and their maritime potential into the
main political networks of the Burgundian state. However, Wolfert did not act very
wisely in politics after 1477 and he fell out of Maximilian’s favour. After Wolfert’s
death in 1486, Maximilian even ordered the removal of Wolfert’s coat of arms from
St Rombaut’s church in Malines where a chapter was held of the Order of the
Golden Fleece. This symbolic exclusion from the duke’s network has to be juxta-
posed with the incorporation of Wolfert’s extensive possessions through the
marriage-alliances of his daughters into families that were more favourably disposed
towards the Burgundian-Habsburg monarchy. As his sons had already died at an
erly stage, Wolfert was not able to continue the strategic (and international) matri-
rimonial policy of his father.

**Gifts for Courtiers**

So far we have seen how the duke managed to link the newly acquired territories of
Holland and Zeeland with the court through administrative reforms and the
appointment of a stadholder who was at the same time a member of his household
and council. Furthermore, we have explored what strategies were developed vis-à-vis
the duke’s noble opponents and collaborators. In this section we will explore the
views of subjects towards the prince and his court. Whereas Philip the Good relied
more or less on the stadholder and the members of the regional institutions for his
political activities (such as for example negotiations over new subsidies and the
establishment of new town governments), Charles the Bold relied less on these
intermediaries. He preferred to send his closest confidants to influence and sup-
ervise the process of decision-making.

The attitude of the ‘subjects’ (that is the political elites of the cities and States)
towards Burgundian officials reflects this change. Numerous entries in the accounts
of the cities of Leiden and Haarlem show that all kinds of payments in kind and
money to regional officers (hovescheden or ‘courtesies’) are concentrated in the first
two decades of Burgundian rule in Holland and Zeeland. At that stage the town
governments did not approach the duke and his entourage directly but instead used
confidential intermediaries. In the second half of the fifteenth century a shift can be

observed. Jim Ward has shown how three confidants of Charles the Bold, Jean Gros (mentioned above) and Guillaume de Bische, together with the papal protonotary Guillaume de Clugny, benefited more than any other Burgundian official from the cities’ generosity, while exercising a kind of political supervision in Holland, and imposing a mini-hierarchy on top of the Council of Holland and Zeeland. They became the new intermediaries between the subjects on the one hand and the prince and his court on the other. De Bische, for example, was granted a wedding gift by the cities of Holland in the autumn of 1466 because they had to settle more and more matters with Charles who had a ready ear for de Bische (‘soe als hij veel audiencie bij mijnen genadigen heere heeft’). Using these intermediaries could be useful to solve a problem in the short term, as for example a reduction in the payment of subsidies, the nomination of town councillors, or the acquisition of a certain privilege. However, the cities also tried to establish more permanent links with court officials. The resolution books of Leiden repeatedly speak of ‘friends at the court’ whom delegates of the city have to contact on a mission. Among these ‘friends’ the chancellor is nearly always named. These friendships were established and maintained in a very concrete way. From 1428 onwards the duke allowed the States to withhold the surplus of the money collected for the subsidies and to distribute it freely among officials throughout the Burgundian administration. In Zeeland this was done more consistently than in Holland, where in the 1470s the individual cities obtained control over the distribution of the gifts from the money left over from the subsidies paid to the duke. The number of beneficiaries of these yearly gifts, exceptional within the Burgundian state, varied from four to forty. In the course of the fifteenth century a clear shift in the money flow can be noted from the regional to the supra-regional level.

Of the beneficiaries related to the court, all successive chancellors, first chamberlains and stadholders benefited from the gifts in the period 1428–77. The amounts of money distributed were considerable. For example, the annual gift that first chamberlain Antoine de Croÿ received between 1445 and 1462 from the States of Zeeland (300 pounds Flemish of 40 groats – the equivalent of 1,200 daily wages of a master mason) almost equalled the maximum salary he could earn in the service of the duke.

43 Ward, ‘Guillaume de Clugny’.
47 He received 36s. per day, that is maximum 528 pounds Flemish 10s. (40 gr.) per year, whereas his yearly gift from the aides was 300 pounds. Gifts: Zeeuws Archief, Middelburg, Rekenkamer Zeeland I: Bourgondisch-Oostenrijkse tijdvak (herafter RKZ i) inv. no. 18, fol. 55r (1445); no. 32, fol. 77r.
year as stadholder, received annually in the period 1473–6 from the cities of Leiden and Haarlem altogether 450 pounds Flemish of the distribution money and on top of that another 570 pounds from the States of Zeeland. The stadholder, who was active both in The Hague and at the court, was of course an officer impossible to neglect.

After these top-ranking officials, numerous stewards (for example Baudouin d’Oignies, Jean de Quielaing, Pierre Bladelin and Guillaume de Bische), councillors-chamberlain (Jacques de Crévecœur, Jean de Créqui and Guy de Brimeu) and sommeliers de corps (Jean Martin, Jean Coustain and Jan van Boshuizen) were rewarded with gifts from the subsidies collected in Zeeland. Jan van Boshuizen, stemming from a Leiden patrician family and since the 1450s in the service of Charles the Bold, also received from 1469 onwards 45 pounds Flemish (of 40 groats) from the distribution money of his native town. Van Boshuizen, the only representative from the ‘urban nobility’ of Holland and Zeeland, had obtained a household office thanks to the special relationship Charles maintained with the family. The duke entrusted him with numerous missions in Holland and Zeeland. For the city of Leiden Jan van Boshuizen was an important ‘friend’ who had to be pampered.

With the yearly gifts the cities and the States established a reciprocal relationship with officers at the highest level of the Burgundian hierarchy which was financed by public funds. They won the friendship of these courtiers which could be generated when needed. Nevertheless, as soon as the States could get rid of these obligations, they took their chance. After the death of Charles the Bold in 1477, Mary of Burgundy granted the States of Holland and Zeeland a charter, known as the ‘Groot Privilege’, in which she exempted them from paying the remainder of the aide granted in 1473 and all the gifts related to it. However, the systematic distribution of gifts related to the fiscal system turned up again in the 1480s, albeit in a different form.

(1452); no. 37, fol. 42v (1457); no. 871, fol. 65v (1462). Salary: Database Prosopographia Burgundica (http://194.242.233.147:591) ID 0228.

48 Damen, De staat van dienst, p. 225.
50 GAL, SA inv. no. 539, fol. 144v; no. 542, fol. 102r; no. 543, fol. 175r; no. 547, fol. 151r; no. 549, fol. 129r; no. 550, fols 154v–155r; no. 552, fol. 168r–v.
Concluding Remarks

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, noble networks in Holland competed continuously for princely favours and official positions. In the Burgundian period, from 1425 onwards, some fundamental changes in this competition took place. In the Bavarian period princes normally favoured especially one of the competing networks. Moreover, the ruler was nearby and could be approached relatively easily. The Burgundian duke, however, hardly ever visited his northernmost territories. The rival noble networks were not integrated into the central institutions but were given material compensations and influence at a regional level in exchange for allegiance. Subsequently, in Holland and Zeeland the Burgundian court did not have a stabilising and integrating function.

However, the Burgundian dukes could not completely neglect the noble elite of the counties. With regard to the duke of Burgundy’s opponents in the years 1425–8, the Van Montfoorts were approached in a tactful way, in an attempt to earn their obligation towards the Burgundian court with marriage-alliances, offices, pensions and gifts. This strategy did not seem to work as planned as the Van Montfoorts maintained a relatively hostile attitude towards the Burgundian-Habsburg monarchy throughout the fifteenth century. On the other side of the political spectrum the support of the Van Borselens for the Burgundian take-over was initially taken for granted. Only later were they offered ceremonial positions at court, but by then they had already developed their own strategies aimed at promoting their interests at a national and international level. Whereas Frank van Borselen clearly tried to exercise influence at the court through gifts to high court officials, Hendrik van Borselen operated more independently.

The duke could exercise control over the political process within the counties via the stadholder. He represented the duke as the highest sovereign power in the counties, combining administrative, military and juridical duties in Holland and Zeeland with an office in the ducal household and membership of the Order of the Golden Fleece. In doing so the stadholder established a crucial link between the prince, his household and other central institutions on the one hand and his principalities in the north on the other. All stadholders owed their position to their good relationship with a powerful patron who could be the duke or one of the members of his household, for example his wife, his son or his first chamberlain. Therefore, changes at the top of the court hierarchy were soon reflected in the lower layers of the official hierarchy.

The name of first chamberlain Antoine de Croÿ pops up time and again when studying the relationship between the Burgundian court and the counties of Holland and Zeeland. He was not only involved in the marriage-alliances of the Van Montfoorts and the appointment of stadholder Jean de Lannoy, but he also received regular gifts from Frank van Borselen and the States of Zeeland. Next to the stadholder he (and after him officers like Guillaume de Bische and Jean Gros) acted as an important broker between the interests of the prince and the political elite of Holland and Zeeland. While initially the subjects (States and cities) were ill at ease
with the new political structures and sought assistance with intermediaries near home, they eventually found a way forward and ventured to approach the duke and his closest collaborators at the court directly. Incidental and regular gifts of money were important media through which subjects could establish and strengthen relationships with high court officials.

This chapter has not given an answer to Paravicini’s question about the absence of nobles from Holland and Zeeland in the duke of Burgundy’s household. The integration of Holland and Zeeland into the Burgundian state, however, cannot only be explained by counting formal appointments of nobles, or by describing administrative reforms at a regional level. The informal contacts created between the political elites of the counties and the top layers of the Burgundian administration were probably of an even greater importance.