Analytical Framework

Inclusive Development, Justice and Energy Transition

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2. Analytical Framework: Inclusive Development, Justice and Energy Transition

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Abstract
Understanding how fossil fuels can be rapidly phased out in a just manner requires an analytical framework. This chapter combines an energy transition framework with an inclusive development framework. The energy transition is about how niche ideas can become regimes and then cause landscape transformation. Inclusive development focuses on social inclusiveness, ecological inclusiveness and relational inclusiveness. This chapter aims to create an analytical framework for this book (and future studies) to analyse whether ideas of energy transformations are in a niche or transformation stage and whether they are socially, ecologically and relationally inclusive. It also looks at the role of key actors—local groups (through using theories of social movements), investors and producers, and states in the phasing-out of fossil fuel and niche ideas that they are promoting.

Keywords: fossil fuel phase-out, socio-environmental justice, actors, inclusive development, transformation

2.1. Introduction

In order to analyse the role of different actors, arguments and approaches in leaving fossil fuels underground (LFFU), this book uses an analytical framework that combines several theoretical approaches. As explained in Chapter 1, we focus on the North–South dimensions of the urgent challenge

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of phasing out fossil fuels and on the related global justice agendas as well as the policies and social movements in South Africa and Ecuador. Ranging from climate justice and socio-environmental justice to economic and intergenerational justice, these agendas emerge both from local social and political struggles, and from the global 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) (UNGA, 2015). Given the radical nature of this challenge and these agendas, it comes as no surprise that the social and political debates on LFFU involve a wide range of interesting ideas as well as profound differences over what the main obstacles and the best course of action and governance are. The academic studies and debates on the subject show similar diversity and dissonances. Our analytical framework acknowledges these differences and indicates the research direction through which we aim to identify successful strategies for LFFU and the possibilities of scaling them up. Section 2.2 discusses how our study of LFFU and energy transition relates to debates and concepts on inclusive development and socio-environmental justice. In Section 2.3, we examine a few relevant theories on the role of actors, approaches and arguments, focusing on social movements, investment actors and states. Finally, before drawing some conclusions, Section 2.4 integrates some key conceptual and theoretical elements into an analytical framework that will guide this book's overall assessment of the possibilities and obstacles for leaving fossil fuels underground globally, but especially in the Global South.

2.2. Energy transition and justice through inclusive development

2.2.1. Energy, development and socio-environmental justice

As any society and any type of development requires energy, the availability of energy has always been strategically important. Since fossil fuels became the main source of energy, countries with substantial reserves of coal, oil and gas were generally considered to be in an advantageous position for development. Provided that they could access the necessary technology and investment, they could use these energy resources for internal use as well as for exporting to countries that are less endowed. However, during the 20th century, it became clear that for societies in the Global South, having a wealth of fossil fuels does not necessarily generate substantial economic progress, social well-being and political stability. Beyond a variety of positive and negative examples, comparative analyses demonstrated that fossil fuel

wealth can in fact even slow down countries' economic modernisation, poverty alleviation and democratic institution-building. While some call it the paradox of plenty (cf. Karl, 1997), this tendency has become best known as the "resource curse" (cf. Ross, 1999). While fossil fuel extraction and exports generate massive foreign investments and state revenues, in Africa, Latin America and beyond, this often perpetuates uneven development instead of contributing to inclusive development (Bebbington et al., 2018a; Hogenboom, 2012; Hogenboom, 2018; Rempel & Gupta, 2021).

Academic studies into the nature and causes of the resource curse in the Global South point to several problems and perverse effects related to fossil fuel wealth. Dependency on external technology, markets and knowledge implies dependency on foreign companies, banks and governments. While most countries nationalised their fossil fuel reserves and created state-owned companies to control part of the operations (see 2.3.4), this external dependency remained prominent. The fact that fossil fuels are connected to large capital flows may generate even larger risks. Economically, the dependency on revenues with volatile prices is problematic, as is the dependency on powerful foreign companies. Furthermore, large-scale fossil fuel exports usually harm other sectors and economic diversification. While this tendency is commonly known as the "Dutch disease," Coronil (2008) prefers to call it the "neocolonial disease." Financially, the availability of large fossil fuel reserves triggers the accumulation of foreign debts, not only to allow for the development of fossil fuel projects and infrastructure, but also because these reserves are viewed as a collateral for additional lending by both the national government and external creditors. Politically, fossil fuel revenues are prone to give way to inefficient public spending, corruption and elite capture. It also tends to trigger a culture of rent-seeking behaviour that affects the public sector, the private sector and organised civil society (e.g. trade unions), resulting in the development of a rentier state and even a rentier society (Peters, 2017). Moreover, geopolitically, large national reserves and exports are automatically of huge international importance, involving actors and interests that easily overpower national actors and interests. Even in countries of the Global South where governments recently claimed to break away from the past and use fossil fuel wealth for the benefit of inclusive development and national sovereignty, such as in Latin America, many of the old patterns and problems were repeated (Svampa, 2015).

Particularly perverse "side effects" of fossil fuel wealth in the Global South can be found at the local sites of extraction, where communities and nature experience the disruptive and destructive side of this industry. While consciousness about the global problem of climate change and the

need to quickly make an energy transition has increased, consciousness about the local impact of the extraction, upgrading and transport of fossil energy sources at numerous sites remains relatively limited. The social and environmental externalities tend to be particularly huge in remote and marginalised areas, where not only the industry's technology, financial and human capital are more limited, but also governmental oversight is weak, and activists may have to risk their lives to rightfully protect their health, income, land and livelihoods. Human rights, ecological and distributional dimensions of the fossil fuel sector continue as a result of both the lack of visibility—even to a large part of society in the countries themselves—and the large national and international interests at stake (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003; Watts, 2005). In short, environmental and social justice are often simultaneously impaired by the fossil fuel industry (Sovacool, 2016).

Despite the inequalities that the fossil fuel enterprise creates, it also fosters multiple dependencies: from the poorest to the richest in society, they all need fuel for their livelihoods and jobs. Ironically, the poor often depend more on cheap fossil fuels. This creates an additional challenge for achieving an inclusive energy transition. Moreover, the need to address energy poverty also ends up being used as a justification by states and energy companies to continue to invest in fossil fuels. Simultaneously, the huge amount of capital involved in the fossil fuel sector make it a lucrative business for the Global North to not only use the Global South as a source of resources (à la dependency theory) but also to dump its know-how, technology and infrastructure onto the Global South now that it is clear that fossil fuels need to be phased out (see Chapter 9).

Socio-environmental justice can be seen from two different schools of thought. The legal school has engaged with justice issues for centuries, focusing on how justice can be defined and how it evolves over time. Where legislative systems fail to address justice issues, the court systems are critical for testing justice concepts within a specific context. Legal systems do not (necessarily) promote a certain kind of justice; they evaluate different claims to justice and weigh these against each other. More recently, the political ecology school of justice focuses on how social dimensions (e.g. in relation to race, ethnicity, gender, class, caste, deprivation, disability, age, generation) influence and are affected by development strategies and other political decisions, and their environmental aspects—air, water and land pollution, loss of biodiversity, loss of fisheries and so on. Political ecology focuses on how marginalised and vulnerable groups are exposed to major intersectional inequalities through the way the society and economy are designed (Walker, 2012). Political ecology studies focus on economic,

ecological as well as cultural distribution conflicts (Escobar, 2006). They demonstrate "a sensitivity to environmental politics as a process of cultural mobilisation, and the ways in which such cultural practices—whether science, or traditional knowledge, or discourses, or risk, or property rights—are contested, fought over, and negotiated" (Watts, 2000, p. 259). Social mobilisation over environmental concerns not only serves immediate local needs but simultaneously challenges systemic inequalities. The two schools can be seen to intersect on the streets and in the courts. When social movements challenge existing policies in courts, the courts weigh these arguments against those of the other actors. As courts may be conservative in trying to promote a predictable and fair legal system, initial court cases by social movements may fail. But as social movements persist, the values and norms they promote acquire greater legitimacy and courts may accept their position and this leads to a new equilibrium in justice values in a society. In this book, we look at how both social movements and courts are addressing and resolving justice issues around energy.

For the study of LFFU we also need to look into debates and theories on climate justice and climate debt. Following directly from the environmental justice movement, climate justice "addresses the intersections of 'green' ecological concerns and 'red' socio-economic ethical considerations, ranging from public policy deliberations to political practices" (Bond, 2013, p. 133). Climate justice advocates tend to be critical of UN interstate climate negotiations for insufficiently dealing with the current and historical responsibility of the largest GHG-emitting countries, the major transnational energy companies and the Global North. Although in 2012 the concept of climate debt was ultimately recognised by the UNFCCC, putting climate debt compensation or payments into practice is still a challenge. Since the early 1990s, there have been proposals to address liability and climate debt. More recently, interesting, detailed proposals have been developed in Latin America (Ecuador) and Africa (Namibia) (Bond, 2018). In addition, when it comes to climate change and socio-environmental justice, a particularly challenging issue to tackle concerns state–corporate crime: "the ways illegal acts and social injuries often emerge from the intersection of economic and political power" (Kramer, 2013, p. 157). This short overview shows that political economy is also central to academic studies and debates on energy, climate change and socio-environmental justice and requires transformative change of the state and corporations. It also raises issues regarding what kind of development we want.

As the following subsection (2.2.2) will indicate, our multidimensional approach to justice resonates with the concept of inclusive development.

Social and ecological inclusiveness refers to the challenges faced by those externalised or marginalised by existing policies, while relational inclusiveness, inter alia, looks at the relations between actors and how social movements fight for justice and how courts and legislatures respond. Our multi-level approach to justice will focus on the differing justice issues at all levels of governance.

2.2.2. Inclusive development: A comprehensive multidimensional perspective

The question of what kind of development should be strived for has been heavily discussed for centuries and links to fundamental social, political and academic debates. Since the mid-20th century, the debates about how to overcome development problems in the Global South have generated numerous new views and policy agendas. Many of these departed from an economic and social development objective—for example, dependency and underdevelopment theories that proposed fundamentally restructuring the global political economy and argued for national and global agendas for poverty reduction and pro-poor growth that aimed at policy reforms and additional funding. Subsequently, ecological crises and the awareness of global environmental limits and interdependencies gave way to new views of how to develop within ecological boundaries, both in the Global North and the Global South. Ideas on sustainable development initially stressed the importance of including economic, social and environmental goals; current and future generations (WCED, 1987). While sustainable development policies of multilateral institutions have been criticised for only addressing socio-environmental needs to the extent that it would not harm dominant economic and political interests (and consolidating rather than overcoming global inequalities and injustice), the idea or at least the discourse of sustainable development gained wide support from NGOs, businesses and governments and led to the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Increasingly, calls for overcoming gender inequality and racism also gained strength and have been included in global debates and agendas for sustainable and inclusive development, such as the Millennium Goals and the SDGs. Since the turn of the century, however, the ways in which new concerns and adjectives were adopted in development discourses and policies of major international actors have been criticised for not addressing the root causes of the problems and for, at best, only reforming rather than transforming the global system. In particular, the growing awareness of climate change and the loss of forests and biodiversity have sparked new

debates on degrowth and alternatives for development (such as *ubuntu*, *buen vivir*, gross national happiness [Van Norren, 2017]), calling for a fundamental rethinking or even altogether leaving aside the idea of development.

In this book, we adopt an inclusive development perspective where inclusiveness is *not* an adjective to development—instead, it redefines the content of development. Core to this approach is the notion of socio-environmental and relational justice. This multidimensional and comprehensive approach thus enables us to look at the problem of phasing out fossil fuel with its huge economic costs from a social, ecological and relational perspective (Gupta et al., 2015; Rauniyar & Kanbur, 2009; Rammelt & Gupta, 2021). This is different from adopting a sustainable development perspective as even though strong sustainability focuses on minimising economic, social and ecological trade-offs, the economic values still dominate as other dimensions cannot (and probably should not) always be translated into monetary terms.

Before discussing this comprehensive approach to inclusive development, let us indicate why it is important by referring to the debate around stranded resources/stranded assets. The stranded resources/assets theory points out that a phase-out of fossil fuels will imply that fossil fuel infrastructure and assets can no longer be used and that a substantial share of the fossil fuel resources and reserves become stranded resources (Griffin et al., 2015; Linnenluecke et al., 2015; Rozenberg et al., 2015). Based on the calculation that to achieve the 2 °C target, only 565 of the 2,975 gigatonnes (so less than one-fifth) of CO_2 available in assets can be used (McKibben, 2012), this results in huge, stranded assets and resources. Asset and resource holders will be reluctant to give these up (Matikainen & Soubeyran, 2022; Ansar et al., 2013), but they are in essence facing a financial risk—referred to as the carbon bubble (Carbon Tracker Initiative, n.d.). Whether phasing out fossil fuels happens due to new policies and legislation (e.g. carbon pricing), pressure from social movements and/or a market reaction (e.g. a shift towards renewables), it will require the fossil fuel industry and those who invest in it to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels (Ansar et al., 2013). As the economic costs and financial risks of leaving fossil fuels underground are very high (see Chapter 1), actors that mainly take economic arguments into account will be unable and unwilling to prioritise the ecological and social aspects. In effect, the economic approach, arguments and actions work against a rapid and fair phasing-out of fossil fuels.

An inclusive approach, in contrast, prioritises the access to a minimum of resources for all people, and a just allocation of the remaining resources, risks and responsibilities, both for current and future generations. Hence, a comprehensive inclusive development approach allows us to take a social,

ecological and relational perspective on economic issues, including challenging issues such as stranded assets. Chapter 1 presented some of the energy-related justice elements that also emerge from Agenda 2030. We identified socio-environmental justice issues such as access to income and services, but also to procedural rights and nature's contributions to people. Equally important is a fair allocation of energy and other resources through reducing inequality and changed production and consumption patterns within and between countries. Evidently, energy and its infrastructure are also indispensable for the economy.

The comprehensive inclusiveness approach applied in this book has three dimensions: social, ecological and relational (see Table 2.1). *Social inclusiveness* (justice) focuses on access issues. It includes access to (i) income/jobs above the poverty line; (ii) access to water, food, energy, health, housing and infrastructure; and (iii) access to procedural rights, including non-discrimination, rights of minorities (including Indigenous and spiritual communities) and women; rights to information, decision-making, recognition and courts. In terms of allocation, social inclusiveness is about sharing resources, risks and responsibilities equitably (Gupta & Lebel, 2020; UNDP, 1994). As mentioned in Chapter 1, Agenda 2030 includes all these access issues related to social inclusiveness. It also stresses that inequality must be addressed at all levels of governance, including globally, including income, production and consumption patterns and the impacts on least developed countries and small island states.

Ecological inclusiveness in terms of access is about access to the beneficial aspects of nature's contributions to people (NCP) (Díaz et al., 2018) and reduced exposure to ecological risks for the most marginalised and vulnerable people. Such access enables income generation from nature and reduced health risks from pollution, and it is protected through environmental rights and nature conservation as well as through territorial rights. In terms of allocation, ecological inclusiveness is about how natural resources, risks and responsibilities are shared, and how natural systems are protected, from the local to the global level. Here, citizens' rights in environmental decision-making are key ingredients contributing to environmental policies and agreements. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992) is a global commitment to grant every citizen the right of access to information, to participation in decision-making and to justice in environmental matters, which has been materialising at the local to regional level. So far, the Pan-European Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice inEnvironmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) (1998) is the most ambitious

step towards environmental democracy undertaken under the auspices of the UN (Ebbesson, 2007, p. 686), but in 2021 the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú Agreement, 2018) entered into force, which is expected to improve the protection of environmental defenders and vulnerable populations (Stec & Jendrośka, 2019).

Table 2.1. Inclusive development with socio-environmental justice

Inclusiveness	Just access to:	Just allocation of:
Social	(i) income/jobs above the poverty line; (ii) access to water, food, energy, health, housing and infrastructure; (iii) access to procedural rights, including non-discrimination, rights of minorities, women, developing countries; rights to information, decision-making, recognition and courts	(i) socio-economic resources (e.g. fossil fuel resources) and infrastructures; (ii) socio-economic risks; (iii) socio-economic responsibilities
Ecological	NCPs—material, non-material, regulating (all with a cultural component)—for the most marginalised to enable (i) income; (ii) healthy lives; (iii) environmental rights	(i) remaining NCPs; (ii) related risks; (iii) environmental responsibilities
Relational	Role of states (and interstate relations) and their ability to provide and/or protect social and ecological common goods and to address inequalities; role of other actors, including financial actors and their desire for maintaining the status quo, and social movements and their desire for change; role of dominant and alternative approaches and arguments in shaping the adoption of substantive and procedural principles, rights and responsibilities to address socio-environmental justice.	
Development	Inclusiveness redefines development away from growth to prioritise socio-environmental well-being of current and future generations	

Relational inclusiveness focuses on the politics of inclusiveness with two ontological strains; it examines existing inclusiveness/exclusiveness from the perspective of political ecology and subsequently explores means to address political exclusiveness from a social constructivist angle. Relational inclusiveness focuses on the role of the state, interstate relations and state–industry–people relations in providing and/or protecting public and merit goods; and the way discourses are translated into principles and instruments for socio-environmental justice. It looks at how other actors shape this relationship and in particular both social movements as well as large financial actors. Relational inclusiveness recognises that resource shortage within a neoliberal capitalist world leads to decisions in favour

of commodifying and privatising resources and promoting private sector participation in the supply of merit and public goods as well as using modern technologies to avoid or minimise the application of tax and labour laws.

Relational inclusiveness recognises that in an international relations context, control over resources—and hence control over the factors of production—leads to hegemonic approaches where states use sovereignty (see the adoption of the "full permanent sovereignty" argument in Chapter 1) and securitisation to justify not sharing resources, not accepting responsibility for damage caused to others and proactively using neoliberal capitalist strategies to access resources elsewhere (e.g. land and water grabbing) (Zoomers, 2010; Fairhead et al., 2012). These dominant tendencies stand in the way of a transition to inclusive development. Relational inclusiveness thus questions the perpetuation of non-inclusive systems and calls for more accountable governance systems that pre-empt the accumulation of power and wealth through dispossession which benefit some while harm others as well as nature (Gupta et al., 2015; Harriss-White, 2006; Hickey et al., 2014; Mosse, 2010).

Ultimately, inclusiveness redefines the content of development by arguing that development can no longer be measured in terms of GDP growth and requires a transition towards inclusive wealth (UNEP, 2018) or other ways of calculating human and ecosystem well-being. For the purpose of this book, our inclusive development perspective implies that our units of analysis include the issues presented in Table 2.1.

2.2.3. An inclusive development perspective on energy transition

Inclusive development is the normative lens that we apply to the challenge of phasing fossil fuel out. This challenge is often discussed in terms of the energy transition which refers to a supply-side process of moving from high-GHG-emitting energy sources to low- to no-GHG-emitting energy sources. This means moving from coal to oil to gas to renewables (with or without nuclear energy and biofuels). Such a transition can be incremental moving upwards from one level to the next or transformational where one skips certain levels. However, next to the entire supply side of infrastructure from extraction, production and distribution, for a full transition also the demand side of infrastructure and technology from households to industrial users will have to change (Geels et al., 2016).

In understanding the energy transition, it is important to appreciate what a transition is. Transitions are "processes of structural change in major societal subsystems" (Meadowcroft, 2009, p. 324) that "profoundly [alter]

the way [society] functions" (De Haan & Rotmans, 2011, p. 92). A transition often requires that all kinds of societal systems have to simultaneously change—this includes cultures and social systems, but also infrastructures as well as investments; and these have to change at all levels of governance, especially when the underlying energy system is a globally embedded system (Geels et al., 2016). This requires alignments not only between society, politics, economics and infrastructure, but also between "technologies, supply chains, infrastructures, markets, regulations, user practices and cultural meanings" (Geels, 2018, p. 224).

A transition normally requires experimental *niches* which can lead to changes in *regimes* before the entire *landscape* can change. This requires leaders and policy entrepreneurs, investors and an encouraging policy and legal infrastructure. It also requires the identification of micro-level technological niches that are radically different from the existing system and which can be nourished as incubation rooms and which can be scaled up to larger geographical areas and can lead to mainstreaming at the end (Geels & Schot, 2007). In the process several stages are distinguished: *pre-development* (status quo, small changes, niches; often involves high risk; can result from the work of NGOs or protests by social movements); *take-off* (collaboration between actors facilitated by windows of opportunity); *acceleration* (changes in institutional dynamics); and *stabilisation* (a new system is established) (Rotmans et al., 2001; Kemp & Loorbach, 2003). In order to stabilise, there needs to be a new status quo achieved where different government, businesses and civil society actors within the "triangle of governance" (Abbott & Snidal, 2009) come together and develop "shared cognitive routines" supported by policy (Geels & Schot, 2007). Figure 2.1 portrays what the LFFU transition would look like, according to these transition theories following the pre-development phase.

However, transition processes face major bottlenecks. Sociocultural bottlenecks refer to the reluctance of society to change or in our story the way in which power politics determines what happens. Technological and infrastructural bottlenecks generally refer to lock-ins within which society functions—where the infrastructure and related technologies promote a certain kind of behaviour and it is difficult to change social behaviour without changing the technological and infrastructural system in society. There is also intense debate about the extent to which the appropriate technologies for a full energy transition are available and can be used. All this is embedded in a political context where values such as an emphasis on economic growth and other related values create a broader ideological lock-in (Geels, 2002).



Figure 2.1. Transition theory applied to LFFU following the pre-development phase.

To any innovative institutional and societal change, including those related to natural resource extraction and use, the politics of ideas are of key importance (Bebbington, 2013). Ideas about how to overcome major problems and injustices are abundant but understanding which new ideas and arguments can be persuasive and can overcome vested interests is the first step to actually develop, realise and up-scale alternatives. Ideas that affect policymaking can take different shapes, ranging from programmes and paradigms at the cognitive level, to frames (including symbols and concepts) and public sentiments at the normative level (Campbell, 1998). While experts and epistemic communities influence public discussions and policies and thus serve as agents of resource governance change, more often "ideas become influential when they are bundled with movements and coalitions" (Bebbington, 2013, p. 10). Thus, it is the *politics* of ideas that play an important role in changing dominant patterns, and this involves multiple actors and scales. When we link this to what the LFFU transition could look like (Figure 2.1), we can appreciate that the politics of ideas are relevant throughout the process: from the implementation of stepping-stone experiments to scaling up and the shifts in regime and even landscape. In



Figure 2.2. Inclusive development and the energy transition.

addition, for new ideas to become persuasive and implemented, LFFU actors, arguments and approaches also need to address the (potential) bottlenecks of transition, especially sociocultural and ideological bottlenecks. Considering the magnitude of the LFFU transition, it is evident that only approaches and arguments that include a wide range of actors, interests and needs are likely to realise all transition steps and effectively leave fossil fuels underground. Therefore, we argue that combining the LFFU transition with inclusive development and national changes with global changes reflects both a normative agenda and political pragmatism.

When we combine our ideas on the energy transition with our approach to inclusive development with socio-environmental justice, we get a figure consisting of four quadrants (Figure 2.2). Only in one quadrant is the energy transition to LFFU socially and ecologically just at the local to global level. In this book, we examine how these transitions are materialising and which actors, arguments and approaches can make them more socio-ecologically and relationally inclusive. In the following chapters, we explore the two national cases of South Africa and Ecuador, but also transition elements within the Global North and South at large. The chapters identify niches

and key actors (social movements, grassroots organisations, financial institutions and state institutions) and their arguments and approaches, and explores how these niches can be scaled up to prompt regime (and eventually landscape) change.

2.3. Theories on actors, approaches and arguments

2.3.1. Introduction

From the perspective of relational inclusiveness, a key element for realising a fair energy transition—that is, an energy transition with inclusive development and socio-environmental justice—is understanding the role of actors, arguments and approaches. This section reviews three key actors: Social movements and their role in pushing for socio-environmental justice; large companies and investors and theories that discuss their role in maintaining the status quo; and the role of the state and interstate relations in addressing challenges, such as leaving fossil fuels underground.

2.3.2. Social movements

Social movements refer to a coming together of large groups of people and groups who coalesce around common grievances and claims for justice and rights. They can be mobilised by a few core (non-governmental) organisations and/or inspiring persons (e.g. Greta Thunberg). Social movements are flexible and loosely coordinated, and their ability to sustain over a large period of time depends on the degree of grievance and their capacity to generate narratives (e.g. claims, arguments and proposals) that mobilise a substantial number of citizens and capture the public imagination. As their ideas, actions and networks often transcend national and continental boundaries, large movements are transnational by nature. An early wave of social movements focused on opposing the monarchy (e.g. the French and Russian revolutions) and colonisation, leading to the creation of republics and decolonised states. Much of these movements were also around class struggles (Calhoun, 1993; Melucci, 1996). The labour movements demanded workers' rights, which led to the institutionalisation of such rights in laws and policy, whereas peasant movements sometimes succeeded in their demands for land distribution. As of the 1970s, social movements emerged centring more on identity-related issues and rights, such as human rights, feminism and women's rights, non-discrimination, rights of Indigenous

peoples, sexual and reproductive rights, and the rights of LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer) communities. In parallel, the environmental movement has developed momentum. Together, the worldwide rise of these movements has contributed to the recognition and protection of various rights.

Since social movements result from an autonomous mobilisation of people around a specific theme, the question arises: What leads to the origin of a movement and when and under what circumstances can it be successful in promoting change? Resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978) focuses on the role of intellectual, financial and organisational resources in mobilising people to coalesce around a strategic narrative (Diani & Bison, 2004). New social movement theory (Larana et al., 2009; Zald, 2000) focuses on the importance of generating a shared ideal, identity or narrative that binds people together to challenge dominant ideas, attitudes and actors (McAdam et al., 2001; Snow et al., 2019). In addition, grounded theory has been influential, building on evidence collected from different case studies of social mobilisation (Strauss et al., 1998, p. 12; Edelman, 2001, p. 285).

Environmental movements have developed all over the world, but they originated through different agendas in different places. Nature conservation represents one early expression, especially but not exclusively in the Global North, while peasant and Indigenous struggles to protect land, water and forests, have been a more common root in the Global South. More has been registered in the academic literature of the rise of the environmental movement in the developed world, but there have been strong movements in India and Latin America since the 1970s. The movements in India focused on the impacts of large dams (such as the social movement Narmada Bachao Andolan [Save the Narmada River]) and were against deforestation (the Chipko movement). The environment justice movement in its current form emerged in Latin America. These movements recognised that social and ecological issues were interlinked and had to be addressed together (Acselrad, 2010; Buttel, 1992) and that local struggles were intimately related to multi-level politics, including globalisation (Martinez-Alier et al., 2016; Temper et al., 2015, p. 256).

Many environmental movements are now focusing on issues related to fossil fuels. Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for Future are global movements on climate change, but there are many more and these are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. And as we will see in Chapters 4–8, interesting new approaches and arguments regarding fossil fuels, development and nature have been developed in the Global South, such as anti-extractivism, living well and rights of nature. In this sense, one of the social movements'

most powerful tools for both autonomy and influence arguably lies in "the art of organising hope": Indigenous and non-Indigenous movements have proven a great creative capacity to think beyond existing frameworks of the not-yet and prefigure alternative realities (Dinerstein, 2014). However, the social movements for climate justice also suffer from a division between grassroots climate justice activists, who portray such a radical thinking, and established international NGOs (Bond, 2018); there are differences between groups in the Global North and Global South; and different social movements focus on different themes (see Chapters 4 and 6).

Next to direct action, advocacy and lobbying, socio-environmental movements use litigation to achieve their goals. Their success in using litigation depends on the legal opportunity structure, which in turn depends on access to justice (which allows for legal standing, affordability), legal stock (precedents, justiciable rights and laws that may help) and judicial receptiveness (where judges are willing to engage in judicial creativity and activism) (Hilson, 2002). This structure focuses on the factors that influence whether and where social movements use courts to demand policy change (Vanhala, 2012; Wilson & Cordero, 2006). Use of courts can lead to an individual judgement which sets a precedent for other such cases, or it can lead to policy change at national level (Vanhala, 2018; De Fazio, 2012). The use of courts is also increasingly happening in the Global South (e.g. Setzer & Benjamin, 2020; Setzer & Vanhala, 2019).

2.3.3. Investors and producers

The ways in which investors and producers (companies) engage in energy governance often challenges the energy transition and relational inclusiveness. In the context of neoliberal capitalism, producers and investors have focused heavily on deregulation at national and international level and on self-regulation or self-governance and public private partnerships. Despite decades of attempts to develop a UN code of conduct for transnational corporations, this has not succeeded. Companies have instead been able to pre-empt regulatory processes by suggesting that they will undertake to regulate themselves. Fuchs (2013) argues that companies have instrumental, structural and discursive power. Instrumental power refers to their ability to lobby policymakers because they have easy access to them due to: their financial power and because government resources are increasingly dwindling; their ability to get a seat at the table in advisory capacities; and their ability to convene round tables to which they invite the government. Structural power refers to their huge financial resources, their ability to shift

short-term production contracts to any part of the world to exploit areas with low governance capacity and their growing role in making rules and setting standards. Discursive power refers to how they use public campaigning to promote themselves and to promote images on the green economy and corporate strategies. Companies increasingly use power relationally to control the state and other actors (Fuchs, 2013).

For our study on LFFU, corporate self-regulatory trends are of great relevance, in particular, corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment (SRI). With respect to the environmental dimensions, these trends are part of the approach of green economy or green business, which copies part of the ecological discourses but aims at preventing state regulation by letting corporate actors themselves be in charge. Corporate social responsibility is a concept that expects companies to take responsibility for their behaviour with respect to the people they employ and the people they affect. It requires them to take the social and ecological implications of their business into account. This includes ethical business practices, proper labour conditions and wages, and ecologically sound strategies with respect to the resources used and wasted. Corporate social responsibility code books list initiatives that many transnational fossil fuel companies adhere to, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility, the UN Global Compact, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ISO 140001, the Global Reporting Initiative, and many more. Today there is a plethora of self-regulation standards in and for businesses, but these have been mostly used to pre-empt regulation and many argue that this is a form of greenwashing.

Increasingly investment companies are also presenting themselves as acting responsibly through impact investing and SRI. In recent years, the concept of impact investing has become important. It aims at ensuring that companies invest taking into account some specific social or ecological issue on which they wish to make an impact. Much of the literature is in the grey literature realm (Maduro et al., 2018). SRI examines the investment patterns of large investors where profit maximisation is made subject to the creation of "blended value" (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011; Clarkin & Cangioni, 2016; Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008), which enables the creation of other kinds of values that emerge from addressing existing problems. The deregulation process enables business to avoid responsibilities caused by externalising social and ecological harm and they were then able to reinvent themselves as aiming for the broader welfare

of society. This was often a response to e.g. the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and the environmental movement more broadly (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011). However, blending social responsibility with profit had to be financed in some way and this led to greater convergence with the aid sector (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011; Clarkin & Cangioni, 2016; Sardy & Lewin, 2016; Nicholls, 2010; Hochstadter & Scheck, 2014; Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008). Impact investing is often linked to the Global Impact Investing Network, Impact Reporting and Investment Standards, and the Global Impact Investments Rating System. A key question that emerges in the literature is how effective these organisations are in doing what they claim to do and to what extent is this all "greenwashing" or "impact washing."

2.3.4. States

Last, but evidently not least, the state and interstate relationships play a key role in energy governance and the ways in which the use and fading out of fossil fuels is deeply entangled with development and justice. Related to relational inclusiveness, we focus on theories on the role of the state in the provision and protection of public and merit goods, and how neoliberal capitalism stands in the way of these tasks. In terms of interstate relations, we look at the role of sovereignty and the no harm principle, the right to (sustainable) development, and the role of states in international financial mechanisms. Public goods are goods that are non-exclusive (no one can be excluded) and non-rival (one's use does not mean there is less for others). The climate and hydrological systems are public goods. Generally, public goods need to be maintained by collectives—communities or states. Merit goods are goods that the public should consume but may be unwilling to do because of the costs involved—e.g. education, sanitation services, etc. (Kaul et al., 2004). This is also something that should not be privatised or commodified. However, states do not always work for the public and democratic societies have not always matured in different parts of the world. There are many debates on these issues—and we will return to them in the case study chapters.

Despite a strong neoliberal tendency among states to facilitate rather than regulate corporate actors, also resource nationalism continues to be a strong factor in the approaches and arguments on fossil fuel governance, especially among states from the Global South.

> Resource nationalism is the notion that natural resources should be managed above all for the needs of "the nation," and therefore should

> be controlled by the state for "the people." This idea is closely related to historical experiences of colonialism, dependent development, and the capture of resource rents by foreign capital. (Bebbington et al., 2018a, p. 207)

Following independence, many post-colonial societies felt that the global system was unfair and that they were still being held back and marginalised by trade and investment laws and policies. This led to a demand by the developing countries' states for permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the 1970s, which has been reiterated in Agenda 2030.

Yet also in the Global North, the state and state-owned companies are key actors in the fossil fuel sector, as the governance of oil illustrates most clearly. Oil is generally much more embedded within state structures than other commodities. Despite transnational investments and powerful corporations, the global oil sector has an exceptionally high degree of state interference, and most (80% to 90%) reserves are under control of state-owned companies (Bridge, 2008). As countries still heavily depend on this energy source, the availability and price of oil determines economic performance, and control over oil is key in (military) security and geopolitical affairs. In global production networks states take on various roles in upstream (exploration and extraction) and downstream (refining and distribution) activities: the state is usually the owner of the resource, which grants concessions for extraction; many operating companies are at least partly state-owned; states are key regulators of the production chain (e.g. taxation, safety and environmental legislation); with foreign loans of development banks, states also engage in major investments in infrastructure to incentivise the oil sector; and they heavily influence the prices for consumers through policies, taxes and subsidies. State actors of both the Global South and the Global North have a key role in leaving fossil fuels underground as part of a global agenda on climate change.

2.4. The analytical framework in a nutshell

This book uses a comprehensive inclusive development lens which is operationalised to assess the challenge of LFFU and stranded assets as part of the energy transition. We are also informed by theories on the role of different actors (in particular, social movements, investors and states) in promoting LFFU, the kinds of motivations they have, the arguments they use and the approaches they develop to promote or resist LFFU. Next to their arguments and approaches, the motivation and relative powers of these



Figure 2.3. Model linking inclusive development and LFFU transitions.



actors strongly affect their influence. All these elements are also relevant for assessing if and how individual ideas (niches) can be scaled up to regimes and landscapes building on transition theory. In assessing how niches can become regimes and landscapes, we look at the different concepts discussed in this chapter—resource curse, resource nationalism, dependency, the politics of ideas, socio-environmental justice, impact investing and so on. In addition, we assess the extent to which initiatives towards LFFU transitions in different countries and globally are linked to the socio-relational and ecological-relational dimensions of inclusive development (see Figure 2.3).

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has created a theoretical background and analytical framework for this book. It uses an inclusive development lens which is operationalised to assess the challenge of LFFU and stranded assets. It examines the theories on the role of different actors (social movements, business and investors, and states) in promoting LFFU, the kinds of motivations they have, the arguments they use and the approaches they develop to promote or resist LFFU. It then shows how individual ideas (niches) can be scaled up to regimes and landscapes building on transition theory.

Finally, let us sum up what we will do in the rest of this book. We will (a) focus on actors, arguments and approaches; (b) in assessing actors—we will also look at their motivations and how they have been able to use their power to adopt certain arguments and approaches that enable LFFU; (c) we will assess how individual activities (niches) can be scaled up to regimes and landscapes thus giving our analysis a dynamic approach; (d) we will examine the trade-offs and synergies between relevant SDGs (see Table 1.1) and (e) we will assess how and under what conditions the transitions can be socio-ecologically inclusive and just.

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