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Original Article

Hybrid Governance Arrangements

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Abstract In this article we address a recent tendency in development policies to engage actors beyond the nation-state, such as corporations, NGOs and other less formalized and local authorities. Many scholars have started questioning, at both the empirical and analytical level, the distinction between state and non-state actors, especially in the context of the governance of natural resources and security. Here, drawing from our case studies in Kingston (Jamaica) and Nairobi (Kenya), where security is provided, respectively, by gangs and by a residents' policing organization, we attempt to understand the mutual entanglement of these actors through the concept of hybrid governance arrangements. We suggest that the added value of the hybridity approach lies exactly in the blurring of lines between the different actors involved.

Dans cet article, on aborde une question récente dans les politiques en matière de développement, c'est à dire l'engagement de ces politiques avec des acteurs au-delà des états-nations, tels que les sociétés, les ONG, et d'autres autorités locales moins formalisées. Les chercheurs en développement mettent en cause la distinction (empirique et analytique) entre l'état et d'autres acteurs hors de l'état dans les procès de gouvernance, en plusieurs matières et régions. A travers de deux études, l'un à Kingston (Jamaïque) et l'autre à Nairobi (Kenya), où les services de sécurité sont fournis respectivement par des bandes et par une association de résidents en charge de l'ordre, nous cherchons à comprendre le enchevêtrement de ces acteurs à travers le concept des 'dispositions de gouvernance hybrides'. On suggère que la valeur ajoutée de cet approche hybride est tout à fait due au brouillage des démarcations entre les acteurs y impliqués.

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Keywords: hybrid governance; security; gangs; community policing; Kingston; Nairobi

Introduction

An important shift in development policy in recent decades has been the engagement with a range of actors beyond the nation-state, from corporations and NGOs to religious groups and community-based organizations. Influenced by both neo-liberal thought and an emphasis on participatory development, donors and multilateral agencies have increasingly engaged these stakeholders as development partners and channelled aid towards them rather than towards state bureaucracies. In a related move, and following the governance literature more generally, development studies has begun to focus more directly on role of non-state actors in governance. More recently, a series of authors has begun to question the distinction between state and non-state actors, attempting to understand their entanglement in governance processes through the concept of hybridity.

In this brief piece, we focus on hybrid governance arrangements as an important new theme in development research. We discuss, first, the concept of hybrid governance and its uses in development studies, highlighting its application in the context of debates on neo-liberalisation and structural adjustment; the governance of natural resources; and conflict and development.

We also consider the practical and conceptual advantages and disadvantages of using the concept. This is followed by a discussion of two short cases of hybrid governance arrangements: resident initiatives in community policing in Nairobi, Kenya and gangs as security providers in Kingston, Jamaica. We use these examples of hybridity in policing and security provision to draw attention to both the utility and the possible drawbacks of an analysis along these lines.

Hybrid Governance in Development Studies

The concept of hybrid governance has been theorized in a range of ways by authors working within the interdisciplinary field of development studies. Generally speaking, hybrid governance arrangements can be defined as arrangements in which non-state actors take on functions classically attributed to the state and, in the process, become entangled with formal state actors and agencies to the extent that it is difficult to make a clear distinction between state and non-state. These are arrangements in which diverse governance actors become co-rulers, sharing control over territories and populations.

The state functions assumed by, or outsourced to, new governance actors include the provision of public goods, services and infrastructure, for instance providing access to water, electricity, education or security. They may also involve maintaining rule of law, conflict resolution and various forms of taxation. While many contexts exist in which non-state actors have entirely replaced the state in exercising such functions, hybrid governance arrangements refer explicitly to those contexts in which state and non-state actors are highly intertwined or merged, often to the extent that we can speak of a new or emergent political formation that is neither state nor non-state.

Hybrid Governance in Development Studies Debates

Discussions of hybrid governance within development studies theory emerged in the context of a number of distinct, if overlapping, debates. A first important debate has been on the consequences of neo-liberalisation and structural adjustment. Although hybrid arrangements are not necessarily tied to specific processes of neo-liberal restructuring, they tend resonate with practices that Peck and Tickell (2002) term 'roll-back' and 'roll-out' neo-liberalism, and especially with what Hendrikse and Sidaway (2010) call 'Neoliberalism 3.0'. After the extensive programs of deregulation and dismantling of state apparatuses in the 1980s – 'roll-back' processes that created space for non-state actors to intervene in the management of public life – a subsequent and equally aggressive programme of state re-regulation took place. This purposeful 'roll-out' restructuring consolidated the roles of non-state actors, often representing private interests (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 384), in neo-liberal governance models across both the global south and the global north. Hendrikse and Sidaway's concept of Neoliberalism 3.0 designates a next phase, in which interests of state agencies (including the military), private corporations and other sectarian interests are so enmeshed that the boundaries between them often blur and vanish. This concept of enmeshed state and corporate agencies and interests resonates strongly with the concept of hybrid governance arrangements.

'Neo-liberalism' remains something of a catch-all terms that is used to group together a diverse array of forces. Processes of neo-liberal restructuring and the shift from government to governance connect processes as diverse as privatization, marketization, outsourcing, decentralization, federalization and public-private partnerships, as well as various forms of participatory development, including community participation and a larger role for 'traditional'

authorities (for example, chiefs, clan leaders, religious authorities). For instance, as O'Reilly and Dhanju (2012) show in their study of drinking-water governance in Rajasthan, India – where reforms resulted in the conjoining of market-led and state-led forms of regulation – neo-liberalism offers an umbrella term where processes of outsourcing, decentralization and marketization combine with community participation initiatives, despite the often contradictory nature of these processes.

A second, related context in which authors have discussed hybrid governance is within debates on environment and development. As state management of (common-pool) natural resources came to be branded as inefficient, ineffective and/or illegitimate in the context of neo-liberal and participatory development paradigms, the involvement of private actors such as community organizations, traditional leaders and corporations became conventional. Lemos and Agrawal (2006) point to different models of hybrid environmental governance, in which state, market and community actors engage in joint action across different social mechanisms and arenas, in domains ranging from fisheries to conservation areas. They note the shift towards co-management of natural resources (in which states and communities share responsibilities) and public-private partnerships (in which state agencies collaborate with market actors). In addition, they emphasize the increasing popularity of 'social-private partnerships' in which community-based organizations and market actors co-manage natural resources.

Although this analysis may run the risk of terming any type of (multi-actor) governance as 'hybrid', other authors point more explicitly to the new logics that can emerge through such collaboration. For instance, in her analysis of payments for environmental services as a tool in Vietnamese forest conservation, McElwee (2012, p. 420) focuses on 'the dynamics of the processes by which an ostensibly market-oriented project becomes tamed by on-the-ground realities, and the unusual hybrid assemblage that can result when markets meet [socialist] institutional practices that are resistant to change'. Studying this type of new assemblage nuances our understanding of both neo-liberal and socialist models of conservation.

A third debate within development studies in which hybrid governance has been theorized is within the framework of conflict and development; a main emphasis here has been on the African continent, where research on states and governance has included influential analyses of hybrid governance arrangements. Following decolonization, the withdrawal of strong, centralized colonial military apparatuses created spaces for multiple sources of authority (Albrecht and Moe, 2015). While state-centric analyses of this multiplicity tended to be negative in tone, drawing on normative terms such as 'weak states' or 'state failure', a new approach in terms of 'hybrid political orders' (Boege *et al.*, 2009) reframed these processes as constructive and generative.

Many studies on hybrid governance arrangements in African contexts have focused on issues of security and violence; although this focus reinforces stereotypical images of the continent, it has also highlighted the resourcefulness of such arrangements. This is evident in the controversial case of the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante group in Nigeria's south-eastern state of Abia. Meagher (2007) shows how what originally was a civil society movement was captured by opportunistic politicians with private agendas, but she also highlights the legitimacy and widespread popular support the group had gained beforehand. The Bakassi Boys' co-optation by state politicians, the group's incorporation in a state-led arrangement and its re-emergence in different forms, all point to the fluidity of relations and boundaries between governance actors.

This fluidity of hybrid governance arrangements – and the way citizens understand them – is also captured in other Africanist research on security and conflict. For instance, Menkhaus (2007, 2008) focuses on institutional arrangements in Somaliland and Kenya's Wajir province, two East African territories where the visible presence of state authority is at best scarce. He introduces the

concept of the ‘mediated state’ to analyse the pragmatic interactions of the state (as repository of Westphalian authority) with traditional political authorities. Working in similar contexts, Albrecht and Moe (2015) shift our attention away from the governing entities themselves, and towards the discourses and practices where processes of order-making and assertions of authority take shape. In particular, they point to the capacity of postcolonial subjects to enact different (and contradictory) sources of authority simultaneously.

Using the Concept: Opportunities and Limitations

The concept of hybrid governance arrangements presents advantages and disadvantages, both in the theoretical reflections it enables and in its practical application. Here, we explore the opportunities that the hybridity approach presents for academic analysis and for development practitioners, followed by a discussion of the drawbacks associated with using this concept.

A first advantage to focusing on hybridity in governance arrangements and political orders is the distance it allows from Weberian state-centric narratives, which generally draw on Westphalian conceptions of the state and are grounded in European experiences of state formation, despite the important work of authors such as Tilly (1985) in historicizing and contextualizing the European experience. A framework focusing on hybrid governance arrangements does not assume the state to be the central actor, but (in contrast to neo-liberal analyses that advocate a limited state role in public management) it does not dismiss it as a meaningless actor either. Such approaches de-naturalize the centrality of the Weberian state, focusing instead on the importance of relations between state apparatuses and various other governance actors. In so doing, it offers scope for practitioners to engage with a broader array of governance actors, with a nuanced understanding of their overlaps and interrelations.

This points to a second benefit, that is, the nuance that hybrid governance approaches bring to distinctions among the different actors involved in these arrangements, their specific interests and shifting roles over time. The unclear distinction between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ evokes a ‘twilight’ zone where governance institutions operate, which is in-between public and private. Awareness of this twilight character of many governance arrangements encourages specific attention to ‘the making of public authority’ (Lund, 2006, p. 679) as a dynamic process rather than a static fact. Relatedly, taking hybridity seriously entails complicating superficial public-private dualisms, both in development practice and as analytical categories. Although public-private and state/non-state dichotomies have preoccupied western thought for centuries (cf. Weintraub, 1997), we should not take for granted the role of these distinctions in everyday life.

The increased focus on hybridity in governance has also been subjected to critique. For instance, the tendency of hybrid governance research to focus on the intertwining of ‘formal’ state institutions with ‘informal’, ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ institutions has been highlighted. Such a narrow focus overlooks the role of corporations, international NGOs and foreign governments in the merging of actors, interests and logics (Meagher, 2012; Meagher *et al*, 2014). More broadly, the tendency of these analyses to focus on cases from the global south (or, more specifically, African countries) obscures the extent to which public service provision and the management of populations and territories in the global north are also a hybrid affair. In addition, the ‘discovery’ of hybridity in contemporary governance arrangements in the global south obscures the fact that such blurred arrangements were central to colonial rule.

Another major analytical concern is that ‘hybrid governance’ is confused with the more general concept of ‘governance’, as a way of understanding the multi-actor process of ruling and managing territories and populations. As Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013) stress, hybridity is not the same as the co-existence of, or competition between, different institutions or governance

actors – we should understand institutional hybridity as distinct from institutional multiplicity. This critique is complicated by the fact that, through everyday practices of interaction, any governance arrangement is likely to eventually become hybridized, with actors, logics and interests merging. Similarly, seemingly bounded governance actors ('NGOs', 'corporations') may not themselves be homogenous either, assembling different interests and sources of authority at any given time. A different concern, then, is that if all governance is hybrid, the concept loses its analytical purchase (see, for example, Stepputat, 2013). A final conceptual problem is that, although the concept of hybridity seeks to overcome the state/non-state dualism, its focus on the interactions between different 'state' and 'non-state' authorities may inadvertently reinforce this same distinction and illusion of boundedness (Albrecht and Moe, 2015).

The shift to the focus on hybridity in development practice has also been critically received. Engaging with 'traditional' governance actors, or with 'irregular' governance actors such as gangs, may contribute to the normalization of situations in which highly coercive actors claim a role in governance. The shift from a normative emphasis on 'good governance' to pragmatic 'arrangements that work', and the associated assumption that 'local' non-state actors are always legitimate, risks suspending ethical assessments. Donor engagement with, and support for, non-state actors may also contribute to the further undermining of state capacity and legitimacy (Meagher *et al*, 2014). Given such concerns, it is vital to consider carefully for each empirical case the distinction between what Meagher (2012) calls 'constructive' and 'corrosive' forms of non-state or hybrid order, or what Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013) term 'concordant' versus 'discordant' forms of institutional multiplicity.

Cases

As noted above in our discussion of conflict and development in Africa, policing and security are among the more fertile grounds for the emergence of hybrid governance. In this section, we take two empirical cases to exemplify the application of hybrid governance of (non-)violence in urban contexts. The first case describes the organization of a strong community policing initiative by residents of a middle-class neighbourhood in Nairobi, Kenya, whereas the second case focuses on gangs as providers of security and conflict resolution in Kingston, Jamaica.

Community Policing in Nairobi

On 29 December 1992, Kenya's first multi-party elections took place, with seven presidential candidates representing as many parties. Although this democratization was greeted with excitement, the elections also elicited anxiety, with violent clashes anticipated between the different political factions. In this context, an initially small group of residents of a middle-class Nairobi neighbourhood (some of whom had a strong police background) resolved to shield their community from potential electoral violence by organizing themselves in a community policing organization (CPO). Although elsewhere in the country sparks of violence occurred, the 1992 elections did not unleash the feared violence in this particular neighbourhood. The CPO (according to its leaders) succeeded in reassuring these neighbourhood residents who had been worried about the political situation, gaining much local legitimacy. After the elections, the CPO shifted its operational focus to protecting residents from everyday crime, a major concern in Nairobi.

The daily practices that earned the CPO its initial popularity have remained more or less unchanged since 1992. Every day, four volunteers go to the local police station to pick up four officers (who receive a daily allowance for their services). This team of residents and police

officers splits into two squads that patrol the neighbourhood in vehicles owned by two of the four volunteers. On a regular day, they are on the streets from 6:00 pm until midnight, but if the CPO's operation managers perceive the security situation to be riskier than usual, they might opt for a longer patrol, lasting until 6:00 am. The organization also operates a control room (in a location they prefer to keep unknown to the public), from where they respond to residents' distress calls 24 hours a day. A direct communication with the local police station's commanding officer and a number of members who are always active on VHF radio handsets enable a capillary presence on the ground. Furthermore, the CPO's city-wide network of high-ranking police officers and private security companies allows the organization to be very effective in its responses and coordination, reinforcing its legitimacy.

Through the daily joint patrol, two categories of people whose relationship has been far from harmonious find themselves together in the space of one car. Nairobi residents generally distrust police, seeing them as ineffective, unresponsive and corrupt. The logistical and resource challenges that the Kenyan police service faces are widely known: they often lack the vehicles or fuel necessary to patrol, and they are always short on (underpaid) personnel. These factors are often considered to be linked to misbehaviour by police, who can engage in extortion and brutality with almost complete impunity. Nonetheless, most residents still consider the police to be the rightful 'owner' of security.

Residents and police have been co-patrolling in these CPO vehicles every single day for over 20 years. The CPO members feel that they are 'the eyes, the ears and the wheels' of the police because they enable the officers to carry out their formal duties, which otherwise would go neglected. The daily allowance and comfort of the arrangement, and the watchful presence of the volunteers, ensure that the police officers have an extra incentive to patrol the streets with the CPO but refrain from harassing residents.

On one occasion during the first author's fieldwork, while patrolling with a private security company, a truck knocked down an electricity cable over one of the neighbourhood's main avenues. Although panic erupted with the crackling sounds of electric sparks and the truck fled the scene, the private security officers tried to contain the traffic and signal danger. Within a few minutes, a white Land Cruiser pulled up, with the driver asking for information that he immediately relayed with his VHF handset. Although there were no visible markers and the security officer had never met the driver before, he was sure that 'he is CPO'. Indeed, just a few minutes later, two smaller unmarked cars with removable VHF antennae clamped on their hoods pulled up, and four police officers emerged to secure the site – residents knew that the CPO was there.

The activities of the CPO in Nairobi provide security to residents in ways that, over time, have made it impossible to pinpoint where the citizens' private initiative ends and where the state policing apparatus starts. When one of the CPO leaders, speaking of the police¹ asked, 'Is it us who need them, or them who need us?', it seemed to be a rhetorical question meant to stress the necessary work of his organization. However, it became evident that there was no clear answer to the question; the different parties have grown towards each other to the point that a police presence often becomes a sign of a CPO intervention. *Vice versa*, CPO for many residents means patrolling with the police, in a movement that in practice erases the distinctions between the two actors.

Residents have become so used to this symbiotic arrangement that they recognize the presence of one as the presence of the other –although they still distinguish conceptually between police and CPO, they have come to understand them as an empirical co-presence. These practices show the level of entanglement between these state and community security actors: CPO and police officers rely on each other to secure the territory of the neighbourhood, each enhancing their own

access to resources and making their own authority more legitimate precisely through their collaboration. The authority held by the formally separate actors is co-constitutive – the CPO's authority bolsters rather than challenges that of the police, and *vice versa*.

Gangs and Security in Kingston

In Kingston's impoverished inner-city neighbourhoods, criminal 'dons' take on a governance role, providing residents with public goods and services that range from social welfare and entertainment to, importantly, crime prevention and dispute resolution. Dons scare off potential violators both within and outside their neighbourhood by punishing perpetrators swiftly and often violently. The offences they punish include theft, rape, domestic abuse and other forms of physical assault within the neighbourhoods where they are in charge. First offenders or those whose transgressions are slight may get off with a warning. More serious infractions lead to violent punishments ranging from beatings to a gunshot in the leg to execution, as well as non-violent sanctions such as fines or expulsion from the neighbourhood (Charles and Beckford, 2012).

Jamaica's dons are the source of much violence. However, for many of the urban poor, they are also the only form of protection against this same violence. In areas marked by high rates of theft, murder and rape, many inner-city residents have little choice but to turn to the extra-legal forms of security that dons offer. The don-based, private form of 'self-help' law and order, which generally relies on violent retribution, is relatively popular among marginalized urban residents, who may also benefit from the broader social provisioning role dons fulfil. These residents have learned to expect little from the police and generally perceive them to be unreliable, uncaring and corrupt. Similarly, they feel, often on the basis of experience, that the formal justice system is biased and inaccessible (see Jaffe, 2012).

However, the formal and informal systems are not so separate. The dons are in many ways entangled with Jamaica's state apparatus – its politicians, bureaucracy and police – to the extent that the different forms of political authority have become inseparable (Jaffe, 2013). In the realm of security, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is known to encourage the dons' informal provision of security and dispute resolution, for instance by referring both victims and perpetrators to this system. This cooperation reflects an acknowledgement of the dons' power in certain parts of Kingston and of the JCF's incapacity to effectively police these areas. It also indicates a conscious move to engage in partnerships with extra-legal, private security providers. Although such partnerships have become exposed to stronger censure following a recent crackdown on organized crime, the police can now be seen appropriating some of the dons' methods. Recent JCF strategies aimed at public order and conflict resolution, including a tendency towards violent retributive policing and an active role in dispute resolution, resemble dons' security practices, whereas increased police involvement in social provisioning and symbolic strategies appear to mimic dons' broader legitimizing strategies (Meikle and Jaffe, 2015).

Looking beyond the police, there are also various more or less opaque relations between private security and dons. One of the most powerful dons, Christopher 'Dudus' Coke (now serving 23 years in a US federal jail), was a shareholder in a formally registered private security company called Bulls Eye Security Services Limited. Even after he was extradited to the United States, Kingston's state-owned Urban Development Corporation still had Bulls Eye on the payroll, both as a direct contractor for a €50 000 contract and as a subcontractor via other companies (Reid, 2010).

These different collaborations, appropriations and overlaps point to a different type of hybridity than in the Nairobi case. Are supposed criminals actually policing agents, or are uniformed police officers the real criminals? Or are they all security entrepreneurs with varying context-specific levels of legitimacy? Inner-city residents may still distinguish between gangs, police and private security companies, but in practice the boundaries between legal and illegal, formal and informal, state and non-state have become very hard to discern. A range of actors involved in providing security and dispute resolution share information, symbols, practices and operational logics, in tight relationships that tend to be less competitive than complementary, or even symbiotic.

Conclusion

Hybridity should not be reduced to the co-presence of several actors in governance processes. It is essential to approach the concept through the blurring and enmeshing of the boundaries between the different actors involved in such processes. Indeed, such a processual approach (emphasizing hybridization over an end product of hybridity *per se*, see Albrecht and Moe, 2015) might be precisely what promises a stronger analytical grip on the concept. It allows us to explore the relational dynamics of governance that change over time and across space. A careful use of hybridity can enable a more coherent method of thinking through, writing about and perhaps even overcoming the duality inherent in conceptualizations of the state/non-state distinction. The examples from our cases in Nairobi and Kingston illustrate how such distinctions become blurred in everyday life.

Contrary to suggestions advanced by analyses that start from the assumption of weak or failed states, hybrid governance approaches tease out the generative potential of these processes and relations. It is important to acknowledge the diversity of outcomes of these practices and the difficulty of predicting or maintaining positive effects. As our cases show, governance actors engage each other in creating new forms and practices of security provision that cannot be simplistically stigmatized as the absence of a supposedly prevailing state apparatus. However, neither of these cases can be taken as 'best practices' *per se*, given the new forms of inequality and violence they can generate.

Going beyond the tautological statement that everything is hybrid because of the multiple actors co-inhabiting any governance space, recent research in development studies is moving more towards analytical approaches, in particular by exploring what theoretical insights might be gained from focusing on the everyday practices that blur the lines between governance actors and make their relations meaningful.

Note

1. Interview conducted by Francesco Colona and Tessa Diphooorn, 14 March 2015.

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