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Periphrastic expressions of non-epistemic modal necessity in Spanish – a semantic description

Hella Olbertz (University of Amsterdam)

1. Introduction

Linguistic modality as expressed by modal verbs, adverbs and adjectival constructions is commonly viewed in terms of possibility and necessity (e.g. Lyons 1977: 787-793). Although this distinction is based on modal logic it turns out to be a useful tool to capture the basic modal distinctions in a large number of languages (Van der Auwera & Plungian 1998). This paper discusses the semantics of the Spanish grammaticalized verbal constructions that are most frequently used for the expression of modal necessity, i.e. the infinitival constructions with *deber* ‘must’ and its free variant *deber de*, *tener que* ‘have to’ and *haber que* ‘have to’, the latter being an impersonal construction which could be rendered in English as ‘one has to’. The literature on Spanish modal periphrastic constructions (Gómez Torrego 1988: 76-92, 1999: 3348-3359; Fernández de Castro 1999: 176-196; García Fernández et al.: 2006; RAE 2009: 2140-2154) includes a fourth infinitival construction, *haber de* ‘have to’, which will not be discussed in this study because of its relatively low frequency.

It should be noted that elsewhere (Olbertz 1998) I restrict the concept of “periphrasis” to constructions with grammaticalized lexical verbs, which excludes constructions with the fully grammaticalized auxiliary *haber*. In the present paper, the term “periphrasis” is used in a less restrictive way and should be read as “grammaticalized analytic verbal construction”.

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1 I am grateful to Kees Hengeveld, Eline van der Veken and Leo Lemmers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. The responsibility of the remaining errors is mine.

2 In the new academic grammar *Nueva gramática de la lengua española*, *deber de* continues to be viewed as a primarily epistemic expression (RAE 2009: 2143-2144). However, Yllera (1980: 128) shows that the academic norm is entirely artificial: from the first texts onward *deber* has preferably been used without a preposition. The incidental use of *deber de* is due to the analogy with other verbal periphrases and independent of its meanings. For an in-depth study of the variation in modern Spanish, cf. Eddington & Silva Corvalán (2011).

3 For the ease of presentation and in the interest of readability, I will refrain from the repeated mention of “+infinitive” after the quotation form of the periphrastic auxiliaries in this paper.

4 A 3rd person singular search in the Spanish oral texts of the CREA corpus yields 2184 cases of *haber que*, 1314 cases of *tener que*, 927 of *deber (de)* and only 92 of *haber de*. The closed corpora used in this study contain only 26 tokens of *haber de* against 177 of *deber (de)*, the least frequent periphrasis dealt with in this study.
This paper concerns the central Peninsular variety of spoken and written Spanish, which will be studied on the basis of two closed corpora: the PRESEEA spoken corpus of Alcalá de Henares (AdH) (443,533 words) and a selection of 15 Spanish narrative literary texts (Lit) published between 1970 and 1990 (106,836 words). Closed corpora have been chosen in order to determine the relative frequencies of the three constructions and their meanings in a consistent and controllable way. For additional information, the CREA corpus will be used.

One of the most striking properties of the three periphrases is their unequal distribution in oral use. Table 1 shows the different frequencies of the three periphrases in oral and in written texts, providing absolute numbers as well as the numbers of tokens per 1,000 words (rendered as ‰). The totals refer to the number of modal necessity periphrases in the texts as well as their relative frequency per 1,000 words (‰).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>words</th>
<th>deber (de)</th>
<th>tener que</th>
<th>haber que</th>
<th>total tokens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AdH</td>
<td>443,533</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>1,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.20‰</td>
<td>1.82‰</td>
<td>0.52‰</td>
<td>2.56‰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lit</td>
<td>10,532</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.87‰</td>
<td>0.93‰</td>
<td>0.39‰</td>
<td>2.11‰</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Token frequencies of periphrastic expressions of modal necessity in the corpora

There is a big difference between the oral texts on the one hand and the literary texts on the other. In the spoken corpus tener que is nine times as frequent as deber (de), while the two have more or less the same frequency in the written corpus. As regards haber que, its frequency per 1,000 words is more or less constant, but in relation to deber (de) its prominence is considerably higher in the spoken texts than in the written ones. It is tempting to consider these differences as a matter of register variation only. However, as this paper will show, there is in fact much more to it.

The meanings of the periphrases will be described from a view inspired by Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008) and will draw on the modal classification presented in Hengeveld (2004). The point of departure is a definition of modality as the marking of non-realized states of affairs or non-factual propositions as regards the possibility or necessity of their realization and factuality, respectively. Although all meanings of the auxiliary constructions will be discussed, this paper will concentrate on the non-epistemic meanings (also known as “root modality”). There are several questions to be answered in this paper: (i) What are the fundamental differences between the three periphrases with respect to their functioning within the modal...
domain? (ii) Which categories are needed to describe the ways they are used in the corpora (and elsewhere)? (iii) How does this help to explain the preferences for *tener que* and *haber que* in oral usage?

The structure of this paper will be as follows: section 2 will deal with the most important differences between the three periphrastic constructions with respect to their morphosyntactic properties and their semantics, thus answering question (i). Section 3 will categorize a number of straightforward uses of the three periphrases. Section 4 will present two complex cases of modal evaluation, which will lead to a further refinement of the classification, thus providing the answer to question (ii). In section 5 I will discuss the results of the previous sections in order to answer question (iii). Section 6 will consist of my conclusions.

2. The basic characteristics of *deber (de)*, *tener que* and *haber que*

Apart from the obvious syntactic difference between the personal constructions with *deber (de)* and *tener que* and the impersonal construction with *haber que*, to which I will come back in section 3, the constructions differ with respect to the range of the basic modal meanings they can express.

In order to show how the three constructions differ from one another, I will distinguish three basic domains of modality, (i) deontic modality, (ii) circumstantial modality and (iii) epistemic modality, which will be further diversified in sections 3 and 4. While the concepts of “deontic” (Lyons 1977: 823-831; Palmer 1986: 96-97) and “epistemic” (Lyons 1977: 793-809; Palmer 1986: 51-54) are well established in modality studies, the term “circumstantial” is less common and will be explained below.

The examples in (1) illustrate deontic modality, which is concerned with the desirability of some behaviour or some state of affairs (henceforth: SoA) in view of social or individual norms. Deontic necessity can be expressed by means of all the three periphrastic modals *deber (de)* (1a), *tener que* (1b) and *haber que* (1c).

(1) a.  

A las once y media sería la reunión con los de la firma y debía presentarles algo convincente.

‘At half past eleven the meeting with the people of the company would take place and he had to show them something convincing’
b. *A las once y media sería la reunión con los de la firma y tenía que presentarles algo convincente.*
   ‘At half past eleven the meeting with the people of the company would take place and he had to show them something convincing’

c. *A las once y media sería la reunión con los de la firma y había que presentarles algo convincente.* (Lit, Ortiz)
   ‘At half past eleven the meeting with the people of the company would take place and they had to be shown something convincing’

Although these different realizations of (1) are by no means synonymous, particularly given the difference between the personal constructions in (1a) and (1b) and the impersonal one in (1c), they are all grammatically correct and pragmatically felicitous expressions of deontic necessity.

The following example is a case of circumstantial modality, which is concerned with possibilities or necessities of the realization of a SoA given the circumstances, independently of whether they are considered to be desirable or not. I have adopted the label “circumstantial” from Narrog (2005, 2012: 10). Circumstantial necessity can be expressed by *tener que* (2) and *haber que* (2a), but not by *deber* (de) (2b).

(2) *La carne tuvimos que tirarla: la humedad la había corrompido.*
   (Lit, Llamazares)
   ‘We had to throw away the meat: it had gone off due to the humidity’

a. *La carne hubo que tirarla: la humedad la había corrompido.*
   ‘The meat had to be thrown away: it had gone off due to the humidity’

b. *?”La carne debimos tirarla: la humedad la había corrompido.*
   either: *?”We must have thrown away the meat: it had gone off due to the humidity’*
   or: *?”We were required to throw away the meat: it had gone off due to the humidity’*

Example (2) is a very clear case of circumstantial necessity, because the circumstance which motivates the necessity is made explicit in the immediate context. The use of *deber* in the first part of (2b) can, in principle, be interpreted epistemically, but this would lead to a semantic clash with the explanation following the colon. Alternatively, a deontic reading is also possible, but then
again, the explanation would be somewhat strange, although less so than in the
epistemic reading.

Epistemic modality is concerned with the possibility or necessity of the
occurrence of some SoA and/or the truth of a propositional content. Examples
(3) and (3a) illustrate epistemic necessity as respectively expressed by \textit{deber}
and \textit{tener que}. This type of modal necessity cannot be expressed by means of
\textit{haber que} (3b).

(3) \textit{Las caras de las mujeres cuando lloran de verdad se vuelven
intensas y contienen una belleza aterradora como las esculturas de
Gaudí. Debe de ser eso lo que les da tanto miedo a los hombres.}
\textit{(Lit, Rico-Godoy)}
‘The faces of women when they weep really become intense and
have a terrifying beauty like the sculptures of Gaudí. It must be this
what makes men so much afraid’
a. \textit{[...]} \textbf{Tiene que ser eso lo que les da tanto miedo a los
hombres.}
\textit{[...]} ‘It must be this what makes men so much afraid’
b. \textit{[...]} *\textbf{Hay que ser eso lo que les da tanto miedo a los hombres.}

Given its context, (3) is a very clear case of epistemic necessity. The variant in
(3a) is fully equivalent with (3). (3b) does not have a translation because it is
uninterpretable, i.e. truly ungrammatical. This ungrammaticality is also related
to the restriction of \textit{haber que} to predications with human referents as their first
argument, or, as put in RAE (2009: 2148), ‘the modified verb predicates only
on nominal groups whose referents are gifted with intention or will’.\footnote{\textit{[E]l verbo auxiliado sólo se predica de grupos nominales cuyos referentes están dotados de
intención o voluntad". The translation quoted in the text is mine.}}

The three basic domains of modal necessity and the corresponding
expressions are presented in Table 2, which shows that \textit{deber (de)} cannot be
used for the expression of circumstantial necessity and \textit{haber que} cannot
express epistemic necessity.

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & \textit{deber (de)} & \textit{tener que} & \textit{haber que} \\
\hline
circumstantial & – & + & + \\
deontic & + & + & + \\
epistemic & + & + & – \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textbf{Table 2. Periphrastic expression of basic modal meanings}

What this table does not show however are the relative frequencies of
the periphrases in each function. In my corpus, \textit{deber (de)} has an epistemic
reading in about half of the cases in both corpora. The epistemic reading of tener que is less frequent (less than 10% on average in my corpora), but this periphrasis is particularly strong in the circumstantial and deontic domains. With respect to haber que, it should be noted that its circumstantial use is much less prominent than its deontic use, and therefore there are researchers who claim that the meaning of haber que is exclusively deontic (García Fernández et al. 2006: 167). However, there are several clearly circumstantial cases in my corpus, one of which is the following:

(4) [es fácil que mi mujer] en no mucho tiempo/ me refiero a meses/ ni siquiera años/ tenga que entrar en diálisis/ y entonces hay que buscar los viajes/ que sean con- con arreglo a sitios donde exista un equipo de diálisis (AdH S15, 11)8

‘[it is probable that my wife] within not too much time/ I’m talking about months/ not even years/ will have to start dialysis/ and then one has to look for trips that have a- a solution to places where there is a dialyser’

The following two sections will discuss the non-epistemic meanings of the constructions in more detail.

3. Non-epistemic deber de, tener que and haber que: straightforward cases

This section consists of two parts: in section 3.1 the basic categories of non-epistemic modality will be refined so as to yield six categories, and in section 3.2 these categories will be exemplified in order to see which periphrases can be used for the expression of each of these categories. In this section, only relatively straightforward cases will be presented, i.e. those cases in which the modalized SoA has no tense marking and is not modalized itself. The discussion of more complex cases will be postponed to section 4.

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8 In the PRESEEA transcription conventions, the slashes indicate pauses of different duration; the maximum of three slashes corresponds to a silence of 2 seconds or more; the colon represents the lengthening of the preceding sound, and the hyphen in cases such as con- con in example (4) indicates a very brief waver. In the source indications of the PRESEEA examples from Alcalá de Henares (AdH), the alphanumeric code before the comma identifies the speaker. The letters S, M, and P respectively correspond to the educational levels superior (university), media (secondary school), and primaria (primary school); the letter is followed by the interview number. The number after the comma, if present, refers to the token-number in my sample.
3.1 Categories of non-epistemic necessity

So far, we have distinguished only two basic domains of non-epistemic modality, deontic and circumstantial modality. In this section a further distinction will be added, that of “participant-internal modality”, which within the domain of possibility consists of “abilities” and within that of necessity consists of “needs”. Participant-internal necessity is relevant for the description of the periphrases at issue, particularly when one defines the concept of “needs” a bit more loosely than does Narrog (2012: 9), who views participant-internal needs as a matter of nutrition and excretion. In addition to these basic human needs, also those cases of necessity will be considered which the speaker presents as if they represent an urgent inner need, of which (5) is a telling example:

(5) [in a conversation with a rival]
   “Tengo que hacerle hablar más –pensó–. Tengo que hurgarle más, sacarle todo lo que se refiere a mí.” (Lit, Pombo)
   “I must make him talk more –he thought–. I must delve into him more deeply, get out of him everything that has to do with me.”

Following Narrog (2005, 2012), I will now introduce two macro-domains of modal evaluation: volitive modality and non-volitive modality. Deontic modality forms part of the macro-domain of volitive modality, and internal and circumstantial modalities belong to the macro-domain of non-volitive modality. Volitive modal distinctions are those that contain “an element of will” (Jespersen 1992 [1924], quoted from Narrog 2005: 683), i.e. deontic modality is volitive in the sense that it concerns the imposition of individual or societal human norms. Thus, so far we have the following picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-epistemic Modal Necessity (Basic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ Volitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Volitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal, Circumstantial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now that we have a total of three modal distinctions, one volitive and two non-volitive ones, it is time to introduce a new parameter into the categorization of non-epistemic necessity, i.e. concerning the source and the target of modal evaluation. Such a parameter has been introduced by Hengeveld

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9 Narrog (2012: 9-10) is nevertheless right in observing that there is a strong bias between possibility and necessity in the sense that ability is much more talked about than are needs, and therefore participant-internal necessity is rarely coded as such cross-linguistically, whereas there tend to be wide arrays of expressions for the corresponding possibility distinction.
(2004), who distinguishes participant-oriented, event-oriented and proposition-oriented modal distinctions, of which only the former two will be relevant in this section.

When modal necessity is *participant-oriented* it concerns obligations and necessities of some specific human participant in an event. The source of the modalization can be either internal or external to the participant. In the latter case the source may be either the circumstances or somebody’s will.

The source of *event-oriented* necessity is of a general nature and does not target an individual but a SoA. In the case of deontic modality the sources are social rules of different kinds. Circumstantial event-oriented modality concerns the necessity of some SoA to occur due to the circumstances. Internal event-oriented modality has the same property as internal participant-oriented modality: the source and the target are identical, which in this case boils down to inherent physical possibilities and necessities of SoAs. Internal event-oriented modality can be relevant in the case of possibility (cf. Olbertz 1998: 386), but it is difficult to conceive of something as an inherent physical necessity of events.

The addition of internal modality as well as the parameter regarding the target of modalization is summarized in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Volitive</th>
<th>Non-volitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deontic</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumstantial</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>State of affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Non-epistemic modal necessity (preliminary)

This classification is sufficient to account for most non-complex uses of modal necessity. In the next section, these categories will be applied to the three periphrases.

3.2 *Participant- and event-oriented meanings of* deber (de), tener que and haber que

In this section I will first present participant-oriented and then event-oriented examples of modal necessity. I will end with an overview of the distribution of *deber (de), tener que* and *haber que* within this modal domain.

Let us start with the two distinctions of non-volitive participant-oriented modality, internal and circumstantial necessity. The following two examples illustrate two types of internal participant-oriented modal necessity.
In (7) we have a case of internal modality proper, in the sense of being related to the need of nutrition. Example (8) concerns a case of an extreme urge of the first-person narrator to meet the lady he is in love with. What both cases have in common is that the source and the target of the necessity concern the same referent.

Example (9) is a case of circumstantial modality, i.e. it is the circumstances that force the bus driver to react by braking abruptly, which leads to serious injuries to passengers who are about to leave the bus:

(9) *bueno se levantaron allí [...] para bajar en la parada// se cruzó un coche/ tuvo que pegar un frenazo* (AdH S9, 48)

‘well they got up there [...] to get out at the stop// suddenly there was a car crossing/ and he had to hit the brake really hard’

Examples (10)-(12) illustrate the two possible expressions of participant-oriented deontic necessity, *tener que* in (10) and *deber (de)* in (11)-(12).

(10) *Ahora lo que tienes que hacer es volver a la cama.* (Lit, Llamazares)

‘What you must do now is go back to bed’

(11) *[at the hairdresser’s]*

*Pero además, hágale caso, usted lo que debía de hacer era ponerse mechas, siempre se lo estoy diciendo, le irían de fenómeno unas mechas; ya lo vería.* (Lit, Martín Gaite)

‘But, what is more, do take my advice, what you should do is have highlights, I’ve always told you, highlights would suit you fabulously; you’ll see yourself’

(12) *Debo hablarle con toda franqueza.* (Lit, Delibes)

‘I must speak to you in all frankness’
In (10) the speaker uses tener que to impose an obligation on the addressee in his or her own interest. In (11) the obligation, expressed by means of deber de, is imposed on the addressee, but mitigated by means of the use of the imperfective past rather than the simple present. In (12) the obligation is self-imposed: the speaker uses deber to express that he feels morally obliged to be honest.

With respect to the distribution of deber (de) and tener que in these examples, we see that the former is used only in the deontic case. Tener que, on the other hand, serves the expression of inherent, circumstantial, and deontic participant-oriented modality. As regards the third modal periphrasis, impersonal haber que, it is excluded from the participant-oriented domain, because it cannot be used to modalize linguistic expressions concerning a specific participant.

Let us now turn to the expression of event-oriented necessity, starting again with the non-volitive distinctions.

(13) [about an old piano]
porque claro es que era de madera/ y con los cambios de tiempo con el verano se contrae/ y cuando llega el otoño tienes que volverlo a afinar (AdH S18)
‘because of course it was from wood/ and due to the change of the weather in the summer it contracts/ and when the autumn comes you have to tune it again’

(14) – ¿dónde queda eso?//
  – nada más pasar el subterráneo// en dirección hacia el Chorrillo// (uf:)/ a ver cómo te diría// desde:/ la Plaza Cervantes [...] yendo hacia el Paseo de la Estación// es al otro lado de- de las vías/ de:l tren [...] hay que cruzar por el subterráneo// (AdH P39, 13)
  ‘– where is that?//
  – immediately after the underpass// in the direction of El Chorrillo// (gee) how to explain this?// from/ the Plaza de Cervantes [...] walking towards the Paseo de la Estación// it is on the other side of the rails/ of the train [...] you have to cross through the underpass//’

In (13) the combined effect of the piano being old and the changing temperature makes tuning necessary. Although in this case, the modal expression with tener que has second person reference, it cannot refer to the addressee, because it is the speaker rather than the addressee who is responsible for tuning the piano. In other words, this second person reference has to be read generically. In example (14) it is reaching a place which implies the necessity of passing through an
underpass, which, due to not being specifically directed to any participant, is expressed by means of *haber que*.

Deontic event-oriented necessity can be expressed by means of the three periphrases: (15) illustrates the use of *haber que*, (16) that of *tener que* en (17) that of *deber* (de).

(15) [on an urban renewal project]

*lo hicieron para el presente no para el futuro ¿sabes? que lo que hay que mirar también es el futuro no es el presente/ hay que mirar el presente ¿me entiendes? pero también el futuro* (AdH P51, 12)

‘they did it for the present not for the future you know? I mean what is necessary to look at is also the future it’s not the present/ it’s necessary to look at the present you understand? but also the future’

(16) *Era grande y tenía todo lo que tenía que tener, pero no daba al mar sino al desierto, a las palmeras agitadas que rodeaban el hotel.* (Lit, Puértolas)

‘It was big and had everything it had to have, but it had a view not of the sea but of the desert, of the waving palms that surrounded the hotel’

(17) *lo cuezo todo/ lo cuelo/ lo pelo/ lo echo/ echo una pastilla de Avecrén/ dicen que no se debe de echar/ pero a mí me gusta* (AdH M35, 2)

‘I cook it all/ I strain it/ I peel it/ I add/ add an Oxo cube/ they say you shouldn’t/ but I like it’

In all these cases some non-specified norms are implicated, in (15) the requirement of a long-term vision in urban planning, in (16) the general expectations of what a hotel room should contain, and in (17) the norm of a recipe or a cookery book (cf. Vázquez Laslop 2001: 95-98 for more details).

In conclusion, this study of straightforward cases of modal necessity brings us to the distribution of the three periphrastic constructions presented in Table 4, which shows that *deber* (de) is excluded from the non-volitive domain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOLITIVE</th>
<th>NON-VOLITIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMAIN</td>
<td>TARGET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deontic</td>
<td>circumstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deber (de) tener que</td>
<td>tener que</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tener que</td>
<td>tener que</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haber que</td>
<td>tener que</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. The periphrastic expression of non-epistemic modal necessity (preliminary)

In the next section this picture will be further expanded to accommodate complex cases of the use of the modal periphrases.

**4. Non-epistemic deber de, tener que and haber que: complex cases**

So far we have considered participant-oriented and event-oriented modalities, i.e., roughly speaking, modal evaluations of SoAs and their relations with participants, circumstances and social norms. In all these cases the SoAs are non-real, but may be expected to be realized. We will now go on to the relation between speakers and past SoAs or unrealizable SoAs.

Let us first consider past SoAs. In (18) the speaker presents his opinion on an action that was carried out without providing something that the speaker deems to be necessary.

(18) tenían que nada más que poner esa:s fábricas/ al mismo tiempo que las ponen haber hecho algo/ para que no/ perjudicara al río// (AdH P39, 11)
‘they should immediately after building these factories/ at the moment of building them/ have done something in order not to/ harm the river//’

The combination of an imperfective past tense form on the periphrastic auxiliary (in this case: tenían que) and the relative past on the non-finite verb (in this case: haber hecho) indicates counterfactuality, i.e. that the SoA expressing the speaker’s proviso has not taken place (Laca 2005: 32-33; RAE 2009: 2152-2153). In other words, (18) is an expression of the speaker’s negative evaluation of past event. I will refer to this type of deontic modality as “evaluative deontic modality” in contrast to “prescriptive deontic modality” which corresponds to event-oriented deontic modality as illustrated in examples (15)-(17).10

10 In Olbertz and Gasparini Bastos (2013) this distinction has been referred to as one between
The following example illustrates a case of an unrealizable SoA.

(19) [joking about death]

\( \text{La gente debería morirse en el cuarto de baño con la radio puesta.} \) 
(Lit, Vázquez Montalbán)

‘People ought to die in the bathroom with the radio on’

Example (19) differs from (18) in not being located in the past. In addition, whereas example (18) is counterfactual, i.e. the SoA “is the exact reverse of the factual world” (Verhulst and Declerck 2011: 25), cases such as (19) create an “imaginary world”, in which the speaker “is not concerned about its relation the factual world at all” (Verhulst and Declerck 2011: 25). In (19) \( \text{deber} \) is used to express a wish, and by using the conditional form of the auxiliary (\( \text{debería} \)) the speaker expresses that he is well aware of the fact that his wish cannot come true. Desires of this type cannot be interpreted as obligations in any sense, because nobody is able to comply with them. Therefore, cases like (19) will be categorized as desiderative modal expressions.

What evaluative deontic necessity and desiderative modality have in common is the fact that they have the speaker as their source and participate in the volitive domain.

In the following sections, I will first discuss evaluative deontic modality and its interaction with tense and other modal expressions (section 4.1), then go into desiderative modality (section 4.2) and end by locating these two modal distinctions within a complete picture of non-epistemic modal necessity (section 4.3).

4.1 Evaluative deontic necessity

As opposed to prescriptive deontic modality, which concerns events that may, in principle, be expected to be realized after the moment of utterance or writing, evaluative deontic modality may concern past SoAs. When this is the case, such as in example (18) above, this SoA is necessarily counterfactual. In a case like (18), the speaker knows that at a given moment in the past, an SoA (\( e_i \)) took place, and he/she indicates that in his or her view there is a necessity that the contrary of (\( e_i \)), i.e. (\( \neg e_i \)), had taken place in the past. Such a procedure is only

“objective” and “subjective” deontic modality. Given the fact, however, that this distinction is generally associated with the difference between the the so-called “directive” or “performative” use of deontic modals in the context of second person address (cf. e.g. Lyons 1977: 824; Vázquez Laslop 1999; Verstraete 2001, 2004), I prefer the labels “prescriptive” and “evaluative” here.
possible in evaluation, because issuing an obligation on a SoA that precedes the moment of speaking is a logical impossibility: “there is an intrinsic connexion between deontic modality and futurity” (Lyons 1977: 824). In order to account for the semantics of the evaluative use, I follow Laca (2005: 29-32), who proposes that in the counterfactual readings of deber (de) and poder, the prospective interpretation of the modals is cancelled, given that the knowledge of the counterfactuality of the SoA is essential for the deontic evaluation. 11 This view is supported by the fact that, in counterfactuals, the modal verb in the imperfective past or conditional form modifies a verb in the perfect infinitive, which, as such, does not have a prospective or future oriented meaning. Let us have a look at some more examples:

(20) yo creo que Sadam se tendría que haber rendido antes  
(Radio, Madrid, 1/3/1991, CREA)  
‘I think Sadam should have given up earlier’

(21) creo que: ha hecho mal/ no sé/// debería haberlos sacado a estos  
¿no?/// o sea que los mejores jugadores son los que jugaron en ... en el último partido ¿no?/// (AdH M22, 33)  
‘I believe he made a mistake/ I don’t know/// he should’ve selected these, right?/// I mean that the best players are those who played in ... in the last game, right?///’

In both (20) and (21) the speaker gives his/her opinion about an event in the past that failed to occur in the way he/she would have approved of. More precisely, the event (e_t) modalized by means of tener que or deber was not effectuated in the past and is marked as such by the combined effect of the conditional marking of the auxiliary and the compound infinitive. This unreal SoA describes what the speaker would have regarded as desirable. However, the evaluative nature of modal evaluation does not depend on the counterfactuality of the modalized SoA, rather, evaluative deontic modality may also concern present or future SoAs. Consider the following variants of (20) and (21), in which the conditional of the auxiliary and the compound infinitive of the main verb have been substituted by the present tense of the auxiliary and a plain infinitive:

[Text continues with examples and analysis of modal evaluation.]
(20)  a.    *yo creo que Sadam se tiene que rendir*  
    ‘I think Sadam must give up’  
    
b.    *Sadam se tiene que rendir*  
    ‘Sadam must give up’  

(21)  a.    *creo que debe sacarlos a estos*  
    ‘I believe he must select these’  
    
b.    *debe sacarlos a estos*  
    ‘he must select these’  

In (20a) and (21a) the evaluative character of the modalization may still be attributed to the fact that the modal evaluations are complements of the matrix clause with *creer* ‘believe’ in both cases. But even when the matrix clause is removed, as in (20b) and (21b), these sentences continue to be evaluative, i.e. speaker-bound comments on a situation the speakers do not control. Participant-oriented readings are excluded in both cases, because the speaker has no authority to impose his or her will on the primary referents in either of them.

Évaluative deontic modality can also concern SoAs in which the speaker him- or herself participates, but in such a case it is crucial for the evaluative deontic reading that he or she is no longer involved with this event. (22) is such a case.

(22)  *Pensaba: “yo tendría que haber estado allí”*. (TVE, 30/1/1990, CREA)  
    ‘I thought: “I should have been there”’

When we adapt this example to the present, the result is an expression of participant-oriented modality:

(22)  a.    *Yo tengo que estar allí.*  
    ‘I must be there’  

In the context given in (22), (22a) may be read either as an expression of participant-inherent modality, similar to the example given in (8) above, or as an expression of self-imposed participant-oriented deontic modality, similar to (12) above.

What we can conclude from this brief excursion is that it is an essential property of evaluative deontic modality that the evaluated event cannot be controlled by the speaker. This may be because it occurred in the past and/or because the speaker does not have the possibility or the authority to influence the course of events.
The difference between evaluative and prescriptive deontic modality is also reflected in the fact that expressions of the former can have expressions of the latter in their scope. Consider the following examples:

(23) *El pueblo cubano debe poder elegir qué sistema desea.*
‘The Cuban people must be allowed to decide what system they want’
(Ruben Blades in *Movimiento mundial de solidaridad con Cuba*, April 2010)

(24) *Se debería abolir la distinción de procedimiento para gastos obligatorios y no obligatorios, es decir, que el Parlamento Europeo debería poder actuar como interlocutor en términos de igualdad para todo tipo de gastos.*
‘The different procedures for obligatory and non-obligatory expenses should be abandoned, in other words the European Parliament should have the right to act as a partner in the same way for any kind of expense’

In (23) Ruben Blades, a popular Panamanian singer, expresses his opinion that Cubans must (*debe*) have the right (*poder*) to political liberty. In (24) the writer deems it necessary (*debería*) for the European Parliament to be entitled (*poder*) to act in a specific way. What is encoded by means of *poder* in both cases are legal norms, which are typical cases of event-oriented prescriptive deontic modalization. What is encoded by *deber* are expressions of necessity as viewed from the perspective of the speaker/writer, who has no authority to change the situation she/he describes.

As regards the place of evaluative deontic modality within our classification, I will make use of the concept of “episode”, introduced by Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 157-166), which can basically be characterized as (sets of) tensed SoAs. As opposed to prescriptive deontic modality, which scopes over tenseless SoA, the SoA may be tensed for being anterior to the moment of speaking in the case of evaluative modality. At this point, it might be objected that also prescriptively used modals can be tensed, such as in (16), repeated here as (25) for convenience:
(25) Era grande y tenía todo lo que tenía que tener, pero no daba al mar sino al desierto, a las palmeras agitadas que rodeaban el hotel. (Lit, Puértolas)
‘It was big and had everything it had to have, but it had a view not of the sea but of the desert, of the waving palms that surrounded the hotel’

However, what happens here is that the imperfective past on the modal is a consequence of tense copying, i.e. consecutio temporum, i.e. the formal adaptation of the modalized clause to the past context of the narrative. This means that the past tense just expresses simultaneity with the context, and that neither the modal nor the SoA is tensed in relation to the remainder.

The functioning of evaluative deontic modality is informally represented in (26), where the elements printed in lowercase are operators of modality and tense, their mutual order reflects their scope, and the elements rendered in uppercase represent the entities on which the operators operate. The bracketed expressions are those that can be within the scope of the episodes, i.e. the tensed SoAs.

(26) The scope of evaluative deontic necessity
   a. evaluative-deontic past/present Episode
      [prescriptive-deontic SoA]
   b. evaluative-deontic past Episode
      [participant-oriented-deontic Primary Participant in SoA]

(26a) represents the possibility of an expression of evaluative deontic modality to take an expression of prescriptive deontic modality in its scope. In addition, “past/present”\(^{12}\) in the representation shows that the expression of evaluative deontic modality can operate on linguistic expressions that can be located freely in time. (26b) concerns the scope of an expression of participant-oriented modality. In this case the tense operator on the episode can only be “past”, because only in that case an evaluative deontic modalization is possible. A past tense operator on the episode will trigger a counterfactual reading of the SoA.

Both representations in (26) account for the fact that the speaker cannot influence the course of events, because evaluative deontic necessity operates neither on the SoA nor on the primary participant in a SoA, but on the episode.

As we will see in the next section, the second type of non-prescriptive modality behaves quite differently.

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\(^{12}\) The theoretical possibility of “future” is not included here, because future tense marking on modals usually triggers a conjectural, i.e. epistemic reading.
4.2 Desiderative modality

What I call “desiderative” here, covers what has been termed “boulomaic”, and defined as the expression of “wishes, hopes, and desires” in Hengeveld (1988: 239). Desiderative modality is an exceptional type of modality because it does not participate in the possibility–necessity dichotomy: it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of desires in terms of anything but necessity (Olbertz 1998: 381, Narrog 2012: 9). The crucial difference between deontic and desiderative modality is that the latter does not impose obligations. Rather, it is a defining characteristic of desiderative modality that it concerns uncontrollable and/or unrealizable SoAs.


‘Goethe said it: “All publishers are sons of the devil. For them there should be a special hell”.’

(28) *De niña pensaba que era una pena que la vida de la gente se perdiese, que tendría que haber un gran libro donde todos los minutos del vivir quedaran registrados uno por uno, tal vez existieran en el Paraíso esos libros gordos donde se guardaba todo.* (ABC Cultural 5/6/1996, CREA)

‘As a little girl I thought that it was a pity that the lives of the people would get lost and that there ought to be a big book where all the minutes of life would be registered one by one, and that perhaps in Paradise there were these huge books where everything was being kept’

In (27) and (28) *deber* and *tener que* are used to modify a proposition describing an imaginary world, “a purely invented scenario”, for which the relation with real SoAs is irrelevant (Verhulst and Declerck 2011: 25).

The following is a particularly telling example, because in this case the desire represents a physical impossibility:

(29) *Se debería poder tocar el piano mientras que se va en bicicleta* (El Alpe d’Huez, 1994, CREA)

‘It should be possible to play the piano while riding a bike’

We have seen that desiderative necessity shares with evaluative deontic necessity the property of having the speaker/writer as their source. A common denominator for both therefore is “subjective modal necessity”. The difference
is that deontic modality concerns evaluations of events and that desiderative modality concerns ideas and fantasies, which may or may not bear a relation to extralinguistic reality. In the next section, I will present a proposal of how to reflect this difference in our classification of modal necessity.

4.3 The targets of evaluative deontic and desiderative modality

We have seen that evaluative deontic modal necessity concerns episodes that can be located independently in time thus relating them to the moment of speaking. Desiderative modality concerns neither SoAs nor episodes, but propositions. As opposed to events, which can be witnessed and located in time and space, propositions are mental constructs such as beliefs and wishes, which are unobservable and cannot be located in time or space, but exist in the speakers’ minds (Vendler 1967: 144; Lyons 1977: 443-447; Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 130-131). This means that the target of desiderative modality is not the episode but the proposition.13

The inclusion of episode- and proposition-oriented modality (i.e. subjective modal necessity) completes the picture of non-epistemic necessity, which is presented in Table 5, where the shaded area concerns subjective modal necessity and the unshaded area the remainder, which I will refer to as “objective modal necessity”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOMAIN</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>volitive</td>
<td>non-volatile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desiderative</td>
<td>deontic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Non-epistemic modal necessity

As regards the linguistic realizations of the two distinctions of subjective necessity, we have seen that \textit{deber (de)} and \textit{tener que} can be used for both.

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13 The present analysis deviates from the one presented in Olbertz & Gasparini-Bastos (2013), where desiderative modality is analyzed in the same way as evaluative deontic modality, i.e. as belonging to the level of the episode, rather than to that of the proposition. I now believe that this approach fails to fully account for the fact that desires are entirely fictitious and have no existence outside the speaker’s mind and his/her corresponding descriptions.
5. Discussion

In this paper I have shown that modality can basically be subdivided into volitive and non-volitive macro-domains, and furthermore be classified according to the target of modal evaluation, as shown in Table 5 above. Table 6 presents the way in which the three periphrases *deber (de)*, *tener que* and *haber que* are distributed over these categories. Again, the shaded area specifies the subjective domains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOMAIN</th>
<th>volitive</th>
<th>non-volitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deontic</td>
<td>circumstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desiderative</td>
<td>deber (de) tener que</td>
<td>tener que</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deber (de) tener que haber que</td>
<td>tener que</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deber (de) tener que</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deber (de)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tener que</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Periphrastic expressions of non-epistemic modal necessity

Apart from the clear exclusion of *deber (de)* from the non-volitive macro-domain, it is obvious that the modal periphrases are highly polysemous. This holds particularly for *tener que*, and to a lesser degree also for *deber (de)* and *haber que*. In addition, there are many cases that allow for multiple readings, such as the case of (22a), repeated here as (30) for convenience, which, out of context, allows for a deontic, a circumstantial and an inherent reading.

(30) *Yo tengo que estar allí.*
‘I must be there’

However, ambiguity is not only a matter of presenting utterances out of context. The following case is one of the many examples that allow for both a circumstantial and a deontic reading within the context in which it appears.

(31) [after an evening out, two friends have to say good-bye]
*A Enric lo habían traído ellos y tuvo que irse con ellos.* (Lit, Puértolas)
‘Enric had come with them (in their car), and he had to return with them’
In the first reading, there is no alternative for Enric to get back, and in the second it is a matter of politeness to return with the same people who brought him. In fact, it is quite possible that in cases like (31) this ambiguity is not being felt as such, since simply both meanings may be intended. Coates (1983) speaks of “merger” in such cases: “merger differs from ambiguity in that it is not necessary to decide which meaning is intended before an example can be understood; with merger the two meanings are involved and are not in certain contexts mutually exclusive” (Coates 1983: 17).

It is this very polysemy of tener que that explains its popularity in oral usage. Given that tener que can be used for both non-volitive and volitive modalities, the use of tener que avoids a potential confrontation with the interlocutor that might arise from the use of an unambiguously deontic expression. Using tener que may always be partially or fully associated with an external (to wit, circumstantial) necessity, i.e. with non-volitive modality, rather than being solely related to the speaker’s will.

As regards the preference for haber que in oral use there is a different explanation, because, as we have seen in section 3, this periphrasis expresses deontic meaning in most of the cases. The reason for speakers to prefer haber que to deber (de) probably lies in the impersonal character of the former. We have seen that modalization with haber que is always event-oriented. This fact can be used in conversational interaction to avoid the use of participant-oriented deontic modality as in the following example, which is uttered in a tense situation between the interlocutors:

(32) Hay que reconocer, Julio, que los santanderinos nos ponemos pesadísimos, siempre con el dichoso Santander [...] (Lit, Pombo)
‘You must admit (lit.: one must admit), Julio, that we Santandarians behave really awfully, always with this fantastic Santander [...]’

The pragmatic effect is very similar to that of the ambiguity effect of tener que: instead of unambiguously imposing his will on the addressee, the speaker circumvents this by using an impersonal deontic expression, seemingly directed to nobody in particular but in fact directed to the addressee. The use of event-oriented deontic modality, as in this example, is another pragmatic strategy of indirectly expressing participant-oriented deontic modality, thus avoiding the risk of any confrontation with the interlocutor.

The situation is different in the case of subjective necessity, where there is no longer any ambiguity involved. Within the subjective domains, the
quantitative difference between *deber (de)* and *tener que* in oral usage in much less prominent: here *tener que* is just a little more frequent than *deber (de).*14

6. Conclusion

I have shown in this paper that the non-epistemic meanings of the three modal periphrases can best be accounted for in a two-dimensional model which distinguishes the domains and the targets of modal evaluation. One of the outcomes of this approach is a strict division between objective (participant-and event-oriented) and subjective (episode- and proposition-oriented) modal domains. Within the former there are many cases of ambiguity and even merger between the volitive and non-volitive modal distinctions expressed by *tener que,* particularly between deontic and circumstantial necessities. This, as well as the impersonal structure of *haber que,* explains the pragmatic preference for *tener que* and *haber que* to the detriment of *deber (de)* in oral usage.

References

*Studies:*

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14 I searched the AdH corpus for all person/number conditional forms of of both *tener que* and *deber (de)* followed by an infinitive and found 20 cases of the former against 17 of the latter.


Corpora:


[Lit]:
Eslava Galán, Juan, Juan Marsé, Álvaro Pombo, Soledad Puértolas, Javier Tomeo, El fin del milenio. Barcelona: Planeta