Daring to vote right: Why men are more likely than women to vote for the radical right

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The Radical Right is the most successful party family to have emerged in the last decades. By now, research has painted a coherent picture of the characteristics and motivations of the citizens supporting these parties. In spite of these insights, one of the most consistent and universal characteristics of the Radical Right electorate has remained puzzling: the considerable overrepresentation of men among these parties’ voters in virtually all countries and at all elections. This so-called ‘gender gap’ – which can substantially constrain parties’ electoral success – could only be partially explained by typical models of Radical Right voting. Not only does this leave us puzzled about a structural pattern in the support for the Radical Right, it also suggests that conventional accounts do not fully grasp all aspects of electoral behavior.

Daring to vote right aims to systematically investigate the causes of the overrepresentation of men in the Radical Right electorate, in a range of European countries, from the point of view of various models of voting behavior. The chapters in this book demonstrate that men’s and women’s differing socio-economic conditions play a role in shaping the gap, but mainly so among those Radical Right parties that strongly cater to the needs of economically precarious voters. Furthermore, no evidence was found that suggests that men are more likely to agree with a range of central features of the Radical Right’s ideology. New data collection does show, however, that men are less likely than women to be deterred by both the social stigma and the ongoing association with prejudice that surround many Radical Right parties. Indeed, the last chapter shows that men are systematically more likely to vote for extreme or stigmatized parties of any political color.

Daring to vote right proposes that we can better comprehend gendered voting patterns and further increase our understanding of the Radical Right electorate by combining socio-structural, attitudinal and socio-psychological models. The findings suggest that a key factor constraining the size and nature of the Radical Right’s electoral fortunes is the perceived legitimacy of the messenger, rather than merely the level of public support for its message.
DARING TO VOTE RIGHT

WHY MEN ARE MORE LIKELY THAN WOMEN TO VOTE FOR THE RADICAL RIGHT

Eelco Harteveld

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DARING TO VOTE RIGHT

WHY MEN ARE MORE LIKELY THAN WOMEN TO VOTE FOR THE RADICAL RIGHT

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments 11

Introduction 13

**Part I Socio-structural and attitudinal explanations**

**Chapter 1**
Angry white (wo)men? Socio-economic status, discontent, and policy preferences 33

**Chapter 2**
Welfare chauvinism, nativist Enlightenment: party programs 55

**Part II Socio-psychological explanations**

**Chapter 3**
“A party one simply does not vote for…” The role of social cues 75

**Chapter 4**
Toxic triggers: the role of anti-prejudice motivations 93

**Chapter 5**
Daring to vote right: Party reputations 107

Conclusions 123

Appendices 135

Nederlandstalige samenvatting 155

References 165
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table I.1</td>
<td>Theoretical framework</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table I.2</td>
<td>Overview of chapters</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table I.1</td>
<td>Overview of parties and their gender gap (2009)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table I.2</td>
<td>Regression models with propensity to vote for the Radical Right as the dependent variable</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table I.3</td>
<td>Separate regressions for men and women</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table I.4</td>
<td>Size of the gender gap in 'East' and 'West'</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.1</td>
<td>Full regression model</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>Measure 1: subjective sensitivity to others when voting</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2</td>
<td>Measure 2: perceived acceptability of vote choices</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.3</td>
<td>Vignettes (in English)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.4</td>
<td>The three conditions for a Radical Right-like party C</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1</td>
<td>Overview of cases</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.2</td>
<td>Measures of Motivation to Control Prejudice</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.3</td>
<td>Difference between average MCP among men and women (in SD)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.4</td>
<td>Regression models, UK and Sweden</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.5</td>
<td>Regression models, Norway</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.1</td>
<td>Analysis per party family</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table C.1</td>
<td>Categorization of Radical Right parties</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Percentage of Radical Right voters among men and women 16
Figure 1.1 Average scores of men and women on socio-structural indicators 43
Figure 1.2 Average scores of men and women on attitudinal indicators 44
Figure 1.3 Percentage of the gender gap that can be explained by each of the models 49
Figure 2.1 Occupations and classes by gender 61
Figure 2.2 Relation between GAL-TAN, Immigration (A) and Social Lifestyle Intolerance (B) position 64
Figure 2.3 Relation between gender gap, GAL-TAN position and Social Lifestyle Intolerance position 65
Figure 2.4 Relation between size of the gender gap and the salience of Social Lifestyle 66
Figure 2.5 Relation between size of the gender gap and Economic position 67
Figure 2.6 Marginal effects of female dummy, over economic positions 70
Figure 2.7 Gender and explained variance by socio-structural variables 71
Figure 3.1 Mean scores, among men and women, on the measure of vote sensitivity 83
Figure 3.2 Mean scores, among men and women, on the perceived acceptability of a SD vote 83
Figure 3.3 Effects of perceived acceptability on voting for a party, among men and women 84
Figure 3.4 Mean PTV for different conditions 88
Figure 3.5 Average PTV for different conditions, among men and women 89
Figure 4.1 Gender differences in MCP and restrictive immigration preferences (women's average score minus men's average score, in SD) 102
Figure 5.1 Marginal effect of gender for different values of the three party characteristics (all parties) 115
Figure 5.2 Effect size of gender for various models 117
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“A COMPLEX AND INTRIGUING PUZZLE”

Men are more likely to vote for Radical Right parties than women. In fact, gender is the only sociodemographic variable that is relevant across virtually all Radical Right parties at every election (Norris, 2005). This feature has led Mudde (2007: 90) to label the party family “Männerparteien” – men’s parties. The electoral male bias is not without consequences: limited success among female voters can substantially constrain the Radical Right’s electoral fortunes. However, more than two decades after Betz (1994: 146) first documented this “complex and intriguing puzzle”, we still do not fully understand the mechanism behind the most consistent and universal gender gap in voting in contemporary democracies. Not only does this leave us puzzled about the origins of this gap, it also suggests that our conventional models of Radical Right voting leave important variation unexplained. The aim of this dissertation is to systematically investigate the causes of the Radical Right gender gap, in a range of European countries, from the point of view of various models of voting behavior. This, in turn, sheds light on the role played by gender in shaping vote choices more generally, as well as on hitherto overlooked determinants of Radical Right voting.

This is not to say that the Radical Right gender gap has not yet attracted insightful scholarship. On the contrary, a number of studies has furthered our understanding of the gap in various contexts. Among these are several case studies, including Hungary (Montgomery, 2015), Switzerland (Fontana, Sidler, & Hardmeier, 2006) and Canada (Gidengil, Hennigar, Blais, & Nevitte, 2005). Next to drawing attention to relevant country-specific factors – for instance, the role of post-communist heritage in Hungary (Montgomery, 2015) – and election-specific events – such as leadership change in France (Mayer, 2013) –, these studies aim to explain the gender gap by generally established models of Radical Right voting. However, with the exception of Canada, where the gender gap in voting for the Canadian Alliance could be traced to gender differences regarding “the appropriate role of the state, law and order, and traditional moral values” (Gidengil et al., 2005: 1171), none of these country studies have been able to identify a combination of factors which fully explains the gap.

These conclusions have been confirmed in comparative studies employing cross-national data (Givens, 2004; Immerzeel, Coffé, & van der Lippe, 2015). In some countries, the gender gap could be explained by a broad set of structural and attitudinal explanatory variables. At the same time, in most countries, the gender gap persists; and where it does not, the relevant set of explanations differs between countries. In short, the literature provides several relevant insights in factors contributing to the gender gap, but as of yet no clear solution for Betz’ “complex and intriguing puzzle” has been found.
However, should we even expect to find one? Howell and Day (2000: 859) note that if “[n]o single explanation has been generally accepted”, they “possibly […] all contribute a piece of the puzzle”. Still, there is reason to continue investigating the Radical Right gender gap. Several socio-structural and attitudinal factors can account for part of the gap in most of the cases, or most of the gap in some of the cases. However, for a phenomenon as consistent and universal as the Radical Right gender gap, one would expect common underlying mechanisms to be at work. Furthermore, the scope of the studies above often necessitated their authors to limit themselves to the study of a small number of cases. Moreover, some potential explanations of the gender gap, especially those pointing to the deterring role played by the controversial reputation of parties, have remained untested. The aim of this dissertation is, therefore, to contribute to our knowledge of the Radical Right gender gap by expanding upon the existing literature both theoretically and empirically.

More specifically, I hope to make two main contributions. The first is to explore a novel set of explanations starting from a socio-psychological point of view. Partly by collecting new data, I test to what extent gender differences in social sensitivity and latent anti-prejudice motivations explain the gender gap, showing that men are across the board substantially less deterred by the Radical Right’s social stigma and ‘toxic’ reputation. This does not only improve the understanding of the gender gap, but also reminds us of the importance of the social and normative context of voting.

A second contribution is to incorporate the supply side: investigating how factors at the party-level determine the size and nature of the gender gap. Regarding many aspects, Radical Right parties are a rather diverse party family, and it is unlikely that the features responsible for the gender gap characterize all parties to the same extent. However, few gender gap studies have introduced measures of differences between Radical Right parties (for an exception, see Immerzeel et al., 2015). I show that the gap and its variation cannot be fully understood without taking crucial interactions between characteristics of parties and voters into account. What parties propose, do, and say, but also the way in which they are portrayed by other actors in society, affects the composition of their electorate – including its gender balance. I show this is especially relevant with regard to parties’ extremism and socio-economic ideology.

Gender is generally acknowledged as a factor affecting political behavior. At the same time, its inclusion in studies of voting is often not strongly defended theoretically. Our understanding of the role of gender in voting is growing (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Studies have traced the origin of electoral gender gaps to factors such as men’s and women’s workforce participation, religiosity, employment in the private versus public sector, support for violence, or post-material values, to name a few. Particularly well-documented is the development, in industrialized societies, from a ‘traditional’ (Duverger, 1955) to a ‘modern’ gender gap (Inglehart & Norris, 2000): in contrast to the immediate postwar period, men are now more likely than women to vote for conservative parties in most countries. Still, across the board, gender gaps in voting are probably less well studied (and understood) than many other sociodemographic cleavages, such as education or class. By investigating the Radical Right electorate,
I focus on one of the most prominent gender gaps in voting. At the same time, I will take a step back where possible to see whether and how this particular gap improves our understanding of the role played by gender in shaping vote choices more generally.

In the remainder of this introduction, I will first briefly sketch the size and development of the gender gap in Radical Right voting. After that, I discuss the theoretical framework that guides this dissertation. Subsequently, I elaborate on definitions, case selection, and methodological choices. Finally, I present a more detailed chapter-by-chapter outline of the dissertation.

“MÄNNERPARTEIEN”

As Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014: 315) note, “even though the act of voting itself is fairly equally distributed, women and men seem to show different preferences when it comes to filling out the ballots.” Gender gaps in vote choices have been studied systematically since at least Duverger (1955). As noted, the most established finding in the literature is probably the trend from a ‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ gender gap. Until the 1980s, women were more likely to cast a conservative vote than men in most industrialized democracies (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960), reflecting their higher religiosity and lower labor market participation. Since then, a process of dealignment and realignment has been ongoing, leading to the modern situation of a systematic overrepresentation of women among left-wing parties in most (Inglehart & Norris, 2000) or by now possibly all (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014) countries.

While these studies provide relevant insights in general patterns of left-wing and right-wing voting among men and women, gender gaps at the level of individual party families are less well understood. In the case of the Radical Right, the gender gap is particularly noticeable (Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005). To get a first overview of the size and consistency of the phenomenon under study, Figure I.1 shows the percentage of men and women who indicated to have voted for a Radical Right party in 12 European countries for which sufficient data is available in the European Social Survey.1

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1 To ensure reliability, the graph includes only those waves in which at least 10 men and 10 women voted for a Radical Right party, and only those countries in which at least two of such waves were available (ESS, 2002; ESS, 2004; ESS, 2006; ESS, 2008; ESS, 2010; ESS, 2012).
A first striking feature of Figure I.1 is the universality of the gender gap: men are more likely to vote for a Radical Right party in all countries. Moreover, Figure I.1 shows that this is a highly consistent feature of the Radical Right electorate: while gaps grow and shrink from year to year, the parties’ popularity among men is always greater than
among women. A third feature is that the gap is substantial: it is not at all uncommon for the percentage of votes among men to be twice as large as its percentage among women. This corresponds to gaps found in other data sources, including Givens (2004), Spierings and Zaslove (2015), Norris (2005) and Immerzeel et al. (2015). Most of these previous studies found that men are up to two times as likely to vote for a Radical Right party. Even earlier evidence for the existence of this gap can be found in Betz (1994).

THEORETICAL APPROACH

How can this universal, consistent and substantial phenomenon be explained? In this section, I will sketch the theoretical framework guiding this dissertation. I will elaborate how the gender gap can be studied starting from this framework, and also briefly discuss the evidence previous studies have contributed. Table I.1 provides a systematic overview of this framework.

Any hypothesis regarding a gender gap in voting should be grounded in theories of what the relevant determinants of vote choices are. A first element structuring this dissertation therefore consists of models of vote choices. In particular, three models for understanding political behavior are central to this dissertation: a socio-structural, an attitudinal, and a social-psychological model. Each of these stresses a different explanation of political behavior, and their respective literatures do not always speak to each other. At the same time, it is important to note that they emphasize different causal stages of voters’ decision-making process. For instance, social-structural conditions can be responsible for the formation of particular attitudes, which in turn can remain unexpressed because of fears of negative social costs. The theoretical models discussed throughout this dissertation are therefore not mutually exclusive. That being said, the gender gap might arise mostly at one level – structural, attitudinal, or psychological – rather than others.

2 The one exception is voting for List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands in 2004. As I will discuss later, this exception might be insightful, given the program and reputation of the LPF.

3 Of course, the question still remains whether the gap is exceptional. Do other party families show a similar universal, consistent and substantial overrepresentation of one of the sexes? Spierings and Zaslove (2015) argue that the overrepresentation of male voters is less remarkable when taking into account that mainstream right parties also attract more male than female voters. Still, the Radical Right gender gap is larger – and more consistent – than those for the mainstream right almost all their cases.
A second relevant structuring element consists of the two sides of demand and supply. Investigating the demand side is crucial because it can tell us which characteristics of male (female) voters are responsible for their stronger (weaker) support for the Radical Right. This is – rightly – the starting point of most of the existing literature on the gap. These studies share the notion that the gap should have its origins in aggregated differences between men and women on variables correlated with Radical Right voting. As discussed below, the nature of such variables is usually hypothesized to be socio-economic (e.g. men being more often employed in precarious blue-collar private sector jobs) or policy-attitudinal (e.g. men being more often opposed to immigration). Finding the relevant individual-level correlates provides insights in the individual-level mechanism involved.

I argue that, next to studying the demand, an investigation of the supply is necessary – in other words, to incorporate variation in what parties have on offer. This sheds light on the question which aspects of the Radical Right are responsible for the gender gap. Of course, at the end of the day, supply side explanations always remain grounded in individual-level characteristics of men and women. However, taking the supply side into account provides a fuller picture because crucial interactions are likely to be at work between factors at the individual and party level. For instance, as I will investigate later in this dissertation, the extent to which socio-structural characteristics shape the gap is conditional on the content of parties’ socio-economic ideology. Few gender gap studies have introduced measures of differences between Radical Right parties. This dissertation investigates the supply side in a systematic way, aiming to investigate – as far as possible – all three models at both the demand and supply side.

Theories and expectations
In this section, I will discuss the three models, from the point of view of both demand and supply, in more detail. The socio-structural model assumes vote choices to be – ultimately – an expression of voters’ structural position in society. In spite of the alleged decline of class-based voting (Clark & Lipset, 2001), a link still exists between
citizens’ socio-economic role and their vote choice. This is not less true when it comes to Radical Right parties, whose electorates show a consistent overrepresentation of voters with a particular employment status, job type, and work logic (Rydgren, 2012). Next to small entrepreneurs, working class voters – often ‘blue-collar’, less skilled, less educated, and working in the private sector – are relatively overrepresented among many Radical Right electorates. While this is not true for each party to the same extent (Van der Brug, Fennema, de Lange, & Baller, 2012), the general pattern suggests that Radical Right parties cater disproportionally to voters with this specific socio-structural profile.

From the point of view of the demand side, there are good reasons to expect a gender gap in Radical Right voting to emerge. European economies and job markets are (still) to a substantial extent stratified among gender lines (Coffé, 2012; Flabbi, 2012). This is true with regard to many crucial variables such as occupation, income and (for older generations) education, as well as other socio-economic factors which have been found to be correlated with Radical Right voting. Indeed, such differences have been found to account – though usually not fully – for various other gender gaps in voting (Bergh, 2007; Inglehart & Norris, 2000; Knutsen, 2001). For that reason, it could be very well possible that the gender gap in Radical Right voting follows from the simple fact that men are dominantly present in the sort of precarious blue-collar work that make up the Radical Right’s core constituency. According to this argument, women are less attracted to the Radical Right because they are relatively more often beneficiaries of state provisions, and more often employed in the public sector. Longer longevity and higher religiosity might further tie women to the ‘old’ right (Betz, 1994; see also Mayer, 2013). At any rate, the socio-structural model suggests that men’s social and demographic positions in society make them more likely to vote for the Radical Right (Coffé, 2012). In short, men would more often be ‘losers of globalization’ (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, & Dolezal, 2008). At the same time, evidence for this assertion in previous studies has – at best – been mixed (Gidengil et al., 2005; Givens, 2004; Immerzeel et al., 2015).

At the supply side, Radical Right parties differ in the extent to which they actually attract ‘losers of globalization’. In economic terms, several Radical Right parties move towards the left, adopting the new ‘winning formula’ of welfare chauvinist nativism (Azmanova, 2011; De Lange, 2007; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). This is likely to be both cause and consequence of an increasing dependence on voters with a precarious working class profile. If the gender gap reflects the extent to which Radical Right parties attract exactly these voters, then parties with a pro-redistributionist profile can be expected to have a relatively large gap.

A second approach to the gender gap comes from the attitudinal model. This works from the supposition that party support is rooted in voters’ distance towards parties on one or more issues or ideological dimensions (Downs, 1957). In ideological terms, the ascent of the Radical Rights has been dubbed a “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi, 1992) against the issues of the New Left. In this view, the rise of the Radical Right is seen as a backlash against the “politically correct” liberal and cosmopolitan values and policies of the New Left. In a similar vein, the Radical Right can be seen as the defender
of the “heartland” (Taggart, 2004), the homogeneous good old days, unspoiled by mass immigration and other threats. Mudde (2007) defines the ideology of the Radical Right as nativist, authoritarian and populist. Indeed, research has repeatedly established nativist views as the strongest predictor of Radical Right voting (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Mughan & Paxton, 2006; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000). Authoritarianism, euroscepticism and right-wing self-affiliation are other recurring determinants. This suggests ideological congruence between Radical Right voters and parties. Another strand of studies argues that Radical Right voting originates (partly) in attitudes towards the political system, especially discontent with elites (a ‘protest vote’). This resonates with the Radical Right’s critique of corrupt elites (Rooduijn, 2013).

A demand side approach to the gender gap would consist of studying whether such attitudes and values are distributed differently among men and women. As Mudde (2007) notes, the notion that men would somehow be ideologically closer to the Radical Right is a latent assumption underlying part of the (older) literature on gender and Radical Right voting. This would reflect the idea that “female morality tends to be more cooperative, caring, and nurturing” (Howell & Day, 2000: 859), leading to less opposition to immigration and less support for authoritarian policies. Others arguments stress that immigration itself would be a “male-dominated activity” (Givens, 2004: 40), leading to more anti-immigrant sentiments among men. Alternatively, the Radical Right gender gap might be a “feminism gap” (Bergh, 2007): if pro-gender equality stances are more often endorsed (or deemed salient) among female voters, allegedly “ideologically sexist” Radical Right parties (Mayer & Sineau, 2002: 50) might attract more male voters. While it would obviously be mistaken to simply assume that all (or even most) women have pro-emancipatory stances, and men don’t, there is some evidence in support of a gender gap in views on emancipation (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Whatever the origin, the attitudinal model would assume stronger ideological congruence – with regard to policy issues or evaluations of the political system – between men and the Radical Right than between women and the Radical Right.

At the supply side, ideological differences between Radical Right parties can further determine the size and nature of their gender gaps. Of course, Radical Right parties share an ideological core, but substantial variation remains. One currently dynamic element of Radical Right ideology that is likely to be relevant for the gender gap is these parties’ view on gender equality and emancipation. While Radical Right parties have traditionally been regarded as culturally conservative in their outlook, favoring traditional, national values over an individual’s right to individual emancipation, scholars have recently nuanced this classification (Akkerman, 2015; de Lange & Mügge, 2015). To the extent that liberal values are considered integral part of the national tradition, a liberal stance might in fact be equally well-defendable from – or at least instrumental to – a nationalist point of view. Several parties have therefore taken up the

4 This is a clear example of the overlap between the socio-structural and attitudinal model.
cause of women’s emancipation against allegedly “backwards” immigrants (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007). If women are indeed more supportive of such pro-emancipatory views, the gender gap can be expected to be a function of the Radical Right’s stance on such issues.

As noted earlier, combinations of these first two models – the socio-structural and attitudinal one – have been at the core of most existing research on the Radical Right’s gender gap. However, with the exception of Canada, few studies have been able to identify a combination of structural and attitudinal factors which satisfactorily explains the gap (Fontana et al., 2006; Gidengil et al., 2005; Montgomery, 2015). Givens (Givens, 2004: 30) shows that the relative importance of “structural, situational, and political factors” differ between Germany, France and Austria, but that they do not fully explain the gender gap in any of the countries. Studying five European Radical Right parties, Rippeyoung (2007) concludes that the gap cannot be traced to value differences, while men’s higher propensity to be a blue-collar worker provides only a partial explanation. A similar conclusion is drawn by Immerzeel et al. (2015), who study a broad set of European cases. In some of the countries in their study, gender is no longer a significant predictor of Radical Right voting after controlling for a broad set of structural and attitudinal explanatory variables. At the same time, in most countries, the gender gap persists; and where it does not, the relevant set of explanations differs between countries. In short, the literature provides several relevant insights in factors contributing to the gender gap, but socio-structural and attitudinal models of voting do not appear to provide a comprehensive and consistent explanation. Furthermore, these models have only been applied from the point of view of the demand side. As discussed above, potentially relevant differences exist between parties, and this might result in overlooking explanations that work only – or to a larger extent – among subsections of the Radical Right.

Still, it seems that the dominant explanatory variables of Radical Right electoral research leave substantial variation unexplained. It is necessary to broaden the set of approaches – to fully understand the gender gap, but also to improve our theories of Radical Right voting in general. This dissertation therefore also explores the gender gap from a third, social-psychological model. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore all possible aspects of this broad tradition that might potentially clarify the Radical Right gender gap. Rather, I focus on mechanisms that are most likely, in light of the literature, to affect this phenomenon. At their core lies the expectation that elements of the reputation of Radical Right parties are more deterring to women than to men. Because this is the most novel contribution of this dissertation it will be covered most extensively.

After all, research shows that – to a larger extent than other party families – Radical Right parties experience denouncement by both elites and masses. Many parties experience cordons sanitaires, media boycotts (Art, 2007), or prosecution of leaders (Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2015). For many citizens, voting for Radical Right parties would cause normative concerns (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010). There is dispersed
Introduction
evidence that this shapes the electoral fortunes of the Radical Right to a considerable extent. The breakthrough and persistence of Radical Right parties can be seriously hindered by perceptions of illegitimacy (Ignazi, 1992). As Ivarsflaten (2006b: 2) notes, it is “nearly impossible for minor parties to make credible appeals to voters on the immigration issue” unless they can “fend off accusations of racism and extremism”. This underlines the delicate position of Radical Right parties. It has indeed been established that not all voters perceive the Radical Right as ‘normal’ parties (Bos & Van der Brug, 2010). A poll shows that from the 1990s through early 2000s, about 70% of French respondents considered the National Front a “threat to democracy” (Le Monde 2013). By 2013, however, this figure had dropped to 47%, showing that parties can make credible attempts at increasing their perceived legitimacy. For other parties, such attempts have proven more difficult (Goodwin, 2013).

This does not mean that Radical Right parties are a sui generis phenomenon for which voting is in need of a completely different set of accounts. Rather, the party family constitutes a ‘pathological normalcy’ (Mudde, 2010), for which explanations that can also be at work among other parties appear in a more pronounced form. For instance, Communist parties have historically, too, been depicted as illegitimate, or connected to violence; corruption scandals can inflict a stigma on perfectly mainstream parties or candidates; and in some milieus support for – say – a Conservative party can be a utterly taboo. In Radical Right parties, many of these factors come together.

How could these ‘toxic’ elements of the Radical Right’s reputation result in a gender gap? Gilligan (1982: 16) notes that “[s]ensitivity to the needs of others and the assumption of responsibility for taking care lead women to attend to voices other than their own and to include in their judgment other points of view”. This leads to the overarching expectation that controversial parties will experience a larger gender gap. Building on insights from the psychological literature on gender, it will be argued that there are two related but theoretically distinct ways in which a controversial reputation might bring about a gender gap: due to the social unacceptability of supporting such a party, and/or due to normative concerns about legitimacy. The former would mean that men are less likely to be deterred by how others judge a party; the latter that men are less likely to be motivated to avoid associations with extremism or prejudice. While in practice these two elements can be expected to often affect support for the same parties, I will cover their respective mechanisms in separate chapters.

The first mechanism implies that men are more likely to support Radical Right parties because they are less strongly deterred by these parties’ (varying levels of) social stigma: the cue voters derive from their social context that parties are not an acceptable option. This would imply that parties with a substantial social stigma – in voters’ close social context or in society more generally – attract more male voters, regardless of the ideological substance of these parties. Indeed, research suggests that such social cues are indeed less likely to affect men’s behavior than women’s (Bond & Smith, 1996; Carlsson, García, & Löfgren, 2010; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dalton & Ortegren, 2011; Goldsmith, Clark, & Lafferty, 2005). Because Radical Right parties are to different
degrees controversial among substantial parts of the electorate, men are generally less likely to be dissuaded from voting for them by such social stigma.

According to the second mechanism, women might on average be more strongly deterred by normative concerns about extremity and prejudice resulting from parties’ legacies, rhetoric, or symbols. This can potentially explain why a consistent gender gap in voting for Radical Right parties occurs, even if as many women as men agree with the Radical Right’s policy positions. Men have been found to be more supportive of violence, to oppose ideologies based on strict social hierarchies (Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000), and to be on average less motivated to avoid prejudice (Ratcliff, Lassiter, Markman, & Snyder, 2006). Importantly, this is fully compatible with the earlier assertion that men and women might not differ substantially in their views on immigration policy. Support for such policies strongly depends, in the words of Ivarsflaten (Ivarsflaten, 2006a: 6), “not [in] the message itself but rather the credibility of the actor who delivers it”. While as many men as women might agree with anti-immigration policies, men are more likely to pursue this by voting for a party with an absent or weak ‘reputational shield’ that upholds the parties’ legitimacy.

At the supply side, this model suggests parties’ reputation and image will determine their gender gap. The more controversial a party is, the larger the gender gap is likely to be, ceteris paribus. More specifically, the gender gap is a function of – first – a Radical Right party’s social stigma (a characteristic produced in voters’ social context), and – second – its extremism and reputational shield (reflecting a party’s program, conduct and history). The former can more easily vary over time and between social contexts, whereas the latter is likely to be more enduring (although, as we will see, it is possible for parties to enhance their reputation). At the same time, extremer parties will usually experience more stigma, and hence the two elements are likely to correlated. An important implication of this argument is that if Radical Right can credibly distance themselves from allegations of extremism, racism, prejudice, and discrimination, they are likely to experience a “feminization” of the their vote.

In this dissertation, I examine to what extent (a combination of) these three models of Radical Right voting can explain why men are more likely vote for the Radical Right than women. The first two models have received most attention in previous research on the gender gap. For that reason they will be tested less extensively than the social-psychological model, though this does in no way disqualify their relevance.

Alternative explanations
Obviously, this choice of models means some potential explanations are emphasized over others. One of the explanation not covered in this dissertation concerns the characteristics of Radical Right leaders and party elites – especially their gender. Given that men are overrepresented among not only the Radical Right voters but also their members and (possibly) representatives (Mudde, 2007: 100-111), the gender gap might reflect homophilous voting on the basis of gender. This has especially been suggested in the context of the shrinking gender gap in France after Marine Le Pen’s ascension to power in the National Front. However, leadership changes often coincide with programmatical
or reputational adjustments (in the case of the National Front, ‘de-demonisation’), which makes it difficult to isolate leadership gender effects. Moreover, experiences in Scandinavia show that female party leadership can go together with substantial gender gaps in voting. Studying this is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but for a discussion of gender and Radical Right leadership, see Meret, 2013.

Another argument that could be made is that the gap is a methodological artifact rather than a social reality. According to this argument, social desirability – which has been found to be more conspicuous among female respondents (Chung & Monroe, 2003) – would lead women to underreport Radical Right support more strongly than men. While this is a possibility, it seems unlikely that the reported gap – which is a consistent finding over time in a multitude a contexts – can be fully attributed to this phenomenon. An analysis of a sub-sample of German ballot papers that bear marks of gender and age shows that the self-reported gap reflects an actual voting gap for the German Democratic Party (Arzheimer, 2009). Moreover, it is relevant to note that a male overrepresentation is not only present among the voters of the Radical Right, but also among its members and representatives (Mudde, 2007: 97-111). The phenomenon thus seems to be more than an artefact of using surveys.

DEFINITIONS AND CASES

Radical Right
In defining and classifying the Radical Right, I follow Mudde’s (2007: 20-23) influential maximum definition of Radical Right Populist ideology as consisting of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Because I do not include any of the small non-populist Radical Right parties he discusses, the addition “populist” is less informative in this dissertation. I will therefore label the parties under research Radical Right. At the same time, at several occasions I do include borderline cases. This includes, for instance, the Norwegian Progress Party, which Mudde classifies as ‘Neoliberal Populist’, but which is denoted as Radical Right by others (Norris, 2005). I also include parties that, although categorized as Radical Right by Mudde (2007), are sometimes referred to as Extreme Right – most importantly the British National Party. I think a broad definition – and thus an extensive selection of cases – is warranted in this dissertation. First of all, because my primary interest lies with explaining voting behavior, the ideological diversity within the party family is of less direct importance to answering the research question. The gender gap is consistently present even when employing a broad definition. A broad selection of cases also has the methodological benefit that it allows to observe sufficient variation, which is crucial to study the role of supply side factors.

Following the majority of studies on the Radical Right gender gap, this cases investigated in this dissertation are usually European. For an important part this is the result of the choice for comparative cross-national data sources, which – for the indicators studied in this dissertation – were mostly confined to Europe. A European perspective also ensures some level of comparability across contexts, although substantial cross-
cultural differences remain. Of these, I pay special attention to the distinction between the post-communist countries of East-Central and Western European countries. Important differences exist between these two groups of countries, both regarding the political system in general and the Radical Right party family specifically (Dahlberg, Linde, & Holmberg, 2015; Minkenberg, 2002; Van der Brug, Franklin, & Tóka, 2008). This warrants special attention to possible differences between “East” and “West”.

Furthermore, in the last chapter, I broaden the view by investigating gender gaps in voting for all parties. The reason for this is twofold. First, in some relevant respects – most clearly their reputation and stigma – Radical Right parties are quite unlike many (though not all) other parties. Methodologically, this means that regarding these factors most variation exists between Radical Right and other parties, rather than within the Radical Right party family. This cannot be uncovered by only studying the latter. Second, I expect the Radical Right gender gap to be the result of mechanisms that are also at work among the electorates of other parties. By including more cases, I can assess how far the conclusions travel outside of the present case.

The most prominent case in this dissertation is Sweden, because it is the source of the experimental and survey data collected especially for this dissertation. It could be argued that Sweden is a least-likely case to find support for the social-psychological hypotheses. Gender differences are the product of a complex interplay of personal, behavioral and environmental factors (Eagly, Beall, & Sternberg, 2005). Children socialized in traditional patterns of gender roles are most likely to internalize the accompanying traits and, through this, to reassert these patterns. It follows from this that individual gender identities and characteristics reflect the extent to which traditionally gendered norms are dominant within a society. At arguably the most ‘de-gendered’ end of the scale, Sweden is a least-likely case to find the hypothesized gender differences in Radical Right demand.

Gender

Customarily, gender is used in relation to characteristics that are socially constructed as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’, while sex refers to the biological categories of men and women. Many studies about the ‘gender gap’ rely on the latter in their operationalization, and are therefore not truly about gender (for a discussion, see Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, & de Lange, 2015). However, because the term ‘gender gap’ has become firmly established, this convention will be followed throughout the dissertation. In this dissertation I define a ‘gender gap’ as a difference in the number of men and women among the electorate of a party.

Still, given that the mechanisms I discuss are strongly shaped by cultural norms, it is very likely the gender gap in Radical Right voting could be better captured using a more refined measure of gender. Relatedly, it is beyond the scope and aim of this dissertation to focus on the origins of many of the gender differences in socio-economic positions, values, and psychological correlates which are hypothesized to be responsible for the gender gap in Radical Right voting. Instead, gender differences already established in earlier research are taken as independent variables.
That being said, political choice making is a multifaceted process, and the differences within each of the groups of men and women are much larger than the differences between the two groups (Costa et al., 2001). Hence, it is important to emphasize at the onset that any statements about gender differences should not be mistaken for stereotypical images. For instance, that men have been found to be on average less responsive to social cues than women does not tell us much about individuals. Still, the fact that men and women have been found to differ on average on such characteristics can help us to better understand aggregate gender gaps in voting.

**RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA**

The data employed in various chapters mostly consists of large-N, quantitative survey data. This allows for (1) investigating gender gaps in a wide range of contexts; (2) measuring Radical Right voting with relatively little social desirability bias; and (3) establishing explanatory factors of voting in an indirect way without (excessively) relying on voters’ own interpretation of their vote decisions. An obvious limitation of this strategy is the limited opportunity for inductive insights into the phenomenon under study. However, given the deductive aims of this dissertation as well as the substantial social desirability and likely post-hoc rationalization surrounding Radical Right voting, this strategy is in my view the most fruitful for explaining the gender gap.

Some of the hypotheses can be tested using existing data. Chapters dealing with socio-structural and attitudinal demand side factors rely (for a large part) on the European Election Study (EES). In contrast to national election studies, this data source has the benefit of including a broad range of items – many of them referring to national elections – in a large number of countries at the same time point. The data on motivation to control prejudice (MCP), central to Chapter 4, are derived from three different data sources: the Swedish Citizen Panel, the Norwegian Citizen Panel, and the British version of the Comparative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP). More information on each dataset can be found in the respective chapters. In Chapter 5, to obtain reputations of parties, data of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides perceptions of respondents of a large number of parties, which among others led to the construction of a novel way of measuring social stigma in a way comparative across countries and elections. To obtain supply-side measures of parties’ policy positions, Chapter 2 relies on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which contains experts’ views on a range of European parties (Bakker et al., 2015).

Because most existing research has been conducted with regard to socio-economic and ideological determinants of Radical Right support, the third – socio-psychological – model involves new data collection for this dissertation. An innovative survey experiment was conducted among two large samples of Swedish citizens, in which the social cue regarding fictitious parties was manipulated. This is complemented by a set of new survey questions, including measures to directly measure levels of stigma surrounding political parties.
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

Table I.2 summarizes the chapters of this dissertation, ordered along the two structuring elements (models and approaches). Below, I shortly discuss them in turn.

Table I.2  Overview of chapters

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<th>Socio-structural model</th>
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<td>Chapter 1</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
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<td>Attitudinal model</td>
<td>Social cues</td>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
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<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
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<td>Socio-psychological model</td>
<td>Extremity</td>
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Part I: Conventional theories

In the first part (Chapters 1–2), the gender gap is assessed on the basis of the most conventional theories of voting behavior: the socio-structural and attitudinal models. Most existing studies of the gender gap have investigated these two. Next to replicating the findings of these studies on a larger set of cases, I also argue and show that it is important to take two additional aspects into account: conditional effects on the demand side, as well as variation on the supply side.

Chapter 1 investigates the two models from the point of view of the demand side. Can differences between men and women in terms of the ‘classic’ determinants of Radical Right voting – most importantly socio-economic position, discontent with elites, or opposition to immigration – explain why women are less likely to support the Radical Right? This question is studied by looking at the distribution of such determinants (and their effect on Radical Right voting) in 16 Western and East-Central European democracies, using European Election Study data. I do not only look at the extent which men are more often nativist, discontented, unemployed, etcetera (compositional effects); I also test whether these ‘usual’ explanations are more important in driving men’s votes than in women’s (conditional effects). While compositional effects leading to the gender gap have been studied earlier, I argue that conditional effects also need to be taken into account.

In Chapter 2, I turn to another understudied aspect of these conventional theories: variation on the supply side. I argue that two important ideological shifts can be observed, both with potential relevance for the gender gap. In economic terms, several Radical Right parties move towards the left (Ivaldi, 2015), adopting the ‘new winning formula’ (De Lange, 2007; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). In cultural terms, some parties have embraced liberal values such as gender equality in an attempt to preserve the principles of the Enlightenment against immigrants (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007). While the latter has been argued to increase the Radical Right’s electoral success among women, the former (‘welfare chauvinism’), which leads to an inflow of generally
male-dominated vulnerable economic groups, is likely to decrease it. I map the relation between economic and emancipatory values on the one hand, and the gender balance on the other, using expert data on party positions as well as survey data on voters at two time points in 17 countries.

Part II: Socio-psychological models

In the second part (Chapters 3–5), I turn to the third, socio-psychological, approach. This part contains most theoretical contributions and new data. In Chapters 3 and 4, I investigate two mechanisms at the demand side. In Chapter 5, I test both mechanisms at the supply side.

The hypothesis guiding Chapter 3 is that the negative social cues associated with many Radical Right parties, while deterring to many voters, are less likely to influence men’s support. I investigate this on the basis of data collected especially for this purpose in Sweden. I examine indicators aiming to measure the extent to which men and women perceive the Radical Right as acceptable in the eyes of others. This is complemented by a survey experiment in which the social signal about a Radical Right and a Green party is manipulated. This allows me to investigate directly whether men and women differ in their perception of the social stigma of the Radical Right, how this affects their vote, and whether an exogenous increase in stigma deters men less strongly than women. The Green party is included in the experiment to see whether social stigma deters voting for all parties, or only in the context of existing concerns about legitimacy.

Chapter 4 investigates the role of normative concerns more extensively. I focus on the aspect of Radical Right parties that is most strongly associated with such concerns: their alleged prejudice against minorities. After all, despite the existence of latent and manifest xenophobia, a norm against prejudice is firmly rooted in Western societies. While the anti-immigrant message of Radical Right parties resonates with many voters, internalized norms against prejudice prevent some from pursuing these policy preferences by voting for Radical Right parties (Blinder, Ford, & Ivarsflaten, 2013). Building on earlier findings (Ratcliff et al., 2006), I hypothesize that women, while possibly as often opposed to immigrants as men, are more likely to be deterred from translating this into a vote for the Radical Right because these parties are considered ‘toxic’. When Radical Right parties ‘trigger’ the perception that the anti-prejudice norm is at stake, this will result in a gender gap. I expect such motivations to be responsible for creating a gap for two parties that have been least able to diffuse normative concerns – the British National Party and the Sweden Democrats – but not for a party that has been successful at overcoming such concerns – the Norwegian Progress Party. This is tested on the basis of measures of motivations to control prejudice in Sweden, Norway and the UK.

In Chapter 5 I investigate the supply side in light of the psychological models. Do differences in the extent to which Radical Right experience social stigma and have an extreme image affect how large their gender gap is? At this point it is important to note that while Radical Right parties show substantial variation in an ideological sense, their denouncement by sizeable fractions of elites and the general public seems a relatively
widespread feature. As a result, these factors might above all set Radical Right parties apart from many other parties, rather than distinguishing them from each other. In this chapter, I therefore first ‘zoom out’ and look at the effect of social cues on all parties – rather than the Radical Right parties alone – in 30 countries at elections over a period of 15 years. This also allows for an assessment of the external validity of the psychological argument. The findings of Chapter 3 results in the hypothesis that widely denounced parties – of whatever ideology – will attract relatively more male voters. The illegitimacy mechanism demonstrated in Chapter 4 leads to the expectation that extreme parties – of both the Left and the Right – will be electorally male-dominated, too. After studying the effect of stigma and extremity on the gender balance of all parties, this chapter zooms in to study variation within the Radical Right party family.

Finally, in the Conclusion chapter, the findings will be summarized and discussed, leading to suggestions for further research.
Part I

Socio-structural and attitudinal explanations
CHAPTER 1
ANGRY WHITE (WO)MEN?
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, DISCONTENT, AND POLICY PREFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

As stated in this dissertation’s Introduction, many studies have searched for explanations for the phenomenon that men are more likely to support Radical Right parties than women. These diverse studies usually have in common that they draw their hypothesized explanations from the socio-structural and attitudinal models discussed previously. However, these studies have yielded mixed results, and generally focused on a relatively small number of cases (an exception being Immerzeel et al., 2015). In addition, not all aspects of these two models have been tested in prior studies. In this chapter, I therefore systematically investigate the extent to which men and women fit the profile of a Radical Right voter in terms of their views on politics and society, as well as their socio-economic positions. Crucially, I also test a demand side mechanism that features less prominently in these studies: conditionality – in other words, the extent to which established determinants are equally relevant in explaining Radical Right voting among men and women (Howell & Day, 2000). In short, this chapter replicates and expands earlier work by conducting a systematic test of the socio-structural and attitudinal Radical Right demand among men and women.

This chapter starts out by first discussing to what extent gender differences in terms of socio-economic situation as well as attitudes can be expected on the basis of earlier research. Subsequently, this framework is tested on a large sample of voters in 16 countries, which enables an assessment of the robustness of the findings. Because the central aim is to develop and test general hypotheses, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide in-depth analyses of individual countries. However, I will investigate whether patterns differ between the post-communist Central and Eastern European...
countries and the countries of Western Europe, given that the nature and context of Radical Right parties differs between these two parts of the continent.

As stated above, this chapter moves beyond most earlier research by arguing that two separate demand side mechanisms might conceivably explain the gender gap in support for the Radical Right, one of which has hitherto been largely overlooked. The first possibility is that men and women differ on key characteristics and attitudes that influence a person's propensity to vote for populist radical parties. This composition effect has hitherto been the primary hypothesized explanation of the gender gap. Especially, it is usually implicitly or explicitly assumed that the gap means that fewer women than men agree with Radical Right ideology. However, empirical evidence for this explanation is weak. Summarizing research on this topic, Mudde (2007: 113) concludes that most studies show "no significant gender gap in terms of radical right attitudes". Gender differences in economic and social positions do continue to be substantial in most European societies, but these factors have generally been found to explain only a part of Radical Right support (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). A puzzle thus remains.

The second possible explanation for the gender gap has been less studied: different factors might explain the vote choice among men and women (for a discussion, see Howell & Day, 2000; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). This, too, might lead to differences in the electoral appeal of Radical Right parties. This mechanism of conditionality could potentially provide additional insights in the gap. Although explored in case studies (Fontana et al., 2006; Gidengil et al., 2005), moderation has not yet been systematically investigated on a large set of cases – even though, in the Swiss case, compositional effects proved "to be less revealing in terms of the gender gap than conditional effects" (Fontana et al., 2006: 263).

This chapter demonstrates that, across the board, men and women do not differ substantially in their attitudes towards Radical Right issues. However, many of the usual explanations of Radical Right voting predict men's vote choices much better than women's. In other words, women are less likely to support the Radical Right even if they agree with these parties' ideology. This suggests that the issues raised by Radical Right parties are more often deemed salient by men, but also that the Radical Right deters women for reasons other than the content of their political program. At the same time, while the general pattern applies to all European parties, gender differences in social-structural position are (still) responsible for a substantial part of the gender gap – especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

THEORY

Below, I discuss explanations of support for the Radical Right drawn from the socio-structural and attitudinal models. To do justice to different traditions in the literature, I further divide the attitudinal model into attitudes towards the political system ("protest voting") and attitudes towards substantial societal issues ("policy voting"). For each of these,
I discuss the theoretical plausibility of composition and conditional effects, in view of the literature.

**The socio-structural model**

As discussed in the Introduction, socio-structural explanations assume that voters rely on their social position as a cue to determine their vote. Indeed, research has shown that Radical Right voters tend to share certain social characteristics (Rydgren, 2012), and persistent gender differences in these characteristics provide reason to expect composition effects. In one of the early accounts of the Radical Right gender gap, Betz (1994) draws attention to four of such social factors: religiosity, age, labor force participation, and occupational stratification. Radical Right support is generally lower among the religious and the elderly, and women are more likely to be both.\(^5\) Arzheimer and Carter (2009) show that churchgoers are less likely to vote for the Radical Right due to their strong ties to traditional conservative or Christian-Democratic parties. At the same time, Radical Right parties’ electorates tend to be relatively young, while women are overrepresented among the older age groups (Arzheimer, 2009; Betz, 1994; Gidengil et al., 2005).

Many of the earlier Radical Right parties relied on the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ of the small-scale self-employed, but the social base of the Radical Right has broadened to include the working and lower middle classes, as well as the unemployed (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Norris, 2005). Additionally, Radical Right voters tend to share a lower or middle level of education and higher levels of job insecurity. These ‘losers of modernity’ or ‘angry white men’ – notice the gendered connotation – feel threatened by rapid changes in post-industrial societies, and their support for the Radical Right is argued to stem from resentment of immigrants and political elites (Rydgren, 2012). As will be further discussed in Chapter 2, the overrepresentation of voters from lower social strata might explain why combining nativist ideology with a centrist or even center-left economic policy has been dubbed the ‘new winning formula’ for Radical Right parties (De Lange, 2007). This ‘proletarianization’ (Betz, 1994) appears to be an ongoing trend.

In many European countries, women still differ from men with regard to important socio-structural characteristics, such as occupation, income and education (the latter among older generations). This is the starting point for many studies on gender differences in political behavior (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Vaus & McAllister, 1989). Importantly, in the context of Radical Right voters, women are more frequently employed in the public sector and less likely to be blue-collar workers. This could make them less likely to vote for Radical Right parties. Rippeyoung (2007) found support for this contention, while Gidengil et al. (2005), Givens (2004), and Fontana et al. (2006) did not find convincing evidence for social-economic

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\(^5\) This formulation implies that women rather than men are the exception that needs to be explained. An alternative approach would be to describe why men are more likely to vote for the populist Radical Right.
conditions as the key to the gender gap. Coffé (2012: 138) summarizes research on this topic by concluding that ‘[m]ost of these studies found that […] gender differences in class positions and patterns of employment fail to account for the gender gap in radical right voting’. Nevertheless, because socio-structural gender differences continue to be sizeable, it remains a plausible expectation that socio-structural characteristics contribute to a compositional gender gap.

Conditional effects might also be present here. More specifically, it can be expected that socio-economic status and education are stronger determinants for men’s vote choices than for women’s. The reason is that, as a group, men have generally been part of the paid workforce for a longer period, which make it likely that class identities have rooted more deeply (Coffé, 2012). Furthermore, in the context of Radical Right parties it is relevant that a majority of (economic) migrants to Europe are male, and they are disproportionally represented in low-skilled jobs which have traditionally been male-dominated. To a greater extent than women, lower educated and working class men compete with immigrants. This makes it plausible that men are more sensitive than women to their economic position and consequently attach more weight to these factors when deciding which party to vote for. Moreover, evidence suggests that ‘pocketbook voting’ is in general more prevalent among men than among women (Chaney, Alvarez, & Nagler, 1998; Welch & Hibbing, 2009). Indeed, Coffé (2013) finds that class is a better predictor of Radical Right voting among men than among women in eight Western European countries, although the differences are not very large. Fontana et al. (2006) came to a similar conclusion. In this chapter, I will further investigate this in a larger number of cases.

The discontent model
The discontent (or protest vote) model is a first subtype of the attitudinal model. According to the discontent model, voters support Radical Right parties mainly to express discontent with ‘the’ political elite (Belanger & Aarts, 2006; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992). Radical Right party voters have indeed shown higher levels of distrust towards and dissatisfaction with the political system (Kitschelt, 1997; Lubbers et al., 2002; Söderlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2009). If European men are more dissatisfied with the political elite than women, this might explain why men feel more attracted to Radical Right parties. However, there seems to be no theoretical or empirical reasons to expect political discontent to be higher among men than among women. A composition effect due to discontent is thus unlikely to the cause of the gap.

With regard to conditional effects, there is reason to expect that evaluations of politics have a more pronounced impact on the male than on the female vote. The reason is internal political efficacy. The tendency for men to have higher levels of internal political efficacy was already noted in The American Voter (A. Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Donald, 1960) and has usually been attributed to men’s higher levels of education and participation in the workforce. However, in spite of higher female participation on the labor market and tertiary education, gender differences in political efficacy and interest have not disappeared (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Mudde (2007) argues that lower levels
of political efficacy could well explain the disproportionately low representation of women among the Radical Right electorate. Along the same line, it could be argued it takes political self-confidence to vote for radical parties for anti-system reasons. As a consequence, less internally efficacious voters – more often women – are less likely to make such a protest vote. Indeed, Gidengil et. al. (2005) found that political discontent was a more important factor for men than for women in explaining the vote for the Canadian Alliance. We therefore expect discontent to be a less important determinant of the Radical Right vote for women than for men. 6

The policy vote model
The policy vote model is the second subtype of the attitudinal model. It assumes that citizens vote for a party because they agree with the party on those policy issues they consider to be important. Since most voters lack detailed information about positions of parties, they rely on information shortcuts, such as party labels or ideological profiles in Left-Right terms. Electoral research has provided substantial support for the policy vote model, because policy preferences of voters – especially regarding immigration – were shown to be the strongest predictors of support for radical right parties (Lubbers et al., 2002; Mughan & Paxton, 2006; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009).

Although Radical Right parties are a heterogeneous group, their programs are commonly believed to have a shared ideology, often defined by nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 2007). In ideological terms, these parties are seen by most voters as representing the far-right end of the left-right spectrum. So, the policy vote model predicts that voters are most likely to support a Radical Right party if they see themselves as being right, if they hold nativist attitudes – a combination of in-group preferences (or nationalism) and out-group fear (or xenophobia) – and if they hold authoritarian views – ‘the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely’ (Mudde, 2007: 23). The Radical Right’s populist element is likely to be mirrored in voters’ political discontent, as discussed in the previous section.

Several studies have suggested that men are more likely than women to agree with the positions of the Radical Right on authoritarianism (Beutel & Marini, 2013; Sidanius et al., 2000) and nativism (Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000; Kuran & McCaffery, 2008). However, recent cross-country studies cast doubt on the existence of a universal and constant gender gap in the core ideology of the Radical Right. In an analysis of 22 countries, Coenders et al. (2004) even find that women have a slightly higher resistance towards immigrants than men. Mudde (2007: 113) summarizes the research by noting that “the difference between men and women in terms of nativist attitudes is

6 Ideally, I would directly test whether a compositional effect of internal political efficacy exists. Unfortunately, the data used in this chapter (EES) does not contain measures for this. As an alternative, I tested the role of efficacy in the alternative dataset, CSES (see Robustness section). This test showed that, while gender differences were indeed present, no composition effect due to internal political efficacy exists.
far from striking, if at all present”. Likewise, the empirical evidence to expect women to be more authoritarian than men is also limited (Lippa & Arad, 1999). Existing research thus yields contradictory predictions as to whether gender differences in either nativism or authoritarianism might explain the gender gap in Radical Right support.

I also investigate voters’ general ideological positions in Left-Right terms. Van der Brug and Fennema (2009) found Left-Right distances between voters and Radical Right parties to be the strongest determinant of support for such parties. Inglehart and Norris (2000) describe how, on average, across a large number of countries, women have moved towards the left of men over the last decades – and Left-wing voters are less likely to support the Radical Right than right-wing voters. Voters’ self-placement on an overall ideological left-right scale are therefore also included, as well as the distance between voters and Radical Right parties on the left-right scale. This captures agreement with parties in a general ideological sense, in addition to our indicators of the specific themes of nativism and authoritarianism.

Again, the explanation might be conditional rather than compositional. Evidence suggests that women assign more importance to issues that are secondary to the Radical Right, such as health and education, whereas men tend to attach more weight to issues such as crime (R. Campbell & Winters, 2012; Chaney et al., 1998; Gidengil, 1995; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). Even if many people agree with the positions of Radical Right parties on issues such as crime and immigration, the policy vote model would predict most support for these parties among people who give much weight to these issues. So, if men base their vote more strongly on their views on these issues than women, they will be more likely to support the Radical Right. Furthermore, if a large number of female voters disapproves of the Radical Right for reasons other than their ideology (as will be explored in Part II of this dissertation), this should too lead to the finding that their attitudes are weaker predictors of their vote for the Radical Right.7

East vs West
I argue that the three theoretical explanations discussed so far can potentially explain the gender gap in all countries where such a party exists. In the next chapter, I will focus on differences between parties. However, in this chapter I will already briefly investigate whether the models posited above differ in their explanatory power between countries. Moreover, special attention will be given to the distinction between the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Western European countries. As party systems are generally less consolidated in the East, ideological

7 In most countries, positions on the Left-Right dimension are associated with socio-economic issues as well as with socio-cultural issues such as crime and immigration. I am not familiar with research showing whether the effect of Left-Right position on party support is gendered. However, if the general Left-Right concept is more strongly associated with the issues that men find important than women, Left-Right distances to parties would matter more for men than for women. In that case, we would also expect the effect of Left-Right to be moderated by gender.
dimensions have rooted to a weaker extent and do not yet provide the strong cue they constitute in older democracies (Dahlberg et al., 2015; Van der Brug et al., 2008). Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009) argue that the legacy of communism has impacted the playing field for the Radical Right; in many of these countries, the mainstream right has already adopted exclusionary appeals. As a result, the radical right in Central and Eastern European countries have been argued to be often ideologically more extreme and organizationally more of a social movement phenomenon (Minkenberg, 2002). For these reasons, it is likely that our explanatory models impact Radical Right voting differently in the two groups of countries, and as a result different patterns might influence the gender gap. Separate analyses of East and West are provided at the end of the empirical section.

**METHOD**

In this chapter, composition and conditional effects are tested with data from the European Election Studies (EES) 2009 (van Egmond, Sapir, van der Brug, Franklin, & Hobolt, 2009). This data allows for an examination of the support for Radical Right parties in 16 European countries, at the same time point, based on equivalent indicators. Although the data were collected at the time of the 2009 European parliamentary elections, many questions – including the party support questions used in this chapter – explicitly relate to national politics and national elections. A discussion of the quality and representativeness of the data can be found in Dahlberg and Persson (2014). For an overview of the selected parties, see Table 1.1 in the Results section. For each country, roughly 1,000 respondents were questioned on several topics. A list of descriptive statistics of all variables, as well as the distribution of key variables, can be found in Appendix A.

The dependent variable is the propensity to vote (PTV) for a Radical Right party. For each party surveyed, respondents were asked to indicate how likely they would be – on a scale from 0 to 10 – to ever vote for that party. These items are strongly correlated with party sympathy scores (thermometer scores), but the propensity to vote questions are more closely linked to the actual vote. As most respondents answered this question, this measure allows to make reliable inferences on the basis of a large number of voters with

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8 Dahlberg and Persson (2014) show that the sample is not representative with regard to a number of factors, including age and education. They attribute this to the fact that the interviews were mainly conducted by telephone and the absence of a fixed sample. Because they show that weighting does not improve the estimations, I refrain from using weights.

9 The word ‘ever’ was included in the survey question to ensure that voters who were already certain about which party they would vote for in the next election could give a high score to their second or third choice of party.
different levels of attraction towards the Radical Right. To check the robustness of our findings, the main analyses were replicated using a dummy variable that indicated whether the respondent would vote for the Radical Right party ‘if elections were held today’. These findings are presented in the Robustness section.

To establish the size of the gender gap, a key variable in our model is a dummy for gender, which takes values 0 for men and 1 for women. The size of the coefficient of this variable reflects the difference between men and women in the propensity to support a Radical Right party. A negative coefficient of the gender dummy indicates that women are less likely to support a Radical Right party. The following predictors of support for Radical Right parties were used to operationalize the socio-structural model: age; a dummy for church attendance (more than once a year); a dummy for the lower educated (measured as lower secondary or lower); a dummy for the working and lower middle classes; a dummy for the unemployed; a dummy for both unskilled and semi-skilled workers; a dummy for the self-employed; and finally a dummy for public sector workers.

To operationalize the discontent model, the analysis includes the two most appropriate items available in this data set: a four-point scale of the extent of respondent satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their country, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent approves of the government. While these measures cannot capture every dimension of political dissatisfaction, it can be argued that for many voters, dissatisfaction with the political elite coincides with dissatisfaction with the democratic system that produces and sustains such an elite. Furthermore, it has been found that, empirically, this measure is more strongly related to a particular government’s performance than to the assessment of democracy as an abstract ideal (Norris, 2005). Both scales were synchronized, added, and subsequently rescaled to a 0 to 1 range to facilitate comparability. Unfortunately, no measure of efficacy was available.

Finally, for the policy voting model, the model includes measures for nativist and authoritarianism policy preferences, as well as positions on an overall Left-Right scale. The EES questionnaire asks respondents to indicate whether they agree or disagree with 12 statements regarding policy issues. The nativism measure consists of respondents’ views on the following issues: “immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of [the respondent’s country]” and “immigration to [the respondents’ country] should be decreased significantly”. For authoritarianism, the following items were combined: “people who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these

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10 There is no reason to believe that this measure itself is gendered, i.e. that men report different propensities than women even under similar voting preferences. An aggregation of men’s and women’s PTV scores for all parties, so not only the Radical Right ones, shows that men and women report almost equal propensities in terms of means and standard deviations.
11 An alternative operationalization, education in years, yielded comparable effects.
12 As an alternative operationalization I used a five-point scale of socio-economic status as an interval measure. Again, this yielded comparable but less strong results.
13 In a principal component analysis, the variance explained by the underlying component is 0.69, with factor loadings of 0.71.
days” and “schools must teach children to obey authority”. Respondents indicated their position on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’; we added and rescaled the items, resulting in a 0 to 1 measure for both nativism and authoritarianism. Though often secondary for the Radical Right (see Chapter 2), economic issues continue to be important in the political arena. The policy vote model therefore also includes the item ‘income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people’. This item, too, was rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale.

Ideological distance was measured using respondents self-reported position on an 11-point Left-Right scale, ranging from ‘Left’ (0) to ‘Right’ (10). Respondents were not only asked to place themselves on this scale, but also to indicate where parties are to be located on it. In the policy vote model, I include a measure of the (absolute) distance between the respondent’s own position on the Left-Right scale and his or her perception of the position of the Radical Right party on the same scale. Left-right position and left-right distance to the Radical Right were rescaled to a 0 (Left) to 1 (Right) and a 0 (minimum distance) to 1 (maximum distance) range, respectively.

As most variables contain missing values, multiple imputation was used to obtain an equal number of cases in each model. Analyses of the models on the basis of actual observations yields substantially equal results as those based on multiple imputation.

The mediating models were tested as follows. The starting point is a model in which the propensity to vote (PTV) for a Radical Right party is explained by the dummy for gender only. The size of this coefficient reflects the average difference between men and women’s propensity to support each of these parties. Subsequently, the indicators of each of the explanatory models were added in turn. If the effect of gender is indeed indirect and channeled through one or more of these differences in characteristics and attitudes, the (direct) effect of the female dummy should decrease, or even become insignificant, once these mediating variables have been added to the model.

The moderation models were tested by including interaction effects (with centered variables). If men and women support Radical Right parties on the basis of different considerations, the effect of these variables should differ between men and women. In that case, one would expect to find significant interaction effects between the female dummy on the one hand and each of the predictors of support for Radical Right parties on the other. The model includes all 16 countries. It contains fixed effects for these countries. The analyses were repeated on the subsamples of Western-European and post-communist Central and Eastern European countries (see the final section of this chapter).
RESULTS

Below, I first describe the distribution of relevant characteristics and values among men and women. I then turn to a test of the moderation and mediation mechanisms.

Parties, gaps, and attitudes

Table 1.1 shows voting preferences of men and women as well as the size of the gender gap for each party included in our analysis. The gaps are calculated as the difference in support for the Radical Right between men and women in terms of (a) the propensity to vote (PTV) score and (b) whether they would actually vote for the party, expressed as a percentage of the male propensity or share. For instance, women’s average propensity to vote score for the Danish People’s Party is 16% lower than men’s, and women report 34% less often that would actually vote for that party. It is important to note that, even though the percentages in both columns obviously differ in absolute terms, they are strongly correlated ($r = 0.82$). This strengthens confidence in using the PTV questions.

Table 1.1  Overview of parties and their gender gap (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Actual vote</th>
<th>Propensity to vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electorate</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Freedom Party</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>True Finns</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Order and Justice</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Greater Romania Party</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Slovenian National Party</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Party for Freedom</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Gaps express the difference between men’s and women’s share (actual vote) or average PTV, expressed as a percentage of the share (actual vote) or average PTV among men. Source: European Election Study 2009

Surprisingly, and contrary to empirical findings in other studies (Goodwin, 2013), the British National Party has a reversed gender gap both in the propensity to vote and the actual vote questions. I was unable to establish the origin of this deviation, which might
be a methodological artefact. At any rate, robustness analysis shows that in- or excluding this case does not alter the results. BNP aside, Table 1.1 confirms that the Radical Right is more popular among men.

Do men and women differ in the extent to which they fit the profile of the Radical Right voter? To assess this with regard to the socio-structural model, Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of men and women in categories of economic and social conditions that have been found to be related to Radical Right voting. Apart from levels of unemployment and self-reported membership of the working and lower middle classes, men and women differ significantly on all indicators, though not always substantively. The most important differences can be found in the share of public sector workers and regular church attendance, which are notably higher among women. Important differences can also be noted in the nature of work: men more often are semi-skilled workers or self-employed—conditions that relate positively to Radical Right voting. The ingredients for compositional effects due to socio-structural characteristics are thus present.

Figure 1.1 Average scores of men and women on socio-structural indicators

Turning to the attitudinal model, Figure 1.2 reports the mean scores of men and women on the synchronized ideological scales (all ranging from 0 to 1). The dissimilarities in nativism and authoritarianism are by no means substantive, and suggest that European women are on average at least as nativist and authoritarian as men. Across the board, men and women seem equally attracted to the core of Radical Right ideology. With regard to discontent, women even turn out to be slightly more discontented than men. Interestingly, women’s average Left-Right position does not differ significantly from
that of male voters. This does not refute Inglehart and Norris’ (2000) ‘modern gender gap’, as their notion referred to post-industrial, established democracies societies. Indeed, in the post-communist countries under study, woman report to be on average somewhat more right-wing than men, whereas the reverse is true in established democracies.

Furthermore, the distribution of Left-Right self-placement scores in Appendix A shows that, across the board, slightly more women than men assign themselves a far right position (10) on the left-right scale (while on 8 and 9 both sexes score the same). Again, the potential for Radical Right voting is at least as strong among women as among men. Replication on our subsamples shows that this is the case in both the Western and Eastern part of Europe. These findings makes it unlikely that the gender gap in Radical Right voting is due to attitudinal composition effects: across the board, men and women do not differ with regard to Radical Right ideology. If anything, women would be expected to show a slightly higher rather than lower support for the Radical Right.

Figure 1.2 Average scores of men and women on attitudinal indicators

![Graph showing average scores of men and women on attitudinal indicators]

Note: striped bars indicate non-significant differences between men and women at the 5% level.

Composition effects
I now turn to a more formal test of composition effects. Table 1.2 shows the results of several regression models. The dependent variable is the propensity to vote for a Radical Right party. In the first model, gender is the only explanatory variable. Its coefficients is -0.32, which shows that, across the 16 countries and parties, the average support for Radical Right parties among men is 0.32 points higher on the 11-point party preference scale than it is among women. Indeed, the average propensity is 2.32 among
and 2.00 among women. Although this difference might seem small, it is responsible for pronounced differences in actual voting (Radical Right parties draw on average 9% among male voters against 6% among female voters). This 3:2 ratio corresponds to the magnitude reported in earlier studies.

Other independent variables are now added in separate blocks. Model II shows that controlling for age and religion provides no explanation of the gap: if anything, the gap increases rather than decreases when controlling for differences between men and women on these factors. This is due to the fact that – on average – women are more religious than men, while at the same time higher levels of religiousness are associated with a higher propensity to vote for Radical Right parties. This positive connection is especially strong in the Eastern part of the continent, whereas in Western European countries church-going is mostly weakly negatively (if at all) related to the Radical Right vote. The link between church-attendance and Radical Right voting is thus different in East and West, but provides no substantial explanation of the gender gap in both. In Model III, adding the indicators for work, class and education does reduce the size of the gender gap by 11%. Additional analyses show that this is due mainly to the share of public sector workers among women, rather than differences in unemployment, class or education. Although socio-structural characteristics thus partly function as mediators of the female vote, this is only a partial explanation of the gap – at least, across all countries.

The discontent model (in Model IV) does not diminish the gap either: male-female differences in discontent cannot explain the gap. This is not surprising, given the earlier descriptive finding that discontent is generally not higher among men. In a similar vein, Model V shows that controlling for nativism, authoritarianism and redistribution attitudes increases rather than explains the gap. Given their views on these topics, women would be expected to express more rather than less support for the Radical Right. The gap clearly does not originate in gender differences in the level of agreement with the core of the Radical Right’s program.

Model VI shows that the single best predictor of Radical Right voting is the Left-Right distance to the Radical Right party. This effect is remarkably stronger than that of the actual left-right position. Taken individually, left-right distance reduces the gap substantially, from -0.32 to -0.20, whereas left-right positions hardly brings about a reduction (to -0.30). While this variable could be argued to be partly endogenous, it is relevant to note here that additional analyses (not shown here) show that women report a systematically larger distance between themselves and Radical Right parties even when controlling for differences in their position on the Left-Right scale or on concrete policy positions.
### Table 1.2 Regression models with propensity to vote for the Radical Right as the dependent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Gender (female)</th>
<th>Age and Religion</th>
<th>Socio-structural position</th>
<th>Discontent</th>
<th>Policy preference</th>
<th>Left-Right position and distance</th>
<th>Full model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model I</td>
<td>-0.322***</td>
<td>-0.333***</td>
<td>-0.285***</td>
<td>-0.329***</td>
<td>-0.364***</td>
<td>-0.198***</td>
<td>-0.224***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model II</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.212***</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education</td>
<td>0.400***</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower class</td>
<td>0.224***</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.342***</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector worker</td>
<td>-0.295***</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontent</td>
<td>0.303***</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>2.931***</td>
<td>2.312***</td>
<td>2.312***</td>
<td>2.312***</td>
<td>2.312***</td>
<td>2.312***</td>
<td>2.312***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.813***</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-redistribution</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right position</td>
<td>-3.870***</td>
<td>0.854***</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.336***</td>
<td>2.347***</td>
<td>2.325***</td>
<td>2.340***</td>
<td>2.361***</td>
<td>2.262***</td>
<td>2.277***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14965</td>
<td>14965</td>
<td>14965</td>
<td>14965</td>
<td>14965</td>
<td>14965</td>
<td>14965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in gap</td>
<td>+3%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>-40%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for parties.

Source: European Election Studies 2009
Rather than being based on ideological disagreement, the gender gap in Radical Right voting thus partially seems to originate in gender differences in the perceived distance between their own ideological position and those of Radical Right parties. This suggests that, regardless of their ideology, Radical Right parties seem especially remote to female voters; this is further underlined by Appendix A, which shows that more women than men assign an extreme low propensity to vote for the party (0). All in all, it seems that Radical Right parties share characteristics other than their core ideology that, to relatively many women, discredit them. This possibility will be further elaborated in Part II.

The last column of Table 1.2 shows the results of a full model including all variables. Obviously, some of the indicators are causally prior to others: socio-economic indicators explain attitudes, which in turn explain voting (for a discussion in the context of gender, see Bergh 2007). It is therefore not surprising that many variables of the socio-structural model lose significance once controlling for attitudes. The most important explanations of Radical Right support – nativism and Left-Right distance – remain strong predictors while controlling for background characteristics, which shows that the correlations observed in earlier models are not spurious. In terms of the coefficient of gender, the gender gap is less reduced than in the model with only Left-Right position and distance, because the inclusion of attitudinal variables boost rather than explain the gap. Again, we conclude that – controlling for all sorts of background indicators – the gender gap seems to be the result of differences between men and women in the perceived distance to the Radical Right.

Conditional effects

To assess whether men and women employ different considerations when deciding on their party preferences, Table 1.3 reports the size of the effects for men and for women per model. To save space, the table only reports those variables that exert a significant effect among men, women, or both. A grey font indicates non-significance of the effect at the 5% level. The last column reports the p-value of the difference between the effects for men and women, obtained by estimating the interaction between gender and the other coefficients in separate models.

When comparing the coefficients of the social-structural indicators in both separate regressions, some differences can be noticed between men and women. As expected, the coefficients for lower class status and low education are substantially lower in the model among female respondents. However, none of the interactions between gender and socio-structural indicators are significant, which means that these factors predict support for Radical Right parties equally well for men and women. When deciding what party to support, socio-structural background characteristics play a similar role for both genders (see Coffé 2013).

Interestingly, all of the policy vote indicators, as well as the measure of discontent, have a stronger impact among men than among women. These differences are in most cases significant at the 5% level (nativism and Left-Right distance), and in others (authoritarianism and Left-Right position) at the 10% level. Although the difference in
the effect of discontent between men and women is insignificant, its coefficient does not significantly differ from zero for women, while it does so for men. We therefore conclude that the usual determinants of Radical Right voting predict men’s preferences better than women’s. As predicted, discontent – although equally present among both sexes – has a stronger effect among men than among women on support for Radical Right parties. Nativism and a general right-wing ideology are also less likely to generate support for the Radical Right among women than among men. Even though the nominal differences are small for most indicators, taken together they could well explain the gender gap. In the next section we investigate the extent to which they do.

Table 1.3 Separate regressions for men and women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect size</th>
<th>Among men</th>
<th>Among women</th>
<th>p-value of difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower educated</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower classes</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontent</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right position</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right distance</td>
<td>-4.20</td>
<td>-3.58</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A grey font indicates non-significance of the effect at the two-sided 5% level.

Differences between countries

Until now, both compositional and conditional effects have proven to provide some clue about the gender gap, though neither explains it fully. However, given the diversity of the different European Radical Right parties, it seems plausible that individual parties show different patterns. In turn, such variation might predict which aspects of the supply side are most relevant (see Chapters 2 and 5). This section therefore first presents the compositional and conditional models for individual countries. After that, I report the models for two groups of countries: those in Western and East-Central Europe.

Figure 1.3 shows the percentage of the gap that is explained by each model for those parties for which the gap is substantial enough to allow it be reliably dissected further.17

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17 Technically, the percentage reduction of the nominal gap (i.e. the effect of the gender dummy in an empty model) after controlling for variables belonging to these models. This can even be higher than 100% if after controlling the direction of the effect of the female dummy switches from negative to positive.
Figure 1.3 Percentage of the gender gap that can be explained by each of the models

- Sweden Democrats (SE)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -15%
  - Explained by protest model: 1%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 33%

- Slovakian National Party (SK)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -3%
  - Explained by protest model: 60%

- Greater Romania Party (RO)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -25%
  - Explained by protest model: 8%
  - Explained by policy vote model: -15%

- Party for Freedom (NL)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -35%
  - Explained by protest model: -13%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 48%

- Jobbik (HU)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: 13%
  - Explained by protest model: 16%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 28%

- Popular Orthodox Rally (GR)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -42%
  - Explained by protest model: 8%

- National Front (FR)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: 5%
  - Explained by protest model: 27%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 20%

- True Finns (FI)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -18%
  - Explained by protest model: 23%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 27%

- Danish People's Party (DK)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: 38%
  - Explained by protest model: 46%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 75%

- Attack (BG)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -3%
  - Explained by protest model: 9%
  - Explained by policy vote model: -7%

- Flemish Interest (BE)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -6%
  - Explained by protest model: 38%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 21%

- Freedom Party (AT)
  - Explained by socio-structural model: -42%
  - Explained by protest model: 16%
  - Explained by policy vote model: 112%

It is important to note that the numbers are not completely additive, as different models might explain the same variance. Nevertheless, the graph makes clear that important differences exist between countries, both in the extent to which individual models provide an explanation, as well as how well they fare overall. Whereas differences in
socio-structural position could explain only 13% of the gap in general, it can explain 75% for the Danish People’s Party, 38% for Flemish Interest and 27% for the True Finns. These parties thus appear to draw voters from certain social classes that are dominated by males. In case of the Danish People’s Party and True Finns, this might reflect the socio-economically relatively left-wing stance of these parties according to some of the secondary literature (Betz & Meret, 2012). This link between adherence to the ‘new winning formula’ (de Lange, 2007) and ‘proletarianization’ (Betz, 1994) will be explored further in Chapter 2.

Ideological differences, especially Left-Right distance, are particularly contributing to a gender gap in case of the Austrian Freedom Party and Dutch Party for Freedom, as well as again the Danish People’s Party. Among the other parties, the policy model often explains at least 10% and often more than 20%, making it the best explaining model across countries. Gender differences in discontent are the single most important explanation for the gap in France, as well as a secondary explanation in Denmark and Hungary; in many other countries it plays no role. In sum, the socio-structural and discontent models performed poorly in an overall model but do have relevance in particular cases. The policy vote, and most importantly Left-Right distance, is important for all parties – with the exception of Attack and Popular Orthodox Rally in the Balkans. At any rate, the clearly varying patterns show that an investigation of the supply side is necessary (Chapters 2 and 5).

With regard to conditional effects (analysis not presented here), no structural difference appears between countries. While in most countries there are small variations in the effect sizes among men and in women, they mostly fail to be either significant or substantial. This suggests that, while differences in the distribution of socio-structural and issue positions can at times contribute to a gap, the finding that the usual determinants of voting predict men’s votes better than women’s is a very consistent finding.

A final step is to take a closer look at specifically the differences between Western European countries on the one hand and the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) on the other, given the generally different nature of the political system in general and the Radical Right in particular in these two parts of the continent (Minkenberg, 2002). Table 1.4 presents the reduction in the gender gap by each model for the two groups of countries separately. It shows, first of all, that the gender gap is substantially larger in post-Communist countries. Furthermore, the part of the gender gap that can be explained by socio-structural differences is also much larger in those countries compared to the others (17% versus 5%, respectively), while controlling for Left-Right position and distance brings about a smaller reduction in the Eastern part of the continent than in the West. This probably reflects that the trend among women to move to the left is more pronounced in established democracies than in newer ones, but also fits the finding that ideological position is a generally weaker explanation of voting in former communist countries (Van der Brug et al., 2008). Gender differences in employment and sector are relatively important drivers of the gender gap in East-Central European countries. On the other hand, differences between men and women in nativism, authoritarianism or redistribution attitudes cannot explain the gender gap in either part of the continent.
Table 1.4 Size of the gender gap in ‘East’ and ‘West’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender only</th>
<th>Socio-structural</th>
<th>Discontent</th>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>LR position and distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b %</td>
<td>b %</td>
<td>b %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-Central Europe</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "b" reports the coefficient of the gender dummy; "%" the change of in the size of the gap after controlling

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Jack-knife analysis
To assess how sensitive the results are for the inclusion or exclusion of individual parties, jack-knife analyses were conducted with parties as sampling clusters. In terms of size, direction and significance, this yielded highly comparable results, which increases confidence in the robustness of the conclusions presented in this chapter.

Alternative data: CSES
To the extent that this was possible, the analyses were replicated using the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset in 20 countries. The dependent variable in these analyses is the party sympathy score, which is also strongly related to party choice, albeit less strong than the propensity to vote questions included in the EES. Unfortunately, this data set lacks indicators for nativism and authoritarianism. However, for most other compositional and conditional models, the analysis can be replicated in a slightly simplified form (see Appendix B). The results are highly comparable to those of the EES analysis. With regard to compositional effects, CSES analyses confirm that Left-Right distance (rather than Left-Right position) is the most important driver of the gender gap. Discontent plays no mediating role, and neither do most economic variables, except (again) public sector employment. The existence of conditional effects is also confirmed. Left-Right position is significantly less important for women than for men. Again, discontent is not a significant predictor of Radical Right support for women, while it is so for men. Although the sets of cases do not completely overlap, the replication thus yields comparable results.

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18 The data in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) modules 1, 2 and 3 were collected in 1996-2001, 2001-2004 and 2006-2011 respectively during post-election surveys. Data can be downloaded from www.cses.org.
Alternative dependent variable: actual vote intention

To further check the robustness, the models were replicated using actual vote intention, a dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether the respondent would vote for a Radical Right party ‘if there were elections tomorrow’. Appendix C shows the results of this multilevel logistic analysis. Because the number of respondents in the sample that would actually vote for such a party is small (on average only about 50 per country), one should be cautious to make strong inferences on the basis of this indicator. At best, it allows for a tentative assessment of whether the conclusions point in a similar direction. I first assess compositional effects. Again, socio-economic differences explain part of the gap, and to an even stronger extent than it did when the continuous dependent variable was used. Controlling for nativism and authoritarianism increases the gap, while including Left-Right distance decreases it, but more modestly. The general picture is thus in line with our earlier findings.

With regard to moderation, I again find a stronger effect of Left-Right position among men. In fact, most of the policy model effects are again stronger among men than among women, but none of them are significantly so. This is probably to a large degree due to technical reasons, as logistic regression with a highly skewed indicator can lead to high standard errors. Alternatively, it might indicate some difference in the translation from the willingness to vote Radical Right to actually doing so in the end. I therefore conclude that this analysis largely confirms the compositional results, and neither confirms nor falsifies the conditionality findings.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I investigated differences in support for the Radical Right among men and women, starting from socio-structural and attitudinal models of voting. With regard to the attitudinal model, I further distinguished a ‘protest vote’ from a ‘policy vote’. For various indicators of all these models, I investigated to what extent the gender gap can be attributed to composition effects (due to gender differences on key characteristics and attitudes) and/or to conditional effects (due to gender differences in the relative importance of these characteristics and attitudes). The hypotheses were tested on European Election Studies 2009 data. While several of these hypotheses have been studied in previous studies on smaller sets of cases (Gidengil et al., 2005; Givens, 2004; Rippeyoung, 2007), this chapter is the first to provide a systematic test of all these models of voting, testing for composition effects as well as conditionality, in such wide a range of cases. Two main findings stand out.

First, mixed evidence was found for socio-structural explanations of the gender gap. Across a large number of parties, gender differences in (mainly) occupational position explain a part of the gap. Most importantly, the large share of public sector workers among women can explain why some of them are less supportive of the Radical Right. Male-female differences in economic vulnerability due to unemployment or lower education provide little clue to the gap. Interestingly, the extent to which
socio-structural conditions contribute to a gap is especially substantive in the former Communist countries of East-Central Europe. This is likely to reflect the fact that the electorate of Radical Right parties in East-Central Europe is relatively strongly concentrated among working class voters (Van der Brug et al., 2012). This will be further investigated in Chapter 2.

Second, theories that link the gender gap to female resistance towards the core Radical Right ideology have to be refuted. Most men are not more nativist or authoritarian than women – across the board they are even slightly less so. Rather, this chapter shows that such attitudes predict women’s support for the Radical Right less strongly than men’s. The same goes for discontent. Women are not more satisfied than men with the working of democracy or the performance of the government – in fact, they are slightly less so on average. However, among women, discontent does not translate to Radical Right support as strongly as it does among men – which is in line with Gidengil et al. (2005)’s study on the support for the Canadian Alliance. This shows that studying conditional effects can be at least as important as compositional effects in order to explain male and female support for the Radical Right (see Howell & Day, 2000).

At this point, there are two possible interpretations of the existence of strong conditional effects of gender. First, even if men do usually not agree more strongly with the Radical Right on their programmatic core, they might attach higher salience to these topics. Even if men and women are to the same extent ‘tough’ on issues such as immigration and law and order, such attitudes are more likely to be translated into a willingness to support the Radical Right among those voters for whom these topics are most important; and these are most often men. However, an alternative explanation of the established moderation is that ideology is not the only factor determining Radical Right voting. Other characteristics of the Radical Right might deter women more strongly than men, resulting in a weaker correlation between women’s issue positions and their vote for the Radical Right. This will be explored in Part II of this dissertation.

At the same time, strong differences were found between parties in terms of the size of their gender gap, as well as in the extent to which the various compositional models could explain it. Apparently, different mechanisms are at work for different parties. This means it is crucial to incorporate what parties have on offer ideologically. The next chapter therefore continues by incorporating the supply side.
INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter established to what extent gender differences exist with regard to conventional socio-structural and attitudinal determinants of Radical Right voting. The substantial variation in the size and background of the gap – as visible in Figure 1.3 – suggests that the supply side of parties is highly relevant. Apparently, parties differ in important ways that affect the size and nature of their gender gap. Finding out which aspects are responsible for the gender gap will provide insights into its underlying mechanisms, but can also explain why some gender gaps are larger than others. In this chapter I therefore turn to the supply side from the point of view of conventional models of vote choices. Can variation in Radical Right parties’ ideology explain the size of their gap?

Because the previous chapter, in accordance with earlier studies, established that support for nativist policies is – across the board – about equally high among both sexes, it is unlikely that variation in parties’ stances on this issue explains the size of their gender gap. Nevertheless, I leave this possibility open and briefly investigate it in this chapter. The main focus of this chapter lies, however, with two aspects of Radical Right parties’ programs that are most likely to bring about a gender gap: their stance on socio-economic and culturally progressive (and in particular gender and family) issues. As I will argue below, this is especially relevant because ideological repositioning regarding both subjects is changing the face of many Radical Right parties. Any connection between the gender gap and these evolving aspects of Radical Right ideology is thus likely to have implications for the future support of these parties among male and female voters.

In cultural terms, several parties – especially in the Northwest of Europe – have embraced culturally progressive values in an attempt to preserve the ‘principles of the Enlightenment against immigrants (Akkerman, 2005). Opposition against (especially) ‘backward’ Islam led some parties to reconsider their earlier anti-liberal stances, and

A substantially adapted version of this chapter is accepted for publication in Electoral Studies as a single-authored article.
to increasingly embrace and stress topics such as women’s rights and emancipation of homosexuals (Akkerman, 2015; de Lange & Mügge, 2015). This “nativist Enlightenment” reflects the incorporation of such values in some Radical Right parties’ definition of national identity.

In socio-economic terms, many Radical Right parties seem to be moving towards the left. In the last two decades, many parties have begun retracting from their laissez-faire heritage, and new parties were founded that took a more centrist approach from the start. In several countries, such as Denmark and France, this shift towards embracing the welfare state as an integral part of national identity has been quite pronounced (Betz & Meret, 2012; Ivaldi, 2015). This formula of nativism plus socio-economic protectionism has been considered a potential ‘winning’ one, because it means potential ‘working class authoritarian’ voters no longer face a trade-off between their cultural values and economic interests (Spies, 2013).

Both changes are also potentially relevant for the gender gap. First, I hypothesize that parties that (claim to) embrace culturally progressive values such as gender equality have a smaller gender gap. This hypothesis is included to investigate the contention that the supposed ‘ideological sexism’ of Radical Right parties largely limits these parties’ electoral potential to male voters (Mayer & Sineau, 2002). If pro-equality stances are more often endorsed (or deemed salient) among female voters, this argument goes, a shift towards embracing these values will be accompanied by greater electoral success among women. Obviously, it would be mistaken to simply assume that all (or even most) women have pro-emancipatory stances, and men don’t. However, there is evidence suggesting that such positions are relatively more supported, and deemed salient, among women (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Neve, 1995). This contention therefore deserves an empirical test. If variation between Radical Right parties with regard to these issues explains the size of the gap, it would support the contention that the gender gap for the party family as a whole is due to its generally more culturally conservative stance.

Secondly, I hypothesize economically left-wing Radical Right parties to have a larger gender gap. To a larger extent than their neoliberal counterparts, such ‘new winning formula’ parties principally attract voters from specific subgroups, such as blue-collar, low-educated, private sector workers. At the same time, workers with such jobs are (still) predominantly male. In other words, Radical Right parties’ economic stances correlate strongly with their level of ‘proletarianization’ (Betz, 1994; Van der Brug et al., 2012), which in turn is mirrored in the size of these parties’ gender gaps. If Radical Right parties are increasingly relying on a formerly Social Democratic precarious working class base, rather than appealing to a broader coalition of constituencies, this is likely to widen the gap.

At the same time, it has been argued that both socio-economic and emancipation policy are secondary to the core component of Radical Right ideology – their nativism. As such, supporting welfare or emancipation might be mere window-dressing, affecting neither the policies, nor the constituencies of these parties. This makes it especially relevant to investigate its effect on the gender balance. In this chapter, I discuss the two developments mentioned above – which I will refer to as Nativist Enlightenment and
Welfare Chauvinism – in view of the literature, and try to map them empirically using data from three waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Combining this with European Election Study data from waves 1999, 2004 and 2009, I then test whether and how such changes affect Radical Right parties’ electorates in terms of gender. This reveals that socio-economic party positions predict the size of the gap, while culturally progressive positions do not. I finish this chapter with a further discussion of the mechanism behind the former finding.

**THEORY**

In the 1980s, early Radical Right parties were unmistakably at the right-wing side of the most salient political cleavages. Economically, the anti-tax origin of quite a few of these parties – including the Progress Party (Norway) and Party for Freedom (Austria) – resulted in an anti-statist, market-oriented stance. Culturally, most parties were right-wing in the sense that they proposed an authoritarian and communitarian solution to societal problems, and often disapproved of the New Left libertarian values. Although deviations from this pattern existed, this ideological core made categorization of these parties as right-wing relatively unproblematic.

This started to change with developments that occurred from the 1990s onwards. Culturally, opposition against immigrants in general – and those with Islamic background in particular – became a central topic in almost all Radical Right parties’ programs. This was accompanied by a general increase in the importance of a nationalist-versus-cosmopolitan dimension in European politics (Azmanova, 2011; Kriesi et al., 2008). Given their opposition to immigrants, the Radical Right parties were clearly still on the ‘right-wing’ part of this cleavage. However, the focus on allegedly conservative immigrants led some parties to reconsider their earlier anti-liberal stances, and to increasingly embrace topics such as women’s rights and emancipation of homosexuals (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007). Embracement of nativism as a core value thus lead to ambiguity regarding the ‘traditional’ cultural issues. Economically, parties began retracting from their neoliberal heritage, and new parties were founded that took a more centrist approach from the start (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). In terms of their electorates, the Radical Right experienced ‘proletarianization’ On the other hand, it has been argued that both ideological changes are mere window-dressing, accompanying or even disguising the ideological core of these parties: their nativism.

Below, I discuss the theoretical background and empirical evidence for both developments, and formulate expectations about their effect on the gender balance of parties’ electorates.

**Cultural issues: nativist Enlightenment**

The first ideological feature studied in this chapter could be called ‘nativist enlightenment’. Radical Right parties have traditionally been culturally conservative in their outlook, favoring conformation to national values, the institution of the traditional family, and the idea that women are ‘equal but different’. However, recently, scholars have nuanced
this classification (Spierings et al., 2015). To the extent that liberal values are considered integral part of the national tradition, a liberal stance might in fact be equally well-defendable from a nationalist point of view. Akkerman and Hagelund (2007) show that the Norwegian Progress Party and the Dutch Freedom Party increasingly emphasize issues such as female labor participation and liberal family laws. Similarly, the Danish People’s Party also increasingly focuses on liberal freedoms and values (Betz & Meret, 2009). At the very least, this shows that variation exists between parties in their views on gender and emancipation.

It is no surprise that such issues are in some cases moving to the forefront of both discourse and policy of the Radical Right. Gender equality and gay rights have been presented as a symbol of Western values as opposed to alleged conservative values of immigrants. In that sense, liberal values fit well in the nativist agenda of the radical right. For instance, issues such as the wearing of veils or headscarves have become salient as Radical Right parties increasingly focus on the Islam as a threat to Western societies (Hadj-Abdou, Rosenberger, Saharso, & Siim, 2012). Along the same emancipatory lines, some Radical Right parties – especially in the Netherlands and Norway – have promoted the protection of gay rights, and also the National Front (F) seems to be moving in that direction (Mayer, 2013: 163).

Akkerman (2005) stresses that, while most Radical Right parties’ ideology carry (some) liberal as well as nationalist elements, parties differ in the extent to which these two elements are compatible. Parties upholding ‘organicist nationalism’ stress “a rejection of multiculturalism, a longing for purity, nostalgia for a mythical world of homogeneity, celebration of ties of blood and history over reason and a common humanity” (idem: 343). This is difficult to combine with liberal values. ‘National’ values are to be preserved against deviant individual (or minority) choices. A precautious or even hostile stance towards gender equality and other emancipatory projects is the logical result. Civic nationalism, by contrast, refers to the Enlightenment (idem: 346). The liberal values that originate in Enlightenment are deemed essential to the West, and are to be protected. Rather than a menace to traditional society, parties based on this type of nationalism frame multicultural problems as a threat to Enlightenment ideals.

The logical consequence of this overlap of national and liberal principles is to argue for a protection of liberal values, which logically includes issues such as equality of men and women. Radical Right parties such as Party for Freedom (NL), Danish People’s Party (DK) and Progress Party (NO) use this frame to take a stance against alleged threats to liberal values by (Muslim) immigrants. On the other hand, this will only occur to the extent that these liberal values are considered an essential part of the national self-image. In countries where this is the case to a lesser extent, for instance in Southern or Eastern Europe, Radical Right parties keep stressing a form of organicist nationalism. In short, a range of stances towards gender and emancipation – from traditionalist to liberal – is potentially internally consistent with Radical Right ideology, and Radical Right parties indeed take varying positions along this dimension.

This, too, might affect parties’ gender gap. There is empirical evidence suggesting that across the board women more often agree with emancipatory policies, or find them more
salient. During the first post-war decades, women were in most countries generally more conservative on cultural issues than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Domestic duties and child-rearing were argued to reinforce women’s ties with traditional right-wing parties, because such parties endorsed values that rationalize traditional housewifery and motherhood (Vaus & McAllister, 1989). Alternative explanations stressed women’s longevity or religiousness. Nowadays, this pattern has been reversed, although this is mainly true for postindustrial societies. Evidence shows that, on average, men have consistently less liberal attitudes towards gender equality and the emancipation of women and sexual minorities (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Mason & Lu, 1988; Neve, 1995). Indeed, according to the European Election Study 2009, more women than men think women should be free to decide on matters of abortion in all countries except the UK; fewer women than men think that same-sex marriages should be forbidden in all countries except Romania.

Given this distribution of attitudes, and the possibility that issues surrounding the role of women are more salient among women, it has been argued that more ‘gender conservative’ Radical Right parties have a relative difficulty in attracting female voters. In 2002, Mayer and Sineau (2002: 50) described the ‘authoritarian paternalism’ of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front (F) and asked themselves “why women [would] vote for a party that is militantly against the rights won at the price of so many battles: the right to work, the right to interrupt an unwanted pregnancy?”. After party leadership was taken over by Marine le Pen, the fact that she is divorced and has shown sympathy for women who abort a pregnancy “could make it less morally reprehensible, less difficult, for a woman to vote for her” (Mayer, 2013: 175). Reversely, it has been argued that anti-feminist sentiments might be important for male Radical Right voters who feel threatened in their traditional masculine supremacy (Ford & Goodwin, 2010). From this, too, it would follow that a shift away from culturally conservative stances decreases the male electoral dominance. This leads to the following expectation at the individual level:

\[ \text{H1a} \quad \text{gender is a less important predictor of Radical Right support for parties that take a more liberal position on emancipatory issues.} \]

This is, in turn, likely to result in the following pattern at the aggregated level:

\[ \text{H1b} \quad \text{the gender gap will be smaller for radical right parties that take a more liberal position on emancipatory issues.} \]

**Socio-economic issues: welfare chauvinism**

The second ideological feature central to this chapter is Radical Right parties’ socio-economic position. As noted by Mudde (2007: 123), the Radical Right party family (by now) “spreads a significant part of the whole dimension between the two poles of laissez-faire and state economy”. Some Radical Right parties originally had – or were even uniquely founded for – a strong neoliberal position, in which anti-statist and populist
arguments were used to criticize high taxes and large governments. A combination of nationalist and neoliberal policies reflected the early electoral opportunities for Radical Right parties (Kitschelt, 1997). In the 1980s Jean-Marie le Pen (National Front, France) claimed to have been a ‘Reaganite’ long before neoliberal policies became fashionable (quoted in Betz & Meret, 2012: 114). His daughter Marine le Pen, however, has developed a rather coherent political project aimed at ‘demondialisation’, shielding France from the influence of banks and big enterprises, stimulating re-industrialization by curtailing global trade, and fiercely protecting France’s ‘acquis sociaux’ by means of the welfare state – although these services should often be limited to French citizens (ibid: 118-120).

This shift towards more left-leaning socio-economic policies is by no means restricted to the National Front. During the nineties, many Radical Right parties moved towards the economic center as a result of increased competition with social-democratic parties (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). This fits the assertion that protection against globalization in both a cultural and economic sense constitutes one pole of the new political cleavage of the early 21st century (Azmanova, 2011; Kriesi et al., 2008). Indeed, scholars agree that most Radical Right parties’ economic stance can often not be described as classically right-wing (Mudde, 2007; Mughan, Bean, & McAllister, 2003; Rydgren, 2012). On the other hand, others found this move to be half-hearted or non-existent before the 2000s (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Importantly, the Radical Right’s socio-economic policy positions are instrumental to achieving other goals. For instance, foreign residents or immigrants are either to be excluded from such services, or to pay higher premiums (Betz & Meret, 2012: 120). Parties in East-Central Europe have been shown to be particularly protectionist, reflecting their ideological “mix of traditional nationalism and state socialism” (Mudde, 2007: 356). All these varying contexts and histories lead to a wide array of stances on socio-economic policies among Radical Right parties, “depending on the party studied, but also when this party was studied” (Ivarsflaten, 2005: 469).

How does relate to parties’ electoral gender balance? I expect that parties with a socio-economically left-wing profile have the weakest electoral appeal among women. This is at first sight counter-intuitive. After all, in many studies, women show on average more support for socio-economically left-wing policies (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). According to the European Election Study 2009, more women than men agree that wealth should be redistributed, or that major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, women are more likely to work in the public sector than men, and have been argued to be disproportionately dependent on the welfare state. Due to a ‘feminization of poverty’, it has been argued that the social safety net has become relatively important to women, making them more supportive of state provision (Gidengil et al., 2005: 1174). All this would lead to the expectation that a socio-economic more left-wing stance would on average be especially attractive – rather than deterring – among female voters. However, Chapter 1 showed that the gender gap did not at all disappear after taking men’s and women’s views on economic issues into account.
The reason to expect that parties with a stronger welfare chauvinist profile would attract more men is as follows. Radical Right parties that have embraced a pro-welfare state discourse rely more strongly on voters from specific socio-economic groups (Harteveld, forthcoming). Due to gendered work and employment patterns, workers in these specific groups are more often male. Figure 2.1 shows that the groups of skilled and semi-skilled workers – the occupational groups with the highest propensity to vote for the Radical Right – consist of about twice as many men as women. Professional and technical occupations, a category that includes education and health jobs, and which are least likely to vote for the Radical Right, consist of many more women than men. In terms of self-perceived class, the scores do not differ much, but there too men are somewhat overrepresented among the class that is most likely to vote for the Radical Right – the working class.

Figure 2.1 Occupations and classes by gender

Source: European Election Study

The extent to which these groups are over- or underrepresented among the Radical Right’s electorate depends on parties’ positions on socio-economic issues: the more left-wing, the stronger the overrepresentation of working class voters (see Van der Brug...
et al., 2012: 59). Radical Right parties that have moved to the socio-economic left can thus be expected to attract a more specific constituency of voters in fitting the ‘loser of globalization’ profile, and these are more often male. The gender gap is therefore likely to mirror the ‘proletarianization’ of parties. This leads to the following hypothesis:

\[ H_{2a} \text{ gender is a more important predictor of Radical Right support for socio-economic} \]
\[ \text{economically more left-wing parties} \]

Which, in turn, is likely to result in the following expectation at the party-level:

\[ H_{2b} \text{ socio-economically left-wing Radical Right parties have a larger gender gap} \]
\[ \text{than neoliberal parties} \]

DATA AND METHOD

The European Election Study again provides the individual-level data. To increase variation at the supply side level, the 1999, 2004 and 2009 waves are included (Schmitt, Loveless, Adam, & Braun, 2004; Van der Eijk, Franklin, Schönbach, Schmitt, & Semetko, 1999; van Egmond et al., 2009). The propensity to vote (PTV) for the largest Radical Right party in the country remains the dependent variable. Because the propensity to vote was measured on either a 10- or a 11-point scale, depending on the wave, they were rescaled to a 0-to-10 range in all years. A dummy indicates whether the respondent is male (0) or female (1). Furthermore, the self-reported social class of the respondent is measured on a five point scale. The Left-Right self-placement indicator was also rescaled to a 0-to-10 scale in all years.\(^{19}\)

Measurements of parties’ ideological positions are derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which consists of experts’ judgments about parties’ positions on a 11-point scale. For parties’ economic position, the following description was used by CHES: “Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state”. The validity of this particular item was confirmed by Bakker et al. (2014: 1100), who conclude that “party experts in Europe view the left/right economic dimension of party competition in largely the same way across countries”. The resulting scores range from roughly 3 for the Southeast-European parties Attack (Bulgaria) and Greater Romania party to almost 9 for Flemish Interest (Belgium) and Northern League (Italy). Other generally left-wing parties are Danish People’s Party and True Finns, while the Freedom Party of Austria (although often described as a relatively neoliberal party)

\(^{19}\) For both PTV and Left-Right position this was done by multiplying the values on the 10-point scale by \(\frac{11}{10}\).
is assigned a centrist position of 5. Still, there is enough face validity in the relative scores to allow for comparison. For instance, the ‘programmatic turnover’ towards a left-wing party is clearly visible in the trend of the National Front, which moved from an economically right-wing position (8.7) in the 1990s to an increasingly moderate position in 2006 (6.6) and 2010 (6.5). To measure parties’ stances on liberal values and emancipation, the most valid indicator is Social Lifestyle Tolerance. ‘Social lifestyle’ is illustrated by the expert survey coordinator with one example, homosexuality. Due to the label and example it is likely that experts considered parties’ stances towards individual expression and emancipation in general, with probably extra emphasis on tolerance towards homosexuality. The variable was recoded as ‘Social Lifestyle Intolerance’, with low values indicating tolerance, and high values indicating intolerance.

Unfortunately, the Lifestyle Intolerance indicator is only available in the 2004 and 2009 waves. As an alternative operationalization available in all three waves, the GAL-TAN measure is included. GAL-TAN consists of a continuum that ranges from a Green, Alternative and Liberal stance (low values) to a Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist outlook (high values). Although this indicator is somewhat convoluted (De Lange, 2007), it can function as a suitable indicator for the extent to which parties uphold emancipatory values: all three main components tap into the core dilemma, as sketched earlier, between respecting the individual choice (as part of civic nationalism) or protecting society’s organic traditions, order and coherency. Moreover, the framing of the question in the Chapel Hill survey mentions the following examples of GAL: “access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation”.

In order for GAL-TAN to measure the intended concept, it should pick up stances towards individual freedoms (the libertarian-authoritarian dimension), rather than a nationalist stance on issues such as immigration. This seems to be the case: Figure 2.2a confirms that parties scoring high on GAL-TAN are not systematically related to CHES’ measure of parties’ immigration stance ($r = –0.03$). By contrast, the GAL-TAN measure does correlate strongly and significantly with the a priori most valid indicator, Social Lifestyle Intolerance ($r = 0.60$), as confirmed by Figure 2.2b. GAL-TAN can therefore primarily be considered to capture parties’ stance on individual freedoms, rather than their views on immigration.

The CHES data also contains the experts’ estimates of the saliency of each issue on the same 11-point scale. The salience of Social Lifestyle Intolerance is included to investigate whether the saliency rather than the position matters for the gender gap.

The models are estimated with random intercepts for country-election combinations. This way, variables at the country-election level – that is, parties’ ideology – can be included in the models.
Figure 2.2  Relation between GAL-TAN, Immigration (A) and Social Lifestyle Intolerance (B) position

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey
RESULTS

The hypotheses are tested as follows. First, graphs will be used to investigate the bivariate relationship between the size of the gap and parties’ ideology. After that, a multivariate model is estimated to test whether the size of the gender gap significantly depends on the substance of party ideology, while controlling for both the other aspects of parties’ ideology and a range of individual-level characteristics.

Bivariate relations

Figure 2.3a and Figure 2.3b show the relation between the size of the gender gap (vertical axis) and parties’ positions on cultural items (Social Lifestyle Intolerance and GAL-TAN; horizontal axis) for 26 party-year combinations. A negative gap indicates that women express less support for a party than men, and the majority of parties actually experience such a gap. It was hypothesized that the gap would be smaller for parties with a conservative position on GAL-TAN and Social Lifestyle Intolerance. However, no pattern emerges linking GAL-TAN to the size of the gap ($r = -0.11$, ns). With regard to Social Lifestyle Intolerance, Figure 2.3b shows that no correlation either ($r = -0.03$, ns). The Freedom Party (NL) and Danish People’s Party are the most liberal parties in the data, but have a modest (2009) or even relatively large gap (2004). In short, there is thus no evidence that a more liberal position on such issues is related to a smaller gender gap.

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20 Calculated as the $PTV_{women} - PTV_{men}$. An alternative specification would be to express the size of the gap as a share of the total vote, which is less sensitive to the size of parties: $(PTV_{women} - PTV_{men})/PTV_{overall}$. This alternative operationalization yielded highly similar results.
It might still be the case that the gender gap depends on the salience of emancipatory issues, rather than the position. However, Figure 2.4 shows no evidence for this contention either ($r = -0.03$).

**Figure 2.4** Relation between size of the gender gap and the salience of Social Lifestyle
I now turn to Radical Right parties' position on economic issues. Does it predict how well they attract female voters? Figure 2.5 suggests it does. A very strong and significant positive correlation ($r = 0.87; p < 0.01$) exists between the two indicators. Parties at the most neoliberal end of the scale have a small – or even absent – gap, whereas large gaps can be found among parties with a socio-economically more left-wing profile. This pattern is replicated for CHES’ more fine-tuned economic sub-items of redistribution ($r = 0.71, p < 0.01$), public services ($r = 0.73, p < 0.01$) and deregulation ($r = 0.71, p < 0.01$), which suggest the overall economic stance, rather than one particular aspect of it, affects parties’ gender gap.

Multivariate test

The bivariate analyses suggested that the size of the gender gap depends on parties’ position on socioeconomic issues, but not on their stance on individual freedoms. Are these findings robust to a multivariate test, controlling for a range of party- and individual-level indicators? Table 2.1 shows the results of a multilevel regression with propensity to vote (PTV) for the Radical Right party as the dependent variable. These models do not include measures of respondents’ attitudes on immigration or emancipation, because these were only asked once, in 2009. However, additional analyses, which include the 2009 wave’s measures on immigration (2 items) and emancipation (3 items), confirm that both attitudes affect voting (with Radical Right voting being associated with more strict views on immigration and opposition to emancipation). However, the effect of views on immigration or emancipation does not differ between men and women (conditionality), nor do emancipation values explain the gender gap (composition).

**Figure 2.5** Relation between size of the gender gap and Economic position

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey; European Election Study
I now turn to the findings of Table 2.1. The negative effect of the female dummy in Model 1 confirms that a gender gap indeed exists. Its persistence in Model 2, after adding a range of controls, shows that the gap is not simply a composition effect of socio-economic status or right-wing views. Model 3 adds party positions and their interaction with gender. These interactions signify whether the gender gap (as captured by the main effect of gender) is moderated by party stances, and thus provide a core test of the hypotheses. Because immigration is key to the Radical Right ideology, its effect and interaction are included here as well. However, as expected due to the findings of Chapter 1, parties’ stances on this issue do not affect their gender gap. Neither do parties’ positions on Social Lifestyle Intolerance and GAL-TAN, which is in line with the bivariate findings above. A significant interaction does exist, however, between gender and parties’ stance on economic issues. This, too, is in line with the bivariate relation, and robust to the inclusion of a range of control variables (Model 4).

Table 2.1  Full regression model

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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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Welfare chauvinism, nativist Enlightenment: party programs

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*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey; European Election Study

Figure 2.6 shows a marginal effects plot of the female dummy. Indeed, the pattern of Figure 2.5 is confirmed: large and significant gaps for the most left-wing parties; an insignificant gap from position 8 onwards. The correlation between the gap and parties’ socio-economic position is thus sizeable and robust.
Additional analyses show no three-way interaction between the respondents’ gender, socio-economic position (on any indicator) and parties’ economic ideology. In other words, parties’ ideology does not affect the relative importance of economic indicators among men and women differently.

Exploring the causal mechanism
To recall, the expected reason for the overrepresentation of men among Radical Right parties with a relatively left-wing socio-economic profile was that these parties draw more voters with a precarious working class profile, and these voters are more often male. As a result, the gender gap mirrors the ‘proletarianization’ of parties. Evidence for this mechanism can be found in Figure 2.7. It shows that the gender gap is largest for parties for which the explanatory power (in terms of pseudo-R²) of the socio-demographic variables used in Table 2.1 (excluding gender itself) is the highest – that is, when parties draw most clearly on specific socio-economic strata of society (Van der Brug et al., 2012).

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21 It must be noted that the R² of this model (which includes socio-economic status, sector, age and education) is not very high. This reflects both the fact that such factors are usually not the strongest determinants of Radical Right voting (Van der Brug et al., 2013), but also that the number of socio-demographic measures that are comparable across waves was low. If anything, this low R² will likely lead to an underestimation of its correlation with the size of the gender gap.
By contrast, parties for which the explained variance of such variables is relatively low – that is, parties that draw on a broader coalition of voters than the working class alone – are predicted to have a smaller gap. This correlation is moderately strong but significant ($r = -0.25; p < 0.01$). All in all, the conclusion seems warranted that the large gender gap in voting for welfare chauvinist Radical Right parties reflects these parties’ strong electoral reliance on specific groups of blue-collar voters – voters who tend to be relatively often male.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I investigated to what extent variation in Radical Right parties’ position on various issues is related to the size of their gender gap. A first relevant finding is that the gender gap in Radical Right voting does not depend on parties’ stance on emancipatory issues such as gay’s and women’s rights. This refutes the assertion that women would more often specifically dislike the Radical Right’s stance regarding these issues. It therefore seems useful not to overestimate the importance of emancipatory issues for Radical Right parties, for whom the topic remains instrumental to their nativist agenda (Akkerman, 2005), or the salience of this topic for female voters as a group (for a discussion, see Mudde, 2007: 113). As expected, parties’ position on immigration issues did not predict the size of the gap either.
A very strong and robust correlation does exist between the size of the gender gap and parties’ position on socio-economic issues. Parties that take a more left-wing position on socio-economic issues – such as some of the Nordic and Eastern European parties – have a much larger gap than parties that are (or were) more laissez-faire in their outlook, such as the Northern League (IT), but also the National Front (F) in its earlier years. Additional analyses suggest that this is due to the fact that welfare chauvinist Radical Right parties draw more heavily on economically vulnerable groups than socio-economically more right-wing parties do. Although men and women can both face economic hardship due to changes in the post-industrial era, the social groups most connected to this phenomenon – mostly private sector unskilled and service workers – consist of more men than women. They form a specific constituency of the relatively ‘welfare chauvinist’ subfamily of the radical right. As a result, the gender gap is – at least partly – a function of the degree of ‘proletarianization’ (Betz, 1994) of parties.

Over time, Radical Right parties may or may not adopt the ‘new winning formula’ of pro-welfare nativism. This is not, however, mere ideological window-dressing. This chapter showed that such shifts are accompanied by substantive moves in parties’ constituencies. However, even the most recent EES wave studied in this chapter, 2009, took place before the crisis in the Eurozone and the increased levels of immigration due to the Syrian civil war – two developments that seem to have increased Radical Right parties’ appeal to socio-economic protection and welfare chauvinism (Ivaldi, 2015). A general prediction would be that, to the extent that Radical Right parties do increasingly adopt the ‘New Winning Formula’, their gender gap will increase rather than shrink, all else (especially their reputation; see Part II) equal. Research using recent data can shed light on this.

At the same time, this chapter also shows that socio-structural factors – even when considered in their interaction with party positions – cannot fully account for the gap. While it can explain why for some parties the gap is larger than for others, it does not explain why a ‘net’ gap remains even after controlling for a wide range of characteristics of parties and voters. The key puzzle from Chapter I remains unresolved: why do women appear structurally less likely to support Radical Right parties, even among those who agree with them? This calls for broadening the set of explanations. In Part II, I therefore turn to a third, socio-psychological, model of voting behavior.
Part II
Socio-psychological explanations
CHAPTER 3

“A PARTY ONE SIMPLY DOES NOT VOTE FOR...”
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CUES

INTRODUCTION

In the first chapter, it was established that women are generally less likely than men to support the Radical Right, even when they agree substantially with the platforms of these parties. It was further established that socio-structural gender differences play a role in shaping the gender gap, especially for socio-economically more left-wing parties (Chapter 2), but fail to fully explain the gender gap either. This suggests that the gender gap has its origins in still other features of the Radical Right than their substantive policy proposals. This theme will be elaborated in the second half of this dissertation. It is plausible that patterns of support for the Radical Right, including the gender gap in its support, can be better understood by studying the (negative) social cues that many voters receive regarding these parties. Specifically, I investigate whether men are more likely to vote for parties that are deemed socially less acceptable in voters’ social environment. As will be argued below, this might in turn explain why a gender gap occurs in voting for the Radical Right despite a lack of a gender gap in support for the Radical Right’s substantial program. This explanation of the gender gap has not been studied before, and the aim of this chapter is therefore to investigate the plausibility of the underlying causal mechanism.

Though not part of most conventional models of political choice, there is theoretical and empirical reason to expect voters’ social context to affect their vote (Zuckerman, 2005). I argue this is especially relevant in the case of Radical Right parties. After all, in most established democracies, Radical Right parties are denounced by elites as well as substantial parts of the public (Happold, 2000; Minkenberg, 2006; Van Spanje & Van Der Brug, 2007). While Radical Right parties’ legitimacy and acceptability have been established as an important precondition for their electoral success (Bos & Van der Brug, 2010; Ignazi, 1992; Ivarsflaten, 2006a), there is little research on the individual-level determinants that predict which citizens are most likely to refrain from voting for
Chapter 3

stigmatized or controversial parties. In the chapter succeeding the current one, I will investigate whether men are less deterred by normative concerns over the legitimacy of the Radical Right’s claims. The focus in the current chapter, by contrast, is on social cues: the way in which citizens are deterred or attracted to parties because of positive or negative evaluations by fellow citizens – regardless of the substantive program of parties.

Not all citizens are affected by such social cues to the same extent when making their vote choice. Though hardly studied in the context of voting, an extensive literature suggests that women are generally more likely than men to take such cues into account (Bond & Smith, 1996; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dalton & Ortegren, 2011). I therefore hypothesize that fellow citizens’ negative evaluations of Radical Right parties, while deterring to many voters, will affect men less strongly than women. To test this hypothesis, a large sample of Swedish citizens was investigated using innovative survey questions and an experiment. These studies show that gender differences in the evaluation of social cues indeed matter. Men perceive voting for the Radical Right as substantially less socially acceptable than women, and such perceptions affect men’s vote choices less strongly than women’s. Moreover, the experiment confirms that exogenously manipulated social denouncement has a stronger deterring effect on women’s party support than men’s. Social endorsement, by contrast, brings women’s probability to vote for a Radical Right-type party closer to men’s.

THEORY

Below, I first discuss why social cues can be expected to be relevant for vote choices. Subsequently, I discuss why men and women are likely to be affected differently by such cues. After that, I discuss why this affects voting for the Radical Right in particular.

The social context of voting

The theoretical starting point of this chapter is that important decisions, including vote choices, are hardly made in social isolation (Festinger, 1962). Rather, such decisions are influenced by the attitudes expressed in voters’ social environments: “an opinion, a belief, an attitude is ‘correct,’ ‘valid,’ and ‘proper’ to the extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar beliefs, opinions, and attitudes” (idem: 272-273). Zuckerman (2005: 4) rightly points out that, while it is “both obvious and well-known” that citizens’ social circumstances affect their political thoughts and actions, “relatively few political scientists incorporate these principles into their analyses”.

Still, there is a long tradition of understanding voting as a socially informed act. In this view, voting, rather than being an individual act, is the result of a complex process which involves all elements of the “lifespace” of a voter, including her/his individual personality and experiences, intimate and close personal contacts (“primary groups”), as well as cues from broader society (Zuckerman, 2005: 9). The importance of the social logic, especially the role of intimate contacts, was confirmed even in The American Voter (A. Campbell et al., 1960: 274): “[n]ot only does the individual absorb from his primary
groups the attitudes that guide his behavior; he often behaves politically as a self-conscious member of these groups, and his perception of their preferences can be of great importance for his own voting act."

However, most of the subsequent voting research has moved away from studying the way in which social context affects voting. Zuckerman (2005: 2) discusses several reasons for this shift. Methodologically, the emerging focus on nationwide, large-N surveys made inferences about small-group processes less reliable and feasible, leading to the exclusion of indicators for social context in such surveys. Theoretically, alleged “social determinism” became unfashionable, being considered irreconcilable with Downsian views of voting as well as theories of democratic representation, and the focus of voting research “moved to the analytical foreground the immediate determinants of vote choice: attitudes and calculations” (idem: 11).

In this chapter, I return to the study of the social context of voting by investigating its relevance for the gender gap in Radical Right voting. I assume that the views and preferences of voters’ fellow citizens (both those intimately and weakly connected) provide a heuristic which limits their ‘choice set’ of parties. It can do so because it provides an informational heuristic – “a desire to obtain an accurate idea of reality” – or for social reasons (Rosander & Eriksson, 2012: 1588). The latter involves “a process of social comparison, which inhibits validation, necessary for conversion, when one is opposing a position held by the majority” (idem: 1588). Staying in line with your peers is relevant, first of all, because of fear for negative social evaluations. Even if the act of voting itself is confidential, it is the expression of political preferences of which the development is in varying degrees subject to social scrutiny. Voters continuously generate and update opinions about parties, and disclosing a favorable position towards a stigmatized party involves potential social costs. In turn, voters might abstain from developing such favorable positions in the first place – they internalize the social cue. After all, incompatible differences between a voters’ political preferences and those found in his or her social context can constitute an incongruence that voters might want to avoid or resolve, according to theories of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) or motivated information processing (Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006; Taber & Lodge, 2006).

Indeed, social cues of various sorts affect political behavior. For instance, even on the broadest level, polling data (as a form of ‘social consensus information’) presents a social cue. It can lead voters to support parties that are doing well – not only because of viability (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006), but also because it reveals general support for a party or candidate. On a more local and intimate network, research has shown that information and evaluations have an impact on vote choices, too (Ryan, 2011), especially those from families (Verba, Schlozman, & Burns, 2005) and friends (Kotler-Berkowitz, 2005). The latter mechanism has to be distinguished from the fact that families and groups of friends are often quite homogenous to begin with. Even in more politically and attitudinally heterogeneous primary groups, a social logic might affect its members, leading to an increase in homogeneity over time.
Social cues, gender, and the Radical Right

Can a social logic of voting potentially help explain the gender gap? While social cues can be expected to be important in shaping voters’ behavior, they do not affect all voters to the same extent. Voters who are most sensitive to social cues will be most likely to refrain from voting for parties for which many negative social cues exist. The influence of such cues thus depends on whether and how voters observe and evaluate them. This can potentially explain many observed voting differences between subgroups of the electorate. Specifically, I expect the consistent and almost universal gender gap in Radical Right support to be the result of the social stigma associated to these parties. Before discussing why there is reason to expect such stigma to exist in the case of the Radical Right, it is important to establish why it might affect women and women differently.

There is a tradition in thinking about gender roles which asserts that the social environment generally affects men’s behavior less strongly than women’s. The core of this argument originates in the view that, in the words of Gilligan (1982: 16), “sensitivity to the needs of others and the assumption of responsibility for taking care lead women to attend to voices other than their own and to include in their judgment other points of view.” Quite some empirical evidence suggests that men are indeed on average less responsive to social cues (Bond & Smith, 1996; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dalton & Ortegren, 2011). To give a trivial example, in an experiment about consumers’ preferences for ecological coffee, some respondents were provided with the information that many others had bought this product (Carlsson et al., 2010). Mentioning this social fact did not raise the intention to purchase ecological coffee among men, while it did do so among women.

Bond and Smith’s (Bond & Smith, 1996) meta-analysis of 133 replications of Asch’ line judgement task, in which respondents were confronted with a dissenting (majority) opinion, found that gender was the moderator with the largest impact. Men were substantially and consistently less likely to change their views according to the majority. On the basis of survey measures, Goldsmith et al. (2005: 593) found that “women [have] higher scores on conformity than men”. This is in line with early research on conformity (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) and on attention to social cues in the environment (Williams & Best, 1982).

The core of the socialization argument is that women’s upbringing – to a larger extent than men’s – would foster interpersonal orientation and interdependence. A different but reinforcing argument is that defying social cues involves a risk of exclusion. Among men, the risk of exclusion would be less because their status in a group is generally higher (Eagly & Karau, 2002; see Rosander & Eriksson, 2012). All in all, it can be expected that social cues generally affect men’s vote preferences less strongly than women’s. This, in turn, might explain the gender gap in voting for the Radical Right.

There are theoretically two distinct ways in which social cues might have a stronger effect among women than among men: gender differences in evaluation of stigma, and gender differences in perception of stigma. Differences in evaluation would imply that men give less weight to social cues, relative to other types of information. This is the
argument generally put forward in the literature on gender socialization. Differences in perception, by contrast, would mean that men are less likely to be aware of the social cue in the first place. In practice, perception and evaluation are likely to be positively related, which leads to the general expectation that, ceteris paribus, social cues are more likely to influence women’s vote choices compared to men’s.

While this expectation should hold for voting for any party, there is reason to expect the social cues regarding Radical Right parties to be especially pronounced. Many of these parties are treated as political outcasts or ‘lepers’ (Van der Brug et al., 2000). Some even face criminal prosecution and party bans for inciting racial hatred, or experience a cordon sanitaire by other parties (Minkenberg, 2006; Van Spanje & Van Der Brug, 2007). Media outlets often take a position as well, sometimes quite outspokenly negative (Art, 2007). The controversial nature of this party family usually originates in its alleged discriminatory intentions, and sometimes connections to extreme right history or subculture (Ivarsflaten, 2006a). The presence of a social stigma on the societal level – in itself a cue – is in turn likely to also influence voters through their primary networks, as such denouncement might appear in many voters’ broader or smaller social environments. Therefore, a social taboo is likely to exist on being associated with some of these parties in many circles. Indeed, Bos and Van der Brug (2010) show that not all voters see the Party for Freedom (PVV) as ‘normal’, and that this negatively affects voting for this party. All in all, I hypothesize that negative social cues regarding Radical Right parties affect men’s support for these parties less strongly than women’s.

CASE, METHOD AND DATA

The data for this chapter was collected in Sweden. It could be argued that Sweden is a least-likely case to find support for the hypothesis. Gender differences are the product of a complex interplay of factors (Eagly et al., 2005). As discussed in the Introduction, individual gender identities and characteristics can be expected to depend on the extent to which social roles in a country at large are gendered. At arguably the most ‘de-gendered’ end of the scale, Sweden is a least likely case to find gender differences in social sensitivity to affect voting. If I do find evidence in support of this hypothesis, it is likely that they apply in other countries as well.

Research on social influences on voting is often hindered by data difficulties. Self-reports about origins of vote choices are potentially unreliable. Citizens are not always aware of the sources of their political views, and social desirability might lead them to overestimate their independence in arriving at a vote choice. Some have researched the extent to which citizens access heuristics by creating an artificial election setting (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Others have looked at the distribution of political preferences among citizens’ self-reported political discussion networks (Levine, 2005), which allows for a more indirect but possibly still endogenous test of their influence. This chapter is based on two complementary methods: first, survey questions designed to directly measure the perception and evaluation of social cues; and secondly, an experiment designed to
study the effect of social cues on men’s and women’s support for a party. While the first most closely measures the concepts of interests, the second allows for a stronger causal inference.

The survey questions and experiment were included in a large sample of Swedish citizens in the online Citizen Panel survey project (Martinsson, Andreasson, Markstedt, & Riedel, 2014). These data were collected through an opt-in sample, based on large-scale recruitment via newspapers, social media, and events. The opt-in character makes the sample not representative for the Swedish population. However, since the core aim of this study is to establish correlations between survey measures and gender, and to assess the effect of a stimulus for different groups, the generalizability of the sample to the entire Swedish population is not crucial in this study. There are no strong reasons to expect the extent to which effects are gendered to differ substantially between subgroups in society. Separate analyses including interaction terms for the higher educated – which is probably the most important overrepresented category – show that the effect of the stimulus did not differ substantially or significantly by educational category.

The data were collected during two different waves, but are for the main analysis treated as if all respondents were interviewed in the same wave. In the Robustness section, I show that this merging was justified, as the same patterns show up in both independent samples. I describe the details of both the survey questions and experiment separately below.

**STUDY 1: SURVEY QUESTIONS**

**Description**

The aim of the first study is to investigate whether there are, first of all, gender difference in sensitivity to social cues in the context of voting, and, secondly, whether women perceive Radical Right parties as more strongly stigmatized. To study these questions, the respondents were presented with two batteries of questions that were intended to tap into perceptions of male and female voters. The first battery aims to measure self-reported sensitivity to the views of others when making a vote choice. This battery consists of three items intended to capture the extent to which respondents perceive themselves as sensitive to what others think about their vote choice. The questions wording can be found in Table 3.1. The items scale acceptably, but not very strongly (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.55$), which possibly reflects their skewed nature: a Mokken scale analysis of dichotomized items suggests a strong scalability ($H = 0.50$). The sum scale of the original items was rescaled to a 0 to 10 range.

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22 For more details, see http://www.lore.gu.se/surveys/citizen/.
Table 3.1 Measure 1: subjective sensitivity to others when voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item wording</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) I don’t care what others think about the party I vote for. (reversed)</td>
<td>2957</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) I take into account what other people think about parties when I make a vote choice.</td>
<td>2957</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) I would feel uncomfortable if I would vote for a party that people around me find unacceptable.</td>
<td>2957</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answer scale
Fully agree (1) to Fully disagree (5)

Scalability
Acceptable (Cronbach’s α = 0.55)

Of course, two disadvantages of self-reported measures are that people are not necessarily aware of their own motivations, and that they might describe them in a socially desirable way. Given the widely held understanding that voting should be an expression of individual political views, social desirability will likely lead respondents to underestimate or underreport the influence of others. While this might bias respondents’ answers in the direction of reporting a more independent vote choice, it is still valid to compare men’s and women’s answers. Women have been found to generally provide more socially desirable answers than men (Dalton & Ortegren, 2011), and this would downplay the extent to which women will be found more sensitive to social cues. This makes any gender difference I do find conservative.

A second battery of questions aims to measure the perceived acceptability of a vote, for various Swedish parties, in respondents’ social context. This is especially relevant with regard the Swedish Radical Right party Sweden Democrats. These items measure perceived stigma both in the immediate environment of the respondent (“family, friends, or colleagues”) and at the societal level (“in general”). The measures are described in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Measure 2: perceived acceptability of vote choices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) How acceptable or unacceptable would a vote for [party name] be to most people in your close surroundings (such as family, friends, or colleagues)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) How acceptable or unacceptable would a vote for [party name] be to most people in general?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answer scale
Not at all acceptable (0) to Totally acceptable (10)

Parties
Social Democrats (S), Moderates (M), Liberal People’s Party (FP), Green Party (MP), Pirate Party (PP), Center Party (C), Left Party (V), Christian Democrats (KD), Sweden Democrats (SD)

This measure is aimed at establishing whether the Radical Right is indeed perceived as socially less acceptable, and if so, whether this differs between men and women. If the hypothesis about perception holds, we should observe that women perceive the Sweden Democrats as a less acceptable choice than men. Furthermore, if the hypothesis about evaluation holds, we should observe that – regardless of the party – perceived
acceptability of a party is a stronger determinant of voting among women than among men.

The latter will be tested by modeling interactions between the measures of Table 3.2 and gender in a stacked regression model with vote choices as the dependent variable. To this end, the dataset was reshaped to a long format with respondents’ evaluations of each party as the unit of analysis. This created $N_{\text{respondents}} \times N_{\text{parties}}$ rows. In a regression analysis, I subsequently predicted the propensity to vote by gender, perceived acceptability of the party, and the interaction between the two.

Because all respondent-party dyads are nested in respondents, I start with a random intercept model. I add education and age as control variables. The effect of these controls obviously varies per party: higher education may be associated with a higher probability to vote for some parties, but a lower probability for others. To make the control variables ‘generic’, I employ the so-called y-hat procedure. In short, this involves three steps. First, the propensity to vote for each party is regressed on the control variables by means of linear regression. Second, the predicted values are then saved and centered around their means. These ‘centered y-hats’ are simply linear transformations of the original independent variables. The values reflect the extent to which respondents are predicted to be more or less likely to vote for a party on the basis of the control variables. In the third step, these values are included in the long (or stacked) data set and used as a control variable in the analyses. See Van der Eijk et al. (van der Eijk, Franklin, & Oppenhuis, 1996) for further details.

In a second regression analysis, I include fixed effects for respondents. This way, the effect of acceptability perceptions are estimated solely based on variation within respondents, thus ruling out any effect of time-invariant respondent characteristics. As a result, the effect of gender can no longer be isolated, but I can still observe its interaction with the perception variables.

Results

This section starts by investigating respondents’ scores on the measure of self-reported sensitivity to the views of others when voting. While the scale has its extremes at 0 (least sensitive) and 10 (most sensitive), few respondents report to be highly influenced by others when making a vote choice, leading to a low overall mean ($M = 2.1$, $SD = 2.1$). Figure 3.1 shows the mean scores for men and women separately. It shows that women score higher on this measure, and significantly so ($p = 0.02$). While small on the full nominal scale, the difference is not negligible given the narrow distribution, and at any rate probably conservative (as discussed above).

The analysis of the other survey questions – about acceptability perceptions – provides evidence for the importance of social cues in shaping parties’ gender balance. It shows, first of all, that acceptability (of any party) ‘among friends and family’ and ‘in general’ are strongly but not perfectly correlated ($r = 0.68$), suggesting that these two perceptions are distinct but often go together. Importantly, such perceptions differ between men and women. Figure 3.2 shows the average perceptions among both genders of acceptability.
(among primary groups and society in general) of a vote for the Sweden Democrats. When asked about their family and friends, women perceive this party as being judged much less acceptable than men do ($p = 0.00$). With regard to society in general, the difference in perceived acceptability is smaller but in the same direction ($p = 0.00$). The data thus confirms that – at least in the Swedish case – women more strongly associate the Radical Right with negative social signals than men do.

Figure 3.2  Mean scores, among men and women, on the perceived acceptability of a SD vote
It could be argued that the acceptability measures are partly endogenous to vote choices: when voters don’t like something, they will project this to others. However, an additional analysis shows that the gender difference in perceived acceptability of Sweden Democrats remains substantial and significant even when looking at the subset of respondents who actually voted for that party. This is a strong indication that women’s generally stronger feeling that the Sweden Democrats is a party “one does not vote for” is not purely endogenous to their reluctance to vote for that party.

Finally, I investigate whether acceptability perceptions play a larger role among women than among men in determining their vote choice. This analysis takes voting for all parties into consideration, given that theoretically the role of stigma is not necessarily reserved for Radical Right parties. For other parties, too, a stronger link between acceptability perception and vote can be expected among women. To recall, the dataset was reshaped to a long format with respondents’ evaluations of each party as the unit of analysis.

Figure 3.3 Effects of perceived acceptability on voting for a party, among men and women

In a first model random intercepts were included for individuals. The predicted probabilities in Figure 3.3, of which the full regression table is presented in Appendix D, shows that a party’s perceived acceptability ‘among friends and family’ is a stronger predictor of actual vote choices among women than among men ($p = 0.00$). Apparently, perceived social cues originating in the local environment affect women’s vote choices more strongly than men’s. Among those respondents who perceive the Radical Right as acceptable, no gender gap emerges at all. With regard to perceived acceptability among the general public, the effect is descriptively in the same direction but not significantly so ($p = 0.26$). Still, the evidence in general confirms that social cues play a role in shaping
the gender gap in voting for Radical Right parties. An analysis with fixed effects (also presented in Appendix D) replicates the findings of Figure 3.3: a significant interaction between gender and perceived acceptability among friends and family.

STUDY 2: EXPERIMENT

Description
In this study, the social cue associated with two fictitious parties was experimentally manipulated. The parties remained fictitious to ensure that respondents consider the actual contents of parties’ programs as well as the social cue, and minimize the extent to which the possible social stigma of existing parties contributes to their answers.

Next to a party with a Radical Right-like program – the main interest – I study the impact of social cues on support for a Green-like party as well. After all, Green parties have been shown to be relatively popular among women in most countries (Dolezal, 2010). This is also true in Sweden. If strong negative social cues deter women more strongly than men even when it comes to a Green party, this clearly would show that social cues always affect women disproportionately. If such a gendered effect appears only when it comes to voting for a Radical Right party, this suggests that deterring effects only work in combination with existing doubts about legitimacy (i.e., a lack of a ‘reputational shield’; see Ivarsflaten, 2006 and the next chapter). If the social cue does not especially affect women’s support for either party, social cues might not at all be responsible for the gender gap in Radical Right voting. In short, two elements are manipulated, ideology and social stigma, and either of them might result in a gender gap, or – most likely – especially its combination.

The social cue that was provided to accompany the Radical Right or Green party was either positive (endorsement by a large share of the fellow experimental subjects) or negative (denouncement by the other subjects). In a control group, no social cue was presented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Policy proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Income differences in Sweden are too high. To decrease these differences, the poorest citizens should pay fewer taxes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To provide young people with a better future, the state should invest more money in education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military expenditure should be decreased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>The state budget can be reduced by being tougher on fraud with social benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A larger part of the Swedish health care should be produced in the private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employer contributions should be lowered in order to reduce youth unemployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C – Radical Right</td>
<td>The European Union is currently way too intrusive in our society. Powers should return from Brussels to Sweden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More money should be made available for care for the elderly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration from non-Western countries should be halted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C – Green</td>
<td>The environment should be protected by raising taxes on polluting firms, products and cars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The state should do more to assure full freedom of the internet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Referendums should be held about important legislation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3

The design of the experiment was as follows. Respondents were shown the vignettes of three fictitious parties (Parties A, B and C), each described by a number of policy proposals. The policy proposals of Party A are those of a Social Democratic party and those of Party B of a liberal party. These were the same in all conditions. The vignette of Party C represented either the program of a Radical Right or that of a Green party (based on randomization). An overview of the proposals is given in Table 3.3.

Respondents subsequently indicated whether they felt positive, neutral or negative towards each party by clicking thumb buttons. Table 3.4 shows the vignettes that were used for the fictitious party C, which in this case represented a Radical Right party.

Table 3.4 The three conditions for a Radical Right-like party C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Endorsement condition</th>
<th>Denouncement condition</th>
<th>Control condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parti C</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mer pengar bör läggas på äldreomsorgen.</td>
<td>Mer pengar bör läggas på äldreomsorgen.</td>
<td>Mer pengar bör läggas på äldreomsorgen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217 598 272</td>
<td>43 65 979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a number of likes, neutrals and dislikes similar to the mainstream parties (±70% “neutrals” or “likes”) an overwhelming amount of disapproval (±90% “dislikes”) no numbers shown for any party

Note: for the exact number of likes, dislikes and neutrals, see Appendix E.

For some respondents, these thumbs were accompanied by a (manipulated) number, which was implied to reflect other respondents’ likes, neutrals and dislikes. This is a common way of expressing and summarizing evaluations in online environments, and because the survey was conducted over the internet a real-time feedback mechanism was

---

23 The accompanying text was: “we are interested to know what you and the other respondents think of the parties below. We kindly ask you to read the program of each party. After reading each program, please click on a thumb to tell us if you like the party (the green thumb), feel neutral towards the party (the orange thumb), or dislike the party (the red thumb)”
The thumbs were interactive: a click on a thumb increased the accompanying number by 1. This was intended to strengthen the credibility of the cue. The bottom row of Table 3.4 summarizes the distribution of thumbs (for further details, see Appendix E). In this way, three experimental conditions were created for Party C. Since Party C is either a Radical Right or a Green party, there are six different experimental groups.

The endorsement condition presents many 'neutrals', rather than an overwhelming amount of 'likes'. For relatively small party families, and especially for a controversial Radical Right party, too many 'likes' would threaten the credibility of the stimulus material. It could be argued that for very small or controversial parties, either a neutral or positive signal from more than two-thirds of the respondents is a sign of endorsement. The presence of denouncement can be expected to deter respondents compared to the endorsement condition (main effect), and this effect can be expected to be stronger among women (interaction).

Two conditions need to be fulfilled for the stimulus to have its intended effect. First, the respondents need to be convinced that the numbers truly reflect the other respondents' views. This study's credibility was confirmed by an analysis of the open-question remarks at the end of the study, which suggest that respondents believed the study. Some respondents actually suggested that showing the 'likes' and 'dislikes' of the other respondents was a bad idea of the researchers, because it might have influenced their answers. Second, respondents need to actually care about what the other respondents – who they don't know personally – think. Pierce et al. (2013) show that social cues deriving from co-participants of social science experiments are indeed taken seriously. Furthermore, although the study was anonymous, the mere suggestion that answer are public have been found to affect respondents' conformity (Nass & Lee, 2001). However, it is important to note that even if some respondents found the thumbs unconvincing, or felt little identification with their co-participants, this would downplay the effects of the thumbs. Any effect that is found is therefore a conservative one.

The dependent variable is a question how likely respondents would be – on a scale from 0 to 10 – to ever vote for party A, B or C. This is the same continuous propensity to vote (PTV) variable as used in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. As an alternative, which is discussed in the Robustness section, voters were also asked which of the parties (or none) they would vote for if elections were held, thus forcing them to choose one of them. However, because the small number of participants that would actually vote for the smaller parties – especially and crucially the Radical Right among women (only 43) – makes PTV a more reliable dependent variable.

More men than women participated in the experiment: the number of men in each condition is ±480; the number of women ±260. However, this does not threaten the validity of a comparison of effects between men and women. Because we have clear theoretical hypotheses regarding both the main effect (negative cues lead to less

24 This measure has been validated as a valid measure of electoral utility (Van der Eijk et al., 2003).
support) and the interaction effect (more so among women), we present one-tailed $p$-values.

Results
Were the respondents’ choices affected by the stimulus? To answer this question, Figure 3.4 shows the predicted probability to vote for the manipulated party, by party program (Radical Right or Green) and condition (endorsement, control, or denouncement). In the case of the Radical Right parties, respondents appear only slightly – if at all – repelled from voting for the denounced party compared to both the control group and endorsement condition. For the Green party, no such effect is visible at all.

Surprisingly, the control group is associated with a higher PTV than both the endorsement and denouncement conditions. Apparently, the anonymity of the control group had itself an effect compared to the ‘exposed’ social cue conditions (where the choice appeared to be shared with others). To study the isolated effect of the thumbs, it is therefore most valid to compare the endorsement and denouncement conditions, rather than the control group and each condition.

In short, no strong effect of the social cue emerges. However, Figure 3.4 combines men’s and women’s responses, whereas we expect the effects to differ between these two groups. To test whether social cue-following (or -ignoring) behavior differs between men and women, Figure 3.5 shows the results of an interaction between gender and
stimulus. It confirms, first of all, that the Green party is relatively more popular among women, whereas the Radical Right is relatively more popular among men. This is in line with earlier characterizations of the Greens and the Radical Right as Frauenparteien and Männerparteien, respectively (Mudde 2007).

Figure 3.5  Average PTV for different conditions, among men and women

![Graph showing predicted probability to actually vote for different conditions among men and women](Graphic)

More importantly, the graph confirms the expectation that the effect of the stimuli differs between men and women. Among men, social denouncement has no effect for both the Green and the Radical Right party ($p = 0.39$ and $p = 0.38$, respectively). Apparently, whether the party was highly liked or highly disliked by other respondents hardly affected men’s choices. Among women, on the other hand, an effect of denouncement does seem to exist, though not for both parties. When it comes to voting for the Radical Right party, women appear somewhat deterred by social denouncement (although $p = 0.06$). This fits our hypothesis: men are less likely than women to incorporate social cues into their vote choice for the Radical Right. When the Radical Right party is endorsed by others, women’s propensity to vote moves for it closer to men’s. The effect is very subtle, but this might indeed be expected given the anonymous context and the absence of acquaintance with fellow survey-takers. If women are more often deterred from voting for a stigmatized Radical Right party in such a context, it might well be responsible for a larger Radical Right gender gap in a real-world context.

In the case of the Green party, however, women were not deterred from voting for that party when it was denounced by fellow participants. The effect even points in
the other direction, although not significantly so ($p = 0.30$). Apparently, the social cue that deterred some of the women in the case of a Radical Right alternative, does not deter a vote for the Green alternative – or, if anything, lead to counteracting it. While stigmatization of a Radical Right-like party resonates with most voters’ pre-existing perceptions of the unacceptability of similar parties and policy proposals, lending it credibility and salience, this is not the case for the Green party. That shows that social cues are not simply incorporated blindly, but are interpreted in the context of pre-existing beliefs. In particular, it is likely that the strong denouncement triggered a latent concern about prejudice. This hypothesis will be further explored in the next chapter.

In short, I conclude that social endorsement or denouncement had no effect on men’s vote choices, whereas it did influence women’s – though only when it resonated with existing beliefs and observations. While the deterring effect of stigma on women’s votes for the Radical Right is only marginally significant, it is still remarkable given that the cue was subtle, the participants probably felt little identification with the other participants, and for some the credibility of the cue might have been low.

**Robustness**

The data were collected during two different waves but were combined to increase statistical power. To check if this merging of the two waves was warranted, I re-analyzed the main model for the two individual waves. As Appendix F shows, the pattern is highly similar in both waves: no clear effect of denouncement among men; a negative effect among women for the Radical Right party, and an absent effect among women for the Green party. The fact that the results in are replicated and identical in both independent waves increases confidence in the conclusions.

As a second robustness check, the analyses were re-conducted with actual vote for one of the three parties (“if elections were held today”) as the dependent variable. Because only ±15 women and ±60 men indicated they would vote for the fictitious Radical Right party in each of the three conditions, we have to be very cautious with regard to the reliability of the findings. Still, it is relevant to see whether the patterns are comparable. The results (presented in Appendix G) show that this is largely the case. A notable difference is that men seem more likely to vote for a Radical Right party that is denounced. However, on closer look this increase is brought about by 4 participants, which renders it unreliable. Among women, the main finding is replicated: the negative effect of denouncement is again the strongest for the Radical Right party. Because the PTV results can be considered more reliable, and the analysis on actual voting confirm that a negative effect of denouncement occurred only among women, I conclude that the data remains supportive of the general conclusion.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In this chapter, I investigated whether the gender gap in Radical Right voting might be due to gender differences in sensitivity to social cues (Bond & Smith, 1996; Croson &
Gneezy, 2009; Dalton & Ortegren, 2011). Because this explanation of the gender gap has not been studied before, the key aim of this chapter was to investigate the plausibility of the underlying causal mechanism. An analysis of survey measures shows that men perceive themselves as generally less influenced by others when deciding what party to vote for. Men also generally perceive the Sweden Democrats as a socially more acceptable choice. Among women who perceive the Radical Right party as rather acceptable, the probability to vote for it was equal to men’s. This makes it plausible that social stigmatization of Radical Right parties, while deterring to many voters, affects women more strongly than men.

In an experiment in which the social cue associated with a Radical Right and a Green party was manipulated, the subtle stimulus had only a modest effect on voting, but still allows for some conclusions. Denouncement of a Radical Right party by fellow respondents reduced the probability of female respondents to vote for that party, while it did not do so among men. This result might explain why women have been found to been less likely to vote for Radical Right parties despite the fact that many agree with the party’s ideology. By contrast, endorsement of the Radical Right by fellow participants moved women’s propensity to vote for it closer to men’s.

On the other hand, stigmatization of a Green party deterred neither men nor women. The fact that denouncement affected female voters only from voting for a Radical Right party tells something important. While gender differences in the perception and evaluation of social cues matter, this does not mean that women more often simply copy these social cues. Rather, social signals are interpreted in the context of existing values and beliefs. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, in many countries a sizeable share of citizens has normative concerns over the compatibility of the Radical Right with shared societal norms (see also Ivarsflaten et al. 2010). Denouncement of a Radical Right-like party is therefore much more credible and salient. Still, and crucially, this did not decrease men’s support, while it did women’s.

More in general, it can be concluded that, if we want to better understand voters’ choices, studying the social cues they receive is informative (Zuckerman 2009). After all, if a subtle message of endorsement by anonymous fellow respondents already raises people’s probability to vote for a party, social cues coming from a larger group, or by people close to the respondent, can be expected to have an even larger effect. While this study was conducted to Sweden, the fact that we find these patterns in a relatively gender-equal country makes it likely that similar mechanism operate in other countries. At the same time, the extent to which parties are deemed socially acceptable will vary between countries and over time. In Chapter 5, I therefore continue the investigation of the role of social cues by taking variation in parties’ social stigmatization into account.
CHAPTER 4

TOXIC TRIGGERS: THE ROLE OF ANTI-PREJUDICE MOTIVATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 demonstrated that women are less likely to vote for Radical Right parties even when they agree substantially with these parties’ core policies. In the previous chapter, it was established that the gap is partly attributable to the social taboo that often rests on expressing a preference for Radical Right parties. However, while the experiment showed that social denouncement affects women more strongly than men, it only did so for Radical Right parties and not for Green parties. This suggests that the effect of social stigma is especially powerful in tandem with existing anxiety about the Radical Right. In this chapter, the role of this anxiety is further investigated. I show that differences in men’s and women’s latent normative concerns about prejudice are key to explaining the puzzle of the Radical Right gender gap.

A novel insight in this chapter is that, to fully understand Radical Right voting, we need to study not only voters’ attitudes, but also their motivations: the strength of their commitment to certain goals and aims (Kawada, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2004). After all, while the anti-immigrant message of Radical Right parties resonates with a large share of the voters, men as well as women, many Radical Right parties also raise normative concerns about discrimination and prejudice due to fascist or extremist legacies, or because of contemporary rhetoric and symbols (Blinder et al., 2013; Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2006a). When parties continuously become trapped in conflicts about discrimination and prejudice, internalized motivations to avoid prejudice can prevent voters from voting for Radical Right parties, even if they agree with the substantive policies they propose. If women are generally more strongly motivated to control prejudice than men – in other words, have a stronger latent commitment, if triggered, not to act or think prejudiced – such differences can explain why women are less likely to vote for Radical Right parties.

It is important to note that this explanation would not be at odds with the finding that women are generally as likely to be opposed to immigration as men, as noted in Chapter 1. Survey questions – or even everyday conversations – about immigration do

This chapter is based on an article, co-authored with Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, that is forthcoming in the *British Journal of Political Science*. 
not evoke the same normative concern as many party reputations do. In other words, the extent to which anti-prejudice motivations discourage support for anti-immigrant parties is not so much dependent upon the anti-immigrant message itself, but especially upon the Radical Right messengers. The motivational hypothesis predicts that men are more likely to vote for a party that is allegedly prejudiced, whereas many women would only support anti-immigration policies coming from a non-‘toxic’ party. The relevant gender difference can be found, then, not in outgroup views per se, nor purely in the sensitivity to denouncement of a party by others (Chapter 3), but crucially also in the extent to which the Radical Right triggers normative concerns. In this context, it is relevant to study motivations, because they might help to explain why the same party can have a different normative connotation for different people.

This explanation of the Radical Right gender gap builds on and extends work by Blinder, Ford and Ivarsflaten (2013), who show that people who are highly motivated to control prejudice are less likely to support Far Right parties, and also less likely to support restrictive immigration policies when proposed by such parties. Using representative survey data from three European countries, this chapter shows – for the first time – that while women are not consistently less opposed to immigration, they are consistently and substantially more motivated to control prejudice than men. As a result, women are more often deterred by normative doubts about ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties. The chapter shows that taking the gender difference in this motivation into account explains the non-policy gender gap in the two countries where the Radical Right has been least able to defuse normative concerns – the UK and Sweden. By contrast, gender differences in motivation to control prejudice do not explain the gender gap where the Radical Right is widely considered to have been successful at overcoming such concerns by advocating a diverse policy portfolio – the Progress Party currently in government in Norway.

Put differently: the electorate of ‘toxic’ parties that have become mired in conflict over past and present discrimination and prejudice is restricted to the subset of voters who are not motivated to control prejudice – and these are more likely to be male. From this it can be concluded that gender differences in normative concerns over prejudice are an important part of the explanation for the persistent gender gap of Radical Right parties.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter investigates an understudied precondition for Radical Right voting and shows how it is relevant to understand the gender gap. The core idea is that the gender gap in voting for Radical Right parties that are mired in conflict about prejudice and discrimination is a ‘special’ one, in the sense that it is largely caused by gender differences in motivations rather than ideological positions. Below, I first outline why normative motivations are crucial for understanding Radical Right voting in general. Subsequently, I discuss how this affects the gender gap in Radical Right voting.
Prejudice versus social norms
When it comes to group politics, citizens’ opinions and actions are shaped by opposing forces (Blinder et al., 2013). On the one hand, it is well-established that many majority population citizens have negative biases against immigrants, ethnic minorities, Muslims, or other ‘out-groups’. On the other hand, present-day Western societies are characterized by a widespread social norm against prejudice, and many citizens sincerely wish to conform to this norm: they are internally motivated to control prejudice. Researchers have developed and validated individual-level measures of the extent of internalization of such motivation, and they show that this Motivation to Control Prejudice (MCP)25 is not distributed equally among citizens (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010; Plant & Devine, 1998).

The psychological model of how motivations shape attitudes and behavior is based on dual-process logic (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The core of this logic is that attitudes consist of both automatic and controlled components. Automatic responses (or ‘implicit attitudes’) are generated without cognitive effort. Controlled responses (or ‘explicit attitudes’), by contrast, do involve effort. This ‘controlled’ process brings behavior into line with conscious normative commitments. While stereotypes are automatically activated in the presence of a member of an out-group, citizens who are motivated to control prejudice can bring this automated response in line with egalitarian beliefs (Devine, 1989). This distinction is useful, because it explains how important context is for people’s reaction to outgroups. The same individual can honestly advocate a range of very different views about for instance immigrants, depending on both the normative connotation of the situation and this individual’s motivations.

Importantly, people need to be aware that a norm is at stake before they take the cognitive effort to control prejudice and adjust their response in accordance with it. Blinder et al. (2013) show that the presence of cues suggesting racism or discrimination ‘triggers’ motivations to control prejudice to override negative outgroup views. They argue that, in the case of the Radical Right, conflicts about racist heritage, symbols, or arguments that surround Radical Right parties make them what could be called ‘toxic’ (Ivarsflaten et al., 2010). Indeed, respondents with high motivation to control prejudice respond differently to arguments and parties that trigger normative concerns than do respondents with low MCP (Blinder et al., 2013). Furthermore, while usual measures of anti-immigrant attitudes correlate with support for Radical Right and mainstream right parties, reflecting the ideology of both types of parties, MCP only correlates with voting for Radical Right parties, reflecting the normative concerns these parties might raise. Blinder et al. (Blinder et al., 2013: 854) conclude that “anti-prejudice norms pull voters away from extremist parties, even if they support the policies these parties espouse”.

25 To be precise: internal motivation to control prejudice. Given the focus in this chapter on the internalization of the anti-prejudice norm, I do not discuss external motivations. However, the previous chapter would suggest that there, too, gender differences are likely to be present.
Because this concept helps to distinguish between support for Radical Right ideas and its translation into a Radical Right vote, it can potentially explain the puzzle of Chapter 1.

**Gender and MCP**

Although the number of population-representative samples that include measures of motivation to control prejudice is currently growing, its application in European countries and in the context of migration and integration policies is recent. The first major European validation study was published in 2010. Our knowledge about the distribution of MCP – both at the individual level (across socio-demographic categories) and at the systemic level (depending on party systems and media debates) – is therefore so far limited. This is also true with regard to gender. Only one previous study employing MCP measures has reported a comparison between men and women. In a study of 760 students, men’s average score on the MCP measure was significantly and substantially – over 20 percent – lower than women’s (Ratcliff et al., 2006). Empirical evidence of a gender difference in motivation to control prejudice is thus supportive but scarce.

There are, however, theoretical reasons to expect women to be more strongly motivated to avoid prejudice than men. Women have been argued to be more likely to “define themselves in a context of human relationship [and] judge themselves in terms of their ability to care” (Gilligan, 1982: 17), thus putting more weight on interpersonal relations, and they have been found to generally score higher on measures of empathy (Lennon, Eisenberg, Eisenberg, & Strayer, 1987; Macaskill, Maltby, & Day, 2002). It is reasonable to expect stronger focus on interpersonal relations to be associated with higher commitment to the goal of acting without prejudice towards others. Again, this does not preclude supporting restrictions on immigration per se, but makes it possible that among women associations with prejudice are more problematic.

Moreover, studies show that men are more likely than women to desire and support group-based hierarchies, in which particular groups dominate others (Sidanius et al., 2000). A reason for this difference might be that women as a group in contemporary Europe have a self-interest in opposing traditional social hierarchies. Due to past and present experience of gender discrimination, women as a group may have become more strongly motivated to fight prejudice of all sorts. The anti-prejudice norm aims to control biases associated with and supportive of traditional group hierarchies, and it is therefore theoretically plausible that commitment to control prejudice will be lower among those who stand to benefit from the traditional hierarchies.

If, indeed, motivation to control prejudice is generally lower among male than among female voters, this can potentially explain the gender gap in voting for ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties: women’s generally higher motivation to control prejudice will then offset any pull towards the Radical Right due to anti-immigrant policy preferences. However, these theoretical conjectures should of course not be accepted without empirical investigation. The chapter therefore tests the hypothesis that male-female differences in motivation to control prejudice, rather than policy attitudes about immigrants, explain the gender gap in voting for controversial Radical Right parties.
Triggers
According to the dual process logic, a strong motivation to control prejudice can easily coexist with negative outgroup biases in the same individuals, and a signal that raises normative concern is therefore necessary for motivation to control prejudice to constrain thoughts and actions. In other words, a normative trigger needs to be present for behavioral differences to be evident between individuals with high motivation to control prejudice and people with low motivation. Controversial (‘toxic’) Radical Right parties that have no shield against accusations of racism and extremism will trigger such normative concerns, while the non-toxic Radical Right parties that have a shield against such accusations will not trigger normative concerns (Blinder et al., 2013).

Few of the parties considered part of the Radical Right family resort to blatantly racist arguments in their party programs. By now, it is an academic commonplace that a ‘legitimate’ or ‘modern’ image is necessary in order for Far Right parties to be potentially successful (Cole, 2005; Ignazi, 2005; Taggart, 1995; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003). Especially, ideological links to the historical Extreme Right have hindered the development of some of these parties (Hainsworth, 2008). Ivarsflaten (Ivarsflaten, 2006a: 2) shows that, in order to achieve electoral significance, parties rallying against immigrants need “a legacy that can be used to fend off accusations of racism and extremism”: a ‘reputational shield’. For example, she shows how a party with a clear reputational shield against charges of racism, the Swedish Liberal People’s Party, was able to successfully mobilize a large share of the Swedish electorate around the controversial policy proposal of a language test for immigrants in 2001 – long before (and to a much larger extent than) any of the contemporaneous Radical Right parties managed to mobilize similar sentiments (Ivarsflaten, 2008).

Consequently, motivational differences between men and women can be expected to only explain the gender gap in voting for those Radical Right parties that lack a ‘reputational shield’. Conversely, normative motivations will not result in a gender gap in those cases where Radical Right parties have been more successful at shielding themselves against charges of racism. The electorate of ‘toxic’ parties that trigger normative concerns is restricted to low-MCP voters, and these are more often male than female. Shielded Radical Right parties, by contrast, do attract high-MCP voters. Such shielded parties may or may not have a (smaller) gender gap in their electorate, depending on the rest of their ideological program, but the internal motivation to control prejudice should not account for such gender gaps. At this point it therefore becomes necessary to already take this variation on the supply side into account when selecting the cases. A fuller examination of the relevance of the supply side in this regard follows in Chapter 5.

Cases
The chapter includes three cases that vary on what could be called the toxicity-dimension. Table 4.1 summarizes the expectations of the extent to which each party can be expected to ‘trigger’ the anti-prejudice norm. The case selection allows to probe the hypothesis that MCP explains the gender gap only in the case of Radical Right parties that are trapped in conflicts over racism and discrimination. While limited to three
cases, this is the first possibility to test the gendered role of MCP in multiple countries with validated measures of the hypothesized mechanism. Chapter 5 will further focus on variation on the supply side.

### Table 4.1 Overview of cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Nature of signal</th>
<th>Role of MCP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British National Party, UK</td>
<td>Association with extremism and street gangs, no reputational shield</td>
<td>Strongest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden Democrats, Sweden</td>
<td>Origin in extreme right, no reputational shield, but recent moderation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress Party, Norway</td>
<td>Radical Right ideology, but reputational shield due to anti-tax origins; and broad policy portfolio had been accepted into the governing coalition at the national level at the time of data-collection.</td>
<td>Weakest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the one end of the scale, the British National Party (BNP) is the most strongly associated with outright extremism and racism. The party continues to be “associated [...] with an illegitimate tradition” (Goodwin, 2013: 11). While attempts have been made by the BNP leadership to distance itself from the old extreme right, notably by stressing cultural and populist arguments over racism, the party’s “continuing dependence on right-wing extremists [associated to violence] consistently undermined the party’s strategy of ‘modernization’” (idem: 11). A gender gap due to differences in MCP can be expected to be clearly present in the UK case.

The Sweden Democrats (SD) have roots in historic fascism as well, and party members wore uniforms as late as the 1990s (Rydgren, 2006). In the 2000s, under new leadership (including current leader Jimmy Åkesson), the SD has aimed to modernize itself. It publicly rid itself of several former extremist elements, substituted a flower for the torch in their party logo, and managed to increase its voter base in local, national, and EU elections. However, because reputations are sticky and the party does not have any main policy agenda other than exclusionist nationalism, the party is still not able to provide a sufficient shield against normative concerns for large parts of the Swedish public – at least, at the time of data collection in 2013. Motivation to control prejudice is therefore expected to explain an important part of the gender gap in SD voting.

At the least ‘toxic’ end of the scale, the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) is a clear example of a Radical Right party with a reputational shield. The party was founded in the 1970s as an anti-tax party, and did not pay much attention to immigration during the first decade of its existence (Widfeldt, 2000). Its status as one of the biggest parties in the country – the second largest between 1997 and 2013 – signaled social acceptability, as did the party’s inclusion into government with the mainstream Conservative Party just a few weeks before the data were collected. This reputational difference between FrP and the other parties is backed by empirical evidence. In surveys that were part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project, respondents were asked to assign like-dislike scores to parties on a scale from 0 (‘extremely dislike’) to 10 (‘extremely like’).
A large percentage of ‘extreme dislikes’ (zero’s) can be argued to signal social stigma, as it represents a very strong repulsion that is qualitatively different from assigning a low but not extreme score like 2 or 3 (see Chapter 5). In that case, the Sweden Democrats are denounced to a much larger extent than the Progress Party is: they are extremely disliked by 64% of the electorate, versus 26% for the Progress Party. In short, we expect that FrP triggers few, if any, normative concerns, and that motivational differences therefore play a limited role in shaping Progress Party voting – let alone create a gender gap.

METHODOLOGY

To investigate the hypotheses posited above, this chapter relies, for each country, on sources of data that have recently incorporated measures of MCP. For the United Kingdom, the source is the British version of the 2009 Comparative Campaign Analysis Project or B/CCAP (Nuffield College, 2009), a multi-wave panel conducted in conjunction with national election campaigns. It was administered to web-based samples aimed at creating a demographically representative sample. For Sweden and Norway, data collected in the respective Citizen Panel surveys of both countries in 2013 is used (Ivarsflaten et al., 2015; Martinsson et al., 2014). The Swedish panel is discussed in Chapter 3. The Norwegian panel was administrated online but its participants were recruited by offline means based on a random national sample. The data is fairly representative but underrepresents the lower educated as well as young women.

Given this multiplicity of data sources, no completely identical measures are available in all countries. However, the measures are sufficiently equivalent to allow for a comparison of the way they are related to gender and voting within each country.

Motivational differences were measured using batteries of indicators of (internal) MCP. Table 4.2 lists the wording of the items in each of the survey batteries, which scaled well in all cases. These measures were validated (based on similar scales) in earlier studies, which show that they are empirically unrelated to the Social Desirability Scale and the Self-Monitoring Scale (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010). This ensures that the measure does not merely pick up a general tendency to give socially desirable answers.

Preferences with regard to immigration and integration, the core policy agenda of the Radical Right, were measured using multiple questions about immigrants and their integration. For a description, see Appendix H. These questions, too, scaled well (Cronbach’s $\alpha$’s between 0.79 and 0.82). For reasons of space, this variable is labeled “restrictive immigration preferences”. As expected based on the dual process theory presented above as well as empirical findings from previous studies, the motivational

26 No CSES data is available for BNP.
27 For more information, see http://ccap.nuff.ox.ac.uk/.
28 For the Swedish Citizen Panel, see http://www.lore.gu.se/surveys/citizen/. For the Norwegian one, see http://www.uib.no/en/citizen/43063/about-panel.
items correlate negatively with restrictive immigration preferences, but are still clearly distinguishable from these. Appendix I presents the results of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), which shows that, in all three countries, the motivational and policy preference items load on different latent factors.\textsuperscript{29}

### Table 4.2 Measures of Motivation to Control Prejudice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards immigrants because it is personally important to me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about immigrants is OK.  (reversed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I feel guilty when I have a negative thought about immigrants.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about immigrants is OK (reversed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer scale</th>
<th>United Kingdom: Strongly agree (1) to Strongly disagree (5)</th>
<th>Norway: Very good (1) to Very bad (7)</th>
<th>Sweden: Strongly agree (1) to Strongly disagree (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scalability</td>
<td>United Kingdom: Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.84$</td>
<td>Norway: Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.82$</td>
<td>Sweden: Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.79$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{29} The measures of immigration policy preferences used here are deliberately chosen to be comparable to those used in most other studies of Radical Right voting. Seen in terms of the dual-process psychological model, these preference measures are composites, related to an unknown degree to both implicit negative bias and explicit motivation to control prejudice. Importantly, the items do not clearly and consistently trigger motivation to control prejudice, because they ask about normatively ambiguous categories such as immigrants (see Blinder et al. 2013). Implicit measures of negative bias would allow a full and detailed test of the psychological mechanisms implied by the dual process logic. Such a test is not needed in the current study, which investigates if taking into account motivations improves explanations of the gender gap in Radical Right voting beyond the conventional accounts, which use the composite measure of policy preferences. For this reason overly contentious items were not included in the migration policy preference scale.
Gender was measured using a dummy for the sex of the respondent, with score 0 for men and 1 for women. The dependent variable – voting for Radical Right parties – was measured in slightly different ways in each country. Any analysis of vote choice for Radical Right parties in the UK suffers from the low number of respondents that have voted for the BNP in a single survey. Therefore, in the UK, the dependent variable consists of a dummy indicating whether respondents reported a vote preference (‘if there were elections today’) for the BNP in any of the five waves – collected over slightly more than one year – of B/CCAP. No such problems arose in the Norwegian case, due to the relatively large vote share of the Norwegian Progress Party. Here, the dependent variable is whether respondents voted for the Progress Party in the last election.

In the Swedish Citizen Panel, no vote preference question was recorded among those respondents who received the battery of MCP questions. Here, the dependent variable is a propensity to vote (PTV) question also used in previous chapters (that is, how likely respondents indicate to be – on a scale from 0 to 10 – to ever vote for the Sweden Democrats). The dependent variable thus differs between countries, preventing direct comparisons of the size of gender gaps in absolute terms. However, and more importantly, these measures do allow for a valid comparison of the mechanisms behind the gender gaps. See Appendix M for descriptive statistics of the main variables.

The hypotheses are tested by relying on the following strategy. First, models are estimated in which voting for the Radical Right is regressed on the gender dummy. The coefficient of this dummy reflects the nominal size of the gender gap. Subsequently, the traditional policy attitude variable Restrictive immigration preferences, as well as the new variable, Motivation to control prejudice, are added in turn. The motivational hypothesis will be supported if there is a significant and substantial decline in the gender-coefficient when including the new motivational variable in the model. This would mean that the gender gap can be explained by a composition effect of anti-prejudice motivations (the distribution of motivation over men and women – see Chapter 1).

Given that the dependent variables in the UK and Norway are binary, the models are estimated using logistic regression in these two countries. Coefficients of logistic models are not directly comparable across models with different covariates because the error term depends on the included covariates. For that reason, the method of so-called y-standardization will be used: the variance of the error is fixed, allowing for better comparison between different models (Scott Long, 1997; see Winship & Mare, 1984). In the Robustness section, I will report the models without y-standardization.

RESULTS

Descriptives
Before testing whether gender differences in motivation to control prejudice shape the gap in Radical Right party voting, it is relevant to establish whether the men and women actually differ with respect to this measure. Figure 4.1 reports the difference between men and women in their average score on both the MCP and restrictive immigration
preference measure. To increase comparability between countries and measures, all scores were standardized. The reported differences, which are thus expressed in standard deviations (SDs), are calculated by subtracting men’s average scores from women’s. Positive numbers therefore mean that women score higher on average, while negative numbers mean that men score higher on average. Non-significant gender differences are indicated with striped bars.

**Figure 4.1 Gender differences in MCP and restrictive immigration preferences (women's average score minus men's average score, in SD)**

Note: striped bars indicate non-significant differences between men and women.

Figure 4.1 shows that men are on average more opposed to immigrants than women in Sweden and Norway, but not in the UK (where, descriptively, women even score somewhat higher). Furthermore, the figure reveals that, as expected, women score significantly higher than men on the motivation to control prejudice scales. This is true for all countries. Moreover, this gap is just as large (Norway) or much larger (UK and Sweden) than any gap in restrictive immigration preferences.

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30 Of course, a comparison of means does not tell the whole story. Such differences could either reflect that (a) most men score somewhat lower than women (a shifted distribution), or that (b) some men score very low and/or some women score very high (outliers). Inspection of the distributions (presented in Appendix L) suggests the former, as the distribution among women is similar to that among men, but shifted to the higher end of the scale. This is relevant for our present analysis: if MCP turns out to play a role in explaining Radical Right behavior, it means that it makes most women somewhat less likely to vote for these parties, rather than making a subgroup of women highly unlikely to do so.
Toxic triggers: the role of anti-prejudice motivations

Table 4.3 Difference between average MCP among men and women (in SD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No controls</th>
<th>With controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To assess whether these gender differences in motivation to control prejudice are robust, gender differences in MCP were subsequently predicted while controlling for socio-demographic characteristics: age and education in all three countries; in addition, income is included in the UK and Norway, and work sector in the UK only. Table 4.3 shows the difference between men and women in motivation to control prejudice before and after controlling. Gender differences in MCP are sizeable and robust to these controls. The finding that women are rather substantially, consistently, and – at least in the cases examined here – universally more motivated to control prejudice than men, is original knowledge.

The non-reputational shield cases of Sweden and the UK

Above, it was established that men are significantly less motivated to control prejudice than women in all of the studied cases. Does this explain the gender gaps in voting for the ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties – the BNP and SD – as suggested in the theoretical discussion above? Table 4.4 shows the result of regression models predicting a vote for British National Party (UK) and Sweden Democrats (Sweden). In the analyses presented here, no socio-demographic or attitudinal controls are included, because the main interest lies in the nominal gap. However, Appendix K presents the models controlling for age, education, and left-right position in both cases, and additionally income and work sector in the UK. These models with additional controls show an identical pattern.

In Model I, the vote is predicted by gender only. The positive coefficients of the gender dummies (female = 0, male = 1) in both countries indicate that, in line with earlier studies, men are more likely to vote for Radical Right parties than women. In the UK, the gap is only significant at a 10% level, which might reflect the low number of actual BNP-voters (101).

31 In contrast to many voting studies, controlling is not needed to prevent spurious relations: we are interested in gender differences, and gender is largely an exogenous variable. The fact that this effect is robust to the inclusion of socio-demographic variables indicates that it is not the result of a composition effect, which suggests that these differences exists regardless of men’s and women’s age, jobs, or education.

32 This also contributes to our understanding of the nature of the relation between different groups experiencing discrimination, such as women and minorities. These findings suggest common interest, rather than competition, between groups that experience discrimination. Scholars examining support for the Tea Party Movement in the U.S. have emphasized precisely this link between the struggle for equal treatment of a variety of groups.
In Model II, controlling for restrictive immigration preferences does not affect the gender gap in the UK. This is not surprising, given the earlier finding that British women score equally high on such policy preferences as do men. In Sweden, where women were found to have somewhat less restrictive preferences than men, the gap is reduced by including this measure. Still, a sizeable and statistically significant gender gap remains. This is in line with earlier studies showing that conventional predictors of Radical Right voting – both attitudinal and socio-structural – do not consistently and fully explain the gender gap in SD or BNP voting (see Chapter 1).

Model III adds controls for respondents’ motivation to control prejudice. Taking this motivation into account has a much larger impact on the estimated gender gap than do immigration policy preferences. In fact, unlike any other studies we have seen of the RRP vote, the gender gap shrinks to insignificance in both cases studied when this variable alone is taken into account. This is in line with the hypothesis that motivational rather than attitudinal differences are responsible for the gender gap in voting for toxic RRPs. The models presented in Appendix K, which include demographic and ideological controls, replicate these findings.

The reputational shield case of the Norwegian Progress Party
If the normative signal theory is correct, then we should find that any gender difference in voting in the Norwegian case is not accounted for by gender differences in motivation to control prejudice. In other words, the gender gap in the Norwegian case – which earlier
research has found to exist (Immerzeel et al., 2015) – ought to be a traditional one based on gender differences in ideology rather than motivation to control prejudice. This is precisely what the analysis in Table 4.5 shows.

### Table 4.5 Regression models, Norway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gender (male)</th>
<th>Restrictive immigration pref.</th>
<th>MCP</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway - FrP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic regression; dependent variable: voted for FrP; coefficients with y-standardization
N=965

A significant gender gap exists and a part of it can be explained by restrictive immigration preferences. The third model shows that there is some general effect of motivation to control prejudice, suggesting that those most concerned to control prejudice are still somewhat less likely to vote for this party. However, unlike in the two other cases, taking the motivational measure into account does not explain the gender gap or even reduce it as much as the models that include the anti-immigrant attitudinal measure.

The gender gap in voting for the Norwegian Progress Party likely reflects other aspects of the Progress Party’s program. The party’s economic ideology (reflecting its anti-tax origins) possibly draws more support among men, who have in earlier studies been found to more often uphold anti-statist and neoliberal values. The party’s transportation policy, with emphasis on road-building and opposition to toll stations, probably also contributes to this pattern. Neither SD nor BNP has such significant additional policy issues. Indeed, using data of the European Value Survey of 2010, Immerzeel et al. (2015: 17) show that controlling for attitudinal variables explains the gender gap in voting for the Progress Party in Norway, turning it insignificant. This was not true for the other Radical Right parties in their study, which lead the authors to conclude that “[o]nly in Norway does the gender gap decrease by including the attitudinal items” (idem: 17).

### CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, it was argued and shown that the Radical Right gender gap must be understood in the light of the normative conflict surrounding these parties. While the anti-immigrant message of these parties resonates with many voters, the strong social norm against prejudice often prevents parties from fully mobilizing this electorate. Only parties that do not become trapped in conflicts over prejudice and discrimination can grow to substantial electoral significance (Ivarsflaten, 2006a). The parties that are
trapped become ‘toxic’, and their electoral potential is limited to the smaller group of voters who are weakly normatively motivated to control prejudice (Blinder et al., 2013).

This insight is relevant for explaining the Radical Right gender gap. I expected women to have generally internalized the social norm against prejudice more strongly than men. The analysis in this chapter showed that this indeed is the case: in all three countries under study, men scored substantially and significantly lower on the motivation to control prejudice (MCP) scales. Crucially, this difference is much more substantial and consistent than gender gaps in anti-immigrant attitudes reported in the present and other studies. It was hypothesized that motivational differences would explain the low popularity among women of ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties, and this was confirmed. The gender gap in voting for the British National Party and the Sweden Democrats – parties that were ‘toxic’ at the time of our study – disappears after controlling for men’s and women’s different scores on the motivation scale. The electorate of these parties is restricted to less normatively motivated voters – and these are more often male. A different pattern was found in the case of the Norwegian Progress Party, which can rely on its legacy as an anti-tax party as well as a more diverse policy portfolio, and did therefore not trigger the anti-prejudice norm to a similar extent. Such parties can draw both voters who are highly motivated to control prejudice and those who are not so.

While it is well-established that Radical Right parties’ image restricts the size of their potential electorate, this chapter further shows how. Association to (historic) fascism or violence does not deter all voters to the same extent. After all, negative bias against out-groups appears to be fairly broadly distributed, but is often kept in check by internalized norms to avoid acting based on prejudice. Such motivations, rather than ideology, thus constitute the natural boundary of the Radical Right potential – especially of the more ‘toxic’ parties.

An important implication of this chapter, but one that could not be fully tested, is that Radical Right parties that make a credible effort to distance themselves from extremism, racism, prejudice, and discrimination can experience a “feminization” of the their vote, while parties that become trapped in these conflicts are likely to exhibit a stable gender gap. This leads to the more general expectation that a party’s gender gap is a function of how extreme a party is. This will be investigated in the next chapter, in which I again turn to the supply side.
CHAPTER 5
DARING TO VOTE RIGHT:
PARTY REPUTATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters demonstrated that, across the board, men are less likely to be deterred by negative social cues (Chapter 3), but also less committed to avoid parties with a prejudiced image (Chapter 4). It follows from these findings that, on the supply side, Radical Right parties’ reputations matter for their gender gap. The logical next step is to investigate to what extent such reputations can explain interparty differences in the size of the gap. This final chapter turns to that task. By measuring social stigma as an aggregate of public opinion, I test whether stigmatized parties draw more male voters. This follows from the finding of Chapter 3 that men are less likely to be deterred by such cues. Following on the motivational findings of Chapter 4, I hypothesize that parties that are considered extreme will, too, attract more male voters.

In contrast to previous chapters, this chapter first “zooms out” to investigate a broader set of parties than the Radical Right alone. The reason is for this is that while reputations vary within the group of Radical Right parties, they can primarily be expected to distinguish Radical Right parties as a group from many – though certainly not all – other parties. This chapter therefore first takes a step back and investigates to what extent reputational factors explain variation in the gender balance for all parties, thus ensuring meaningful variation. Taking this broader selection of cases is in itself relevant in light of the literature, because little research has hitherto structurally investigated the role of stigma and extremity in determining the gender balance of parties. This chapter thus aims to put these novel explanations to a more general test. After establishing whether these factors matter, this chapter zooms in to see whether it explains further variation within the Radical Right.

Of course, this is not the first study to investigate why – in general – some parties are more popular among men, while others attract more women. As discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation, it is well-noted that before the 1970s, the Republican Party in the US attracted more female than male voters, while nowadays women are more likely to vote for the Democratic Party. Most other industrialized countries have,
too, experienced the emergence of this ‘modern gender gap’ in which women are more often left-leaning than men (Giger, 2009; Inglehart & Norris, 2000). Gender gaps are also likely to reflect gender differences in the distribution of policy preferences and saliency. Studies, including chapter 1, show that such differences indeed exist, although regarding many topics they are marginal. Still, despite these insights, a great deal of variation in the gender balance remains unexplained, both within and between party families. The reputational factors established to be relevant in earlier chapters can potentially provide such explanations.

This chapter builds on the literature on the demand side mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. A first starting point is that men are on average less sensitive to social cues than women (see Chapter 3; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dalton & Ortegren, 2011; Carlsson et al., 2010; Goldsmith et al., 2005). This leads to the hypothesis that men are less deterred from voting for socially stigmatized parties. Following the same mechanism, it would also follow that men would be more likely to vote for smaller parties, which are after all socially less endorsed. The second finding inspiring this chapter is that men are on average less motivated to control prejudice, more supportive of social hierarches, and less concerned with social harmony than women (see Chapter 4; Block, 1984; Eagly 1987; Johnson & Marini 1998; Gilligan 1982; Costa et al. 2001). As I will elaborate below, this results in the hypothesis that men are more likely to vote for extreme parties of either the Left or Right.

These hypotheses are tested on CSES-data on the electorates of 340 party-year combinations in 28 countries in elections between 1996 and 2011, relying on cross-level interactions between gender (at the individual level) and party characteristics (at the party level). I show that parties with a social stigma – i.e., parties that are disliked by large majorities of the public – indeed deter women more strongly than men. This confirms the relevance of the findings of Chapter 3 for actual voting. Furthermore, in line with the social harmony expectation, extreme parties too attract more male voters. At the same time, there is no robust support for the hypothesis that women are generally more likely to vote for larger parties. In a final step, I estimate how well these models explain variation in the gender gap for Radical Right parties specifically.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Few studies have been applied socio-psychological models to explain gender gaps in voting for a wide range of parties in various contexts. I aim to test which reputational party characteristics contribute to gender gaps in voting for all sorts of parties, and in particular Radical Right ones. I first discuss social cues: heuristics voters receive from their social context regarding the acceptability of a party, regardless of its conduct or ideological substance. I then turn to parties’ ideological extremity. Because these party characteristics are obviously correlated, this section finishes by discussing their interrelatedness.
Social cues

As discussed in Chapter 3, men and women have repeatedly been shown to differ in the extent to which they are sensitive of and responsive to signals from others (Bond & Smith, 1996; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dalton & Ortegren, 2011). To recall some of the evidence cited in that chapter, Goldsmith et al. (Goldsmith et al., 2005: 593) find that “women [have] higher scores on conformity than men”, and men have been found to be less likely to conform to majority opinions (Bond & Smith, 1996) as well as less responsive to social cues in the environment compared to other stimuli (Carlsson et al., 2010; Williams & Best, 1982). I therefore expect that a party which is considered socially highly unacceptable – in other words, a stigmatized party – will attract relatively more male than female voters. Reversely, a party that receives wide electoral support – and is thus broadly ‘endorsed’ – can be especially attractive for voters sensitive to social cues. In short, we expect the gender balance among the supporters of parties to be affected by their stigma and their size. Below, I will discuss these in turn.

Goffman (2009 [1963]: 12) defines stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”. He stresses that the characteristic responsible for the stigma is neither creditable nor discreditable in itself; rather, it is the reaction of others that ‘spoils’ the stigmatized person’s identity. As such, stigma is socially defined. While Goffman mainly refers to individuals, stigma can also be considered an attribute of entities such as parties. From the point of view of a voter, a party experiences stigma if it is regarded as unacceptable by a large proportion of the people that constitute the social context in which this voter lives.

As also discussed in Chapter 3, the Radical Right parties are a well-documented example of the existence of a social taboo. The findings of that chapter confirmed that, at least in the Swedish case, a strong social taboo exists with regard to the Radical Right, both at citizens’ primary groups and at the societal level. However, such stigma can be present for other parties as well; for instance, for Communist parties, or for centrist parties that face scandals or corruption charges. The presence of stigma can be expected to function as a strong social heuristic. Stigmatizing by fellow citizens is dissuasive for many voters, male as well as female. Yet, the evidence presented in Chapter 3 and the research cited in that chapter predicts stigma to be less deterring to men. Stigmatized parties are thus expected to have relatively few female voters.

H1 Men are more likely than women to vote for stigmatized parties, ceteris paribus.

In this chapter, stigma is studied as a societal characteristic – that is, as an aggregate of public opinion. Of course, stigma on a more local level – among primary groups – is also relevant. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to research the role of cues from primary group in a reliable cross-national way. At the same time, Chapter 3 showed that perceptions of local and societal-level stigma correlate strongly. It also suggested that the deterring effects of primary groups cues are even stronger than perceptions of acceptability on the general level, which means any results I do find are conservative about the total role played by social cues at all levels.
If the proposed mechanisms hold, one would also expect a reverse mechanism: parties that are widely endorsed could be expected to attract relatively more female than male voters, ceteris paribus. While I expect stigma to be the stronger social cue, parties’ electoral success is also hypothesized to provide a heuristic for voters. Of course, this outcome is not yet known at the time of the election, but voters can be expected to be able to estimate the support for a party through election polls and earlier electoral performance. If a party is supported by a large share of the electorate, this gives a signal of acceptability. Apparently, such a party has managed to bring together a broad range of citizens, which is appealing to voters who are sensitive to ‘social consensus’ information (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Reversely, a vote for a party that is hardly supported by other voters is unattractive to people who are sensitive to social cues. It is important to note that this reasoning is related to but not the same as the reasoning underlying the effect of stigma: theoretically and empirically, most small parties are not necessarily stigmatized. Again, male voters can be expected to be generally less likely to be influenced by this cue than female voters.

H2 Men are more likely than women to vote for smaller parties, ceteris paribus.

Possibly, the effect of size is non-linear: when parties are ‘large enough’, additional growth might become less important for the image of social acceptability.

Extremity
For the third hypothesis, I shift the emphasis from the social phenomenon of stigma – which might exist as a social reality regardless of political color – to the substantial reputation of parties. While empirically related to stigma, the mechanism here is theoretically different, as discussed in Chapter 4. That chapter found that women were more often “triggered” by the extreme nature of Radical Right parties to refrain from voting for them – except when parties have a ‘reputational shield’ and are not associated with racism or violence. This leads to the general expectation that the extremity of a party presents another heuristic in the process of decision making, which will affect the gender balance in parties’ support base. Mudde (2007: 116) made exactly this point when he noted that “men and women hold fairly similar views on all aspects of the populist radical right except extremism and violence, which are rejected far more by women than by men”. Mayer and Sineau (2002), too, argue that the extremist image of France’s National Front deters female voters. As discussed in Chapter 4, women are generally socialized into stronger feelings of connection to others, as well as more communal behavior (Gilligan, 1982). Studies have found (in 25 of the 26 cultures studied) gender differences in agreeableness, which reflects a general concern for social harmony (Costa Jr, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). Men have been found to be more accepting of hierarchical social dominance and its enforcement, even by means of violence (Sidanius et al., 2000).

For present purposes, a political party can be considered extreme to the extent that it aims to fundamentally revise the societal and political system – by overturning
class relations (extreme left) or pitching against minorities (extreme right); see Mudde (2007). To some extent, parties proposing such a disruption are inherently discordant in nature. Not only are their programs ideologically highly distinct from those of most other parties and voters, they also tend to contend that more or less incompatible cleavages exist between ethnic groups or economic classes. A related argument is that extreme parties have (historically) been connected to verbal or physical aggression. A certain amount of aggressive or revolutionary discourse is inherent to parties that wish to profoundly change the status quo. So, even though most parties at the extreme right or extreme left discard the use of physical violence, their discourse is often quite aggressive. If this is true, there should not only be a gap among extreme parties of the right, but also of the left. After all, extreme left parties have also been associated with revolutionary language and political violence (March & Mudde, 2005; Monaghan, 1999). Such reputations can be expected to be deterring to voters who are concerned about social harmony. Since this is across the board of more concern for women than for men, extreme parties are expected to attract fewer female voters.

H3 Men are more likely than women to vote for extreme parties, ceteris paribus.

Relations between the variables
In this chapter, the main focus lies with the main effects of these three party characteristics, and particularly on the question whether these exert a different effect on the likelihood of men and women to vote for a party. However, given that the three characteristics are likely to be related in various ways, I will also investigate patterns of mediation, spuriousness and conditionality. With regard to mediation, it is likely that extreme parties are more often stigmatized, and for that reason (even) more likely to draw relatively more male voters. However, it is also possible that any effect of stigma is spurious due to the fact that extreme parties would be more likely to be stigmatized. Furthermore, extreme parties are often rather small, so any effect of party size could be due to these party’s extremity. In short, it is necessary to investigate whether direct effects of stigma, size and extremity are also found in a multivariate model. Finally, interactions between the variables might also be present. While I refrain from formulating specific hypotheses regarding such interactions, they will be investigated after testing the direct and indirect effects.

DATA, DESIGN, AND OPERATIONALIZATION

The hypotheses are tested using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems modules 1, 2 and 3, which were collected in 1996-2001, 2001-2004 and 2006-2011 respectively during
post-election surveys in dozens of countries (CSES, 2003; CSES, 2007; CSES, 2013).\textsuperscript{33} This data was collected as a common module in a large number of post-election studies in countries around the world. This allows to test the hypothesis on the broadest number of cases possible. Because gender identities are to a large extent the product of socialization, their role will differ between cultural contexts. The analyses are therefore limited to the sphere of Western countries, which is the source of the research on gender differences cited above. This selection also ensures that the Left-Right scale, which forms the basis of one of the predictors and also functions as a control variable, is meaningful. Furthermore, only countries that are considered ‘free’ according to the Freedom House categorization are included. Finally, to ensure a focus on parties rather than candidates, the analyses are restricted to parliamentary rather than presidential elections. On the basis of this selection, the gender gap of parties can be investigated in 28 countries.\textsuperscript{34} In total, the data covers 65 elections and represents the views of 86,811 respondents. Descriptive statistics of the core variables can be found in Appendix N.

The main unit of analysis is the ‘voter-party dyad’ – that is, voters’ evaluation of each individual party – as the unit of analysis. The hypotheses are tested by investigating cross-level interaction effects between gender and party characteristics. This is the most thorough test of the hypotheses, because it allows to control for individual-level characteristics that may be correlated with gender. The robustness of the findings is assessed by also investigating aggregated data at the party-level. This way, the macro-level outcome of these individual-level processes can be assessed: which types of parties are dominated by male and which by female voters? This party-level analysis is presented in Appendix P and briefly discussed later in this chapter.

The dataset was transposed to a long format to create voter-party dyads ($n = 392,906$). Because the set of parties differs per country and election, a conditional logit regression is not feasible. Instead, logistic regressions are estimated with the vote choice (0 means ‘did not vote for the party’, 1 means ‘voted for the party’) as the dependent variable. The three hypotheses are tested by estimating interaction effects between a gender dummy (0 is female, 1 is male) and the party characteristics. The observations are nested in respondents and party-election dyads with random intercepts. The control variables in the individual level analysis are income (measured in quintiles), high education (defined as higher than secondary education) and ideological distance between the respondent and the party (calculated as the absolute distance between the position of the respondent and that of the respective party on a 0 to 10 Left-Right scale). These factors have been established as important predictors of vote choices. Unfortunately, no

\textsuperscript{33} All data, as well as full information on the collection procedures, are available at www.cses.org.

\textsuperscript{34} The final selection of countries for which all (control) variables were available in CSES, and which conform to all criteria, is the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
indicator of religiosity was available in several countries, so this factor is not included as a control variable in the main models.

While Left-Right distance can be expected to be negatively related to a vote for all parties, the effect of income and education obviously varies per party. So, for each combination of parties and years (340), two interaction effects would need to be included (one for each control variable). Since the inclusion of 680 interaction variables yields estimation problems, the y-hat procedure is used to create a ‘generic’ control variable (for more information, see Study 2 in Chapter 3).

In roughly 20 percent of the party-voter dyads the respondent did not locate the party on a Left-Right scale. In these cases, the distance towards the party is calculated on the basis of the interpolated median placement of the party by the rest of the respondents. In the case of missing values on the other control variables, the mean score of these variables within that country (and year) is used. As a robustness check, the main models were replicated using listwise deletion. This resulted in highly similar conclusion in terms of significance, effect size and coefficient size.

Operationalization of party characteristics
To find out whether reputations matters, measures are needed of parties’ social stigma and extremity. The former, as an aggregate of public opinion, can most directly be measured using voters’ views about parties. The latter is established on the basis of voters’ perceptions of parties’ ideological positions.35 Below, the measures are discussed in turn.

Parties’ social stigma is measured by the proportion of voters that ‘strongly dislikes’ the party (a score of 0 on an 11-point like-dislike scale, which ranges from 0 to 10). While assigning a low score (such as 2 or 3) indicates low likeability of a party, it can be argued that the extreme low point points to an aversion that goes further than mere non-support. If a substantial share of the respondents assigns such a score to a party, this party can be expected to be stigmatized. Indeed, an assessment of the scores suggests a high face validity of this measure. In many cases of parties that have been described in the literature as being stigmatized, more than half of the respondents assigns the absolutely lowest score – for instance, the National Front in France and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. This already suggests a strong relationship between social stigma and extremity. However, some Radical Right parties that are seen as relatively extreme are not stigmatized, especially those that were founded originally on a different platform than anti-immigration (Ivarsflaten 2008). This group includes the True Fins (10% extreme dislikes) and the Progress Party in Norway (13%). Furthermore, non-extreme parties can score high on social stigma as well, such as Italy’s scandal-ridden

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35 Ideally, this perceptional measure of extremity should be validated by expert surveys, party histories or a content analysis of media, but gathering such data for the wide number of cases this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Christian Democrats (49%). While it is obvious that stigmatized parties generally have fewer voters, this does not in itself affect the gender balance. Still, if a disproportionate part of those who ‘extremely dislike’ a party is female, the reasoning could become circular. To ascertain that this is not the case, the models will also be tested by measuring social stigma on the basis of male respondents only, which is exogenous to women’s vote choice.

Parties’ size is straightforwardly measured by the fraction of the respondents that voted for a party. Of course, this information is not yet available at the time of actual voting. However, it could be argued that voters are aware (through earlier elections and polls) which parties are likely to be well-supported and which parties are not.36

The measure of parties’ extremity relies on voters’ placement of parties on a Left-Right scale, of which only the extremes are labeled ‘left’ (at 0) and ‘right’ (at 10). This ‘wisdom of the crowds’ (aggregated placement by voters) has been shown to provide valid measurements of party positions (Markus, 1982; Van der Brug & Van der Eijk, 1999). Furthermore, the argument relies on the extreme image of parties, which can best be captured by asking voters themselves. While the specific meaning of the terms ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ varies by context and time, it accurately captures how centrist or extreme parties are according to respondents. A party is considered to be more extreme to the extent that it is located further away from the middle of the scale (5). This extremity is based on the interpolated median of all respondents’ answers, rather than the mean placement. This reduces the sensitivity of the measurement to respondents with outlying perceptions of the parties.37 Because the extremity measure is calculated as the absolute difference between 5 and the interpolated median, it captures both left- and right-wing extremism.

RESULTS: ZOOMING OUT

In this section I investigate the gender balance of all types of parties. The section starts by assessing whether the party characteristics discussed above affect men’s and women’s vote choices differently by modelling interactions between party characteristics and gender. That is followed by investigating whether the conclusions hold in a multivariate analysis controlling for the other party characteristics. Subsequently, the interaction between party characteristics is investigated. After that there follows a replication at the party level. In the subsequent section, I will zoom out to investigate the role of reputations in shaping the gender balance for different party families, and in particular the Radical Right one.

36 An alternative operationalization would be to use parties’ share of the votes at the previous election. However, this measure is not available for the new parties in the data.
37 Usually, the interpolated median and the mean values are approximately equal. However, in some instances the interpolated median is a better indicator of a party’s position than the mean value (Dahlberg, 2009).
At this point it is important to point out that, even if the hypotheses hold, very strong relationships are not likely to appear. Many country- and election-specific factors contribute to the gender balance of parties’ electorates in individual elections, which cannot be captured by an analysis across 65 elections. Still, precisely because the factors described above are difficult to isolate in individual cases, it is highly relevant to search for trends underlying a large number of parties and elections.

Interactions between party characteristics and gender
The first step is to estimate interactions between the individual party-level characteristics and gender, controlling for Left-Right distance as well as background characteristics (by means of the y-hat procedure). In the case of size, where the hypothesized effects might be non-linear, a squared term for the party characteristic was added. Because large tables with higher-level interactions are difficult to interpret, the results are presented visually in Figure 5.1a to Figure 5.1c. In each graph, the y-axis represents the marginal effect of the male dummy. Positive values thus indicate that men are overrepresented, negative values that women are. If the hypotheses hold, one should observe that women are overrepresented at one side of the spectrum (for instance, among non-extreme parties) and men at the other (i.e. extreme parties). The full regression tables are presented in Appendix O.

Figure 5.1 Marginal effect of gender for different values of the three party characteristics (all parties)
The graphs provide ample evidence for all three hypotheses. All three interactions between the party characteristic and the dummy for gender are significant ($p < 0.05$). Figure 5.1a shows that stigma affects men and women to a different extent. Parties that score high on the stigma measure are male-dominated, whereas non-stigmatized parties draw relatively many female voters. Male voters thus seem less discouraged by stigma than female voters, as expected by H1. This interaction is significant and substantive: additional calculations show that for highly stigmatized parties the predicted voting probability among men is more than 25% higher than among women.

It could be argued that this finding is a possible artifact of endogeneity. This would be the case if, compared to men, women assign particularly low like-dislike scores to parties they do not vote for. To rule out this possibility, we estimate an interaction using stigma calculated among male respondents only. This results in a marginally smaller ($b = 0.62$ instead of 0.74) but still sizeable and significant interaction term, strengthening confidence in the conclusion that the general level of stigma affects men and women differently. Although this finding is based on all parties, it strongly suggests that the Radical Right’s gender gap will at least partly be due to this party family’s relatively high level of stigma. This will be investigated in the next section.

The second predictor of the gender gap, the size of a party, also has a significant interaction with gender (Figure 5.1b). Men are more likely to vote for small parties; larger parties are generally more popular among women. While male overrepresentation seems to apply to only a small range of the scale, it is important to note that more than a third of the parties obtained fewer than 10% of the votes. H2 is thus also supported.

Figure 5.1c suggests that extremity, like stigma, is less deterring to male than to female voters. Men are more likely to vote for parties that score high on the extremity measure; centrist parties are dominated my female voters. The turning-point is situated around an extremity score of 2, which reflects a position on the Left Right scale either between 0 and 3 (left) or between 7 and 10 (right). So, even when controlling for Left-Right distances between voters and parties, men are more likely than women to support non-centrist parties. An additional analysis shows that the effect of extremity exists both on the Left and the Right side of the spectrum. On the basis of these bivariate relationships, H3 is thus also supported. Again, this is likely to be relevant in explaining the gender gap in voting for the ideologically relatively extreme Radical Right.

**Full model**

So far, the analysis suggest that men are overrepresented in the electorates of stigmatized, extreme and small parties. Of course, these party characteristics are themselves related to each other: extreme parties are generally small and they are at the same time more likely to be stigmatized than center parties, etcetera. I therefore turn to a full model including all party level characteristics and their interactions with gender. The full table is again sizeable and difficult to interpret, and therefore presented in Appendix O, while Figure 5.2 summarizes the results. For each party characteristic, the graph shows the 95% confidence intervals of the size of its interaction with gender, both with and without full controls for the other party characteristics. The party characteristics were
standardized; this makes a comparison of the size of the interactions meaningful. A positive interaction indicates that the effect of a characteristic is more positive among men compared to women; a negative interaction that the effect is more negative among men compared to women.

**Figure 5.2 Effect size of gender for various models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-0.1</th>
<th>-0.05</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.05</th>
<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social stigma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Individual-level controls only
- Full model

Note: In the case of size, the interaction with the squared term is insignificant and left out of the graph. Source: CSES

Figure 5.2 shows that, after controlling for the other party characteristics, stigma and extremity continue to interact with gender. The interaction with extremity is reduced substantially (and significantly) when controlling for the other characteristics. Additional analysis shows that this reduction is fully attributable to the inclusion of stigma. This means that the effect of extremity is strongly mediated by stigma: extreme parties are more often stigmatized, which is in turn less attractive to relatively many female voters. Extreme parties thus discourage female voters more strongly than men due to their extreme stance, but also due to the social undesirability of a vote for

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38 The coefficients were estimated using the y-standardization procedure (Winship & Mare, 1984), to make comparison between models possible; see Chapter 4.

39 In the analyses presented here, no weights were applied. Controversy exists whether weighting is feasible in a multilevel logistic context, and weights are not universally available in the CSES data. However, I checked whether the results were replicated when applying sampling weights. These results showed the same patterns of direction and significance, and were also highly similar in terms of effect sizes.
an extreme party. In terms of effect size, social stigma remains the strongest factor interacting with gender. The effect of stigma is thus independent and not attributable to the extremity of many stigmatized parties. Finally, Figure 5.2 shows that in a full model the effect of parties’ size is somewhat reduced and now only significant at the 10% level.

In addition, all three possible interactions between the predictors were estimated. None of these interactions turn out to be statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level. They are presented in Appendix Q.

Replication on the party-level
This chapter started with the question why some parties have more male than female voters, and vice versa. In this section I therefore analyze whether the conclusions are similar at the party-level – that is, when taking the parties as the unit of analysis, rather than the individual voter. The dependent variable in the party-level analysis is the share of male voters as a percentage of all voters for each party. Appendix P shows the full regression tables of these analyses, as well as more details on the methodology. The results are very similar to those at the individual level. Stigma and extremity have a significant effect on the gender balance: both are associated with an underrepresentation of women. Again, the effect of stigma on the gender balance is particularly strong. Party size is also related to a female-dominated electorate, but not significantly so.

Looking at the party level also allows an assessment of the relative explanatory power of the indicators. The extremity of a party explains roughly 2.5%, whereas stigma explains almost 10% of the variance in the gender balance of parties. While these percentages are not very large, the variance explained by – especially – stigma is impressive if considered in the light of the sizeable variation that can be expected due to country- and party-specific circumstances.

Robustness checks
To rule out the possibility that the results are affected by individual countries with high leverage, the main individual-level model was estimated 30 times, each time leaving out a different country. All interactions between gender and party characteristics remained significant in all regressions, except for – again – party size (which was not significant in regressions without either Austria, Denmark, or Finland). Again, it can be concluded that gender differences in the effects of stigma and extremity are robust.

RESULTS: ZOOMING IN ON THE RADICAL RIGHT
Now that the effect of stigma – and to a lesser extent extremity – has been established as substantial and robust, it is time to start “zooming in”. Below, I first discuss how well these factors explain the gender balance of various party families, including the Radical Right. I then turn to the latter party family specifically to investigate whether stigma and extremity explain variation in the gender gap within the Radical Right.
To provide an indication of how well these factors explain the gender gap of particular party families, I rely on a party family classification, by CSES experts, of a sizeable subsample of the parties in the CSES data. Unfortunately, Radical Right parties are not included as a separate category in the CSES classification. I therefore manually added a Radical Right category and labelled parties as such based on the literature (mainly Mudde, 2007). Because this category overlapped to a very large extent with the (smaller) category of “Nationalist” parties in the CSES scheme, the two classifications were merged under the label “Radical Right”.

Table 5.1 lists the party families in the first column. The second column describes the average size of the gender gap of parties that are member of these party families. The number shows the relative overrepresentation of men, expressed as the difference in percentage points from a 50% balance. A gap of ‘5%’ thus means 55% men, 45% women. By means of multivariate regressions on the party-level data, the remaining size of the gender gaps for the same parties is then calculated after controlling for individual-level or party-level characteristics. The average difference between these two estimates describes how well the gender gap for each specific party family is explained, expressed as a percentage reduction. This way, it is possible to assess whether stigma, extremity and size explain less, more, or just as much as classic ideological-demographic explanations of gender gaps.

Table 5.1 Analysis per party family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party family</th>
<th>Nominal Gap</th>
<th>% of gap explained by</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indiv. Level</td>
<td>Party level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stigma</td>
<td>Extremity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecology</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democratic</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian-Democratic</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The nominal gap shows the overrepresentation of men, expressed as difference in percentage points from a 50% balance. For instance, a 5% gap for Communist parties indicates that on average 55% of the voters are male and 45% is female. Gray numbers indicate that the gap is not (or no longer) significant at the 10% level. No explanation is provided for nominal gaps of 2% or smaller due to unreliability of estimates.

Table 5.1 shows, first of all, that the largest gender gaps can be found among Ecological (Green), Communist, Radical Right, and Agrarian parties. The latter three are male-dominated, while women are overrepresented among the supporters of Green parties. This is in line with the literature on the Greens (Dolezal, 2010; Mudde, 2007). Socialist, Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties also attract relatively many female
voters. The table shows that the Radical Right is not the only party family experiencing a substantial gender gap, though it is the largest one for a party family of its size (compared to Agrarian or Communist parties), while others are not as universally and consistently present (given the gradual emergence of the Green gender gap).

The next column shows the extent to which each gap can be explained by individual-level characteristics: Left-Right distance, self-perceived class, level of education, and age. It shows that such variables can account for a sizeable part of most gaps, but far from the whole of it. Much remains unexplained of the largest gaps, above all of the gap in voting for Communists and Christian Democrats.

The remaining columns show how well the three party-level factors discussed in this chapter explain the gaps. They were calculated based using the same method of calculating gaps and reductions, but this time on the basis of the party-level data. It turns out that social stigma explains about a third of the gap in voting for both Communist and Radical Right parties. Extremity explains part of these gaps, too. In combination with size, the party-level variables explain 59% and 33% of the overrepresentation of men in the electorate of Communist and Radical Right parties, respectively. That is remarkably sizeable, and at any rate larger than the explanation provided by a range of individual-level variables. Stigma and the other factors explain the gap in voting for other party families to a smaller extent, but their explanation is not restricted to Communist and Radical Right parties. The explanatory power of stigma and extremity is thus non-trivial for several party families and very large for some.

In addition, the three variables can still explain the gender balance of individual parties even when they do not do so at the aggregated gap level. This is especially likely for more heterogeneous party groups.

Explaining gaps within the Radical Right

In this final section, I fully “zoom in” by returning to the Radical Right. Can variation in stigma and extremity explain differences in vote choices for individual Radical Right parties? To find out, I repeat the individual-level analysis on the subset of 23 party-election combinations of the Radical Right category in the CSES dataset. The full table is presented in Appendix R.

This yields evidence that the mechanisms at work at large also determine voting for Radical Right parties specifically. There is a significant interaction ($p = 0.00$) between stigma and gender, as well as between extremity and gender. The effects of stigma are, again, particularly strong. The level of stigma of a Radical Right party does not affect the

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40 Specifically, for each party family, voting was predicted, first, by gender, and second, by gender and the controls (by means of a y-hat procedure). The gender gap in both models, as well as its reduction after controlling, was then calculated in the same way as for the other columns.

41 A larger part (23%) of the gap in voting for the Christian-Democrats can be explained by also controlling for religiosity. However, because this variable is not included in one-third of the CSES cases, we left it out in the general analysis.
probability of voting for it among men, while it does deter women. When parties have a low level of stigma (10%), they are predicted to have no gender gap at all; when the stigma is large (50%), the model predicts men to be twice as likely to vote for a party. This shows that stigma not only explains the aggregate gender gap of the Radical Right as a party family, but also further predicts differences between such parties. There is a significant interaction between gender and extremity: the Radical Right’s extremity slightly deters women, while it has a positive effect among men ($p = 0.00$). Size, too, seems to affect the gender balance: larger parties obviously draw more voters, but more clearly so among women. In short, those gendered patterns observed among all parties are also at work explaining men’s and women’s vote choices for Radical Right parties specifically.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I investigated the role of the supply side in shaping the gender gap based on the socio-psychological model. In doing so, this chapter aimed not only at explaining the gender gap in voting for the Radical Right, but also at broadening our understanding of the gender balance of the electorates of all parties. After all, research has so far mostly provided explanations for individual parties and party families, or mapped very broad trends such as women’s general move towards the political left in industrialized countries. The novel explanation proposed in this chapter applies to parties across different countries and can account for variation between party families.

This chapter started from the two mechanisms discerned in the previous two chapters. The finding that men are less likely to incorporate cues from their social context when making a decision (Chapter 3) led to the hypothesis that they are more likely to vote for stigmatized and small parties. The finding that women are more negatively triggered by a prejudiced reputation (Chapter 4) inspired the expectation that they are less likely to vote for extreme parties in general.

An analysis of 340 party-election combinations in 28 countries provides strong evidence that the hypothesized mechanisms are at work in shaping the gender balance for many parties. Even when controlling for ideological distance and background variables, the level of social stigma attached to a party was found to deter female voters much more strongly than male ones. The more a party is stigmatized, the smaller its relative share of female voters becomes. Similarly, the analysis yielded some evidence that smaller parties are less attractive for female voters, although this result is less robust. Furthermore, and in line with the social harmony mechanism, extreme parties – both of the Left and the Right – were found to draw more male voters than moderate parties do, even when controlling for voters’ own Left–Right positions. At the same time, this effect is for a large part indirect, due to the higher stigma of most extreme parties. In other words, the explanation for the relatively low support for extreme parties among women partly reflects the low social desirability of such an extreme vote – a social fact.

In short, the analyses show that, even across a very broad sample of over a hundred parties in dozens of countries, parties’ stigma and extremity can predict a sizeable part
of the variance in the gender balance of their voters. Nevertheless, these very general models explained by no means all of the variance in men’s and women’s vote choices. This suggests that other mechanisms exist that shape the gender balance but which were not taken into account. This chapter might therefore inspire further research into different gendered (social) explanations of voting employing the same methodology. Conceivably, sensitivity to social cues and social harmony is also associated with class, age, cultural background and many other characteristics related to voting. As a result, it is likely to shape parties’ electorates in more ways.
CONCLUSIONS

It has now been more than twenty years since the gender gap in voting for the Radical Right was documented by Betz (1994). Existing studies provide valuable insights but leave many instances of this most consistent and universal gap in contemporary democracies unexplained. The aim of this dissertation has been to systematically investigate the causes of the gender gap, in a range of European countries, from the point of view of various models of voting behavior. Below, I first summarize the findings of the individual chapters. After that, I draw conclusions about the origin of the gender gap in Radical Right voting. I conclude by discussing several broader implications of these findings.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER FINDINGS

A first structuring element of this dissertation consisted of three models of voting. The dissertation started out, in Part I, with investigating the two models that are most dominant in explaining Radical Right voting: a socio-structural and attitudinal one. Based on these models, Chapter 1 established the electoral demand for the Radical Right among men and women using data on the electorates in 16 Western and Eastern European countries. In Chapter 2, I subsequently incorporated the supply side by including expert survey measures of Radical Right parties’ positions on various policy areas.

These chapters yielded evidence for the assertion that the gender gap reflects socio-structural differences between men and women. On average, gender differences in (mainly) occupational position explain part of the gap. Especially, the large share of public sector workers among women turned out to explain why many of them are less supportive of the Radical Right. The finding that job type matters dovetails with Givens (2004). By contrast, gender differences in unemployment, self-perceived class and levels of education contribute less. At the same time, the overall relevance of socio-structural factors masks substantial differences between countries. In some countries – especially in Central-Eastern Europe, but also in several Western cases – they contribute to the gap to a much larger extent.

Chapter 2 showed why. I demonstrated that parties that take a more left-leaning position on socio-economic issues – mostly in the North and East of Europe – have a much larger gender gap than parties that are (or were) more neoliberal in their outlook, such as Northern League (IT), or the National Front (F) in its earlier years. The reason for this appears to be the following. Socio-economically left-wing (‘new winning formula’) Radical Right parties draw more heavily on economically vulnerable working class voters than their more neoliberal counterparts. These groups – mostly private sector unskilled and service workers – (still) consist predominantly of men. As a result, the gender gap mirrors the extent of ‘proletarianization’ (Betz, 1994) of parties.
The attitudinal model fares less well in explaining the gender gap. I found little evidence for the assertion that women are less likely to agree with the Radical Right's stances. In many countries, I found men to be on average slightly less nativist and authoritarian than women – and in countries where they are not, the differences are small. This is further underlined by the finding that parties with stronger anti-immigration positions do not have larger gender gaps. Neither does the size of the gender gap depend on parties' stance on emancipatory issues, which refutes the claim that many women would dislike the Radical Right's alleged sexist outlook.

The evidence for a gendered “protest vote” is mixed. Discontent with democracy is not higher among men. However, such discontent is a more important factor in determining men's choice for the Radical Right. This could reflect gender differences in internal efficacy, although a preliminary analysis yielded no evidence for this contention. That the appeal of a “protest vote” is higher among men, in spite of equal levels of discontent, became clear by looking at conditionality: the different extent to which factors explain voting among men and women (Howell and Day, 2000) – a methodological approach often overlooked. I show that, in fact, most established attitudinal predictors of Radical Right voting predict men's vote better than women's. This amplifies the puzzle guiding this dissertation: women are less likely to vote for the Radical Right even if they agree.

All in all, these conventional models of vote choices leave a substantial part of the gap unexplained. In Part II, I turned to a third model of voting: a socio-psychological one. In Chapter 3, I investigated whether women are more strongly deterred by negative social cues about Radical Right parties. Data from new survey measures, collected among a large sample of Swedish citizens, shows that women are more likely to perceive a vote for the Sweden Democrats as socially highly unacceptable. Furthermore, perceptions of acceptability play a larger role in shaping women's vote choices than in men's. This is further confirmed by an experiment in which the social cue associated with a Radical Right and a Green party was manipulated. Denouncement of a Radical Right party by fellow respondents reduced the probability of female respondents to vote for that party, while it did not do so among men. By contrast, endorsement of the Radical Right by fellow participants moved women's propensity to vote for the party closer to men's. All in all, it seems that men are less deterred to vote for a party which is portrayed by others as a party "one does not vote for”.

The impact of this mechanism on electoral outcomes was further explored in Chapter 5. Parties – Radical Right or otherwise – that are extremely disliked by large parts of the electorate draw consistently more male than female voters. I show that such social stigma is a significant predictor of the share of male voters among the electorates of dozens of parties, of all political colors, in 30 countries. This is true even when controlling for voters' own ideological position. Furthermore, I show that also within the Radical Right party family the most strongly stigmatized parties have the largest gender gap.

At the same time, the stigma story is nuanced. The experiment of Chapter 3 showed that social denouncement deterred women from voting for a Radical Right party, but not from voting for a Green party. This suggests that social cues are interpreted in the light of the substantial program and conduct of parties. This is further elaborated in
Chapter 4. In it, the guiding hypothesis is that the gap results from differences between men’s and women’s motivation (i.e., latent commitment) to avoid prejudice. It is relevant to again quote Ivarsflaten (2006: 6), who notes that, rather than “the message itself, [it is] the credibility of the actor who delivers it [that] makes the crucial difference”. While the anti-immigrant message of Radical Right parties resonates with many voters, many of these parties also raise normative concerns about discrimination and prejudice, due to fascist or extremist legacies, or contemporary rhetoric and symbols. When parties are trapped in conflicts about discrimination and prejudice, internalized motivations to avoid prejudice can prevent voters from voting for such parties, even if they agree with their programs (Blinder et al., 2010). In all three countries studied in this chapter, men scored substantially and significantly lower on the motivation to control prejudice (MCP) scales. Crucially, this difference is much more substantial and consistent than gender gaps in anti-immigrant attitudes. The analysis showed that motivational differences explain why ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties are particularly unpopular among women.

The gender gap in voting for the British National Party and the Sweden Democrats – parties that lacked a ‘reputational shield’ (Ivarsflaten, 2006a) at the time of data collection – disappears after controlling for men’s and women’s different scores on the motivation scale. The electorate of controversial Radical Right parties thus seems restricted to less normatively motivated voters – and these are more often male. By contrast, motivational differences did not create a gender gap among the electorate of the Progress Party in Norway, which is less controversial due to its origins as an anti-tax party and a broader program – in short, its ‘reputational shield’ (Ivarsflaten 2006).

THE GAP AND ITS ORIGINS: MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The gender gap in Radical Right voting is indeed a “complex and intriguing puzzle” (Betz, 1994: 146). However, the preceding chapters provide some insights about its origins. The most important conclusion is the relevance of socio-psychological factors. Two other conclusions are the substantial but conditional impact of socio-structural factors, as well as the minor relevance of differences in men’s and women’s policy preferences. Below, I discuss these three conclusions in the order of their appearance in this dissertation. After that, I build on these conclusions by proposing a classification of parties.

A first conclusion is that men and women’s socio-structural positions (still) contribute to the gap. Apparently, economic roles often found among men are more likely to involve the kind of experiences that foster the values and interests the Radical Right caters to. Somewhat stereotypically, a woman working part-time in the public sector has both a different self-interest and everyday experience than a man having a blue-collar private sector job. This has substantial consequences for these persons’ worldview and political allegiance. Women with blue-collar jobs are also likely to be attracted to the Radical
Conclusions

Right, but still consistently less than men. Socio-structural factors are part of the story, but not the whole story.

In the case of the Radical Right gender gap, the relevance of class has been discarded because earlier scholarly evidence has been mixed (see Coffé, 2012). Scholars found evidence for a socio-structurally induced gender gap in some cases but not in others. I show that these mixed findings in the previous literature become understandable when taking differences at the supply side into account. Radical Right parties differ in their socio-economic worldview and, relatedly, do not all cater to ‘losers of globalization’ to the same extent. Where parties adopt a socio-economically left-leaning ‘new winning formula’ of welfare chauvinism, their ‘proletarianization’ is larger. This, in turn, increases their gender gap. If anything, the development towards a ‘new winning formula’ is likely to continue. Many voters can be found supporting such policies (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009), and a political program that promises protection from the effects of globalization in both an economic and cultural sense fits the emergence of a new axis of political competition (Azmanova, 2011; Kriesi et al., 2008). If Radical Right parties indeed increasingly adapt to this formula, their level of ‘proletarianization’, and thus the size of their gender gap, is likely to grow rather than shrink.

An important side note is that, rather than being fully opposed to a ‘substantive’ vote, class and attitudes occupy different stages in the funnel of causality. Men’s and women’s socio-economic roles are translated into gendered political behavior because of the different experiences and interests involved with these roles. Rather than being ‘automatically’ translated into a class vote, the political expression of such experiences and interests must somehow be mediated by voters’ views on societal issues. For instance, socio-structural theories assume that one of the reasons working class voters are attracted to the Radical Right because they experience more economic and cultural competition from immigrants. This makes the second core finding all the more salient: this dissertation found no consistent, universal or substantial gender difference in support for anti-immigration policies or other core Radical Right issues. This is true for nativism, authoritarianism and discontent with political elites. It follows from this that the gender gap for welfare chauvinist parties reflects a specific combination of nativism and precarious economic situation among a group of ‘working class authoritarian’ men. It confirms that this particular combination of cultural and economic anxiety provides especially fertile ground for electoral mobilization (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009).

The third core finding is that Radical Right parties’ reputations matter. While the anti-immigrant message resonates as strongly with men as with women, women are more likely to stay away from the messenger, especially if that messenger is framed as unacceptable or morally contentious. The evidence in this dissertation would support Johnson and Marini’s (1998: 248) notion of a “greater sense of interdependence and connection to others” among women, who are “more interpersonally oriented, while men are more individualistic and instrumental”. I show that women are more strongly deterred by the stigma that surrounds Radical Right parties. They perceive these parties as less socially acceptable than men do, and perceptions of acceptability play a larger role in their vote choices. Indeed, when in the experiment a Radical Right party was socially
endorsed, the share of women willing to vote for it becomes closer to the share among men. The supply side analysis confirmed that this is generally true for all parties, not only Radical Right ones. This fits the view of men as being more individualistic when making choices (Gilligan, 1982).

However, while gender differences in sensitivity to social cues matter, this does not mean that women more often simply copy all social cues. Rather, social signals are interpreted in the context of existing values and beliefs, and reinforce these. This is where a related mechanism comes into play: men are generally less deterred by many Radical Right parties’ continuing association with illegitimate prejudice. I show that women are across the board more motivated to avoid such prejudice, most likely because the societal norm against prejudice resonates with their abovementioned stronger interpersonal orientations. When confronted with a party that ‘triggers’ the activation of such latent motivations through symbols or associations, women are more likely to be deterred. For many Radical Right parties, their continuing association with extremism constitutes such a trigger (Blinder et al., 2013), while other parties, for instance the Alpine ones, have been more successful in fencing off such associations, and in doing so have reduced their gender gap. This is, therefore, another instance in which taking the supply side into account is crucial. In general, more extreme parties – of the Left or Right – are more popular among male voters.

Of course, social stigma and concerns over prejudice are closely related. While not all parties with a social stigma are associated with prejudice, most openly prejudiced parties will experience a social stigma. This social stigmatization – the signal that this is a party “one does not vote for” – is likely to signal to normatively motivated voters that norms are at stake. This is where the two reputational mechanisms become mutually reinforcing. Indeed, an analysis of the supply side confirmed that men are more likely to vote for parties that are either socially stigmatized or extreme, but also that these two conditions often go together.

In short, from a socio-psychological point of view, the gender gap reflects relatively stronger doubts, among women, about the Radical Right’s legitimacy, as well as the social stigma that surrounds parties without strong ‘reputational shields’. It follows from this that if a non-controversial Radical Right party mobilizes on an equally anti-immigrant platform, without triggering the motivations mentioned above, no gender gap needs to occur. Indeed, several modern(ized) parties have been able to fend off accusations of racism and extremism, while remaining a nativist policy platform. As a result, they attract a broader range of voters (m/f) who are more motivated to control prejudice. If parties manage to further “de-demonize”, as Marine le Pen labels her efforts to increase legitimacy and disconnect from old racist elements in her party, the electorates of such parties are likely to become more gender-equal.

A tale of two gaps

Taken together, these conclusions suggest that the Radical Right experiences two gender gaps of a rather separate origin. One is a reputational gap, depending on the strength of parties’ reputational shield. The other is a class gap, largely depending on
the content of parties’ socio-economic ideology. A party might experience one of these, both of these, or even none of these. While both dimensions are continuous rather than dichotomous, most parties can be roughly categorized as belonging to one of the four types of Table C.1.42

Because protectionism and a weak shield are expected to result in a gender gap, the largest gap can be expected when these factors come together (category III). Conversely, no gap is expected among economically more laissez-faire parties with a strong shield (category IV). Moderate gaps are expected among parties that have only one of the gap-inducing attributes (I and II). Below, I discuss the categories in turn. I illustrate the size of parties’ gender gaps based on the data of Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.

Table C.1 Categorization of Radical Right parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reputational shield</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Protectionist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaker</td>
<td>Anti-statist</td>
<td>III 805 Radical Right 83% male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger</td>
<td>Protectionist</td>
<td>IV Neoliberal Populist 48% male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: gap size per category is the average gap for the examples mentioned in the text below based on Table 1.1.

Parties in category I are characterized by the lack of a reputational shield and an socio-economically anti-statist ideology. Although one might categorize many early Radical Right parties – for instance, the National Front (France) in the 1980s – in this category, few (successful) parties in Europe presently fit this category very well. No figures about the gender gap can be presented about this category.

The completely opposite category II consists of parties that have a convincing reputational shield and present themselves as pro-welfare ‘protectors against globalization’. These are modernized (or modernizing) Radical Right parties of the ‘new winning formula’ type. Such parties successfully mobilize on a promise of protection against economic and cultural threats of globalization, proposing welfare chauvinist policies, and manage to get substantial numbers of votes and sometimes enter government coalitions. They are in competition with Social Democrats as well as the mainstream Right and have a relatively ‘proletarianized’ electorate. These parties have a specific gender gap because men are often found in the sort of precarious economic situation that can be found in their electorates. Examples of parties that fit this

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42 I use the term ’reputational shield’ in a somewhat broader fashion than Ivarsflaten (2006), who mainly focuses on the background of parties: what were they founded for? I refer, more generally, to the extent to which parties manage to fend off associations with extremism or racism.
Conclusions

A category would be the Danish People’s Party and the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands). Indeed, these parties have substantial but moderate gaps – on average, 62 women for every 100 men. France’s National Front also appears to be moving in this category, and recent studies indeed suggest that this party’s gender gap is narrowing (Mayer, 2013; Mayer, 2015).

Parties in category III combine a weak reputational shield with a socio-economically left-leaning profile. Parties close to this type can predominantly be found in countries in East-Central Europe, where Radical Right parties “are more antiliberal and protectionist than their brethren in the West” (Mudde, 2007: 129). Their socio-economic profile of course differs per country and is not always coherent, but these parties’ “mix of traditional nationalism and state socialism” (idem: 356) is different from the early West-European Radical Right tradition. Indeed, parties in CEE countries “tend to receive more support from the working class than Radical Right parties in Western Europe” (Van der Brug et al. 2013: 70). Their ‘toxic’ reputation reflects their relatively extreme character: they are often irredentist and compete with an already rather nationalist mainstream (Minkenberg, 2002). Such parties can be expected to have very large gaps, given their appeal to less normatively motivated voters and their ‘proletarianized’ electorate. Examples are Greater Romania Party, Jobbik (Hungary) and Attack (Bulgaria), and, indeed, these gaps of these two parties are among the most substantial of all: on average only 52 women for every 100 men. A party from outside the CEE region for which data is available and that could be considered to (largely) fit this combination of a weak reputational shield and a strong appeal to working class voters are the pre-2010 Sweden Democrats, who present themselves as defenders of the “folkhem” of the welfare state but which were also experiencing strong denouncement. This party, too, has an extraordinary large gap: 20 women for every 100 men. At the same time, their seemingly normalization within the Swedish political field after their electoral breakthrough of 2010 is seemingly moving this party closer Scandinavian neighbors in category II.

Parties in category IV, finally, have a convincing reputational shield without fully adopting the ‘new winning formula’, rather staying relatively close to their laissez-faire background. Parties that fit this category are the Swiss People’s Party and to some extent also the Freedom Party in Austria (Mudde, 2007: 123). Both parties obtain their reputational shields from their origins in the mainstream right. Northern League (Italy) could also be considered fitting in this category. It obtained a reputational shield from being founded not for anti-immigrant but anti-Rome purposes, and did not experience the cordon sanitaire of the co-regionalists of Flemish Interest (Belgium). At the same time, the Alpine parties’ economically more liberal outlook provides them with a relatively broad electorate in socio-economic terms. Table 1.1 provides no estimates for the size of the gap for Swiss People’s Party, but the gaps for Freedom Party and Northern League are indeed non-substantial (97 women for every 100 Freedom Party men) and absent (113 women for every 100 Northern League men).

In short, the previous chapters provide evidence for two different core mechanisms to be at work to shape gender gaps: the overrepresentation of men among the electorate of relative ‘proletarianized’ parties, and a stronger sensitivity of women concerning
the lack of a reputational shield. These mechanisms could be combined to conceive of a categorization of parties that provides a plausible division of subfamilies of the Radical Right. These categories subsequently fare well in explaining gender gap patterns: the largest gaps are found among parties that are both ‘proletarianized’ and extremist, while the gap is almost absent for broad-appeal parties with a reputational shield.

IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Below, I discuss some implications of these findings for understanding and studying gender, social cues, and the Radical Right.

Gender gaps
A first set of implications concerns our understanding of gender gaps more generally. This dissertation confirmed that socio-structural differences continue to shape differences in men’s and women’s vote choices. This is true in spite of the alleged decline of class voting, and notwithstanding an ongoing development towards a (relatively) less gender-stratified economy. Ongoing differences in men’s and women’s roles inside (or their position outside) the labor market thus still shape their political choices in all sorts of contexts (Bergh, 2007). Another relevant finding is that men and women – at least with regard to the cases studied in this dissertation – were found to agree (on average) on a range of relevant concrete issues. While some aggregated differences exist, they were not substantial enough to clearly discern ‘the’ male and ‘the’ female policy position. At the same time, the relevance of many issues for vote choices differed between men and women. This suggests that ideological gender differences might be most pronounced in terms of saliency (Howell & Day, 2000; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). An important task in this respect is to measure saliency as directly as possible. After all, in this dissertation, the presence of interactions between gender and immigrant attitudes reflected more than just differences in issue saliency; rather, it pointed to the existence of overriding considerations.

While differences in attitudes were minor, evidence does point to a ‘different voice’ (Gilligan 1982) on a more fundamental level. The findings in this dissertation are in line with a “greater orientation [among women] toward relationships and interdependence, [implying] a more contextual mode of judgment and a different moral understanding” (idem: 22). I show that aversion to stigma and extremity plays an important role in shaping the gender balance of all sorts of parties around the world. This finding is the first evidence of a consistent and universal role played by these factors. Further research along this lines can help to arrive at a more extensive understanding of their impact.

While the novel mechanisms discussed in this dissertation could well explain the overrepresentation of men among – especially but not only – Radical Right and Communist parties, they seem less suited to explain why certain parties’ electorates experience an underrepresentation of men. This is a third point: the mere absence of stigma or the lack of a prejudiced reputation can only to a limited extend explain why, say, Green parties attract so relatively many female voters. After all, this controversial
aspect is absent for many more parties. The previous chapters suggest two preliminary explanations that can be explored in further research.

The most obvious one concerns the socio-economic background of the electorate of female-dominated parties. At least in the case of Green parties, their electorates have been found to be in many respects the mirror image of those of Radical Right parties (Oesch 2008). A second explanation might lie in the ‘other side of the same coin’ of the interpersonal orientation mechanisms discussed in this dissertation. Turning that argument around, one would predict an overrepresentation of women among parties that have an inclusive reputation. This goes beyond merely proposing pro-welfare or multiculturalist policies – gender gaps in such policy preferences do not seem to be very substantial (and, at any rate, the pro-welfare policies proposed by some Radical Right parties did not close the gender gap). Again, it might be relevant to separate the messenger from the message. Future research could focus on investigating whether and how ‘Frauenparteien’ (Mudde, 2007: 116) share an outlook and conduct alluring to preferences for social harmony, as opposed to endorsing social hierarchies (Sidanius et al., 2000).

Social cues and voting
Secondly, this dissertation shows that studies of political behavior can greatly benefit from acknowledging that “a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially” (Berelson et al., 1964). Conventional models of individual-level voting behavior risk overlooking relevant social elements that go into voters’ decision. I showed that studying the social context of voting – both intimate and general – provided insights in voting behavior that were puzzling from the point of view of existing models of party choice.

At the same time, scholars aiming to study such social aspects of political behavior invariably bump into methodological problems (Zuckerman 2009). In this dissertation, I have shown that studying the effects of social cues is possible, even in large-N contexts. First, the experimental design of Chapter 3 proved able to plausibly uncover a social cue mechanism at the individual level. If the weak bond respondents will feel towards fellow survey-takers is enough to observe social cueing, it is likely that its influence is even more powerful in ‘real’ social contexts. Furthermore, these conclusions were cross-validated by direct survey questions about reputations, which shows that the latter can to some extent grasp the relevant mechanisms when experimental designs are not feasible. These methods can be used to further investigate which groups other than women are relatively sensitive to social cues.

Second, the comparative-aggregated analysis of Chapter 5 also enabled the observation of the effects of stigma by virtue of comparing a large number of cases. By aggregating reputations at the level of the polity as a whole, cross-level interactions with individual characteristics can be used to observe different susceptibilities to such reputations while avoiding the endogeneity issues discussed above. This approach can also be used on lower levels of aggregations, like schools, municipalities, or social circles.
Radical Right

A final set of implications concerns our understanding of Radical Right parties and their voters. First, this dissertation confirms that the supply side matters when studying the electorates of parties. The selection of cases will determine which factors will prove most relevant in predicting vote choices. This became most clear with regard to parties’ socio-economic ideology. Parties may or may not adopt the ‘new winning formula’ of pro-welfare nativism. This is, however, more than window-dressing. The chapter shows that such shifts have substantive implications for the composition of the electorate, in terms of class and gender.

However, a second aspects of parties’ “supply” cannot be controlled so easily. Radical Right parties’ reputations are a ‘sticky’ feature that constrains their electoral potential among various groups. While it is well-known that Radical Right parties’ legitimacy strongly determines their ability to achieve electoral success (Ignazi, 2005, Cole, 2005, Ivarsflaten, 2006; Bos and Van der Brug, 2010), I show how reputations shape the size and composition of parties’ electorate. After all, negative bias against out-groups appears to be fairly broadly distributed, but is often kept in check by internalized norms to avoid acting based on prejudice (Blinder et al. 2010). Such motivations, rather than issue positions on immigration, thus constitute the natural boundary of the Radical Right potential – especially of the more ‘toxic’ parties. This can help to understand the weak correlation between the extent of anti-immigrant public opinion and Radical Right success (Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2005). Investigating which groups other than women are generally more motivated to control prejudice will lead to a better understanding of the Radical Right electorate than studying the distribution of restrictionist immigration attitudes alone. At the same time, the relevance of such motivations is conditional on the strength of parties’ reputational shield. If parties can prevent associations with prejudice, their potential electorate is much broader. Parties can make credible attempts at increasing their perceived legitimacy, as Marine le Pen aims with her project of dédiabolisation. At the same time, reputations are usually sticky (Ivarsflaten, 2006) and changes in perceived legitimacy will in all likelihood happen gradually, if at all.

The previous points have consequences for how we model Radical Right voting. Mudde (2007: 225) noted that “[o]ne of the fundamental problems of most empirical studies on the electoral support of populist radical right parties is the underlying assumption of one homogeneous electorate.” Finding ‘the’ Radical Right voter is problematic in the obvious sense that vote models are always probabilistic and incomplete. However, the profile of ‘the’ voter also differs between (subgroups of) Radical Right parties. Given the two ways – reputational and ideological – in which I found the supply side to matter, the categorization along the lines proposed in Table C.1 might be a way forward to better explain patterns of voting behavior among different members of the Radical Right party family. Incorporating interactions between supply and demand is not only the most fruitful way forward to increase the quality of our models of Radical Right voting, but also of voting in general.
In short, greater consideration of this interaction between supply and demand, and one which does justice to the varying set of criteria that go into the vote choice equation for different voters (m/f), might hopefully solve more ‘complex and intriguing puzzles’.
Graph 1  Descriptives of variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>50.29</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Church visiting</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Public sector worker</td>
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<td>Pro-Redistribution</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Left-Right distance to party</td>
<td>12669</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EES 2009
Graph 2  Distribution of (a) LR position and (b) propensity to vote (in %)
Appendix B  Replication on CSES data

Table 1  Mediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Size of female coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender only</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic variables (education, unemployment, public sector worker)</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right position</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right distance</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: dependent variable is party sympathy
Source: CSES

Table 2  Moderation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Size of effect</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.17 ns</td>
<td>0.28 ns</td>
<td></td>
<td>significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Satisfaction democracy</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.04 ns</td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left-Right position</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td>significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: dependent variable is party sympathy
Source: CSES
Appendix C  Replication on actual vote intention

Table 1  Mediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gender only</th>
<th>Age and Religion</th>
<th>Socio-economic characteristics</th>
<th>Discontent model</th>
<th>Policy preference</th>
<th>Left-Right position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
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<td>-0.49</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
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<td>Public sector worker</td>
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<td>Pro-Intervention in Economy</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right position</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right distance</td>
<td>-3.65</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent would vote for a Radical Right party if there were elections tomorrow.

Source: EES 2009

Table 2  Moderation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effect among men</th>
<th>Effect among women</th>
<th>p-value of difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower educated</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower classes</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontent</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right position</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right distance</td>
<td>-3.89</td>
<td>-3.36</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: EES 2009
### Table 1  Regression (random effects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (primary groups)</td>
<td>$0.256^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>$-0.949^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.227$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (primary groups) X</td>
<td>$0.101^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls (Y-hat)</td>
<td>$10.658^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.600)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (in general)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.115^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (in general) X</td>
<td>$0.020$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>$-4.207^{***}$</td>
<td>$-3.090^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>20951</td>
<td>20719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Citizen Panel Sweden

### Table 2  Regression (fixed effects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (primary groups)</td>
<td>$0.397^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (primary groups) X</td>
<td>$0.144^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (in general)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.204^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability (in general) X</td>
<td>$0.026$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17803</td>
<td>17444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Citizen Panel Sweden
## Appendix E Description of experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Policy proposals (English)</th>
<th>Likes</th>
<th>Neutrals</th>
<th>Dislikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>1. Income differences in Sweden are too high. To decrease these differences, the poorest citizens should pay fewer taxes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. To provide young people with a better future, the state should invest more money in education.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Military expenditure should be decreased.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The state budget can be reduced by being tougher on fraud with social benefits.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>2. A larger part of the Swedish health care should be produced in the private sector.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Employer contributions should be lowered in order to reduce youth unemployment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> (Radical Right)</td>
<td>1. The European Union is currently way too intrusive in our society. Powers should return from Brussels to Sweden.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. More money should be made available for care for the elderly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Immigration from non-Western countries should be halted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> (Green)</td>
<td>1. The environment should be protected by raising taxes on polluting firms, products and cars.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The state should do more to assure full freedom of the internet.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Referendums should be held about important legislation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: actual number of likes, neutrals and dislikes between brackets
Appendix F Results per wave

wave=1, Male

wave=1, Female

wave=2, Male

wave=2, Female

Predicted propensity to vote

endorsement
denouncement

endorsement
denouncement

Source: Citizen Panel Sweden
Appendix G  Results with actual vote

Source: Citizen Panel Sweden
CHAPTER 4

Appendix H  Operationalization of measure of restrictive immigration preferences

**Sweden** (Cronbach’s α = 0.79)
1. Immigrants have been disadvantaged in Sweden these last years. (*Reverse)
2. Immigration contributes to the Swedish economy’s competitiveness. (*Reverse)
3. Most Muslims in Sweden have respect for other cultures and how other people live their lives. (*Reverse)
Scale: Don’t agree (1) to Totally Agree (5)

**UK** (Cronbach’s α = 0.70)
1. Immigration contributes to the competitiveness of the British economy. (*Reverse)
2. We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now.
Scale: Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (5)

**Norway** (Cronbach’s α = 0.82)
1. Refugees should be entitled to social services. (*Reverse)
2. Norway will lose its identity if more Muslims come to live here.
3. Norwegian Muslims are more loyal to other Muslims in the world than to the people of this country.
4. It is better for a country if nearly everyone shares the same traditions and customs.
Scale: Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (7)

Note: in Norway, the question ‘Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others’ was skipped to prevent a strong triggering of the prejudice norm.

Appendix I  CFA of MCP and restrictive immigration preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correlation between scales</th>
<th>Confirmatory Factor Analysis (nested comparison Chi2 test)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>One latent factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>( r = -0.48 )</td>
<td>Chi(^2)(20) = 730.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Test of difference: Chi(^2)(1) = 206.44; ( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>( r = -0.52 )</td>
<td>Chi(^2)(df) = 1014.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Test of difference: Chi(^2)(1) = 212.71; ( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>( r = -0.48 )</td>
<td>Chi(^2)(df) = 738.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Test of difference: Chi(^2)(1) = 619.92; ( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: B/CCAP; Citizen Panel Sweden; Citizen Panel Norway
### Appendix J  Main models without y-standardization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Model I</strong></th>
<th><strong>Model II</strong></th>
<th><strong>Model III</strong></th>
<th><strong>Model IV</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom (BNP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive immigration pref.</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.62</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>pseudo R²</strong></td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Logistic regression; dependent variable: voted for BNP in any of the waves

N=1253; number of BNP voters is 101

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Sweden (SD)</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive immigration pref.</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(adjusted) R²</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OLS regression; dependent variable: reported propensity to vote for SD (0-to-10 scale)

N=1381

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Norway (FrP)</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive immigration pref.</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
<td>-2.75</td>
<td>-2.54</td>
<td>-3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(adjusted) R²</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic regression; dependent variable: voted for FrP

N=965; number of FrP voters is 125

Source: B/CCAP; Citizen Panel Sweden; Citizen Panel Norway
Appendices

Appendix K  Main models with control variables

Table 1  Operationalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. No qualification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. GCSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Degree</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other qualification</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummies:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not completed elementary school</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school (not graduated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school (graduated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies after high school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/college (without degree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/college (with degree)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous variable (in pounds sterling)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left-Right self-placement</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous variable (between 0 and 10)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled, semiskilled or professional/technical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2  Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>0.407**</td>
<td>0.405**</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref: no schooling):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elementary school</td>
<td>-2.681</td>
<td>-1.099</td>
<td>-1.670</td>
<td>-0.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school</td>
<td>-3.464*</td>
<td>-1.512</td>
<td>-2.203</td>
<td>-1.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school: graduated</td>
<td>-3.290*</td>
<td>-1.411</td>
<td>-2.031</td>
<td>-1.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>studies after high school</td>
<td>-3.882*</td>
<td>-1.862</td>
<td>-2.429</td>
<td>-1.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university/college: without a degree</td>
<td>-4.746**</td>
<td>-2.348</td>
<td>-3.000*</td>
<td>-1.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university/college: with a degree</td>
<td>-4.718**</td>
<td>-2.087</td>
<td>-2.878*</td>
<td>-1.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>-4.416**</td>
<td>-1.616</td>
<td>-2.454</td>
<td>-1.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.413***</td>
<td>0.106*</td>
<td>0.186***</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant scale</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.182***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.923***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.256**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.748***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.359***</td>
<td>8.212***</td>
<td>9.306***</td>
<td>9.936***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1299</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref: a level)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.092*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>0.147*</td>
<td>0.083</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.021*</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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### Norway

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Sources: B/CCAP; Citizen Panel Sweden; Citizen Panel Norway
Appendix L  

Distributions

Sources: B/CCAP; Citizen Panel Sweden; Citizen Panel Norway

Appendix M  

Descriptive statistics

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<td>0.13</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<tr>
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Note: descriptives of those respondents who actually received and answered the MCP questions, but before listwise deletion. Scales have been standardized for the main analyses; unstandardized values are presented here.
CHAPTER 5

Appendix N  Descriptive statistics of core variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
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<th>SD</th>
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<td>Individual</td>
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<td>Left-Right position</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Left-Right distance</td>
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<td>Party</td>
<td>Stigma (%)</td>
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<td>Size (%)</td>
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Source: CSES

Appendix O  Individual level regressions

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<th>Full model</th>
<th>Full model (standardized)</th>
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<td>p</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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controlled for income, education and left-right distance

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<th>b</th>
<th>p</th>
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<th>b</th>
<th>p</th>
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<th>p</th>
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N 392906 392906 392906 392906 392906

Source: CSES
Appendix P  Party-level regressions

Explanatory notes
The dependent variable in the party-level analysis is the share of male voters as a percentage of all voters for each party. I correct for any overrepresentation of either men or women in the sample.\textsuperscript{43} This yields a dependent variable which ranges from just over 30\% male voters for the Green SF in Denmark to almost 80\% male voters for Christian-conservative New Slovenia and the radical right Greater Romania Party. Interestingly, the mean of this measure is 50.7\%, indicating that on average parties are somewhat male-dominated. This already shows that men are more likely to vote for small parties: a concentration of women in larger parties is accompanied by an overrepresentation of men in a larger number of small parties.

Because the dependent variable is a percentage, theoretically OLS regression can be problematic. Predicting proportions in OLS carries the risk of non-linearity, heteroscedasticity and impossible predictions due to the truncated nature (Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006). However, if most or all of the proportions are between 0.2 and 0.8, the bias of OLS regression is minor (Judd & McClelland, 1989: 525–526). Because all the observations are within this range (and a vast majority lies within the even narrower range of 0.4–0.6), we report OLS estimates. As a robustness check, the models were re-analyzed on the basis of beta distributions (Buis, 2006), which yielded the same substantive conclusions.

Table 1 reports all models; Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationships between the variables. The vertical axis reflects the percentage of a party’s electorate that is male. A regression line has been added indicating the best fitting line between the points (with a squared term in the case of size). The correlation (in terms of Pearson’s $r$) is added to the graphs of hypothesized linear relationships. A dotted line indicates the average percentage of male voters.

\textsuperscript{43} Assuming the electorate to be half male, half female, the precise calculation is as follows: % support among men + % support among women + % support among women * 100. In reality, electorates are not completely equally divided into males and females, as women are slightly overrepresented in the population and turnout rates differ between the genders. However, the former hardly affects the ratio and the latter cannot be quantified in a general way. Our results turned out to be insensitive to alternative calculations of the gender gap.
Figure 1  Bivariate relations

![Bivariate relations](image)

Source: CSES

Table 1  Regression tables (party level)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>(adjusted) R²</td>
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Note: $b$ is the regression coefficient; $p$ the p-value

Source: CSES
### Appendix Q  Interactions

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controlled for income, education and left-right distance

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Note: two-way interactions that are constituent parts of a three-way interaction but not relevant for the analysis are not shown in the table for reasons of space.

Source: CSES
### Appendix R  Regression among Radical Right parties only

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<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>-0.013 (0.009)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male X SocialStigma</td>
<td>0.010** (0.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controls (y-hat)</td>
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<td>8.609*** (0.465)</td>
<td>8.377*** (0.464)</td>
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<td>-0.400*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.400*** (0.011)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Size X Size</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male X Size²</td>
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Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
Source: CSES
Radicaal-rechtse partijen (RRP’en) vormen de grootste partijfamilie die sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Europa is ontstaan. In de afgelopen decennia hebben deze partijen in veel landen een blijvende plaats in het politieke bestel verworven. Hun aanwezigheid leidt tot belangrijke veranderingen in de politieke ruimte en in het gedrag van andere partijen. Hun electorale succes weerspiegelt en veroorzaakt verschillende fundamentele veranderingen in politiek en samenleving. Het is daarom belangrijk deze partijen beter te begrijpen, en een cruciaal onderdeel daarvan is het in kaart brengen van de kenmerken en beweegreden van hun electoraat.

Hoewel er veel waardevol onderzoek is gedaan naar de oorsprong van deze partijen en de beweegredenen van hun kiezers, snappen we de processen die leiden tot radicaal-rechtse steun nog niet volledig. Één van de meest stelselmatige electorale kenmerken vormt tegelijk één die momenteel het minst begrepen wordt: de consistente en universele oververtegenwoordiging van mannen onder radicaal-rechtse kiezers. In sommige gevallen stemmen er meer dan twee keer zoveel mannen op deze partijen (zie Figuur 1.1 eerder in dit boek). Daarmee is geslacht één van de meest consistente voorspellers van steun voor radicaal rechtse. Dit fenomeen is in de literatuur de ‘gender gap’ gaan heten (hoewel het feitelijk op een seksverschil slaat). Hoewel de opvallende oververtegenwoordiging van mannelijke kiezers door Georg Betz al twee decennia geleden werd bestempeld als een “complex en intrigerende puzzel” heeft onderzoek tot nu toe geen sluitende verklaring weten aan te wijzen. Dit doet vermoeden dat de gebruikelijke wetenschappelijke benaderingen van kiesgedrag niet volledig zijn.

Het doel van dit proefschrift is daarom om de oorzaken van deze gender gap te onderzoeken in een groot aantal Europese landen vanuit het oogpunt van verschillende modellen van kiesgedrag. Dit leert ons ook meer over de manier waarop sekse een rol speelt bij politiek gedrag. Het werpt bovendien licht op tot nu toe ondergewaardeerde verklaringen van steun voor radicaal-rechts.

Ik hoop daarbij in het bijzonder de volgende twee bijdragen te leveren. De eerst is dat ik behalve conventionele modellen ook een relatief nieuwe set aan verklaringen van radicaal-rechts stemgedrag verken vanuit een sociaalpsychologische invalshoek. Door nieuwe data te verzamelen onderzoek ik of de verschillen in radicaal-rechtse steun tussen mannen en vrouwen kunnen worden verklaard door substantiële verschillen in waardering van sociale signalen en/of in (latente) motivaties betreffende vooroordelen. Ik laat daarbij zien dat deze een relevante verklaring kunnen bieden voor het verschil in steun voor radicaal rechts onder mannen en vrouwen. Daarmee toon ik ook aan hoe belangrijk het is niet uit het oog te verliezen dat stemgedrag afhankelijk is van de sociale en normatieve context.
Een tweede bijdrage is het opnemen en systematisch onderzoeken van de aanbodzijde. Dit heeft betrekking op de manier waarop de mate van electorale oververtegenwoordiging van mannen wordt gevormd door factoren op partijniveau. Ik laat zien hoe belangrijk het is om te kijken naar de verschillen tussen partijen in wat ze doen, zeggen, en hoe ze worden geportretteerd door andere maatschappelijke actoren. Voor de onderhavige gender gap laat ik zien dat deze vooral afhangt van de reputatie en extremisme van partijen, alsmede hun ideologie op sociaal-economisch gebied.

**Theoretische modellen**

De vormende elementen in dit proefschrift zijn enerzijds drie modellen van kiesgedrag en anderzijds twee gezichtspunten. De drie modellen van kiesgedrag bestaan uit een sociaal-structureel, een attitudinaal en een sociaal-psychologisch model. Deze drie manieren om het gedrag van kiezers te begrijpen sluiten elkaar niet volledig uit: elk benadrukken ze een andere stap in het causale proces. Desalniettemin is het cruciaal ze afzonderlijk te bestuderen, omdat electorale patronen in verschillende stadia kunnen ontstaan.

De twee gezichtspunten bestaan uit vraag en aanbod. Waar een analyse van de vraagzijde zich ten taak stelt te achterhalen welke kenmerken van mannen en vrouwen aan de basis liggen van uiteenlopende electorale keuzes, kan een analyse van de aanbodzijde meer inzicht geven in welke partijkenmerken hiervoor verantwoordelijk zijn. Zoals ik laat zien kan aandacht voor de wisselwerking tussen deze twee gezichtspunten nieuwe inzichten opleveren. Tabel 1 vat dit basisschema samen.

**Tabel 1 – Theoretisch model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vraagzijde</th>
<th>Aanbodzijde</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociaal-structureel</td>
<td>Ideologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinaal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houdingen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociaalpsychologisch</td>
<td>Reputaties, gedrag, geschiedenis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivaties en disposities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hieronder bespreek ik in verkorte vorm de eerste twee modellen en hoe ik deze heb onderzocht. Daarna bespreek ik kort het derde model en de bevindingen die daar uit voortkomen.

**Sociaal-structurele en attitudinale verklaringen**

Een sociaal-structurele benadering van kiesgedrag begint met de assumptie dat de keuze in het stemhokje – uiteindelijk – uitdrukking geeft aan de structurele positie van een kiezer in de samenleving. Hoewel het einde van stemmen op basis van klasse
al vaak is aangekondigd, bestaat er nog steeds een consistente samenhang tussen sociaaleconomische status en partijkeuze. In het geval van radicaal-rechtse partijen is het vaak opgemerkt dat deze partijen vaker kiezers trekken die wel als ‘verliezers van de globalisering’ zijn aangeduid: meer dan gemiddeld hebben ze een lagere opleiding en zijn ze werkzaam in de private sector, vaak in minder geschoolde beroepen. Hun inkomen, status en identiteit worden het meest bedreigd door globaliseringsprocessen. Dit zou de aantrekkelijkheid vergroten van radicaal-rechtse partijen die zulke processen beloven om te keren en de grenzen willen sluiten voor immigratie.


Een attitudinale verklaring van stemgedrag gaat er vanuit dat kiezers de afstand tot hun partij minimaliseren inzake één of meerdere beleidskwesties of ideologische dimensies. De ideologie van radicaal-rechtse partijen is in een invloedrijke studie van Cas Mudde uit 2007 gekarakteriseerd als bestaande uit drie elementen: nativisme (het idee dat staten exclusief door bewoners van de inheemse groep zou moeten worden bewoond en dat niet-inheemse personen en ideeën een bedreiging vormen voor de homogene natiestaat), autoritarisme (het geloof in een strikt geordende samenleving) en populisme (kort gezegd het geloof dat de samenleving bestaat uit twee antagonistische homogene groepen, het goede volk en de slechte elite). Surveyonderzoek laat zien dat de kiezers van radicaal rechts het vaak eens zijn met deze partijen wat betreft deze kwesties. Andere terugkerende voorspellers zijn euroscepsis en verschillende vormen van onvrede met het politieke systeem.

Deze twee modellen (sociaal-structureel en attitudinaal) komen in de meeste eerdere studies van dit fenomeen in meer of mindere mate terug. In dit proefschrift wordt er daarom iets minder aandacht aan besteed; het voornaamste doel is deze hypotheses in een groter aantal casussen te testen. Uitgaande van deze eerste twee modellen onderzoek ik in Hoofdstuk 1 de electorale vraag naar radicaal-rechtse partijen onder mannen en vrouwen met behulp van surveyonderzoek onder ca. 15.000 kiezers in 16 West- en Oost-Europese landen. In Hoofdstuk 2 voeg ik volgens de aanbodzijde toe met behulp van de positionering, door experts, van elf partijen op de sociaaleconomische en cultureel-progressieve dimensies in 1999, 2004 en 2009.

Deze hoofdstukken steunen deels de verwachting dat de gender gap een reflectie is van sociaaleconomische verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen. Hierbij is vooral het feit dat vrouwen vaker werkzaam zijn in de publieke sector van belang; verschillen in werkloosheid of opleidingsniveau dragen minder bij. Echter, deze verklaring gaat in slechts een deel van de landen op – naast enkele West-Europese landen is dit vooral in Oost-Europa het geval. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien waarom. Ik toon aan dat partijen die een linksere positie innemen op sociaaleconomische kwesties (dit zijn vaak partijen in Noord- of in Oost-Europa) een substantieel grotere electorale oververtegenwoordiging van mannen kennen dan partijen die dichter bij liberale positie staan. De in de literatuur wel als ‘nieuwe winnende formule’ bestempelde combinatie van nativisme plus welvaartstaatbehoud trekt vooral kiezers in de meest kwetsbare economische posities in de private sector. Deze groep bestaat (nog steeds) vaker uit mannen.

De eerste twee hoofdstukken laten echter minder steun zien voor de attitudinale verklaring. Er bleek geen bewijs voor de stelling dat mannen het vaker eens zijn met radicaal-rechtse ideologie dan vrouwen. In sommige landen was eerder het omgekeerde het geval: daar bleek onder vrouwen marginaal meer steun voor het sluiten van grenzen en zwaardere straffe. De verschillen zijn echter miniem. Ook bleek het standpunt van partijen over cultureel-progressieve kwesties de samenstelling van het electoraat in termen van sekse niet te beïnvloeden. Dit laat zien dat de gender gap niet bestaat dankzij verschillen in houdingen, maar ondanks. Wel lijkt het er echter op dat een proteststem vaker plaatsvindt onder mannen. Dit komt niet omdat mannen vaker ontevreden zijn met de politiek; wel is ontevredenheid een belangrijkere voorspeller van hun stemkeuze. Dit is mogelijk terug te voeren in verschillen in politiek zelfvertrouwen. Deze bevinding laat bovendien zien dat verschillen in stemgedrag niet alleen moet worden verklaard met compositie-effecten maar ook door patronen van conditionaliteit: verschillende factoren spelen een rol voor verschillende groepen kiezers.

Sociaal-psychologische verklaringen
Hoewel bovenstaande verklaringen een deel van de puzzel kunnen oplossen in een deel van de landen, lijkt het er op dat de klassieke modellen van stemgedrag veel variatie onverklaard laten. Daarom onderzoek ik in dit proefschrift ook andere verklaringen vanuit het oogpunt van een meer sociaalpsychologische verklaring. Het ligt buiten het
bereik van dit proefschrift recht te doen aan alle mogelijke elementen en invalshoeken van deze traditie; wel besteed ik aandacht aan twee mechanismes die het meest plausibel ten grondslag zouden kunnen liggen aan het sekseverschil in steun voor radicaal rechts. De kern hiervan is de verwachting dat elementen van de reputatie van radicaal-rechtse partijen in het algemeen een minder afschrikkend karakter hebben voor mannen dan voor vrouwen.

Onderzoek laat zien dat radicaal-rechtse partijen in sterkere mate dan andere partijen worden veroordeeld door elites en delen van de bevolking. Voorbeelden van het eerste zijn cordons sanitaires, mediaboycots, en de juridische vervolging van leiders. Ook is vastgesteld dat een deel van de Europese burgers sterke normatieve bedenkingen heeft bij deze partijen. Daarnaast laat onderzoek zien dat de doorbraak van partijen sterk afhangt van de gepercipieerde legitimiteit deze partijen. Dit betekent niet dat steun voor radicaal-rechts een geheel nieuwe set aan verklaringen behoeft; het is eerder zo dat mechanismes die ook deels bij andere partijen werken in sterke mate samenkomen bij radicaal-rechts.

Dit is potentieel relevant bij het bestuderen van man-vrouw-verschillen in radicaal-rechtse steun. Een consistent thema in de socialiseringsliteratuur is dat mannen overwegend gesocialiseerd worden om minder hun sociale omgeving in hun overweging te betrekken dan vrouwen. Dit leidt tot twee gerelateerde maar afzonderlijke manieren waarop een kloof op basis van sekse kan ontstaan. Het eerste is dat mannen minder vaak worden afgeschrikt door het sociale stigma van deze partijen – het signaal dat een deel van de kiezers bereikt dat een partij volstrekt niet acceptabel is. Hieruit zou volgen dat partijen met een groter stigma – in de kleinere of grotere sociale context van een kiezer – een grotere gender gap hebben. Deze verwachting is gegrond in survey- en experimenteel onderzoek dat in andere contexten heeft vastgesteld dat sociale signalen een sterkere uitwerking hebben onder vrouwen dan onder mannen.

Het tweede mogelijke mechanisme is dat mannen minder sterk worden beïnvloed door associaties met extremisme en/of discriminatie van radicaal-rechtse partijen. Zulke associaties kunnen voorkomen uit de geschiedenis, retoriek of symbolen van sommige partijen. Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat mannen meer steun vertonen voor strikte sociale hiërarchieën, (verbaal of fysiek) geweld en minder gemotiveerd zijn associaties met vooroordelen te vermijden. Hieruit volgt de verwachting dat extremere partijen met een lagere gepercipieerde legitimiteit een relatief kleinere achterban zullen kunnen verwerven onder vrouwen. Hierbij is het belangrijk te onderstrepen dat dit samen kan gaan met de bevinding dat mannen en vrouwen gemiddeld even vaak kritisch zijn over immigratie en immigranten: het cruciale aspect is hier niet de inhoud van de boodschap, maar de reputatie van de boodschapper. Dit wordt onvoldoende meegenomen in attitudinale modellen van kiesgedrag.

In het tweede deel van het proefschrift test ik deze hypothesen. In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik of vrouwen sterker worden afgeweerd door negatieve sociale signalen over radicaal-rechtse partijen. Hiervoor werden speciaal ontworpen vragen voorgelegd aan duizenden Zweden in een online survey. Hieruit blijkt dat vrouwen in Zweden de lokale radicaal-rechtse partij, de Zwedendemocraten, als sociaal veel minder acceptabel
rapporteren dan mannen. (Dit is zelfs het geval onder kiezers die daadwerkelijk op deze partij gestemd hebben, wat laat zien zulke percepties niet volledig endogeen is aan de steun voor een partij.) Daarnaast blijkt dat percepties van sociale aanvaardbaarheid bij vrouwen een sterkere voorspeller vormen van hun partijkeuze dan bij mannen. Deze bevindingen worden verder onderstrept door een experiment waarin (in een sociale media-achtige context) het sociale signaal over een fictieve radicaal-rechtse en een groene partij werd gemanipuleerd. Wanneer het signaal werd gegeven dat vele anderen een radicaal-rechtse partij onacceptabel achten, verminderde de steun onder de deelnemende vrouwen, maar niet onder de mannen. Wanneer echter het signaal werd gegeven dat anderen deze partij steunen verdween het sekseverschil in steun voor deze partij gedeeltelijk. Het lijkt er dus op dat mannen sneller bereid zijn op een partij te stemmen die in de omgeving als onacceptabel wordt geportretteerd.


Door voor het eerst de rol van deze motivaties te testen laat ik in Hoofdstuk 4 zien dat in alle onderzochte landen (Noorwegen, Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) mannen substantieel lager scoren op door psychologischen ontwikkelden metingen van zulke anti-vooroordeel-motivaties. Het is hierbij cruciaal dat dit sekseverschil groter en meer consistent was dan dat in anti-immigratiehoudingen. Bovendien
blijkt dat anti-immigratiehoudingen niet de gender gap kunnen verklaren, terwijl motivaties dit wel doen. Althans, dit is het geval bij de partijen die het meest worden geassocieerd met extremisme: de Britse Nationale Partij en de Zwedendemocraten. Bij de Noorse Vooruitgangspartij, die onderdeel was van een minder extreme traditie voordat het radicaal-rechtse standpunten ontwikkeld, spelen zulke motivaties geen rol, en dus ook niet in het veroorzaken van een gender gap. Deze partij heeft een zogenaamd ‘reputatieschild’. Dit sluit aan bij een bevinding, in Hoofdstuk 5, onder de vele partijen die deelnamen aan verkiezingen tussen 1996 en 2011: ideologisch meer extreme partijen (van welke politieke kleur dan ook) trekken systematisch meer mannen dan vrouwen als kiezers.

In een notendop
Met dit proefschrift is hopelijk een extra steentje gelegd van de “complexe en intrigerende puzzel” die Georg Betz in 1994 beschreef. Een paar zaken springen er uit. Een eerste belangrijke conclusie is dat sociaal-structurele verklaringen nog steeds relevant zijn voor het begrijpen van sekseverschillen in stemgedrag. Dat dit niet eerder overtuigend aangewezen is als oorzaak van de kloof in steun voor radicaal rechts lijkt te komen omdat in die studies variatie in de aanbodzijde over het hoofd werd gezien. Niet alle partijen proberen (of slagen) er in de zelfde mate in om kiezers uit kwetsbare sociaaleconomische posities aan te trekken. Wanneer radicaal-rechtse partijen de ‘nieuwe winnende formule’ van een linkser economisch beleid adopteren kan worden verwacht dat de oververtegenwoordiging van mannen in hun achterban zal groeien.

Een tweede belangrijke bevinding is dat dit proefschrift geen bewijs vond voor een consistent, universeel of substantieel sekseverschil in steun voor radicaal-rechtse standpunten. Dit geldt voor zowel nativisme, authoritarisme als ontevredenheid met elites. Hoewel ideologische convergentie met radicaal-rechtse nog steeds de sterkste voorspeller is van stemmen op die partij, laat dit zien dat dit op zichzelf geen voldoende voorwaarde is.

De derde en meest belangrijke gevolgtrekking is daarom dat reputaties er toe doen. Hoewel een anti-immigratie-boodschap even sterk lijkt te resoneren onder mannen en vrouwen, zijn vrouwen systematisch minder geneigd zich aan te sluiten bij de boodschapper – zeker indien deze als moreel ambigu of sociaal onacceptabel wordt gepresenteerd. Dit lijkt in lijn te liggen met de stelling dat vrouwen vaker handelen op basis van een interpersonele oriëntatie. Dit betekent echter ook dat, wanneer het sociale stigma van radicaal-rechtse partijen afsluit, de seksebalans van deze partijen evenwichtiger zal worden. (Dit geldt overigens ook voor andere controversiële partijen, zoals radicaal-linkse of communistische partijen.) Echter, het gaat hierbij niet enkel om het sociale signaal, maar evenzeer om het daadwerkelijke gedrag van partijen. Extremere partijen, of partijen die beschuldigingen van racisme minder goed kunnen afwenden, trekken systematisch meer mannen dan vrouwen als kiezers.

Dit bevestigt dat de natuurlijke electorale grens van radicaal-rechtse partijen niet zozeer afhangt van de reikwijdte van steun voor anti-immigratie-standpunten; zulke houdingen zijn immers op vergelijkbare en vrij brede schaal te vinden in veel Europese landen. In plaats daarvan wordt deze grens bepaald door de mate waarin partijen zulke
antimmigratiekiezers weten te overtuigen zonder tegen reputatiebarrières aan te lopen.

**Implicaties voor verder onderzoek**

Tot slot biedt dit proefschrift een aantal implicaties voor onderzoek in bredere zin, die ik hieronder slechts zeer kort aanstip. Wat betreft de studie van sekseverschillen in politiek gedrag is het belangrijk sociaal-structurele verschillen (nog) niet af te schrijven als verklaringen. Ook blijkt dat, wat betreft de rol van ideologie, relevantere manvrouw-verschillen werden gevonden in de relevantie van onderwerpen bij het bepalen van de stemkeuze dan in de daadwerkelijke verschillen van houdingen tussen mannen en vrouwen. Daarnaast kunnen onderzoekers die zich met dit vakgebied bezighouden nog meer leren van kennis aanwezig in de sociaalpsychologische literatuur. Tegelijkertijd moet worden vastgesteld dat dit proefschrift vooral suggesties aanreikt voor factoren die tot een oververtegenwoordiging van mannen leiden; voor het verder verkennen van de andere kant van deze medaille is meer empirisch en theoretisch werk nodig.

Daarnaast onderstreep dit proefschrift in het algemeen dat studies van politiek gedrag niet moeten vergeten dat, zoals Bernard Berelson stelde in 1964, “een persoon denkt, in politieke zin, zoals hij is: sociaal”. Conventionele modellen van kiesgedrag zien vaak de sociale dynamiek die belangrijk is voor kiesgedrag over het hoofd. In dit proefschrift worden een aantal pogingen gedaan hun rol bij het vormen van het radicaalrechtse electoraat enigszins in kaart te brengen. Echter, het blijft onverminderd waar dat de studie van de sociale kant van stemgedrag grote methodologische uitdagingen met zich meebrengt.

Tot slot houdt dit proefschrift een aantal implicaties in voor de studie van radicaalrechtse partijen. Allereerst bevestigt het dat aandacht voor de aanbodzijde cruciaal is. Zo heeft de mate waarin partijen wel of niet de ‘nieuwe winnende formule’ overnemen grote gevolgen voor de aard van hun electoraat. Echter, niet alle elementen van de aanbodkant liggen binnen het bereik van partijen zelf. Reputaties en gepercipieerde legitimiteit zijn lastig te veranderen. Dit proefschrift laat zien hoe deze factoren de grootte en aard van het radicaalrechtse electoraat beïnvloedden. Brede publieke steun voor anti-immigratie-maatregelen is an sich geen voldoende voorwaarde voor electoraal succes van radicaalrechtse partijen. Dit verklaart de zwakke correlatie op macroniveau tussen deze twee trends. Waar partijen echter geloofwaardig percepties van legitimiteit weten te verbeteren, zoals Marine le Pen beoogd met haar project van dédiabolisation (‘ontdemonisering’), kan het potentiële electoraat van radicaal rechts sterk vergroot worden.

Al deze punten hebben gevolgen voor de manier waarop zowel radicaalrechtse steun als sekseverschillen in stemgedrag worden bestudeerd. Het kan niet voldoende worden benadrukt dat de mannelijke kiezer niet bestaat, en de radicaalrechtse kiezer evenmin. Het laatste punt werd eerder opgemerkt door Cas Mudde. Waar hij doelede
op de verschillende subgroepen die binnen in het radicaal-rechtse electoraat aanwezig zijn, moet hier nog aan worden toegevoegd dat de aard van dit electoraat ook nog eens verschilt tussen partijen. De belangrijkste dimensies op aanbodniveau waarlangs dit zich afspeelt zijn de mate waarin tegemoet wordt gekomen aan de verliezers van de globalisering en de mate waarin een ‘reputatie-schild’ aanwezig of ontwikkeld is. Meer aandacht voor zulke aspecten van de aanbodzijde, en meer gevoeligheid voor verschillen in de sociaal-structurele, attitudinale én sociaalpsychologische factoren die de kiezer (m/v) in het stemhokje leiden, kan dit in de toekomst hopelijk nog meer “complexe en intrigerende puzzels” een stukje dichter bij de oplossing brengen.


170 References

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