



## UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

### Daring to vote right: Why men are more likely than women to vote for the radical right

Harteveld, E.

**Publication date**

2016

**Document Version**

Final published version

[Link to publication](#)

**Citation for published version (APA):**

Harteveld, E. (2016). *Daring to vote right: Why men are more likely than women to vote for the radical right*.

**General rights**

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

**Disclaimer/Complaints regulations**

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

# TOXIC TRIGGERS: THE ROLE OF ANTI-PREJUDICE MOTIVATIONS

## INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 demonstrated that women are less likely to vote for Radical Right parties *even* when they agree substantially with these parties' core policies. In the previous chapter, it was established that the gap is partly attributable to the social taboo that often rests on expressing a preference for Radical Right parties. However, while the experiment showed that social denouncement affects women more strongly than men, it only did so for Radical Right parties and not for Green parties. This suggests that the effect of social stigma is especially powerful in tandem with existing anxiety about the Radical Right. In this chapter, the role of this anxiety is further investigated. I show that differences in men's and women's latent *normative concerns about prejudice* are key to explaining the puzzle of the Radical Right gender gap.

A novel insight in this chapter is that, to fully understand Radical Right voting, we need to study not only voters' *attitudes*, but also their *motivations*: the strength of their commitment to certain goals and aims (Kawada, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2004). After all, while the anti-immigrant message of Radical Right parties resonates with a large share of the voters, men as well as women, many Radical Right parties also raise normative concerns about discrimination and prejudice due to fascist or extremist legacies, or because of contemporary rhetoric and symbols (Blinder et al., 2013; Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2006a). When parties continuously become trapped in conflicts about discrimination and prejudice, internalized motivations to avoid prejudice can prevent voters from voting for Radical Right parties, even if they agree with the substantive policies they propose. If women are generally more strongly motivated to control prejudice than men – in other words, have a stronger latent commitment, if triggered, not to act or think prejudiced – such differences can explain why women are less likely to vote for Radical Right parties.

It is important to note that this explanation would not be at odds with the finding that women are generally as likely to be opposed to immigration as men, as noted in Chapter 1. Survey questions – or even everyday conversations – about immigration do

not evoke the same normative concern as many party reputations do. In other words, the extent to which anti-prejudice motivations discourage support for anti-immigrant parties is not so much dependent upon the anti-immigrant *message* itself, but especially upon the Radical Right *messengers*. The motivational hypothesis predicts that men are more likely to vote for a party that is allegedly prejudiced, whereas many women would only support anti-immigration policies coming from a non-‘toxic’ party. The relevant gender difference can be found, then, not in outgroup views per se, nor purely in the sensitivity to denouncement of a party by others (Chapter 3), but crucially also in the extent to which the Radical Right triggers normative concerns. In this context, it is relevant to study motivations, because they might help to explain why the same party can have a different normative connotation for different people.

This explanation of the Radical Right gender gap builds on and extends work by Blinder, Ford and Ivarsflaten (2013), who show that people who are highly motivated to control prejudice are less likely to support Far Right parties, and also less likely to support restrictive immigration policies when proposed by such parties. Using representative survey data from three European countries, this chapter shows – for the first time – that while women are not consistently less opposed to immigration, they *are* consistently and substantially more motivated to control prejudice than men. As a result, women are more often deterred by normative doubts about ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties. The chapter shows that taking the gender difference in this motivation into account explains the non-policy gender gap in the two countries where the Radical Right has been least able to defuse normative concerns – the UK and Sweden. By contrast, gender differences in motivation to control prejudice do not explain the gender gap where the Radical Right is widely considered to have been successful at overcoming such concerns by advocating a diverse policy portfolio – the Progress Party currently in government in Norway.

Put differently: the electorate of ‘toxic’ parties that have become mired in conflict over past and present discrimination and prejudice is restricted to the subset of voters who are not motivated to control prejudice – and these are more likely to be male. From this it can be concluded that gender differences in normative concerns over prejudice are an important part of the explanation for the persistent gender gap of Radical Right parties.

## THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter investigates an understudied precondition for Radical Right voting and shows how it is relevant to understand the gender gap. The core idea is that the gender gap in voting for Radical Right parties that are mired in conflict about prejudice and discrimination is a ‘special’ one, in the sense that it is largely caused by gender differences in *motivations* rather than *ideological positions*. Below, I first outline why normative motivations are crucial for understanding Radical Right voting in general. Subsequently, I discuss how this affects the gender gap in Radical Right voting.

### Prejudice versus social norms

When it comes to group politics, citizens' opinions and actions are shaped by opposing forces (Blinder et al., 2013). On the one hand, it is well-established that many majority population citizens have negative biases against immigrants, ethnic minorities, Muslims, or other 'out-groups'. On the other hand, present-day Western societies are characterized by a widespread social norm against prejudice, and many citizens sincerely wish to conform to this norm: they are internally motivated to control prejudice. Researchers have developed and validated individual-level measures of the extent of internalization of such motivation, and they show that this *Motivation to Control Prejudice* (MCP)<sup>25</sup> is not distributed equally among citizens (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010; Plant & Devine, 1998).

The psychological model of how motivations shape attitudes and behavior is based on dual-process logic (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The core of this logic is that attitudes consist of both automatic and controlled components. Automatic responses (or 'implicit attitudes') are generated without cognitive effort. Controlled responses (or 'explicit attitudes'), by contrast, do involve effort. This 'controlled' process brings behavior into line with conscious normative commitments. While stereotypes are automatically activated in the presence of a member of an out-group, citizens who are motivated to control prejudice can bring this automated response in line with egalitarian beliefs (Devine, 1989). This distinction is useful, because it explains how important context is for people's reaction to outgroups. The same individual can honestly advocate a range of very different views about for instance immigrants, depending on both the normative connotation of the situation and this individual's motivations.

Importantly, people need to be aware that a norm is at stake before they take the cognitive effort to control prejudice and adjust their response in accordance with it. Blinder et al. (2013) show that the presence of cues suggesting racism or discrimination 'triggers' motivations to control prejudice to override negative outgroup views. They argue that, in the case of the Radical Right, conflicts about racist heritage, symbols, or arguments that surround Radical Right parties make them what could be called 'toxic' (Ivarsflaten et al., 2010). Indeed, respondents with high motivation to control prejudice respond differently to arguments and parties that trigger normative concerns than do respondents with low MCP (Blinder et al., 2013). Furthermore, while usual measures of anti-immigrant attitudes correlate with support for Radical Right and mainstream right parties, reflecting the ideology of both types of parties, MCP only correlates with voting for Radical Right parties, reflecting the normative concerns these parties might raise. Blinder et al. (Blinder et al., 2013: 854) conclude that "anti-prejudice norms pull voters away from extremist parties, even if they support the policies these parties espouse".

---

25 To be precise: *internal* motivation to control prejudice. Given the focus in this chapter on the internalization of the anti-prejudice norm, I do not discuss *external* motivations. However, the previous chapter would suggest that there, too, gender differences are likely to be present.

Because this concept helps to distinguish between support for Radical Right ideas and its translation into a Radical Right vote, it can potentially explain the puzzle of Chapter 1.

#### Gender and MCP

Although the number of population-representative samples that include measures of motivation to control prejudice is currently growing, its application in European countries and in the context of migration and integration policies is recent. The first major European validation study was published in 2010. Our knowledge about the distribution of MCP – both at the individual level (across socio-demographic categories) and at the systemic level (depending on party systems and media debates) – is therefore so far limited. This is also true with regard to gender. Only one previous study employing MCP measures has reported a comparison between men and women. In a study of 760 students, men’s average score on the MCP measure was significantly and substantially – over 20 percent – lower than women’s (Ratcliff et al., 2006). Empirical evidence of a gender difference in motivation to control prejudice is thus supportive but scarce.

There are, however, theoretical reasons to expect women to be more strongly motivated to avoid prejudice than men. Women have been argued to be more likely to “define themselves in a context of human relationship [and] judge themselves in terms of their ability to care” (Gilligan, 1982: 17), thus putting more weight on interpersonal relations, and they have been found to generally score higher on measures of empathy (Lennon, Eisenberg, Eisenberg, & Strayer, 1987; Macaskill, Maltby, & Day, 2002). It is reasonable to expect stronger focus on interpersonal relations to be associated with higher commitment to the goal of acting without prejudice towards others. Again, this does not preclude supporting restrictions on immigration per se, but makes it possible that among women associations with prejudice are more problematic.

Moreover, studies show that men are more likely than women to desire and support group-based hierarchies, in which particular groups dominate others (Sidanius et al., 2000). A reason for this difference might be that women as a group in contemporary Europe have a self-interest in opposing traditional social hierarchies. Due to past and present experience of gender discrimination, women as a group may have become more strongly motivated to fight prejudice of all sorts. The anti-prejudice norm aims to control biases associated with and supportive of traditional group hierarchies, and it is therefore theoretically plausible that commitment to control prejudice will be lower among those who stand to benefit from the traditional hierarchies.

If, indeed, motivation to control prejudice is generally lower among male than among female voters, this can potentially explain the gender gap in voting for ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties: women’s generally higher motivation to control prejudice will then offset any pull towards the Radical Right due to anti-immigrant policy preferences. However, these theoretical conjectures should of course not be accepted without empirical investigation. The chapter therefore tests the hypothesis that *male-female differences in motivation to control prejudice, rather than policy attitudes about immigrants, explain the gender gap in voting for controversial Radical Right parties.*

### Triggers

According to the dual process logic, a strong motivation to control prejudice can easily coexist with negative outgroup biases in the same individuals, and a signal that raises normative concern is therefore necessary for motivation to control prejudice to constrain thoughts and actions. In other words, a normative trigger needs to be present for behavioral differences to be evident between individuals with high motivation to control prejudice and people with low motivation. Controversial ('toxic') Radical Right parties that have no shield against accusations of racism and extremism will trigger such normative concerns, while the non-toxic Radical Right parties that have a shield against such accusations will not trigger normative concerns (Blinder et al., 2013).

Few of the parties considered part of the Radical Right family resort to blatantly racist arguments in their party programs. By now, it is an academic commonplace that a 'legitimate' or 'modern' image is necessary in order for Far Right parties to be potentially successful (Cole, 2005; Ignazi, 2005; Taggart, 1995; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003). Especially, ideological links to the historical Extreme Right have hindered the development of some of these parties (Hainsworth, 2008). Ivarsflaten (Ivarsflaten, 2006a: 2) shows that, in order to achieve electoral significance, parties rallying against immigrants need "a legacy that can be used to fend off accusations of racism and extremism": a 'reputational shield'. For example, she shows how a party with a clear reputational shield against charges of racism, the Swedish *Liberal People's Party*, was able to successfully mobilize a large share of the Swedish electorate around the controversial policy proposal of a language test for immigrants in 2001 – long before (and to a much larger extent than) any of the contemporaneous Radical Right parties managed to mobilize similar sentiments (Ivarsflaten, 2008).

Consequently, motivational differences between men and women can be expected to only explain the gender gap in voting for those Radical Right parties that lack a 'reputational shield'. Conversely, normative motivations will not result in a gender gap in those cases where Radical Right parties have been more successful at shielding themselves against charges of racism. The electorate of 'toxic' parties that trigger normative concerns is restricted to low-MCP voters, and these are more often male than female. Shielded Radical Right parties, by contrast, do attract high-MCP voters. Such shielded parties may or may not have a (smaller) gender gap in their electorate, depending on the rest of their ideological program, but the internal motivation to control prejudice should not account for such gender gaps. At this point it therefore becomes necessary to already take this variation on the supply side into account when selecting the cases. A fuller examination of the relevance of the supply side in this regard follows in Chapter 5.

### Cases

The chapter includes three cases that vary on what could be called the toxicity-dimension. Table 4.1 summarizes the expectations of the extent to which each party can be expected to 'trigger' the anti-prejudice norm. The case selection allows to probe the hypothesis that MCP explains the gender gap only in the case of Radical Right parties that are trapped in conflicts over racism and discrimination. While limited to three

cases, this is the first possibility to test the gendered role of MCP in multiple countries with validated measures of the hypothesized mechanism. Chapter 5 will further focus on variation on the supply side.

**Table 4.1 Overview of cases**

Party	Nature of signal	Role of MCP
British National Party, UK	Association with extremism and street gangs, no reputational shield	Strongest
Sweden Democrats, Sweden	Origin in extreme right, no reputational shield, but recent moderation	
Progress Party, Norway	Radical Right ideology, but reputational shield due to anti-tax origins; and broad policy portfolio had been accepted into the governing coalition at the national level at the time of data-collection.	

At the one end of the scale, the *British National Party* (BNP) is the most strongly associated with outright extremism and racism. The party continues to be “associated [...] with an illegitimate tradition” (Goodwin, 2013: 11). While attempts have been made by the BNP leadership to distance itself from the old extreme right, notably by stressing cultural and populist arguments over racism, the party’s “continuing dependence on right-wing extremists [associated to violence] consistently undermined the party’s strategy of ‘modernization’” (idem: 11). A gender gap due to differences in MCP can be expected to be clearly present in the UK case.

The *Sweden Democrats* (SD) have roots in historic fascism as well, and party members wore uniforms as late as the 1990s (Rydgren, 2006). In the 2000s, under new leadership (including current leader Jimmy Åkesson), the SD has aimed to modernize itself. It publicly rid itself of several former extremist elements, substituted a flower for the torch in their party logo, and managed to increase its voter base in local, national, and EU elections. However, because reputations are sticky and the party does not have any main policy agenda other than exclusionist nationalism, the party is still not able to provide a sufficient shield against normative concerns for large parts of the Swedish public – at least, at the time of data collection in 2013. Motivation to control prejudice is therefore expected to explain an important part of the gender gap in SD voting.

At the least ‘toxic’ end of the scale, the Norwegian *Progress Party* (FrP) is a clear example of a Radical Right party with a reputational shield. The party was founded in the 1970s as an anti-tax party, and did not pay much attention to immigration during the first decade of its existence (Widfeldt, 2000). Its status as one of the biggest parties in the country – the second largest between 1997 and 2013 – signaled social acceptability, as did the party’s inclusion into government with the mainstream *Conservative Party* just a few weeks before the data were collected. This reputational difference between FrP and the other parties is backed by empirical evidence. In surveys that were part of the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES) project, respondents were asked to assign like-dislike scores to parties on a scale from 0 (‘extremely dislike’) to 10 (‘extremely like’).

A large percentage of ‘extreme dislikes’ (zero’s) can be argued to signal social stigma, as it represents a very strong repulsion that is qualitatively different from assigning a low but not extreme score like 2 or 3 (see Chapter 5). In that case, the *Sweden Democrats* are denounced to a much larger extent than the *Progress Party* is: they are extremely disliked by 64% of the electorate, versus 26% for the *Progress Party*.<sup>26</sup> In short, we expect that FrP triggers few, if any, normative concerns, and that motivational differences therefore play a limited role in shaping *Progress Party* voting – let alone create a gender gap.

## METHODOLOGY

To investigate the hypotheses posited above, this chapter relies, for each country, on sources of data that have recently incorporated measures of MCP. For the United Kingdom, the source is the British version of the 2009 *Comparative Campaign Analysis Project* or B/CCAP (Nuffield College, 2009), a multi-wave panel conducted in conjunction with national election campaigns.<sup>27</sup> It was administered to web-based samples aimed at creating a demographically representative sample. For Sweden and Norway, data collected in the respective *Citizen Panel* surveys of both countries in 2013 is used (Ivarsflaten et al., 2015; Martinsson et al., 2014).<sup>28</sup> The Swedish panel is discussed in Chapter 3. The Norwegian panel was administered online but its participants were recruited by offline means based on a random national sample. The data is fairly representative but underrepresents the lower educated as well as young women.

Given this multiplicity of data sources, no completely identical measures are available in all countries. However, the measures are sufficiently equivalent to allow for a comparison of the way they are related to gender and voting within each country.

Motivational differences were measured using batteries of indicators of (internal) MCP. Table 4.2 lists the wording of the items in each of the survey batteries, which scaled well in all cases. These measures were validated (based on similar scales) in earlier studies, which show that they are empirically unrelated to the *Social Desirability Scale* and the *Self-Monitoring Scale* (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010). This ensures that the measure does not merely pick up a general tendency to give socially desirable answers.

Preferences with regard to immigration and integration, the core policy agenda of the Radical Right, were measured using multiple questions about immigrants and their integration. For a description, see Appendix H. These questions, too, scaled well (Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ ’s between 0.79 and 0.82). For reasons of space, this variable is labeled “restrictive immigration preferences”. As expected based on the dual process theory presented above as well as empirical findings from previous studies, the motivational

26 No CSES data is available for BNP.

27 For more information, see <http://ccap.nuff.ox.ac.uk/>.

28 For the Swedish Citizen Panel, see <http://www.lore.gu.se/surveys/citizen/>. For the Norwegian one, see <http://www.uib.no/en/citizen/43063/about-panel>.



items correlate negatively with restrictive immigration preferences, but are still clearly distinguishable from these. Appendix I presents the results of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), which shows that, in all three countries, the motivational and policy preference items load on different latent factors.<sup>29</sup>

**Table 4.2 Measures of Motivation to Control Prejudice**

---

**Question wording**

---

*United Kingdom*

1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards immigrants because it is personally important to me.
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about immigrants is OK. (*reversed*)
3. I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced.
4. I feel guilty when I have a negative thought about immigrants.

*Norway*

1. It is important to me personally to be unprejudiced towards immigrants.
2. I would not like to be perceived as racist, not even unto myself.
3. I feel guilty if I have negative feelings towards immigrants.
4. I try to be unprejudiced towards immigrants due to my own conviction.

*Sweden*

1. It is important to me personally to be unprejudiced towards immigrants.
2. I try to be unprejudiced towards immigrants due to my own conviction.
3. I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced.
4. I feel guilty if I have negative feelings towards immigrants.
5. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about immigrants is OK (*reversed*)

*Answer scale*

*United Kingdom:* Strongly agree (1) to Strongly disagree (5)

*Norway:* Very good (1) to Very bad (7)

*Sweden:* Strongly agree (1) to Strongly disagree (5)

*Scalability*

*United Kingdom:* Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.84$

*Norway:* Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.82$

*Sweden:* Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.79$

---

<sup>29</sup> The measures of immigration policy preferences used here are deliberately chosen to be comparable to those used in most other studies of Radical Right voting. Seen in terms of the dual-process psychological model, these preference measures are composites, related to an unknown degree to both implicit negative bias and explicit motivation to control prejudice. Importantly, the items do not clearly and consistently trigger motivation to control prejudice, because they ask about normatively ambiguous categories such as immigrants (see Blinder et al. 2013). Implicit measures of negative bias would allow a full and detailed test of the psychological mechanisms implied by the dual process logic. Such a test is not needed in the current study, which investigates if taking into account motivations improves explanations of the gender gap in Radical Right voting beyond the conventional accounts, which use the composite measure of policy preferences. For this reason overly contentious items were not included in the migration policy preference scale.

Gender was measured using a dummy for the sex of the respondent, with score 0 for men and 1 for women. The dependent variable – voting for Radical Right parties – was measured in slightly different ways in each country. Any analysis of vote choice for Radical Right parties in the UK suffers from the low number of respondents that have voted for the BNP in a single survey. Therefore, in the UK, the dependent variable consists of a dummy indicating whether respondents reported a vote preference (‘if there were elections today’) for the BNP in any of the five waves – collected over slightly more than one year – of B/CCAP. No such problems arose in the Norwegian case, due to the relatively large vote share of the Norwegian *Progress Party*. Here, the dependent variable is whether respondents voted for the *Progress Party* in the last election.

In the Swedish Citizen Panel, no vote preference question was recorded among those respondents who received the battery of MCP questions. Here, the dependent variable is a propensity to vote (PTV) question also used in previous chapters (that is, how likely respondents indicate to be – on a scale from 0 to 10 – to ever vote for the *Sweden Democrats*). The dependent variable thus differs between countries, preventing direct comparisons of the size of gender gaps in absolute terms. However, and more importantly, these measures do allow for a valid comparison of the *mechanisms* behind the gender gaps. See Appendix M for descriptive statistics of the main variables.

The hypotheses are tested by relying on the following strategy. First, models are estimated in which voting for the Radical Right is regressed on the gender dummy. The coefficient of this dummy reflects the nominal size of the gender gap. Subsequently, the traditional policy attitude variable *Restrictive immigration preferences*, as well as the new variable, *Motivation to control prejudice*, are added in turn. The motivational hypothesis will be supported if there is a significant and substantial decline in the gender-coefficient when including the new motivational variable in the model. This would mean that the gender gap can be explained by a composition effect of anti-prejudice motivations (the distribution of motivation over men and women – see Chapter 1).

Given that the dependent variables in the UK and Norway are binary, the models are estimated using logistic regression in these two countries. Coefficients of logistic models are not directly comparable across models with different covariates because the error term depends on the included covariates. For that reason, the method of so-called *y-standardization* will be used: the variance of the error is fixed, allowing for better comparison between different models (Scott Long, 1997; see Winship & Mare, 1984). In the Robustness section, I will report the models without *y-standardization*.


## RESULTS

### Descriptives

Before testing whether gender differences in motivation to control prejudice shape the gap in Radical Right party voting, it is relevant to establish whether the men and women actually differ with respect to this measure. Figure 4.1 reports the difference between men and women in their average score on both the MCP and restrictive immigration

preference measure. To increase comparability between countries and measures, all scores were standardized. The reported differences, which are thus expressed in standard deviations (SDs), are calculated by subtracting men’s average scores from women’s. Positive numbers therefore mean that women score higher on average, while negative numbers mean that men score higher on average. Non-significant gender differences are indicated with striped bars.

**Figure 4.1** Gender differences in MCP and restrictive immigration preferences (women’s average score minus men’s average score, in SD)



Note: striped bars indicate non-significant differences between men and women.

Figure 4.1 shows that men are on average more opposed to immigrants than women in Sweden and Norway, but not in the UK (where, descriptively, women even score somewhat higher). Furthermore, the figure reveals that, as expected, women score significantly higher than men on the motivation to control prejudice scales.<sup>30</sup> This is true for all countries. Moreover, this gap is just as large (Norway) or much larger (UK and Sweden) than any gap in restrictive immigration preferences.

<sup>30</sup> Of course, a comparison of means does not tell the whole story. Such differences could either reflect that (a) most men score somewhat lower than women (a shifted distribution), or that (b) some men score very low and/or or some women score very high (outliers). Inspection of the distributions (presented in Appendix L) suggests the former, as the distribution among women is similar to that among men, but shifted to the higher end of the scale. This is relevant for our present analysis: if MCP turns out to play a role in explaining Radical Right behavior, it means that it makes most women somewhat less likely to vote for these parties, rather than making a subgroup of women highly unlikely to do so.

**Table 4.3** Difference between average MCP among men and women (in SD)

	No controls	With controls
UK	0.33	0.32
Sweden	0.48	0.44
Norway	0.29	0.28

To assess whether these gender differences in motivation to control prejudice are robust, gender differences in MCP were subsequently predicted while controlling for socio-demographic characteristics: age and education in all three countries; in addition, income is included in the UK and Norway, and work sector in the UK only.<sup>31</sup> Table 4.3 shows the difference between men and women in motivation to control prejudice before and after controlling. Gender differences in MCP are sizeable and robust to these controls. The finding that women are rather substantially, consistently, and – at least in the cases examined here – universally more motivated to control prejudice than men, is original knowledge.<sup>32</sup>

The non-reputational shield cases of Sweden and the UK

Above, it was established that men are significantly less motivated to control prejudice than women in all of the studied cases. Does this explain the gender gaps in voting for the ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties – the BNP and SD – as suggested in the theoretical discussion above? Table 4.4 shows the result of regression models predicting a vote for British National Party (UK) and Sweden Democrats (Sweden). In the analyses presented here, no socio-demographic or attitudinal controls are included, because the main interest lies in the nominal gap. However, Appendix K presents the models controlling for age, education, and left-right position in both cases, and additionally income and work sector in the UK. These models with additional controls show an identical pattern.

In Model I, the vote is predicted by gender only. The positive coefficients of the gender dummies (female = 0, male = 1) in both countries indicate that, in line with earlier studies, men are more likely to vote for Radical Right parties than women. In the UK, the gap is only significant at a 10% level, which might reflect the low number of actual BNP-voters (101).

31 In contrast to many voting studies, controlling is not needed to prevent spurious relations: we are interested in gender differences, and gender is largely an exogenous variable. The fact that this effect is robust to the inclusion of socio-demographic variables indicates that it is not the result of a composition effect, which suggests that these differences exist regardless of men’s and women’s age, jobs, or education.

32 This also contributes to our understanding of the nature of the relation between different groups experiencing discrimination, such as women and minorities. These findings suggest common interest, rather than competition, between groups that experience discrimination. Scholars examining support for the Tea Party Movement in the U.S. have emphasized precisely this link between the struggle for equal treatment of a variety of groups.

**Table 4.4 Regression models, UK and Sweden**

United Kingdom (BNP)	Model I		Model II		Model III		Model IV	
	b	p	b	p	b	p	b	p
Gender (male)	0.21	0.07	0.21	0.05	0.09	0.42	0.14	0.22
Restrictive immigration pref.			0.35	0.00			0.25	0.00
MCP					-0.34	0.00	-0.21	0.00
Intercept	-2.62	0.00	-5.43	0.00	-1.15	0.00	-3.76	0.00
pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.5%		5.4%		4.6%		6.6%	

Logistic regression; dependent variable: voted for BNP in any of the waves

Coefficients on basis of  $\gamma$ -standardization procedure

N=1253; number of BNP voters is 101

Sweden (SD)	b	p	b	p	b	p	b	p
Gender (male)	0.81	0.00	0.52	0.00	0.16	0.27	0.22	0.08
Restrictive immigration pref.			1.29	0.00			0.95	0.00
MCP					-1.47	0.00	-0.82	0.00
Intercept	1.64	0.00	6.23	0.00	7.61	0.00	8.40	0.00
(adjusted) R <sup>2</sup>	2.0%		28.0%		22.3%		32.5%	

OLS regression; dependent variable: reported propensity to vote for SD (0-to-10 scale)

N=1381

In Model II, controlling for restrictive immigration preferences does not affect the gender gap in the UK. This is not surprising, given the earlier finding that British women score equally high on such policy preferences as do men. In Sweden, where women were found to have somewhat less restrictive preferences than men, the gap is reduced by including this measure. Still, a sizeable and statistically significant gender gap remains. This is in line with earlier studies showing that conventional predictors of Radical Right voting – both attitudinal and socio-structural – do not consistently and fully explain the gender gap in SD or BNP voting (see Chapter 1).

Model III adds controls for respondents' motivation to control prejudice. Taking this motivation into account has a much larger impact on the estimated gender gap than do immigration policy preferences. In fact, unlike any other studies we have seen of the RRP vote, the gender gap *shrinks to insignificance in both cases studied when this variable alone is taken into account*. This is in line with the hypothesis that motivational rather than attitudinal differences are responsible for the gender gap in voting for toxic RRPs. The models presented in Appendix K, which include demographic and ideological controls, replicate these findings.

The reputational shield case of the Norwegian *Progress Party*

If the normative signal theory is correct, then we should find that any gender difference in voting in the Norwegian case is not accounted for by gender differences in motivation to control prejudice. In other words, the gender gap in the Norwegian case – which earlier

research has found to exist (Immerzeel et al., 2015) – ought to be a traditional one based on gender differences in ideology rather than motivation to control prejudice. This is precisely what the analysis in Table 4.5 shows.

**Table 4.5 Regression models, Norway**

Norway - FrP	b	P	b	p	b	p	b	P
<b>Gender (male)</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>0.00</b>
Restrictive immigration pref.			0.41	0.00			0.35	0.00
MCP					-0.32	0.00	-0.13	0.00
Intercept	-2.36	0.00	-2.75	0.00	-2.54	0.00	-3.05	0.00
(adjusted) R <sup>2</sup>	2.2%		17.1%		11.2%		22.8%	

logistic regression; dependent variable: voted for FrP; coefficients with y-standardization  
N=965

A significant gender gap exists and a part of it can be explained by restrictive immigration preferences. The third model shows that there is some general effect of motivation to control prejudice, suggesting that those most concerned to control prejudice are still somewhat less likely to vote for this party. However, unlike in the two other cases, taking the motivational measure into account does not explain the gender gap or even reduce it as much as the models that include the anti-immigrant attitudinal measure.

The gender gap in voting for the Norwegian Progress Party likely reflects other aspects of the Progress Party's program. The party's economic ideology (reflecting its anti-tax origins) possibly draws more support among men, who have in earlier studies been found to more often uphold anti-statist and neoliberal values. The party's transportation policy, with emphasis on road-building and opposition to toll stations, probably also contributes to this pattern. Neither SD nor BNP has such significant additional policy issues. Indeed, using data of the European Value Survey of 2010, Immerzeel et al. (2015: 17) show that controlling for attitudinal variables explains the gender gap in voting for the Progress Party in Norway, turning it insignificant. This was not true for the other Radical Right parties in their study, which lead the authors to conclude that "[o]nly in Norway does the gender gap decrease by including the attitudinal items" (idem: 17).

## CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, it was argued and shown that the Radical Right gender gap must be understood in the light of the normative conflict surrounding these parties. While the anti-immigrant message of these parties resonates with many voters, the strong social norm against prejudice often prevents parties from fully mobilizing this electorate. Only parties that do not become trapped in conflicts over prejudice and discrimination can grow to substantial electoral significance (Ivarsflaten, 2006a). The parties that are

trapped become ‘toxic’, and their electoral potential is limited to the smaller group of voters who are weakly normatively motivated to control prejudice (Blinder et al., 2013).

This insight is relevant for explaining the Radical Right gender gap. I expected women to have generally internalized the social norm against prejudice more strongly than men. The analysis in this chapter showed that this indeed is the case: in all three countries under study, men scored substantially and significantly lower on the motivation to control prejudice (MCP) scales. Crucially, this difference is much more substantial and consistent than gender gaps in anti-immigrant attitudes reported in the present and other studies. It was hypothesized that motivational differences would explain the low popularity among women of ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties, and this was confirmed. The gender gap in voting for the British National Party and the Sweden Democrats – parties that were ‘toxic’ at the time of our study – disappears after controlling for men’s and women’s different scores on the motivation scale. The electorate of these parties is restricted to less normatively motivated voters – and these are more often male. A different pattern was found in the case of the Norwegian *Progress Party*, which can rely on its legacy as an anti-tax party as well as a more diverse policy portfolio, and did therefore not trigger the anti-prejudice norm to a similar extent. Such parties can draw both voters who are highly motivated to control prejudice and those who are not so.

While it is well-established that Radical Right parties’ image restricts the size of their potential electorate, this chapter further shows *how*. Association to (historic) fascism or violence does not deter all voters to the same extent. After all, negative bias against out-groups appears to be fairly broadly distributed, but is often kept in check by internalized norms to avoid acting based on prejudice. Such motivations, rather than ideology, thus constitute the natural boundary of the Radical Right potential – especially of the more ‘toxic’ parties.

An important implication of this chapter, but one that could not be fully tested, is that Radical Right parties that make a credible effort to distance themselves from extremism, racism, prejudice, and discrimination can experience a “feminization” of their vote, while parties that become trapped in these conflicts are likely to exhibit a stable gender gap. This leads to the more general expectation that a party’s gender gap is a function of how extreme a party is. This will be investigated in the next chapter, in which I again turn to the supply side.