Daring to vote right: Why men are more likely than women to vote for the radical right

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CONCLUSIONS

It has now been more than twenty years since the gender gap in voting for the Radical Right was documented by Betz (1994). Existing studies provide valuable insights but leave many instances of this most consistent and universal gap in contemporary democracies unexplained. The aim of this dissertation has been to systematically investigate the causes of the gender gap, in a range of European countries, from the point of view of various models of voting behavior. Below, I first summarize the findings of the individual chapters. After that, I draw conclusions about the origin of the gender gap in Radical Right voting. I conclude by discussing several broader implications of these findings.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER FINDINGS

A first structuring element of this dissertation consisted of three models of voting. The dissertation started out, in Part I, with investigating the two models that are most dominant in explaining Radical Right voting: a socio-structural and attitudinal one. Based on these models, Chapter 1 established the electoral demand for the Radical Right among men and women using data on the electorates in 16 Western and Eastern European countries. In Chapter 2, I subsequently incorporated the supply side by including expert survey measures of Radical Right parties’ positions on various policy areas.

These chapters yielded evidence for the assertion that the gender gap reflects socio-structural differences between men and women. On average, gender differences in (mainly) occupational position explain part of the gap. Especially, the large share of public sector workers among women turned out to explain why many of them are less supportive of the Radical Right. The finding that job type matters dovetails with Givens (2004). By contrast, gender differences in unemployment, self-perceived class and levels of education contribute less. At the same time, the overall relevance of socio-structural factors masks substantial differences between countries. In some countries – especially in Central-Eastern Europe, but also in several Western cases – they contribute to the gap to a much larger extent.

Chapter 2 showed why. I demonstrated that parties that take a more left-leaning position on socio-economic issues – mostly in the North and East of Europe – have a much larger gender gap than parties that are (or were) more neoliberal in their outlook, such as Northern League (IT), or the National Front (F) in its earlier years. The reason for this appears to be the following. Socio-economically left-wing (‘new winning formula’) Radical Right parties draw more heavily on economically vulnerable working class voters than their more neoliberal counterparts. These groups – mostly private sector unskilled and service workers – (still) consist predominantly of men. As a result, the gender gap mirrors the extent of ‘proletarianization’ (Betz, 1994) of parties.
The attitudinal model fares less well in explaining the gender gap. I found little evidence for the assertion that women are less likely to agree with the Radical Right’s stances. In many countries, I found men to be on average slightly less nativist and authoritarian than women – and in countries where they are not, the differences are small. This is further underlined by the finding that parties with stronger anti-immigration positions do not have larger gender gaps. Neither does the size of the gender gap depend on parties’ stance on emancipatory issues, which refutes the claim that many women would dislike the Radical Right’s alleged sexist outlook.

The evidence for a gendered “protest vote” is mixed. Discontent with democracy is not higher among men. However, such discontent is a more important factor in determining men’s choice for the Radical Right. This could reflect gender differences in internal efficacy, although a preliminary analysis yielded no evidence for this contention. That the appeal of a “protest vote” is higher among men, in spite of equal levels of discontent, became clear by looking at conditionality: the different extent to which factors explain voting among men and women (Howell and Day, 2000) – a methodological approach often overlooked. I show that, in fact, most established attitudinal predictors of Radical Right voting predict men’s vote better than women’s. This amplifies the puzzle guiding this dissertation: women are less likely to vote for the Radical Right even if they agree.

All in all, these conventional models of vote choices leave a substantial part of the gap unexplained. In Part II, I turned to a third model of voting: a socio-psychological one. In Chapter 3, I investigated whether women are more strongly deterred by negative social cues about Radical Right parties. Data from new survey measures, collected among a large sample of Swedish citizens, shows that women are more likely to perceive a vote for the Sweden Democrats as socially highly unacceptable. Furthermore, perceptions of acceptability play a larger role in shaping women’s vote choices than in men’s. This is further confirmed by an experiment in which the social cue associated with a Radical Right and a Green party was manipulated. Denouncement of a Radical Right party by fellow respondents reduced the probability of female respondents to vote for that party, while it did not do so among men. By contrast, endorsement of the Radical Right by fellow participants moved women’s propensity to vote for the party closer to men’s. All in all, it seems that men are less deterred to vote for a party which is portrayed by others as a party “one does not vote for”.

The impact of this mechanism on electoral outcomes was further explored in Chapter 5. Parties – Radical Right or otherwise – that are extremely disliked by large parts of the electorate draw consistently more male than female voters. I show that such social stigma is a significant predictor of the share of male voters among the electorates of dozens of parties, of all political colors, in 30 countries. This is true even when controlling for voters’ own ideological position. Furthermore, I show that also within the Radical Right party family the most strongly stigmatized parties have the largest gender gap. At the same time, the stigma story is nuanced. The experiment of Chapter 3 showed that social denouncement deterred women from voting for a Radical Right party, but not from voting for a Green party. This suggests that social cues are interpreted in the light of the substantial program and conduct of parties. This is further elaborated in
Chapter 4. In it, the guiding hypothesis is that the gap results from differences between men’s and women’s motivation (i.e., latent commitment) to avoid prejudice. It is relevant to again quote Ivarsflaten (2006: 6), who notes that, rather than “the message itself, [it is] the credibility of the actor who delivers it [that] makes the crucial difference”. While the anti-immigrant message of Radical Right parties resonates with many voters, many of these parties also raise normative concerns about discrimination and prejudice, due to fascist or extremist legacies, or contemporary rhetoric and symbols. When parties are trapped in conflicts about discrimination and prejudice, internalized motivations to avoid prejudice can prevent voters from voting for such parties, even if they agree with their programs (Blinder et al., 2010). In all three countries studied in this chapter, men scored substantially and significantly lower on the motivation to control prejudice (MCP) scales. Crucially, this difference is much more substantial and consistent than gender gaps in anti-immigrant attitudes. The analysis showed that motivational differences explain why ‘toxic’ Radical Right parties are particularly unpopular among women. The gender gap in voting for the British National Party and the Sweden Democrats – parties that lacked a ‘reputational shield’ (Ivarsflaten, 2006a) at the time of data collection – disappears after controlling for men’s and women’s different scores on the motivation scale. The electorate of controversial Radical Right parties thus seems restricted to less normatively motivated voters – and these are more often male. By contrast, motivational differences did not create a gender gap among the electorate of the Progress Party in Norway, which is less controversial due to its origins as an anti-tax party and a broader program – in short, its ‘reputational shield’ (Ivarsflaten 2006).

THE GAP AND ITS ORIGINS: MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The gender gap in Radical Right voting is indeed a “complex and intriguing puzzle” (Betz, 1994: 146). However, the preceding chapters provide some insights about its origins. The most important conclusion is the relevance of socio-psychological factors. Two other conclusions are the substantial but conditional impact of socio-structural factors, as well as the minor relevance of differences in men’s and women’s policy preferences. Below, I discuss these three conclusions in the order of their appearance in this dissertation. After that, I build on these conclusions by proposing a classification of parties.

A first conclusion is that men and women’s socio-structural positions (still) contribute to the gap. Apparently, economic roles often found among men are more likely to involve the kind of experiences that foster the values and interests the Radical Right caters to. Somewhat stereotypically, a woman working part-time in the public sector has both a different self-interest and everyday experience than a man having a blue-collar private sector job. This has substantial consequences for these persons’ worldview and political allegiance. Women with blue-collar jobs are also likely to be attracted to the Radical
Right, but still consistently less than men. Socio-structural factors are part of the story, but not the whole story.

In the case of the Radical Right gender gap, the relevance of class has been discarded because earlier scholarly evidence has been mixed (see Coffé, 2012). Scholars found evidence for a socio-structurally induced gender gap in some cases but not in others. I show that these mixed findings in the previous literature become understandable when taking differences at the supply side into account. Radical Right parties differ in their socio-economic worldview and, relatedly, do not all cater to ‘losers of globalization’ to the same extent. Where parties adopt a socio-economically left-leaning ‘new winning formula’ of welfare chauvinism, their ‘proletarianization’ is larger. This, in turn, increases their gender gap. If anything, the development towards a ‘new winning formula’ is likely to continue. Many voters can be found supporting such policies (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009), and a political program that promises protection from the effects of globalization in both an economic and cultural sense fits the emergence of a new axis of political competition (Azmanova, 2011; Kriesi et al., 2008). If Radical Right parties indeed increasingly adapt to this formula, their level of ‘proletarianization’, and thus the size of their gender gap, is likely to grow rather than shrink.

An important side note is that, rather than being fully opposed to a ‘substantive’ vote, class and attitudes occupy different stages in the funnel of causality. Men’s and women’s socio-economic roles are translated into gendered political behavior because of the different experiences and interests involved with these roles. Rather than being ‘automatically’ translated into a class vote, the political expression of such experiences and interests must somehow be mediated by voters’ views on societal issues. For instance, socio-structural theories assume that one of the reasons working class voters are attracted to the Radical Right because they experience more economic and cultural competition from immigrants. This makes the second core finding all the more salient: this dissertation found no consistent, universal or substantial gender difference in support for anti-immigration policies or other core Radical Right issues. This is true for nativism, authoritarianism and discontent with political elites. It follows from this that the gender gap for welfare chauvinist parties reflects a specific combination of nativism and precarious economic situation among a group of ‘working class authoritarian’ men. It confirms that this particular combination of cultural and economic anxiety provides especially fertile ground for electoral mobilization (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009).

The third core finding is that Radical Right parties’ reputations matter. While the anti-immigrant message resonates as strongly with men as with women, women are more likely to stay away from the messenger, especially if that messenger is framed as unacceptable or morally contentious. The evidence in this dissertation would support Johnson and Marini’s (1998: 248) notion of a “greater sense of interdependence and connection to others” among women, who are “more interpersonally oriented, while men are more individualistic and instrumental”. I show that women are more strongly deterred by the stigma that surrounds Radical Right parties. They perceive these parties as less socially acceptable than men do, and perceptions of acceptability play a larger role in their vote choices. Indeed, when in the experiment a Radical Right party was socially
endorsed, the share of women willing to vote for it becomes closer to the share among men. The supply side analysis confirmed that this is generally true for all parties, not only Radical Right ones. This fits the view of men as being more individualistic when making choices (Gilligan, 1982).

However, while gender differences in sensitivity to social cues matter, this does not mean that women more often simply copy all social cues. Rather, social signals are interpreted in the context of existing values and beliefs, and reinforce these. This is where a related mechanism comes into play: men are generally less deterred by many Radical Right parties’ continuing association with illegitimate prejudice. I show that women are across the board more motivated to avoid such prejudice, most likely because the societal norm against prejudice resonates with their abovementioned stronger interpersonal orientations. When confronted with a party that ‘triggers’ the activation of such latent motivations through symbols or associations, women are more likely to be deterred. For many Radical Right parties, their continuing association with extremism constitutes such a trigger (Blinder et al., 2013), while other parties, for instance the Alpine ones, have been more successful in fencing off such associations, and in doing so have reduced their gender gap. This is, therefore, another instance in which taking the supply side into account is crucial. In general, more extreme parties – of the Left or Right – are more popular among male voters.

Of course, social stigma and concerns over prejudice are closely related. While not all parties with a social stigma are associated with prejudice, most openly prejudiced parties will experience a social stigma. This social stigmatization – the signal that this is a party “one does not vote for” – is likely to signal to normatively motivated voters that norms are at stake. This is where the two reputational mechanisms become mutually reinforcing. Indeed, an analysis of the supply side confirmed that men are more likely to vote for parties that are either socially stigmatized or extreme, but also that these two conditions often go together.

In short, from a socio-psychological point of view, the gender gap reflects relatively stronger doubts, among women, about the Radical Right’s legitimacy, as well as the social stigma that surrounds parties without strong ‘reputational shields’. It follows from this that if a non-controversial Radical Right party mobilizes on an equally anti-immigrant platform, without triggering the motivations mentioned above, no gender gap needs to occur. Indeed, several modern(ized) parties have been able to fend off accusations of racism and extremism, while remaining a nativist policy platform. As a result, they attract a broader range of voters (m/f) who are more motivated to control prejudice. If parties manage to further “de-demonize”, as Marine le Pen labels her efforts to increase legitimacy and disconnect from old racist elements in her party, the electorates of such parties are likely to become more gender-equal.

A tale of two gaps

Taken together, these conclusions suggest that the Radical Right experiences two gender gaps of a rather separate origin. One is a reputational gap, depending on the strength of parties’ reputational shield. The other is a class gap, largely depending on
the content of parties’ socio-economic ideology. A party might experience one of these, both of these, or even none of these. While both dimensions are continuous rather than dichotomous, most parties can be roughly categorized as belonging to one of the four types of Table C.1.42

Because protectionism and a weak shield are expected to result in a gender gap, the largest gap can be expected when these factors come together (category III). Conversely, no gap is expected among economically more laissez-faire parties with a strong shield (category IV). Moderate gaps are expected among parties that have only one of the gap-inducing attributes (I and II). Below, I discuss the categories in turn. I illustrate the size of parties’ gender gaps based on the data of Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.

Table C.1 Categorization of Radical Right parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Anti-statist</th>
<th>Protectionist</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaker</td>
<td>I 80S RADICAL RIGHT –</td>
<td>III CLASSIC EXTREME RIGHT 83% male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger</td>
<td>IV NEOLIBERAL POPULIST 48% male</td>
<td>II NEW WINNING FORMULA 61% male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: gap size per category is the average gap for the examples mentioned in the text below based on Table 1.1.

Parties in category I are characterized by the lack of a reputational shield and an socio-economically anti-statist ideology. Although one might categorize many early Radical Right parties – for instance, the National Front (France) in the 1980s – in this category, few (successful) parties in Europe presently fit this category very well. No figures about the gender gap can be presented about this category.

The completely opposite category II consists of parties that have a convincing reputational shield and present themselves as pro-welfare ‘protectors against globalization’. These are modernized (or modernizing) Radical Right parties of the ‘new winning formula’ type. Such parties successfully mobilize on a promise of protection against economic and cultural threats of globalization, proposing welfare chauvinist policies, and manage to get substantial numbers of votes and sometimes enter government coalitions. They are in competition with Social Democrats as well as the mainstream Right and have a relatively ‘proletarianized’ electorate. These parties have a specific gender gap because men are often found in the sort of precarious economic situation that can be found in their electorates. Examples of parties that fit this

42 I use the term ‘reputational shield’ in a somewhat broader fashion than Ivarsflaten (2006), who mainly focuses on the background of parties: what were they founded for? I refer, more generally, to the extent to which parties manage to fend off associations with extremism or racism.
category would be the Danish People’s Party and the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands). Indeed, these parties have substantial but moderate gaps – on average, 62 women for every 100 men. France’s National Front also appears to be moving in this category, and recent studies indeed suggest that this party’s gender gap is narrowing (Mayer, 2013; Mayer, 2015).

Parties in category III combine a weak reputational shield with a socio-economically left-leaning profile. Parties close to this type can predominantly be found in countries in East-Central Europe, where Radical Right parties “are more antiliberal and protectionist than their brethren in the West” (Mudde, 2007: 129). Their socio-economic profile of course differs per country and is not always coherent, but these parties’ “mix of traditional nationalism and state socialism” (idem: 356) is different from the early West-European Radical Right tradition. Indeed, parties in CEE countries “tend to receive more support from the working class than Radical Right parties in Western Europe” (Van der Brug et al. 2013: 70). Such parties can be expected to have very large gaps, given their appeal to less normatively motivated voters and their ‘proletarianized’ electorate. Examples are Greater Romania Party, Jobbik (Hungary) and Attack (Bulgaria), and, indeed, these gaps of these two parties are among the most substantial of all: on average only 52 women for every 100 men. A party from outside the CEE region for which data is available and that could be considered to (largely) fit this combination of a weak reputational shield and a strong appeal to working class voters are the pre-2010 Sweden Democrats, who present themselves as defenders of the “folkhem” of the welfare state but which were also experiencing strong denouncement. This party, too, has an extraordinary large gap: 20 women for every 100 men. At the same time, their seemingly normalization within the Swedish political field after their electoral breakthrough of 2010 is seemingly moving this party closer Scandinavian neighbors in category II.

Parties in category IV, finally, have a convincing reputational shield without fully adopting the ‘new winning formula’, rather staying relatively close to their laissez-faire background. Parties that fit this category are the Swiss People’s Party and to some extent also the Freedom Party in Austria (Mudde, 2007: 123). Both parties obtain their reputational shields from their origins in the mainstream right. Northern League (Italy) could also be considered fitting in this category. It obtained a reputational shield from being founded not for anti-immigrant but anti-Rome purposes, and did not experience the cordon sanitaire of the co-regionalists of Flemish Interest (Belgium). At the same time, the Alpine parties’ economically more liberal outlook provides them with a relatively broad electorate in socio-economic terms. Table 1.1 provides no estimates for the size of the gap for Swiss People’s Party, but the gaps for Freedom Party and Northern League are indeed non-substantial (97 women for every 100 Freedom Party men) and absent (113 women for every 100 Northern League men).

In short, the previous chapters provide evidence for two different core mechanisms to be at work to shape gender gaps: the overrepresentation of men among the electorate of relative ‘proletarianized’ parties, and a stronger sensitivity of women concerning
the lack of a reputational shield. These mechanisms could be combined to conceive of a categorization of parties that provides a plausible division of subfamilies of the Radical Right. These categories subsequently fare well in explaining gender gap patterns: the largest gaps are found among parties that are both ‘proletarianized’ and extremist, while the gap is almost absent for broad-appeal parties with a reputational shield.

**IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

Below, I discuss some implications of these findings for understanding and studying gender, social cues, and the Radical Right.

**Gender gaps**

A first set of implications concerns our understanding of gender gaps more generally. This dissertation confirmed that socio-structural differences continue to shape differences in men’s and women’s vote choices. This is true in spite of the alleged decline of class voting, and notwithstanding an ongoing development towards a (relatively) less gender-stratified economy. Ongoing differences in men’s and women’s roles inside (or their position outside) the labor market thus still shape their political choices in all sorts of contexts (Bergh, 2007). Another relevant finding is that men and women – at least with regard to the cases studied in this dissertation – were found to agree (on average) on a range of relevant concrete issues. While some aggregated differences exist, they were not substantial enough to clearly discern ‘the’ male and ‘the’ female policy position. At the same time, the relevance of many issues for vote choices differed between men and women. This suggests that ideological gender differences might be most pronounced in terms of saliency (Howell & Day, 2000; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). An important task in this respect is to measure saliency as directly as possible. After all, in this dissertation, the presence of interactions between gender and immigrant attitudes reflected more than just differences in issue saliency; rather, it pointed to the existence of overriding considerations.

While differences in attitudes were minor, evidence does point to a ‘different voice’ (Gilligan 1982) on a more fundamental level. The findings in this dissertation are in line with a “greater orientation [among women] toward relationships and interdependence, [implying] a more contextual mode of judgment and a different moral understanding” (idem: 22). I show that aversion to stigma and extremity plays an important role in shaping the gender balance of all sorts of parties around the world. This finding is the first evidence of a consistent and universal role played by these factors. Further research along this lines can help to arrive at a more extensive understanding of their impact.

While the novel mechanisms discussed in this dissertation could well explain the overrepresentation of men among – especially but not only – Radical Right and Communist parties, they seem less suited to explain why certain parties’ electorates experience an underrepresentation of men. This is a third point: the mere absence of stigma or the lack of a prejudiced reputation can only to a limited extend explain why, say, Green parties attract so relatively many female voters. After all, this controversial
aspect is absent for many more parties. The previous chapters suggest two preliminary explanations that can be explored in further research.

The most obvious one concerns the socio-economic background of the electorate of female-dominated parties. At least in the case of Green parties, their electorates have been found to be in many respects the mirror image of those of Radical Right parties (Oesch 2008). A second explanation might lie in the ‘other side of the same coin’ of the interpersonal orientation mechanisms discussed in this dissertation. Turning that argument around, one would predict an overrepresentation of women among parties that have an inclusive reputation. This goes beyond merely proposing pro-welfare or multiculturalist policies – gender gaps in such policy preferences do not seem to be very substantial (and, at any rate, the pro-welfare policies proposed by some Radical Right parties did not close the gender gap). Again, it might be relevant to separate the messenger from the message. Future research could focus on investigating whether and how ‘Frauenparteien’ (Mudde, 2007: 116) share an outlook and conduct alluring to preferences for social harmony, as opposed to endorsing social hierarchies (Sidanius et al., 2000).

Social cues and voting
Secondly, this dissertation shows that studies of political behavior can greatly benefit from acknowledging that “a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially” (Berelson et al., 1964). Conventional models of individual-level voting behavior risk overlooking relevant social elements that go into voters’ decision. I showed that studying the social context of voting – both intimate and general – provided insights in voting behavior that were puzzling from the point of view of existing models of party choice.

At the same time, scholars aiming to study such social aspects of political behavior invariably bump into methodological problems (Zuckerman 2009). In this dissertation, I have shown that studying the effects of social cues is possible, even in large-N contexts. First, the experimental design of Chapter 3 proved able to plausibly uncover a social cue mechanism at the individual level. If the weak bond respondents will feel towards fellow survey-takers is enough to observe social cueing, it is likely that its influence is even more powerful in ‘real’ social contexts. Furthermore, these conclusions were cross-validated by direct survey questions about reputations, which shows that the latter can to some extent grasp the relevant mechanisms when experimental designs are not feasible. These methods can be used to further investigate which groups other than women are relatively sensitive to social cues.

Second, the comparative-aggregated analysis of Chapter 5 also enabled the observation of the effects of stigma by virtue of comparing a large number of cases. By aggregating reputations at the level of the polity as a whole, cross-level interactions with individual characteristics can be used to observe different susceptibilities to such reputations while avoiding the endogeneity issues discussed above. This approach can also be used on lower levels of aggregations, like schools, municipalities, or social circles.
Radical Right

A final set of implications concerns our understanding of Radical Right parties and their voters. First, this dissertation confirms that the supply side matters when studying the electorates of parties. The selection of cases will determine which factors will prove most relevant in predicting vote choices. This became most clear with regard to parties’ socio-economic ideology. Parties may or may not adopt the ‘new winning formula’ of pro-welfare nativism. This is, however, more than window-dressing. The chapter shows that such shifts have substantive implications for the composition of the electorate, in terms of class and gender.

However, a second aspect of parties’ “supply” cannot be controlled so easily. Radical Right parties’ reputations are a ‘sticky’ feature that constrains their electoral potential among various groups. While it is well-known that Radical Right parties’ legitimacy strongly determines their ability to achieve electoral success (Ignazi, 2005, Cole, 2005, Ivarsflaten, 2006; Bos and Van der Brug, 2010), I show how reputations shape the size and composition of parties’ electorate. After all, negative bias against out-groups appears to be fairly broadly distributed, but is often kept in check by internalized norms to avoid acting based on prejudice (Blinder et al. 2010). Such motivations, rather than issue positions on immigration, thus constitute the natural boundary of the Radical Right potential – especially of the more ‘toxic’ parties. This can help to understand the weak correlation between the extent of anti-immigrant public opinion and Radical Right success (Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2005). Investigating which groups other than women are generally more motivated to control prejudice will lead to a better understanding of the Radical Right electorate than studying the distribution of restrictionist immigration attitudes alone. At the same time, the relevance of such motivations is conditional on the strength of parties’ reputational shield. If parties can prevent associations with prejudice, their potential electorate is much broader. Parties can make credible attempts at increasing their perceived legitimacy, as Marine le Pen aims with her project of dédiabolisation. At the same time, reputations are usually sticky (Ivarsflaten, 2006) and changes in perceived legitimacy will in all likelihood happen gradually, if at all.

The previous points have consequences for how we model Radical Right voting. Mudde (2007: 225) noted that “[o]ne of the fundamental problems of most empirical studies on the electoral support of populist radical right parties is the underlying assumption of one homogeneous electorate.” Finding ‘the’ Radical Right voter is problematic in the obvious sense that vote models are always probabilistic and incomplete. However, the profile of ‘the’ voter also differs between (subgroups of) Radical Right parties. Given the two ways – reputational and ideological – in which I found the supply side to matter, the categorization along the lines proposed in Table C.1 might be a way forward to better explain patterns of voting behavior among different members of the Radical Right party family. Incorporating interactions between supply and demand is not only the most fruitful way forward to increase the quality of our models of Radical Right voting, but also of voting in general.
In short, greater consideration of this interaction between supply and demand, and one which does justice to the varying set of criteria that go into the vote choice equation for different voters (m/f), might hopefully solve more ‘complex and intriguing puzzles’.