

Appendix for “Preaching to the Converted: Misinformation and Voter Preferences in India”

- (A) Vignette Visuals
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A Vignette Visuals

Sometimes, Muharram and Durga Pooja processions overlap.

Figure A.1. I: Control

Sometimes, Muharram and Durga Pooja processions overlap.

On this issue, please see the following newspaper clip:

Times of India, Kolkata, 03/02/2021
Bijaya Kumar

Yogi: Why Muharram, not Durga Puja?



Yogi Adityanath in Purulia, West Bengal, on Tuesday: ANI

Note: For research purposes only.

On Tuesday, BJP leader Yogi Adityanath said that “Mamata allows Muharram processions but not Durga Pooja. This government creates obstacles for Saraswati Pooja and Janmashtami as well.”

Figure A.2. II: Treatment BJP (Muslim Favoritism)

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On Tuesday, BJP leader Yogi Adityanath said that “Mamata allows Muharram processions but not Durga Pooja. This government creates obstacles for Saraswati Pooja and Janmashtami as well.”

However, an independent investigation reveals that this allegation is false. The Government allowed both processions, Durga Pooja and Muharram.

Figure A.3. III: Treatment BJP with Correction

Sometimes, Muharram and Durga Pooja processions overlap.

On this issue, please see the following newspaper clip:

Times of India, Kolkata, 03/02/2021
Bijaya Kumar

Siddiqui: Why Durga Pooja, not Muharram?



Abbas Siddiqui in Hooghly, West Bengal, on Tuesday: ANI

Note: For research purposes only.

On Tuesday, Indian Secular Front leader Abbas Siddiqui said that “Mamata allows Ram Navami and Durga pooja processions but not Muharram. This government creates obstacles for Muslim festivals as well.”

Figure A.4. IV: Treatment ISF (Hindu Favoritism)

Sometimes, Muharram and Durga Pooja processions overlap.

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Times of India, Kolkata, 03/02/2021
Bijaya Kumar

Siddiqui: Why Durga Pooja, not Muharram?



Abbas Siddiqui in Hooghly, West Bengal, on Tuesday: ANI

Note: For research purposes only.

On Tuesday, Indian Secular Front leader Abbas Siddiqui said that “Mamata allows Ram Navami and Durga pooja processions but not Muharram. This government creates obstacles for Muslim festivals as well.”

However, an independent investigation reveals that this allegation is false. The Government allowed both processions, Durga Pooja and Muharram.

Figure A.5. V: Treatment ISF with Correction

B Survey Methodology & Field Report

The survey was carried out in collaboration with Cicero Associates from September 24th and October 12th, 2021. A total sample of 2,885 respondents was achieved. Interviews were spread across 195 polling booths in 65 assembly constituencies of West Bengal. These constituencies were selected after drawing multiple sets of 65 Assembly Constituencies out of the total 294 Assembly Constituencies and compared for levels of demographic and political representativeness against demographic data from the 2011 Census of India and past election results from the Election Commission of India. The most representative set was selected. Within each Assembly Constituency, three Polling Booths were randomly sampled. In each polling booth, respondents were sampled from the latest electoral rolls obtained from the Election Commission of India. Two sets of 15 respondents were randomly sampled from the electoral rolls, one treated as the primary list and the other as a reserve list. A sample size of 2,885 respondents corresponds to a 50% response rate. The achieved sample was representative of the social and political demography of West Bengal (see Table B.1).

The data collection method employed Computer Assisted Interpersonal Interviewing (CAPI). All interviews were conducted face-to-face using Cicero’s application for data collection and transmission. Before starting the questionnaire, each respondent’s informed consent was recorded after reading out the ‘Statement of Informed Consent’. Vote choice was recorded using a dummy electronic voting machine (EVM) in order to maintain confidentiality. All survey experiments, treatments, and randomization were programmed in the application. Geo-tagging of polling stations helped in monitoring movement, and variables such as time stamps helped in identifying systematic errors. All data were saved on a secure cloud server.

A training workshop was conducted in Kolkata on September 23rd, 2021. The field manager and one of the authors [Name withheld to preserve anonymity] trained 20 Field Investigators and three supervisors. The next day teams of four Field Investigators were sent to conduct a pilot survey in five pre-dominantly urban constituencies around Kolkata.

TABLE B.1. Sample Profile: Census 2011 and Survey

	Census	Survey	Control	M1	M2	M3	M4
	Percentage of Sample						
Rural	68.2	73.5	76.6	77.3	78.7	77.2	78.9
Urban	31.8	26.5	23.4	22.7	21.3	22.8	21.1
Male	51.3	50.9	49.8	50.8	53.9	50.9	50.3
Female	48.7	49.0	50.2	49.1	46.1	49.1	49.7
SC	23.0	24.6	22.1	27.3	27.8	24.4	25.1
ST	5.5	5.6	6.5	5.5	6.1	5.0	7.0
Hindu	70.5	75.6	74.0	72.7	78.7	74.3	77.6
Muslim	27.0	22.7	24.4	25.2	20.1	23.7	21.1
	Percentage of Vote-Share						
INC	2.9	2.6	3.1	2.9	3.3	1.7	2.9
BJP	38.1	22.0	19.4	21.8	24.0	23.7	24.0
TMC	47.9	61.2	64.2	62.2	59.4	59.6	57.7
Left	4.7	6.3	5.9	6.1	6.7	6.1	6.0
Others	6.3	7.9	7.4	7.0	6.5	9.0	9.4

The purpose of conducting a small pilot was to identify whether a sufficient response rate could be achieved, and whether respondents' answers would . Specifically, due to the Delta wave of Covid, we were concerned about response rates and whether respondents would be comfortable sharing their views in unbiased ways. The pilot did not reveal systematic problems with response rate or the substance of responses. Response rates were only marginally lower, and while we did find over-reporting of winning TMC at the cost of the runner up, over-reporting was within the expected margin. Any effect would be to downward bias our findings and hence make it more difficult to find sub-group effects. For the full survey, fielded from 27th September, field Investigators were divided in three groups; one stationed in the Cooch Bihar region, the second in Murshidabad, and the third in Kolkata. The survey was completed on October 12th, 2021.

C Ethical Considerations

Conducting surveys on sensitive topics such as misinformation raises ethical concerns that require risk management. Consistent with the American Political Science Association’s guidelines on human subjects research (APSA, 2020), our ethics assessment established protocols to obtain informed consent and maintain confidentiality, to minimize potential harm for respondents and enumerators, and to minimize deception, which we discuss in turn.³⁰ To protect the integrity of respondents, enumerators were instructed to interview individuals in their homes. Interviews started after respondents provided verbal consent to participate in the study. The consent process entailed informing respondents that participation is voluntary, can be withdrawn at any point, and that data collected will be treated with confidentiality and respondent identity not disclosed. Respondents were also informed about the institutional affiliation and contact details of the responsible researchers. Misinformation as biased and false information can risk harm to respondents and enumerators, including spreading misinformation to respondents not previously exposed or deepening beliefs in misinformation. We took several steps to reduce these risks. First, our vignette does not generate new misinformation. The vignette quotes verbatim from a political leader’s campaign speech. Respondents would routinely be exposed to this type of misinformation by political leaders campaigning for office. Second, an in-person survey provides us with greater control over how respondents interact with misinformation. In particular, enumerators can make sure that respondents do not take screenshots of misinformation and share it with others. Enumerators could also pay attention to respondents’ reaction to the survey and offer to end it if they became visibly upset. Third, the misinformation was not directed against any community or individual, instead priming religious issues at a more general level. Finally, enumerators debriefed

³⁰The COVID-19 epidemic posed risks for enumerators and respondents. We had planned to field the survey right after respondents had voted in each round (thus from late April until early May), but had to postpone it by several months due to the Delta outbreak in India. We implemented the survey only after the local government permitted business activity and free movement. We required that all enumerators were vaccinated and developed and implemented a COVID-protocol for enumerators.

respondents at the end of the survey.

D Baseline Tests & Summary Statistics

TABLE D.1. Covariate balance.

	Treatment Assignment			
	M1	M2	M3	M4
Hindu	0.125 (0.433)	0.785 (0.513)	0.085 (0.424)	0.492 (0.471)
Muslim	0.422 (0.449)	0.669 (0.530)	0.226 (0.441)	0.441 (0.489)
Scheduled Caste	0.293 (0.177)	0.257 (0.181)	-0.036 (0.176)	0.091 (0.182)
Scheduled Tribe	-0.159 (0.283)	-0.047 (0.283)	-0.593* (0.297)	-0.106 (0.280)
Other Backward Caste	-0.044 (0.150)	0.045 (0.156)	-0.322* (0.149)	-0.157 (0.156)
BJP Voter	0.239 (0.197)	0.204 (0.200)	0.127 (0.195)	0.072 (0.201)
TMC Voter	0.048 (0.168)	-0.037 (0.172)	-0.164 (0.166)	-0.194 (0.172)
Age	0.077 (0.183)	0.149 (0.189)	0.232 (0.186)	-0.216 (0.192)
Income	-0.249* (0.112)	-0.049 (0.116)	-0.161 (0.113)	0.000 (0.117)
Religious	0.198 (0.189)	0.222 (0.197)	0.096 (0.195)	0.285 (0.197)
Constant	1.785 (1.363)	-1.018 (1.428)	0.816 (1.373)	0.307 (1.429)
Observations	2640			
Log Likelihood	-4219.449			
Chi-squared	48.528			

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. M1=Allegation of Muslim favoritism by BJP leader. M2=Allegation of Hindu favoritism by ISF front leader. M3=Allegation of Muslim favoritism by BJP leader with factual correction. M4=Allegation of Hindu favoritism by ISF front leader with factual correction.

TABLE D.2. Baseline Tests and summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
Policy Preferences	2666	.042	.299
Beliefs About Incumbent	2568	-.01	.365
Polarization	2666	.091	.288
BJP Voter	2885	.220	.414
TMC Voter	2885	.612	.487
Hindu	2885	.756	.430

E Preferences After Exposure to Misinformation




Figure E.1. Voter preferences after exposure to BJP's campaign misinformation




Figure E.2. Voter preferences after exposure to ISF's campaign misinformation

TABLE E.1. Replicating Table III with Control Group as Base Category

Dependent Variable:	Policy Preferences		
	M1	M2	M3
Misinformation BJP	0.020 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.039)	-0.031 (0.016)
Misinformation ISF	0.021 (0.018)	-0.031 (0.040)	-0.007 (0.018)
Misinformation & Correction BJP	-0.005 (0.017)	0.021 (0.047)	0.003 (0.019)
Misinformation & Correction ISF	-0.010 (0.016)	0.009 (0.039)	-0.014 (0.016)
Hindu	0.098*** (0.014)	0.080* (0.032)	0.094*** (0.014)
BJP Voter	0.135*** (0.017)	0.134*** (0.017)	0.052 (0.033)
Misinformation BJP × Hindu		0.061 (0.043)	
Misinformation ISF × Hindu		0.070 (0.045)	
Misinformation & Correction BJP × Hindu		-0.032 (0.050)	
Misinformation & Correction ISF × Hindu		-0.023 (0.043)	
Misinformation BJP × BJP Voter			0.244*** (0.055)
Misinformation ISF × BJP Voter			0.138** (0.051)
Misinformation & Correction BJP × BJP Voter			-0.022 (0.048)
Misinformation & Correction ISF × BJP Voter			0.036 (0.047)
Constant	-0.067*** (0.017)	-0.054 (0.029)	-0.049** (0.017)
Adj R-squared	0.065	0.067	0.083
N	2666	2666	2666

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models report OLS estimates. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The dependent variable (DV) measures policy preferences. Respondents were asked “*If there were to be an overlap between Muharram and Durga Pooja, what should the government do?*” The DV is coded as 1 for a reported preference for Hindu favoritism, 0 for equal treatment of Hindus and Muslims, and -1 for a reported preference for Muslim favoritism. The reference group consists of respondents in the control group.

F Beliefs After Exposure to Misinformation




Figure F.1. Beliefs after exposure to BJP's campaign misinformation




Figure F.2. Beliefs after exposure to ISF's campaign misinformation

TABLE F.1. Replicating Table V with Control Group as Base Category

Dependent Variable:	Belief that Government is not Secular		
	M1	M2	M3
Misinformation BJP	0.017 (0.019)	0.008 (0.033)	-0.010 (0.020)
Misinformation ISF	0.045* (0.021)	0.007 (0.035)	0.007 (0.021)
Misinformation & Correction BJP	0.023 (0.021)	0.080 (0.044)	0.028 (0.022)
Misinformation & Correction ISF	0.005 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.021)
Hindu	0.017 (0.014)	0.014 (0.029)	0.014 (0.014)
BJP Voter	0.151*** (0.019)	0.150*** (0.019)	0.075 (0.040)
Misinformation BJP × Hindu		0.011 (0.041)	
Misinformation ISF × Hindu		0.049 (0.043)	
Misinformation & Correction BJP × Hindu		-0.072 (0.050)	
Misinformation & Correction ISF × Hindu		0.020 (0.043)	
Misinformation BJP × BJP Voter			0.133* (0.059)
Misinformation ISF × BJP Voter			0.174** (0.061)
Misinformation & Correction BJP × BJP Voter			-0.007 (0.057)
Misinformation & Correction ISF × BJP Voter			0.073 (0.059)
Constant	0.069*** (0.017)	0.072** (0.024)	0.086*** (0.017)
Adj R-squared	0.036	0.037	0.043
N	2568	2568	2568

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models report OLS estimates. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The dependent variable (DV) measures beliefs about government policy. Respondents were asked “*When there is an overlap between Muharram and Durga Pooja, what does the government do?*”. DV=1 when respondent reports that government facilitates only Hindus or only Muslims; and 0 otherwise. The reference group comprises of respondents in the control group.

G Polarization After Exposure to Misinformation

We describe results for misinformation’s effects on polarization in policy preferences. A political party could benefit from misinformation if it enhances cohesion among supporters or exacerbates divisions between supporters and non-supporters. If misinformation is processed along the religious identities, it could polarize Hindus into two camps, one preferring secularism and the other majoritarianism. This scenario would be beneficial for the BJP because it would create a clear choice for Hindus, with those favoring majoritarianism opting to align with BJP. If, on the other hand, misinformation is processed along partisan lines, it will not convince non-BJP supporters. Instead, it could split BJP supporters into two camps with distinct policy preferences. This scenario is problematic for the BJP since it will require that the party to satisfy diverse policy preferences among its own voters. To ascertain these possibilities, we examine a pre-registered hypotheses on polarization resulting from exposure to misinformation. Overall, we find exposure to BJP’s campaign misinformation does not create clear between-party segmentation differentiating the BJP from TMC; instead, the misinformation creates divergent preferences among BJP supporters.

Table G.1 reports the average treatment effects of campaign misinformation on policy polarization. Polarization is measured as each respondent’s squared distance to the group median issue preference (Bischof and Wagner, 2019).³¹ In the control group, we find that preference polarization among Muslims is twice that among Hindus. This means that there is more preference dissonance among Muslims as compared to that among Hindus. However, there are no statistically significant differences in polarization between the BJP and TMC camps. Exposure to campaign misinformation does not result in a statistically significant increase in preference polarization among those exposed to BJP’s campaign

³¹

$$\text{Polarization} = (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2 \tag{1}$$

where, Y_i equals 0, 1, or -1 and \bar{Y} is the median value of Y .

TABLE G.1. Polarization After Exposure to BJP’s Campaign Misinformation

DV	Polarization		
	M1	M2	M3
Misinformation BJP	0.030 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.016)
Misinformation ISF	0.035* (0.018)	-0.013 (0.039)	0.016 (0.018)
Hindu	-0.053** (0.017)	-0.091** (0.030)	-0.056** (0.017)
BJP Voter	0.166*** (0.023)	0.164*** (0.023)	0.047 (0.032)
Misinformation BJP × Hindu		0.051 (0.042)	
Misinformation ISF × Hindu		0.065 (0.043)	
Misinformation BJP × BJP Voter			0.236*** (0.054)
Misinformation ISF × BJP Voter			0.105** (0.051)
Constant	0.082*** (0.019)	0.110*** (0.028)	0.107*** (0.019)
Adj R-squared	0.051	0.052	0.067
N	1666	1666	1666

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models report OLS estimates. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The dependent variable (DV) measures polarization in policy preferences. The reference group consists of respondents in the control group (no misinformation).

misinformation (see Column M1 of Table G.1) and there are no discernible effects among Hindus specifically (see Columns M2 of G.1). Disaggregating by partisanship, we find that exposure to misinformation results in greater polarization among BJP voters. Thus, it appears that the BJP’s campaign misinformation causes policy dissonance within its own camp.

We use the categorical dependent variable, to provide an alternate interpretation of polarization. We measure within-group fractionalization in terms of the *effective* number of policy positions (ENP).³² In a non-polarized or unipolar society, everyone will prefer the same policy, and the ENP will equal 1. In a perfectly polarized system with two equal

³²We use a modified version of the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979):

$$\text{Polarization}_{\text{ENP}} = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^N r_i^2} \quad (2)$$

where π_i is the proportion of each policy group (equal treatment of Hindus and Muslims, Muslim favoritism, Hindu favoritism) and N is the number of groups.

TABLE G.2. Polarization: Effective Number of Policy Positions

	All	Hindus	Muslims	TMC	BJP
Control	1.327	1.283	1.415	1.293	1.395
Treatment BJP	1.473	1.427	1.525	1.316	2.019
Treatment BJP with Correction	1.364	1.340	1.481	1.343	1.567
Treatment ISF	1.544	1.524	1.595	1.482	1.813
Treatment ISF with Correction	1.338	1.316	1.418	1.289	1.438
Treatment (Any Misinformation)	1.507	1.474	1.557	1.391	1.920
Treatment (Any Correction)	1.351	1.329	1.450	1.317	1.502

sized groups with diametric preferences, ENP will equal 2. We observe that, prior to exposure to campaign misinformation, ENP ranges between 1.3 to 1.4 across various subgroups comprising of Hindus and Muslims, and TMC and BJP partisans (see Table G.2). When exposed to the BJP’s campaign misinformation, within-BJP ENP increases from 1.4 to 2, indicating that the BJP is perfectly polarized into two factions. This is undesirable for any party: instead of clear between-party segmentation differentiating the BJP from TMC, the BJP ends up with within-party factions and a discordant base.

H Exposure to Trump's Misinformation

TABLE H.1. Perceptions After Exposure to Trump's Misinformation

DV	Perception of Change in Crime			
	M1	M2	M3	M4
Misinformation	-0.023 (0.040)	-0.087 (0.062)	-0.070 (0.049)	-0.122 (0.077)
Misinformation \times White		0.133 (0.082)		
Misinformation \times Trump Supporter			0.157* (0.077)	
Misinformation \times White \times Trump Supporter				0.283* (0.111)
Misinformation \times non-White \times Trump Supporter				0.117 (0.120)
Misinformation \times White \times non-Trump Supporter				0.120 (0.100)
White		-0.303*** (0.056)		
Trump Supporter			0.415*** (0.054)	
White \times Trump Supporter				0.138 [†] (0.078)
non-White \times Trump Supporter				0.319*** (0.080)
White \times non-Trump Supporter				-0.354*** (0.068)
Constant	0.244*** (0.028)	0.409*** (0.041)	0.124*** (0.034)	0.317*** (0.050)
R-squared	-0.000	0.020	0.073	0.096
N	1681	1608	1681	1608

[†] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

TABLE H.2. Perceptions After Exposure to Trump’s Misinformation & Correction

DV	Perception of Change in Crime			
	M1	M2	M3	M4
Correction	-0.443*** (0.034)	-0.409*** (0.055)	-0.431*** (0.040)	-0.418*** (0.067)
Correction × White		-0.088 (0.071)		
Correction × Trump Supporter			-0.035 (0.067)	
Correction × White × Trump Supporter				-0.095 (0.097)
Correction × non-White × Trump Supporter				0.041 (0.109)
Correction × White × non-Trump Supporter				-0.082 (0.084)
White		-0.170** (0.061)		
Trump Supporter			0.572*** (0.055)	
White × Trump Supporter				0.421*** (0.080)
non-White × Trump Supporter				0.436*** (0.090)
White × non-Trump Supporter				-0.234** (0.074)
Constant	0.221*** (0.029)	0.322*** (0.047)	0.055 (0.035)	0.195*** (0.058)
R-squared	0.045	0.066	0.122	0.154
N	3302	3142	3302	3142

† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

I Registered Pre-Analysis Plan

I.1 Study Description

We will examine three sets of questions. The first pertains to the propensity to believe in political misinformation. Specifically, we will examine if citizens are more (less) likely to believe in misinformation alleging favoritism towards outgroups (ingroups); and if they are more likely to believe in misinformation spread by co-partisans. The second question relates the efficacy of correction of political misinformation. Particularly, we study the conditions under which correction of misinformation is works. Third, we examine if misinformation leads to greater distrust and polarization among all citizens; or only among citizens with strong prejudices against outgroups.

I.2 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Exposure to misinformation makes respondents less knowledgeable of government policy.

Hypothesis 2: Exposure to correction, makes respondents more knowledgeable of government policy as compared to those who are only exposed to misinformation but less knowledgeable as compared to those who were never exposed to misinformation.

Hypothesis 3: People are more (less) likely to believe in misinformation alleging favoritism towards outgroups (ingroups).

Hypothesis 4: People are more likely to believe in misinformation spread by one's own political party.

Hypothesis 5: Correction of political misinformation is less effective when the misinformation is spread by one's own political party.

Hypothesis 6: Exposure to misinformation aggravates polarization, but the effects are larger among those with prior outgroup prejudice.

I.3 Study Design

A researcher randomly assigns treatments to study subjects, this includes field or lab experiments. This is also known as an intervention experiment and includes randomized controlled trials.

Blinding. For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

Study design. We will examine our research questions and test our hypotheses using a public opinion survey with an embedded vignette experiment. The survey will be administered in West Bengal in India during the month of September and October in 2021. We will use misinformation drawn from a real campaign speech. We will use a vignette experiment to examine how misinformation shapes people’s understanding of civic knowledge and evaluation of the incumbent government.

Randomization. The randomization will take place at the individual level. The respondents will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned. The respondents will be randomly assigned to one of five vignettes.

I.4 Sampling Plan

Explanation of existing data. The data is still being collected by the survey organization. We have not seen individual or summarized data. For the pilot round, we did see the data to check if the randomization is working as intended.

Data collection procedures. We will survey respondents based on representative random probability samples drawn from the voter registry. The survey will be implemented by Cicero Associates, which specializes in exit polling, surveys, and psephology.

Sample size. We will conduct a survey with approximately 3,000 respondents.

Sample size rationale. We estimate that a sample size of 3,000 will be adequate to obtain sufficient statistical power. To arrive at the estimated sample size, we conducted a power analysis using effect sizes based on prior research. Specifically, we use estimates from Badrinathan, Chauchard, and Flynn (2020), which measures the effect of correction on a range of incorrect claims in the neighboring state of Bihar in India.

Stopping rule. We provide each surveyor with a randomly drawn list of 30 names from each polling booth. The surveyor starts with the first name and continues till he/she has completed 15 surveys.

I.5 Variables

Manipulated variables. We assigned each respondent to one of five vignettes: Vignette I, II, III, IV, and V.

Measured variables. We will measure the DV based on responses to Q31 and Q32 of the survey.³³ We will measure partisan priors on the basis on their responses to Religion (Q5), Caste (Q4), Vote-Choice (Q10), Partisan Affiliation (Q12), Media Usage and Consumption (Q13, Q14, Q15, and Q16), Policy Preference (Q20 and Q21), Outgroup / Ingroup Sentiment (Q22 and Q26).³⁴

Indices. We will use responses to Q20, Q21, and Q32 to create a scale on policy preferences on state-religion relationship.

³³This corresponds to the questions, “*What should the government do in case of an overlap...*” and “*What does the government do in case of an overlap...*”.

³⁴The sample is balanced on all of these covariates. See Appendix D

I.6 Analysis Plan

Statistical models. We will estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of our independent variables on our outcome variable indicators with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Our baseline regression models will include pre-treatment covariates, but we will also report unadjusted models.

Inference criteria. We will use the standard $p < 0.05$ criteria for determining if the mean values for the treatment and the control groups are significantly different from those expected if the null hypothesis were correct.

Missing data. Treat it as “No Response” but keep it in the survey.