Young Asian Dutch constructing Asianness
Understanding the role of Asian popular culture
Kartosen, R.A.

Publication date
2016
Document Version
Final published version

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
CHAPTER 2

Articulating Asianness: Young Asian Dutch and Asian/Asian Dutch popular culture

A shortened version of this chapter has been published as:

This study explores young Asian Dutch’ cultural identifications in relation to their consumption of media and popular culture. More specifically, this study focuses on young Asian Dutch’ panethnic Asian cultural identifications and their consumption of non-homeland popular media as well as so-called Asian parties. The scholarship on the consumption of media and popular culture by ethnic minorities is growing. In particular ethnic minorities’ consumption of (popular) media from their homelands has received quite some scholarly attention in recent years (e.g., Aksoy & Robins, 2000; Chow, Zwier, & Van Zoonen, 2008; D’Haenens, Van Summeren, Saeys, & Koeman, 2004; Hafez, 2007; Peeters & D’Haenens, 2005). For example, Aksoy and Robins (2000) focus on Turkish migrants in Germany and the UK and their consumption of transnational television from Turkey, while Peeters and D’Haenens (2005) have studied members of the four largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands and their consumption of media from the Netherlands and their countries of origin. These studies have enhanced our understanding of the relationship between ethnic minorities’ cultural identifications and their consumption of homeland (popular) media.

However, ethnic minorities’ consumption of media and popular culture from countries that they may perceive as sharing similarities with their homelands in terms of culture and people – for example the consumption of Chinese films by Vietnamese Dutch – is an under-researched area. Research on the latter is warranted because it may be an articulation of panethnic Asian identifications that transcend traditional cultural boundaries. Furthermore, so far no studies have investigated these panethnic Asian identifications of Asian Dutch as a combined panethnic group (although Boogaarts (2009) does report on panethnic Asian parties in the Netherlands). In addition to Dutch and Asian homeland cultural identifications (e.g., Chinese or Indonesian), young Asian Dutch appear to engender novel, less territorially limited and less culturally exclusive panethnic Asian cultural identifications – they self-identify as Asian as well.

We suggest that young Asian Dutch’ consumption of popular culture from non-homeland Asian countries as well as panethnic Asian Dutch popular culture (i.e., Asian parties), is an articulation of their Asian cultural identifications. And in turn, the consumption of non-homeland Asian and panethnic Asian Dutch popular culture provides them with cultural material and discursive spaces to explore and articulate Asian cultural identifications. In this study young Asian Dutch’ (patterns of) consumption of films, television series, popular music and nightlife will be investigated. While studies on ethnic minorities often place emphasis on news media representations and consumption, here the focus is on popular media. Notwithstanding the importance of news media, the present study thus underlines the pivotal role of popular culture in processes of social identification and the production of meaning in everyday life, especially where it concerns youth and young adults (e.g., Fiske, 1990; Hermes, 2005; Van Zoonen, 2003).

The present study, then, is the starting point for investigating the relationship between young Asian Dutch’ Asian cultural identifications and their consumption of non-homeland Asian and panethnic Asian Dutch popular culture, and will thus address
the gaps in the research on Asian Dutch as well as Asian cultural identification. This study will thus contribute to a more encompassing understanding of the processes of cultural identification young ethnic minorities are engaged in and their practices of the articulation thereof. We will explore how young Asian Dutch’ consumption of media from different countries is related to their configurations of Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identifications. Following this, we will zoom in on non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties to investigate whether there is a relationship between young Asian Dutch’ Asian cultural identifications and the Asian cultural identification gratification they obtain from non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Conceptualizing ‘Cultural Identification’

The first objective of the present study is to explore young Asian Dutch’ cultural identifications. More specifically, the focus is on young Asian Dutch’ self-identification as Dutch, homeland-ethnic (e.g., Chinese or Indonesian) and panethnic Asian. Before conceptualizing ‘cultural identification’ as employed in this study, it is helpful to look at ‘cultural identity’ first. This study is premised on the notion that ‘groups’, ‘communities’, ‘ethnicities’, ‘cultures’ and ultimately ‘identities’ are socially constructed, rather than real and natural entities (Baumann, 1996; Brubaker, 2002; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Jenkins, 2002). Jenkins (2002) posits that ethnic identities, and by extension all cultural group identities, are imagined, and this connects to Brubaker’s (2002) argument that ethnicity exists “only in and through our perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifications” (p. 174) and should be understood as a process rather than an entity. Jenkins (2002) further observes that while these ethnic identities are imagined, they are not imaginary and can indeed be meaningful and consequential to individuals who may act upon them. This underlines Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000) suggestion that ethnic identities are to be regarded as ‘categories of practice’ as they are perceived as real and are employed in the social world. Thus, when individuals are engaged in self-identification they may identify themselves with these imagined cultural groups: they construe themselves as members of these groups, engender feelings of similarity and connection with other (perceived) members, and engender a shared sense of belonging (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Jenkins, 2002). Following this, the concept of identification as employed in this study entails several cross-cutting aspects: 1) self-categorization, 2) perception of commonality and 3) feelings of belonging.

At the core of identification lies the assumption that people are engaged in developing understandings and articulations of their self. Self-categorization serves this objective as it involves a formal categorization of oneself as a member of a specific and well-articulated social category based on (imagined and perceived) attributes such as gender, nationality or ethnicity (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Lawler, 2008). Perception of commonality is a more subjective and affectively laden sense of sameness. An individual can perceive the self as
sharing distinct attributes with another person or group. This requires an individual to see the self in others, which involves establishing an emotional tie (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Hamilton, 2004; Hermann, 2003). The third and arguably most important aspect of identification in the context of this study is an individual’s notion that one belongs to a particular group based on certain shared objective or subjective attributes (Bauman, 2001; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Hermann, 2002). Like the perception of commonality, this too involves both cognitive and affective investment. It also involves a high degree of creativity since it requires an individual to construct the self as connected to, and part of, a collectivity based on (a perception of) shared attributes, and to see the self in terms of what the group is.

In the present study, cultural identification is analyzed as a single concept entailing the aforementioned three aspects. Consequently, ‘Asian cultural identification’ is conceptualized as identifying oneself with an imagined Asian community and Asian identity. This entails construing oneself as Asian, engendering feelings of similarity and connection with others perceived as being Asian, and engendering a sense of belonging to a panethnic Asian community. Homeland and Dutch cultural identification are conceptualized in a similar manner.

**Ethnic Minorities and Cultural Identification**

Ethnic minorities can identify with more than one cultural group and the configurations of these identifications are ever shifting. Cultural identification is not a ‘zero-sum game’ as individuals can identify strongly with multiple cultural groups simultaneously (Baumann, 1996; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid [WRR], 2007). Empirical studies indeed show that ethnic minorities combine homeland and hostland cultural identification in a variety of ways (e.g., Chow et al., 2008; Ersanilli, 2009; Van der Welle & Mamadouh, 2009). Also, depending on social context, cultural identification and combinations thereof are consciously and strategically articulated (Bauman, 2001; Jenkins, 2002). Some ethnic minorities only show hostland cultural identification, which may be a consequence of their desire to fit in the host society, rather than stand out. Other ethnic minorities identify solely with their homeland cultures, which for some is a reaction to perceived and experienced social exclusion and discrimination in the hostland (Van der Welle & Mamadouh, 2009). Furthermore, evidence of ethnic minorities identifying equally strong with both homeland and hostland cultures, is fueling the idea of the production of hybrid cultures and identities (e.g., Parker, 1995). In addition to the possibility of engendering multiple cultural identifications simultaneously, it is also argued that attachments to cultural groups are not necessarily always congruent with attachments to associated countries in a territorial sense (Berry, 1997; Ersanilli, 2009). Thus, one may culturally identify as Chinese and not Dutch, while at the same time feeling a sense of belonging in the Netherlands and not China.

It has been suggested that the more capital (economic as well as cultural, social and symbolic) ethnic minorities possess, and hence the better they are socially, economically and culturally integrated into their hostland, the less they will identify with their
homeland cultural group. However, homeland cultural identification is not necessarily limited to less integrated and disenfranchised ethnic minorities only. In fact, larger stocks of social and cultural capital provide individuals with the space to explore and express new identifications (Alba, 1990; Halter, 2000). Furthermore, identification can be seen as following from individuals’ desire to accumulate social and cultural capital. To establish and maintain relationships with other individuals one needs to identify with them first, hence identification is essential for the accrual of social capital (Hamilton, 2004). Identification with a specific group or category also serves the presentation of self in general and the distinction of self from others specifically. Depending on the ‘standing’ of the group one identifies oneself with, one gains more or less cultural capital from it (Bauman, 2001; Halter, 2000; Lawler, 2008).

As Halter (2000) convincingly argues, economically successful and socioculturally integrated ethnic minorities can afford to engender homeland cultural identifications through which they can distinguish themselves from their middle class peers and mainstream society in general. Hence, for ethnic minorities who have reached middle class status in the hostland, homeland cultural identifications have evolved from a liability to an asset. For ethnic minorities lacking social and cultural capital, the employment of homeland cultural identifications is a different story all together. For them, strong homeland cultural identifications may be related to perceived and experienced social exclusion and discrimination (Van der Welle & Mamadouh, 2009). By engendering homeland cultural identifications, these ethnic minorities aim to reinforce relations with co-ethnics and thus enlarge their social capital within the confines of their ethnic community. Furthermore, in addition to hostland and homeland cultural identification, ethnic minorities may also engender panethnic cultural identifications, as a growing scholarship on Asian American panethnicity suggests (e.g., Espiritu, 1992; Kibria, 2002; Lee, 1996). Thus, based on the literature, the question arises whether, to what degree, and in what configurations young Asian Dutch engender Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identifications.

**Ethnic Minorities and the Consumption of Media and Popular Culture**

It is argued that individuals articulate their diverse social identifications and affiliations through the consumption of media and popular culture. In turn, the consumption of media and popular culture facilitates the construction and maintenance of those very same processes of identification and affiliation. In addition, through the consumption of media and popular culture individuals can engender a sense of community and belonging (e.g., Fiske, 1990; Hall, 2003; Halter, 2000; Hermes, 2005; Hermes & Dahlgren, 2006; Van Zoonen, 2003). Also, it seems that at least for youths and young adults popular culture is of particular importance, especially since popular music and other forms of popular culture are inextricably linked to diverse youth cultures. Young people experiment with and engender various group identifications and for this they need symbolic material as building blocks. Given the intrinsically social and emotional nature of processes of identification they may have a particular need for symbolic material that provides
them with social and emotional cues, i.e., popular culture. D’Haenens et al. (2004) for instance, show that young ethnic minorities consume high levels of news media and do so critically, but at the same time they also find that music, television and internet play a more important role in young ethnic minorities’ everyday lives than radio, newspapers, books and magazines. Also, while television is undoubtedly also used to watch news programs, it is also found that young ethnic minorities especially use television to relax, experience excitement or otherwise manage their moods which most likely is achieved by watching popular television shows rather than news programs. In line with these findings Chow et al. (2008) show that young Chinese Dutch consume more popular media than news media. Thus, a particular focus on young Asian Dutch’ consumption of popular culture is warranted.

Furthermore, while there is a wide body of research on ethnic minorities’ consumption of mediated popular culture with an emphasis on (transnational) film and television, there is relatively little research on ethnic minorities’ consumption of non-mediated popular culture such as ‘ethnic’ parties or festivals. But as Malbon (1998) and MacRae (2004) argue, especially so-called experiential forms of popular culture such as clubbing and festivals are spaces that facilitate identification processes. These spaces provide their consumers the opportunity to see, meet and connect with others who are ‘like them’ in real life, and thus facilitate feelings of sameness and belonging. This is certainly the case for ethnic minorities who consume ethnic, or indeed panethnic, forms of non-mediated popular culture (Bennett, 2000; Boogaarts, 2008, 2009; Nurse, 1999). It can be argued that experiential forms of panethnic Asian Dutch popular culture play an important role in the construction of panethnic Asian identities among young Asian Dutch. Thus, the aforementioned Asian parties are a compelling form of Asian Dutch popular culture to include in this study.

Much of the research on the consumption of popular culture by ethnic minorities has focused on the consumption of homeland popular media by ethnic minorities, sometimes set against the consumption of hostland popular media (e.g., Gillespie, 1995; Punathambekar, 2005; Shim, 2007), while attention has also been directed to the reception of hostland popular culture by ethnic minorities (e.g., De Bruin, 2001; Dhoest, 2009), as well as the consumption of diasporic popular culture (e.g., Bennett, 2000; Boogaarts, 2008; Echchaibi, 2002; Nurse, 1999). In addition, a great deal of the research on ethnic minorities and their consumption of media and popular culture (mainly) focuses on a rather limited hostland-homeland dichotomy (e.g., D’Haenens et al., 2004; Hafez, 2007; Peeters & D’Haenens, 2005). Furthermore, it is suggested that these patterns of consumption, like cultural identifications, can be explained by the degree of integration into the host society: the less ethnic minorities are integrated, the more they are involved with their homelands and the more they will consume homeland media and popular culture (Peeters & D’Haenens, 2005). However, both the notion of patterns of consumption of hostland and homeland media and popular culture, as well as the notion of a straightforward relation between these and the degree of integration, seem to be problematic.
**Degree of ‘Integration’ and Consumption of Media and Popular Culture**

The suggestion that the consumption of homeland popular culture is related to the degree of integration into the host society (Peeters & D’Haenens, 2005) may seem appealing at first sight, especially when first generation migrants are compared to their children who were born in the hostland and who are consequently better integrated. But when considering important motives to consume homeland popular culture, proposing a straightforward relationship between consumption and degree of integration is problematic. One important motive for the consumption of homeland popular culture is ethnic minorities’ desire to stay connected to their homelands. By consuming homeland popular culture ethnic minorities symbolically (re)create their homelands and establish imagined communities, which engenders a sense of belonging (Anderson, 1991, 1992; Appadurai, 1996; Hermes & Dahlgren, 2006). Ethnic minorities also consume homeland popular culture because it contains ‘positive’ and ‘authentic’ representations of ‘people like themselves’, which hostland media and popular culture lack (e.g., D’Haenens et al., 2004; Gillespie, 1995; Hamamoto, 1994; Shohat & Stam, 1994). And thirdly, it is suggested that ethnic minorities consume homeland popular culture to articulate their cultural identifications and distinguish themselves from mainstream society. Consequently, this may enlarge their social, cultural and symbolic capital (Alba, 1990; D’Haenens et al., 2004; Halter, 2000).

For all of the above mentioned motives it can be argued that they do not only apply to less integrated ethnic minorities, but to well-integrated ethnic minorities as well (e.g., Chow et al., 2008; Punathambekar, 2005; Shim, 2007). Ethnic minorities’ patterns of consumption of popular culture appear to be related to their cultural identifications rather than their degree of integration. What is even more interesting in the context of the present study, is that it can be argued that all of the above motives may apply to Asian Dutch’ consumption of popular culture from Asian countries other than their homeland as well. Thus, it is suggested that both well-integrated and less integrated young Asian Dutch youth will consume Asian non-homeland popular culture.

**Beyond the Consumption of Hostland and Homeland Media and Popular Culture**

Studies that simultaneously investigate the consumption of both homeland and hostland media have resulted in typologies entailing different patterns of consumption of these. D’Haenens et al. (2004) and Peeters and D’Haenens (2005) for example have been able to categorize young ethnic minorities in three groups based on their media consumption: 1) *Homelanders*, who mostly consume homeland media, 2) *Omnivores*, who more or less consume similar levels of homeland and hostland media, and 3) *Adapters*, who mostly consume hostland media. Media and popular culture consumption patterns of certain ethnic minority groups and in particular the older, first generation members of these groups, may indeed be limited to combinations of hostland and homeland media and popular culture. However, young ethnic minorities may also consume media from countries other than their homeland or hostland and this should be addressed in the research.
Given its omnipresence in the Netherlands and other European countries (Kuipers, 2008) and its popularity among youth in general, incorporating global (i.e., UK and US) popular culture in analyses of consumption patterns of ethnic minorities greatly enhances our understanding of the matter at hand. Chow et al. (2008) for instance, show that young Chinese Dutch mostly consume global popular culture, followed by Chinese (homeland) popular culture. Dutch (hostland) popular culture was consumed the least by these youths.

Furthermore, besides homeland, hostland and global popular media, ethnic minorities may also deliberately consume popular media from countries that they perceive as sharing similarities with their homelands in terms of people and culture. This can be related to their imagining of new and broader panethnic groups, identities and identifications. This warrants further investigation into this type of popular culture consumption. Such research, however, is scarce, although for instance Cunningham and Nguyen (1999) found that Vietnamese Australians consume popular media from Hong Kong (i.e., non-homeland Asian popular media), but they have not investigated this in relation to possible processes of panethnic Asian cultural identification. Research by Park (2004) on young Korean Americans’ consumption of Japanese television dramas is more insightful and suggests there may be a relationship between the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media and panethnic Asian identification. Also, while Oh’s (2011) study is on Korean Americans’ consumption of Korean films and thus on the consumption of homeland popular media, he concludes by suggesting that future research should look into the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media and processes of panethnic Asian identification.

The present study makes a clear distinction between news media and popular media from Asian Dutch individuals’ respective homelands and from Asian countries other than Asian Dutch individuals’ homelands (non-homeland Asian). This study connects to Park (2004) and Oh (2011) by focusing on the relationship between young Asian Dutch’ panethnic Asian cultural identifications and their consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media. Also, in concurrence with the above it can be argued that young Asian Dutch do not only consume hostland and homeland experiential popular culture (e.g., bars, nightclubs and festivals) but panethnic Asian Dutch popular culture (i.e., Asian parties) as well. Thus, two questions follow from the literature. The first is whether, and to what degree, young Asian Dutch consume non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties, and if this is related to their Asian cultural identification. The second question is whether young Asian Dutch obtain a sense of Asian cultural identification, or ‘Asian cultural identification gratification’, from the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties, and if this is linked to their Asian cultural identifications.
METHOD

Procedure
From mid-March 2010 through mid-July 2010 an online survey was conducted among Asian Dutch visitors and members of several Asian Dutch online spaces. The main online space included was www.asn-online.nl, the largest panethnic Asian Dutch website, which has a database of over 9,000 members and receives over 250,000 page views per month (ASN, n.d.). Amongst others this website offers young Asian Dutch listings and pictures of Asian parties, Asian entertainment news and personal online profiles. Since only a few popular dedicated websites aimed at Asian Dutch exist in the Netherlands, a number of prolific Asian Dutch public groups on Netherlands’ largest social network Hyves (comparable to public groups on Facebook) were included as well. These public groups differ in reach and content. Indoweb for example has more than 8,000 members of mainly Indo-Dutch and Indonesian origin and of all ages. It provides information on Indo-Dutch/Indonesian events and facilitates online discussions on Indo-Dutch/Indonesian sociocultural and political issues. Similarly to Indoweb, the much smaller group Pinoy (approximately 200 members) caters to a specific ethnic cultural group, in this case people of Filipino origin. Other groups were for example Asian music (600 members) which offers news about East Asian pop artists and links to their music videos to an audience of mainly teenagers and young adults of diverse East and Southeast Asian origin, and Nhac Viet (100 members) which provides its young Vietnamese Dutch members with news and links related to Vietnamese pop music.

A message containing basic information about the survey and an invitation to participate was posted in the Asian Dutch online spaces and administrators of these spaces were asked to include this message in their news letters to members. Potential participants were redirected to the questionnaire by clicking on a link in the invitation. It took respondents 20 to 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire as well as all messages and instructions related to the survey were in the Dutch language.

Participants
Of 1118 people who started the questionnaire, 723 completed it. After removal of respondents who did not meet the age criterion (18 to 35 years) or who were not of East or Southeast Asian origin, a sample of 486 participants remained. The sample consisted of 289 females (59%) and 197 males (41%), the average age of the respondents was 24.92 years (SD = 4.81), and 77% of the respondents were born in the Netherlands. In addition, 74% of the respondents had received (some) higher education or were in higher education at the time of the survey and 93% held a paid job and/or were students. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their cultural origin(s) from a list in the questionnaire, and they could also add any origin that was not included in the list. Thus, a respondent of Chinese Indonesian origin could for example indicate Chinese and/or Indonesian as cultural origin (in official Dutch census data (s)he would be recorded as of Indonesian origin only). Of the sample, 57% identified as Chinese, 30% identified as
Indonesian and 10% identified as Filipino. Other cultural origins indicated included for example Vietnamese, Malaysian and Singaporean.³

**Measures**

Analyses were conducted using self-designed measures based on single survey items as well as 5-point scales constructed of two or more survey items. Single items were used to determine respondents’ sex, age, level of education and intention to vote, as well as whether respondents were born in the Netherlands, whether they were unemployed and how many friends of particular ethnic origins they had. All items used for the construction of scale measures were 5-point Likert scale items with 1 corresponding with *totally disagree*, *never or none* and 5 corresponding with *totally agree*, *very often* or *many*. The survey items were formulated in such a manner that they would connect to the participants’ demotic discourse (Baumann, 1996). Thus, notwithstanding their argued imagined nature, categories of practice (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000) such as ‘identity’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ were employed in the survey items as these are part of participants’ everyday talk and uses.

**Cultural identification.** Based on Hogg and Reid (2006) and Jenkins (2002) cultural identification was conceptualized as entailing: 1) construing oneself as member of a particular cultural group, 2) engendering feelings of similarity and connection with other (perceived) members, and 3) engendering feelings of belonging. This was translated into three corresponding survey items for Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identification. Thus, a scale for Asian cultural identification was constructed based on three 5-point items: “I feel Asian”, “I feel connected to Asians who are of different ethnic origin than me” and “I feel at home in the Asian culture” (Cronbach’s α = .68). Similar scales were constructed for homeland cultural identification (α = .70) and Dutch cultural identification (α = .81). Also, the items for homeland cultural identification were formulated in general terms as the analysis required to measure to what extent participants identify with any homeland related cultural group, rather than a specific group or groups. Thus, for example instead of “I feel Chinese/Indonesian/Vietnamese/etc.” the first item was formulated as “I feel a member of an Asian ethnic group (e.g., Chinese, Indonesian or Vietnamese)”.

**Dutch territorial identification.** In addition to cultural identification, the extent to which participants identify as Dutch in a territorial rather than a cultural sense, was measured as well (see also WRR, 2007). A scale for Dutch territorial identification was constructed based on the 5-point items “I feel at home in the Netherlands” and “I feel connected to the Netherlands” (Cronbach’s α = .78).

**Education.** The level of education of respondents was measured by means of a 7-point scale item that indicated the highest level of education a respondent had received, whether completed or not (1 = “elementary school”, 7 = “university”).

**Number of friends of particular ethnic origin.** The questionnaire contained four items which asked respondents to indicate how many friends of similar Asian ethnic origin (‘co-
ethnic Asian’), of Asian but different ethnic origin (‘panethnic Asian’), of non-Asian and non-White Dutch origin (‘non-Western’), and of White Dutch origin they have. The items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “none”, 5 = “many”).

**Perception of social exclusion.** To measure respondents’ perception of social exclusion, a scale was constructed based on the items “I am not seen and treated as a full-fledged Dutch citizen” and “Sometimes I am discriminated against because of my Asian background” (α = .66).

**Consumption of popular media and news media.** The consumption of popular media from Asian countries other than respondents’ Asian homeland(s) (‘non-homeland Asian’) was measured by a scale based on the 5-point items “How often do you watch films and television series from Asian countries other than your homeland?” and “How often do you listen to music from Asian countries other than your homeland?” (Cronbach’s α = .78). Similar scales were constructed for the consumption of Dutch (α = .52), homeland (α = .76) and global (i.e., UK and US) (α = .58) popular media. The consumption of non-homeland Asian news media was measured by a single 5-point item: “How often do you use news media from Asian countries other than your homeland to stay informed of news and current affairs?” Similar items were used to measure the consumption of homeland, Dutch and global news media.

**Consumption of Asian parties.** Respondents were asked to indicate how often they visited Asian parties, as well as to indicate how often they visited clubs and bars in total. By dividing these two items, a measure was constructed that indicated respondents’ relative frequency of visiting Asian parties. To ensure compatibility with the other scales, the values were recoded into a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “never visits Asian parties”, 5 = “only visits Asian parties”).

**Asian cultural identification gratification obtained from non-homeland popular media and Asian parties.** The degree to which respondents derive a sense of feeling Asian from the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media, or ‘Asian cultural identification gratification obtained’, was measured by a scale constructed of six 5-point items including “Films and television series from Asian countries other than my homeland make me feel connected to Asian people who are of different ethnic Asian origin than me” and “Music from Asian countries other than my homeland makes it easier for me to express my Asian identity” (Cronbach’s α = .90). Also, a scale for Asian cultural identification gratification obtained from visiting Asian parties was based on the following items: “Asian parties make me feel connected to Asian people who are of different ethnic Asian origin than me”, “Asian parties make it easier for me to express my Asian identity” and “What I like about Asian parties is that people who are of Asian origin come there” (α = .75).
RESULTS

Typology of Configurations of Cultural Identifications
The first objective of this study was to explore configurations of Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identification that can be found among young Asian Dutch. A K-Means cluster analysis based on the three cultural identification scales resulted in a final solution consisting of three highly distinctive and comprehensible configuration types. Table 1 presents the types’ cluster center values (means) for the three cultural identification scales.

Table 1 | Mean Cultural Identification Scores of Cultural Identification Types, N = 486

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Identification Type</th>
<th>CO n = 259</th>
<th>AS n = 131</th>
<th>HL n = 96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: CO = Cosmopolitans, AS = Asians, HL = Hostlanders*

The cluster analysis showed that young Asian Dutch engender Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identifications simultaneously, but to different degrees and in different combinations. The following three distinct types of configuration of cultural identification were found:

- **Cosmopolitans**, on average these respondents show strong Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identifications.
- **Asians**, these respondents show strong homeland and Asian cultural identifications and weak Dutch cultural identification.
- **Hostlanders**, these respondents show moderate homeland and Asian cultural identifications and stronger Dutch cultural identification.

Differences Between the Cultural Identification Types: Demographic Variables
No significant differences were found between Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders for sex, unemployment and income (for respondents who held a job and were not students). However, the three cultural identification types did differ on other demographic variables. Cosmopolitans (83%) were more often born in the Netherlands than Hostlanders (71%) and Asians (69%), χ²(2, N = 486) = 11.53, p < .01. Also, a one-way ANOVA test indicated that differences in age are significant, F(2, 483) = 8.62, p < .001, η² = .03. Asians are significantly younger (M = 23.45, SD = 5.00) than Hostlanders (M = 25.57, SD = 4.32) and Cosmopolitans (M = 25.41, SD = 4.75) (Scheffe post hoc tests, p < .05). Where education is concerned there are
significant differences as well. Cosmopolitans (78%) and Hostlanders (75%) have more often received (some) higher education than Asians (63%), $\chi^2(2, N = 486) = 11.26, p = .004$.

*Differences Between the Cultural Identification Types: Sociocultural Variables*

**Ethnic composition of friends.** A two-way ANOVA was employed to investigate whether there are differences between Cosmopolitans, Asians, and Hostlanders in the number of friends of particular ethnic origin they have. Cultural identification type was taken as between-subjects factor and ethnic origin of friends as within-subjects factor. Furthermore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to the degrees of freedom of the within-subjects factor. Table 2 presents the means for the number of friends of four distinct ethnic origins for the three cultural identification types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Origin of Friends</th>
<th>CO ($n = 259$)</th>
<th>AS ($n = 131$)</th>
<th>HL ($n = 96$)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnic Asian</td>
<td>3.49 (1.27)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.26)</td>
<td>2.82 (1.26)</td>
<td>3.38 (1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic Asian</td>
<td>3.04 (1.12)</td>
<td>3.35 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.65 (1.12)</td>
<td>3.05 (1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western</td>
<td>2.81 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.98 (1.25)</td>
<td>2.97 (1.17)</td>
<td>2.89 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Dutch</td>
<td>3.49 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.93 (1.16)</td>
<td>3.33 (1.30)</td>
<td>3.31 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: CO = Cosmopolitans, AS = Asians, HL = Hostlanders*

The test showed a significant main effect of the within-subjects factor, $F(2.29, 1301.04) = 10.05, p < .001$, with friends of non-Western origin and panethnic Asian origin occurring less often. A main effect of the between-subjects factor was also found, $F(1, 483) = 6.91, p < .01$, indicating that cultural identification type affects the total number of friends. Cosmopolitans seem to have slightly more friends than Asians, while Hostlanders have the least friends.

In addition, a significant interaction of ethnic origin of friends with cultural identification type was found, $F(5.39, 1301.04) = 9.16, p < .001$. This indicated that the three cultural identification types differ significantly from one another in the number of friends of particular ethnic origin. Cosmopolitans have mostly co-ethnic Asian and White Dutch friends, Asians mostly have co-ethnic Asian and panethnic Asian friends, and Hostlanders mostly have non-Western and White Dutch friends.

**Perception of social exclusion.** A one-way ANOVA showed that differences in perception of social exclusion between the three cultural identification types are significant, $F(2, 463) = 4.01, p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .02$. Scheffe post hoc tests ($p < .05$) indicated that Asians have a higher perception of social exclusion ($M = 3.09, SD = 1.05$) than Hostlanders ($M = 2.70, SD = 1.01$).
**Dutch territorial identification.** A one-way ANOVA test showed that the cultural identification types differ significantly from each other in their Dutch territorial identification, $F(2, 482) = 112.43, p < .001, \eta^2 = .32$. Scheffe post hoc tests ($p < .05$) indicated that Cosmopolitans ($M = 4.35, SD = 0.05$) identify with the Netherlands more strongly than Hostlanders ($M = 3.84, SD = 0.91$). Also, both Cosmopolitans and Hostlanders identify with the Netherlands more strongly than Asians ($M = 3.23, SD = 0.83$).

**Intention to vote.** More Cosmopolitans (86%) indicated the intention to cast a vote for elections concerning Dutch parliament and other government bodies than Hostlanders (73%) and Asians (72%), $\chi^2(2, N = 411) = 11.12, p < .01$.

**Cultural Identification Type and Consumption of Media and Popular Culture**

**Consumption patterns of popular media and news media.** A three-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate young Asian Dutch’ consumption of media of different genres (news media and popular media) and different geographical origin (The Netherlands, homeland, non-homeland Asian and global) in relation to their cultural identification. Cultural identification type was taken as between-subjects factor and origin and genre of media as within-subjects factors. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to the degrees of freedom of origin and genre of media.

The test showed a significant main effect of genre of media $F(1, 483) = 47.56, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$, while no significant interaction of genre with cultural identification type was found. This indicated that the participants in general consume more popular media ($M = 2.61, SD = 0.52$) than news media ($M = 2.37, SD = 0.65$). Furthermore, a significant main effect of origin of media $F(2.24, 1079.65) = 177.28, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$ as well as an interaction of origin with cultural identification type $F(4.47, 1079.65) = 20.09, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$ were found.

To further investigate the relationship between origin of media and cultural identification type two two-way ANOVAs were conducted, one for news media and one for popular media. Table 3 provides the means for news media consumption and popular media consumption for the three cultural identification types.
Table 3 | Consumption of News Media (NM) and Popular Media (PM), N = 486

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Identification Type</th>
<th>CO (n = 259)</th>
<th>AS (n = 131)</th>
<th>HL (n = 96)</th>
<th>Total (M (SD))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>3.98 (1.03)</td>
<td>3.53 (1.19)</td>
<td>3.70 (1.15)</td>
<td>3.80 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>1.80 (0.99)</td>
<td>2.18 (1.12)</td>
<td>1.52 (0.82)</td>
<td>1.85 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-homeland Asian</td>
<td>1.42 (0.77)</td>
<td>1.73 (0.96)</td>
<td>1.37 (0.76)</td>
<td>1.49 (0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>2.37 (1.09)</td>
<td>2.25 (1.08)</td>
<td>2.38 (1.11)</td>
<td>2.34 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>2.29 (0.81)</td>
<td>1.85 (0.67)</td>
<td>2.20 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.15 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>2.46 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.03 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.17 (0.89)</td>
<td>2.56 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-homeland Asian</td>
<td>2.28 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.77 (1.27)</td>
<td>1.98 (0.99)</td>
<td>2.35 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>3.58 (0.74)</td>
<td>3.15 (0.81)</td>
<td>3.18 (0.87)</td>
<td>3.38 (0.81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CO = Cosmopolitans, AS = Asians, HL = Hostlanders

Consumption of Dutch, homeland, non-homeland Asian and global news media.
A two-way ANOVA showed a significant main effect of origin of news media, \( F(2.37, 1145.13) = 499.24, p < .001, \eta^2 = .51 \). This indicated that the participants consume Dutch news media the most followed by global news media. Homeland and non-homeland Asian news media are consumed the least. A main effect of cultural identification type was not found, thus Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders do not differ in their total level of consumption of news media. However, an interaction of news media origin with cultural identification type was found \( F(4.74, 1145.13) = 10.18, p < .001, \eta^2 = .04 \), which indicated that Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders do in fact differ from one another in their consumption of news media where the origin thereof is concerned. Dutch news media are consumed most by Cosmopolitans, followed by Hostlanders and finally Asians. Asians consume more homeland and non-homeland Asian news media than Cosmopolitans and Hostlanders. And finally, Hostlanders and Cosmopolitans consume more global news media than Asians.

Consumption of Dutch, homeland, non-homeland Asian and global popular media. A two-way ANOVA showed a significant main effect of origin of popular media, \( F(2.26, 1089.88) = 125.88, p < .001, \eta^2 = .21 \). The participants consume global popular media the most and Dutch popular media the least, while the consumption of homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media falls in between. A main effect of cultural identification type was also found, \( F(2, 483) = 12.35, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05 \), Asians show the highest level of popular media consumption and Hostlanders the lowest. Furthermore, an interaction of origin of popular media with cultural identification type was found, \( F(4.51, 1089.88) = 18.27, p < .001, \eta^2 = .07 \). This indicated that the three cultural identification types differ significantly from one another in their consumption of popular media originating from specific locales. Homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media are consumed.
most by Asians and least by Hostlanders while Cosmopolitans’ consumption thereof falls in between. Also, Cosmopolitans consume Dutch popular media the most followed by Hostlanders, while Asians consume the least thereof. Finally, Cosmopolitans consume more global popular media than Hostlanders and Asians while in addition Hostlanders consume slightly more global popular media than Asians.

**Non-homeland Asian popular media versus non-homeland Asian news media.** The three-way ANOVA also yielded an interaction of origin of media, genre of media and cultural identification type, $F(5.08, 1226.31) = 3.83, p = .002, \eta^2 = .02$. Given this study’s focus on non-homeland Asian popular media and news media, a paired samples t-test was conducted to investigate differences between the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media and the consumption of non-homeland Asian news media. The test indicated that the participants consume significantly more non-homeland Asian popular media ($M = 2.35, SD = 1.16$) than non-homeland Asian news media ($M = 1.49, SD = 0.83$), $t(485) = 16.76, p < .001$.

**Consumption of Asian parties.** A one-way ANOVA showed that Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders differ from one another in how often they visit Asian parties relative to other non-Asian mainstream nightlife spots, $F(2, 483) = 4.85, p < .01, \eta^2 = .02$. Scheffe post hoc tests ($p < .05$) indicated that on average the proportion of Asian parties visited is higher for Asians ($M = 2.42, SD = 1.33$) than for Cosmopolitans ($M = 2.12, SD = 1.02$) and Hostlanders ($M = 1.99, SD = 0.98$).

**Asian cultural identification gratification obtained from non-homeland popular media and Asian parties.** A one-way ANOVA showed that the cultural identification types differ in the Asian cultural identification gratification they obtain from the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media, $F(2, 202) = 20.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = .17$. Scheffe post hoc tests ($p < .05$) indicated that Asians ($M = 3.66, SD = 0.69$) obtain more Asian cultural identification gratification from non-homeland Asian popular media than Cosmopolitans ($M = 3.26, SD = 0.77$) and Hostlanders ($M = 2.60, SD = 0.66$) while in addition Cosmopolitans do so compared to Hostlanders.

Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA indicated that Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders differ in the Asian cultural identification gratification they obtain from visiting Asian parties, $F(2, 156) = 9.20, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11$. Scheffe post hoc tests ($p < .05$) indicated that Asians ($M = 3.78, SD = 0.68$) and Cosmopolitans ($M = 3.64, SD = 0.77$) obtain more Asian cultural identification gratification from visiting Asian parties than Hostlanders ($M = 3.00, SD = 0.87$), but the post hoc tests did not indicate any significant differences between Asians and Cosmopolitans.
DISCUSSION

This study explored the relationship between young Asian Dutch’ patterns of media consumption and their cultural identifications, in particular their consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media and their Asian cultural identifications. Using survey data, it was first investigated how young Asian Dutch’ consumption of Dutch, homeland, non-homeland Asian and global popular media and news media is related to their diverse configurations of Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identifications. Subsequently, the study zoomed in on non-homeland Asian popular media and looked at the ‘sense of feeling Asian’ young Asian Dutch obtained from the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media and how this is related to their Asian cultural identifications.

First, in line with expectations, a cluster analysis showed that young Asian Dutch identify with Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural groups simultaneously and do so to varying degree and in different configurations. Three types of distinct configurations of cultural identifications were identified: 1) participants who show strong Dutch, homeland as well as Asian cultural identifications, 2) participants who show strong homeland and Asian cultural identifications and weak Dutch cultural identification, and 3) participants who combined moderate homeland and Asian cultural identifications with stronger Dutch cultural identification. For the purpose of this study the three types found were labeled ‘Cosmopolitans’, ‘Asians’ and ‘Hostlanders’ respectively.

The finding that young Asian Dutch identify with Dutch and homeland cultural groups as well as a broader and more vaguely delineated Asian cultural group is in concurrence with previous empirical studies that showed that ethnic minorities can indeed identify with different cultural groups simultaneously (e.g., Berry, 1997; D’Haenens et al., 2004; Ersanilli, 2009; Van der Welle & Mamadouh, 2009). The fact that Cosmopolitans show strong Dutch, homeland and Asian cultural identifications also underlines that cultural identification is not a ‘zero-sum game’ as is increasingly suggested by dominant political and public discourse in the Netherlands (e.g., Awad & Roth, 2011; WRR, 2007). Thus, one’s identification with one cultural group does not necessarily hinder one’s identification with another cultural group. Furthermore, in previous research a focus on hostland and homeland cultural identifications has been prevalent (e.g., Berry, 1997). However, our finding that young Asian Dutch identify with Dutch and homeland as well as Asian cultural groups suggests that further research that goes beyond the hostland-homeland dichotomy and also takes into account novel and broader cultural group identifications is warranted.

Also, Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders do not differ from one another in terms of unemployment and income. Thus, they possess equal amounts of economic capital. However, differences in education, perception of social exclusion, intention to vote, and Dutch territorial identification suggest that Cosmopolitans possess the most ‘mainstream’ cultural capital and are the best integrated into Dutch society followed by Hostlanders and lastly Asians. Still, it has to be noted that even Asians identify positively with the
Netherlands and are relatively well integrated into Dutch society. The finding that Asians identify the weakest as Dutch while Cosmopolitans do so the strongest, suggests that higher degrees of integration go hand in hand with stronger hostland identification. However, an inverse relationship between integration and homeland and Asian cultural identification is not as clear-cut as Cosmopolitans also show strong rather than the weakest homeland and Asian cultural identification. Perhaps this can be explained by Halter’s (2000) suggestion that especially well integrated ethnic minorities have the luxury and the willingness to engender and articulate homeland cultural identification – and by extension Asian cultural identification as well in the case of young Asian Dutch. Further research is needed to gain more insight into the factors that inform processes of cultural identification in general and of non-hostland cultural identification in particular.

After establishing young Asian Dutch’ configurations of cultural identifications their patterns of media consumption were investigated. First of all, the findings show that young Asian Dutch consume more popular media than news media, which is in line with previous research. For example Chow et al. (2008) report similar findings for young Chinese Dutch and D’Haenens et al. (2004) find that popular media play a more important role than news media in young ethnic minorities’ everyday lives. Quite strikingly, the levels of consumption of non-homeland Asian news media are very low for all young Asian Dutch. It seems that if Asian cultural identification is articulated at all, then it is through the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media rather than non-homeland Asian news media. This underlines the importance of popular media for cultural identification processes.

This, however, is not to suggest that news media are of no importance at all to young Asian Dutch. Young ethnic minorities do indeed consume high levels of news media as D’Haenens et al. (2004) have already shown, and while young Asian Dutch consumption of news media is lower than their consumption of popular media, the difference is small. Also, Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders consume Dutch news media the most, even more so than global popular media. Perhaps this can partly be explained by the wide availability and easy accessibility of Dutch news media (amongst others multiple television news shows throughout the day and three widely circulated free newspapers). Still, the high levels of consumption of Dutch news media by young Asian Dutch supports the idea that they feel connected to the Netherlands and want to learn and know about Dutch and international current affairs reported from a Dutch perspective. Dutch news media thus function as a point of reference for young Asian Dutch and binds them regardless of their configurations of cultural identifications.

As expected, the analyses of the patterns of popular media consumption show that young Asian Dutch consume a combination of Dutch, global, homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media. First, it becomes clear that Cosmopolitans, Asians and Hostlanders all consume global popular media the most. Global popular media can thus be regarded as a binding element between the three identification types. The high levels
of consumption of global popular media have also been observed by Chow et al. (2008) and can be explained by the pervasiveness and dominance of especially US popular media in certain popular media genres in Western European contexts (Kuipers, 2008).

Like other ethnic minorities, Asian minorities consume homeland popular media as well (e.g., Oh, 2011; Park, 2004). In addition, our analyses indicate that young Asian Dutch also consume popular media from Asian countries other than their homeland. It can be argued that the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media has been facilitated by a recently growing interest in and popularity of Asian popular culture in the West in general. This has led to ever increasing flows of films and other forms of (mediated) popular culture from Asia to the West. With respect to East and Southeast Asia, this concerns popular media from China, Japan and South-Korea in particular (e.g., Iwabuchi, 2004; Park, 2004; Pham, 2004). Thus, Japanese animation or anime has for example become much more accessible to Chinese Dutch youth while Indonesian Dutch youth can more easily watch a Chinese film. As said, the participants in our study consume non-homeland Asian popular media although they consume more popular media from their homelands. The consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media may lag behind the consumption of homeland popular media because of the popularity and accessibility of Japanese, Korean and Chinese popular media in the Dutch context, especially when compared to for example Indonesian or Vietnamese popular media. For the many Chinese Dutch participants in this study, Chinese popular media amount to homeland popular media which decreases levels of non-homeland Asian consumption. Nonetheless, differences in levels of consumption of homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media are small and non-homeland Asian popular media can bind Cosmopolitans and Asians in particular.

As expected, increasing levels of panethnic Asian cultural identification are associated with increasing levels of consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media. Asians show the highest levels of consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media, followed by Cosmopolitans and finally Hostlanders. Still, the levels of consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media are not particularly high when compared to much wider available global popular media. On the other hand, the relatively high standard deviations for consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media may indicate the existence of subgroups of Cosmopolitans and Asians with very high levels of consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media. Ultimately, what becomes clear is that young Asian Dutch are deliberately searching for and consuming non-homeland Asian popular media. The findings underline that popular media from non-homeland Asian countries are part of young Asian Dutch’ everyday lives. Thus, it may be worthwhile to expand existing hostland-homeland typologies of ethnic minorities’ media consumption (e.g., D’Haenens et al. 2004; Hafez, 2007) by incorporating the consumption of media from countries that ethnic minorities may perceive as sharing similarities with their homeland(s).
The cultural identifications of young Asian Dutch also explain their consumption of Asian parties. Asians show the strongest Asian cultural identification and they visit Asian parties more often than Cosmopolitans and Hostlanders. It can be argued that Asians go there with their friends who mostly are Asian Dutch too. They visit Asian parties to establish and maintain relationships with other Asian Dutch and thus to enlarge social capital. However, it should be noted that Asian Dutch in general show relatively low levels of Asian party consumption. Perhaps this is due to a relatively limited supply of Asian parties in the Netherlands compared to other nightlife options. Furthermore, unlike Asians, Cosmopolitans do not visit Asian parties more often than Hostlanders despite their stronger Asian cultural identifications. Perhaps this is due to the fact that Cosmopolitans have a more diverse group of friends than Asians. Cosmopolitans may prefer to go to mainstream clubs and bars where their non-Asian friends would like to go as well. Also, Cosmopolitans have more ‘mainstream’ cultural and social capital, enabling them to comfortably consume mainstream nightlife. Still, Cosmopolitans do visit Asian parties and ultimately they feel at home anywhere. But because they have more options and want to accumulate as many different cultural experiences as possible, they do not visit Asian parties regularly.

Clearly, Cosmopolitans possess large stocks of social and cultural capital and may be seen as cultural omnivores (D’Haenens et al., 2004) who consume and appreciate all types of popular culture: Dutch, global, homeland and non-homeland Asian alike. In line with Halter’s (2000) suggestion, it can be argued that especially well integrated Cosmopolitans have the luxury to articulate their homeland and Asian cultural identifications. By consuming homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media, Cosmopolitans can distinguish themselves from their non-Asian peers and accumulate even more cultural, social and symbolic capital. This may be a rewarding strategy especially now that non-Asians show a growing interest in Asia and Asian popular culture (e.g., Pham, 2004).

Compared to Cosmopolitans, Asians possess lower stocks of social and cultural capital and are less integrated into Dutch society. It can be argued that their consumption of homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media as well as their consumption of Asian parties is a strategy to connect to co-ethnics as well as other Asian Dutch and thus to enlarge their social capital. This strategy is intrinsically linked to their homeland and Asian cultural identifications. Also, Asians’ lower stocks of mainstream cultural capital may limit their choice of popular media to consume to homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media, which they are familiar with. Finally, it could also be the case that like Cosmopolitans, Asians consume homeland and non-homeland Asian popular media as well as Asian parties to distinguish themselves from their non-Asian peers. Further research is needed to enhance our understanding of the relationship between young Asian Dutch’ cultural identifications and their consumption of Asian and Asian Dutch popular culture.

Our final analysis was concerned with the sense of ‘feeling Asian’ young Asian Dutch obtain from consuming non-homeland Asian popular media. The results show that
young Asian Dutch actively use non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties to explore and construct their panethnic Asian cultural identifications. This underlines the idea that popular media and other forms of popular culture play a pivotal role in the creation of meaning in young people’s everyday life (e.g., Fiske, 1990; Hermes, 2005) and is just as, or perhaps even more important than news media for young people’s cultural identification. In line with expectations, Asians obtain more Asian cultural identification gratification from the consumption of non-homeland Asian popular media than Cosmopolitans and Hostlanders, while Cosmopolitans do so compared to Hostlanders. However, where Asian cultural identification gratification obtained from the consumption of Asian parties is concerned, the findings were not entirely in line with expectations. Here, no differences were found between Asians and Cosmopolitans despite their differences in Asian cultural identification. Further research is needed to better understand how Asian Dutch are using non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties to maintain their Asian cultural identification.

The findings of the present study shed light on the relatively invisible group of Asian Dutch, as well as on panethnic Asian cultural identification and the relationship between cultural identification and popular culture. Still, further research is needed to investigate in depth why young Asian Dutch consume non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties, and how they use these to work on their Asian cultural identification. What kind of feelings of belonging and commonality do they obtain from non-homeland Asian popular media and Asian parties, and by what attributes of popular culture are these facilitated? Or, to be more concrete: how is it possible that Vietnamese and Malaysian Dutch adolescents see themselves in, and identify with, Korean actor and popstar Rain? Or why do Chinese and Indonesian Dutch youth mingle at Asian parties and feel a sense of groupness despite different ethnic backgrounds and migration histories? These types of questions should be addressed in future research.

This study also has its limitations. First, it has to be noted that the findings of this study cannot be generalized to the entire population of young Asian Dutch. This is because respondents have been recruited through Asian Dutch online spaces which are most likely for those already showing a certain level of homeland and/or panethnic Asian cultural identification. Hence, young Asian Dutch who show no or very low homeland and/or Asian cultural identification may be underrepresented in this survey. Also, in this study all respondents were treated as members of one ‘group’: Asian Dutch. The diverse Asian homeland origins of the respondents were not taken into account in the analyses. Future research should take young Asian Dutch’ different homeland origins into account as these may further explain the strengths and directions of their Asian cultural identification as well as their consumption of Asian and Asian Dutch popular culture.

Notwithstanding its limitations, what this study ultimately shows is that relatively well integrated ethnic minorities actively engender and combine hostland, homeland and even broader and more vaguely delineated panethnic cultural identifications. Also, these
cultural identifications are articulated through the consumption of popular culture. Thus, the findings undermine the popular conviction that in order to properly integrate into Dutch society it is imperative for ethnic minorities to prioritize Dutch cultural identification and Dutch popular culture. In fact, identifying with multiple cultural groups and consuming popular culture of diverse origins, enlarges ethnic minorities’ stocks of social, cultural and symbolic capital and may just be the way for them to feel a sense of belonging and to further integrate into the hostland society.

NOTES

1 ‘Non-homeland Asian popular media’ entails popular media originating from Asian countries other than young Asian Dutch individuals’ Asian homeland country.

2 Because participants could indicate multiple cultural origins, the percentages for all the cultural origins indicated add up to more than 100%.

3 While participants who identify as Chinese appear to be overrepresented this does not affect our study as the analyses are not concerned with specific homeland cultural identifications (e.g., Indonesian or Vietnamese) but with homeland cultural identification in general.

4 It should be noted that the three clusters are not to be considered as actual groups manifesting themselves in the social world. Rather, the clusters are a set of respondents who so happen to share similar configurations of cultural identifications.