Observable persuaders: A longitudinal study on the effects of quality signals in the contemporary visual art market

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Citation for published version (APA):

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OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS

A LONGLITUDINAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF QUALITY SIGNALS IN THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ART MARKET

Monika Kackovic
A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market
OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS:

A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex
ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel
op donderdag 17 november 2016, te 16:00 uur

door
Monika Kackovic
geboren te Bratislava, Slowakije

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