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A LONGITUDINAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF QUALITY SIGNALS IN THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ART MARKET

Monika Kackovic
A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market
OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS:

A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. K.J.J. Maex
ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op donderdag 17 november 2016, te 16:00 uur

door

Monika Kackovic
geboren te Bratislava, Slowakije

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