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OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS

A LONGITUDINAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF QUALITY SIGNALS
IN THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ART MARKET

Monika Kackovic

OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS

**A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals
in the Contemporary Visual Art Market**

OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS:

**A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals
in the Contemporary Visual Art Market**

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

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aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex

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FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFKUNDE

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