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A LONGLITUDINAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF QUALITY SIGNALS IN THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ART MARKET

Monika Kackovic
A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market
OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS:

A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

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aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
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Monika Kackovic
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