Observable persuaders: A longitudinal study on the effects of quality signals in the contemporary visual art market

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OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS

A LONGLITUDINAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF QUALITY SIGNALS IN THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ART MARKET

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A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market
OBSERVABLE PERSUADERS: A Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Quality Signals in the Contemporary Visual Art Market
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