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Research Note

Vox populismus: a populist radical right attitude among the public?

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ABSTRACT. In the last two decades, populist radical right (PRR) parties have been electorally very successful in Western Europe. Various scholars have argued that these parties share an ideological core that consists of a specific form of nationalism (nativism), in combination with two other attitudes (authoritarianism and populism). The aim of this research note is to assess whether this ideological core also exists as a consistent attitude among citizens. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the attitudes of Dutch citizens indicate that we can indeed speak of a consistent PRR attitude among the public. I also show that this attitude is strongly related to the probability of voting for the PRR Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) of Geert Wilders.

KEYWORDS: nationalism, populism, public opinion, radical right

Introduction

One of the most successful nationalist party families in Western Europe is the populist radical right (PRR). Parties such as the French *Front National* (National Front), the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party of Austria), the Italian *Lega Nord* (Northern League), the Belgian *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Interest), the Danish *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish People's Party) and the Dutch *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Freedom Party, PVV) have, in their most successful years, obtained between twelve and twenty-seven per cent of the votes. The success of these parties has been studied extensively in the last two decades (see, to name just a few influential studies, Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1997; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005).

According to Mudde (2007), nationalism is a key ingredient of the ideology of these parties. However, it is a specific form of nationalism that underlies the PRR outlook. PRR parties propagate a Manichean and exclusive nationalism, according to which the 'Good' nation-state is threatened by 'Evil' outsiders who undermine the collective homogeneity. Mudde refers to this specific type of nationalism as *nativism*. The success formula of the PRR party family is a combination of this nativist form of nationalism with two other attitudes:

authoritarianism and populism (see also Rydgren 2007). Together these elements constitute the PRR ideology. In order to understand the success of PRR parties it is of essential importance to assess whether this ideological package also exists as a consistent attitude among the public.

Although various scholars have assessed the separate effects of nativist attitudes (see Ivarsflaten 2008; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003; Van der Brug et al. 2000, 2005), authoritarian attitudes (see Lubbers 2001; Minkenberg 2000) and populist (or 'anti-establishment') attitudes (see Bélanger and Aarts 2006; Betz 1994; Swyngedouw 2001), they have only focused on the effects of these attitudes in isolation. It is still unclear whether the separate attitudes form a coherent set of ideas in the minds of voters (Mudde 2007: 222). If this is the case, they should not be studied in isolation, but in conjunction with each other. Moreover, if a PRR attitude is also related to (the likelihood of) voting for PRR parties, we can conclude that it is most probably the *combination* of nativism, authoritarianism and populism that makes the PRR parties so attractive to voters.

For two main reasons, the focus of this study is on the Netherlands. First, one of the most recent upsurges of the PRR took place in this country. During the 2010 national elections, the PRR party PVV was very successful with a vote share of almost sixteen per cent and a decisive role during the cabinet formation. Although the party lost seats during the subsequent elections in 2012, the PVV is still an influential player in the Dutch political arena. Second, the national Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) is one of the few surveys that asks batteries of questions that can be employed as proxies for all the relevant attitudes (i.e. nativism, authoritarianism and populism).

By means of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses I demonstrate that we can indeed distinguish a coherent PRR attitude that consists of the sub-dimensions of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. I also show, by means of structural equation modelling (SEM), that this PRR attitude is strongly related to (the likelihood of) voting for the PRR Freedom Party.

This study is relevant for both scholars of the PRR and scholars of nationalism. It is interesting for scholars of the PRR, because it is shown that PRR attitudes should be studied in conjunction with each other in order to explain PRR voting behaviour. The study is relevant for scholars of nationalism, because it is demonstrated how the electorally most successful nationalist party family in Western Europe employs nationalism in combination with other attitudes.

The populist radical right

Scholars have defined the party family that I refer to as 'populist radical right' in various ways (see, to name just a few, Betz 1994; Carter 2005; Eatwell 2000; Ignazi 1992; Norris 2005). In this study I build on the work of Mudde (2007) because his definition of the populist radical right is one of the most notable ones in recent studies of this party family (see, for instance, Arter 2010; Ennser 2012; Pauwels 2011).

One of the key characteristics of PRR parties is their nationalism (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Mudde 2007). Nationalism focuses on the congruence of the cultural and the political unit (Freeden 1998; Gellner 1983), and can be defined as 'an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential "nation" ' (Smith 2010: 9). PRR parties may be called nationalist in all these respects. However, it is not just nationalism in general that these parties propagate; it is a specific, Manichean, form of nationalism, which emphasises the antagonistic relationship between the Good nation and Evil outsiders. Mudde refers to this exclusive form of nationalism as *nativism*. Nativism can be defined as 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state' (Mudde 2007: 19). According to this ideology, the biggest enemy of the people is formed by 'dangerous others' – people who are said not to belong to the nation. These dangerous others could be, for instance, immigrants or people of another race or religion (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Arter 2010; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2004; Taguieff 1995). Whereas nationalism can also be liberal, nativism is by definition illiberal. Nativism could be conceived of as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde 2007: 24). This does not mean that nativism is always racist – i.e. based on ethnicity. In the case of the Dutch PVV, for example, a religious instead of an ethnic minority constitutes the main 'enemy'. In order to fully understand PRR parties, it is essential to focus on the specific form of nationalism they share and the other ideological elements they combine it with. According to Mudde (2007), PRR parties combine their nativism with two other attitudes: authoritarianism and populism.

Hence, the second attitudinal element that PRR parties share is an authoritarian outlook. PRR parties aim for a society that is strictly ordered, and therefore emphasise the importance of law and order. Violations of the rules should be punished severely (Mudde 2007: 23; Rydgren 2007: 242). This belief in authorities does not mean that PRR parties are anti-democratic or anti-liberal. Their inclination to accept strong authorities does not mean that they strife for blind obedience. Ultimately, for a PRR party, the will of the authority is always subordinated to the will of the people. Together, nativism and authoritarianism make PRR parties 'radical right'.

This brings us to the third main attitudinal element of PRR parties: populism. Populism could be seen as a set of ideas according to which the 'Good' people is betrayed by an 'Evil' elite (see Hawkins 2010; Mudde 2004). It is often not clear, however, what these parties consider themselves to be the representatives of 'the people' (Canovan 1981). Yet what they are often very clear about is their negativity towards the elite (Canovan 2004). They argue that 'the established order' has no idea of what ordinary people find important and only think about their own interests (Barr 2009; Mény and Surel 2002). The elite is said to be arrogant, selfish, incompetent and often also corrupt.

Together nativism, authoritarianism and populism make up an ideological position which Mudde defines as the 'populist radical right'.[1]

Although it has often been argued and demonstrated that these three attitudinal elements form the core of what populist radical right *parties* share with each other, it has not been studied yet whether these attitudes also form a coherent underlying attitude among the *public*. This is an important question because if these attitudes do not form a coherent whole among citizens, it might be concluded that supporters of the PRR do not support the PRR because of its complete package of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, but only because of specific elements of their world-view (see Betz 1994; Ivarsflaten 2008; Norris 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2000, 2005). However, if nativism, authoritarianism and populism are also related to each other in the minds of citizens, and are, moreover, related to voting for the PRR, we should conclude that these ideas should be understood in relation to each other. It then is the *combination* of nativism, authoritarianism and populism that makes the PRR parties so interesting for voters.

Case selection, measurements and methods

I focus on public opinion in the Netherlands during the 2010 national elections. During these elections the Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders was very successful and received approximately sixteen per cent of the seats – almost ten per cent more than during the previous national elections (and six per cent more than during the subsequent 2012 elections). After the elections, a minority cabinet was formed, consisting of the liberal party (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD)) and the Christian democrats (*Christen-Democratisch Appèl* (CDA)). The PVV supported this minority coalition so that it could make political decisions with a majority in the Dutch parliament. Many scholars have labelled the PVV as populist and/or radical right (e.g. Bos et al. 2011; De Lange and Art 2011; Lucardie 2007; Lucardie and Voerman 2012; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Van der Pas et al. 2012; Van Kessel 2011; Vossen 2011).

The PVV is strongly nativist. The party emphasises the importance of the preservation of the Dutch culture and argues that Islam is a dangerous political ideology, and that therefore all Islamic schools should be closed, the burqa should be forbidden and Dutch asylum policy should be made much more strict (see also Vossen 2011). The party exhibits authoritarian attitudes as well. It is in favour of strong punishment and a 'zero tolerance' approach by the police. The party's populism becomes apparent from its 2010 election manifesto in which it is argued that the elites have lost their touch with reality and that they have done things that by no means have improved the situation of 'ordinary people' (PVV 2010: 5; see also Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011).

I employed the data of the 2010 DPES. The population of the DPES study consists of persons with the Dutch nationality who are 18 years or older and

live in the Netherlands. Respondents have been asked various questions that can be used to measure nativism, authoritarianism and populism. It needs to be emphasised, however, that these items only measure nativism and populism in a negative way, i.e. they focus on *negativity* towards 'dangerous' others and the elite, without explicitly emphasising the coinciding positive attitudes towards 'the nation' and 'the people', respectively. This is an important short-coming of this study that should be dealt with in future research projects on the topic. Nevertheless, because nativism and populism are essentially negative sets of ideas (see Mudde 2007), I believe that using these proxies is a good first step in measuring the combination of the various components of the PRR attitude. I pay further attention to this issue in the concluding section of this research note.

For nativism I employ four variables. The first variable assesses the attitude of the respondent towards asylum seekers on a seven-point scale: '1' represents 'admit more', and '7' 'send back more' (Asyl). The second variable concerns the culture of foreigners. It is measured on a seven-point scale again in which '1' says that foreigners can keep their own culture and '7' states that they have to adjust to the Dutch culture (Foreign). The third and fourth variables measure agreement with the following propositions: 'illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay' (Illeg) and 'the immigration of Muslims should be stopped' (Muslim). Respondents could answer on a four-point scale ranging from 'fully agree' (1) to 'fully disagree' (4).[2]

The DPES data set contains four propositions that could be employed to measure authoritarianism. The first one asks respondents their position on the way in which authorities deal with criminality (Crime). The question contains seven answering categories ranging from '1' 'authorities are too strict' to '7' 'authorities should be more strict'. The second item is: suspects of a terrorist crime should be held in prison (Terror), and could be answered on a five-point scale ranging from 'fully agree' to 'fully disagree'. The third question asks if the law should be upheld strictly no matter what the consequences (Law). Respondents could also answer this question on the same five-point scale. The final item with which authoritarianism is measured is the question how crimes are punished (Punish). The answering categories range from 'too heavily' to 'too lightly' on a three-point scale.

Finally, populism is measured with nine variables: (1) politicians are honest (Honest); (2) politicians are profiteers (Profit); (3) politicians keep their promises (Promis); (4) politicians are corrupt (Corrup); (5) politicians are reliable (Reliab); (6) politicians only have fine talk (Talk); (7) politicians do not understand what is going on in society (Underst); (8) politicians are capable of solving problems in society (Problem); and (9) most politicians are competent people (Compet). Respondents could answer on a five-point scale from 'fully agree' to 'fully disagree'. In a later stage of the analysis, I also included the probability of a future vote for the PVV in the analysis (1 = never, 10 = certainly some day). In order to compare the inclination to vote for the PVV with the inclination to vote for other parties, I also included variables that measure

the probability of voting for other parties. For an overview of all the variables see Table 1.

The actual analysis consists of three parts. To assess whether the attitudinal variables actually measure the latent constructs of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, I have first executed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). As the used variables are measured on an ordinal scale, the factor analysis is based on the polychoric correlation matrix. The principal-component factor method with an oblique rotation (promax) was used to extract the factors. An oblique rotation was chosen because I assume that the factor axes are correlated. To assess whether nativism, authoritarianism and populism can indeed be modelled as sub-dimensions of a PRR attitude, I have also performed a hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis (HCFA) in which the latent factors load on a

Table 1. *Descriptive statistics*

	N	*Mean*	*SD*	*Min*	*Max*
Asyl	2,592	4.56	1.47	1	7
Foreign	2,611	4.91	1.57	1	7
Illeg	2,454	2.63	0.80	1	4
Muslim	2,451	2.69	0.84	1	4
Crime	2,611	5.77	1.25	1	7
Terror	2,483	1.85	0.95	1	5
Law	2,462	2.57	1.02	1	5
Punish	2,452	2.17	0.39	1	3
Honest	2,146	3.18	0.75	1	5
Profit	2,136	3.36	0.95	1	5
Promis	2,146	3.45	0.73	1	5
Corrup	2,125	3.91	0.77	1	5
Reliab	2,142	2.87	0.76	1	5
Talk	2,142	3.11	0.91	1	5
Underst	2,144	3.38	0.96	1	5
Problem	2,138	2.82	0.83	1	5
Compet	2,139	2.46	0.78	1	5
PVV vote	2,134	3.43	3.16	1	10
CDA vote	2,134	5.09	3.00	1	10
PvdA vote	2,129	5.83	2.90	1	10
VVD vote	2,128	5.78	2.95	1	10
D66 vote	2,104	5.77	2.48	1	10
GL vote	2,112	5.17	2.66	1	10
SP vote	2,116	4.97	2.82	1	10
CU vote	2,108	3.22	2.41	1	10
SGP vote	1,991	2.34	1.94	1	10
PvdD vote	2,123	2.73	2.31	1	10
TON vote	2,109	2.06	1.95	1	10

second-order construct. The parameters of the CFA models have been esti-
mated with Mplus Version 5.21 (Mplus, Los Angeles, California, United
States; Muthén and Muthén 1998–2010). A robust weighted least squares
estimator was used, because the variables have been measured on an ordinal
level. Finally, by means of SEM, I have assessed whether the PRR attitude is
associated with the likelihood of voting for the PRR Freedom Party (PVV)
and other parties within the Dutch party system.

Findings

The results of the EFA are presented in Table 2. Three underlying factors turn
out to have an eigenvalue of more than 1.00, which means that we can
distinguish three factors that structure the seventeen indicators. The first
factor consists of the nine variables that were assumed to measure populism
and accounts for about twenty-nine per cent of the variance. The variables that
have high loadings on the second derived factor are the attributes that were
expected to measure nativism. This factor explains about twenty-one per cent

Table 2. *Exploratory factor analysis*

	Factor 1 *Populism*	*Factor 2* *Nativism*	*Factor 3* *Authoritarianism*
Honest	**−0.705**	0.067	0.126
Profit	**−0.667**	−0.019	0.254
Promis	**0.649**	0.079	0.157
Corrup	**−0.659**	0.094	0.244
Reliab	**0.798**	0.016	0.135
Talk	**−0.716**	0.028	0.198
Underst	**−0.673**	0.074	0.245
Problem	**0.654**	0.002	0.213
Compet	**0.732**	0.022	0.201
Asyl	−0.018	**0.809**	−0.011
Foreign	0.013	**0.761**	−0.088
Illeg	−0.129	**−0.608**	0.155
Muslim	−0.152	**0.777**	0.256
Crime	0.023	**0.540**	**−0.379**
Terror	0.034	−0.251	**0.593**
Law	0.088	0.059	**0.743**
Punish	−0.161	**−0.307**	**0.370**
Eigenvalue	5.498	2.450	1.116
R^2	0.289	0.213	0.141

Note: Results of exploratory factor analysis based on the polychoric correlation matrix.
To extract the factors the principal-component factor method with an oblique rotation
(promax) was used. Factor loadings above 0.30 are printed in bold.

of the variance. Note, however, that also two of the items that were expected to measure authoritarianism (Crime and Punish) load relatively high on this factor. The items that I expected to measure authoritarianism all load high on the third construct, which accounts for about fourteen per cent of the variance.[3]

To assess whether we can also distinguish a second-order factor underlying these three first-order factors, I have performed a HCFA. 'Asyl', 'Crime' and 'Honest' were used as marker indicators for nativism, authoritarianism and populism, respectively. The measurement model contained no double-loadings, and all measurement error was assumed to be uncorrelated. The variance in the three latent factors was assumed to be explained by the second-order factor. In order to identify the second-order model, the variance of the second-order factor was fixed to 1.0. Goodness of fit was assessed with the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the Tucker–Lewis fit index (TLI), and the comparative fit index (CFI). The criteria for reasonable model fit are: RMSEA ≤ 0.080, TLI ≥ 0.90, CFI ≥ 0.90. The criteria for good model fit are: RMSEA ≤ 0.050, TLI ≥ 0.95, CFI ≥ 0.95 (Brown 2006; Kline 2005).

This first model has a reasonable fit (RMSEA = 0.072, TLI = 0.95, CFI = 0.93). I changed the model in several ways. I excluded the variables 'Law' and 'Problem' from the model because its standardised factor loadings were lower than 0.5. Moreover, the modification indices suggested freeing some of the error correlations between the indicators of populism. This leads to a good fit of the model: RMSEA = 0.054, TLI = 0.098, CFI = 0.97 (see Figure 1). These findings indicate that the second-order factor 'populist radical right' explains the correlation structure between the latent variables nativism, authoritarianism and populism well.

Note that the factor loading of populism is considerably lower than the factor loadings of nativism and authoritarianism. This is most probably due to populism being compatible with many other ideologies as well. Various scholars have indicated that although populism in Western Europe is often associated with the radical right, it can also be combined with a radical left-wing outlook (see March 2007; March and Mudde 2005), and even with liberalism (Pauwels 2010). This is what Taggart (2000) refers to as the chameleonic quality of populism.

In a final step I assessed whether the latent PRR attitude is related to the probability of voting for the PRR Freedom Party of Wilders. Because this variable is skewed (many people are not inclined to vote for the PVV), I have also dichotomised this variable so that 0 indicates that someone will *never* vote for the PVV and 1 indicates that one *might* vote for the party in the future. Moreover, I have compared the probability of voting for the PVV with the inclination to vote for other parties within the Dutch party system. The results are presented in Table 3. The findings indicate that the probability of voting for the PVV is strongly affected by the PRR attitude (the standardised coefficient is 0.68 with regard to the ten-point measurement and 0.61 regarding the dichotomous measurement). Moreover, the probability of voting for most other parties

Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis. Standardised factor loadings for the final model.
Note: N = 2,621. Weighted Least Squares Mean and Variance adjusted (WLSMV) estimation is used because the indicators are measured on an ordinal scale. The populist radical right ideology is a second-order factor. All factor loadings are significant at $P < 0.01$. Factor variances, error variances and error covariances are omitted for clarity. Chi-squared = 380.752; d.f. = 44; RMSEA = 0.054; TLI = 0.98; CRI = 0.97.

is negatively or not at all associated with the PRR attitude. Not surprisingly, only the probability of voting for the right-wing populist party *Trots op Nederland* (TON) and the right-wing and very conservative Christian party *Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij* (SGP) are positively associated with the PRR attitude – albeit much less strongly than the probability of voting for the PVV.

Conclusion and discussion

By means of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses I have demonstrated that nativism, authoritarianism and populism form three distinguishable latent constructs that underlie the attitudes of citizens. Moreover, a HCFA demonstrated that there is a deeper-lying second-order factor that

Table 3. *Standardised effect of PRR attitude on the probability to vote for various parties*

	Vote probability ten-point scale	Vote probability two-point scale
PVV	0.68	0.61
CDA	−0.09	−0.29
PvdA	−0.41	−0.48
VVD	ns	ns
D66	−0.48	−0.49
GL	−0.50	−0.49
SP	−0.19	−0.30
CU	ns	−0.07
SGP	0.10	0.07
PvdD	ns	−0.09
TON	0.36	0.30

ns = not significant

explains the correlation between these three latent factors. Apparently, a PRR ideology exists as a coherent latent attitude not only among parties but also among the public. I also showed, by means of SEM, that this PRR attitude is strongly related to voting for the PRR Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders.

These conclusions suggest that future studies on why citizens vote for PRR parties should focus on the attitudes of nativism, authoritarianism and populism in conjunction with each other. After all, these separate attitudes together form a coherent outlook; it is the *combination* of these attitudes that makes that citizens vote for PRR parties. Future studies should further investigate whether the PRR ideology also exists as a coherent attitude in other contexts. Does it, for example, also exist when PRR parties have not been successful? Also, many more studies must be conducted to understand what makes citizens adhere to the PRR attitude and how exactly this attitude affects the vote choice for PRR parties.

One important limitation of this study may be that nativism and populism have only been measured by means of negative indicators. Although these negative indicators serve as good proxies for measuring these concepts validly – after all, nativism and populism are characterised by their explicitly negative outlooks (see Mudde 2007) – future studies should also aim at including indicators that measure a positive attitude towards the nation (as opposed to 'dangerous others') and the people (as opposed to 'the elite'). This could be achieved in two different ways. Either one could develop 'combined' indicators that measure nativism and populism by explicitly contrasting what is Good with what is Evil (e.g. 'The strength of the Dutch nation is threatened by the constant influx of immigrants' or 'The interests of hardworking people are neglected by a corrupt elite'), or one could develop separate indicators, so that

what is Good is only linked to what is Evil later on, in the measurement model (e.g. 'I am proud to be Dutch' or 'The will of the people should be the point of departure for political decision-making).[4]

Future research should also aim at a better understanding of how individuals combine the three elements of the PRR attitude. I briefly touched upon the tension between populism (or anti-elitism) and authoritarianism. Another important issue is the strong association between nativism and authoritarianism. Theoretically they are clearly different concepts. Yet empirically the distinction between the two is much less clear-cut. Finally, the combination of nativism and populism deserves further attention as well. Although it is not surprising that a focus on the nation and 'dangerous others' coincides with an emphasis on the 'Good' people and the 'Evil' elite, populism is not an exclusive feature of the far right. Populism might also be combined with left-wing attitudes. More research is required to understand the precise ways in which citizens combine these attitudes.

Nonetheless, this study has been an important first step in understanding the separate elements of the PRR ideology in conjunction with each other. Although nationalism might constitute the core of the PRR ideology, it is the combination with other attitudes that makes PRR parties so attractive to voters.

Notes

1 Note that there exists an interesting tension between populism and authoritarianism. On the one hand PRR parties fiercely criticise elites, but on the other hand they plead for strong authorities. This remarkable combination of attitudes might be explained by the distinction that PRR parties make between parties and politicians on the one hand and the state on the other hand. Parties and politicians are conceived of as corrupt and arrogant and are associated with a badly functioning decision-making process. The state, on the other hand, is not directly associated with this ill-performing political process. On the contrary, the state is often conceived of as an almost sacred institution – threatened by the evil parties and politicians. The reason for this positive attitude towards the state and the obedience of authorities is most probably that many PRR parties see the state as the institutionalisation of the nation (hence the word nation-state) – and thereby as the main protector of its members. Moreover, because non-native groups such as immigrants are assumed to continually break the rules of the state, PRR parties are inclined to combine their populism and authoritarianism with nativism as well.
2 It should be emphasised that nativism does not necessarily only concern the issues of migration and Islam. In Eastern Europe, for example, 'dangerous others' might well consist of indigenous minorities within the majority population – e.g. Estonian Estonians vs. Russian Estonians (Mudde 2007: 19). However, for most PRR parties in Western Europe (such as the PVV in the Netherlands) the main 'dangerous other' is the Muslim immigrant. For this reason, I have focused my measurement of nativism on indicators concerning migration.
3 Because this analysis is not fully conclusive on the question as to whether we should distinguish two or three latent factors, I have also executed a confirmatory factor analysis. In the first model I distinguished two latent factors (the indicators for nativism and authoritarianism together load on one factor and the attitudes for populism load on the other factor). In the second model I distinguished three latent factors (nativism as factor 1, authoritarianism as factor 2 and populism as factor 3). Because the second model fits the data better than the first, I conclude that the

attitudes are structured by three underlying attitudes: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. In light of the results of the EFA, I have also estimated a model in which 'Crime' and 'Punish' load on both authoritarianism and nativism. However, this does not improve the model. Moreover, the factor loadings on nativism are rather low. Because double factor loadings make no theoretical sense either, I have not allowed for double loadings in the final model. The specific results of these analyses are available upon request.

4 Within the DPES data set, some of such 'positive' questions have been asked regarding nativism. Yet they have not been asked to all respondents, and, most importantly, they have not been asked with regard to populism.

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