SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF EMOTION AND EMOTION REGULATION

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The classic perspective on the functionality of emotions is that they increase the probability of an individual's survival and/or reproductive success. The general argument is that emotions are functional in the sense that they help the individual to address or overcome problems (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1999; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Fear of predators or enemies, for example, is adaptive in the sense that individuals who have the capacity to experience such fear are more likely to be vigilant and avoidant, and thereby to escape the threat of predation or attack (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Öhman, 2000).

In this chapter, we shift the attentional focus to functional analyses of emotion that emphasize "social survival"—that is, our human capacity to build social bonds and address and overcome social problems such as social exclusion or loss of power (see, e.g., Barrett, 1995; Fridlund, 1994; Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). The central argument we advance is that emotions are important to social well-being because the emotions we experience and express help us to (1) form and maintain positive social relationships (affiliation function); and (2) establish or maintain a social position relative to others, and to preserve our self-esteem, identity, or power, sometimes at the expense of others (distancing function). Both functions point to the importance of a precarious balance between maintaining close and harmonious relations without sacrificing a secure and

healthy sense of self. We summarize evidence for the affiliation and distancing functions of positive and negative emotions first at the interpersonal level and then at the group level. Because these functions cannot be served without social regulation, we also discuss the social function of emotion regulation, and the issue of how other people play a role in regulating our emotions.

The Nature of Social Functions

Some social functions of emotions may have an evolutionary origin, because humans compete and cooperate in order to meet survival and reproduction goals. Cultural and social norms, however, have become increasingly important in our complex, industrialized societies, where social well-being is based on how well we adjust to the challenges of different social goals. Living a socially successful life has become a complex endeavor that requires knowledge of norms, sensitivity to one's own and others' needs, and the ability to regulate one's emotions in a socially appropriate way. This entails striking a balance between competing social goals, which can be described as social connectedness and cooperation, on the one hand, and autonomy and competition, on the other. Humans are social creatures who need social bonds in order to thrive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995): We affiliate with others, work together with others, and seek

harmony, closeness, and love. The importance of social bonds is illustrated by research on social isolation, showing that this leads not only to poorer health and well-being, but also to inhibited development of various social, emotional, and cognitive skills (Williams, 2001). On the other hand, we also have goals that set us apart from others: We are keen to avoid others who might pose a threat to us, excel above others and win when competing with others, exert control over others, or enhance our social power or social standing. These latter social goals cannot simply be achieved through cooperation and affiliation; they typically require distancing ourselves from others, or even being ready to compete with other persons or groups.

Emotions play an important role in realizing these two types of goals, and we therefore draw a broad distinction between two general social functions of emotion. The "affiliation function" of emotion refers to the idea that emotions help an individual or group to establish or maintain cooperative and harmonious relations with other individuals or other social groups. The "distancing" function of emotion serves to differentiate or distance the self or group from others (see also Brewer, 1991) and even to compete with these others for social status or power. Each of these general social functions of emotion operates at both the interpersonal and group level.

Any analysis of the social functions of emotion is likely to encounter the same conceptual and empirical issues as those encountered by analyses of its nonsocial functions (Gross & John, 2002; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Parrott, 2001, 2002). Emotion expressions typically have social effects (e.g., Algoe, Fredrickson, & Gable, 2013; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Hess & Fischer, 2013; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Tiedens & Leach, 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2010; Van Kleef, van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011), whether or not these effects are intended. However, social effects are not the same as social functions.

Social effects of emotions depend on the way in which the emotion is expressed, and also on the specific features of the social and cultural context (e.g., Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2003; Mesquita, 2003; Parkinson, 2005; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Van Kleef et al., 2011). For example, anger can be expressed by ignoring, criticizing, or shouting at someone. These behaviors are likely to have different effects, and these effects are also likely to vary as a function of the

identity of the target and the appropriateness of the expression. Scolding a friend because he or she forgot an appointment might elicit an apology on the part of the friend, but the same expression of anger toward a superior who forgot an appointment might evoke a contemptuous response (e.g., Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). In the same vein, the effects of emotion are likely to vary across cultural contexts, depending on what is considered a typical or desirable expression in a specific situation (see also Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). Thus, the social effects of emotion expressions are quite concrete and also context specific (see also Philippot, Feldman, & Coats, 1999).

Social functions are defined at a more abstract level and are inferred from the social-relational goals inherent in the appraisals and action tendencies that are typical of a given emotion (e.g., Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; see Table 24.1). The social distancing function is typical of contempt (wanting to exclude another person), anger (wanting to confront, attack, or criticize), disgust (wanting to move away, isolate oneself from), social fear (wanting to flee from someone), or *schadenfreude* (being pleased about or amused by another's misfortune). The affiliation function, on the other hand, is typical of happiness and other positive emotions, such as gratitude, love, or admiration (sharing positive experiences with or communicating positive experiences to others), but is also characteristic of certain negative emotions, such as guilt (acknowledging that you have harmed someone), shame (acknowledging one's faults), or sadness (seeking help and support from others).

We therefore propose that each emotion has a prevalent social function, based on the individual's

TABLE 24.1. Illustrative Social Functions of Some Emotions

Affiliation function	Distancing function
Happiness	Anger
Love	Hate
Gratitude	Contempt
Admiration	Disgust
Sadness	Social fear
Guilt	Schadenfreude
Shame	Pride about self
Regret	Disappointment in others

goals in a social situation (affiliating with another or distancing from another). It is possible, however, that a single emotion can serve both social functions, depending on the context and taking the time frame into account. This is a point we return to below.

The idea that emotions have social functions does not imply that emotions are always socially functional—that is, that they always have the social effects that would be predicted on the basis of their relational goals. Anger, contempt, and even hate can be socially functional if they help to protect the self from destructive relations with others. However, these emotions can be and frequently are socially dysfunctional when expressions of anger or contempt are targeted either at others who pose no threat to the self or at others who have the power to inflict even greater damage. In the case of others who pose no threat to the self, expression of these emotions may irreparably damage relationships with them, without achieving anything in terms of social control or social standing. In the case of others who have the power to inflict greater damage, expression of these emotions clearly runs the risk of eliciting such damage.

The same applies to positive emotions such as pride, happiness, or love: Rather than strengthening social bonds, they may cause others to take exception to what they regard as inappropriate in the circumstances. Social dysfunctionality is especially likely to occur if the social impact of one's emotions is not taken into account or if inappropriate appraisals of the social context are made (e.g., Evers, Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, & Manstead, 2004; Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parrott, 2001). According to Giner-Sorolla's (2012) functional conflict theory, dysfunctionality may also be a consequence of emotions having different functions at different levels, at least some of which can be contradictory. Thus, the social functionality of emotion in a particular set of circumstances is not a given, but rather depends on the way in which the person assesses his or her concerns or goals in relation to others' concerns or goals, and regulates his or her emotions accordingly. Becoming "too" jealous, getting angry "too often," or feeling contempt for many people is unlikely to be socially functional, although it can sometimes be functional at an individual level (e.g., by allowing the individual to vent negative feelings). Below we further explore the social functions of emotion, starting with emotions in interpersonal relationships.

The Affiliation Function of Emotions at the Interpersonal Level

Social relations between individuals vary in emotional tone from love affairs to work relations, but any relationship between two persons involves some degree of emotion. The amount of emotion that is experienced and expressed, however, is closely related to the nature of the relationship, reflecting an important function of emotions at the interpersonal level: Emotions enable us to form and maintain long-term and intimate relationships by promoting closeness and harmony, by providing comfort and avoiding social isolation. This function can be inferred from research on the social effects of emotions on others or on the relationships with others.

There is evidence that the frequency and intensity of emotion experience and expression increase with the intimacy of the relationship. For example, research by Clark, Fitness, and Brissette (2004) has shown that emotions are more often experienced and expressed in communal or intimate relations than in other types of relationships. Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco, and Eyssell (1998) also found that the degree of expression of specific emotions, as reported in diary entries, was highly correlated with the closeness of the interaction partner. Research on social sharing has also repeatedly shown that people share their emotions mainly with family and friends (Rimé, Philippot, Boca, & Mesquita, 1992). A related point is that an absence of emotions in relationships casts doubt on the strength of the social bond between the relationship partners (Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998). In their analysis of marital conflicts, Gottman and Levenson (2002) found that an absence of affect during such conflicts was a predictor of subsequent divorce. Studies of anger and aggression have shown that people, especially women, are most often angry with intimates (Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Kring, 2000), and that physical aggression, especially on the part of women, also occurs more often within intimate relationships (Archer, 2000).

These various lines of research provide support for the idea that intimate and communal relationships are characterized by strong mutual concerns and therefore give rise to emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1986), whether positive or negative. In addition, intimate relations also allow the expression of emotions, especially emotions that may expose weak or vulnerable facets of the self (such as jealousy, pow-

erlessness), which may then further strengthen the emotional involvement. Indeed, suppression of emotional expressions in such relationships may be dysfunctional, because it may reflect a lack of trust or support. The suppression of emotional expressions in relations between strangers may also be dysfunctional, however. Research on the social effects of emotion suppression (Butler et al., 2003), for example, has shown that if one individual is instructed to suppress his or her emotions, the other person feels less emotional rapport, and exhibits heightened cardiovascular responding. Van Kleef, Oveis, Van Der Löwe, LuoKogan, Goetz, and Keltner (2008) further showed that a higher sense of power leads to being less emotionally responsive to a conversation partner's distress, which then resulted in partners' feeling less understood and less keen on befriending the other. In addition, a study of the long-term social relationship effects of emotion suppression showed that suppression as measured in freshmen prior to entering college led to poorer social relations 4 years later (English, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2012). In other words, suppressing emotions may not only be detrimental in intimate relationships but also limit the formation of new relationships.

Previous research also shows that the expression of virtually all positive emotions promotes the development of stable and close relationships. This applies not only to romantic relationships but also to relations between strangers. Smiling people, for example, are more likely to be ascribed positive traits, such as kindness, humor, intelligence, or honesty, than are their nonsmiling counterparts (Hess, Beaupré, & Cheung, 2002; Reis et al., 1990). Krumhuber and colleagues (Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005; Krumhuber, Manstead, & Kappas, 2007) showed that these positive effects of smiling are moderated by the perceived genuineness of the smile. The more we believe that a stranger's smile reflects sincere positive feelings, the more cooperative we are likely to be toward that person (Krumhuber, Manstead, Cosker, et al., 2007).

The reciprocal expression of gratitude has also been shown to be very functional in close relationships. Showing that one is grateful for what one's partner has done leads not only to positive and appreciative feelings in the partner, but also to the recognition that one's relationship is valuable and that one feels secure and appreciated by the other (Algoe, Gable, & Maisel, 2010; Gordon, Impett, Kogan, Oveis, & Keltner, 2012). Expressions of gratitude also benefit relations between strangers and result in prosocial behavior, even if

such behavior is effortful and unpleasant to carry out (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). One of the few positive emotions that does not necessarily result in closeness and affiliation is pride because (along with positive affect) this emotion signals high relative social status (Shariff & Tracy, 2009), and this is more likely to serve the social distancing function than the affiliation function. However, this only applies when the pride is expressed in relation to one's own attributes or achievements; in cases where one expresses pride in relation to the attributes or achievements of others, as is quite common in collectivistic cultures (Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez, 1999), such expressions can clearly serve the affiliation function.

Negative emotions play a different role in the development and maintenance of interpersonal relationships. The evidence suggests that negative emotions serve three specific social functions that all promote the more general affiliation function, namely *signaling*, *support*, and *social change*. These functions are not mutually exhaustive but refer to different processes. Signaling refers only to providing information about the state of the expresser, which can then result in different behaviors from the recipient. Support refers to a specific type of behavior that is elicited in the recipient, namely psychological (consoling, offering solutions) or material (e.g., financial) support. Social change also refers to the elicitation of a specific range of behaviors, namely those that evoke a change in the other person's behavior that may in turn improve the relationship with another person.

A classic example of the signaling function (also referred to as the alerting function; see Parkinson, 2011; Parkinson & Simons, 2012) is provided by research on social referencing (e.g., Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985), showing that 12-month-olds are less likely to proceed in an uncertain and possibly unsafe situation when their mothers display a negative expression. Thus, negative emotions potentially have informational value for others because they communicate concerns and appraisals of the current situation. The use of others' nonverbal expressions as a signal has been referred to as social appraisal and has been seen as one of the mechanisms in how others' emotions affect one's own (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Mumenthaler and Sander (2012) demonstrated this idea at a very basic level by showing that the recognition of a facial expression on a computer screen is facilitated by another facial expression that gazes at the target face, but not by a facial expression that gazes away. More specifi-

cally, when a target face shows anger, the presence of a fear face gazing at the target face leads to a stronger rating of the anger face. This phenomenon also occurs in daily life, as illustrated in a diary study by Parkinson and Simons (2009). They found that anxiety and excitement about decisions involving another person are predicted by the (perceived) anxiety and excitement of the other person, even after controlling for one's own appraisals. Although the nature of the relationship was not examined in these studies, we know from other lines of research that the extent to which emotion signals are sent and the extent to which they are acted upon by receivers is also a function of relational closeness (e.g., Bruder, Fischer, & Manstead, 2013; Erber, Wegner, & Therriault, 1996; Hess & Fischer, 2013). The fact that a key outcome of emotional signaling is the strengthening of trust and social connection between signaler and receiver (Campellone & Kring, 2013) suggests that this process is bidirectional.

Second, expressing negative emotions may not only signal that a person is in danger or helpless, but may also evoke help or support. Studies on social sharing of emotions (see Rimé, 2009) have shown that we are inclined to share nearly all of our negative emotions, with the possible exception of shame, after an emotional event. Research on crying also provides evidence of this support function, because individuals are more likely to cry in the company of partners or intimates than in the company of strangers (Vingerhoets & Becht, 1997). Independently of the motive of seeking support, perceivers also actually tend to provide help when someone cries or shows signs of distress (e.g., Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978).

A third way in which the expression of negative emotions can directly serve an affiliative function is because it acknowledges one's own wrongdoing and is thereby intended to rescue or reaffirm the relationship with the other person. This is clearly the case in episodes of regret, guilt, or shame. Research on regret, for example, shows that it motivates efforts to undo the harm done in relationship contexts (Zeelenberg, Van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998). Studies of guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996) have shown that this emotion is typically expressed in the context of valued relationships and where people have high respect for the other. Embarrassment displays have also shown to be beneficial for one's relations with others, because they evoke sympathy, positive evaluations, or helpful behavior in others (Fein-

berg, Willer, & Keltner, 2012; Keltner & Buswell, 1976, 1997; Ketelaar & Au, 2002; Miller, 2004), as well as increased perceptions of trustworthiness and conscientiousness—as, for example, in studies on blushing, a typical signal of embarrassment (de Jong, 1999; Dijk, Koenig, Ketelaar, & de Jong, 2011). Interestingly, embarrassment displays tend to elicit more positive evaluations on a "warmth" dimension, but not on a "competence" dimension (Semin & Manstead, 1981), consistent with the notion that this emotion serves an affiliation function. The expression of these emotions thus promotes harmonious relationships.

Although there is abundant evidence of the affiliation function served by both positive and negative emotions, we argued above that social functionality does not necessarily mean that these emotions serve this social function regardless of context. An important boundary condition for social functionality is that the emotion display should be perceived as appropriate by targets or observers of the display. For example, individuals who are regarded as *too* happy, or who display smiles for self-interested reasons (see Maringer, Krumhuber, Fischer, & Niedenthal, 2011), are likely to be regarded as inauthentic. Clearly, smiles can be interpreted in different ways, depending on culture and context (Hess et al., 2002). The expression of negative emotions, such as shame or guilt, may also fail to serve an affiliation function if they are seen as ambiguous or unjustified. For example, individuals who blush when there is no reason to blush may be regarded as being guilty of something they have not done. In such situations, blushing may backfire and have negative effects on the blusher (de Jong & Dijk, 2013). In other words, social functions of emotions are at least partly related to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion expression in the situation (see also Parrott, 2001; van Kleef et al., 2011), and whether the expresser is regarded as sincere and as willing and able to change his or her behavior.

The Social Distancing Function of Emotion at the Interpersonal Level

Emotional expressions in interpersonal contexts do not always serve to increase relational closeness. Indeed, emotions such as anger, contempt, disgust, or fear of another person do the reverse, increasing the social distance between self and other (e.g., Fridlund, 1994; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). Markus and Kitayama (1991) alluded to a similar notion

when they distinguished between "socially engaging" and "socially disengaging" emotions. The latter are more socially acceptable or even desirable in cultures in which an independent rather than an interdependent self is promoted. The emotions of anger, contempt, socio-moral disgust, *schadenfreude*, and pride are assumed to serve this function. We now consider examples of these emotions, and the ways in which they increase social distance.

Although anger is generally categorized as belonging to the "approach" family of emotions, the nature of the approach is confrontational, which is likely, at least in the short term, to increase the distance between self and other. If directly expressed to the object of the anger, this emotion confronts the other person with the fact that the angry person wants to change the target's behavior and exert some control over the target (e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Fischer & Evers, 2011; van Dijk, van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). This implies that the target of the anger should apologize, yield, show submissiveness, or simply stop doing whatever he or she was doing. Studies by Van Kleef and colleagues have shown that the verbal expression of anger in a negotiation context does indeed result in greater concessions by the other party (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Indeed, even when others do not visibly and immediately react to the expresser's anger, they may covertly retaliate against the angry person (e.g., Wang, Northcraft, & Van Kleef, 2012).

In keeping with the idea that direct anger expression is an attempt to regain or maintain status or power, or simply to control the other, research by Tiedens (2001) confirms that high-status persons are expected to respond to negative outcomes with anger (rather than sadness or guilt), and to positive outcomes with pride (rather than appreciation; see also Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004). Moreover, when people express anger or pride they are regarded as high in status, but when they express sadness, guilt, or appreciation they are regarded as low in status. The underlying explanation for these differences, according to Tiedens (2001), lies in the appraisals of agency that are inferred from the expression of each of these emotions (see also Hareli & Hess, 2009). An expression of anger is seen as reflecting an appraisal of other-blame, implying not only greater social distance but also self-elevation; by contrast, an expression of guilt or sadness reflects an appraisal of self-blame. On the other hand, actual social status, power, or dominance increases the likelihood that

one expresses one's anger (Fischer & Evers, 2011; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007).

Schadenfreude is another example of an emotion that serves a social distancing function, as is clear from evidence that one feels greater *schadenfreude* following others' misfortune if these others pose a threat to one's self-esteem (Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Wesseling, & van Koningsbruggen, 2011). A more extreme example is provided by contempt. The expression of this emotion, typically in the form of derogation and rejection, often results in social exclusion of the object of the contempt (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2014; Gottman, 1994). The aim is to make it clear that the other person is inferior or even worthless, which is a way of boosting one's own social position or status, either as an individual or as a group member. Contempt as well as anger may be elicited if alternative ways of changing others' behavior are expected to fail. Disappointment *in* another person is less extreme than contempt but nevertheless serves a similar function, because it implies that the target of these emotions has not met one's expectations, and one therefore feels distance from or even abandonment of the person who is the object of the emotion (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).

Thus anger, disappointment, hate, and contempt all serve a social distancing function because they imply that the target is responsible for a negative outcome. The social distance results from the negative appraisals of the actions or character of the other person and can be further reinforced by tendencies to attack the other (in the case of anger and hate) or to treat the other as an inferior being (in the case of contempt). Although these emotions all serve a social distancing function, they differ in the extent to which they are also able to serve an affiliation function: Whereas contempt is highly unlikely to give rise to any improvement in a social relationship (see Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2015), anger can do so, especially in the longer term (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). This suggests that whereas the primary social function of anger is to criticize the other person, and thereby to increase distance, it can also serve an affiliation function, but at a later point in time.

To summarize, we have considered evidence that certain emotions have the effect of creating social distance between self and others in a way that may enhance one's social standing or self-evaluation. Expression of these emotions implies movement away from, and sometimes above, the other person(s). Confronting and constraining the antisocial or dysfunctional behaviors of oth-

ers by expressing anger and contempt toward them thus serves the function of protecting the individual or group from the harmful or disruptive behavior of others. Likewise, it is sometimes functional for individuals and groups to set themselves apart from or to cut themselves off from other individuals or groups. For example, anger felt toward an ex-partner can be helpful not only in detaching oneself from that relationship but also in creating the possibility for a new one. Likewise, contempt expressed toward others who fail to endorse or live up to key norms and values can be beneficial in protecting those norms and values.

Affiliation Functions of Emotions at the Group Level

Affiliation and social distancing functions can also be identified at the group level. In line with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which argues that self-esteem derives in part from the status and achievements of the groups with which we identify, we can safely assume that emotions serve the function of strengthening ingroup bonds as well as creating distance from outgroups. The strength of these group-based emotions is related to one's categorization as a group member (e.g., Smith, 1993). For example, Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Gordijn (2003) showed that mere social categorization could increase or decrease the intensity of group-based emotions. When Dutch or Belgian participants categorized themselves as Westerners, a social identity that includes Americans, they reported experiencing more fear after being reminded of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 than when they categorized themselves as Europeans, an identity that excludes Americans.

Typically, the more one identifies with a group, the stronger the positive group-based emotions one experiences (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). However, strong identification with a group can also lead to weaker group emotions if such emotions could be harmful to one's social identity and/or beneficial for an outgroup. This is the case with group-based guilt (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Doosje et al. (1998) found that strength of identification with Dutch identity among Dutch participants was inversely related to guilt about the way that Indonesians were treated during the colonial era. High identifiers appeared to engage in defensive denial that wrongdoing had been perpetrated. In a study on European Americans' "White guilt" with respect to African Americans, Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003) further suggested that group-based guilt may involve a focus on the ingroup with a view to alleviating ingroup distress, rather than a more outgroup-focused desire to help members of the disadvantaged group. The aversive nature of group-based emotions such as guilt and—especially—shame is also functional in preventing group members from engaging in actions that might give rise to these emotions. Shepherd, Spears, and Manstead (2013a, 2013b, 2013c) have shown that *anticipated* group-based shame results in less ingroup favoritism and motivates group members to engage in collective action to stop the shame-evoking behavior.

The affiliative, group-bonding function of positive group emotions is shown more directly in a study where group-based emotions resulted in stronger identification with a group (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Shared positive emotion is likely to play a role in the "basking in reflected glory" phenomenon (Cialdini et al., 1976). The shared positive affect that supporters experience as a result of their team's success on the football field presumably serves to strengthen their ingroup identification. Likewise, it seems plausible that shared negative emotions provide an emotion-based account for the related phenomenon of "cutting off reflected failure" (Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986), in which group failure leads individuals to distance themselves from the ingroup in question. Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, and Shepherd (2011) have gone a step further by showing that similarity between own and others' emotional reactions to an event led participants to be more inclined to see themselves as having a shared identity. Just as shared identity strengthens group-based emotions, shared emotions in a group strengthen social identity.

One way in which emotions serve an affiliative, group-bonding function is because the communication of emotion within a group provides group members with rapid information about group structure and the environment (Spoor & Kelly, 2004). Furthermore, if others share one's emotional reactions to an event, one is more likely to regard oneself as sharing group membership with them (Livingstone et al., 2011) and to feel emotions on behalf of that group (Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dandache, Fischer & van der Schalk, 2013). Moreover, emotions within one's group also seem useful when distinctions from other groups are relevant. This is nicely illustrated by research on sports

teams, where individual team members' moods are correlated with their own team's aggregate mood, and not with that of a competing team (Totterdell, 2000). Work teams also experience "group moods," and the extent to which group members have similar moods has an influence on levels of cooperation and conflict in the group (Barsade, 2002; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). In particular, the collective display of positive emotion leads to greater cooperation and reduces conflict in the group, whereas the display of negative emotion is associated with the opposite outcomes. George and her colleagues have also shown that group affective tone is related to prosocial behavior (see George, 1990).

Group emotions may also serve an affiliation function in cases where groups are less cohesive and when group members do not agree or have different opinions. For example, Heerdink, Van Kleef, Homan, and Fischer (2013) examined expressions of anger or happiness toward a group member's deviant opinion and found that happy expressions by other group members led to stronger feelings of being accepted, whereas angry expressions led to stronger feelings of being rejected. In other words, as well as strengthening group bonds, emotions can also maintain cohesiveness in less cohesive groups by excluding deviant members. This has also been illustrated in research by Sani and colleagues (e.g., Sani, 2005; Sani & Reicher, 1999), who showed that schisms develop from perceptions that positions taken by other ingroup members threaten the shared identity of the group. Shared identity is a core attribute of the group, so any threat to it is likely to evoke negative emotions such as dejection and agitation, resulting in decreased identification with the group and lower perceived cohesiveness. In a field study of the secession of a subgroup from the Church of England, Sani (2005) showed that strong negative emotion aroused by a perceived threat to group identity was a positive predictor of intentions to secede from the group.

A third way in which group emotions may have an affiliative function is at the level of intergroup relations: By eliciting and expressing (social distancing) emotions toward outgroups, one can strengthen relations within one's own group. The stereotype content model (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008) proposes that group-based emotions are a key feature of stereotypes and prejudice, reinforcing not only differences between groups but also a social hierarchy. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002) argued that stereotypes are based on two dimensions, warmth and competence, and depend on social structural features of intergroup relations in a society. A group's status predicts the degree to which a group is seen as competent, whereas its cooperativeness predicts the degree to which it is seen as warm or cold. These dimensions also predict how people emotionally react to members of specific outgroups. Envy is felt toward groups seen as cold but competent; in the North American context such groups include Asians, Jews, and rich people. Contempt or disgust are felt toward social groups that are seen as both cold and incompetent, such as welfare recipients, homeless people, or drug addicts. Pity and sympathy are felt toward those seen as warm but incompetent, such as the elderly. By contrast, groups seen as warm and competent elicit admiration (Sweetman, Spears, Livingstone, & Manstead, 2013).

Although much research has been conducted on anger, other emotions also help to sharpen group boundaries by stressing dissimilarities with the outgroup, or by promoting prejudice. For example, studies on intergroup *schadenfreude* (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003; Spears & Leach, 2004) have shown that its intensity is, among other things, associated with feelings of inferiority with respect to the outgroup, suggesting that intergroup *schadenfreude* can be seen as a way of coping with the lower social status of one's own group.

Distancing Functions of Emotions at the Group Level

Clearly, group-level emotions can also serve a social distancing function when they are targeted at outgroups. In particular, anger challenges existing social hierarchies. Indeed, anger has been considered to be the basis of intractable intergroup conflicts, such as the one between Israelis and Palestinians (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Rivera, 2007). These group-based distancing emotions are also strengthened by identification with one's group. The more strongly people identify with a group or take the perspective of a group, the more group-based anger they feel toward an outgroup that threatens the well-being of the group—even if they are not personally affected by any injustice (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006) found that a perceiver's degree of identification with the victims of an injustice affected not only the perceiver's level of group-based anger, but also his or her willing-

ness to engage in collective action or protest to redress the wrong. Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) sought to understand why collective disadvantage sometimes does and sometimes does not lead to collective action, and hypothesized that this was due to different expectations about the type of support that members would receive from their group. These researchers drew a distinction between "instrumental support" (support for action) and "emotional support" (sharing opinions). They found that the anticipation of instrumental support was sufficient to predict collective action in the absence of anger; however, if group members anticipated emotional support, this led to more group-based anger and thereby to collective action. In the latter case, anger served the function of motivating group members to engage in collective action.

Group-based anger therefore has the effect of mobilizing people who are not themselves directly affected by the perceived injustice. Research by DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, and Cajdric (2004) has shown that even the memory of a personal anger incident can automatically evoke negative evaluations of outgroups in an intergroup context, supposedly because of its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition.

It should be noted that whereas anger has often been thought of as providing the basis for strong intergroup conflict, there is recent evidence suggesting that its social function is more complex, in keeping with our reasoning about the possibly beneficial effects of anger in interpersonal relations in the longer term. Anger appears to have a distancing and even destructive effect if it is accompanied by hatred or contempt, associated with appraisals of the other group as evil, or expresses a long-term negative sentiment (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin & Gross, 2011). If, however, anger is simply based on appraisals of a group's negative behavior, and is expressed to communicate an injustice and to change the outgroup's attitude, it may ultimately decrease the social distance between groups. For example, the communication of pure group-based anger (without contempt) toward an outgroup can evoke empathy in the outgroup and decrease the intention to engage in a conflict (De Vos, van Zomeren, Gordijn, & Postmes, 2013).

Consistent with this reasoning, Halperin, Russell, Dweck, and Gross (2011) showed that it was the level of hatred that determined whether anger toward an outgroup was destructive or constructive. Inducing anger toward Palestinians in Israeli respondents who had low levels of hate toward Pal-

estinians resulted in stronger support for compromise in an upcoming peace negotiation, whereas it decreased support for compromise among Israelis who had high levels of hatred. Another way in which group-based anger can bring groups closer together is when group members express moral outrage at the actions of other ingroup members who have adversely affected members of a disadvantaged outgroup (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). Such outrage motivates political action aimed at reducing the outgroup's disadvantage. In sum, anger serves a distancing function in intergroup relations when it is based in long-term negative sentiments, such as hatred and contempt, but it can serve a constructive role when it signals unjust treatment that may be acknowledged by the perpetrating group.

In summary, there are different ways in which group emotions help to promote emotional bonding within groups (affiliative function) and to delineate the boundaries between groups (social distancing function; see also Keltner & Haidt, 1999). First, positive group-based emotions, such as happiness or admiration, promote group cohesiveness, ingroup identification, and ingroup cooperation. Second, ingroup bonds can also be strengthened by emotions that serve a distancing function when these are expressed toward deviant group members, thereby promoting cohesion within the group. Third, certain negative group-based affiliative emotions, such as guilt and shame, may strengthen bonds within groups because they are collectively experienced as aversive and/or threatening to the group's social identity; group members may then become motivated to defend their group identity by engaging in reparation or collective action. Fourth, group bonds can also be strengthened by differentiating one's group from other groups and/or challenging the social hierarchy by expressing anger, hate, or contempt toward outgroups that are seen as threatening the ingroup's interests or values. At the same time, positive emotions, such as admiration for another group, may also help to maintain social hierarchies. Finally, positive intergroup relations can be promoted by group-based anger, but only if the anger is focused on the outgroup's behavior, rather than being based on appraisals of the outgroup's negative nature.

Interpersonal Regulation of Emotions

If emotions serve social functions, a natural place to look for the origin of these functions is the re-

actions of others to expressions of emotion. The fact that others respond to our emotions—and because we often care about the way in which they respond—means that emotions are subject to regulation, both by the person experiencing the emotion and by others. Interpersonal emotion regulation is defined as the explicit or implicit attempt to change someone else's emotions. The related concept of co-regulation refers to a process of reciprocal regulation of each other's emotions. Both types of emotion regulation are often preceded by the perception and appraisal of anticipated, imagined, or actual emotional reactions by others (i.e., social appraisal; Manstead & Fischer, 2001). The functions that emotions serve in interactions and relationships with others are therefore intertwined with the interpersonal regulation of emotion (e.g., Lopes, Salovey, Côté, & Beers, 2005; Niven, Macdonald, & Holman, 2012; see Emotion Regulation, Chapter 26, this volume).

It has been argued that the concept of emotion regulation is difficult to define, because it is unclear where emotion ends, where emotion regulation begins, and who is regulating what (Kappas, 2013). We might shout a little harder at a friend than at a superior, or we might cry more overtly in the company of a friend than in the company of strangers, without even noticing that we are regulating our emotion. Thus it can be argued that emotion regulation, like emotions themselves, serves the same two social functions that we have described in this chapter (see also Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Emotions are typically regulated in such a way that they are socially functional, helping us to establish or maintain closeness and cooperation with some but separation and distance from others (see also Emotion Regulation, Chapter 26, this volume).

Interpersonal regulation starts already early in life (Trevarthen, 1984): Parents adjust their own facial and vocal expressions of emotion in order to soothe, interest, or bring pleasure to a baby. When children are older, caregivers try to calm agitated or angry children by encouraging them to reappraise the situation, count to 10, or go to their room. Children who are unhappy are stimulated to smile; children who appear to be ungrateful are encouraged to express their gratitude (Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998). Parents' regulation of their children's emotions is later supplemented or superseded by peers (Helsen, Vollebergh, & Meeus, 2000) and still later by partners, who tell one to calm down, give disapproving looks, offer verbal comfort or criticism, or laugh with someone or at someone when expressing or

sharing an emotion (Rimé, 2009). In communal relationships, partners are both targets of emotional expression and regulators of such expression (see also Clark et al., 2004). Interpersonal regulation thereby serves an affiliative function, because it is essentially cooperative.

Co-regulation involves not only telling others how to modify unwanted feelings, but also expressing one's own emotions in a way that regulates others' emotions. By expressing anger when one's partner is jealous, displaying shame when one's child has a temper tantrum in public, or expressing empathy when one's friend is in distress, we also attempt to help others to regulate their emotions. In the context of cooperative relationships, co-regulation is likely to involve encouraging affiliative emotions, and discouraging social distancing emotions.

Sharing the experience of affiliative emotions in interpersonal relations or groups is likely to enhance the closeness (see also Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998), intimacy, or positivity of a relationship, and may result in emotional transference, convergence, or contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992; Parkinson & Simons, 2012). Indirect evidence for such co-regulation of affiliative emotions can be found in a study by Anderson, Keltner, and John (2003), who found that dating partners and college roommates became emotionally more similar over the course of a year. This emotional convergence effect applied to both positive and negative emotional reactions to events and could not be explained by increased similarity in personality variables. More direct evidence for co-regulation comes from research by Bruder, Dosmukhambetova, Nerb, and Manstead (2012), who found that dyads jointly exposed to emotional films converged in their appraisals, emotions, and nonverbal behavior.

Regulating others' emotions can also operate via emotional mimicry (e.g., Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg & Lundquist, 1990). Research has shown that we mimic intimates more than strangers (Fischer, Becker, & Veenstra, 2012), ingroup members more than outgroup members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008, Study 2; Van der Schalk et al., 2011), and people whom we like more than people whom we do not like (Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008). Instructions to mimic another person also lead to more affective bonding with this person, in comparison with conditions in which people are instructed not to mimic (Stel & Vonk, 2010). In short, interacting with others involves regulating our tendencies to mimic the other's

emotional expressions, which is likely to serve an affiliative function.

The social consequences of interpersonal emotion regulation are also apparent when emotions are socially shared (Rimé, 2009). Sharing any emotion is likely to involve some degree of co-regulation, and to the extent that the emotion is not only communicated but also shared, the effect is likely to be one of strengthening social bonds. Indeed, a study by Kuppens and colleagues (2013) showed that talking about an emotionally relevant topic in a group resulted in stronger indignation than did discussing an emotional topic that was irrelevant to the group, suggesting that sharing emotions within a group can lead to the up-regulation of group-based emotions and thereby serve an affiliative function. In general, we assume that the expression of anger, rage, antipathy, and other negative emotions may serve a social distancing function with respect to the outgroup (moving away from the threatening group), whereas sharing these emotions with ingroup members serves an affiliation function (see also Hess & Fischer, 2013).

Conclusion

Emotions are experienced and expressed in social contexts, and they help us to deal with the challenges posed by the social environment. We have distinguished two general social functions of emotion: affiliation and social distancing. Emotions can reduce or increase the social and psychological distance between self and others, or between one group and another. However, it should be evident from our review of the literature that the social functions of emotion cannot be equated with the social effects of expressing that emotion in any given setting. The social functions of emotion are relatively independent of specific context, but rather are intrinsic to the social-relational goals and prototypical features of the emotional reaction, whereas the social effects of an emotion are contingent on both the way in which the emotion is expressed and the specifics of the social context. Social functionality thus depends on the typical social action tendencies intrinsic to an emotion, such as wanting to hide, avoid, run away, promote the self, attack, stay as close as possible to another, or make up with another. These goals are met only when an appropriate balance is struck between affiliation and cooperation, on the one hand, and social distancing and competition, on the other (see also Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Social survival

and social well-being involve a compromise between these fundamental social goals.

We have argued that each emotion can be seen as having a primary social function, either affiliation or social distancing. Most positive emotions—but also some negative emotions like regret, embarrassment, sadness, shame, or guilt—serve an affiliation function. By contrast, anger, contempt, and (social) disgust serve an individual's or group's need for social distance and increased social standing. However, when we take into account the way in which an emotion is expressed, or the target of the emotion, or the time frame of the emotion, other effects may become apparent. For example, anger generally increases social distance in the short term, but may ultimately be constructive in a relationship. Whether or not this latter effect takes place depends primarily on the perceived appropriateness of the anger.

A final point that bears repetition is that although we firmly believe that emotions serve social functions, this does not mean that emotions are always socially functional. The potential social functionality of emotions can be inferred from their social-relational goals and typical features. In practice, this functionality depends on how the individuals or social groups involved appraise the social context, and the extent to which they regulate their emotions and expressions in ways that are consistent with those appraisals. Perhaps the ultimate social function of emotions is to persuade others to acknowledge the validity of one's own or one's group's appraisals (see Parkinson, 1995).

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