Doing chemical sexualities, becoming a jago

Pakasi, D.T.

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DOING CHEMICAL SEXUALITIES, BECOMING A JAGO:
Masculinities, Personhood, and Precarity in West Papua

Diana Teresa Pakasi
Doing Chemical Sexualities, Becoming a Jago:  
Masculinities, Personhood, and Precarity in West Papua

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex

ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit

op woensdag 12 september 2018, te 11:00 uur

door Diana Teresa Pakasi

geboren te Jakarta, Indonesia
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Contents

Contents ...................................................................................................................................................... ii
Figures ....................................................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgement .................................................................................................................................. vi

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ............................................................................................................................................. 1
Conceptual Framework ......................................................................................................................... 8
  Gendered Personhood ............................................................................................................................ 9
  Body and Performativity ..................................................................................................................... 13
  Masculinities in Precarity .................................................................................................................. 16
Methods: Doing Research in a Precarious Place .............................................................................. 19
  West Papua: A Place of Struggle ........................................................................................................ 20
  Fieldwork ............................................................................................................................................. 24
  Researching Masculinities, Performing Femininities ........................................................................ 28
Outline of the Dissertation .................................................................................................................. 31

Chapter 1 Chemical Sexualities .............................................................................................................. 33
  Strong Medicines .................................................................................................................................. 35
    Bungkus Leaves .................................................................................................................................. 38
    Penis Massage Oils ............................................................................................................................. 42
    Substances for Penile Injection ........................................................................................................... 45
    Viagra and Herbal Viagra .................................................................................................................. 47
  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 51

Chapter 2 Dynamics of Masculinity in Contemporary Urban Jayapura ......................................... 53
  Special Autonomy and the Changing Social, Political, and Economic Landscape ..................... 56
  Big Men, Strong Men, and Bosses: Powerful Men in the Special Autonomy Era ....................... 57
  The Backbone of the Family: Young Men’s Aspiration to Be a Good Man .................................. 67
  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 72
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 3</th>
<th>Size It Up and Be Manly</th>
<th>75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dorms, Kos, and Mabes</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Practices of Bungkus and Suntik</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Shamed or Gaining Pride</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4</th>
<th>In Search of Pleasure and Power</th>
<th>95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Maitua-Paitua (Husband and Wife) to Timba Rame-Rame (Pump It Together): Changing Heterosexual Relations in West Papua</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonte Women in Contemporary Sexual Relations</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biar Enak (For Pleasure) and Kasih Tobat (To Make Women Repent)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Sexualities as Technologies of Masculine Power</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5</th>
<th>Jago Masculinities and Precarious Transformations</th>
<th>115</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence and the Construction of Masculinities</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Violence in the Everyday Lives of Young People</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic tensions and military oppression in gender violence</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Resistance in Daily Life</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Clashes, Indonesian Military Oppression, and Precarity in Jayapura</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jago Masculinities: Masculinities in Precarious Transitions</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Conclusion | 145 |
| Doing Chemical Sexualities, Becoming a Jago | 146 |
| Chemical Sexualities, Sexual Violence, and Precarity | 148 |

| Summary | 153 |
| Samenvatting | 155 |
| Bibliography | 157 |
Figures

1. Map of West Papua .................................................................................................................................. 21
2. The area of Humboldt Bay and the Jayapura city center. ...................................................................... 21
3. Jamu products on the supermarket shelf .............................................................................................. 36
4. Penis and sex enhancement products found in Jayapura and Sentani .............................................. 37
5. Daun tiga jari (three fingers leaves) or dendrocnide sp. ........................................................................ 39
6. Kangkung pantai or smilax sp. ................................................................................................................ 39
7. Daun patah tulang or euphorbia tirucalli ................................................................................................. 39
8. Pictures of the processes of doing bungkus described in Dr. Anton’s paper ....................................... 40
9. Bungkus mixture from an online shop .................................................................................................... 41
10. Bungkus capsules from an online shop .................................................................................................. 41
11. Leech oil sold on the internet ................................................................................................................. 43
12. Leech oil sold at a beauty salon ............................................................................................................. 43
13. Arabian oil ................................................................................................................................................ 43
14. Advertisement in the Cendrawasih Post ................................................................................................. 44
15. Local’s healer therapy place in Jayapura ............................................................................................... 44
16. Leaflet with penis sizes for enlargement ............................................................................................... 44
17. Tokyo Night Oil ........................................................................................................................................ 46
18. Viagra sold on the counter at a pharmacy in Sentani ........................................................................ 48
19. Herbal Viagra sold on Facebook claimed for enlarging the penis ...................................................... 48
20. Herbal capsules for men’s stamina sold through multi-level marketing ........................................... 48
21. Galaxs ad ................................................................................................................................................ 49
22. Young men at a hangout spot in Jayapura City .................................................................................... 72
23. The modern men’s house (Kombo) in East Sentani ........................................................................... 78
24. Performance at Lake Sentani Festival in 2016 evokes the warfare and rituals of the past ................ 78
25. Dormitory in Jayapura built by the Municipality of Mamberamo Raya ............................................. 81
26. Communal bathroom in the Mamberamo Raya’s dorm ..................................................................... 81
27. Young man blocking the road asking for money from minibus passengers .................................... 130
28. After a clash in Jayapura...

29. Burning houses in the Highlanders settlements in the Organda riot of August 2015

30. Student demonstration rejecting special autonomy in front of the Papua provincial parliament building in 2015.


32. In this demonstration the KNPB General Secretary released a statement: You can burn down the flag, the paper, but the real Morning Star is rising in each Papuan.
Acknowledgement

My dream to get a PhD would not have been a reality without the opportunity that was given by Irwan Hidayana to meet Professor Anita Hardon in 2013, when she came to Jakarta for a Chemical Youth workshop. I was so grateful that she encouraged me to apply to the AISSR PhD program and to the Indonesia Directorate General of Higher Education (DIKTI) scholarship. I want to express my deep gratitude to Anita for giving me a chance to be her student and to be part of the Chemical Youth project, and for her support throughout my PhD journey. Whenever I doubted myself during the writing process, she always reassured me and got me motivated to keep going to finish this thesis.

My sincere gratitude also goes to Sylvia Tidey who helped me from writing the 8th month paper to finishing my final draft. Her comments were always stimulating in generating new ideas whenever I felt stuck. I will never forget how she gave me comfort and courage to face the fieldwork hurdles.

I owe much to my Chemical Youth colleagues: Nastasja, Mariana, Mai, Gideon, Swasti, Lisanne, Tait, Daan, and Piera from whom I learned a lot through the discussions and debates in the workshops or meetings. It was a wonderful experience to be involved in the team. My thanks also go to Emilia Sanabria who always gave valuable insights in the Chemical Youth workshops. Also, this thesis would have never been finished without the thorough language edits of Takeo David Hymans, my thanks go to him. My sincere appreciation goes to Hayley Murray without her huge facilitation I would have lost my way in the defense processes.

I also got enormous support from the AISSR program manager Janus Oomen who helped me dealing with financial and administrative matters. I also thank Muriel Kiesel and Yomi van der Veen for answering my questions and helping me to get settled in Amsterdam, and Alix Nieuwenhuis for assisting me registering the classes.
I am very grateful for the precious study visit opportunity from the State, Society, and Governance in Melanesia Program (now Department of Pacific Affairs) at the Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific. In particular, I want to thank Richard Eves, Jenny Munro, and Margaret Jolly who gave valuable suggestions and provided me with enormous literatures on gender in Melanesia. My interaction with a PhD fellow at the ANU who also did a research in West Papua, Indri Sari, also enriched my visit.

I am grateful that I had some fellows from Indonesia at the AISSR: Vita, Lisa, Hana, Prio, and Isdah. I will miss the discussions in the kitchen or on the red sofa. I also thank the members of Indonesia reading group, specially Lex Kuiper and Yatun Sastramidjaja, for the fruitful discussions that often gave me insights for my writing.

I am forever indebted to the participants of my research. I learned a lot from them and their lives. My interactions with them have taught a new perspective and a new meaning of livable life. I will always miss my conversations with my female participants, thank you for sharing your stories and staying with me during the bumpy journey of my fieldwork. I am also grateful for the helping hands of the Department of Anthropology University of Cendrawasih, specially Jack Morin, Pak Enos, Pak Abdi, Abner Koibur, and Yance, thank you for being patient answering my questions about language, custom, and many other things and for sharing your stories about doing ethnographic research in West Papua.

My boss at the Center of Gender and Sexuality Studies, Irwan Hidayana, was a source of inspiration and motivation. He encouraged me to pursue a PhD and I am thankful for the opportunity he gave to meet Anita which led to the beginning of my PhD journey.

I am thankful that I had my mother-in-law and sister-in-law who patiently took care of my daughter whenever I was a way for my fieldwork or conferences.

Finally, I do not enough words to express my gratitude to my daughter, Mariana Salma. I am thankful I have a daughter who endlessly and uncomplainingly supported me throughout my PhD trajectory, she was my greatest source of energy and inspiration.
Introduction

Background

Back in 2013—when I was studying HIV/AIDS in Jayapura, the capital city of Papua province in Indonesia—I attended an event organized by the Jayapura Regency AIDS Commission. West Papua was already suffering from the highest prevalence of HIV in Indonesia, and I remember being struck by stories recounted by Ardi, a 30 year-old NGO worker, about how the traditional practice of penis enlargement was contributing to the spread of the virus. The practice of penis enlargement was common among young men in Jayapura, Ardi said. But how they pursued these practices within their peer groups was something that I had never heard of before.

When I began my fieldwork in 2014, I contacted Ardi again to learn more about the practices of penis enlargement in Jayapura. He invited me to an informal meeting of Narcotics Anonymous, an independent and self-organized support group for narcotics users whom the AIDS commission regards as a high-risk group. Some who attended that meeting would later become my key informants.

After I introduced myself and my research, the informal meeting turned into a three-hour informal conversation full of laughter. Ardi and his friends, Raymond and Guz, were enthusiastically telling me about their own experiences with penis enlargement, while others talked about the experiences of their friends. But their narratives barely touched on the risks of contracting HIV; they instead focused on male friendships, sexual pleasure, sexual prowess, and male pride—and more specifically, pride to be seen as jago (virile) or jantan (manly) by their peers.

Practices of penis enhancement are not new to Indonesia. In the big cities of Java, one encounters advertisements for drugs and healers in local newspapers and on leaflets glued to trees and power poles. A few years ago, an old healer woman in West Java, Mak Erot, was famous in the country for her skills. But practices in Java differed from those
that I encountered in Jayapura. For starters, penis enhancement in Java mostly takes place behind closed doors; in Jayapura, I found talk to be much more open. Young men would point to peers who had done it and introduce them to me, a female stranger.

It was my first week of fieldwork and I was excited. But I was also a bit overwhelmed by the young men’s stories, which left me with many questions. Why were they so open and proud about their practices of penis enlargement? Why did they do it together? To what extent is penis size a symbol of masculinity? Did the practice confirm their sense of masculinity?

This dissertation frames the practices of penis and sexual enhancement as a lens through which to understand evolving masculinities in West Papua.¹ As we saw above, local public health authorities view these practices—which often involve dangerous techniques and materials that can lead to infection—as risk factors for HIV (Ap 2007; Oktavian, Diarsvitri & Dwisetyani 2011; Oktavian 2011; Pranata et al. 2014). But the phenomenon of penis enhancement is not merely a public health issue. The practices are part of the everyday lives of young men, embedded in local notions of gender and sexuality and situated within the wider social, economic, historical, and political contexts of West Papua.

Practices of penis enhancement have long histories in many parts of Southeast Asia and Melanesia, related to customary rituals and traditional notions of masculinity and sexual pleasure. For instance, Brown (1991) illustrates how the practice of penis inserts in Borneo was tied to the idea of women’s sexual pleasure. In West Papua, rituals of manhood to enlarge the penis culminated in the covering of the penis with an ornamented penis sheath, a distinguishing mark of adult masculinity (Pouwer 2010). In Highlands Papua

¹ The term West Papua is used to refer to the western part of New Guinea Island, now a part of Indonesia; the eastern part of the island is Papua New Guinea. Although Indonesia divided the territory into two provinces (Papua and West Papua) in 1999, the term West Papua is commonly used by scholars as well as independence movements to represent the territory as a single national political imagery.

Growing people’s mobility and cultural exchange are today leading to the emergence of new practices of penis enhancement. As practices and materials circulate in the region, they are appropriated to create new practices and to transform existing ones. In the Solomon Islands, the practice of penis inserts was introduced by Asian fishermen (Buchanan-Aruwafu & Maebiru 2008). Contemporary practices in Papua New Guinea encompass new forms of penis inserts and injections, with products often imported from Indonesia (Buchanan et al. 2012). In mainland Southeast Asia, the practices of penis inserts and injections are generally practiced by working class men and involve a bewildering range of materials (Hull 2000; Hull & Budiharsana 2001). In Thailand, for example, they include using olive oil as filler for penis injections (Thomson et al. 2008).

Men in West Papua today encounter myriad drugs, foods, drinks, cosmetics, and other substances to enhance their bodies and sexual performance, not just traditional herbs. The practices of penis and sexual enhancement in West Papua, embedded in the history of male initiation and beliefs about gender and sexuality, are merging with new technologies, while West Papua’s rapidly changing society and gender norms are opening new opportunities to experiment with alternative forms of sexual relations, pleasures, and products.

The practice of penis enhancement is part of becoming a man: a jago or jantan man whose sexual desires and performance are symbolized by the big penis. In their attempts to embody their desired masculine identities, young men turn to chemicals to transform and enhance their bodies. Such chemical practices are new ways of being a man in contemporary West Papua, and have not been explored in previous studies.

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2 jago literally means a fighting cock. According to the Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia, the official Indonesian dictionary, jago has multiple definitions: a cock, a champion, an expected winner, or a notable person.
Hardon et al. (2013) use the term ‘chemical sexualities’ to describe the phenomenon of young people in Indonesia turning to pharmaceuticals and cosmetics to feel attractive and sexually confident, to increase their sexual stamina, and to transform their bodies. In this dissertation, I define chemical sexualities as the chemical practices of young men to manage their bodies and sexual performance, which in turn constitute gendered personhood. Taking Viagra, drinking herbal tonics, applying sexual enhancement oils—all contribute to the formation of particular kinds of masculinity.

The question of how the practices of chemical sexuality constitute a particular kind of masculinity is at the heart of this thesis. The perspective of gender performativity posits that gender is constituted through doing, much as Measham (2002) points out that doing drugs is often a means to achieve a desired gendered identity. Building on these insights, this dissertation inquires about the kinds of masculinity that are constituted through the practices of chemical sexuality.

Chemical sexualities make use of enhancement technologies to improve physical appearance, moods, and bodily capacity (Hogle 2005). In our era of the medicalization of masculinity, men have become eager consumers of various enhancement technologies. Enhancement technologies like Viagra, for example, aid men to bolster their confidence, spirits, and sexual performance, in the process constructing male bodies and masculinities (Rosenfeld & Faircloth 2006). In Brazil, men constitute the fastest growing market for cosmetic surgery, with growing numbers turning to surgery or pharmaceuticals to address their anxieties or to achieve their bodily aspirations such as losing weight, gaining muscle mass, growing hair, and enhancing virility (Edmonds 2010). Enhancement technologies are a way to reveal the body, to make it visible and display its capacity (Elliott 2011).

The visibility of the body indeed is crucial to the formation of gendered identity. As Strathern (1988) argues, the body and its capacity must be known and recognized by others; gender is achieved in and through relations with others, and is realized in actions.
In other words, the body *per se* does not give a person identity; it is the performativity of the body directed towards and recognized by others through rituals of manhood that constitutes one’s gendered self within the gift exchange system (Strathern 1988). But if gendered personhood is constructed and enacted through relations with others, traditional gift exchange and male rituals are now rarely practiced in West Papua. In their stead, the practices of chemical sexuality allow young men to perform their bodies in and through relations with others—to become men.

The practices of chemical sexuality show that the body and sexual performance are central within constructions of masculinity (cf. Garlick 2003). How chemical use can mediate the construction of masculinity has been addressed in research on Viagra use, which has found it to reproduce hegemonic notions of virile masculinity (Brubaker & Johnson 2008; Loe 2001; Mamo & Fishman 2001; Potts 2001; Potts et al. 2004). Studies have also shown that sexual performance becomes the site of male anxieties, and that enhancing the body and sexual performance is a way to reassure one’s masculinity.

As chemical practices are intertwined with society’s notions of gender and sexuality, the chemical practices of young men in West Papua must be understood within local contexts of gender and sexuality. And to facilitate interpretation, the practices must be situated in the historical, social, political, and economic contexts of West Papua. How is a particular kind of masculinity constituted by the practices of chemical sexuality? How do chemical practices enable young men to perform their bodies in and through relations with others? And to what extent are these notions and performances of masculinity shaped by contexts of precarity? These are the main questions this dissertation sets out to answer.

In this dissertation, I argue that a specific form of masculinity emerges from the practices of chemical sexuality among young men in West Papua, a phenomenon I term *jago masculinity*. Examining the chemical practices of young men not only sheds light on their constructions of sexuality and masculinity, but also points to the broader social forces—and in particular, the environments of precarity—that shape their practices. The context
of precarity in West Papua, I argue, fuels young men’s practices of chemical sexuality and their performances of jago masculinity.

Research for this dissertation took place in West Papua. Sadly, life in the land of Papua (Tanah Papua)—the land of the bird of paradise—is not as beautiful as its label suggests. West Papua has a long history of disputed sovereignty and the West Papuan struggle for independence continues today. The special autonomy status that Papua province received from the central government in 2001 was a response to many Papuans’ demand for complete independence from Indonesia (Anderson 2015; Sumule 2003). Special autonomy status means that Papua province can disburse much of the revenue from its mineral wealth for its own health, education, and other development needs; it also entails affirmative action for Papuans in local legislative and executive bodies (Anderson 2015). But despite the central government’s commitments to improve socio-economic and political conditions in Papua, the Indonesian military has only intensified its operations

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3 The dispute over the sovereignty of West Papua (then, West New Guinea) can be traced back to decolonization, when the Netherlands contended that the territory did not belong to Indonesia. Indonesia brought the issue to international diplomacy in 1954 (Chauvel 2003a). On December 1, 1961, the West New Guinea Council declared the territory West Papua, with its own flag and anthem, and called on all nations to respect Papuans’ right to self-determination. The Netherlands transferred the territory to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in 1962 under the New York Agreement, which then passed the control to Indonesia in 1963. In 1969, the Act of Free Choice act of free choice was held under the supervision of the United Nations, resulting in an unanimous vote to remain with Indonesia, thereby neglecting West Papuan political and human rights (Saltford 2003).

4 The independence movement against integration with Indonesia began in 1965 with the founding of the OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement) (Saltford 2003). In the New Order era (1966-1998), the OPM was suppressed and labelled a wild terrorist gang, its acts of violence serving to conceal the motive of self-determination (Kirksey & Roemajauw 2002). The downfall of the New Order fueled aspirations for self-determination among Papuans (Sumule 2003). The ensuing era has witnessed some political milestones, including the flag-raising ceremony on 1 December 1999 and the Great Assembly and Second Papua Congress in 2000 (Sumule 2003). The Second Papua Congress, held in Jayapura in 2000, declared that Papua has been a sovereign nation since December 1, 1961; that the people of Papua reject the 1962 New York Agreement made without Papuan representation; and that the people of Papua reject the 1969 Act of Free Choice that took place under conditions of coercion, intimidation, and killings by the Indonesian military (Chauvel 2003b).
in Papua under special autonomy status (Supriatma 2013), continuing with its public displays of violence and torture of members of liberation groups (Hernawan 2015). But military violence is not the sole cause of insecurity in West Papua. Other sources of everyday insecurity include tensions between Papuans and Indonesian settlers, clan conflicts, roadblocks, and domestic and sexual violence (Anderson 2015). Jago masculinities are inextricably linked to these precarious circumstances.

Jago is an Indonesian word literally meaning cock,\textsuperscript{5} and is a central concept to understand masculinity and power in Indonesia (Wilson 2012). I use the term since my interlocutors used it to refer to a type of man who is brave, strong, powerful, and skillful, displayed through acts of violence. Wilson (2012) indeed illustrates how a jago’s performances involve acts of violence to develop reputation. When explaining their practices of chemical sexuality, many young men used the term to refer to the masculinity they aspired to: to be a virile man, whose penis and sexual prowess are a champion among peers, capable of dominating women sexually.

Being violent, however, is generally not a characteristic of idealized Indonesian masculinity, which more often revolves around being the breadwinner, head of the household, family decision maker, and guardian of family morality (Davies 2007; Robinson 2015). But in practice, violence is often part of the constitutive performance of masculinity, legitimized as a normal action of strong masculinity (Nilan 2009), as proper action to uphold normative masculinity (Boellstorff 2004), or as a rite of passage to enter into manhood (Alcano 2016).

As shown in previous studies in Melanesia, violence crucially informs the formation of masculinities, with experiences of colonial and postcolonial violence shaping models of personhood (Hirsch 1999, 2001; Stewart, Strathern & Hirsch 2002). In West Papua—where Indonesian constructions of masculinity intersect with the notion of bigmanship—

\textsuperscript{5} The term Jago has been in use since colonial times. Nordtholt (1991) points to the Jago as a thief with a significant role in the village order, a figure who used physical violence to disrupt the colonial administration.
models of gendered personhood are produced out of these manifold discourses on masculinity, enmeshed with the multiplicity of violence and the rapid transformation of society, economy, and politics.

West Papua has undergone rapid transformations with the penetration of Indonesian state institutions, transnational corporations, digital technology, and global youth culture. All of these forces have transformed traditional institutions, local power structures, gender norms and relations, and interpersonal and intimate relations. While these changes give rise to new hopes, they also introduce new tensions into the understandings and practices of masculinity. Amidst this rapid change and enduring structural violence, in lives full of uncertainty and precarity, young men must continuously rework their understandings of gendered personhood to find viable models of manhood.

Inspired by Strathern’s work on gendered personhood, Butler’s insights on gender performativity (Butler 1993, 1999, 2004b), and Butler and Schep-Hughes’ studies of precarity and structural violence (Butler 2004a, 2015; Schep-Hughes 1992, 2004), this dissertation examines how a specific type of masculinity emerges from the context of precarity and rapid transformation in West Papua. Jago masculinity, I argue, is a precarious kind of masculinity constructed through the practices of chemical sexuality within wider—precarious and violent—contexts of society, economy, history and politics.

Conceptual Framework

My conceptual framework is built around three main sets of concepts. First, I make use of a concept of gendered personhood that allows for individual modes of personhood—in particular the relational dimension of the person, or how the person is composed through relations with things, other persons, and places. Second, I rely on concepts around body performativity to examine how gender is constituted through repetitive performance, and
how the performativity of the body and sexuality is implicated in the formation of gendered personhood. Third, I use the concept of *precarity* to discuss how social, political, and economic contexts shape a particular form of gendered personhood. Here I build on the concept of *structural violence*, as the context of precarity in West Papua is largely due to the structural violence that reproduces multiple forms of violence in everyday life. The masculinities that emerge out of contexts of precarity are not only ways to survive, but also ways to rework the limits of young men’s social world.

**Gendered Personhood**

Strathern’s theorization of gendered personhood remains highly influential in Melanesian anthropology. In contrast to the opposition between the social and the individual that graces much social theory, Strathern (1988) argues that dividuality is the foundation of Melanesian personhood and that relationality is the basis of Melanesian sociality, in which gender is the main organizing principle (McDougall 2009).

For Strathern (1988), gender is not an intrinsic property of persons; rather, it has to be made known. It is not the femaleness or maleness of sexual organs, but what people do with them. Gender is a capacity that must be drawn out and displayed in interaction with others, made visible through performance and enactment. People depend on others for their own self-definition (Strathern 1988). Persons are made up relationally.

Strathern’s Melanesian personhood is perceived as a dividual, as constituted through relations with others. Dividual personhood, according to Strathern (1988: 13), is ‘the plural and composite site of the relationships that produced them’. This relational dimension of personhood helps to order societies and provides the structures of relatedness that inform systems of feeling and acting (Bialecki & Daswani 2015). Relations with others constitute gendered personhood and organize societies, which in turn structure the gendered persons’ acts and feelings.
Robbins (2015) and Stasch (2002) argue that the roles played by relations in Melanesian society can help to better understand Melanesian persons. Robbins (2015) shows the role of relationships in some Christian traditions, in particular, how the Urapmin social formation is configured in a copresence of traditional dividual/relational and Christian individualism modes of personhood. Stasch (2002), drawing upon Strathern (1988), illustrates how Korowai take dyadicentric personhood that is a type of relationalism in which relationships between pairs of persons are the locus of value and identity.

Strathern (1988) points out how personhood is divisible into parts or relations that are transactable with others through the processes of gift exchange. Over the duration of a person’s life, he or she is cumulatively composed and decomposed of the reciprocated parts of other persons (Mosko 2015). Hess (2006) further argues that dividuals are a nexus of relations with particular places and particular others. Therefore, dividual personhood is constituted through doing in relations to things, people, and places. It is dynamic and always in the making.

Dividual persons act with others in mind, with their acts directed towards others to be known. This raises a question: does the dividual person have agency? Strathern suggests that gendered personhood is manifested in actions, a sphere of agency. Male rituals, for example, are the application of male agency in creating special effects for one gender (Strathern 1988). However, Strathern differentiates the person from the agent. The person is constituted by relations, whereas the agent is the one who acts because of these relationships. ‘A person is an agent from the point of view of her or his relations with others, the agent is the person who has taken action with those relations in view’ (Strathern 1988: 273). ‘The agent acts in the knowledge of his or her own constitution as a person in the regards of others’ (Strathern 1988: 275). Strathern’s conceptualization of agency focuses on acts within relations; the acts are not autonomous but depend on the person’s knowledge or personhood.
Recent studies on Melanesian personhood show how dividual and individual modalities of personhood can coexist (Hess 2006; Morgain & Taylor 2015; Mosko 2010, 2015). The dividual is not always enacted everywhere in Melanesia (Street 2014) as dividual and individual personhood are co-present. Studies of male leaders in Melanesia, for example, show how individuality is enacted (Hess 2009), with big men possessing a set of culturally associated traits and abilities attached to individual male leaders (Lederman 2015; Lindstrom 1981; Sahlins 1963). Also, the encounters with Christianity and colonialism are assumed to have produced a new kind of person that requires a new approach to personhood and change: one that can explain the relation between dividual and individual personhood (Mosko 2010).

The relations between dividual and individual modalities of personhood are complex (Bialecki & Daswani 2015). Christianity is believed to have been central in the development of individualism, and the interaction with Christianity has created alternatives modes of personhood in Melanesia. Robbins (1998) points to how the Urapmins of Papua New Guinea combine the relationality of Urapmin culture with the individuality of Christian values, while Bialecki and Daswani (2015) argue that in places where Christianity and modernity have undermined the existing web of social relations, new constructions of the person emerge. For Mosko (2015), the contemporary conceptualization of dividuality and individuality in relation to continuity and transformation in Melanesia is far from self-evident. In this light, this dissertation explores both individuality and dividuality as aspects of gendered personhood in Papua in the midst of ongoing change.

Hess’ work shows how dividual and individual personhood is enacted in Melanesia. In particular, she argues that place is key to understanding dividual and individual personhood (Hess 2009: p. ix). To explore how dividuality and individuality materialize in Vanuatu, Hess examines peoples’ ideas about place and their engagement with place in everyday life, and finds that increasing private land ownership is fueling individuality (Hess 2009). Hess also asserts that personhood in Vanuatu is permeable as persons,
things, and places can influence and be influenced by one another (Hess 2009). Through relations with things, persons, and places, a person’s actions, thoughts, motives, and emotions can change. Also, through relations with things, persons, and places, a person can change the things, other persons, and places. Departing from Hess, I consider gendered personhood to be both constituted by and constitutive of relations with things, others, and places.

The concept of in/dividuality helps me to understand the many ways in which the use of chemicals is related to the new construction of gendered personhood in West Papua. Under the impact of the forces of modernity and the Indonesian state, traditional notions of manhood and gendered personhood are changing. As the idea of manhood backed by the Indonesian state centers around individual capabilities to be the breadwinner and head of the family, and modernity generates longings for individual property and prosperity, both bigmanship and the traditional relational gendered personhood become harder to maintain.

The availability of multiple modes of gendered personhood means that young men can embrace them at different moments. Strathern’s model of relational and dividual gendered personhood indeed allows for strategic behavior (Bialecki & Daswani 2015). Young men can select relevant relations with persons or things for their gendered identities. Gendered personhood in West Papua is constituted through relations with others as well as with chemicals.

Rapid societal transformation in West Papua has opened alternative spaces for expressions of sexuality and gender relations, with sexuality a part of contemporary manhood and womanhood (cf. Spronk 2006). The practices of chemical sexuality can be seen as alternative ways to relate to the body, other persons, and places that in turn construct gendered personhood; chemicals for enhancing the body and sexuality in contemporary West Papua thus inform alternative ways of gendered being. Here my research examines the role played by chemicals in the relational dimension of jago
masculinities and how chemicals are deployed in the complex emergent relations between various forms of jago masculinities (its dividual and individual forms) in the context of precarity and rapid societal transformation.

**Body and Performativity**

Strathern’s understanding of gendered personhood illustrates how gender is constituted—enacted and displayed—through relations with others. While Strathern does not elaborate further on how gender is enacted and displayed to others within particular structures of gender and sexuality, Butler’s theorization of gender performativity usefully does so. Here I explain through the intersecting works of Butler and Strathern how gender performativity constitutes gendered personhood, which also allows me to examine the relationships between the body, performativity, and gendered identities.

Butler sees gendered and sexed identities as performative, as learned doings, and parts of a discourse that has the capacity to reproduce what it names or enacts (Butler 1993). Gender is continuously reconstructed through the repetitive acts of dominant discourses, while gender performativity is best understood as the routine way in which bodily acts, movements, and styles constitute a gendered identity (Butler 1999). Gendered identities—or in the current study, masculinities—are produced and maintained through mundane, repetitive, and ritualized doings.

Gender performativity cannot be understood without considering the powerful and repetitive practices of regulatory regimes of gender formation (Butler 1993). Any performance of gender always takes place within the constrained reiteration of gender norms. Butler sees performativity as a discursive production, an enactment of power in the form of discourse that has a history as well as conditions contemporary practices (Butler 1993). In her later publications, Butler asserts that the concept of performativity encompasses both bodily and speech acts (Butler 2004b). In this sense, doing gender—as
a bodily act or speech act— is always governed by the regulated operations of gender norms in a specific historical and discursive context.

For Butler, the formation of the subject always takes place within sexed and gendered power structures (Salih 2002). Butler’s focus on how the subject is configured through relations of power is a useful addition to Strathern’s notion of dividuality, introducing relations of power into the subject’s relations with things, others, and places. At the same time, the concept of performativity can take into account the aspect of relationality advanced by Strathern and Hess, the relations that a person establishes with things, others, and places in their performances. This allows me to explore performativity in young men’s relations with things (for example, chemicals and bodies), other persons (men and women), and places (the context of precarity as well as gender and power relations between Papuans and the Indonesian state, among ethnicities, and so on).

It is important to recognize that Butler does not conceive of the subject as passive, as totally shaped by social forces (Eves 2010). Although far from complete freedom, performativity opens the possibility of reworking the body in such a way that it can lead to redefining dominant norms in particular situations (Eves 2010). In this sense, the concept of performativity allows me to analyze how young men strategize to rework their bodies and choose different modalities of personhood at different moments and in different contexts.

In conceptualizing the relationship between the body, gender, and performativity, both Butler and Strathern argue that it is not the bodies or biological sex organs that sex the person, but what they do with their bodies. Butler argues that the materiality of the body is constructed through the repeat performance of gender norms (Butler 1993). This delineation of the body through discursive practice raises the question of ‘how and to what end bodies are constructed and how and to what end bodies are not constructed’ (Butler 1993: 16). Butler acknowledges that bodies live and die, suffer and experience pleasure, and so on— realities that cannot be seen as mere constructions (Butler 1993). But
she insists that the materiality of the body is an effect of power; indeed, power—in the form of discourse as regulatory acts of gender formation—is central to Butler’s conceptualization of the body. Seeing the body as an effect of power is useful as it brings into focus how the dominant discourse of the idealized masculine body shapes what young men do with and to their bodies. In other words, young men’s chemical practices to enhance their bodies and sexualities are shaped by the dominant discourses of masculinity, while their practices simultaneously reproduce these discourses.

Through the lens of gender performativity, one can glimpse how subjects refer to gender norms as well as the mechanisms by which gender is reproduced and altered (Butler 2004b). The concept of sexual antagonism underpinning gender relations in Melanesia (Herdt & Poole 1982; Knauft 1997; Langness 1967; Taylor 2008) can be seen as the regulatory norms that governed gender performativity in the past. But how the notion has been transformed and materializes in the contemporary context in Papua still needs to be researched.

Here I would like to augment Butler’s conceptualization of the body with an insight from Strathern’s work. For Strathern, the body can be disaggregated into its constituent parts (such as blood, semen, and so on) and be transacted in relations with others (Strathern 1988). In my study, the masculine body is constructed by the penis and what young men do to and with their penises in their relations with other male peers and female partners. On the other hand, the chemicals that are ingested or absorbed in young men’s bodies are constitutive of their gendered personhood. By taking into account the body’s ‘partibility’, we can arrive at a conceptualization of the body that encompasses its physical, symbolic, social, and political dimensions.

It is important to note that the body and gendered personhood can never be fully accomplished as the subject is always involved in the endless process of becoming (Butler 1999). Here, Butler’s idea that the subject is a subject-in-progress parallels Strathern’s argument that persons are always in the making. As masculinities and the idealized
masculine body are never accomplished, young men always work and rework their bodies—including by doing chemicals—in their efforts to achieve their desired masculinities. Chemical practices are young men’s performances of jago masculinities; they are done in order to become a jago.

**Masculinities in Precarity**

Performances of masculinity in West Papua take place in contexts of precarity. Here I draw on Butler’s work on precariousness and precarity to disentangle how gendered personhood and masculinities are constituted in relations with precarity. And because precarity in West Papua is largely caused by structural violence, I also introduce insights from Scheper-Hughes, Das, and Kleinman on everyday violence and subjectivity.

As in the previous section, how and what persons do with their body forms their gendered personhood. But the context of precarity in which the body experiences insecurity and violence can undermine this personhood, shattering the agency of the subject (Butler 1993). I suggest that precarity produces a particular gendered personhood. When the social world is precarious, the body embraces the precariousness and challenges the modalities of in/dividual (Wolputte 2004). How is a particular gendered personhood composed out of the context of precarity? Butler’s (2004) work on precarious life offers an avenue to understand how personhood is developed in the context of enduring violence in West Papua.

The concept of precarious life departs from an ethics positing an understanding of how human life is negated without difficulty (Butler 2004a). Precariousness is a way of thinking through connections and relations, a relational condition of social being. It acknowledges the conditions of dependency, vulnerability, conflicts ranging from the conditions of working and living to various ways of subjectivization, embodiment, and agency (Berlant et al. 2012).
For Butler, the concepts of precariousness and precarity are intertwined. While precariousness points to precarious life conditions in general, precarity is a politically produced condition in which certain groups suffer from deteriorating access to social and economic goods and are disproportionately exposed to violence and death (Butler 2009). Butler further points to the double-edged role of the state: while people turn to the state for protection, it is the state that induces the precariousness (Butler 2009). Precarity is thus always political. In West Papua, the condition of precarity among Papuans is largely due to the policies of the Indonesian state.

Precariousness and precarity often precede the intensification of violence as physical vulnerability incites the desire to end it through violence. According to Butler (2015), secondary violence is part of the struggle for survival as well as the search for agency in the midst of oppression. Agency emerges through self-defense; it is the agency of the colonized.

Butler (2015) also links secondary violence to gender identity as violence is an instrument through which the oppressed becomes a man, a particular kind of man. To be colonized is to be humiliated as a man and this humiliation is unbearable and must be overcome. Turning to violence is an alternative when a life full of poverty and cruelty seems worse than death (Butler 2015). In this way, the masculine body becomes a site of struggle, of domination, and the embodiment of precariousness and precarity. Gender violence by men, in this case, is secondary violence by oppressed men to overcome precariousness and precarity.

Colonization produces the body in ‘social death’ (Butler 2015: 189). Colonization brings a sense of slow-death (Berlant 2007) and undermines promises of the future. But how are men’s gendered identities informed by their experiences of colonization, violence, and precariousness? As Butler leaves this part of the puzzle under-theorized, I base my conceptualization of masculinity in precarity on Scheper-Hughes’ (1992) important work.
on everyday violence as well as the works of Das (2007) and Kleinman (2000) which explore how subjectivity is constructed through the experience of violence.

Das and Kleinman argue that everyday life is transformed by violence and that this transformation shapes subjectivity. The creation of an alternative moral order—the norms and normality that govern individual behavior—affects day-to-day interactions (Das & Kleinman 2000). Kleinman (2000) further argues that the violence of everyday life is multiple and encompasses social, cultural and structural forms. This multiplicity of violence is seen as normal and a consequence of changing interactions and individual subjectivity.

Much as Kleinman sees how the violence of everyday life becomes normal and existential to daily living, Scheper-Hughes (1992) emphasizes the routinization of violence in everyday life. Scheper-Hughes further elaborates on the covert institutionalization of violence whereby violent acts by authorities come to be seen as an acceptable mode of social control. Everyday violence operates through hegemonic discourses such as depictions of oppressed group as dangerous as well as through mundane rituals and routines of humiliation and violence. These practices of everyday violence are often defended by the victims themselves (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 228). In light of Kleinman’s and Scheper-Hughes’ work, I outline how everyday violence is routinized and institutionalized by the Indonesian state, and often multiplied by the victims themselves.

In another important study, Das (2007) examines how experiences of violence affect the subject. Memories of violent events become embedded in subjects and their day-to-day relationships, leading to a mutual absorption of events and the ordinary (Das 2007: 7). Das’ research, based on enduring conflicts in India since 1984, illustrates how discursive practices by the state feature a sort of gendered subjectivity. Gendered subjects are formed through complex relationships between the violent events themselves and their sequelae as they leak into everyday relations and become part of them (Das 2007: 62).
Das also shows how everyday violence provides an alternative way through which individuals can relive the world (Das 2007). Social life becomes fragile as violent events undermine individual moorings in society and fuel a sense of betrayal by the everyday. Nevertheless, everyday violence can also create a capacity, through embracing the wounds, to recraft space and become subjects constituting the limit of the world (Das 2007: 4). Das has inspired me to see violent masculinities performed out of precariousness as a way for young men to rework the limits of the social. In this sense, the practices of chemical sexuality are performances of masculinity that cannot be separated from the precariousness of young men’s lives as they are also ways of reworking their social limitations. As traditional models of relational masculinity have weakened, young men’s relations with chemicals are an alternative dimension of relational/dividual gendered personhood under precarious conditions.

Methods: Doing Research in a Precarious Place

When I started my preliminary fieldwork in Jayapura, I was always concerned with safety issues. Later I realized that throughout my period of fieldwork safety in fact was my main concern. It was only five days after I arrived in Jayapura when there was a riot at a gambling site that had led to a stabbing. I had to ask a policeman whether the road to my place was open. ‘Jayapura is safe’, a policeman said to me before showing me the way. The policeman did not directly answer my question, perhaps because he knew I was new in Jayapura and saw that I was worried. Despite what he said later I found that the longer I lived in Jayapura, the more interpersonal conflicts, community clashes, and multi-day riots I encountered. The military oppression and inter-ethnic relations are in constant tension due to the ongoing structural violence in West Papua, and the resulting precarity shapes not only the modalities of relational personhood but the research process as well. This section aims to situate and illustrate the way in which my interactions with interlocutors as well as how I position myself are within the precarious circumstances in West Papua.
This section also draws on my experiences as a woman researching masculinities and male sexuality. My relations with my male interlocutors are best understood in the wider context of gender dynamics and power relations in Papua. I illustrate how gendered relations in the field are interwoven with other social relations, those between Papuans and Indonesian settlers in particular.

**West Papua: A Place of Struggle**

The area of *Tanah Papua* includes the provinces of Papua and West Papua. The territory was divided into two provinces in 2003. The term *Tanah Papua* is used among the Papuans, but the term West Papua is more common among scholars and liberation movements. In this section I discuss how West Papua as my research setting is marked by the condition of precariousness, with a long history of multiple forms of violence.

I conducted my fieldwork in Jayapura, the capital city of Papua province, and Sentani, a town in Jayapura regency neighboring Jayapura city. Jayapura is home to 272,544 people (BPS-Statistics of Jayapura City 2014), whereas the population of Sentani is 47,409 (BPS-Statistics of Jayapura Regency 2014)
Formerly named Hollandia, Jayapura is a multi-ethnic city with non-Papuans (65%) outnumbering Papuans (35%) (BPS-Statistics of Jayapura City 2014). Its residents include orang pantai (the coastal people), orang gunung (the highlanders), and pendatang (non-
Papuans or Indonesian settlers). The influx of Indonesian settlers into West Papua followed Indonesia’s occupation of the land in 1962 (Chauvel 2003a). Since then, there have been waves of both state-sponsored and spontaneous migration to West Papua from other provinces in Indonesia (Rutherford 2001). Spontaneous in-migration has followed economic growth in the province, which accelerated to 12% in 2013 (BPS-Statistics of Jayapura City 2014), much higher than the national average.

Jayapura is also a place where young people from across the province and from neighboring provinces migrate to pursue their education. The largest cohort in the population (24%) is made up of 20-29 year-olds. Many of them (28%) study at the 19 colleges or universities in Jayapura (BPS-Statistics of Jayapura City 2014).

Despite the city’s ethnic diversity, racialized stereotypes and prejudice inform daily interactions between ethnic groups. The root of the prejudice is economic inequality and discrimination against Papuans (Anderson 2015); indeed, the province is economically dominated by Indonesian settlers (Chauvel 2003a). Although the province of Papua since 2001 enjoys special autonomy status, it remains the poorest in the country with almost 30% of the population categorized as poor (BPS 2015) and 28% of children under five suffering chronic under-nutrition (WFP Indonesia 2013).

Poverty is not the only problem afflicting this province. The HIV prevalence rate of 2.3% is the highest in the country (Ministry of Health Republic of Indonesia 2017). Education also leaves much to be desired: in 2015, 29.2% of the population aged 15 and above was considered illiterate, much higher than the national rate of 4.8% (The Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics 2017). Access to quality education is hampered by a teacher absenteeism rate of 37% (Uncen et al. 2012).

In the wake of the New Order era, West Papua, like other parts of Indonesia, has experienced a rapid and vast transformation of its political economy landscapes. The referendum in Timor Leste, followed by its secession from Indonesia, encouraged calls
for a similar referendum in Papua (Anderson 2015). In response, the central government offered special autonomy status to West Papua.

The special autonomy policy aims to accelerate development in West Papua, mainly in the sectors of education, economy, health, and infrastructure. The policy also mandates the central government to allocate significant funds to finance these sectors. Education and health programs are financed by the Special Allocation Fund, while additional funds are available for infrastructure (Wael & Laurens 2015). Additionally, West Papua receives 70 percent of its revenues from natural resources. Between 2002 and 2010, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance disbursed almost 29 trillion rupiahs (1.8 billion euros) to infrastructure projects in Papua and West Papua provinces (Wael & Laurens 2015). Between 2002 and 2013, Papua province alone received 37.5 trillion rupiahs (2.4 billion euros) (Ruhyanto 2016).

The dispute over sovereignty in West Papua reaches back to 1949 when the Netherlands and Indonesia disagreed on whether the territory should become part of Indonesia (Chauvel 2003b; Saltford 2003). In 1962, Indonesia and the Netherlands signed the New York Agreement, resulting in the administration of West Papua being transferred to the United Nations. While the 1969 Act of Free Choice was conducted under United Nations supervision, Indonesia is believed to have manipulated the process (Chauvel 2003b; Saltford 2003). The voting resulted in West Papua’s integration into Indonesia.

The collective memory of suffering reaches back to the transfer of authority from the Netherlands to Indonesia (Rutherford 2001). Human rights violations have been and remain omnipresent, with at least 100,000 people killed since 1963 (Capriati 2016), leading to debates about whether Indonesia has committed genocide in West Papua (Banivanua-Mar 2008; Brundige et al. 2004; Chauvel & Charles 1963; Upton 2009).

Political violence has persisted in West Papua since the New Order era, focusing on the suppression of the liberation movement (Kirsch 2010). Nevertheless, the West Papuan struggle for independence continues. The Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka—OPM), established in 1965 (Supriatma 2013), endures although its leader Kelly Kwalik was killed by the Indonesian security forces in 2009 (Anderson 2015). Since 2009, the West Papuan National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat—KNPB) has played a central role in organizing protests (Anderson 2015; Supriatma 2013). To suppress this new movement, the Indonesian state has conducted multiple military operations, killing and detaining many KNPB activists (Supriatma 2013).

While the special autonomy policy mandates the Indonesian state to protect the fundamental rights of indigenous Papuans (Wael & Laurens 2015), human rights abuses and poverty remain widespread. Stories of human rights abuses were never far from the surface when I spent time with university students. I myself observed numerous student demonstrations demanding the central government take responsibility for human rights abuses by the security forces. These demonstrations often ended up in chaotic situations involving violence as the security forces intervened. The condition of precarity colored my experiences in the field and affected how interlocutors perceived me: as a female Indonesian, as I discuss below.

Fieldwork

My fieldwork extended over a period of 12 months from June 2014 to December 2015. The first time I was in the field I received help from a local NGO, Noken, as well as from researchers at the Anthropology Department of Cendrawasih University. Noken ran a ‘high-risk’ men’s support group in which some of the staff also managed a Narcotics Anonymous group, through which I met some of my key informants. In total I conducted in-depth interviews with 40 informants with different backgrounds: young men aged 18-30 who used the penis and sex enhancement products, men who provided the penis

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6 The high-risk men support group was a group created by Noken and the Jayapura Regency Aids Commission consisting men who are regarded at higher risk for HIV/Aids such as narcotics users, taxi drivers, motorcycle drivers, and gay men.
injection or the traditional penis enhancement treatment, young women, older women, religious leaders, and customary leaders. I also did interviews with physicians, nurses, government officials, NGO staffs, and politicians. In addition, I did six focus group discussions with young men who used various penis and sex enhancement products, who are university students, and dropped out of school young men. Two focus group discussions with young women who are university students and out of school young women were also done. I also conducted participant observations; I hung out with young men and young women in their neighborhood, campus, or places where they usually met, and came to my interlocutors’ parties or music performances, and to the community gatherings such as a customary meeting, a customary ceremonial, and a wedding.

My informants are mostly young men aged 18-30 years with diverse backgrounds in terms of level of education, occupation, religious affiliation, ethnicity, and migration status. I also interviewed young women, older men and women, customary chiefs, religious leaders, government officials, health providers, and NGO representatives. The interviews were semi-structured and were conducted in the places where the young men hung out: on the Cendrawasih University campus, at food kiosks near the university or near their boarding houses, and in cafeterias in the malls. I also conducted focus group discussions with groups of young men and women. Focus group discussions with young women were held at their own places or at a karaoke café, while those with young men were held at a karaoke café.

I was careful in choosing interview venues as these can affect power relations between the researcher and the researched (Manderson & Andajani-sutjahjo 2006). Scholars have addressed the many challenges faced by female researchers studying male sexuality: experiencing sexual advances, harassment, and violence (Lee 1997; Perrone 2010) and more generally being seen as a sexual object (Grenz 2005). One might argue that public places are ill-suited for conducting interviews on private and sensitive topics, as people may be reluctant to talk while surrounded by potentially eavesdropping strangers. But in light of the risks of sexual harassment and violence, I opted for public places, although
asking informants to meet at cafes could be problematic too. Once I invited a senior researcher for an interview at a local café, and he canceled out of fear that someone might think we were having an affair and spread rumors. He had a girlfriend and did not want her to misunderstand. Having trusted male company present thus became my strategy to ensure that the interviews remained harmless, for both the male informants and for me as a researcher.

The same male companion accompanied me throughout my fieldwork. His name was Neil, a 23 year-old university student majoring in mining and mineral engineering, who introduced me to his friends and family members experienced with the practices of chemical sexuality. I was introduced to him by members of the Narcotics Anonymous group that I contacted when I began fieldwork in June 2014. Neil lived in the same neighborhood as them. As I often spent time doing observation in the neighborhood, I came to know his house, his parents, brothers, and sisters. Neil called me *kakak* (sister) and introduced me to his friends as such. He provided me with background information which helped me to figure out how to approach them. His friends perceived me as their older sister; some even sought my advice when they had problems with their girlfriends. Having a trusted male companion helped me to not only gain access and build rapport, but also to prevent sexual advances as he warned me when potential male interlocutors gave sexual cues.

Being an older female Indonesian allowed me to inquire about the meanings of sexual terms without being seen as an ‘easy’ girl for speaking ‘dirty’ words. My interlocutors understood that I—as a much older non-Papuan—had no idea about the sexual meanings of certain phrases, which they would explain to me. Although Neil helped me to understand sexual idioms and jokes, my identity gave me opportunities to question many things that would sound silly if asked by a local male researcher.

I am aware that my informants were mainly from Neil’s friendship network, but it was not easy to develop mutual trust in a short time. I tried to broaden my network, but only
through people whom I trusted, for example anthropology students and young researchers at Cendrawasih University. Most of my key informants were thus Cendrawasih University students. I also received some help from Buginese men who also called me *adik perempuan* (female sister); they saw in my situation something they themselves had experienced when they first came to Jayapura, depending on the support of fellow Indonesians to survive. Being seen as a sister was the position I chose to develop rapport with my male interlocutors.

Although Neil helped me to approach them, it remained essential to build rapport with key informants on my own. After hanging out with them accompanied by Neil, I approached those who seemed interested in participating in my study and who had interesting stories relevant to the study. I approached them, and this often led to me being invited to events: a birthday party, a graduation party, concerts, music projects, or a routine gathering with their close friends or with their band in their homes. To reciprocate, I usually invited them to dinner or karaoke. Sometimes we had picnics on the beach; at other times we visited islands in the Humboldt Bay area or other beautiful places in Jayapura or Sentani, most of the time accompanied by my informants’ girlfriends. All of these occasions provided me with opportunities for participant observation. At first during the interviews, we talked about their experiences using sex and penis enhancement products. But as I got to know them better and we became closer, the longer and deeper conversations did not take place during interviews. Our conversations instead happened spontaneously, especially when my informants asked me to listen to them ‘outpouring their heart’. It was mainly about their relationships with their girlfriends, school problems, family problems, issues in the neighborhood, and their worries about the future. In the end, I came to see my interlocutors not merely as users or consumers of various sexual enhancement products, but as multidimensional men with complex lives.
Researching Masculinities, Performing Femininities

During my ethnographic fieldwork, as a female ethnographer who did research on masculinity and sexuality that at times in a male-dominated setting, I realized that gender and the performances of gender done by myself and my male interlocutors could reveal social dynamic and larger gender relations in the setting. Scholars have argued that being a female researcher is not necessarily a liability in studying male sexuality, that female researchers can strategically negotiate their gender and sexual identities to gain access and build rapport and trust with male participants (Bucerius 2013; Mazzei & Brien 2009; Perrone 2010).

To help me to gain access, build rapport, and prevent sexual advances, I had a male companion who perceived me as a sister. My position as a female sister entailed a particular performance of femininity, requiring me to perform a kind of femininity that was locally appropriate for a female of my age. But still at times, I had to deal with sexual advances when I met older male interlocutors who were in their 30s. Nevertheless, sexual advances by the male interlocutors and the way my interlocutors and I interacted in the field were performances of gender. Previous studies have also shown how the enactment of gender by female researchers can reveal a wider context of power relations (Orrico 2014; Presser 2014; Sallee & Harris 2011). In my research, performances of gender done by my interlocutors and I were embedded in Papua’s complex power relations, between ethnicities and between Papuans and Indonesian settlers. I found that my identity as a female Indonesian also affected how my male interlocutors perceived me.

When I met Neil’s friend, Freddy, a 23-year-old man Papuan who was a university student and a famous rapper, he seemed to dislike me. I met him for the first time at a beautiful site on a hilly part of Sentani Lake outside Jayapura city. Freddy was with his male friends, also students. I was not with Neil but with my friends from the Narcotics Anonymous group. One of them was Raymond, a 23 year-old NGO fieldworker who also
knew Freddy. Freddy’s hip-hop group was Raymond’s group of PKBI7 ‘high-risk men’, to whom he gave a box of condoms each month. Raymond introduced me to Freddy: ‘This is my sister from Amsterdam, she is doing research here about bungkus, magic tissues and the like. This is the sister whom Neil wanted you to meet.’ Freddy glanced at me, laughed and responded, ‘Study? Study for what? You know that all she wants to do is to show how stupid we are, the Papuan kids! I do not want to talk to her. So, Neil has been helping her. Tell Neil, he is stupid!’ As I often heard the same talk from the Papuans – that Indonesians often portray them as backwards, stupid, and such, I just smiled without responding. Raymond insisted that ‘It’s alright’ (Iyo sudah, trapapa). We then sat on the grass together. Freddy and his friends took off their shirts. I did not approach them. But minutes later, one of Freddy’s friends, an Indonesian settler, came to me to strike up a conversation. ‘Hey, so tell me about Amsterdam, where is it and how does it look like?’ He laughed and so did I. I was surprised that Neil did not introduce me as a researcher from Jakarta despite he knew I am a Jakartan who happened to study in Amsterdam. However, Freddy’s initial reaction somewhat reflects the underlying tensions between Papuans and Indonesian settlers. Despite Neil wanted to emphasize my identity as a student from Amsterdam, Freddy still saw me as an Indonesian female.

As a female Indonesian, I found it difficult to approach Papuan young men. My experience of breaking the ice with Freddy was indicative. After our inauspicious first encounter at Sentani Lake, Neil arranged a meet up with Freddy at a karaoke café. At the karaoke café, after we sang together for more than an hour, we managed a long conversation. After that night, Freddy and I often spent time together and he agreed to become my informant.

I also found that my identity also sometimes dissuaded them from criticizing the Indonesian state. For example, everytime I asked about the daily violence faced by people in Jayapura, most of my informants mentioned violence by drunk men or highlanders.

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7 PKBI (Perhimpunan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia) or the Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association-Jayapura Chapter.
But when a young Papuan man asked essentially the same question, Papuan students would often refer to the use of violence by the Indonesian security forces. One of them said: ‘The violence done by the Pauans is nothing compared to that of the Indonesian military, you asked about the incidences of violence, you’d better ask them (the Indonesian military) about the killings in Paniai and elsewhere. Javanese people also portray us like we’re violent, but they…you know.’

In retrospect, I think my identity as an Indonesian to some extent kept my interlocutors from criticizing the abuse of Pauans by the Indonesian security forces. However, later in my interactions with key informants, our discussions often revolved around their political imaginaries as Pauans: how they perceive discrimination in everyday life, their sense of belonging to Papua as a nation, and their longing for independence. I think the young Pauan men I met were very careful in talking about discrimination, human rights abuses, and their quest for independence to a stranger. In a context where Indonesian settlers and Pauans live side by side, and mixed marriages are not uncommon, criticizing discrimination risks conflict. Even more, the oppressive approach of the Indonesian security forces to eliminate the independence movement made the young men hesitate to openly talk about state violence.

As a female researcher, hearing about the sexual experiences of young men particularly in the beginning of the fieldwork was hard. Listening to stories of young men dragging a girl off the street, pulling her into the car, bringing her to their place, locking her inside a room, and raping her was depressing. A female researcher doing research in a male-dominated field is prone to emotional risks, of becoming disturbed and exhausted as she has to continuously manage herself to talk to men (Holland 2009). It also makes her prone to physical risks and unwanted personal experiences with the gender-based violence so central to the construction of some kinds of masculinity in Jayapura. But feeling disturbed and sad in the field can at the same time serve as a research tool (Hage 2010). The emotions around the violence done to others and to myself are part of my attempt to know and make sense of sexual violence and its role in the construction of masculinities.
Through feelings of sadness and distress, I could sense the power of men and the vulnerability of young women.

On the other hand, the powerlessness women feel in their (sometimes unwanted) dealings with men was in some ways mirrored by the powerlessness men felt in their dealings with the world around them. I could feel their sense of powerlessness while they recounted their insecurities: of not being able to be breadwinners, of losing their wives or children because of their inability to provide, or of dying on the street because of violence. Power relations between gendered beings are multidirectional and multidimensional. As a female researcher interviewing men about their sexuality, I often found myself feeling powerless. But at times, I could sense their discomfort in relating their insecurities or experiences of male powerlessness in front of me, a woman.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation questions what kinds of masculinity emerge out of the practices of chemical sexuality. I pursue this main question over the course of five chapters.

Chapter 1 introduces the variety of chemical practices pursued by young men in West Papua to manage their bodies and sexual performance, and examines how these practices relate to particular gender scripts and constructions of masculinity. By focusing on various penis and sexual enhancement products used by young men, the advertisements for these products, their packaging, and the history of these substances, I argue that chemical sexualities construct dominant, virile, and heterosexual masculinities.

Chapter 2 recounts the various ways of being a man in rapidly changing West Papua. I highlight how the ideal notion of masculinity that revolved around the big man has transformed alongside changes to society, economy, and politics in the special autonomy era. I argue that special autonomy has brought new meanings to masculinity and new avenues for young men to reinvent masculinity in a way that is accessible to them amid
enduring structural limitations. The transformations in the special autonomy era are also a product of West Papua’s encounter with missionization, the Dutch and Indonesian occupations, the expansion of capitalism and contemporary global youth culture.

Chapter 3 shows that current chemical sexualities—the manifold practices of enhancing the penis and sex—have long historical roots and arise out of specific social relations. I argue that contemporary chemical practices are a product of relations between place, peers, and penis and sexual enhancement products.

Chapter 4 focuses on how the practices of chemical sexuality enact masculinities in the midst of changing heterosexual relations and emerging forms of femininity. Through the practices of chemical sexuality, young men perform masculinity to display and reassert male domination over female sexuality.

Chapter 5 illustrates how performances of masculinity are conditioned by precariousness. I argue that jago masculinity is a kind of masculinity that has emerged out of young men’s relations with precarity. The masculinity that is often enacted through gender violence is more than a way of surviving precarity and structural violence; it is a way to rework gendered personhood and the limits of the social world.

I conclude this dissertation by summarizing how rapid transformations in West Papua, brought by the Indonesian state and processes of modernization, have changed modes of personhood as well as gender and sexual norms and relations. The changing social, economic and political context also generates alternative ways to experience sex and perform masculinity. Chemical sexualities are new ways to embody gendered personhood in today’s West Papua. In this way, doing chemical sexualities is doing gender and doing jago masculinity. As a relational gendered personhood, being a jago is constituted by relations with other persons, with heterosexuality, with chemical sexualities, and with precarious places.
Chapter 1 Chemical Sexualities

When I was studying sexual and reproductive health and the HIV/AIDS program in Jayapura regency in early 2013, my interlocutors mentioned a beauty salon in Sentani town providing men with penile silicone injections. The injections were given by a *waria* named Julia who worked as a hairdresser in the salon. When I began my fieldwork in 2014, I visited the salon hoping to meet Julia. Instead I met Mulan, who was also a *waria* and a hairdresser at the salon. I decided to have my hair cut so that I could converse with her. I told her about my research, about why I was looking for Julia, and asked her if she knew about the practice of penile silicone injection. Mulan told me Julia was the one who provided the service, but had quit almost a year ago. She then showed me a cabinet with some of Julia’s small bottles, probably containing silicone.

Mulan asked me if I had noticed the man in front of the salon. A seller of *obat kuat* (literally ‘strong medicine’ but more accurately ‘virility medicine’), he visited the salon each day, offering his products to male passers-by. Mulan told me that the seller, Dani, was a good friend, and that he would sometimes enter the salon for a chat. Mulan offered to introduce us; as the salon was empty, she invited Dani to come in. Dani was from Pontianak, a city on Borneo Island. He emptied his bag and displayed his products on the table: penis massage oils, a crocodile’s penis, instant tonic powders, and a small stone that dissolved in water. All of these products, Dani said, explaining the benefits of each, work to enlarge the penis, to stimulate sexual desire, or to maximize sexual pleasure. I was amazed by Dani’s wares. It was only later that I would encounter the myriad products available to young men in West Papua to enhance their sexual encounters and masculinity — products that I will introduce in this chapter.

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*Waria* are male-to-female transgender individuals who do not want to be women, but aspire to be like women (Idrus & Hymans 2014).
Sexual enhancement products are a part of young men’s everyday lives in West Papua, and how they encounter and experience these products inform the kinds of masculinities they perform. Hardon et al. (2013) employ the term ‘chemical sexualities’ to describe the phenomenon of young people in Indonesia turning to pharmaceuticals and cosmetics to feel attractive and sexually confident, to increase their sexual stamina, and to transform their bodies. In a similar vein, Moe et al. (2016) recount how the chewing of betel nut by young men in Mandalay is a performance of sexuality. I conceptualize chemical sexualities as the chemical practices of young men to manage their bodies and sexual performance, which in turn constitute gendered personhood. Departing from Measham’s (2002) thesis on ‘doing gender, doing drugs’—that taking drugs is a way to embody gender identity in specific drug cultures (Measham 2002)—my study situates chemical sexualities within a broader field of changing gender relations and scripts in West Papua.

This chapter highlights the array of penis enhancement products used by young men in West Papua—the material basis of their chemical sexualities. Studying these materials—and their forms and meanings within specific social and historical contexts (Tilley 2004; cf. Ingold 2012)—gives us insight into the kinds of masculinity enacted through their use. As Overholtzer and Robin (2015:4) point out, material practices constitute persons, places, and social relations. In this chapter, I argue that chemical practices to enhance the penis and sexual performance construct dominant, virile, heterosexual masculinities. By examining product advertisements, packaging, and narratives about their origins and ingredients, I show that chemical sexualities construct masculinity in ways that resonate with the past, but at the same time are new ways of becoming a man. I first give a brief history of obat kuat in Indonesia and West Papua before illustrating the products and how chemical sexualities construct masculinity.
Strong Medicines

In Indonesia, including in the province of Papua, people often call products for enhancing the penis and sex obat kuat. The idiom does not mean that the products are believed to have strong effects, but that they will strengthen men’s sexual drive and stamina. Obat kuat in Indonesia have a long history that can be traced back to the history of jamu in Javanese culture. Central Java is widely regarded as the home of herbal medicines in Indonesia, jamu originally being a Javanese word for plant-based medicines (Elfhahmi, Woerdenbag & Kayser 2014). Herbal medicines have existed in Central Java since the times of palace civilization in Yogyakarta and Solo, with Chinese, Indian, and Arab influences (Beers 2001). Serat Centhini, an eighteenth century Javanese manuscript, provides herbal medicine recipes for daily use and to counter sexual problems, while ancient manuscripts found in a palace in Solo also contain herbal recipes to enhance sexuality (Beers 2001).

Herbal medicines are broadly used in Indonesia. In Sumatra, for example, plants are used as aphrodisiacs (Silalahi et al. 2015). Herbal medicines are also widely used in other parts of Asia to treat erectile dysfunction and to enhance sexual performance. Eurycoma longifolia Jack—known as tongkat ali—is a popular aphrodisiac in Southeast Asia (Kotirum, Ismail & Chaiyakunapruk 2015; Rehman, Choe & Yoo 2016). Another popular plant is panax ginseng, the Korean or Chinese ginseng whose roots are used as a sex stimulant (Kotta, Ansari & Ali 2013) and to treat or prevent erectile dysfunction (Ho & Tan 2011; Low & Tan 2007). Both tongkat ali and ginseng are common ingredients in Indonesian jamu.

Once the secret recipes of local healers, tongkat ali, ginseng, and other herbal substances are now available as pills, powder, capsules, and drinks, mass produced in cottage industries as well as by commercial firms. They are omnipresent in traditional markets, street stalls, online shops, supermarkets, local pharmacies, and in the bags of door-to-door sellers.
Obat kuat are generally classified as ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’. Practices of penis enlargement such as bungkus⁹ are often claimed to be traditional, with some older people even able to retell the origins of the practice and how bungkus was practiced in men’s houses in the past. In contrast, modern obat kuat are generally seen as factory-made products with chemical ingredients (bahan kimia). I found these modern products to come in many forms. There are the well-known Viagra pills, herbal Viagra, various herbal pills, Chinese pills, instant tonic drinks, instant coffee, lotions, and wipe tissues—widely available in traditional and modern markets and drug stores, and through online shops, social media platforms, and multi-level-marketing. People categorize obat kuat as ‘natural’ or ‘chemical’ based on their ingredients. Natural obat kuat contain herbs, leaves and sometimes animal parts (such as leeches, cassowaries, and crocodiles). In contrast,

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⁹ Bungkus means wrapping leaves and is a traditional penis enlargement in West Papua.
chemical obat kuat are often described as non-natural, man-made substances; people generally do not understand what they are and how they are made.

In reality, the neat divisions between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, and between ‘natural’ and ‘chemical’, are hard to sustain. The boundaries between modern pharmaceuticals and traditional herbal medicines are porous, with the Indonesian National Agency for Drug and Food Control (BPOM) warning that some herbal ‘strong medicines’ for men contain sildenafil citrate, the active ingredient in Viagra (Indonesia National Agency of Drug and Food Control 2006). This suggests that products claimed to be traditional herbal medicines may in fact contain chemical substances produced by the modern pharmaceutical industry.

Previous studies have shown how ‘sexuopharmaceuticals’—drugs invented to enhance or sustain sexual performance (Holt 2009)—become part of everyday life, and how the growing medicalization of sexual life defines and treats non-medical problems as medical ones (Cacchioni and Tiefer 2012). However, this is not the processes of medicalization taking place in West Papua. Unlike in many Western contexts, the increasing use of sexual enhancement products in West Papua is not driven by the pharmaceutical industry,
hospitals, and insurance companies, but by interactions among peers, as I will argue in chapter 3.

The sexual enhancement products found in the field are not limited to sexuopharmaceuticals. Alongside the ‘strong medicine’ above, there are also ‘tryout products’ (barang coba-coba) created through experimentation among peers. Young men in West Papua appropriate many materials such as hair oil, silicone, and baby oil to create their own chemical sexualities. The ‘strong medicines’ to enhance sexual desire, pleasure, and stamina come in numerous forms—as drugs, foods, drinks, cosmetics, and concoctions—and are made and administered in many different ways. Chemical sexualities are thus diverse, fluid, and often experimental, as can be seen in the breadth of materials used to enhance penis size and increase sexual pleasure and stamina in West Papua today, illustrated below.

**Bungkus Leaves**

*Bungkus* is claimed to be a traditional penis enlargement technique from Biak Island (Ap 2007). Bram, a 60 year-old from Biak, told me *bungkus* was invented by a clan in Amroben (an area of Biak Island) to treat male infertility. He explained that the treatment could only be performed by healers recognized by the community. Men who suffered from infertility were treated with *bungkus* in the healer’s house. The treatment, it was believed, strengthened the penis and improved the quality of sperm.

*Bungkus* today is the most popular practice of penis enhancement in Jayapura. I found that many young men from various backgrounds and walks of life—including students, drivers, civil servants, policemen, rappers, and football players—had tried it. The practice can also be found in many other areas of Papua and West Papua (Morin 2000; Pranata et al. 2014).
Bungkus entails wrapping the penis in a mixture of leaves with a gauze pad for 3-5 minutes. The leaves used for the concoction most commonly include *daun tiga jari* (the stinging three leaves—*dendrocnide sp*), *kangkung pantai* (*smilax sp*), and *daun patah tulang* (*euphorbia tirucalli*) (Pranata et al. 2014). Dr. Anton Oktavian, a general practitioner in Jayapura and a researcher of *bungkus*, told me that in Java, *daun patah* is used alongside *eurycoma longifolia jack* to increase sexual potency. He explained that 30 minutes after the gauze is unwrapped, the penis will suffer rash or severe irritation; after several days, it will be infected. Some of my informants considered the inflammation to be part of the process, claiming that after the swelling subsides, their penis will be permanently thicker.

Figure 5. (left) *Daun tiga jari* (three fingers leaves) or *dendrocnide sp*. Source: Pranata et al. 2014: 233.
Figure 6. (center) *Kangkung pantai* or *smilax sp*. Source: Pranata et al. 2014: 174.
Figure 7. (right) *Daun patah tulang* or *euphorbia tirucalli*. Photo by author.
Alfasis, an anthropologist from Cendrawasih University, states that the practice of *bungkus* was recognized before 1950 (Ap 2007) but only became known outside the island of Biak after 1970. Today, the *bungkus* practice is no longer attached to the traditional treatment of male fertility and can be done by anyone, not only healers. *Bungkus* is now practiced by ordinary young men, who often begin at a very young age (14-16 years old). Guz, a 24 year-old Jayapura-Timorese, told me: ‘I was in middle school when I tried *bungkus* for the first time. My friends and I made the wrapping leaves mixture. We pounded the leaves then bandaged our penises with the mixture. We stood in front of the fan, because we felt our penises were burning.’

Many young men said that achieving the ‘correct’ mixture and technique was a challenge. If it is too strong (meaning the composition of the leaves is not good) or the wrapping is left on for too long, the penis will get burned, causing severe inflammation. Young men experiment with many different kinds of leaves in their attempts to make the optimal *bungkus* mixture. Many of my interlocutors told me that their friends often lacked experience and remained ‘amateurs’. Others claimed that they have friends who are already skillful ‘*bungkus* doctors’.
Bungkus has emerged as a commodity in modern society, colorfully packaged and advertised online and through social media. It appears in many forms including oil, concoction, and capsule, and can be applied to the penis directly or be taken orally. Nevertheless, young men prefer to use bungkus created by their peers. Gerson, a 23 year-old college student from Sorong, told me: ‘What they sell is a dupery. We made the bungkus mixture ourselves with our friends from Biak who often did bungkus, we looked for the leaves together and then we made it.’ Gerson’s friend Mario from Biak, was acclaimed as a bungkus expert. He stated: ‘Yeah, just recently I made the bungkus mixture six times for my friends. I did not sell them, I made them just because they are my friends.’ Jerry from Serui, told me: ‘So people who make business out of the bungkus practice are usually dishonest, we do not know what is inside. But people from Biak, and especially older people from Biak providing bungkus, I think they sincerely want to help. They are not doing business because they never ask for money. If we give something, it is a gratuity.’ The practice of bungkus within young men’s collectives in Jayapura will be described in greater detail in chapter 3.

Figure 9. (left) Bungkus mixture from an online shop: http://jualherbalajaib.blogspot.nl/

Figure 10. (right) Bungkus capsules from an online shop: http://jualdaunbungkus.com/kapsul-daun-bungkus-papua.
Penis Massage Oils

I came across various massage oils used to enlarge the penis. The ones most commonly used by young men included leech oil, Arabian oil, and cobra oil. Leech oil is made by placing leeches in a coconut. The leeches will eat the flesh of the coconut and then die as they are trapped inside the fruit. The coconut and leeches are then fermented before being dried under the sun, until the fermented leeches secrete oil. The oil is then used for massage, applied to the shaft of the penis each morning before taking a bath or at night before going to bed. Following this routine, young men believe their penises will grow longer after two weeks.

There is no agreement on the proper creation and use of leech oil. Some said ‘real’ leech oil is produced from leeches taken in the forest near Papua New Guinea. Some recounted that only small black leeches are effective. Others claimed it is more effective to use leech oil at night, while still others claimed the effects of leech oil can be seen in minutes following the massage.

Leech oil can be found in traditional markets in Jayapura and Sentani. Sold by Papuan women, a small bottle costs 50,000 rupiahs (3.33 euros). I also met men from Borneo and Java at the Jayapura seaport and at a beauty salon selling leech oil. Young men believe the oil sold by Papuan women is the genuine article, whereas the one sold by Indonesian settlers is fake. Although the use of leech oil cannot be traced in West Papuan history, many claim it is part of tradition. Some said that healers who massage the penis with leech oil and chant mantras still exist today.

Like bungkus, leech oil can be bought online. One bottle (larger than the ones sold by Papuan women) costs 150,000 rupiahs (10 euros). Nevertheless, young men—both Papuans and Indonesians—prefer to buy oil from persons they know or from the Papuan
women in traditional markets. None of them bought it online, claiming that such oil is fake (palsu) and mixed with chemicals they do not know.

Another product commonly used by Buginese young men in Jayapura is Arabian oil, which they believe originates from the Arabian tradition. It is assumed to be safe and effective for enlarging the penis as Arabian men, they said, are known for their big penises. Cobra oil could also be found in the traditional markets of Jayapura and Sentani, one bottle costing 75,000 rupiahs (5 euros). The seller told me that the red oil, smelling like blood, is from the blood of a cobra. As the cobra’s blood is hot, he explained, it can expand the blood vessels and ease the flow of blood to the penis. The result is an enlarged penis and longer-lasting sex.

I also found healers (Indonesian settlers) advertising their services in local newspapers. One ad promoted ‘therapy for men’s genitals to be jumbo and virile’ to ‘overcome various
masculinity problems’. The therapy, it claimed, ‘does not depend on age, it guarantees men’s genitals to become big, long, strong, and long lasting’.

I had a chance to visit one such healer in Jayapura. He was from Banten, the westernmost province on the island of Java, and claimed to be able to enlarge the penis through prayer and by massaging it with his secret oil. He offered different sizes—L (diameter 26 mm) to XXXL (diameter 32 mm)—with prices ranging from 500,000 to 2 million rupiahs (33 to 133 euros)—the larger the size, the higher the cost.

Figure 15. (left) Local’s healer therapy place in Jayapura. Photo by author.

Figure 16. (right) Leaflet with penis sizes for enlargement. Photo by author.
Substances for Penile Injection

Other chemical sexualities are created through tryouts among male peers. Young men try out various techniques, the most notorious being the injection of liquid substances—hair oil, cassowary oil, Arabian oil, baby oil, liquid silicone, even liquid glue—into the shaft of the penis. The most commonly used products are hair oils, the most popular brand being ‘Tokyo Night Oil’, injected into the shaft of the penis using 3 or 5 ml syringes bought at the pharmacy. A man can have between 3 and 20 ml of oil injected in one session.

Although the man who performs the injection is called a doctor, he is not a medically trained professional. Rather, he is an expert in experimenting with substances, dosages, and the methods of administering them—on himself and his peers. Nusi was one of the injection doctors I met. He explained to me the detailed procedures, materials, and dosages of the injection:

For the materials, first gloves and second, a syringe. You can use either 5cc, 3cc, or 1cc syringe, but remember only use 1cc needle. Third, the medicine. I usually use Tokyo Night Oil. I recommend doing the injection at night. After I prepare the materials, I wear gloves to do the injection. Then, I prepare the dosage of the oil and plan its administration. For example, my friend wants 20cc of oil, so I will inject him four times to distribute the oil evenly all over his penis. I will inject him at the top of his penis, at the right, at the left and at the bottom, 5cc for each injection. I do the injection carefully I have practiced a lot. Do not inject too deep into the penis muscle or into the vein, it is fatal. I inject the oil under the penis skin. After I do one injection at the top, I massage the penis with warm water to distribute the oil evenly. After 2 or 3 minutes I do the second injection at the right and massage it again. 2-3 minutes later I inject at the left and so on. That is the procedure. I do the injection at night and I suggest going to sleep afterwards so that the penis can have a rest too. The medicine works while we are sleeping and at 4 AM in the morning you can see your penis enlarged and hardened.
Penis enlargement by injecting substances is not a practice unique to West Papua. The practice is popular among working-class men in other parts of Indonesia (Hull 2000) and its risks are often reported in the mass media (cf. Anon 2012; Ant 2014; Fadillah 2013). Studies conducted elsewhere in the world have found men injecting their penises with a variety of substances including body fat (Rowanchilde 1996), liquid injectable silicone (Nugteren et al. 2010), and oil (Thomson et al. 2008).

Hardon and Idrus (2014) have shown how young people in Indonesia experiment with and appropriate pharmaceuticals for their own ends in creative and unpredicted ways. In the current study, young men experiment not only with pharmaceuticals but with many other substances to achieve their desired body and gender identities. Their experimentation also shows how the materiality of chemical sexualities is never static or finished, but created through young men’s interactions with other practices, people, and places, as I will show in chapter 3.
Viagra and Herbal Viagra

Pills to enhance the penis and prolong sex are widely available in Jayapura. Viagra, while expensive, is sold in pharmacies; a single pill costs Rp. 185,000 (about 12 euros). Several young men had tried Viagra once or twice out of curiosity. Although they claimed that the ‘blue pill’ stimulates desire, prolongs sex, and generates pleasure, they did not use it regularly; alongside its prohibitive cost, Viagra was considered a dangerous pill with potentially lethal side-effects. Young men recounted how their hearts beat harder after taking a single pill, claiming that Viagra causes mati di atas poro (death on top of a woman’s belly) for those whose hearts cannot handle it.

There were also herbal versions of ‘Viagra’ such as Vimax, Galaxs, Sparta X, Ever-Joy, and Mencap. The price for a bottle of 30 Vimax pills is Rp. 500,000 (33 euros), less than a tenth of the branded original, while a strip of four Galaxs pills costs Rp. 250,000 (17 euros). These products claim they are better than Viagra as they are made from natural ingredients; Vimax contains ginseng, Galaxs contains tongkat ali (eurycoma longifolia jack). The Indonesian National Agency of Drugs and Food Control withdrew marketing approval for Sparta X, Ever-Joy and Mencap in 2015 due to safety concerns (Indonesia National Agency of Drug and Food Control 2015). While these brands claim they only contain natural ingredients, they in fact contain sildenafil citrate and its derivatives. Nevertheless, Sparta X, Ever-Joy, and Mencap could still be found in some pharmacies in late 2015.
Other popular sexual enhancement products included wipe tissues that are relatively cheap and affordable for young men, particularly the two famous brands ‘Super Magic’ and ‘Magic Power’. Pharmacies usually sell the tissues in a package with a condom; a package containing a sachet of tissues and a condom costs Rp. 5,000 (33 cents), while a box of the tissues goes for Rp. 15,000 (1 euro). The tissues do not contain ingredients usually found in herbal Viagra; one of the brands (Magic Power) only contains aloe vera extract (Hardon & Idrus 2015). In their advertisements, the products promise strong sexual drive and stamina. Young men claim the tissues prolong sex.
As a ‘herbal Viagra’, Galaxs is presented as a traditional *obat kuat*. Its advertising states that Galaxs can make a man mighty and fierce in bed (*perkasa dan galak di ranjang*), which in turn will satisfy women, both physically and emotionally. Advertisements for Galaxs make use of personal testimonies, including that of a 60 year-old man who claims Galaxs allows him to perform (*beraksi*) as if he were 30 years old, having non-stop sex for 45 minutes. Since Galaxs only contains natural herbs and is produced with modern technology, the ads claim, it can be safely used by men to address their masculinity problem (*problem kejantanan*). Many herbal Viagras such as Galaxs and Vimax promise to improve male virility (*kejantanan*) by enlarging the penis, curing erectile dysfunction, prolonging sex, and increasing sexual stamina. Instant herbal drinks (Kuku Bima, see figure 1) in their packaging likewise display men with muscular bodies, reflecting the widespread Indonesian gender script that men should be virile (Hardon & Idrus 2015).

*Obat kuat* can be seen as (sexual) enhancement technologies that aim to improve the appearance and functioning of the body (Hogle 2005). Technologies of enhancement are a prominent part of the making of the modern self, of a person’s identity (Elliott 2011), where identity is not simply defined in private but is created in relations with, and through recognition by, others. Previous studies have examined how technologies of
sexuality relate to constructions of masculinity, for example how the use of Viagra is embedded in notions of sex, gender, and sexuality that reassert hegemonic notions of virile masculinity (Mamo & Fishman 2001) and how the practices of ‘chemsex’\(^{10}\) are related to the social norms of being a gay man (Ahmed et al. 2016; Glyde 2015). Just as people turn to sexual enhancement technologies to meet socially sanctioned images of self-respect and dignity (Elliott 2011), the use of these technologies are fueled by and reproduce socially constructed meanings of gender and sexuality (Carpenter & Casper 2009).

Advertisements for *obat kuat* promise to improve the size and capacity of the penis so as to overcome crises of masculinity. The ads as well as the narratives surrounding young men’s practices reveal the centrality of the body in constructing masculine identity. The body becomes a project through which gendered identity is constructed (Hogle 2005). As I will show in the section on the history of *bungkus*, the body as a signifier of masculinity has a long trajectory in West Papuan history (Pouwer 2010) and continues to mark masculinity today.

These illustrations of how enhancement technologies are experimented with, reinvented, and administered show how chemical sexualities open up a new form of embodied masculine practice. The technologies of chemical sexuality are often used in creative and unexpected ways, creating new ways of relating as well as new ways of being (Hardon & Moyer 2014). How chemical sexualities create new ways of relating will be addressed in chapter 3.

\(^{10}\) ‘Chemsex’ entails the use of mephedrone, \(\gamma\)-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), \(\gamma\)-butyrolactone (GBL), or crystallised methamphetamine to facilitate longer lasting sex with multiple partners (McCall et al. 2015).
Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown how practices of chemical sexuality in West Papua construct virile, dominant, heterosexual masculinities. Some of the practices I outlined have long histories, with the use of sex and penis enhancement products or *obat kuat* in Indonesia tied to the tradition of *jamu* in Javanese culture. *Bungkus* is also believed to be a part of West Papuan tradition dating back to the era of men’s houses. Today, *jamu* and *bungkus* have many forms depending on how people treat them in practice.

Advertisements for *obat kuat* that promise to enhance the penis suggest that *obat kuat* can fruitfully be seen as enhancement technologies for young men’s bodies and sexual performance, technologies for overcoming crises of masculinity that facilitate the formation of gendered identity. The widespread use of these enhancement technologies by young men reveals a new form of embodied masculine practice in West Papua in the era of chemical sexualities.

Chemical sexualities are practices of everyday life that both constitute and are constituted by broader social life. In this chapter, I have illustrated how the notion of virile masculinity marked by the muscular body, big penis, and potent sexual performance are reflected in advertisements, while chemical practices that alter young men’s bodies generate a sense of manhood-reassuring virility. It is also important to note how the practices of penis enhancement in Indonesia as mentioned by Hull (2000) are popular among working class men. In the next chapters I will show the way the practices of chemical sexualities are situated in young men’s precarious situation. As I will show in chapter 2, the expectations of being a good man in West Papua are changing and young men struggle to meet them. In this way, the notion of men’s virility endures and is facilitated by chemical sexualities which I will explore further in chapters 3 and 4, showing how sexuality and gendered identity are formed through engagement with the practices of chemical sexuality.
One evening in Jayapura in mid-July 2015, a group of young men went out together to a karaoke café. To have a self-entertaining and an outpouring of worries, they said. Aldo, a 30-year-old Biak-Sentani man, was among them. It had been a tough year for Aldo, who had been jobless. When he needed money, he sometimes sold marijuana, which once landed him in jail. The only times he had money was when, thanks to a friend, he had a temporary gig in a public works or a local NGO project. Aldo was also an addict (a ‘junkie’, he called himself). Being a junkie had repercussions, he said. ‘No one believes me, my girlfriend, her family, and my family, let alone other people out there, no matter how hard I try or work.’ But what hit hardest was his separation from his long-time girlfriend, Desy, and their one-year-old daughter because he could not afford the bride wealth and compensation demanded by her family. Despite the gloomy events he recounted, Aldo brought a happy vibe that night. His voice was beautiful; everybody loved it and asked him to sing more. He made his friends sing together as if they were letting out all the tension in their lives through singing and laughter.

Aldo came to the karaoke café that night with his girlfriend and daughter. When his girlfriend left to take their daughter to bed, he did not accompany her. Desy said that Aldo lacked the guts to come to her house to meet her father. Earlier that day, Desy had come to Aldo’s place with their daughter to spend the day together. The daughter had been unwell for some days and Desy assumed she was missing her father. For more than one year, Aldo and Desy had not been living together. He had assaulted her, hitting her in the face until she bled. When Desy reported this to her father, he grew furious and asked her to return home. Desy’s father subsequently demanded that Aldo and his family pay compensation for the assault. And after Desy gave birth, her father wanted Aldo to marry her according to custom. But as Aldo could not fulfill these obligations, he was not
allowed to meet Desy and their daughter. Nevertheless, Aldo and Desy occasionally broke this rule.

After Desy left the café, Aldo admitted that he was terrified of losing his girlfriend and daughter, of not being able to see them again. He said he loved them too much but was unable to meet Desy’s father’s demands. He feared that Desy would marry another man and that he would no longer be able to see his daughter. I could see that his eyes were watering while still holding the mic that he used to sing. Aldo’s friends were silent after hearing his confession. Realizing that he had just caused an awkward situation, he quickly added, ‘Do not tell Desy about this.’ His friends broke into laughter, teasing him that they would tell her anyway.

Without an income, Aldo could not support his girlfriend and his daughter’s living expenses, let alone the 50 million rupiahs (approximately 3,350 euros) for the bride wealth and another 50 million rupiahs for the customary fine of hitting his girlfriend. If he married Desy according to custom, he would still have to pay the ‘breastmilk money’ (uang susu) for Desy’s mother as well as contribute to the wedding ceremony costs. Aldo’s father was a retired civil servant, while his mother had a chronic illness that required money for treatment. It was impossible for Aldo and his family to afford all the costs of marriage. Nowadays in West Papua, the groom and his close family are expected to pay the bride wealth, whereas for previous generations—those of Aldo’s father and grandfather—bride wealth was paid by the leaders of the clan.

Although having a family was desired by all of my male interlocutors and remains a key social obligation, not all could afford it. To have a family, a man should ideally have a customary marriage (nikah adat), a church marriage (nikah gereja), and then register the marriage in the district court—all of which requires money. Although it is now becoming more common for young men to live with their girlfriends and have children without getting married, most have limited access to employment and the cash economy, struggle to make a living, and financially depend on their parents. These circumstances create
conflicts between the couple and their parents as well as between husband and wife. Young men are haunted by worries of lacking the financial resources to start and support their own family.

This chapter discusses various ways of being a man in contemporary urban Jayapura, where notions of manhood have transformed over the decades. More specifically, I highlight notions and performances of masculinity among young men in the midst of rapid transformations in the special autonomy era. The special autonomy (*otonomi khusus*, popularly called *otsus*) era is a critical historical and political moment for Papuans in their contestation over sovereignty. Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001\(^\text{11}\) normatively allows Papuans to reclaim their rights, and particularly for young men, opportunities for better education, more job openings, and improved living conditions in their own land. However, rising hopes are deflated by the fact that many young men are still struggling to get an education or a job, and in a larger sense, to fulfill society’s expectations of being a man. In this regard, special autonomy brings new meanings to masculinity as well as new avenues for young men to acquire social status, to reinvent masculinity in a way that is accessible amid enduring structural constraints. These transformations in the special autonomy era do not represent a rupture with the past, but continued entanglement with the missionization, the Dutch and Indonesian occupations, the expansion of capitalism, and global youth culture. In this chapter, I discuss how previously idealized masculinity—that of the big man—has been transformed into new fantasies of manhood in contemporary Jayapura.

\(^{11}\) Article 1 of Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy states that the province of Papua should be able to manage and meet its own needs self-reliantly, according to the aspirations of the Papuan peoples and their basic rights.
Since the end of the New Order era, West Papua—like other parts of Indonesia—has experienced a rapid and vast transformation of its political, social, economic, and cultural arenas. After the secession of Timor-Leste, calls for referenda on independence grew louder in Indonesia, particularly in Papua (Anderson 2015; Sumule 2003; Widjojo 2006). In response to the escalating conflict between the Indonesian state and the West Papuan secessionists, the central government offered Papua special autonomy status (Anderson 2015; Bertrand 2014; Sumule 2003).

The *otsus* policy has emerged as a tool for indigenous Papuans to reclaim their rights neglected under the Suharto regime. Under the *otsus* policy, a new special Assembly for Indigenous Papuans, the *Majelis Rakyat Papua* (Papuan Peoples’ Assembly), was established to represent religious groups, customary groups, and indigenous women in West Papua (Bertrand 2014). Under the *otsus* policy, greater numbers of indigenous Papuans have been elected as local leaders (as Governor, Regents, or to district and provincial legislatures) and recruited into the civil service (Bertrand 2014; Widjojo et al. 2008).12 Moreover, the policy has allocated significant funds from Papuan and West Papuan natural resource revenues to various development needs. In sum, the *otsus* policy has given new powers to the local government to manage the territory.

Despite the access to power and funds, the *otsus* policy is seen as a failure by both the local government and Jakarta. Just five years after its implementation, the *Dewan Adat Papua* (Papua Customary Council) symbolically returned the policy to Jakarta. Years later, in 2010, the Papuan Peoples’ Assembly also rejected the status of special autonomy, while the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, expressed his dissatisfaction with the implementation of *otsus* (Bertrand 2014). Clearly, the policy has failed to meet its expectations of improving Papuan living conditions and has backfired.

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12 Widjojo et al. (2008) term this process Papuanization.
for the central government as secessionist groups gain the sympathy of Papuans. Relations between the Indonesian state and local peoples remain fraught. The policy has only created new local elites while most indigenous Papuans continue to suffer poverty, marginalization and human rights abuses. In May 2016, 15 years after the implementation of otsus, demonstrations demanding a referendum for West Papua led to more than 100 arrests in Papua and West Papua (Gema Demokrasi 2016).

As the otsus policy provides emergent leaders with abundant funds, competition among local elites focuses on obtaining political positions in order to secure local resources. Many local leaders (governor, regents, and heads of local offices) sustain their power by distributing civil service and local legislative positions to their followers and by granting them contracts in development projects, thereby continuing and bolstering the old patronage system (Anderson 2015; Stasch 2015). These politicians and bureaucrats (most of whom are male) are the primary beneficiaries of the otsus policy—at the expense of ordinary Papuans, including young men.

Big Men, Strong Men, and Bosses: Powerful Men in the Special Autonomy Era

The changing political, economic, and social landscape of West Papua provides alternative avenues for becoming a powerful man. In addition to the big men or Ondoafi13—the traditional male leaders of mainland Papuan societies—there now exist a new class of male leaders. These new powerful men—popularly known as ‘orang kuat’ (strong men), ‘orang gede’ (big men), or ‘bos’ (bosses)—embody alternative imageries of desired manhood for young men to aspire to.

The otsus era has witnessed the rise of numerous young Papuan politicians. They generally build their political careers on local activism (for example, in student

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13 Ondoafi is a term for a traditional male leader in West Papua. Tribes in West Papua had different names for their leaders, but Ondoafi is the most common (Mansoben 1994).
organizations or NGOs) before joining a political party and entering into alliances with mass organizations and national politicians. The usual route is to be appointed as a political party officer, a head of one of the local executive boards of a national youth organization, and then to be elected as either a head of a provincial/municipal bureau (Kepala Dinas) or a member of the provincial/district parliament, or even as regent (bupati). Many of these young politicians do not hail from families or clans of Ondoafi.

Glen, a member of the provincial parliament, was one of the new big men I encountered. It was his second term, meaning he had served as a legislator for almost six years. A 32-year-old man from an ordinary family, Glen was born and raised in Nabire, a small coastal city on Cendrawasih Bay, the northern part of the Papua mainland. He came to Jayapura after finishing high school to continue his studies at Cendrawasih University, the only public university in Jayapura. He majored in public administration with the hope of becoming a civil servant, but fortune led him to becoming a big politician. Nonetheless, life was far from easy for Glen during his student years.

Glen recounted that after his second year of university, his parents could no longer afford to send him money. Without relatives to provide for him, he had to work as a day laborer to survive in the city, to buy food and pay his tuition fees. He nevertheless managed to get involved in student activism, eventually becoming the chairman of the student executive body of Uncen. Through his activism, he became known by local politicians, the mass media, and even local businessmen. After graduating, a senior politician invited him to join a newly established political party and to run for a seat in the provincial parliament. Although he did not have the funds for a mass campaign, he accepted the offer, returning to his hometown to work with the people with help from members of his girlfriend’s family, among the influential people in the Biak Island and Cendrawasih Bay areas. In short, Glen surmounted the challenges to become a successful politician.

Glen was elected as the head of the Papua chapter of a political party in 2015. He was also the chairman of the infrastructure faction in the Papua provincial parliament.
Infrastructure being the priority of the current president as well as the governor of Papua, sizable central and local government budgets were allocated to infrastructure projects in the province of Papua. Interestingly, Glen could provide for all the members of the faction from his own political party.

I visited Glen’s office on the third floor of the parliament building nicely situated on Humboldt Bay. His room was equipped with two air conditioners; it was chilly when I entered the room. He had a personal secretary, a young Javanese university graduate. Her speech was formal and sophisticated, while she appeared professional in her blazer and skirt. She had her own workspace next to Glen’s room. Both rooms were neatly organized.

Glen’s room had a big clean window with an ocean view, a large table made of teak wood, and a leather chairman’s chair. On his table were gadgets: a tablet, a smartphone, and an old-fashioned mobile phone. His room also contained a sofa set, a dusty meeting table with eight seats, an empty wooden book cabinet, and a 40-inch LCD television. The room was too big for him. During my two-hour visit, he only received one quick visit from another member of parliament.

Glen wore a tidy suit, an elegant watch and shiny leather shoes. I could smell his perfume. Since joining politics, he no longer chewed betel nuts. When I asked him why, he only smiled. He received his master’s degree from the University of Indonesia in 2014; although he said he would like to get a doctorate, he no longer had time to study. Besides, he added, learning English was more important now as he regularly traveled abroad. He told me that he had been to the United States twice, to all the major cities of Europe and Asia, and to every Indonesian province. His hobbies included traveling and diving, and he frequented Raja Ampat—the most popular dive site in West Papua—staying at one of the most luxurious resorts there. All of his travelling took place during his six-year stint as a member of parliament.
In the evening I joined Glen and his political allies for dinner. Members of his political party, a local contractor and a local journalist were present. The dinner was held in a fancy restaurant in Jayapura, though not one famous for its delicious food. When I asked why he chose this particular restaurant, he answered that as a renowned politician, he could not eat anywhere he chose, but only at establishments that he trusted—not only in terms of privacy but also security. He said he was afraid of being poisoned, an answer that surprised me. In contrast to local human rights and liberation movement activists, I could not recall many deaths among local politicians. All that I remembered was the death of the chairman of the selection committee of the election commission in 2013. Rumors had it that he had been poisoned during a meeting at the most expensive hotel in Jayapura. But his family had rejected the autopsy.

We had dinner at a large round table. The restaurant was empty except for one other group, whose members Glen identified as the former head of the provincial public hospital and his colleagues. Glen went to them for a short talk. At the table across from us were Glen’s personal driver and a policeman currently working as his guard. Over the course of dinner, Glen mostly discussed his plans for his loyal party fellows, some road construction projects, and the renovation plans for his own house.

Glen’s house was in the same area as the governor’s, the provincial police chief’s, and those of other important officials—the most expensive area in Jayapura city. He had another, or perhaps more, houses in the city. I visited one of his houses, which he had just bought. Still under renovation, the house was big and modern, with a high iron gate. All the rooms were air-conditioned. The floor was of high quality granite and the roofs were made of tiles. The garage could fit two cars. Glen said he had three cars for himself as well as others for his wife and parents. The price of each was more than 400 million rupiah (approximately 27,000 euros).

As the head of the Papua chapter of a political party, Glen had a close relationship with a retired four-star general who was the party chairman. Glen’s political party supported
Jokowi, the current Indonesian president. During the presidential campaign, Glen had frequent meetings in Jakarta and was one of the most important persons in Jokowi’s campaign team in Papua province. Right after the polls had closed, Glen claimed that he had ‘secured’ Jokowi’s victory in Papua province. But Glen was opposed to the current governor of Papua province, whom he often criticized in the media. For the upcoming governor election in 2018, Glen was once named a potential candidate for vice governor, to be paired with the present regent of Jayapura regency as the head of the ticket.

Glen often met with his loyal political supporters— all men—in four-star hotels and fancy restaurants. Based on my observations, these meetings were more like forums where Glen delivered instructions. Apparently the youngest, he dominated the talks. Although Glen was a coastal Papuan (Orang Pantai), some of his followers were highlanders (Orang Gunung) or settlers (pendatang). And unlike Glen, who was always finely dressed, his political clients were modest in appearance. And while Glen spoke sophisticated formal Indonesian, his Papuan political clients spoke Indonesian in a strong Papuan pidgin. Glen was also called ‘boss’ by his followers.

Before the 1960s, the big man embodied the virile masculinity desired by young men in Melanesian societies (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997). But the expansion of the market and the development of the modern state gradually undermined the power of big men (Brown 1987; McKeown 2001; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997). This was also the case in West Papua, where the power of the institution of bigmanship has gradually faded and been replaced by modern state institutions, forcing traditional male leaders to adapt, negotiate or collaborate with the Indonesian state. Nevertheless, the Indonesian state during the otsus era has begun to restore the institution of traditional male leaders or Ondoafi by creating the Papua Customary Council and involving it in the political process in Papua province.

The Papua Customary Council consists of leaders from five customary areas or Ondoafi in the province of Papua (Jayapura city and Sentani town are in the customary area of Mamta) (Mansoben 1994). Among the prominent Ondoafi in Jayapura and Sentani town I
talked to was Ramses Ohee. I met him for the first time in June 2014, when the presidential election was about to take place. There were sharp differences between the political parties, mass organizations, and indigenous peoples’ institutions. Rumors proliferated, the most worrisome for the Indonesian government and security forces being that indigenous Papuans would boycott the election. July 1 is the anniversary of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka-OPM), the secessionist guerrilla movement in West Papua. People said that OPM wanted people to boycott the election.

A friend told me to bring some betel nuts, sugar, tea, coffee, frying oil and biscuits when visiting him. I followed the suggestion and brought them to his house. Ohee welcomed me and my friend on his veranda, wearing a thin white t-shirt and brown pants, and with bare feet. I gave him the gifts. He unpacked them right away, took the betel nuts, and handed the rest to his wife. While I was introducing myself and my research, he started to chew the betel nuts. In our conversation, he spoke the Indonesian language with a strong Papuan dialect and sometimes said things I did not understand.

Ohee was the head of Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Papua (Papua Indigenous Peoples Organization). He had previously established the Red and White Front (Barisan Merah Putih) in 1997 as an anti-separatist movement supporting the Unitary State of Republic Indonesia (NKRI). A wooden board in front of his house read ‘Barisan Merah Putih’, proclaiming his house as the headquarters of the movement. A map of the seven customary areas of Tanah Papua graced his large veranda.14

Ohee invited me to talk on the veranda. We sat on a tattered sofa with the foam coming out. There were also a few plastic chairs and a wooden coffee table. Despite its modesty, the open veranda was an important space for the community. Important meetings among customary chiefs took place here, said Ohee. A meeting yesterday had addressed the boycott.

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14 Tanah Papua (the land of Papua) covers the territory of Papua and West Papua provinces.
Ohee’s house was modest for a man of his influence, large but made of bricks with roofs of tin. His house lacked a gate to separate his land from others’. In contrast, the church next door was extravagant, with a two-meter statue of Jesus in front of the entrance made by an ornate iron fence that encircled the church. The church was the most luxurious building in the area; most of the others were ramshackle wooden structures that could easily collapse in a storm.

Although the house was short on furniture and decorations, there were numerous photographs of Ohee shaking hands with Indonesian presidents from Sukarno to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. One photo showed Ohee receiving an award from the TNI, the Indonesian military. There was also a photo of his father joining the Soempah Pemoeda (the Youth Pledge) in 1928, an embryo in the development of Indonesian nationalism. Ohee called himself ‘pelaku sejarah’ (an agent of Indonesian history) as he had participated in the Pepera (the Act of Free Choice) in 1969. The result of the Pepera was the integration of Papua into the Indonesian state.

Ohee said he would have a press conference about the boycott. As a customary chief, he was asking people to support the upcoming presidential election and to avoid any acts of violence. His words were reminiscent of Indonesian military jargon. During my visit, he received numerous phone calls from journalists asking for his opinion on the boycott. His answer was consistent: he prohibited it. He had ensured, he told me, that the next day’s headline of the Cendrawasih Post, the major newspaper in West Papua, would be about him prohibiting mass mobilization that sought to undermine the election. His words indeed became the headline. But despite his status and influence, many people criticized his cooperation with the Indonesian security forces. Young men, particularly university students, told me that Ohee was a scatterbrained old man who had forgotten the ‘true’ Papuan history and should stay away from politics.

The 83-year-old man had only one wife, whereas I had heard rumors that some Ondoafi have more than one. Ohee had married twice. His first wife had died long ago. He then
married his late wife’s younger sister, a common practice according to the custom of Sentani. From both marriages, he had 16 children and 64 grandchildren, some of whom still lived in his house. Throughout the interview, one of his grandchildren was playing around us, riding a mini bicycle. In the front yard, two of his sons were playing football. They had both already graduated from high school but did not have formal jobs yet. A motorcycle and an old minibus were parked next to the house. Ohee said the motorcycle was his son’s. His large backyard was planted with betel nuts, mangoes, and rambutan trees. His children had a stall on the main street selling betel nuts and fruits from the backyard.

As a customary chief of the Waena area of Jayapura city and Sentani town, Ohee told me that every inch of the land in West Papua is possessed by custom (adat). God mandates the ownership of the land to Ondoafi, who hence have the right to govern the use of the land. He said that anyone who wants to use the land, including the local state and the church, must first ask his permission.

The institution of Ondoafi is based on the patrilineal inheritance system, the power of which was symbolized in the ownership of land, crops, pigs and wives (Mansoben 1994). But land ownership in West Papua today—under the new agrarian law, the development of infrastructure and rapid in-migration—has become much more contested. While land regarded as clan property (ulayat) was not supposed to be sold, land now is becoming individual property. Land disputes within and between families and clans are frequent and at times lead to roadblocks and community clashes. Individuals from certain clans sell their land to settlers, businesses or local governments, whereas many indigenous families own no land at all. All this is inevitably happening with little control from Ondoafi.

Although crops and pigs remain important, they are no longer enough to gain and sustain power. Particularly after the implementation of otsus, enormous funds have been slushed in Papua province. Money has replaced crops, pigs and other traditional materials as the
vital unit of exchange in society. As a 69-year-old man told me, money—rarely seen in the 1970s—has fundamentally changed relations between Papuans. The bride wealth, previously paid with pearl shells, beads or porcelain plates, now includes a monetary sum. All previously voluntary work for the community now approximate paid jobs. Families conducting wedding or funeral ceremonies must now give money to those who help, while a man who contributes his labor to the building of a relative’s house expects money for his work. ‘Now people are like don’t talk if you do not have money’ (*jang bicara kalau ko trada uang*), he said, implying that only men with money will be heard or will have influence in the community.

Papuans are struggling for cash. Crops that were once bartered between families are today sold for cash in street markets. Access to the cash economy has indeed become crucial. While the main route to access the cash economy is formal employment, local businesses are dominated by Indonesian settlers who discriminate against Papuans (Anderson 2015; Stasch 2015). Young Papuan men thus aspire to jobs in the civil services.

As university degrees are needed to land civil service jobs, large numbers of young people migrate to cities like Jayapura and Manokwari where there are relatively good high schools and universities. There they pursue higher education and acquire Indonesian language proficiency, the human capital needed to compete on the labor market. Unfortunately, the number of civil service openings is limited, especially compared to the number of job seekers. Moreover, one’s educational level and skills are insufficient to open doors; one must also have a connection (*koneksi*) with a local government official (*orang dalam/pejabat*). Even finding work at a mining company requires a connection, said students majoring in mining at Cendrawasih University.

The transformation of male status due to the shifting political, social, cultural, and economic sands is not unique to West Papua. Other Melanesian societies now also link

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15 In 2006 there were 52,392 applicants to compete for 8,056 vacancies in the Papua provincial government office (Anon 2006a).
male status to success in the cash economy (Bainton 2008; Biersack 2016). This privileges higher education and proficiency in the national language, steady employment, and having a network that includes influential people over one’s association with traditional male leaders (Bainton 2008). Within the context of special autonomy in West Papua, these competencies have emerged as the new sources of men’s power.

Men’s power and prestige today are largely based on financial wealth and political position. As political power becomes more localized (Hadiz 2007), men turn to emergent local institutions in attempts to build their power. Those who can achieve positions with direct access to the funds brought by the otsus policy become the new ‘big men’ with more power than traditional male leaders. These shifting sources of power encourage traditional male leaders to seek ways to mobilize their influence through emergent customary institutions built by the state, to maintain their previous power as well as to benefit from the ongoing development of West Papua. At times, they have to collaborate with the new big men. For example, I noticed how an Ondoafi submitted a project proposal to a local government official without knowing the actual value of the project. He was nevertheless eager to collaborate with this official to unleash a local government project from which he stood to benefit.

Young men are more inspired by the new big men than by traditional male leaders. The new big men display new forms of wealth that fit the imageries of modern, cool young men: expensive cars, big houses, smartphones, branded luxurious clothing and shoes, and other adornments. Such materials—which traditional male leaders lack—are the new signifiers of men’s power, backed up by the global popular culture that circulates in Papua through television programs, movies, music videos and social media platforms.

While traditional male leaders tend to maintain their influence in customary affairs in their territorial land (Tanah Adat), the new big men’s influence traverses physical space, shifting between the local and national levels and pervading many domains of politics and economy in Papuan societies. Knowledge of other places in Indonesia and overseas
as well as the ability to travel to these places are markers of the modern man—in stark contrast to the ‘kampung’ (village) or ‘udik’ (backward) man, a disparaging term for those who have never travelled or seen places other than their village.

Although many young men are critically aware of the abuse of power by local politicians and bureaucrats utilizing otsus funds for their personal and followers’ benefit, many are also willing to work for these strong men. In their view, the new big men are the koneksi who can help them land a civil service job. This is how young men become clients of new big men and their political patronage machines in the special autonomy era.

The Backbone of the Family: Young Men’s Aspiration to Be a Good Man

‘The most important qualities of being a man are to be the backbone of the family, to be responsible, and courageous,’ said Raymond, a 25-year-old from Serui. Raymond was employed as a field officer by a local NGO in Jayapura, but his job relied on a temporary, donor-based project. He had a long-term girlfriend whom he wanted to marry soon. However, the girl’s father remained unconvinced by his capacity as a provider. Raymond needed to find a stable job to get the father’s blessing. He said that if he proposed to his girlfriend now, her father would reject the proposal right away.

The good or ideal man must be the backbone of the family. Raymond told me that he did not want to be like Aldo. He respected Aldo, but saw him as a confused man (laki-laki babingung), clueless about life. He recounted how Aldo could not make a decision when his girlfriend Desy was about to give birth to their second child. When the constant pain in her belly grew intense, Desy had called Aldo to her father’s house. Desy’s father—still angry at them for disobeying his rule not to meet each other—wanted Aldo to be responsible for the labor. Raymond told me that Aldo, confused, had asked him to help with the delivery. Raymond then grew angry with his friend and told him to take Desy to the hospital; he added that Aldo was crazy to think he could help in the childbirth just because he gave sexuality classes. Desy also expressed her disappointment in Aldo’s
failure to be the backbone of their family. The 23-year-old man from Biak told me that he was an irresponsible man who could not be depended on to support his girlfriend and their children. Due to his failure to be the backbone of the family and to pay the bride wealth, Desy and their children had to live with her family.

Narratives of the good man always emphasize men’s ability to have a steady income, to be a reliable provider for his wife and children as well as the parents, and to be dependable when the family is in need. These qualities make up the ‘backbone of the family’. Failing to fulfill them means one is not good enough to be a husband and to be the head of the family (kepala keluarga). If a man cannot be the head of his family, his capacity as a leader in other domains will be questioned as well.

The aspiration to be the backbone of the family resembles the ideal man in the New Order era’s ideology of Bapakism, spread through state institutions as part of the project of modern Indonesia (Robinson 2015). Bapak are expected to be the family breadwinners, determined, and capable of providing paternal guidance (Nilan 2009)—qualities of ideal manhood shaped by Javanese views and philosophies central to Indonesian politics at the time (Suryakusuma 1996). In contrast, the traditional notion of the ideal man in Papuan societies focused on the communal lives of clans. Men were not only expected to be leaders in their families, but more importantly, members of their clans. The ability to distribute wealth such as crops and pigs to clan members, knowledge of customary rules to settle conflicts, and bravery to fight in ethnic clashes were important qualities to gain reputations as leaders (Ondoafi) (Mansoben 1994). Men were therefore not the providers for their families; their role was to be involved in community rituals and events while it was the socially acknowledged role of women to provide food for the family (Pouwer 2010). Society’s changing expectations regarding ideal manhood thus seem to go hand in hand with the modernization project of the Indonesian state since the New Order regime.

Traditionally, having a family and descendants was crucial for meeting society’s expectations (Munro 2012). Although the expectation to have numerous offspring is now
contested in many Melanesian societies, many men still believe that marrying and having children is necessary to enter into complete manhood (Herdt 1999). And as more non-Papuans enter the urban areas of Papua (Brata & Legendijk 2013), having more children is seen as a way for Papuans to fight the tides of demography. Nevertheless, men of higher socio-economic standing often saw that it was no longer the era of having more children, but providing fewer children with a good upbringing and formal education—a view related to the notion of Bapak.

Nevertheless, a trustworthy family provider must have a stable income. For Papuan men, the most desired way is to become a civil servant, and the ‘Papuanization’ (Widjojo et al. 2008) of the local bureaucracy and politics has indeed opened more opportunities. Some university students working as honorary staff at a local government office (Dinas) hoped to get permanent positions with help from their connections. Some claimed they had to pay at least 5 million rupiahs (335 euros) to be considered, meaning that payment was no guarantee of a position. Given the large numbers applying for positions in local government offices, it was difficult for young men to get jobs, even with help from koneksi.

Young men also aspired to jobs in multinational mining and oil companies in Papua or West Papua province. Some already had experience as interns at one of the companies, which regularly recruited at Cendrawasih University. But some Uncen graduates complained that they were consigned to lower-level positions, with the higher-level positions usually occupied by graduates from the Bandung Institute of Technologies, the most prestigious institute in Indonesia.

Many men with high school or university degrees therefore remain unemployed. In 2013, 67.5% of the job seekers in Papua province were high school or university graduates (BPS-Statistics of Papua Province 2014). Another popular option for a steady job was to enter the military or police. Some of my Papuan interlocutors who were high school or university graduates applied for military or police vacancies; for them becoming a member of the security forces, apart from the stable income, made them feel proud and
manly (*gagah*). They said the uniforms, weapons, and the prestige of the job generated these feelings. It thus seems that contact with the security forces have, to some extent, shaped local aspirations of being a man as well. Since the implementation of *otsus*, Indonesian military bases in Papua and West Papua provinces have been hiring more Papuans (Supriatma 2013). But again, positions are limited and are for the lower ranks.\(^{16}\)

Papuans with little or no education fare the worst of all. Unable to access jobs in the formal sector, they often entered the informal sector without secure incomes, or the ‘dark’ economy to steal, rob, or block roads to extort money from passers-by. Many of my interlocutors worked as motorcycle drivers, minibus drivers, shopkeepers, gardeners and construction workers, or were involved in public works projects provided by the local government. But most of the time, they were idle and just hung around with their peers. To access a public works project, one needed *koneksi*. Local officials generally did not recruit labor for their projects, which was done by middlemen, who also often received money from the project to pay the laborers.

Unemployed young men thus sought to benefit from their connections with new big men, becoming part of their political machines. Some of my male interlocutors were actively involved in supporting a candidate for Jayapura City mayor. *Otsus* has provided abundant funds for development projects—a way of dispersing economic resources in decentralized Indonesia that has led to intensifying patronage (Aspinall 2013). In the end, young men in order to survive became the clients of new big men, whom they looked to for jobs and other benefits. They thus perpetuated the very system that was contributing to their marginalization.

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\(^{16}\) For example, in the 2017 Indonesian police recruitment, Papuans were mostly recruited to be *Tamtama*, the lowest rank of police. There were 1170 applicants, but only 512 were recruited: 173 Indonesian settlers, 331 coastal Papuans and 8 highlanders. Indonesian settlers dominated the highest rank, *Akpol*. From 364 applicants, 90 were recruited: 70 Indonesian settlers, 20 coastal Papuans, and no highlanders (Franky 2017).
Young men looked up to the new big men as powerful modern men, who stood in stark contrast to lingering imageries of poor and backward Papuans—imageries that they resisted in the midst of the process of modernization and the penetration of global youth culture in West Papua. It is through youth culture that young Papuan men find ways to express themselves as modern, global, cool young men.

Many young Papuan men in Jayapura are attracted to American hip-hop culture as seen in music videos and numerous social media platforms. Hip-hop culture reflects their pride in being Papuan. As popular African-American artists such as Tyga, Chris Brown, and 50 Cent share physical characteristics—usually described as black skin and frizzy hair (hitam kulit dan keriting rambut)—with Papuans, representations of black artists’ bodies enable Papuan youth to challenge the image of backwardness that has been attached to them (Richards 2015). The consumption of American hip-hop culture among young men is vast. Their mobile phones played hip-hop songs, they visited karaoke cafés to sing the songs, and many created hip-hop groups, wrote and produced their own songs, and made music videos that they uploaded to YouTube or Facebook. Hip-hop performances take place in Jayapura every Saturday night in public parks such as Taman Imbi, in public parking lots, or at a mall in the Kotaraja area. The adornments of hip-hop style including jeans, hoodies, sneakers, sunglasses, and caps are used by young men to present themselves as ‘kalas’ (classy, cool). While young men struggle to make a living, the adornments of hip-hop style facilitate the immediate sense of being a modern, cool and virile Papuan man.
Like in hip-hop music videos, motorcycles, sports cars, and four-wheel drive trucks are crucial possessions for the more affluent. Saturday nights were the occasions for young men in their various automotive clubs (geng motor, geng mobil) to display their rides as well as their racing skills in the city center, events that young Indonesian settlers participated in as well. And like the music videos, young women were part of the socializing. Young women packed every show of the hip-hop groups. As Freddy—the famous Jayapura rapper—claimed, groupies (female fans) crowded around them, often offering sex in exchange for drinks and companionship with famous rappers. I will explore this phenomenon in chapter 4.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how traditional ways of being a man have been transformed in West Papua, and how special autonomy status and processes of modernization have
introduced new sources of power as well as alternative forms of masculinity. Both processes have intensified monetization, money now being the most valuable commodity in urban life in Jayapura and Sentani. Men who can master the art of occupying the new state institutions and accessing cash in the new economy become the new big men. These men possess human capital including higher education, Indonesian language proficiency, networks to national politicians and business people, the ability to understand local state policies and communicate them, and the capacity to turn various development budgets into projects or slush funds that can be distributed to people who become their clients. These new big men embody the modern virile masculinity young men aspire to—being the backbone of their families and possessing modern material wealth. They provide young men with jobs and assistance that make them more powerful than the traditional big men.

However, the new big men constitute a small Papuan elite who get the most benefit from special autonomy status. Most young men continue to experience difficulty accessing employment and the cash economy, which in turn undermines their efforts to become good men and the backbone of their families. In the midst of their marginalization, young men find that hip-hop culture enables them to imagine themselves as powerful and wealthy. Hip-hop culture further enables them to challenge the imageries of Papuans as backwards, stone-aged people. For decades, the general imagery of Papuan men was that of black men carrying spears and wearing only penis sheaths (Slama & Munro 2015). Contemporary performances of manhood in relation to hip-hop culture are thus also part of Papuans contesting Indonesian state domination, which I will explore further in chapter 5.

The emergence of the new big men along with global youth culture has promoted alternative ways to be a man. To be clients of new big men and displaying hip-hop masculinities are young men’s ways of coping with the uneven development process. How young men interact with global youth culture and its adornments of modernity reveals the dividuality of gendered personhood: they depend on these modern
commodities in their performances of masculinity to be recognized by others and to reveal their gendered personhood. Unable to access the kinds of materiality displayed by the new big men, young men also resort to chemical sexualities as I will show in chapter 3. The next chapter zooms in on the relational and dividual gendered personhood shaped by chemical practices: how chemical practices to enhance the penis form and are formed by relations among peers in a particular place.
Chapter 3 Size It Up and Be Manly

One Friday night in March 2015, I was hanging around the city with some friends. Max, a 24-year-old hip-hop rapper, had just returned from Sorong, a coastal city on the Bird’s Head Peninsula of West Papua. It was more than six months since I had seen him. I recalled the first time we met in June 2014 at a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. Sitting in the corner, sporting his long braided hair and wearing a cap that concealed his eyes, Max did not talk much. He said he was not part of the group, but that its members were good friends. Despite his elusive style, I later found him to be a funny guy who told me countless ‘mop’ (folk humor). Max was a songwriter and a leader of a hip-hop group well-known in the Jayapura and Sentani areas. We hung out a lot, sometimes at his house or at the rappers’ place when they recorded a new song.

Max, the guy with a star tattoo—he referred to it as a ‘morning star’—on his right cheek, was high-spirited as he recounted his adventure that night. My friends—Desy, Raymond, Niel, Willy and Karlos—heeded him in awe. Under the street lights on Kupang beach, I could see his eyes gleam as he recounted his trips to Timika, Nabire and Sorong with his hip-hop group. He said his life in the past six months had been crazy. ‘Those cities were wild,’ he exclaimed. ‘Our performances were always full of crowds. Maybe because they did not have much entertainment like here in Jayapura,’ he explained. He continued, ‘The craziest are the girls (fans), they were aggressive. They came to our concert in revealing clothes, like tight camisole tops and hot pants. They followed us everywhere after the show. Once I had to hide inside a car to avoid them.’ He told us that he got drunk a lot during his trips, ‘Sometimes they paid us with drinks and there were always some people who brought alcohol to our place.’ Yet he had more news, ‘I have a secret: I got an injection in Sorong. I did it with other kids (rappers). While we were drinking, a friend

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17 The morning star is a symbol of the West Papua nation as well as the name of the West Papuan national flag used by the liberation movement.
of us came. He had done an injection to his own penis and showed his to us. He offered us to try. We got ourselves drunker and we did that. I got a 20cc injection and one of our friends asked for 60cc.’ I asked him why he had done that, recalling that he had once said that only men with low self-confidence would do the injection. He grinned, ‘Yeah I was so drunk with friends, if I had not been drunk, I would not have done that. I could not really think.’

It is no secret that penis enlargement is a practice pursued by many young men in Jayapura and Sentani within their peer groups. Practices of enlarging and modifying the penis were previously well known in Melanesian societies as part of rituals of male initiation (Buchanan et al. 2012). Herdt (1981) recounts how the initiation of Sambian men involved rituals to ‘grow’ male genitalia, with a large penis symbolizing reproductive capacity, a crucial feature of masculinity. Initiations in men’s houses showed how male sociality was mingled with sexuality, calling forth the imagined ideal man: powerful, feared, and desired (Herdt 1999).

More recent studies of penis enhancement have related practices to local constructions of gender, particularly of sexual pleasure (Hull & Budiharsana 2001). Buchanan et al. (2012) have shown that penis modification involves beliefs and practices surrounding masculinity and sexuality in the context of rapid socio-cultural change due to processes of modernization, monetization and greater mobility. Nevertheless, studies in contemporary settings generally overlook how men’s sociality as well as place shape practices of penis enhancement—factors that were central in studies during colonial times or during the early stages of modern state formation and market expansion in Melanesia. In those earlier times, men’s houses and tribal rituals of male initiation were central in reproducing masculinities (Gregor & Tuzin 2001; Herdt 1997, 2003; Strathern 1988). Male collectives, I suggest, continue to be important avenues for establishing men’s sense of power and of superiority to women.
In this chapter I argue that penis enhancement is both a practice with long historical roots and a product of specific contemporary social relations among young men. Although traditional men’s houses no longer exist in urban Jayapura, young men establish their own collectives and places where penis enhancement is practiced, constituting specific configurations of masculinity. Unlike the traditional male homo-sociality of the past, present-day male sociality is more diverse across ethnicities and clans, and more open to women too, as we glimpsed in the chapter’s opening vignette. This chapter unravels how penis enhancement practices are intertwined with young men’s social relations and places.

Social relations are important in young men’s daily lives as they furnish emotional support and security in the absence of family bonds. It is a new cultural, social and spatial arena in which young men interact and contest the meanings of their bodies and masculinities. Penis enhancement is part of a broader range of practices that young men pursue with their peers in their own spaces. Place is an essential part of human experience; it shapes our identity and belonging and is fundamental to the practices of everyday life (Duff 2011). Place is active, constitutive, and a product of economic arrangements and social relations (Massey 1994). The practice of penis enlargement is thus a product of multilayered and manifold social relations involving numerous gender and sexual scripts: notions of the big penis, penis growth and virile masculinity as well as Papuan social, political, and economic arrangements.

This chapter addresses in turn: (1) the places within which young men pursue penis enhancement with their peers, (2) their collective penis enhancement practices, and (3) how affective relations and emotions are exploited in young men’s collectives in order to reproduce a particular form of masculinity.
Dorms, Kos, and Mabes

Historically in some areas of New Guinea Island, the men’s house was a place where masculinity was learned, reinforced and monitored, a place where women were not allowed to enter (Gibbs 2016; Herdt 2003; Strathern 1988). Men’s houses and their rituals were prohibited by the Church and the Dutch colonial administration in the early twentieth century (Mawene 2004; Pouwer 2010; Timmer 2000). The last initiation cult reportedly took place in 1960 (Timmer 2000) in the Bird’s Head Peninsula area. A men’s house, modified by modern materials and architecture, still exists in Lake Sentani; although rituals are no longer practiced, it is a place for customary meetings. The stories of the men’s house in the Jayapura and Sentani areas are nowadays told by Ondoafi and elderly Papuan men.

Figure 23. (left) The modern men’s house (Kombo) in East Sentani. Photo by author.

Figure 24. (right) Performance at Lake Sentani Festival in 2016 evokes the warfare and rituals of the past. Source: http://festivaldanausentani.com/.

Ramses Ohee, Dirk Pepuho and Martinus Ongge—all members of the Ondoafi organization—told me that in the past, men and women lived separately in different
houses. Before reaching puberty, boys were taken into the men’s house (named Kombo) to undergo rituals to prepare them for marriage and to become members of the clan. The older men taught them skills for warfare and hunting, as well as knowledge about customs such as land ownership, the ondoafi system, bride price, valuable tokens (beads, stone axes), compensation in conflicts, matrimony and mortuary rites. Following Christianization, young men had to attend church instead of the Kombo. All Kombos were burned to the ground; only one remains today on an island in Lake Sentani.

Ramses Ohee told me that clans in the Sentani area had their own specializations. Some clans specialized in healing the sick; others had knowledge of plants, animals and weather, or had supernatural powers. The men’s house taught the specific skill of the clan. For example, the Wally people of the islands in the western part of Sentani Lake were well known for their ability to heal people. Possibly due to the supernatural teachings and efforts to abolish war among the clans, Ohee explained that Kombo was forbidden by the church and the Dutch administration. Ethnographies in other areas of West Papua have similarly recounted how missionaries, the Dutch administration, and later the Indonesian government prohibited the men’s house and its rituals (Pouwer 2010).

As men’s houses and their rituals disappeared, some of the clans’ skills have disappeared as well. Many older people view the Papuan people’s contemporary dependence on modern education, the health system and governance as a problem rather than as progress. As stated by Hana Hikoyabi, the head of the Jayapura Regency Development Planning Agency (Bappeda) and a former member of the Papuan Peoples Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua), ‘The younger generation nowadays does not know their tradition as they are uprooted from their custom (adat).’ She saw that in-migration, interethnic marriage, and the Indonesian education system and governance are undermining the role of adat in young people’s lives. ‘Young men do not know how to be responsible, they are just hanging around on the street and drunk. Unlike in the past, young men were sent to the men’s house, so they knew how to do their roles as a man. The education system has
failed to produce good Papuan men. Many become lazy because they only wait for the disbursement of Otsus money that can reach as much as one billion rupiahs per village. They get involved in local politics supporting politicians but forget to get a real job. They do not want to harvest the sago palms like older generation used to do because now they are expecting the distribution of rice for the poor (beras raskin) from the government.’

Despite this, I found in my fieldwork young people striving for better lives through education and employment. Many people from across Papua and West Papua provinces come to Jayapura to study or work. Some live with their relatives, but many live without family in dormitories near the campus. These places become new homes for young men as they establish collectives to adapt to and survive in city life.

Joe, a 38-year-old researcher at Cendrawasih University, recounted how his family moved from Wamena (a city in West Papua’s highlands) to Sentani in search of opportunities. After finishing high school in Sentani, Joe continued his education at the Department of English Literature at Cendrawasih University, moving from his family house in Sentani to live in the campus dormitory. As the dormitory is free, it was hard to get a room; some tenants who were no longer students still occupied the rooms with their wives and children. With the help of a family acquaintance, Joe found a place in the campus dormitory in his first year. It was in the dormitory where he learnt how to drink with the other male residents, where he found his first girlfriend, and where he was introduced to bungkus, a penis enlargement technique that involves wrapping leaves around the penis.

Besides the campus dormitories, there are church and municipal dormitories. Since the implementation of the Special Autonomy policy (Otsus), Cendrawasih University has provided more seats for indigenous Papuans. Some municipalities—for example Biak, Jayawijaya, Mamberamo Raya and Mimika—built dormitories for their students studying in Jayapura. Some churches also run female-only or male-only
accommodations. Young men living in a particular dormitory therefore often share the same ethnicity, or attended the same university or church.

As the campus, municipal and church dormitories are unable to accommodate all students and job seekers coming to Jayapura, many private dormitories (called kos) provide rented rooms. Some private dormitories cater exclusively to men or women; others are mixed. I once visited a male kos near my place. It was a three-story building with ten rooms and two bathrooms on each floor. Each room was less than nine square meters. The walls were full of graffiti and dirty. While each room was only meant to house two persons, friends sometimes came and stayed overnight. The place was a bit crowded, and as all doors were open, I could see what everyone was doing. Most of the young men were in front of their laptops, either watching a movie or playing a game. Others were listening to loud music, laying on the floor and chitchatting. There were also women present. Often, young men communally smoked ganja. On some nights, they also drank together. Women could join in the smoking and drinking. Typically, they were
friends of the young men. However, my informant told me that it is taboo for a girlfriend or wife to join in the smoking or drinking with her husband and his friends.

Some young men with more affluent parents bought or rented small houses. Freddy, a 24-year-old university student and rapper, was one of them. Coming from a clan in Biak, Freddy was born in Wamena and raised in Timika, and came to Jayapura a few years ago to study at a vocational technology and engineering high school. His family remains in Timika but owns a house in Jayapura. His house is one of the rappers’ ‘headquarters’ (markas besar/mabes) in the Abepura area of Jayapura. They named the place mabes, a military term for a central place to meet. Freddy also often lives with other rappers in their other mabes, a small rented house near Cendrawasih University. In a densely populated area, the house, consisting of a bedroom, bathroom and living room, is less than 25 square meters. There is only one small window beside the front door, making the place stuffy and murky. When I visited the house, four young men and a girl were there. I think young men’s places are quite the same everywhere: a small living space packed with peers at all times. It is in such places that young men hang out, drink, smoke ganja, watch porn, have sex with their girlfriends, and practice penis enlargement.

As places where young men gather and live together, mabes and dormitories evoke the imagery of the men’s house of the past. But in contrast to the traditional men’s house, the residents are mainly young men coming from different clans, ethnicities and social classes; they sometimes stay temporarily, moving between places that are cheaper or closer to their school or work, or simply to follow their peers. Unlike the traditional men’s house in Melanesian societies, these places are not associated with a set of rituals. Nor do they exclude women. Nevertheless, their members partake in an overarching set of activities through which male residents build social and emotional bonds. Calling other residents who have become close friends their younger brother (adik) or older brother (kakak) and naming their girlfriends as in-laws (ipar) reveal the depth of these emotional and social bonds. In the absence of caring relationships provided by families and clans, these men’s spaces and places provide feelings of togetherness and companionship.
The young men are also part of larger social networks built on an array of similarities such as ethnicity, clan, religious affiliation, prior attendance at the same junior or high school, attendance at the same university, common free time activities (football, drinking, music), working at the same place, and/or involvement in the same youth clubs (church-based organizations, NGO support groups, futsal or football clubs, hip-hop groups or dance clubs). The overlapping collectives of contemporary young men are established on the basis of more ephemeral and non-traditional ties; nor are all collectives equally important, with members usually having stronger attachments to a specific collective in a particular time and space. Social life within these collectives is not only characterized by affective attachment; members at times cheat and insult each other, and compete over jobs, money, food, alcohol and young women. Nevertheless, these are new forms of sociality with new configurations of exchange, ritual and affection in the context of contemporary urban Jayapura.

In the history of the men’s house, the production of masculinity is the main result as well as the indispensable action of its continuation (Herdt 2003). Now that traditional men’s houses have been abandoned, new forms of sociality—spatially based in dormitories, houses, clubs and organizations—have become the sites for the reproduction of masculinity among young men in Jayapura and Sentani. And although not every young men’s collective practices it, the enhancement of male genitalia is one of the key ‘rituals of masculinity’. In the following section, I describe the collective practice of penis enhancement.

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18 I draw on Duff’s (2016) concept of sociality to refer to a set of shared activities and collective experience. Duff highlights relationality within sociality—what bodies do in relation to other bodies, to a place, and how bodies are affected by place (Duff 2014).
On the Practices of Bungkus and Suntik

*Bungkus*, the leaves-wrapping technique discussed in chapter one, is a traditional penis enlargement practice from Biak Island (Ap 2007). Bram, a 60 year-old from Biak, claimed *bungkus* was invented by a clan on the island to treat male infertility, and that it had to be performed by a healer recognized by the community. The treatment was believed to cure male infertility by strengthening the penis and by improving the quality of sperm. Bram’s words seem to parallel Strathern’s claim that this rite aims not to make boys into men, but to ensure that they will have the capacity to become ‘fathers’ (Strathern 1988), the essential role for men in Papuan societies. But nowadays, it is no longer the practice to enhance young men’s capacity to become fathers; instead, it is to ‘grow’ the penis so that they may become virile men.

Today, *bungkus* is the most popular practice of penis enhancement in Jayapura. Alfasis, an anthropologist from Cendrawasih University, states that the practice of *bungkus* was recognized before 1950 (Ap 2007) but only became better known outside the island of Biak after 1970 due to the rapid increase in people’s mobility across West Papua with ferries and airplanes. Alfasis and Enos, anthropologists from the same university, claim that the use of *bungkus* became popular among young men in Jayapura around 2000. After the implementation of the Special Autonomy policy, in-migration from across West Papua and other parts of Indonesia fueled a massive wave of urbanization in Jayapura. The city grew faster than at any time before, with new dwellings, roads, shopping malls and hotels, as well as karaoke bars, cafés and men’s massage centers. The sex industry arose alongside the availability of sexual enhancement drugs from outside West Papua, including Viagra or blue pills, Chinese herb pills, and sex tonics (*jamu* products from Java) as well as traditional Papuan products, specifically *bungkus* mixtures and leech oils. Alfasis added that *bungkus* nowadays has become a commodity sold by young men outside of bars and hotels.
Despite bungkus becoming a commodity, I observed that all of my informants were reluctant to use products offered by people they did not know. The creation, trying out, and use of bungkus usually took place within young men’s peer groups. As experienced by Joe, Freddy and other young men I talked to, they were introduced to bungkus and then persuaded or provoked to do it with their peers. Joe said that he had done bungkus twice as an undergraduate student in the campus dormitory:

I have a friend in my class who is from Amroben, Biak, where the traditional bungkus comes from. He is a bungkus doctor. From him, I learnt about bungkus. Usually, students from Biak encourage us to do bungkus, they often invite their friend who is a bungkus doctor to show us how to do that. Once, my friends from Papua New Guinea came, I told them about bungkus. They were interested. So there were six of us to do the bungkus. We drank three bottles of wiro (local whiskey) to reduce our fear and my friend from Biak wrapped our penises one by one. That was the first time I did that. It was my third year in the dorm. The second time was when a senior student got a visit from his relative who is a bungkus doctor in Biak. The senior asked us to do the bungkus. So, ten people, including me, did that. They said women like it big.

Joe’s initiation was not due to peer pressure alone; he was eager to do bungkus and promoted it to his peers. His story also shows how his collective enabled the practice by providing the knowledge, place and companions, the person who provided the ‘service’ and the materials to support the practice, for example alcoholic drinks. Micheal, a 24-year-old ojek driver and Azty, a 25-year-old NA member, also emphasized how bungkus was part of what they did in their collectives, at times involving shared tryouts (coba-coba). As Micheal put it, ‘In my case, I just wanted to try it out. Because I have many friends from Biak, there is a friend who is famous because his penis is as big as that bottle (a drinking water bottle), so why don’t we try bungkus? It began with sitting down together having an informal conversation like this and having some drinks. Then my friend came and he brought the bungkus leaves and said like let’s try, but yeah maybe because we were too drunk, so it failed (laughing).’
While penis size is an important symbol of manhood within young men’s collectives, perceptions of a big penis are ambiguous, defined by the gaze and consensus of the collective. As Joe explained, ‘The big penis is a man’s pride in his collective, I think it (big penis as a man’s pride) only applies in his group, not in public life. It is to show our manliness (kelaki-lakian), virility (kejantanan) and gallantry (kegagahan).’

A younger male fellow, Freddy, said he wanted to do bungkus because his ‘brothers’ did it too. He went on, ‘Men like their penises big, if the penis is small, others will talk.’ He did bungkus more than twice. Lomo, a 24-year-old student and Freddy’s friend, admitted that he did bungkus because he wanted his penis to be bigger. He said that among his peers ‘baku ganggu’ (teasing each other) about one’s penis is common. Freddy and Lomo did bungkus together once in high school. It was in a friend’s rented room with eight peers who attended the same school. They were lining up to have their penises wrapped one by one by a friend, a bungkus doctor from Biak. The side effects included rashes, itchiness, and a burning sensation on their penises. Nevertheless, both said that the bungkus was successful and that their penises had enlarged, although they were unsure by how much since they did not measure themselves before and after.

I found that the growth of the penis was not something to be measured; nor was the efficacy of the practice questioned within the young men’s collective. None of my informants knew the normal size of their penis, let alone the exact changes in diameter following the practice. Size is relative. It is the doing that is important—as a collective reinforcement of manhood and sexuality.

Another widespread practice among young men in Jayapura is the injection of hair oil, cassowary oil, or Arabian oil into the shaft of their penises, a practice called suntik. This practice is largely the result of experimentation (coba-coba) among young men within their collectives. The men are injected by a friend called ‘doctor suntik’ or ‘mantri (orderly) suntik’—reminiscent of the doctors and orderlies who administer injections at community
health centers. In fact, I found a real orderly working at the provincial public hospital in Jayapura providing the penis injections.

Like the *bungkus* practice, penile injection is done together in young men’s collectives. I found this to be the case among a group of Buginese settlers who shared a rented room in the Entrop area of Jayapura, known for its concentration of Buginese lower class migrants. They worked, ate, and slept together in the community, depending on each other for jobs, money and places to live. Penis size, they told me, was among their anxieties living in a new environment, as it was said that Papuan men have bigger penises. Penile injection was one way to cope with the stresses of city life.

In sum, the practice of penis enhancement is embedded in young men’s socialities. It is not simply the result of peer pressure directed at individuals to act in certain ways to be accepted by the group (Foster & Spencer 2013; Pilkington 2007). It is not the practice of a subculture, of a group of people with similar backgrounds upholding particular values (Moore 2004). It ranks among the collective activities of young men, alongside playing and making music, drinking, smoking ganja, watching movies, playing sports, praying, and participating in customary ceremonies or community work.

This practice also has roots in the past. Herdt mentioned the ritualized homoeroticism of penis enhancement among bachelors and older men in men’s houses in the Humboldt area of West Papua (Herdt 1999), now part of the city of Jayapura. Besides Herdt’s study, I found few stories about rituals of growing the phallus in the Jayapura and Sentani areas. But Sisco, a man from Biak in his 20s, narrated a tale of *bungkus* that he knew from old people in his village on Biak Island. Once, there was a young man who wondered why men did not have breasts like women. He asked a village elder who showed him a secret cave where he could harvest special plants to grow his breasts. He picked and wrapped them with banana leaves and took them home. He then wrapped his chest with the leaves and was surprised to find that he had grown breasts. His brother, who saw this, thought breasts inappropriate for a man. He instead thought to use these special leaves to enlarge
his penis. He told the other men, asking them to try. Men from all over the village gathered in a house and wrapped their penises in the leaves, staying in the house until their penises had enlarged. Although fictional, the tale is an idiom of masculinity (Herdt 1981) that can tell us much about the cultural context of the ritual—its meanings, norms, and knowledge—by showing that men’s desires, beliefs, and efforts to enhance their penises is a collective concern.

The dream of the penis growing through ritual also underlies the practice of *bungkus* within contemporary collectives of young men. Although today’s ‘rituals’ are no longer based on traditional customs or a clan’s secret ceremony, the hope and belief that the penis will grow through ritual persists.

**Getting Shamed or Gaining Pride**

In a context where the penis is a traditional marker of masculinity, its visibility in dorm life easily renders it an object of examination by one’s peers. The penis can alternatively become a source of a young man’s shame, confidence or pride. It turns into an object of shame if the collective judges one’s penis is not ‘good’ and ‘big’ enough. Mocking the penis is a way of shaming the person, an assault on his self-esteem and self-worth as a man.

Mockery and teasing often motivate young men to try *bungkus*, as illustrated by Joe. ‘We lived in the dorm, there, we took a bath together, we could see each one’s penis. Then, we mocked each other’s penis, like “yours is not good, you’d better do *bungkus*”. What I saw, people lived in a group like that tended to tease each other, such as “your thing (penis) is small, but you talk a lot” or “your thing could only tickle a woman’s vagina”, those mockeries could make a man think maybe he should do *bungkus*.’

The social order of attitudes, feelings, and values are reflected in mockery (Lipset 2004). Mockery tells us what social expectations surround being a man, while whomever falls
short of these values of masculinity will be ridiculed. Since the body is a prominent marker of masculinity, men’s bodies are constantly surveilled; those whose bodies are not considered masculine enough will be mocked by other men, including fathers and male peers (Tcherkezoff 2014). Mockery is a subtle instrument among men, one that cannot be reduced to peer pressure. Mockery brings shame; one feels ashamed not necessarily because one has done something wrong, but because one feels different from the group. Shame is a tool to differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’ (Simon 2005), to distinguish what is considered the norm and desired masculinity from unsatisfactory masculinity. By feeling embarrassed, one learns the cultural meanings of being a man, particularly the sort of manhood expected in one’s sociality. As emotions can also reveal apprehensions in people’s lives generated by cultural, economic and political change (Boellstorff & Lindquist 2004: 440), examining emotions enables us to better understand a particular form of masculinity in changing West Papua.

Ariel and Fahri, 23-year-old university students, emphasized how their peers tended to ‘bakar emosi’ (literally, burn the emotion; means inflame) by insulting one’s penis, causing ‘hati panas’ (literally the heart boils, means fuming). Feelings of humiliation and anger at times fueled the desire to prove their manhood and to mend their damaged name. As Fahri’s friend said, ‘just wait till I do bungkus and then you can talk.’ Doing bungkus can indeed restore a young man’s reputation. Fahri said that although he and his friends had not participated, they once noticed blisters on their friend’s penis when they bathed together. They teased and applauded the young man. ‘Nama naik’ (become popular or get a big name), young men called it. While the applause was brief, men often later boasted to their collective that they could sleep with many girls, give them pleasure, or make them cry, which I will describe in the next chapter. Doing bungkus gave young men a sense of pride and sexual potency, regardless of whether the practice indeed enlarged their penises. It is by doing bungkus that young men become jantan (manly).

Young men also narrated how the famous football athletes of Persipura, the provincial football club, also did bungkus. These athletes are regarded as heroes by young men in
West Papua. Andre, a 23-year-old university student, stated, ‘They are Papuans but their achievement is tremendous. They have shown us that Papuan kids can accomplish something great.’ They also claimed that a popular Indonesian footballer, Bambang Pamungkas, did bungkus when he visited Jayapura for a match. Regardless of whether the story is true or not, it induced young men to proudly try bungkus, allowing them to identify with their idols who embody the desired masculinity.

The practices of suntik and bungkus establish affective bonds and exchanges among young men in the collective; their shared activities can be seen as rituals to develop and strengthen affects or feelings of togetherness (Foster & Spencer 2013) as men. The praises (jantan: manly, hebat: prowess, jago: potent) and the reputation (‘nama naik’) that follow penile injection or doing bungkus in the collective fuel young men’s pride and make them more attached to the collective.

The term nama naik or big name is reminiscent of the big man, the traditional male leader recognized by the tribe for his strength, reproductive capacity, power and wealth. The collective practices of penis enlargement evoke how men’s houses in the past prepared the tribe’s bachelors to become warriors and big men. The praises, the reputation, and the practice of penis enlargement within young men’s collectives give their members a feeling of being a big man. As one informant said, penis enlargement allowed him to feel himself a tough manly man (laki-laki pejantan tangguh), strong and virile. In this way, the collective fuels the hopes and feelings of becoming a big man.

The big man nowadays (as illustrated in chapter 2) wields power by holding political position, wealth by possessing money and private property, and prestige by having multiple sexual relationships—characteristics difficult for many young men to achieve. The sense of being jantan encouraged by penis enhancement is a project of becoming a big man and feeling like an urban warrior in the face of uncertainties and struggles that are getting a job and money and having a family.
Nevertheless, the practice of penis enhancement is potentially dangerous to young men’s health. A venereal doctor at a clinic near Cendrawasih University told me that he received patients aged 20-30 almost every day suffering from severe penis inflammation due to *bungkus* or penile injection. Another doctor at a public hospital in Jayapura, Samuel Baso, stated in the mass media that at least one or two surgeries are performed each day due to infections arising from silicon injection (Anon 2016). Thomson et al. (2008) and Fischer & Hauser (2010) agree that the practice of penile modification among young men can cause infection, inflammation and pain, and can further facilitate the spread of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections due to the sharing of instruments.

Despite these harmful side effects, the practices of penile modification enable young men to be strong and brave in the face of uncertainty. The performance of masculinity through penis enhancement is a social product of young men’s collectives, a way to survive in the city, claim respect and gain social status given limited resources and structural constraints. Performance of masculinity is a means for young men to reassert their sense of confidence and authority in dealing with the uncertainties of modern city life in Jayapura.

Performances of masculinity are not singular acts but repetitive ritualized productions done under and through a set of norms that enable subjects (Butler 1993: 95). For Butler, repetition is necessary; it means that the gendered body inscribed by discourse is never accomplished, that the masculine body is never completed—although the practices can be harmful to the physical body. John, a 29-year-old occasional ganja smuggler, had tried various penis enhancement practices: the injection, *bungkus*, leech oil and wipe tissues. His penis once became severely inflamed, resulting in him having to undergo surgery. After his penis was cured, he did *suntik* again with his friends. He said, ‘I just could not see my penis like that, it was not me, it was not mine. I have to size it up, make it big again. I felt ashamed (*malu*), it was not mine. I could not. It was actually not something important, but men in my neighborhood always talk, hey he has a big penis or he has a small penis. Men with a big penis are popular (*terkenal*). Hey, big penis (*gosi besar*). In my
opinion, my penis has to be big and it has to be able to erect for a long time, it is to show that I am manly (jantan).’ John seemed desperate to reclaim his power and authority as a man, and one way of doing it was by displaying sexual prowess. John is not alone; many young men have carried out the same practice and ended up in clinics and operating rooms.

For John and many other young men, the body project of penis enlargement is a means of constructing strong, virile masculinity—not an individualized body project of postmodern society (Gill, Henwood & McLean 2005) but a collective practice pursued within young men’s spaces. Indeed, masculinities are collective creations in which individuals engage together to produce a collective performance of masculinity (Messerschmidt 2009; West & Zimmerman 2009; West & Zimmerman 1987). In our case, performances of masculinity through penis enhancement are situated performances in young men’s spaces within the context of their uncertain lives in Jayapura city.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented (1) young men’s spaces in contemporary Jayapura where they pursue penis enhancement together with peers, (2) the collective penis enhancement practices of bungkus and suntik, and (3) how affective relations or emotions are deployed in young men’s collectives to facilitate the practice of penis enhancement and reproduce a particular form of masculinity.

The practices of penis enhancement take place within young men’s collectives in the urban space of Jayapura. In those spaces—to be part of the collective and to be seen as manly—one must partake in a set of practices that includes drinking, smoking ganja, playing sports, and taking part in the collective rituals of penis enhancement.

The practice of penis enlargement is an important part of young men’s communal life in which they establish affective relations in the city. Affective relations among young men
provide feelings of togetherness and assurance in the midst of uncertainty, while emotional ties become more developed under deprived living conditions (Meth 2009). Emotions also facilitate the practice of penis enhancement within young men’s collectives, with feelings of shame and pride deployed to initiate and reinforce the practice. Emotions are further used as tools to define ‘us’ or a type of manhood the collective wants, to support or discredit masculine bodies and performances.

The collective practice of penis enhancement is a way of becoming a man and reproduces a particular form of masculinity, a transitional manhood on the way to becoming a big man. It shows how this becoming is situated in an ongoing process that both constructs and is constructed by gender and sexual norms as well as by historical and structural circumstances (West & Zimmerman 2009). Furthermore, it is through doing in relation with others that gendered personhood is constituted. Drawing upon Strathern (1988), gendered personhood is not an intrinsic property but a capacity that must be displayed in interactions with others. Doing is crucial to the formation of masculinity.

In this study, the practice of penis enhancement is linked to notions of the big penis, penis growth, and the big man. Becoming jantan or jago requires body projects to be able to display the big penis as a symbol of strong, virile masculinity. Finally, the practice of penis enlargement is a product of young men’s collectives interwoven with complex political, social, and economic networks in urban Jayapura. The practice brings a sense of confidence and control as young men navigate the uncertainties of life in the modern city.
Chapter 4 In Search of Pleasure and Power

One afternoon in early October 2015, I was hanging out with Freddy and his friends in the Aberap’s mabes, listening to a new song Freddy had written and recorded with Sunrise, another hip-hop group in Jayapura. Freddy, as I introduced in chapter 3, is a university student and rapper within Aberap, a well-known hip-hop group in the Jayapura and Sentani area. He often asked me to listen to their new songs or watch their new video clips. He had composed this song—‘Silicone’—following our discussion of penis enlargement. Freddy had tried bungkus, the traditional penis enlargement technique, several times with his friends. The lyrics went as follows:

Want something good (enak)?
You have to inject till the woman you got cannot move (tidak berkutik), aah.
The woman won’t let you go, cause that thing can make her reach climax.
But it is temporary, in the end, you will be miserable.
Hey stop following friends, silicone is dangerous to our lives.
Just because your friends do it but then you are unprotected.
So stop injecting silicone, so stop injecting silicone, so stop injecting silicone.
Stop injecting silicone into your vital instrument, sex criminals (penjahat kelamin) never have a lot of sense, never think.
Reach the climax, be virile (jago) in bed, repeat it again, increase the size, so he is called a manly man (jantan) hahaha (laugh).

The song points to the many meanings of penis enhancement through silicone injection. It captures young men’s understanding of female pleasure. A big penis will bring women to orgasm, paralyzing them and making them loyal. Although young men are aware of the dangers, they do it because their friends do it too. Yet the song mocks ‘sex criminals’ who do not think about the risks, who only want to be a jago in bed. And the song reveals how the big penis symbolizes masculinity, how sex is a way for men to dominate women. Indeed, my research reveals that narratives of the use of penis enhancement products—whether through injections, bungkus, wipe tissues, pills or tonics—always swirl around the notions of sexual pleasure, male sexual prowess and female subjugation.
In this chapter, I elaborate on the use of sex and penis enhancement products within heterosexual relations, situating the practices within changing gender and sexual relations in West Papua including changes in the marital institution and the bridewealth system due to broader transformations in society. More specifically, I argue that the use of penis and sex enhancement products is a way for young men to demonstrate sexual prowess, to sexually subjugate women, and to gain a sense of control amidst anxieties and resentments towards changing sexual relations. Sex as an avenue for young men to assert their power is informed by their social and economic marginalization as well as the enduring notion of sexual antagonism and female pollution.

This chapter examines (1) changing heterosexual relations and practices in West Papua; (2) the emergent type of femininity in contemporary sexual relations; (3) men’s views on the use of sex enhancement products, centering around sexual pleasure and female subjugation; and (4) how the use of penis and sex enhancement products encourage young men to reassert their masculinity.

From *Maitua-Paitua* (Husband and Wife) to *Timba Rame-Rame* (Pump It Together): Changing Heterosexual Relations in West Papua

Many previous studies have addressed how sexual practices have been changing in West Papua (Butt 2007; Butt & Munro 2007; Butt, Numbery & Morin 2002a; Diarsvitri et al. 2011). Modernization and increasing mobility have opened possibilities for alternative sexual relations as young people escape sexual taboos and restrictions enforced by families and clans (Butt 2007). The changes have also penetrated Highlands West Papua, where young people are increasingly expressing their sexuality through experimentation (Butt & Munro 2007). As we saw in chapter 3, young people in Jayapura City are creating new socialities, and within them, new meanings of sexuality.
This section illustrates changing sexual norms and relations. Changing sexual relations are an ongoing concern for older generations of Papuans. With the high rate of HIV and AIDS, teenage pregnancies and pregnancies out of wedlock, older people tend to view young people’s sexuality as out of control (tidak terkendali). Mama Banus, a 61 year-old woman from Biak, narrated these changes. The old woman called me out whenever she saw me and her neighbor Neil walking about in the neighborhood. She repeatedly asked whether we were dating. On each occasion, I would clarify that I was doing research and Neil was helping me to meet people. Besides, I told her, I was more than 10 years his senior. She would then usually laugh and comment that in the past, we would have to get married.

Mama Banus was the most outspoken woman in the neighborhood; the petite woman with a high-pitched voice loved telling stories. She called me adik, a friendly, informal term for younger people. She seemed excited when I visited her in her home, welcoming me with warm tea in a huge glass. After we were seated in her living room, she asked Neil for a cigarette, which she only lit at the end of our conversation. She said that she had lost a lot of weight during a previous illness; she coughed a lot during our conversation. We talked about many things: her marriage, how her late husband had eloped, how he cheated on her within two years of marriage. She also talked about how sexual relationships are different nowadays:

Parents in the past, they could not marry their children to a random person. For example, you have been seen strolling together here with Neil. People would ask, is that girl Neil’s girlfriend? Neil could say, no she is my friend, and then people know that you are Neil’s friend. But in the past, no, it could not be like that. When people see a man and a woman having a walkabout together, they will report it to your parents. Your parents would chase after Neil. Because a man and a woman cannot have a walkabout together, it is restricted. ... In the past, parents would arrange their children’s mate (menjodohkan) when they are still a kid. The engagement is arranged by the parents and when they grow up, nobody can approach them because they already have their mate. Thus, a girl cannot be seen together with a man other than her arranged mate. Because parents have arranged with whom she will get married, how and when, when she will be brought to the groom’s family, and the processions that will be done according to our custom.
Relationships between men and women in the past were antagonistic and arranged by the exchange system. ‘Friendship’ between men and women was not recognized. When warring, hunting, fishing, and making art, men not only avoided women sexually but altogether; women were seen as polluting, as capable of depleting men’s strength (Bonnemere 2001; Herdt 1999; Herdt & Poole 1982; Roscoe 2001). Relationships between men and women were mainly framed within the marital institution; engagement and marriage rituals involved the payment of bridewealth, an essential part of gift exchange and bigmanship (Lederman 1990; Sahlins 1963, 2005). As Sahlins (1963) points out, bigmanship was sustained by placing others in gratitude and obligation in return for help, most commonly the payment of bridewealth.

As we saw in chapter 2, the institution of bigmanship can no longer dependably support the payment of bridewealth. While young men today are expected to pay bride price (Knauft 1997), they also have the freedom to choose their own wives, and to be able to afford bridewealth, young men must compete for stable jobs by investing in education and networking. They migrate from small towns to Jayapura to pursue their studies or to find jobs. In Jayapura, many of them also develop romantic relations and start their own families.

In the past, choosing one’s spouse meant violating arranged marriage and disrupting the exchange system. This could result in severe punishment and customary compensation. Mama Banus’ marriage was a violation of arranged marriage; she had eloped with her boyfriend when she was 19 years old. Her boyfriend first took her to Biak, but after a week, her boyfriend’s father came to reclaim his son and return young Mama Banus to her family. Her father, who was waiting for her at home, beat her with a rattan stick until she fell unconscious. Her boyfriend’s father intervened, telling her father to stop or he would take her to his own home. The boyfriend came to her house that night to take her to his family home. He said that he was willing and able to accept the knives (sanggup terima barang tajam) —a metaphor to show that a young man is willing to accept the
consequences of his actions and is ready to fight for his girlfriend. The families later settled the elopement through payment, including payment of the bride price. Mama Banus said elopements always created big problems between the clans and could even lead to murder. Echoing Mama Banus’ story, Arnold, a 70 year-old man from Serui, told me how young men of his generation resisted arranged marriages by eloping with their girlfriends. Elopement at times ended in a jago lawan jago (a cock against a cock)—a fight between the young man and the girl’s father.

Mama Banus then turned to how urban life has unraveled customary sexual restrictions. She recounted how living in the city had changed her marriage. After a year of marriage, she moved with her husband to Jayapura so that he could pursue a career as a civil servant. Alas, he had an affair with a woman whom he met near his office every day. Her husband had told her that he had to work overtime at the office, but Mama followed him to the woman’s place. The next morning, she knocked on the woman’s door; her husband’s suits were hanging inside. Furious, she hit the woman until her nose bled and smashed the windows and everything inside the room. She also knifed the woman in the belly, but it only tore her shirt. Mama Banus told the mistress to leave Jayapura the next day or she would kill her.

It is becoming more and more common for men to have concurrent sexual relationships. Mama Avon, a 37-year-old woman from Biak, told me that her husband who worked in development projects had affairs during their almost two decades of marriage. He now hardly came home or supported the family. At first, each time her husband had an affair, she would find the mistress and hit her, just as Mama Banus had done. But over time she learnt not to be bothered by her husband’s infidelities; attacking the mistress would in any case not change her husband’s behavior. Besides, she had three children to feed; were she to get injured in a fight, she would be unable to work. Women like Mama Banus and Mama Avon—migrants to Jayapura—are already loosely attached to the clan system and its regulation of marriage and sexual behavior, and are unable to demand customary
settlement or compensation for their husbands’ infidelities. This is why they sometimes took matters into their own hands.

In the past, big men had multiple wives—a symbol of wealth and power (Mansoben 1994). Today, both young men and women have more freedom from customary restrictions to pursue sexual and romantic relations. Living in the city opens possibilities for young people to create their own practices and morals surrounding sexuality (Butt et al. 2002a; Diarsvitri et al. 2011). Fueled by the process of urbanization, the marital institution and sexual taboos are in flux.

Another growing practice is the exchanging of sex for money or modern goods such as branded alcoholic drinks and mobile phones. Some of my interlocutors explained that exchange sex has become much more common in the wake of the Special Autonomy policy, with Jayapura’s hotels, massage centers, bars and karaoke cafes catering to men from regencies and cities across West Papua and even Papua New Guinea. Previous studies of ‘mobile men with money’ (Butt 2015; Lepani 2008) focused on male wage laborers in industries such as mining and logging patronizing women and girls with limited education and employment opportunities. Lepani (2008) describes a similar phenomenon in Jayapura, where men come for work, business, and leisure.

Neil and his friends told me that they were often approached by ‘mobile men’ to find them girls who would accompany and have sex with them during their stay in Jayapura. If Neil could provide such a girl, he would receive a commission from both the man and the girl. Neil and many other male interlocutors told me that nowadays many girls, including their friends, work as escorts.

The practice of exchanging sex for money not only occurs among young women and mobile men. Some of my young male interlocutors narrated how they would pay for alcoholic drinks in exchange for sex; they could always find willing girls by hanging around the city in a car or motorcycle. When they spotted girls on the street wearing revealing clothes, they would pull over and approach them. ‘Then we just haul them
(angkut) in the car, have some drinks and bring them to our place,’ said Neil. They would then have a timba rame-rame (literally, pump it together, meaning group sex).

Freddy, the rapper, also had experiences with group sex—‘gang bangs’, he called them. ‘Now, I am afraid to do that,’ he said, ‘but yeah, we did that. We even have a song about it, the title is Gang Bang. The lyrics are about how to bring a girl to mabes (a central place for young men to meet as in chapter 3). Because sex is always unfinished (tagantung), because we are never satisfied, we want more, we want it to last longer.’ Freddy opened his playlist on his phone and played the song:

The first time we met, we might like each other
I could see it clearly on your face, from the way you talked to me
I was talking to you but my brain was hung
Ooh this girl would get the needle
It seemed that this girl could play in group
Play locked her in and one on a thousand
Didn’t wait for long, mabes was near
Came to the mabes, friends were surprised
Sticky looked upon her
Be patient friends, get in line
We will take turns
Now you all wait there
I will give you a code then you just hit the door

Previous studies of youth sexuality in West Papua have identified practices of group sex, referred to as seks antri (literally, queued sex) or seks borongan (literally, wholesale sex) (Butt 2005; Butt et al. 2002a). But these terms obscure the fact that the practice of group sex is often gang rape. In the lyrics to the above song, ‘locked her in’ (kurung) and young men getting in line to take turns suggest rape. I asked Freddy if the gang bang was a rape. He said no, because the girl wanted it too. I also asked Neil and his friends whether ‘pump it together’ was gang rape. Neil answered this was probable. He told me that his friends once picked up a 12 year-old girl. He had insisted on driving her back home, but some of his friends, wanting to have sex with her, refused. He decided not to join in. He also recounted instances of his friends tricking a girl by asking a handsome friend to
approach her. After the handsome man had sex with her, the rest of the group took turns having sex with her too. He said that the girls were usually too drunk to realize what was happening, but that some who were conscious would try to escape. Many young men justified the gang rape by saying that the girls ‘wanted it.’ If they hadn’t wanted it, they would have avoided them from the outset.

_Lonte_ Women in Contemporary Sexual Relations

Nowadays, both young men and women can choose their own partners and are not constrained by their clan’s exchange system. As sexual relationships become less controlled by customary rules, young men and women in Jayapura are freer to experience romantic or sexual relationships outside marriage, and experiment with short-lived, multiple or concurrent relations as well as with transactional sex. While many people see this freedom as excessive or corrupting, it is invariably the girls who are seen to be polluting the traditional ways. Once labelled _lonte_ (longgar tapi enak, literally, loose but satisfying), girls can be punished by sex, including sex with the enlarged penis. This section discusses this new type of femininity emerging from new sexual relations in Jayapura.

Many young men claimed that girls who will drink with a bunch of men must be _lonte_. The phenomenon of young women living in the city beyond family control, choosing their own sexual partners, expressing their sexuality, and at times making money from sex fuels anxieties and resentments among men and older generations. They see such free women and their unrestrained sexuality as in need of correction, control, or punishment.

Many young women today engage in exchange sex while waiting for a proper husband or bridewealth payment from their boyfriends. Young women, like young men, need to survive in the city. Without support from their families, they turn to exchange sex to afford mobile phones and the latest clothes, and to experience urban life—consuming branded alcoholic drinks, hanging out in the city in cars, going to bars and karaoke cafes.
Evin, Desy and Mona were among them. All had families in the city but decided to live with their friends, choosing freedom and companionship over the security, supervision and chores that came with family living. Evin, a 24-year-old woman from Wamena, a city in the West Papua Highlands, came to Jayapura after finishing high school. Her father had sent her to Jayapura to continue her studies at a nursing college, but instead of studying, she spent her time socializing and moving between her drinking mates all over the city. Although Evin and Desy had steady boyfriends, they supported themselves. They would sometimes go out to find men to exchange sex for money and drinks. They pooled this money to pay for their modern lifestyles: mobile phones, the latest fashion, trendy haircuts, cigarettes and alcohol.

Although many women were ashamed to talk openly about sexual pleasure, this did not apply to Evin, Desy and their female friends. Desy once told me, ‘Women tend to be silent when it comes to sex. Men ejaculate, reach climax, but women do not, they keep silent. Not because they do not have sexual desire (hasrat), but they keep it for years. In my case, I want to be satisfied too, I said to my man thank you. If I am not satisfied, I may become ill and suffer (menderita).’

Desy also rejected the common refrain among men that penis enlargement is for women’s sexual pleasure. She explained, ‘For me, the problem is not how big or small the penis is, but how he can satisfy me.’ She recounted her experiences of having sex with men who had injected their penises. Once she got abrasions in her vagina after sex. The big penis, she said, hurts rather than pleases women.

Desy, Evin, and Mona reject the lonte label attached to them. Desy said that occasional transactional sex does not make them lonte. Desy does not consider herself lonte since she is faithful to her husband, meaning she does not have romantic or serious relationships with other men. She is involved in transactional sex because her husband does not provide for her and their children. When she is bored at home and wants to relieve stress, she hangs around the city and drinks with men. Evin told me that although she has affairs
and sometimes exchanges sex for money and drinks, she is offended by the lonte label. What she does is none of their business, she said, and no one has the right to label her.

The accusation of lonte is vague. It suggests a girl who is willing to have sex in exchange for money or gifts, but can also refer to girls involved in casual relationships. Young men could easily label a girl as bad or lonte just because she smokes, drinks alcohol, wears shorts, gives out her phone number, goes out at night with her friends, or only because she smiles at them. Certain styles, acts, and gestures can label a girl as a lonte; in the end, all girls can fall into this degrading category. Elsewhere in Melanesia, women can be stigmatized as loose if they are perceived to be mobile, educated, un-Christian, looking for money, or loosely attached to their kin—regardless of their sexual relationships (Knauft 1997). Analogous to the phenomenon of free women or lonte in Jayapura, women in Papua New Guinea who engage in paid sex—called pesinja meri (passenger women)—are stigmatized for only having sex with those who can pay them (Wardlow 2005, 2006). Wardlow (2005) points out that these women humiliate men and violate the bridewealth system. The label of pesinja meri serves to control women’s behavior (Wardlow 2006), which I believe is the case with the lonte label in West Papua as well.

The notion of loose women emerged with the transformation of West Papua society and its social, political, economic spaces, as young women joined their male counterparts in migrating from rural villages to Jayapura in search of opportunities and a better life. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of women living alone in the city is relatively new, one that appeared only after the implementation of Special Autonomy status which reserved university seats and government jobs for Papuans. Unfortunately, independent women are judged as bad or loose regardless of their sexual practices.

With the monetization of the economy, the payment of bridewealth is no longer sufficient for survival. Young women are also expected to get a job and support the family. But as many Papuan women do not have the education or skills to compete with Papuan men or Indonesian women, some turn to transactional sex. Young women who live in the city
are often only loosely attached to their clans. They are seen as belonging to no man—and thus available to all men—and are more vulnerable to sexual assault including rape and gang rape. In this context, the label of *lonte* casts women as the wrongdoers and perpetuates/condones violence against women.

As Knauft (1997) argues, women are now judged not just against the norms of female pollution but against those of being loose. Pollution signifies being out of place, of transgressing the boundaries of the system (Douglas 1984). In this case, *lonte* are transgressing the boundaries of women’s place, sexuality, and the bridewealth system. The *lonte* label furthermore reveals how the notion of female pollution persists in a new guise. The label is reminiscent of the men’s house era when relations between men and women were antagonistic and women were depicted as dangerous, to be distrusted and kept at a distance (Herdt 1999). Nowadays, subjugating women’s sexuality remains part of the performance of masculinity.

*Biár Enak* (For Pleasure) and *Kasih Tobat* (To Make Women Repent)

Although many young women disagreed that the big penis brought pleasure to women—and none of the women I talked to valued it as an important aspect of sex and being a man—young men invariably invoked narratives of female sexual pleasure when talking about penis enhancement. Like the lyrics in the ‘silicone song’, they believed women love big penises and prolonged sex. This section discusses the manifold narratives of the use of sex and penis enhancement products among young men.

Narratives of the practice of traditional penis enhancement—*bungkus*—circulate in everyday conversations in public. For example, when participants in a meeting have reached a decision and want to move on to other issues, they would call out *bungkus* (meaning ‘it’s a wrap’). They would then chuckle as they knew the word could refer to the traditional penis enlargement technique. Female participants commented, ‘Men
indeed like bungkus.’ Another example was during lunch in an office. One staff member asked her colleagues if they wanted to have take-away (bungkus) or to eat at a restaurant. A man quickly replied bungkus, because it is more delicious (lebih enak). Others laughed because enak here has a sexual double entendre.

The discourse of sexual pleasure that suffuses young men’s practices of penis and sexual enhancement are reproduced within young men’s socialities. In particular, women’s sexual pleasure is often invoked as motivation for young men to grow their penises. An informant, Joe, did bungkus with his friends in the dorm because his friends told him ‘women like it big’. But later, he confessed that he had ‘never heard of a man doing bungkus and then having sex and asking his woman, how was it? Did you feel pleasure (ko rasa enak)?’

Claims by young men that they practiced penis enhancement for their women’s sexual pleasure seem ambiguous. Some young men admitted that they had never asked sexual partners about their preferences; many told me they were most concerned about their own pleasure. Gerald, a 25 year-old minibus driver, had used leech oil, done bungkus, and drank crocodile penis concoction (tangkur buaya). When I asked him why, he told me that it was for pleasure, for his own self-satisfaction (memuaskan diri). Max, the rapper I introduced in chapter 3, also admitted that men enhance their penises for their own sexual pleasure. Men never ask about their lover’s feelings regarding sex or the enlarged penis, he said. ‘Men only think about themselves, whether they can make their women cry (with the big penis). How their women experience the sex, they do not know! Because they do not understand their women.’

Some young men declared that they turned to the practices of chemical sexuality for their own pleasure. Young men in search of sexual pleasure tried out various products including Viagra, pills of both Chinese and local provenance, wipe tissues, creams, ginseng coffee and herbal tonics (jamu). Since they also believed that longer-lasting sex brings more pleasure and satisfaction, many used a variety of products not only to
enlarge their penises but to prolong sex. Adi, a 29 year-old entrepreneur, was among the men who occasionally took Viagra. He recounted his experience taking the pills:

I told you, I took one pill but I did not feel anything so I took another. At that time I was with my friends, we drank together and got girls. We are men, so the girls wanted our money and we wanted satisfaction. If we had sex just for a little while and then we ejaculated, it would not be satisfying at all. So we took drugs to enjoy the sex more.

Kiki, a 23 year-old student and intern at the provincial government office, told me he used ‘magic power’ wipe tissues and took Vimax (claimed to be herbal Viagra) to boost his sexual stamina. He recounted the pleasure he got from delaying ejaculation:

Actually I just wanted to try it out (coba-coba saja). When I tried, my heart pumped very fast. I just took one pill. I felt enormous energy. At that time I enjoyed the sex, really enjoyed it, but do not ask me the details. It was really good, I could hold it until the woman was no longer able to do anything. Super! So that is why the pills are expensive.

Kiki did not take the pills regularly as he was concerned about their side effects. Instead, he used Magic Power and Super Magic brand wipe tissues at least once a month. These wipe tissues don’t carry risks, he said, because he applies them on his penis for less than 5 minutes.

Young men also said that they used sex enhancement products in pursuit of momentarily pleasure (mencari kenikmatan sesaat) with women they called ‘lover for one night’ (cinta satu malam). All of my informants used sex enhancement products, not for their steady partners, but for those whom they saw as lonte women experienced in sex. Kiki told me, ‘I only use tissues for certain girls (perempuan tertentu).’ I asked him to clarify and he explained:

Yeah, when I play futsal, when we have a match, many girls come. Usually some will approach and certainly, there is a girl who is willing to be invited somewhere.
In fact, there are many girls who are willing to have that (sex). I just approach them, ask for their numbers, and if I ask them out they definitely want it too.

I asked him again who the ‘certain girls’ were. He replied, ‘They are lonte, we know it from the way they dress and behave.’ He continued, ‘Yeah, that label always comes from people’s judgment. No, it is impossible (to regard the girls as his dates), but I have to satisfy them, and satisfy myself too.’ I asked him why it is important to satisfy a lonte. He answered:

That sort of girls, if they do not feel satisfied, they will undervalue you. Yeah, maybe I want to show that I am capable (mampu). All the more so if the girl has friends who are also like her, have a lot of experience with sex. If we have limited abilities, they will talk about us.

Men already in steady relationships admitted that they enlarged their penises in order to have more self-confidence when encountering loose women and sex workers. Dasrun, a Buginese driver in his 30s, recounted how he lacked the self-confidence to visit brothels when he arrived in Jayapura some ten years ago. He told me:

At that time, even though I was single, I had no guts, no self-confidence. Because I knew women in those places maybe have experienced 1,000 different men, right? I was thinking other men’s are big, so I have no guts, no self-confidence, I was afraid of being rejected. But after I made it big, I was rejected by many women, in fact, women are not looking for a big penis.

I asked Dasrun what made him think that women prefer a big penis. He said that his friends, who had injected their penises with oil, claimed women receive more sexual satisfaction this way. But now, after marrying a nurse, Dasrun regretted his past actions: ‘I regret it. I want to have surgery to remove it (the injected oil). I feel sorry for my wife.’

Practices of penis and sexual enhancement do not necessarily lead to sexual pleasure, even for men. As we saw in chapter 3, the results can include inflammation, pain, and
severe rash, making sex far from pleasurable, if not impossible. Prolonging sex with wipe tissues can numb the penis, which many young men admitted is less pleasurable.

Nevertheless, enhancing the penis and prolonging sex remain important, as the big penis and sexual stamina are part of young men’s sense of manhood. Many young men admitted that their self-worth as a man would be destroyed were a woman to mock their penis and sexual performance. They narrated many such mockeries: ‘Your penis is a cotton bud, it is for ear holes’, ‘Your penis can only tickle (my vagina)’, or ‘I could not feel anything, your penis only made (my vagina) dirty’. But tellingly, none admitted to a woman actually mocking them in this way. Rather, it is the imagined mockery that fuels young men’s anxieties towards their bodies and sexual performance. From Dasrun’s story, we learn that these anxieties are generated in young men’s socialities, reproduced to compel young men to perform sexually potent masculinities.

Performances of sexual prowess—shown by their capacity to prolong sex or by the size of their penis—must be displayed to sexually experienced women. Unfortunately, performing sexually potent masculinity often entails the sexual subjugation of women. Many young men said that they enlarged their penises or sought to prolong sex to make lonte women repent. Neil told me, ‘If it is big, women will definitely repent (tobat). If they go hang around, give them that, they must repent.’ I asked him what he meant by tobat. He replied, ‘They will be afraid (of the big penis), so it is to make them afraid of doing naughty things (nakal).’ Raymond, a 25-year-old man from Serui, added, ‘Yeah, so that those itchy women (perempuan-perempuan gatal, meaning bad women) will go back to the straight way (jalan yang lurus), they will be regretful (kapok).’ Freddy agreed, ‘To make them repent, those itchy women.’ It was thus justifiable to have sex with a lonte and punish her with a big penis, a punishment often described as ‘pleasurable pain’ for the women. Other young men boasted how their big penises made the women meriang (abbreviation of merintih-rintih tapi riang, moaning in pain but happy). Even more, they boasted how the big penis wounded the vagina—‘feel it and feel it to death’.
These accounts reveal how male practices of sexual enhancement aim to dominate, control and punish women. I suggest that the practice of punishing women through sex is in particular tied to anxieties and resentments towards free women; the label *lonte* is essentially a discourse to control women’s behavior (Wardlow 2006). Additionally, since free women are seen as sexually experienced, they invoke a sense of sexual weakness and incompetence among men. The phenomenon of free women threatens masculinity built on the institution of heterosexuality (Garlick 2003). Men use sex, at times with aggression, to counter their own anxieties about women, especially their feelings of dependence upon women (Herdt 2003).

It is through sex that men assert their masculine power; at the same time, it is through sex that men most acutely experience uncertainties and dependence on women. Traditional beliefs in many parts of Melanesia depicted women as dangerous and polluting inferiors (Herdt 1999). Sex with women was seen as dangerous; today, it is sex with loose women that is seen as dangerous. In the past, rituals to ‘grow’ the penis bolstered male subjectivity to conquer the dangers of sex with women. Today, the physically enlarged penis is used to control and punish the dangerous polluter. In so doing young reassert their sense of power.
Chemical Sexualities as Technologies of Masculine Power

Sex as an avenue for men to exert masculine authority was acknowledged in Melanesian societies. For example, communal rape was used to punish women who broke into the men’s house and disturbed its rituals (Herdt & Poole 1982; Knauft 1997). The notion of ‘sexual antagonism’ was central in understanding social and gender relations in the classical studies of Melanesian culture (Herdt 1997; Herdt & Poole 1982), differentiating between men and women and assigning men positions of both physical and intellectual superiority (Herdt 1981). Sexual antagonism was produced through the men’s house and applied through violence and ritual practices to dominate women (Herdt 1997). As sex with women was seen to lessen men’s power, sexually active women were treated most harshly (Herdt 1981).

Although the process of modernization has transformed sexual relations in the past decades, recent studies have found that sexual antagonism—transformed and driven by modern tensions—continues to inform violence and gender relations between men and women (Wardlow 2005, 2006). The incidents of communal rape and sexual violence in Papua New Guinea, for example, while having roots in the past, are fueled by present-day insecurities (Jolly 2000, 2016; Jolly, Stewart & Brewer 2012; Lepani 2008; Macintyre 2008).

Although the men’s house and its rituals have been abandoned, men still uphold antagonistic and misogynist views about women. Sex remains an important avenue to achieve and maintain male power. But why do men use sex as an avenue to reassert their power? I suggest that the answer lies in the enduring idea of female pollution. Anthropologists have addressed how sex with women was perceived as dangerous as their menstrual blood could pollute men’s power and strength (Herdt 2011; Roscoe 2001). In today’s context, I argue that menstrual blood has been replaced by ‘loose’ women as the source of pollution.
Male status today depends on men’s capacity to access the cash economy and to accumulate wealth. Difficulties here can increase new forms of gender antagonism towards women (Knauft 1997). Knauft also notes that male status remains culturally and morally reliant on restraining female sexuality and limiting women in the larger cultural and economic domains. To a certain extent I found this to be the case; for example, some of my interlocutors said that in Sentani areas, older men remain reluctant to accept female priests, grumbling that women should not be allowed to talk too much. Past notions of male domination are now complicated by women’s participation in socio-economic, political and religious affairs. In the current context, sexual antagonism is largely related to male anxieties about modernity.

Women nowadays have greater opportunities to be involved in public life. As teachers, midwives, nurses, doctors, civil servants, and even as elected members of parliament, they now have access to the cash economy and are able to display their consumption of modern goods—the same ones desired by men to symbolize their power and status. Young women can also follow the latest fashions, wearing jeans, sneakers and sunglasses. Some even support their boyfriends, buying them food, call credits, and paying for their accommodation. People call the type of man who lacks economic capacity *mokondo*—an abbreviation for *modal kontol doang* (men who only have the penis as their ‘capital’). The label *mokondo* is not necessarily insulting, a university student explained, ‘to Javanese people, it must be degrading, but here it is capital.’ Other men said *mokondo* men are not sex workers; they just use their penis and sex to ‘please women’ so that they can display their virility (*kejantanan*) and gallantry (*kegagahan*). Their narratives show that in the midst of men’s anxieties about modernity, male bodies, too, can become capital—deployed to receive material gain and to reassure their sense of manhood.

The penis continues to signify strong and potent masculinity, much as semen in the past signified boys’ transitions into men. Modern pharmaceutical advances and the chemical sexualities that they enable reproduce the idea of phallic masculinity—that sexual prowess is signified by the size of the penis as well as the duration of the erection. The
penis thus becomes the object of intervention as it is the form of capital that is always accessible to them. Chemical sexualities are technologies to enable young men to reassert their sense of masculine power and to materialize their control over women’s sexuality.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have illustrated how the use of sex and penis enhancement products is situated in changing gender and sexual relations in West Papua. I argued that the use of penis and sex enhancement products is a way for young men to demonstrate sexual prowess, to sexually subjugate women, and to gain a sense of control amidst anxieties and resentments towards changing sexual relations. Young men tried to resolve their social and economic marginalization by resorting to the display of sexual prowess. This kind of performance of masculinity is also related to the enduring notion of sexual antagonism and female pollution.

This chapter also illustrated how changing gender roles and sexuality have led to the emergence of a new type of femininity: free or lonte women. This sort of femininity is seen to violate the bridewealth system, revealing the continuation of misogynistic attitudes towards women’s sexuality and traces of the idea of female pollution. Young men narrated how the use of sex and penis enhancement products was part of their way to punish free women. The subjugation of women’s sexuality, facilitated by chemicals, thus becomes part of the performance of masculinity. As sex is a crucial avenue to attain and maintain male power to signify masculinity, chemical sexualities become technologies for young men to re-assert strong and virile masculinities in the face of ongoing anxieties and resentments towards shifting circumstances, economic marginalization, and the growing social and sexual freedoms of women.
Chapter 5 *Jago* Masculinities and Precarious Transformations

One night in March 2015, I had an unplanned dinner with Ben, a 24-year-old man from Sentani. I had known Ben for two months since moving to his neighborhood in Waena, Jayapura. His boarding house was located on the corner of my street; we met frequently, chatting on a long bench in front of his house. That night, when I met Ben and his friends on the street, I asked him whether he knew of an eatery nearby; the one that I frequented was already closed. Ben offered to walk with me since, he said, the drunken Highlands men in the area often made trouble. We ended up having dinner together and I used the opportunity to hear more of his story.

Some of Ben’s friends called me while we were having dinner. If they knew where we were, I thought, they would want to join us. But Ben was talking about himself, about how he was often involved in fights and how his part-time job was boring and tiresome. As I did not want to miss the story, I dismissed the calls. When we returned to our neighborhood, Raymond, a 25-year-old man from Biak, informed Ben that his wife had been looking for him, and that she looked furious. Ben rushed home. Then Raymond looked at me and asked, ‘I called you many times, why did you not pick up? I was worried that his wife would find you both. But, you’re lucky this time.’ Another man, Armin, a 23 year-old Buginese, told me, ‘You’d better not go with him alone again, his wife is a jealous woman’.

The next day, Armin told me that Ben’s wife had stabbed his foot. She had been furious, looking for her husband who after hours of hanging out had not returned for dinner. Armin was unsure whether she was angry because Ben hung out a lot or because she knew Ben was with me. Armin said she stabbed Ben’s foot so that he would not be able to go hanging around again. I could not believe my ears. A few days later, while talking to Armin on the street, I saw Ben and his wife emerge from their house. Ben was limping, his left foot wrapped in gauze bandages; his wife followed carrying a big handbag.
asked him where he was going when they passed us. ‘To the hospital, my foot hurts and I have a fever,’ he answered, while looking down at his injured foot. I kept asking him what had happened but he just smiled and continued to walk. His wife gave me a smile too. I said to Armin that his wife looked very nice and it was still hard for me to believe that she had knifed him. He responded that I did not know her and that she had family in Jayapura so I should avoid making any trouble with her. He continued, ‘If Ben does something wrong, her family will chase after him and his family will have to pay customary compensation.’ I asked him what would happen if she was jealous of me. He answered that she would attack me: hit, stab or undress me in public.

I did not see them again after the encounter. Later I heard that Ben and his wife had moved out of the neighborhood. They were now living with Ben’s parents to save their marriage. In the boarding house, they often had vicious fights and harmed each other. A young man who lived next to their room told me that he often heard them hitting each other, breaking furniture as well as the front door.

A week later, I saw Ben in the neighborhood. He was limping slightly and I could see through his sandal a gauze bandage wrapped around his foot. I asked him where he had been and he told me he now lived with his parents in the Abepura area. I said this was too bad as we could no longer chat on the street. Ben was a talkative man who loved to gossip about people in the neighborhood. After he moved, I missed this information. Ben said he was uncomfortable to be seen talking with me; people would get the wrong idea and talk. However, he said he wanted to help me. He again mentioned his friend, the ‘injection doctor’. Ben wished to tell me stories about him and promised to introduce us someday. He said we could meet near Cendrawasih University as this area popular with students was close to his house. I asked him if his wife would be jealous. He looked surprised to hear my question and replied that it would be safe so long as we met in a public place and near his home. I was hesitant to meet him but I also felt bad to turn down his offer, but then, we decided to meet in a café near the university.
It was a hot, bright day when we met. Ben was wearing a thick Christmas sweater. Although confused by his choice of outfit, the first words out of my mouth were, ‘What a nice sweater!’ He laughed and told me it was the only clean outfit he had. He was wearing long pants which I had never seen before; I had always seen him wearing boxer pants. I thought he might be a little dressed up for our meeting in the café. The place was full of people whom I assumed were middle-class university students.

As our conversation began, I told him again about my research. He looked serious while listening to me and then asked whether I had family in Jayapura. I said no. He replied that I had to be careful doing my research in Jayapura as I was alone and had no idea how cruel a Papuan could be. I was puzzled. I often heard similar warnings from Indonesian settlers, but Ben was a Sentani man. He told me that girls in Jayapura walking alone, particularly at night, were often kidnapped and raped. Although I had heard similar stories before, I remained uncertain whether this happened frequently.

Ben recounted an incident with his female relative. She had had some drinks with boys at a soccer field and passed out, drunk. She found herself naked the next morning with grass stuffed in her vagina. Ben told me that boys often inserted things in a woman’s vagina after having group sex. Friends had told him about inserting forks and sticks into their sexual partners’ vaginas when they were unconscious.

I asked him why men would do this, and he replied ‘Just for fun (iseng), sometimes boys do this after the sex, while the girl is still unaware and naked so they insert whatever they find nearby.’ Not satisfied with his answer, I asked him again. He replied, ‘I don’t know, it is just what some men do.’ I inquired about the state of his female relative following the terrible incident. Ben said that she was now living in Sentani with her family. I asked if she had been traumatized. He answered probably. I asked him if her family had demanded customary compensation. He said he did not know all he knew was that she had been admitted to the hospital. She looked fine afterwards and went on some dates but had not married yet.
The conversation—in the café, with the delicious food, music and laughter from other guests in the background—was surreal. The words coming out of Ben’s mouth were slowly taking me to dark scenes of rape; I felt overwhelmed to understand male violence in this beautiful land. I then remembered the words of a young man: ‘West Papua at a glance looks fine with its picturesque landscape and the diversity of ethnicities living side by side. But if we look closer and deeper, it becomes obvious that the lives of West Papuans are far from fine: people scam each other because they do not have jobs and money, drunks are everywhere making trouble, indigenous rights are robbed, young people have no future. West Papua is not beautiful; it is not fine.’

Ben’s story sheds light on the dark side of the lives of young Papuans, how their everyday lives are caught up in multiple forms of violence. Violence is blatant in their mundane lives, yet is delicate. It is not only a matter of unequal gender relations in which men are the perpetrators and women the victims; young men are also victims of other kinds of violence. In Jayapura, perpetrators and victims are entangled within power relations between ethnicities, migration statuses (indigenous-migrant), and socio-economic classes. Although young women are the most vulnerable, particularly to gender violence, we need to acknowledge how the lives of young men are impacted by violence and how violence contributes to the performance of masculinity.

In this chapter, I argue that violence constitutes young men’s performances of *jago* masculinity—a form of sexual antagonism that has emerged against the background of social and political-economic change in Papua province in the era of Special Autonomy. The ongoing transformations of society are marked by uncertainties and structural violence that not only marginalize young men but also brutalize and diminish them.
Structural Violence and the Construction of Masculinities

The role of violence in defining masculinities in Melanesia has been studied extensively. In the classical studies, acts of male violence to assert power over women are explained through the concept of sexual antagonism (Herdt 1997; Herdt & Poole 1982; Langness 1967). Antagonistic relations between men and women were reproduced through the institution of the men’s house in which boys underwent rituals to prepare them for their tasks in the public domain and to maintain control over female sexuality (Herdt & Poole 1982). More recently, economic inequality, urbanization, wage labor, mobility, political tensions, and the social and cultural effects of globalization have all contributed to gender violence (Knauft 1997, 2011). Knauft suggests that antagonistic relations between men and women are fueled by the tensions of succeeding in the cash economy (Knauft 1997, 1999). Jolly (2012) and Wardlow (2005, 2006) similarly argue that contemporary sexual antagonism needs to be understood in the context of men’s anxieties about modernity. In any case, contemporary tensions in social, political, economic, and cultural realms are at the heart of understanding gender relations and gender violence.

The everyday lives of young men in West Papua are colored by structural violence, which goes beyond physical attacks and includes assaults on self-respect and personhood (Farmer 2004). Structural violence operates systematically and has economic, social and cultural dimensions (Farmer 2004). Enacted through social relations and institutions (Green 2004), social inequalities lie at the heart of structural violence (Scheper-Hughes 2004). It is the violence of everyday life as it affects people in multiple and mundane ways (Kleinman 2000). Drawing on these studies, I frame structural violence by the Indonesian state as encompassing physical abuses perpetrated by its security forces as well as the ongoing poverty and insecurities of everyday life in West Papua. Masculinities are shaped within power relations. Sexual violence against women and girls is more likely in societies that suffer multiple insecurities (Goett 2015; Merry 2009). In the context of West
Papua and its long history of state oppression, state power permeates social relations and affects how young men enact masculinity.

This chapter begins with depictions of gender violence in Jayapura. From the perspective of gender performativity, committing gender violence is part of being a man; I illustrate how gender violence is a way for young men to perform masculinity in front of women and other men. Second, I illustrate how young men in Jayapura live under multiple forms of insecurity and violence, and argue that many cases of collective violence are materializations of structural violence, poverty and lack of access to employment and political decision-making among Papuans that persist after the implementation of the Special Autonomy policy. These tensions erupt in community clashes that often lead to the reinforcement of control by the Indonesian security forces, which also suppress human rights and liberation movements. The structural violence of the Indonesian state permeates the everyday lives of young Papuans.

In the last section, I discuss how jago performances of masculinity are enacted through gender violence in the context of structural violence in West Papua. Jago masculinity, I suggest, is a form of manhood made through relations with other men and women, places, and precarious circumstances. Jago masculinity is constituted and enacted through relations with others and permeated by structural violence.

**Gender Violence in the Everyday Lives of Young People**

The opening vignettes showed how young women in Jayapura are vulnerable to sexual violence. Sexual violence is part of gender violence, which Merry (2009) defines as violence interpreted through the gendered identities of the parties. Gender violence, intertwined with structural violence, is seen as mundane in the context of conflict and insecurity in contemporary West Papua (cf. Lockhart 2008). Gender violence points to routinized experiences of violence (Scheper-Hughes 2004) within intimate and
interpersonal relationships (Das 2007; Das & Kleinman 2000) which ultimately shape people’s subjectivities (Kleinman 2000).

It is difficult to gain an accurate picture of the extent of gender violence in West Papua and Jayapura. From my experience in the field, most cases of sexual violence go unreported to the authorities and are therefore not reflected in the statistics. Nevertheless, reports suggest that the incidence of sexual violence is higher in the province of Papua than elsewhere in Indonesia. The National Violence Monitoring System (*Sistem National Pemantauan Kekerasan* or SNPK) reported 44 cases of serious domestic violence in Papua in 2014, in which the victims were mostly female (Habibie Center 2014), while the Papeda Institute reported 31 cases of sexual assault against women (out of 332 cases of violence) in Jayapura alone in the period between January and June 2014 (Papeda Institute 2014). A 2013 report on violence against women found 60.2% of male respondents in Jayapura, 30.6% respondents in Jakarta, and 25.7% respondents in Purworejo admitting to physical and sexual violence against women. The report also mentions that the prevalence of gang rape is more common in Papua province than in Jakarta, Purworejo, and Aceh (Fulu et al. 2013).

Although sexual violence also affects young men, young women—across social classes and ethnicities—are its most vulnerable victims. While the young men in the opening vignettes suggested it was ‘just for fun’, sexual or gender violence is deeply rooted in history as well as in contexts of socio-economic hardship and inter-ethnic tension. Ongoing political unrest in West Papua—previously a military operation area (*Daerah Operasi Militer*) and still suffering from a heavy military presence—also affects the characteristics of gender violence in Jayapura.

A prominent female activist told me that sexual violence against women in Jayapura is common (*biasa*), taking place in houses, streets, soccer fields and other public places, and perpetrated by husbands, boyfriends, friends, relatives or strangers. She recounted her encounter with a young woman encircled by a group of drunken men on her way home
last week, and how a female body had been found several weeks ago in the river near her place. It appeared to be the body of an 18 year-old Torajan who had been raped before she was killed. She told me that her organization – LP3AP\(^{19}\) – once reported the gang rape of two junior high school girls to the police. The girls’ genitals had been damaged by the perpetrators inserting a big cassava into the girls’ genitals. The word \textit{biasa} implies that sexual violence is so frequent that it becomes ordinary—the lives of persons and communities become embedded in violent events which permeate into the recesses of the ordinary (Das 2007).

In contrast to the woman activist, I found it difficult to ask young men to recount incidences of rape. At times, men did not see acts of gang rape as rape, claiming that girls ‘wanted it too’. Some of my interlocutors said girls should know what would happen when accepting invitations to drink with a group of men. A girl who accepts such an invitation is seen as a \textit{bispak} (abbreviation of \textit{bisa dipakai}, literally can be used, meaning can be fucked). Young men did not recognize the practice of gang rape as a form of sexual violence; they used euphemisms such as ‘pump it together’, ‘queued sex’ or ‘gangbang’.

To some degree, this reveals how practices of sexual violence have shaped men’s subjectivities; men often do not perceive gender violence as such, but rather feel entitled to commit it. Many felt that it is their ‘right’ to be violent towards ‘subversive’ women, for example towards \textit{lonte} women who are seen as sexually free (as we saw in chapter 4). Violence is men’s way to control women and to display their authority over women.

In West Papua, where men dominate the institutions of kinship and marriage, violence is often used to subjugate women within extended families; gender violence takes place in family or kinship domains in which communities do not consider it violence. Shortly after moving to a community near Cendrawasih University, I heard girl screaming in the middle of the night. As she did not stop screaming right away, I went out to see what was happening. The occupants of my boarding house, all young women, were likewise

\(^{19}\) \textit{Lembaga Pemberdayaan dan Pengkajian Perempuan dan Anak Papua} (Institute for Empowerment and Studies on Papuan Women and Children).
curious. We peeked through the curtain of our window at the house across the street but could not see anything. But I knew whose voice it was. It was Ruth, a 15-year-old girl from Biak whom I often met and talked to. Although Ruth was being beaten, no neighbors came to help, and since we could not see anything and did not know what to do, we went back to bed. I met Ruth the next morning, playing with one of her nephews in front of her house. I asked her what she was doing, and she said she was babysitting because the mother, as usual, had gone out. I saw a large bruise around her eye and more bruises on her arms. She did not want to make eye contact with me. I asked her what had happened last night but she did not answer. I then asked her if the bruise (I used the term mata kotak, or square eye) was from last night; she answered yes with a faint smile. I was very uncertain how I should respond. Should I report the case to the police? Should I even be talking to her about the abuse? Should I consult a woman’s organization? I decided to ask the young men in the neighborhood.

One young man said it was a family matter so we should not interfere. If we insisted, the family would be offended and demand that we pay a customary fine (in most cases money). Raymond and Armin, who were close to Ruth’s family, explained the incident to me. They said Ruth had been difficult to control (susah diatur). This is why her father—a former member of parliament for Jayapura city—and her brothers hit her that night, to teach her a lesson. They told me that several weeks earlier, Ruth had run away from home with her much older boyfriend, whom she stayed with for two days. Her father, brothers and relatives all went looking for her. When they learnt where she was, Raymond and Armin were sent to the boyfriend’s place to pick her up. When they arrived, they found that Ruth had slept with the man. Furious, they knocked him out, destroyed his place, and burned his clothes. They warned him not to contact Ruth again. But apparently, Ruth had met him again. So that night, she was beaten.

Ruth’s experience of gender violence points to the wider social and cultural norms surrounding gender that shape the lives and experiences of women in West Papua. It shows how violence is used as an instrument of domination in family and kinship
relations, and how subjugating girls and women reaffirm the honor of the family and the patriarch. The men in Ruth’s family and community justify violence as a response to Ruth’s resistance to the patriarch’s control. Disobedient girls are seen to be insulting and humiliating men who claim authority over her (Merry 2009). These gender norms are woven into the fabric of daily life.

Ideas about male domination enacted through violence have shaped people’s subjectivities. Battering a girl is not perceived as violence, but as giving her a lesson to reaffirm the family’s honor. The acts of violence are one way of asserting men’s authority. When men turn to violence, they are performing masculinity not only for the battered woman but also for other men who assess their masculinity by the performance. The men in Ruth’s family battered her not only as a way of disciplining her but to display to the community that they could control their women.

Gender violence is part of the performance of masculinity that must be repeated and routinized in daily life. The longer I lived in the community, the more I witnessed gender violence. Another night, I heard Ruth’s sister-in-law being beaten by her husband. Rumor had it that her husband did not like her hanging around with the boys in the community, drinking alcohol and smoking weed while leaving their son at home. When he hit her, I heard her scream that he did not provide for her and has not fully paid the bride price to her family.

Gender violence also occurs in courtship. Evin, a 24-year-old woman from Wamena whom I introduced in chapter 4, told me how her then-boyfriend Kris abused her. They had been in an on-and-off relationship for almost a year before getting married. Each time Kris grew jealous, he hit her. Evin would then run away and avoid him for some time, but somehow they always got back together. One day Evin realized she was pregnant and informed Kris about this. He told her that he did not want the baby for he wasn’t ready to have a family. She became furious and said it was sinful for a Christian to say that. She kept her pregnancy and did not talk about it again. One night they slept together
after a tiring day at Evin’s rented room. Kris turned off the light and locked the door, to allow them to sleep better, he said. Evin fell asleep but then woke up to an acute pain in her belly. She was shocked to find Kris standing on her belly. When she tried to get up, he choked her and said he did not want the baby. She cried and asked him to go. Some days later, she flew from Jayapura to Wamena to live with her parents. In Wamena, she did not tell her father that she was pregnant. She said that her father, a respected public figure in Wamena, could kill her because she was pregnant without a partner instead of being a college student as he wanted. But her mother accepted her pregnancy and took care of her. Sadly, when her pregnancy entered the sixth month, Evin had a miscarriage. She was devastated. But later, Evin decided to marry Kris after his family paid compensation for the miscarriage. After their marriage, violence continued to be a part of everyday domestic life.

Young women regardless of their cultural and socio-economic backgrounds can become victims of gender violence. Ruth and Evin had fathers of stature yet became victims of gender violence. Papuan young women with lower social status were even more vulnerable. There were also cases of gender violence among the Indonesian settlers. I was told by a researcher at Cendrawasih University that a Moluccan high school girl in his neighborhood had experienced queued sex (*seks antri*). He said the girl went out for drinks with some boys and passed out in the drinking group and ended up waking up naked in a motel room with her vagina wounded.

**Ethnic tensions and military oppression in gender violence**

Gender violence is located in a particular set of social relations, including ethnic relations. In West Papua, cases of gender violence at times reveal the tensions between ethnic groups. When my friend was sexually assaulted in a public space by a Highlander, her narrative, and that of her relatives, quickly shifted to how Highlanders did not know custom (*tidak tahu adat*) and could not control their sexual drives. Highlanders were often
accused of sexually assaulting women in Jayapura and Sentani; their sexuality was considered to be dangerous and uncontrollable. I often heard allegations and rumors about how Highlanders kidnapped and raped women in Jayapura and Sentani. Both coastal Papuans and Indonesian settlers often warned me to be wary of Highlanders.

The demonization of Highlanders’ sexuality reveals the interethnic tensions in Jayapura. There is an ethnic hierarchy among Papuans, with coastal Papuans claiming superiority over Highlanders (Slama & Munro 2015). But it is the latter who are seen as threats to women.

In addition to the interethnic tensions, West Papua has been a theatre of military operations since the Indonesian occupation in 1962, and this has colored gender violence in the province. The long history of armed conflict has rendered the presence of Indonesian military bases and troops highly visible in Jayapura and its surrounding areas. With the influx of soldiers, sexual relationships between soldiers and Papuan women were unavoidable (Butt et al. 2002a; Butt, Numbery & Morin 2002b). There are numerous stories of Indonesian soldiers dating or marrying Papuan girls and then leaving them. And as has been documented in numerous reports and studies, soldiers are often the perpetrators of sexual violence against Papuan women (Brundige et al. 2004; Capriati 2016; Kirksey 2012; Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan et al. 2010).

In the field, I found Indonesian soldiers with their uniforms and weapons inclined to show off their force. When I was travelling to a village near Papua New Guinea with Desy and three other interlocutors (a female and two males), our car was stopped by soldiers at a checkpoint. The soldiers with their rifles asked the driver to show his identity card and then asked for cigarettes. When they saw girls inside the car, they asked us to get out of the car. None of us obeyed. They said they would not let the car pass until one of us gave our phone number and promised to go out with them. One of them laughingly rocked our car. One of the women, Elsa, a 23-year-old woman from Biak, began to shake,
terrified. Desy took the initiative to ease the situation, talking to the soldiers and lightly teasing them. Not long after, an approaching car prompted the soldiers to let us go. Elsa said that she had been afraid of the Indonesian military since childhood, when she had heard a shooting. Although her grandfather was an Indonesian soldier, she perceived the Indonesian military as cruel. From this experience, I learnt how easy it is for soldiers, even the low-ranking ones, to abuse their power, threatening young women for their sexual interest.

The display of militarized masculinity affects how young men enact masculinity. Some young men aspired to be Indonesian soldiers, proudly appropriating military attire such as the camouflage-pattern uniforms, rifles, and knives (some young men who were not soldiers displayed their pictures on Facebook wearing army uniforms and carrying a gun or a military knife). But the impact of militarized masculinity is not limited to the attire. The violence of the Indonesian security forces is visible in daily life, creating both direct and indirect threats of violence against women.

**Women’s Resistance in Daily Life**

Just as women become victims of gender violence on a daily basis, girls and women resist in daily life as well. Women’s resistance is not only a survival form but also a remaking of the social world (Das 2007). Resistance to repetitive violent events in domestic and public spheres forms an alternative mode of femininity. Evin showed me that even in the confines of her violent marriage, she did not stay silent and refused to accept her husband’s domination. She sought ways to prevent violence as well as alternative ways to fulfill her desire for companionship and sexual pleasure, showing me that young women are capable of navigating male aggression in the city. She said that women living in Jayapura must display their bravery to men and be physically strong so that men will think twice before making trouble. Evin, Ruth, and other young women show how they must continuously challenge and resist men’s power. Just as gender norms that subjugate
women are stitched into daily life, women’s resistance to male domination takes the form of everyday confrontation. Young women become subjects who are able to rework the limits of the social (Martin 2007).

Community Clashes, Indonesian Military Oppression, and Precarity in Jayapura

At the beginning of my fieldwork, when I discussed the frequent incidences of community clashes creating insecurities in West Papua with my interlocutors, some told me that the riots exaggerated the sense of insecurity living in Jayapura. For them, the leading source of insecurity was the drunk men with knives and choppers blocking the roads, demanding money and valuables from passers-by. This was why many of my male interlocutors armed themselves with folded knives and knuckle knives. I, too, experienced having my bag grabbed and being stopped in a minibus by a drunk man demanding money. But others argued that the real perpetrators of violence in West Papua are the Indonesian military, not the drunks or those who create the community clashes.

Violence was omnipresent in the everyday lives of young men in Jayapura. The incidents of chaos, road blocks, and snatchings interlock in the precarity fueled by limited access to cash and steady employment as well as tensions between ethnic groups and between Papuans and settlers. Violent encounters between men of different ethnicities were often driven by unemployment, poverty, and economic inequality. Violence also erupted in the clash between the Indonesian security forces and Papuan resistance to state oppression. In this section I wish to illustrate how all of this everyday violence is related to the structural violence of the Indonesian state in the era of special autonomy.

As I mentioned in chapter 2, the proliferation of violence in everyday life is related to the poverty and social inequality in which Papuans desperately seek access to the cash economy. Following the implementation of special autonomy in 2001, Papua province
continues to be the poorest in Indonesia, with policies only benefiting a few Papuan elites. Most Papuan young men continue to be trapped in precarious circumstances—without jobs, relying on the new ‘big men’ for jobs and projects, or involved in urban criminality through thieving, snatching, and blocking roads.

The cash economy has also brought conflicts over land ownership between clans as well as between clans and the local government. As the old land-based subsistence economy is no longer sufficient to provide for the family and to purchase modern consumer goods, the Papuans of Sentani and Jayapura who still own land can sell or rent it. While numerous land ownership disputes revolve around concessions for mining, forestry, plantation, and other activities (Anderson 2015), these disputes are rooted in the longer history of the central government and the military expropriating land in West Papua (Anderson 2015; Glazebrook 2008; Timmer 2015), alienating the Papuans from their land. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Papuans have been much more active in reclaiming their land (Timmer 2015), leading to numerous conflicts over land ownership. According to the National Violence Monitoring System, 33 conflicts in Papua province in 2014 alone led to 15 deaths and 272 injuries (Habibie Center 2014).

I found laying claim to land to be a strategy among Papuans to access money, one that produced a sense of insecurity among indigenous as well as Indonesian settlers. Some Papuans extorted money from Indonesian settlers or other Papuans by claiming to be an *Ondoafi*, the customary leader who according to custom owns the land. In an extreme case in December 2016, a public elementary school was sealed off by a man who claimed to own the land; his demand for payment from the school led to its closing. Such claims to land ownership often lead to open conflict.
Disputes over land ownership also occurred between coastal Papuans and Highlanders, with migrant Highlanders occupying and claiming ownership of Jayapura and Sentani ulayat land (customary land). Many coastal Papuans said that since the implementation of special autonomy, and in particular since the Highlander Lukas Enembe was elected the governor of Papua province in 2013, there has been a wave of people from the highlands to Jayapura and Sentani seeking a better life. Enembe’s success prompted coastal Papuans to reassert their control over land, fueling further tensions between coastal Papuans and Highlanders.
The tensions between Highlanders and coastal Papuans are not only caused by disputes over land. They are also the result of military oppression by the Indonesian state. According to Chauvel (2003), the exodus from the highlands has been fueled by conflict between the Highlanders on one side and the security forces and settlers (Indonesian and coastal Papuans) on the other, which has been growing since 2000. Chauvel (2003a) further argues that the violence in the highlands was actually the Indonesian security forces’ attempt to redirect local politics from the demand for independence towards inter-ethnic conflict. In any case, the exodus from the highlands intensifies tensions between coastal Papuans and Highlanders in Jayapura, with the conflict between them possibly encouraged by the Indonesian state (see Chauvel 2003).

The term Highlanders (orang gunung) is a general term to refer to people who come from the central highlands of West Papua. While the area is populated by numerous ethnic groups, people in Jayapura seem to lump them into a single category: orang gunung. The Highlanders were notoriously labeled by the coastal and Indonesian settlers as ‘triple M’—mabuk (drinking), mencuri/penipu (thieving/scamming), and memperkosa (raping)—and blamed for crimes that often ended in local inter-ethnic chaos. The ethnic group most
marginalized from accessing political and economic resources, Highlanders were also the most stigmatized as backwards. Coastal Papuans indeed continue to dominate local government institutions (Anderson 2015), perpetuating the hierarchy among Papuans (Slama & Munro 2015).

In order to survive, some Highlanders in Jayapura turn to thieving and armed robbery. When incidents result in death or injury, large riots can ensue, with coastal Papuans and Indonesian settlers retaliating against the broader Highlander community. When I was in the field, I encountered at least three riots involving Highlanders in Jayapura and Sentani. In August 2015, a riot lasted for three days in Abepura, an area near Cendrawasih University. Numerous rumors were circulating. One version had it that a Highlander caught stealing a motorcycle had killed two men in a housing complex. Enraged, residents of the housing complex took revenge on the adjacent Highlander settlement, burning houses to the ground. But the riot did not stop there. It quickly escalated because one of the two men killed was a Moluccan. In a very short time, members of Moluccan communities in Jayapura and Sentani had gathered wearing red bandanas as a symbol of war. Although they sought to hunt down the murderer, it later appeared that they attacked any Highlander in Abepura. Some of my informants living in the housing complex told me that they too were ready to fight the Highlanders with axes and choppers. Normality returned only as the police and military secured the area. The Ondoafi of the Abepura area urged people to avoid violence. On the third day, the crowds had dissipated and public transportation was operating again.

Some weeks later, a joint military and police base (Pos Gabungan TNI-Polri) was built between the housing complex and the Highlanders’ settlement. Some of my interlocutors told me that they had mixed feelings. On the one hand, they felt more secure. On the other, they came under the surveillance of the Indonesian security forces. Some said that the Highlanders’ settlement was where some West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat/KNPB—a liberation movement) members resided. There was suspicion that this clash—as well as other incidents of inter-ethnic violence in Jayapura—
was orchestrated by the Indonesian state in its effort to suppress the independence struggle. In any case, the Indonesian state’s response revealed its high-handed security approach to restoring the peace, ignoring the political and economic concerns of the Papuan underclass as well as the tensions between the Highlanders on one side and coastal Papuans and Indonesian settlers on the other. This is a form of structural violence in which the Indonesian state maintains the conflictual relations between ethnic groups.

Figure 29. Burning houses in the Highlanders settlements in the Organda riot of August 2015. Source: Hendrik Ford.

The presence of the Indonesian military in West Papua is massive and has only increased in the era of special autonomy. Alongside the efforts of the Indonesian state to accelerate development in the provinces of Papua and West Papua, the numbers of police and military combat units have skyrocketed (Supriatma 2013). The ratio of Indonesian soldiers to the population in Papua and West Papua provinces is 1 to 162, much higher than the national ratio of 1 to 558 (Supriatma 2013).
The intensification of military operations aims to suppress the independence movement in Jayapura, the center of economic and political life in West Papua. The West Papua National Committee did not disband after the granting of special autonomy to the province, and the conflict between the movement and the Indonesian security forces leads to frequent incidents of open violence. Other incidents are attributed to ‘mysterious persons’ (orang tidak dikenal) whom many people assume are Indonesian military or guerillas. ‘Mysterious persons’ were behind the shootings of both security personnel and ordinary civilians (Supriatma 2013). I also heard of stabbings and incidents of hit and run committed by mysterious persons, including one that killed a human rights activist in 2016. The term mysterious persons is known since the New Order era, when many indigenous interlocutors said they were afraid of leaving their homes due to rumors of shootings by mysterious perpetrators. But now they felt safer. It seems that the Indonesian security forces now target human rights activists and liberation movements rather than civilians.

Many of my interlocutors—activists as well as non-activists—had experienced violent attacks by the Indonesian security forces. Nico from Biak, and Jerry from Serui, both in their 30s, recounted how a demonstration they were involved in was provoked by the Indonesian security forces. In what later turned into the ‘bloody Uncen tragedy’ (tragedi Uncen berdarah), they had to hide overnight in a kangkung garden near the campus, waiting in terror for the military and police to leave. Other young men who were Uncen undergraduate students at the time recounted how the Third Papuan People’s Congress

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20 Robert Jitmau (Rojit) died on May 20, 2016. His dead body was found on the street and the police claimed he was a victim of a hit and run. Many did not believe this claim and the National Human Rights Commission will investigate the case (Sitanggang 2016).

21 There were also cases of the Indonesian police raiding student dormitories in Jayapura (students were accused of an attack on a police station in 2000). The raid killed three students; 90 were detained (Chauvel 2003). Such incidents show how abuses by the Indonesian security forces are part of everyday violence for young people in Jayapura.

22 This tragedy in 2006 led to the deaths of four members of the security forces and the injury of numerous students and civilians (Anon 2006b).
(Kongres Rakyat Papua Ketiga)\textsuperscript{23} in 2011—the congress that demanded a referendum for Papuans—ended in chaos and violent attacks by the Indonesian security forces. Some then had to hide in a locked-down shopping mall. Other Uncen graduate students told me how they had witnessed the killing of Mako Tabuni, the deputy chairman of the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) in 2012. They recounted how Tabuni was shot in the middle of a busy intersection by four armed men in a jeep wearing black outfits. One of the men fired twice; the blood was flowing from Tabuni’s body and people in panic ran into the open kiosks. Another armed man dragged Tabuni into the jeep, which quickly left the scene. It was later believed that Tabuni was killed by Densus 88, the police anti-terror detachment (Supriatma 2013).\textsuperscript{24} When I was in the field in October 2015, graduate students told me they had witnessed the arrest of Catholic priests holding a demonstration in Jayapura demanding an investigation of the Paniai shootings of 2014.\textsuperscript{25}

The military operations in West Papua, which involve a range of intelligence operations to fight the separatist movements (Supriatma 2013), damage the social fabric of communities. In the field, I found that the term ‘intel’ (intelligence) was often used to label someone—it could be anyone, a student, a driver, a street vendor, or a petty criminal—who was acting suspiciously. Early on in my fieldwork, a young man in my neighborhood accused me of being an intel, saying that I had to prove that I was, in fact, a student from Amsterdam. Intel stories circulated through neighborhoods and campuses. Sometimes, a stranger would come to a young men’s hangout spot in my neighborhood asking questions. My interlocutors said he is a babinsa, a non-commissioned army intelligence at the sub-district and village level. Whether the man

\textsuperscript{23} The Third Papuan’s People Congress was the third major assembly of Papuan leaders and representatives held on October 17-19, 2011 in Jayapura at University of Cendrawasih in which it was stated that the Papuans rejected the sovereignty of Indonesia over Papua and proclaimed the Federal State of West Papua (Widjojo 2012a).

\textsuperscript{24} Tabuni was not the only KNPB activist shot in 2012. In that year alone, 22 KNPB activists were killed by the Indonesian security forces in West Papua (Supriatma 2013).

\textsuperscript{25} The Catholic priests and journalists were threatened at gunpoint by the security forces (Himawan 2015). In the Paniai case, four students were allegedly killed by the military in a demonstration (Ambarita 2014).
was indeed a *babinsa* or not, people were aware of ongoing intelligence operations which created fear and suspicion, even in daily interpersonal interactions.

Rumors have the power to reproduce political violence. They emerge in response to violence, feed off experiences of state oppression (Butt 2005), and fuel terror (Kirsch 2002). Rumors of intelligence agents and feelings of fear and distrust are products of political and structural violence. Manifested in life-threatening violence against families and communities, structural violence tears at the fabric of everyday life, causing people to mistrust their social world (Martin 2007).

In the era of special autonomy, the Indonesian state has created and recreated many forms of everyday violence in West Papua. The violence is structural, operating as a social machinery of oppression attacking the self-respect of indigenous Papuans (Farmer 2004). Oppression since the Indonesian occupation in 1962 has materialized in many forms, often masked under the banner of development. For example, the military’s *koteka* (penis gourd) operation in the early 1970s sought to abolish the penis gourd and grass skirts in order to ‘civilize’ the Papuans (Butt 2005; Glazebrook 2008; Sugandi 2008). But the imagery of primitive Papuans continues to inform development projects such as in HIV/AIDS prevention (Butt 2005), in education (Munro 2013), in economic institutions (Slama & Munro 2015), and in tourism (Stasch 2015).

The denigration of the penis gourd and grass skirts, the demonization of Papuan sexuality, and the perpetuation of the image of primitive Papuans constitute symbolic violence. They are designed to assault self-respect and to humiliate, to show indigenous peoples that what is most important to them is worthless, outdated, and powerless (Sahlins 2005). It is more than a feeling as it is inflicted by institutions (Robbins 2005). It is a form of structural violence embedded in symbols and structures.

Amidst the marginalization and oppression, Uncen students turned to protesting human rights abuses, the failures of special autonomy, and continuing injustices in social, political, and economic spheres through demonstrations, often blocking the main
entrance to the campus and dismissing classes. Some were also members of the West Papua National Committee under the organization of the Alliance of West Papua Students (Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua/AMP). Those who were not involved in student activism, like Freddy, Leo, and his friends, expressed their resistance through hip-hop songs. Below is an excerpt from one of their songs mocking Indonesian propaganda and military abuse:

Who do you think you are?
You can spread the false news
I do not have to respect you
Who do you think you are?
You’re sensitive, I’m relaxed, but for sure
I give the symbol, I get results
Without negotiating, your card will fall
Get ready to get lost
And one by one will begin to come to love instead of being forced
You are indoctrinating people, pitting the sheep
Your way is wrong, you will lose
Just ask the mirror you will get the answer there
Look at me now, I’m slow but for sure
Not over yet, will not die, you are slaughtering, I’m relaxed
Bird-of-paradise will begin to fly
Raising the morning star on the way to the throne

The song equates Indonesian propaganda to spreading ‘false news’. Indeed, Indonesia grants limited access to foreign journalists who wish to report on the situation in West Papua (RSF 2017). The song also declares that the abused Papuans are not afraid; they will slowly rise and regain their independence as symbolized by the Bird of Paradise flying with the morning star flag.

Nico in some ways echoed the song above. He told me that the Papuans will resist in the midst of abuses as they are not as strong as the Indonesian military forces. He said he keeps dreaming that one day by the power of Christ, the morning star flag will rise over West Papua and the Indonesian military and settlers will all be gone. It seems that the
Indonesian security forces and their abuses have left deeper marks on the lives of young men in West Papua than the implementation of special autonomy.

Acts of resistance arise out of the repetitive and multiple violations of Papuan human rights. The student organizations, demonstrations, and the liberation movement were all dominated by young men, with acts of defending the land of West Papua becoming part of the performance of masculinity, perhaps related to enduring gender scripts that place men as warriors who protect the clan’s territory (Widjojo 2012). Although I did not specifically study how gender plays out within student activism or the liberation movement, I found that the demonstrations at Uncen were always dominated by male student activists who projected themselves as brave and heroic Papuan men. Emerging from experiences of military violence, this was also a form of alternative manhood that young men could easily imagine.

Figure 30. Student demonstration rejecting special autonomy in front of the Papua provincial parliament building in 2015. Photo by author.
Young men in West Papua are exposed to the precariousness of life, and the violence and the blatant display of brutality and death inform the identity of Papuans as an endangered nation. Narratives of Papuan extinction (*kepunahan*) circulated in local government meetings, political speeches, the independence movement, and the local mass media. These narratives addressed the number of Papuans killed by the Indonesian security forces as well as by diseases, including social diseases (*penyakit sosial*) such as drinking alcohol and interpersonal conflict.

The narratives of extinction lead to narratives of genocide circulated by liberation movements and indigenous peoples, not only when condemning abuses by the military (King 2006) but when addressing the high rate of HIV and AIDS (Butt 2005). The proportion of indigenous Papuans in the province has indeed been declining. In 1959, less than 2% of the population in West Papua was non-Papuan. This rose to 4% in 1971 and 35% in 2000 (Widjojo et al. 2008). In some transmigration areas, Indonesian settlers...
easily outnumber Papuans. Arso, a district in a regency bordering Jayapura city, is home to 19,000 Indonesian settlers and 1,000 Papuans (Sugandi 2008). And as I recounted in chapter 2, Indonesian settlers dominate the economy of West Papua. Unfavorable demographic trends and the economic dominance of Indonesian settlers have fueled among Papuans a sense of losing control over their homeland (Chauvel 2003a).

In these precarious circumstances, many young men were aggrieved by their inability to find work, make money, and to provide for their families—the ideal masculinity. Raymond was one of them. He told me that he often felt devastated (hancur) and powerless (tidak berdaya). Some older men also expressed fears that their descendants would die off without resources to survive in urban Jayapura.

Life in West Papua is full of uncertainties that encourage young men to rework their understandings of what life is, and what is possible within it. Reworking their gendered personhood is part of this project of engaging with violence in everyday life (Das 2007). To engage with precarity, to be vulnerable and to grieve, should not be mistaken for becoming submissive or powerlessness; rather, the experience of precariousness can lead to new subject formations (Butler 2004b). In this way, I see Butler’s idea of bodies and subjectivity here parallels Strathern’s dividual, whose unbounded boundaries of personhood are defined through relations—in this case, through relations of violence.

Previous studies in Melanesia have linked violent models of masculinity to traditional gender scripts and rituals of manhood as well as to the social, political and economic transformations of the region. For example, while male violence is seen as a continuation of past practices, it is also attributed to the attempts of marginalized indigenous men to weaken the effects of colonialism and to counteract increasing inequality and failures of the state (Macintyre 2008; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2012). But the question remains: how do shifting contexts transform young men’s modalities of personhood towards violent ones?

Drawing upon Strathern’s concept of the dividual and previous studies on the violence of everyday life (Das 2000, 2007; Kleinman 2000; Scheper-Hughes 2004), I perceive the
omnipresence of violence in contemporary West Papua province as one that permeates people’s subjectivity. People’s identities are constituted and reconstituted through their relations with violent events. Threatened by diminishment, young men seek ways to resist and to recover their sense of power. One way is to join the political resistance, where they perform a heroic and brave masculinity. But not all men were willing to risk their lives or interested in activism. Some sought to restore their sense of power via gender violence.

Gender violence is one of the ways to deal with the structural violence that denies young men access to ‘ideal’ masculinities (as the backbone of the family, see chapter 2). Through gender violence, young men perform the strong and powerful body and antagonistic manhood that were valued in the past (see chapters 3 and 4). This alternative manhood is *jago* masculinity—a kind of masculinity that flourishes under the precarious circumstances brought forth by the structural violence of the Indonesian state.

John, a 29-year-old occasional ganja smuggler, embodied *jago* masculinity. I often saw him drunk, asking money from passers-by. His friends said that his life was messy (*kacau*) and that he was often involved in fights and had knifed someone. Once when he was drunk, he told me that he is a *jagoan*, not afraid of the police and above the law. His friends told me how his wife and their baby had left him due to his violent behavior and inability to support the family. When I him asked about this, John told me that he would find a highly paid job in the highlands and that his wife would soon return.

On another occasion, John bragged how his big penis had caused a high school girl to bleed after having sex. He had tried various penis enhancement practices, and at our meetings he would often ask me to buy him wipe tissues. He sought to resolve his social and economic disadvantages as well as his personal problems of being a good man for his family by resorting to violent acts and displaying his virility and sexual prowess. As he said, the big penis and strong sexual performances show that he is manly (*jantan*). They become means to reassert his sense of power and authority as a man.
For John and many other young men, the body project of penis enlargement is a means to construct a strong, virile manhood, a performance of masculinity rooted in their uncertain lives in Jayapura city. Young men drifted between their desires to be the backbone of the family or to achieve the status of new big men (as in chapter 2) and the ongoing structural violence that marginalized, brutalized, and diminished them. With Indonesian development projects often failing to deliver basic needs as well as opportunities, many Papuan men struggled to redefine themselves within the process of modernization and the changing political, economic, and social spaces brought by special autonomy.

Young men turn to their body to work on their (gendered) personhood. In particular, they construct jago masculinities in which bodies and sexuality are central. Young men narrated how enlarging the penis is their attempt to become a jago and to be recognized by his peers as one. The big penis is a desired trait of jago masculinity. To be able to display sexual prowess through prolonged sex, multiple sex partners, and to perform domination over women’s sexuality also mark jago performances of masculinity.

At times, to be manly and jago means to be able to perform punitive sex. A jago often uses acts of violence to establish his power so that he can ‘develop name’ (Wilson 2012). I likewise found developing name or gaining reputation and recognition (‘nama naik’) to be central to jago masculinities in Jayapura. Nama naik is achieved through performances in front of other men and women: displaying the power of the body as well as power over women, which often involves gender violence.

Jago masculinities are formed out of relations with things (particularly bodies and the technologies of chemical sexuality), other people, and places. The practices of penis enhancement in chapter 3 revealed how young men enact jago masculinity. Being a Jago is performative. Doing is not only constituting; it must also be displayed in relations. Practicing penis enlargement in peer groups and publically displaying violence against women are examples of performances of jago masculinity.
Jago in urban Indonesia is a term to describe a type of local strongman who is notorious (‘punya nama’) in a particular place or lahan (Wilson 2012). In my study, such places included young men’s physical spaces in urban Jayapura such as kos, dorms, and mabes where young men live together, as well as emotional, social, and cultural spaces where young men build solidarity (as in chapter 3). The notion of place here also entails a complex set of relations of domination and subordination (McDowell 2005), including male domination over women and the structural violence of the state. As Wilson (2012) argues, being a jago is a way to claim respect and gain social status with limited resources, a product of social constraint. Jago masculinity is constructed through relations with structural violence and enacted through domination over women.

Place in a broader sense includes the long duration of structural violence in West Papua as the province is torn apart through the Papuan struggle for independence and the Indonesian state’s reliance on its security forces to maintain the territory at all costs. Within this context, jago masculinities emerge from young men’s experiences of precariousness, from their efforts find a way to incorporate the impact of violence in their everyday lives. Being a jago is not only a mode of survival but a mode of remaking the social world through repetitive violent acts over time (Das 2007). Jago masculinities are both dividual and individual modes of masculinity. It is dividual as it is a nexus of relations with things, others (including women to subjugate), and places (including their structural violence). Simultaneously, it is also an individual mode of manhood as it has the capacity to autonomously forge new lives in the midst of precariousness.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have illustrated how precarious transformations in West Papua—suffused by structural and everyday violence—constitute a specific type of manhood: that of jago masculinity. Jago masculinities are composed through practices related to things, others, and places. Being a jago is performative, and it is often enacted through gender violence.
Gender violence is part of a performance of masculinity that must be repeated and routinized in daily life. Given the long duration of conflict and precariousness, gender violence is likely to take on the colors of everyday violence and be accepted as such. This chapter has shown how gender violence is routinized in everyday life, including in intimate and interpersonal relationships.

_Jago_ masculinities are a form of manhood composed through relations with structural violence. They emerge from young men’s experiences of precariousness, from conditions in which the lives of young men are continuously marginalized, brutalized, and annihilated. _Jago_ masculinity is a product of social constraint, a way to embed the impact of structural violence in everyday life. More than a mode of survival, it is a mode of remaking the social world, a world that is possible in the context of precarity. _Jago_ masculinities are both dividual and individual modes of masculinity. It is dividual as it needs women to compose itself while enfolding the results of structural violence. At the same time, it is individual as it encourages young men to be autonomous actors when navigating conditions of precarity.
Conclusion

This chapter concludes this dissertation by outlining the main contributions of the previous ethnographic chapters to answering my main research questions: How is a particular kind of masculinity constituted by the practices of chemical sexuality? How do chemical practices enable young men to perform their bodies in and through relations with others? And to what extent are these notions and performances of masculinity shaped by contexts of precarity? In this dissertation, I examined the practices of chemical sexuality as a lens to understand emerging masculinities in contemporary West Papua.

My ethnographic fieldwork in Jayapura and Sentani revealed that young men pursue a wide range of chemical practices to achieve their desired gendered personhood. The kind of masculinity that I found emerging from the practices of chemical sexuality is a phenomenon I have termed jago masculinity.

The societal transformations brought by the Indonesian state and the social forces of modernity have undermined traditional social relationships and modes of personhood. These developments have created space for new norms for gender and sexuality to emerge, enabling alternative ways to experience and perform sex and gender. In this new context, the use of chemicals for the purposes of bodily and sexual enhancement is part of the formation of gendered personhood, which continues to be defined through relations. Jago masculinity is a form of relational gendered personhood, constituted through relations with other persons, with heterosexuality, with chemical sexualities, and with precarious places.

Chemical sexualities are a window not only on the construction of masculinities, but on the transformations of the social fabric of West Papua due to the forces of modernity and the practices of the Indonesian state. In what follows, I sum up the main conclusions of this dissertation.
Doing Chemical Sexualities, Becoming a *Jago*

I defined chemical sexualities as the chemical practices of young men to manage their bodies and sexual performance. These practices constitute their gendered personhood; by doing chemical sexualities, young men perform virile *jago* manhood. The big penis and sexual prowess signify them as being champions among their peers, capable of sexually dominating women.

We encountered these dominant, virile, heterosexual masculinities in all the chapters of this dissertation. In chapter 1, we saw how the use of sex and penis enhancement products reproduces notions of virile, heterosexual masculinity. In their advertisements and packaging, these products—popularly known as *obat kuat* or virility medicine—promise to improve the size and capacity of the penis so as to overcome crises of masculinity. *Obat kuat* can be seen as (sexual) enhancement technologies, the use of which inform a person’s identity (Elliott 2011). I found young men’s use of enhancement technologies to be fueled by—and reproducing—notions of sex, gender, and sexuality that reassert hegemonic notions of virile masculinity.

Chemical sexualities are made up of practices in everyday life that both constitute and are constituted by broader social life. Chapter 1 illustrated how the muscular body, big penis, and potent sexual performance are important dimensions of virile masculinity. Young men turn to the practices of chemical sexuality to display their physicality and bodily performance—to be seen and known as *jago* by others. Chapter 1 further revealed that some sexual enhancement practices have long histories in West Papua, such as *bungkus* practices to enhance the penis. But why do body projects that focus on the penis remain so prominent today?

As I recounted in chapter 2, the traditional notion of the big man as the embodiment of an ideal masculinity has broken down. Young men in contemporary West Papua seek access to the cash economy and positions in the social, political, and economic institutions brought by the Indonesian state. Traditional big men must adapt to these changes too. In
the era of special autonomy, the new big men of West Papua are those who succeed under
the new circumstances. However, only a minority of young men can gain positions in the
new institutions. Since the policies of special autonomy only benefit an elite minority,
many young men are left in situations of socio-economic precarity. Unable to access or
accumulate real wealth, they turn to bodily and sexual performance to reassure their
manhood. The form of masculinity that remains most readily accessible to many young
men is what I have termed *jago* masculinity.

In chapter 3, I zoomed in on how young men do chemical sexualities in urban Jayapura.
Through the practices of chemical sexuality, young men perform *jago* masculinities,
constituted in relations with male peers and places. The practices are done collectively in
young men’s places such as boarding houses and dorms, where to be part of the collective
and to be seen as manly, young men participate in practices that include the collective
rituals of penis enhancement.

The practices of chemical sexuality, in particular those of penis enhancement, have long
historical roots; they are also products of specific social relations among young men in a
particular time and place. Place here is not merely a particular location but an amalgam
of socio-economic structures and relations (Massey 1994). Place contains the history and
power structures that shape ongoing relations and practices. In West Papua, it embraces
the history of men’s houses, past rituals of masculinity, ideas of penis growth and the big
man.

The idea that the penis has to be grown to become a big man—a strong and powerful
man—endures. Young men turn to the practices of penis enhancement to become a *jago*.
Through the repetitive doings of chemical sexualities, young men are performing and
constituting *jago* masculinities. Young men who have smaller penises will be mocked by
their peers and feel ashamed, prompting them to participate in practices to restore their
self-respect among peers. In this manner, penis enhancement practices become
performances that have to be known by others so that men can be acknowledged as *jago*. 
The practice of penis enhancement facilitated by chemicals is a way of becoming a man and reproduces *jago* masculinities as a transitional manhood on the way to becoming a big man. Becoming a *jago* requires performances as ongoing processes that both construct and are constructed by gender and sexual norms as well as by historical and structural circumstances (West & Zimmerman 2009).

**Chemical Sexualities, Sexual Violence, and Precarity**

*Jago* masculinity is a kind of gendered personhood that emerges in the midst of vast societal transformations in West Papua. As I recounted in chapter 2, notions of ideal masculinity are in flux, giving rise to not only new modes of being a man but also alternative sexual relations and practices. *Jago* masculinities facilitated by chemical use are interwoven with changing gender and sexual norms and practices.

Chapter 4 illustrated how the practices of chemical sexuality are situated in changing notions of masculinity and femininity as well as sexual relations and practices. One emerging type of femininity— that of the free woman who lives away from her family and clan and who can enter into sexual relations at will—is seen to threaten the bridewealth system and traditional notions of womanhood. Misogynistic attitudes towards women’s sexuality continue to persist, as can be gleaned from young men’s narratives of chemical use to punish women through sex or the big penis. Sex thus continues as an avenue for men to retain their sense of power; the practices of chemical sexuality are ways for young men to re-assert strong and virile masculinities in the face of ongoing anxieties and resentment towards their changing environments, economic marginalization, and the growing social and sexual freedoms of women.

In West Papua’s past, gender and sexual relations were framed as antagonistic. The notion of sexual antagonism was produced through the institution of the men’s house and manifested through rituals of manhood and violence against women (Herdt 1997; Herdt & Poole 1982). The formation of masculinity thus depended on the control and
subjugation of women’s sexuality. In contemporary West Papua, gendered personhood continues to be constituted through sexual relations, as sexuality is an important way to display one’s gendered identity. The notion of sexual antagonism today has been transformed, and is driven by modern tensions (Jolly 2000, 2016; Jolly et al. 2012; Lepani 2008; Macintyre 2008; Wardlow 2005, 2006).

As I illustrated in chapter 2, male status now relies on men’s capacity to access the cash economy and to accumulate wealth. If young men are unable to achieve these goals, they seek other ways to restore their status. New forms of gender antagonism emerge that still depend on restraining women’s sexuality and limiting women in the larger cultural and economic domains (Knauft 1997). Jago masculinity thus does not represent a radical rupture from the past; it is an amalgam of past conceptions of manhood and emergent masculinities brought about by the changing society, economics and politics of West Papua.

Jago masculinity is an alternative masculinity accessible to young men in West Papua. In chapter 5, I argued that conditions of precarity shape performances of jago masculinity. Drawing on Butler (2004a), Scheper-Hughes (1992), Das (2007), and Kleinman (2000), I illustrated how jago masculinity is a kind of masculinity that emerges out of precariousness and routinized violence in everyday life. Violent events become part of the everyday, affecting social identities and relations. Given the long history of militarization in West Papua and the proliferation of violence at all levels of society, sexual violence is common. In West Papua, the militarization of society and militarized masculinity coexist with the notion of sexual antagonism, making women more vulnerable to sexual violence—by soldiers, by dominant men, as well as subordinated men.

Being a Jago is performative, and performances often rely on chemical enhancement. The Jago represents both dividual and individual modes of manhood constituted in relations with bodies, chemical sexualities, other men, women, and places. The jago is a
ivial in the sense that he is composed of relations: with the materialities of chemical sexuality as well as the norms of heterosexuality. At the same time, the jago is an individual, a person who actively reworks his subject position in the midst of precarity.

Jago performances of masculinity often entail sexual violence. In the history of jago masculinities in Indonesia, the jago is a violent figure, whose performances often involved acts of gender and sexual violence (Wilson 2012). I do not mean that young men who do chemical sexualities in their performances of jago masculinity always turn to sexual violence. However, as I recounted in chapter 4, the practices of chemical sexuality are often implicated in the sexual subjugation of women, in punitive sex. This kind of sexual violence, I have suggested, is a way of dealing with oppression.

Sexual violence is situated in historical, social, and political processes (Baxi 2014). In this dissertation, I situated sexual violence in the myriad conflicts overwhelming contemporary West Papua. As I recounted in chapter 5, conflicts and insecurities in everyday life can be traced to the military and structural violence of the Indonesian state. Militarism is related to masculinity (Gill 1997; Goett 2015; Merry 2009; Stephen 2008). In particular, militarized notions of masculinity emphasize courageousness, capability, strength, leadership, and patriotic duty to defend the nation (Gill 1997) and are conducive to violence against women including rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence (Merry 2009). Although my research did not specifically interrogate the process of militarization or the construction of militarized masculinity, militarization in West Papua has generated a culture of violence ranging from the violence of combat troops to intimate everyday violence including sexual violence against women (Merry 2009). Sexual violence was normalized through the vernacular used in everyday life, for example masking gang rape in euphemisms such as ‘pump it together’, ‘lock her up’, and ‘one on three’. Building on past and present configurations of social and cultural male dominance, sexual violence is part of the proliferation of violence under militarization (Sanday 2015), leaving women vulnerable to sexual violence perpetrated by the military and the dominant population as well as by subordinated men.
Young men in West Papua in their daily lives are marginalized, brutalized and annihilated by structural violence. Gender and sexual violence become everyday violence and a means for young men to restore their sense of power. Jago masculinities are a form of relational gendered personhood, composed through violent relations with women and facilitated by chemical practices in the context of precarity. Here, doing chemical sexualities is doing gender (Measham 2002) that is doing jago masculinity. Doing chemical sexualities is an alternative way to embody gendered personhood in a precarious and changing society.

In regard to the condition of precarity and changing masculinities, a question which remains is how the context of structural violence shapes the constructions of militarized masculinity in West Papua. The experience of long history of military oppression I believe has generated kinds of masculinities that can be manifested in many ways. Many young Papuan men today aspire to work in the Indonesian army, but at the same time their participations and interests in the liberation movement are also growing. While I showed jago masculinities as the kinds of masculinities that emerge from the practices of chemical sexualities in the context of precarity, there are other kinds of masculinities too shaped in the context of the rapid changing society in West Papua and the enduring condition of precarity which future anthropological inquiries can unfold.
Summary

This dissertation frames the practices of penis and sexual enhancement as a lens through which to understand evolving masculinities in West Papua. Men in West Papua today encounter myriad drugs, foods, drinks, cosmetics, and other substances to enhance their bodies and sexual performance. As Hardon et al. (2013) use the term ‘chemical sexualities’ to describe the phenomenon of young people in Indonesia turning to pharmaceuticals and cosmetics to feel attractive and sexually confident, to increase their sexual stamina, and to transform their bodies, in this dissertation, I define chemical sexualities as the chemical practices of young men to manage their bodies and sexual performance, which in turn constitute gendered personhood.

The question of how the practices of chemical sexuality constitute a particular kind of masculinity is the focus of this thesis. There are three main questions to answer: How is a particular kind of masculinity constituted by the practices of chemical sexuality? How do chemical practices enable young men to perform their bodies in and through relations with others? And as this research took place in West Papua that has a long history of military oppression, I also seek to answer: To what extent are the notions and performances of masculinity shaped by contexts of precarity?

The practices of penis and sexual enhancement in West Papua, embedded in the history of male initiation and beliefs about gender and sexuality, are merging with new technologies, while West Papua’s rapidly changing society and gender norms are opening new opportunities to experiment with alternative forms of sexual relations, pleasures, and products. Examining the chemical practices of young men not only sheds light on their constructions of sexuality and masculinity, but also points to the broader social forces—and in particular, the environments of precarity—that shape their practices. The context of precarity in West Papua, I suggest, fuels young men’s practices of chemical sexuality and their performances of masculinity.
Drawing upon Strathern’s concept of gendered personhood (1988), this dissertation argues that a specific form of masculinity emerges from the practices of chemical sexuality among young men in West Papua, a phenomenon I term jago masculinity. Jago is a form of relational gendered personhood, constituted through relations with other persons, with heterosexuality, with chemical sexualities, and with precarious places.

The concept of jago – literally means a fighting cock – has a trajectory in Indonesian history of masculinity to understand the relations between acts of violence, masculinity, and power. In West Papua, many young men when explaining their practices of chemical sexualities used the term to refer to the masculinity they aspired to: to be a virile man, whose penis and sexual prowess are a champion among peers, capable of dominating women sexually.

The context of precarity in West Papua is largely due to the military and structural violence of the Indonesian state reproducing multiple forms of violence in everyday life. At the same time, the rapid transformations have created precarious circumstances too as they changed traditional institutions, local power structures, gender norms and relations, and interpersonal and intimate relations. Amidst these rapid changes and the enduring structural violence, jago masculinities emerge linked to these precarious circumstances. Jago masculinity is a precarious kind of masculinity constructed through the practices of chemical sexuality within wider—precarious and violent—contexts of society, economy, history and politics.
Samenvatting

In dit proefschrift worden het uitoefenen van penisvergrotingen en het verbeteren van de seksuele prestaties gebruikt als frame om de ontwikkeling van mannelijkheid in West-Papoea te begrijpen. Tegenwoordig worden mannen in West-Papoea blootgesteld aan een grote hoeveelheid medicijnen, voedsel, dranken, cosmetische producten en andere middelen die hun lichaam en seksuele prestatie verbeteren en stimuleren. Aangezien Hardon et al. (2013) de term ‘chemische seksualiteiten’ gebruiken om het fenomeen te beschrijven waarbij Indonesische jongeren geneesmiddelen en cosmetische producten gebruiken om zich aantrekkelijk en seksueel zelfverzekerd te voelen, om hun seksuele uithoudingsvermogen te vergroten en om hun lichamen te transformeren, definieer ik ‘chemische seksualiteit’ in dit proefschrift als de chemische ingrepen van jonge mannen om hun lichamen en seksuele prestaties te beheersen, wat uiteindelijk leidt tot de vorming van gendered personhood.

Dit proefschrift richt zich op de vraag hoe de beoefening van chemische seksualiteit een bepaalde soort mannelijkheid creëert. Er zullen drie hoofdvragen beantwoord worden: hoe wordt een bepaalde soort mannelijkheid gecreëerd door het uitoefenen van chemische seksualiteit? Hoe stellen chemische middelen jonge mannen in staat om hun lichamen te laten presteren in en door relaties met anderen? En aangezien dit onderzoek plaats vond in West-Papoea, een regio met een lange geschiedenis van militaire onderdrukking, tracht ik ook de volgende vraag te beantwoorden: in hoeverre zijn de ideeën ten aanzien van en het uitoefenen van mannelijkheid gevormd door de context van instabiliteit?

Penisvergrotingen en het verbeteren van seksuele prestaties, verschijnselen die ingebed zijn in de West-Papoease geschiedenis van mannelijke inwijding en de houding ten aanzien van geslacht en seksualiteit, komen in aanraking met nieuwe technologieën, terwijl de snel veranderende West-Papoease maatschappij en gendernormen nieuwe mogelijkheden creëren om te experimeneten met alternatieve vormen van seksuele relaties, genot en producten. Het onderzoeken van de chemische ingrepen onder jonge
mannen stelt mij niet alleen in staat om een beeld te vormen van hun constructies van seksualiteit en mannelijkheid, maar wijst ook op bredere sociale krachten – specifieker, een situatie van onzekerheid – die hun gedrag gevormd hebben. Mijn suggestie is dat de onzekere situatie in West-Papoea een stimulans is voor jonge mannen voor chemische ingrepen en het vertonen van mannelijkheid.

Voortbordurend op Stratherns concept van *gendered personhood* (1988), stelt dit proefschrift dat het uitoefenen van chemische seksualiteit door jonge mannen in West-Papoea leidt tot een specifieke vorm van mannelijkheid. Dit fenomeen noem ik *jago mannelijkheid*. *Jago* is een vorm van relationele *gendered personhood*, gevormd onder invloed van relaties met andere personen, heteroseksualiteit, chemische seksualiteit en van precaritair plaatsen.

Het *jago* concept, wat letterlijk vechthaan betekent, werd gebruikt in de Indonesische geschiedenis van de mannelijkheid om de relaties tussen gewelddadigheid, mannelijkheid en kracht te begrijpen. Veel West-Papoease jonge mannen gebruiken de term om te verwijzen naar de mannelijkheid die ze ambiëren: het zijn van een sterke man, wiens penis en seksuele dapperheid ongeëvenaard zijn, in staat om vrouwen seksueel te domineren.

Onzekerheid in West-Papoea komt voort uit het militaire en structurele geweld van de Indonesische staat, wat resulteert in een diversiteit aan geweldsdelicten in het dagelijks leven. Tegelijkertijd hebben de snelle ontwikkelingen in West-Papoea, die geleid hebben tot een verandering in traditionele instituten, lokale machtsstructuren, gendernormen en -relaties en interpersoonlijke en intieme relaties, instabiele omstandigheden gecreëerd. Te midden van deze wereld vol veranderingen en langdurig structureel geweld heeft de *jago* mannelijkheid zich ontwikkeld, gelinkt aan deze onveilige omstandigheden. *Jago* mannelijkheid is een onzekere vorm van mannelijkheid die gevormd is door het uitoefenen van chemische seksualiteit, binnen de wijdere -onveilige en gewelddadige-contexten van de maatschappij, economie, geschiedenis en politiek.
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158


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