Who Leads the Party?

On membership size, selectorates and party oligarchy

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Published in: Political Studies

DOI: 10.1177/0032321716667957

Citation for published version (APA):
Who Leads the Party? On Membership Size, Selectorates and Party Oligarchy

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Abstract
We examine the degree to which party leaders dominate their parties over time and across countries and analyse how leadership domination relates to formal aspects of party organisation. Moreover, we analyse whether antidotes against leadership domination – widening the selectorate and increasing the membership – explain change in leadership domination. For this purpose, we use a new dataset that brings together different sources of party data over time and between countries. We find that leadership domination indeed has increased over time, but still a lot of variation exists between parties. We also demonstrate that widening the selectorate – for example, letting members elect the party leader – and increasing membership boosts leadership domination. In other words, the antidotes against leadership domination do not work.

Keywords
party organisation, party leadership, selectorate, members

Accepted: 9 June 2016

Political parties provide electoral choices in the form of electoral promises about public policies, and they select the candidates who – once elected to office – are expected to implement the policies that were promised. The party organisation, in turn, prescribes how the candidates are selected and which electoral promises are made. From that perspective, it is unsurprising that party organisation has taken such a prominent role in several political science classics (Duverger, 1964; Michels, 1915; Ostrogorski, 1902; Panebianco, 1988; Weber, 2004). These classics mostly had a pessimistic outlook on the effect of the evolution of party organisations on the quality of democracy, particularly regarding the link between the members and the party leadership. Robert Michels (1915) predicted that all parties – no matter how idealistic their origins – are doomed

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to be dominated by the leadership.¹ According to this iron law of oligarchy, the inevitable formalisation and bureaucratisation of parties strengthens the leaders’ position vis-à-vis the party members, allowing the leader or leadership to use the party as a vehicle to pursue their own petty interests (Michels, 1915). In this vision of the evolution of parties, parties shed their ideological roots and become professional electoral machines to better serve the office-seeking ambitions of their leaders (Epstein, 1967; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988). They engage in oligopolistic competition by restricting access for outsiders and reducing political alternatives (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2002) and at the same time the centre of gravity of the party shifts from the party on the ground or the party in central office to the party in public office. This transfers public attention from the party’s core ideology to the party leader and his or her personal qualities, which brings about the process of presidentialisation of party leaders (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). As a consequence or corollary of these developments, members have left parties en masse (Katz et al., 1992), the electorate has stopped identifying with parties (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002), and parties have lost legitimacy and today only ‘rule the void’ (Mair, 2013). Is this pessimism warranted? Do all parties drift towards leadership domination?

A handful of studies have analysed these broad claims and reach somewhat more nuanced conclusions. For example, a study of Danish political parties rejects the claim that in all parties the party in public office has become more important (H. H. Pedersen, 2010a). A comparative study of party membership figures concludes that while total party membership declines, many individual parties in fact have expanded their membership (Kölln, 2016). Several studies demonstrate a clear trend towards the one-member-one-vote system in party leadership elections (Kenig, 2009b; LeDuc, 2001; Scarrow, 1999) and some argue that this actually demonstrates decreasing leadership domination. Others, however, have claimed that involving members in leadership elections leads to more leadership domination (Katz and Mair, 1995). This article tests (1) whether also for leadership domination within parties a more nuanced story is in order, and if so (2) whether variation in leadership domination can be meaningfully explained by differences in intra-party institutions and party membership size. By doing so we also address the question (3) whether changes to certain institutional designs or a rejuvenation of membership-based party organisations can effectively counter the trend towards leadership domination.

Before we continue, we need to define leadership domination. According to Angelo Panebianco (1988), party leaders differ in their degree of freedom of choice, meaning that in some parties leaders effectively determine party policy in all aspects (candidate selection, platform construction, goal formulation), whereas in other parties the rank-and-file, mid-level activists, trade unions or other potential veto players limit the degree of freedom of choice for the party leader and thereby influence one or more aspects of party policy. In other parties, the influence of members and activists is so large that the party leader has no degree of freedom of choice. Schumacher et al. (2013) propose to conceptualise this as a scale, with on one end parties that are leadership-dominated and on the other end parties that are activist-dominated. Using an expert survey (Laver and Hunt, 1992) they demonstrate that many parties are in the middle, where a balance of power exists between the leader and different intra-party elements. What is still lacking in the literature is a temporal perspective on leadership domination and an exposition of how the measure correlates with formal party organisation measures. This is what this study contributes to the state-of-the-art. By tracing parties from the 1960s to the 2000s, we are able to evaluate whether a trend towards leadership domination can be discerned.
This article employs a new comparative dataset to systematically analyse trends in leadership domination of parties and the determinants of this development (Giger and Schumacher, 2015). The classics (e.g. Duverger, 1964; Kirchheimer, 1966; Michels, 1915) draw conclusions from a reading of developments in one party or a few parties. Contemporary accounts of party organisation make more systematic use of party organisation data, such as membership figures (Van Haute et al., 2015), candidates or leadership selection methods (Bille, 2001; Cross and Blais, 2011; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Lundell, 2004), party organisational structure and finance (Katz and Mair, 1995) or expert survey evaluations of various aspects of parties (Janda, 1980; Kitschelt, 2013; Laver and Hunt, 1992; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). However, so far information from these datasets has not been electronically available and thus many questions could not be addressed.

We have engaged in systematising and aggregating existing data in a single dataset that is electronically available which renders it possible to get a closer grip on a long-standing issue with regard to the causes and consequences of party organisational change.

We now proceed with discussing the evolution of party organisation models before elaborating on our hypotheses and presenting the empirical approach of this study. Afterwards, we discuss the empirical results and conclude.

The Development of Parties

Party researchers have developed rich characterisations of party organisations and their evolution over time. Before proceeding, we will briefly discuss this extensive literature. Most summaries include the cadre party (Koole, 1996), the mass party (Duverger, 1964), the catch-all party (Kirchheimer, 1966) and the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1995). The cadre party originates from the pre-mass suffrage period and was a weakly organised team composed of various elites who also financed the party (Duverger, 1964). Mass parties represent one particular social group, originate from outside parliament, initially sought to enfranchise their group and later represent it in parliament. Formally, members controlled the leadership by appointing delegates to a party congress that oversees all party behaviour. Also, members financed the party and due to their large role in the party exercised significant influence over party policy (Duverger, 1964). Otto Kirchheimer (1966) coined the term catch-all party to signify the marginalisation of party members in party decision-making and the increased influence of individuals and interest groups. The catch-all party is geared towards office-seeking behaviour, seeks to cater to various interests and therefore needs to shed its ideological baggage and identity. For this purpose, power had to be shifted towards the leadership and the party’s membership reduced to cheerleaders (Krouwel, 2003; Safran, 2009). A further step in party evolution is the cartel party, which uses state resources to limit political competition and thereby guarantee the party’s access to office (Katz and Mair, 2009). The party has a weak membership, depends on state subsidies and is dominated by the party in public office rather than the party on the ground or the party in central office (Blyth and Katz, 2005; Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). Voter interests are only a secondary office-seeking strategy and excluding the competition by changing the rules becomes a primary strategy. The cartel party is not held in high regard from a normative perspective because (1) state subventions allow parties to become independent of their members, (2) by cartelising competition parties stop competing on issues and thereby limit electoral choice, and (3) in combination with globalisation parties downsize policy expectations and externalise policy commitments (Blyth and Katz, 2005).
In sum, party evolution from mass to cartel party entails (1) an increase in leadership domination, (2) a tremendous decrease in the number and influence of party membership and (3) an oligopolistic form of competition with parties without clear ideologies and therefore a depreciation of political alternatives for the electorate. These different concepts of party organisation are contested (Kitschelt, 2000; Koole, 1996; Loxbo, 2013; Sandri and Pauwels, 2010) and updated (Katz and Mair, 2009), but it is probably fair to claim that there is not one party model that describes every single party at a given point in time. More importantly, parties are innovating constantly. They experiment with new forms of organisation and strategies of political competition. In the 1980s, Green parties adopted inclusive institutions and attracted highly motivated and informed activists (Kitschelt, 1988) and thereby gave élan to an intra-party version of participatory democracy. The business-firm party of the 1990s is completely de-linked from members, but seeks by means of professional campaign strategies – financed by a rich benefactor (who could also be the party leader) – to reach out to the voter (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). The Pirate Parties of the moment explore new ways of member–politician linkage by experimenting with new methods of delegation and discussion. The Dutch Freedom Party is also innovative in its organisation, as it has only one member – the party leader. But mainstream parties innovate too: many parties have adopted membership ballots or primaries to select a new party leader (Kenig, 2009a; LeDuc, 2001) and at least pay lip service to the goal of increasing the membership. Parties promote this as opening up the party to society, allowing members a meaningful say in party politics. However, it is also argued that membership ballots shift power from informed and active party members and mid-level party elites to uninformed and inactive party members (Mair, 1994; Scarrow, 2002; Wauters, 2013; Webb, 2000). By consequence, the best-known candidate has a much better chance of winning these internal leadership elections (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009).2 Similarly, members have more input into candidate selection than in the past, but at the same time the party elite has veto powers over membership decisions (Katz, 2001; Scarrow, 2002).

To summarise, the literature describes a trend towards leadership domination, member-less parties and more democratic leadership selection procedures. What is more, the literature hints at various hypotheses concerning the relations between size, selection procedures and leadership domination but provides little systematic testing to gauge their empirical potential. In the next section, we will spell out these hypotheses more clearly and move towards an empirical test.

**Developing Hypotheses**

**Does Size Matter?**

Party membership size and its effect on how parties function has been a concern in classical works of political science (Duverger, 1964; Michels, 1915; Panebianco, 1988). For Michels, the growth of the mass party in terms of membership is associated with a growth in organisational complexity, technical specialisation and the development of a party bureaucracy. These developments increase apathy among party members and enable the party oligarchy to alter the organisational goals of the party such that they serve their own interests best (Michels, 1915). Indeed, the larger a group becomes, the smaller the influence a citizen has (Dahl and Tufte, 1973) and the less motivated and more apathetic a citizen becomes vis-à-vis party activism (Olson, 1965). Hence, leaders dominate parties
with large memberships because (1) they control the party bureaucracy and (2) member apathy increases with party size. Empirical studies indeed show that intra-party participation declines as party size increases (Scarrow, 2002; Tan, 1998; Weldon, 2006). With less active members, we thus hypothesise that membership size increases leadership domination (H1).

But contrary to Michels’ prediction, Tan (1998) also finds that organisational complexity – which grows with membership size – influences intra-party participation positively. Of course, larger groups are more difficult to control because it becomes easier for individuals to free ride (Olson, 1965) and it becomes more difficult to ‘buy’ individual support with private goods (jobs, appointments, connections etc.) (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002; Weldon, 2006; Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). As such, a party leadership may struggle to discipline its members, especially when the leadership needs the time, money and support of these members. Another mechanism is that even if large size makes members apathetic, it allows at the same time small groups of members to influence party decision-making. With party activism rates between 10% and 45% (Cross and Young, 2004; Gallagher and Marsh, 2004; Heidar, 1994; Heidar and Saglie, 2003; Pedersen et al., 2004; Scarrow, 2002; Seyd and Whiteley, 2003), it is possible for a motivated group of activists to create their own power base within the party and effectively influence the party leadership. An example of this is the influx of young and motivated members in social democratic parties in the late 1960s and early 1970s who effectively influenced the party leadership and motivated them to shift to a more radical policy platform (Schumacher, 2012; Wolinetz, 1977). Hence, for membership size we can also arrive at a prediction contrary to H1, that is that membership size decreases leadership dominance (H2).

**Do Selectorates Matter?**

In addition to size, it should also matter how members can influence the leadership. A party leader needs the support of a minimal winning coalition of the leadership selectorate in order to survive (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002). If the majority of selectors support another candidate the leader or the leadership loses. Of course parties differ a lot in how they select a leader (Cross and Blais, 2011; Kenig, 2009b; Pilet and Cross, 2014) and therefore the minimal winning coalition supporting a leader differs from party to party. We consider six types of selectorate here – in order of inclusiveness: membership, delegates, party council, party parliamentary group, the party leader and a mixed category (Pilet and Cross, 2014). A selectorate is the group that is formally designated to appoint a leader. In a party where the membership has a direct vote on the leader, the party leader thus needs to win a majority of the vote (or depending on election method, a plurality) of the members. More and more parties have switched to direct leadership elections by members over the last decade (Kenig, 2009b; LeDuc, 2001; Scarrow, 1999), but the most common system remains to have delegates that represent a subunit of the party voting for the leader in the leadership election at a party conference (Pilet and Cross, 2014). Rarer is the party council selection method. Here, a small group of politicians, appointees and party elders select the leader. Other parties let the parliamentary party group select the leader and in some rare cases the outgoing leader selects a new leader. Finally, some parties combine elements from different selectorates (most notably the British parties) and so these parties have mixed selectorates.

In selectorate theory, a theory from International Relations that explains country leader behaviour, the inclusiveness of the selectorate is linked to leadership duration
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(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002). If a party leader is supported by a small winning coalition – for example, a few party bosses on a party council – the selectorate theory predicts that the leader sustains her position by providing this group with private goods – for example, parliamentary, ministerial or intra-party appointments. But if a party leader is appointed by a large selectorate – for example, party members or party delegates – she cannot rely on private goods, since she cannot appoint all members or delegates as ministers. Instead, she must rely on public goods, such as a party platform that is supported by the members or delegates. The catch of selectorate theory is that it is easier to keep a small group happy with private goods than a large group with public goods and therefore leaders in exclusive selectorates survive longer than leaders in inclusive selectorates (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002). To translate this to parties, a party almost always has some seats in parliament and some intra-party appointments; hence, it should be easy to keep a small party council happy with appointments. But if members or delegates form the selectorate, the lack of party performance may immediately endanger the party leader’s position, because the public good – the party’s platform – cannot be put into practice (for similar arguments, see Harmel and Janda, 1994a). Empirical analyses of party leader survival underline that inclusiveness of the selectorate is indeed associated with shorter tenures for party leaders (Ennser-Jedenastik and Schumacher, 2015).

Our claim is that the leader’s ability to sustain her position is a proxy of the degree to which the leader can dominate the party. If she cannot sustain her own position, then it is unlikely that she had much power in the party in general. Hence, we hypothesise that the more exclusive the selectorate, the more leadership-dominated a party is (H3).

The corollary of H3 is that if parties widen the selectorate, leadership domination should recede (H4). Hence, the parties that have shifted their method of leadership selection from a delegate system or party council appointment to a one-member-one-vote system should have become less leadership-dominated. Of course, this has been the stated goal of many parties implementing these transitions, but party scholars have criticised this notion (Blyth and Katz, 2005; Katz and Mair, 1995). They claim that shifting power from delegates to members is shifting power from the active, knowledgeable, motivated and arguably more radical delegate or mid-level activist (May, 1973) to the uninformed and inattentive ordinary member. In a leadership contest, this benefits the better-known leader and generally allows the leader to get away with more agenda-setting than in a delegate system. But empirically we do not know whether this is true. Research demonstrates that membership ballots for the party leadership generally attract more candidates but less competitive elections than other selection methods (Kenig, 2009b) and that more democratisation does not improve political participation (Scarrow, 1999). But in general, the jury is still out over the question whether more inclusive leadership selection procedures empower or disarm the rank-and-file (Allern and Pedersen, 2007).

Do Size and Selectorate Interact?

So far, we have treated size and the selectorate separately. However, it could well be that their effect is interrelated and thus an interaction between membership size and the size of the selectorate exists. In particular, we argue that the effect of selectorate type is dependent on the size of the party.

If parties are small organisations, the physical distance between leadership and membership is also small, relations are informal and the organisation as a whole is more
horizontal. Leaders can be approached directly and the leadership may find it easier to discipline by means of social norms. In such cases, it may not matter so much how a leader is selected. If the membership is active and has direct and close access to its delegates, there may not be a big difference between that type of party and a party with a one-member-one-vote system. But the larger a party becomes, the more vertical relations become. In that case, it matters who the selectorate is and how it is organised. Delegates or MPs have stronger power bases if they represent more people, because it makes them less dependent on the central party. The one-member-one-vote selectorate is essentially unorganised because it mostly consists of inactive members that do not take part in the various local committees and subunits of the party. Their information derives mostly from the communication of the party leadership and the party central office and thus they are generally less exposed to alternative currents in the party that do not make up the party’s ruling junta. Because the larger the party gets the less active people are (Scarrow, 2002; Tan, 1998; Weldon, 2006), parties with membership electorates get more leadership-dominated the larger their membership size (H5).

Table 1 summarises our theoretical expectations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: The larger a party’s membership the more leadership-dominated the party</td>
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<tr>
<td>H2: The larger a party’s membership the less leadership-dominated the party</td>
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<tr>
<td>H3: The more exclusive a party’s selectorate the more leadership-dominated the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4: A party becomes more leadership-dominated if it enlarges its selectorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>H5: For parties with a membership electorate, the larger a party’s membership the more leadership-dominated the party</td>
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</table>

Methods and Data

This article employs a new dataset that has integrated a large amount of existing party organisation data from different sources. We have assembled data from the Katz/Mair handbook (Katz and Mair, 1992), the Janda and colleagues cross-national party surveys (Janda, 1980), updated membership data (Van Biezen et al., 2012), data on selectorate mechanisms (Pilet and Cross, 2014), and several expert surveys (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). We now discuss how we constructed our dependent and independent variables from this new dataset. Four hypotheses (H1–H3 and H5) are about levels of leadership dominance and are analysed in study 1. Hypothesis 4 is about change in dominance and is analysed in study 2.

Methods and Operationalisation Study 1

Measuring Leadership Domination. We have found three expert surveys with questions that relate to the latent concept of leadership domination (see Table 2). First, from Janda (1980) and Harmel and Janda (1994b) we take two questions – who formulates the party’s policy (Q1), and how concentrated is the leadership (Q2) – that probe to what extent a leader dominates the party. Both focus on the locus of decision-making in the party.
Second, our second data source (Laver and Hunt, 1992) asks experts to assess how much the leadership influences party policy (Q3) and how much the party activists influence party policy (Q4). Our third data source asks questions very similar (Q5 and Q6) to the second data source (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012).

For each data source, we constructed leadership domination indices that theoretically cover a range between −1 (activist-dominated) and 1 (leadership-dominated) (see Table 3 for specifics). The four datasets cover different periods and include information on different countries and parties. This limits a comparison of the data. For 12 parties, we have observations both from the Harmel and Janda data and the Laver and Hunt data covering the same time period (early 1990s). The correlation between the two leadership domination indices is 0.60. Still, the question wordings are so different that it is difficult to claim that they measure exactly the same and we therefore refrain from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question/year/source</th>
<th>Answers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Indicate how much the party leadership influences party policy Y: 1990 S: Laver and Hunt (1992)</td>
<td>0 (not at all) to 20 (completely)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: Indicate how much party activists influence party policy Y: 1990 S: Laver and Hunt (1992)</td>
<td>0 (not at all) to 20 (completely)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5: The extent to which the party leadership is strong in determining party policy Y: 2008 S: Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012)</td>
<td>1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6: The extent to which party membership is strong in determining party policy Y: 2008 S: Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012)</td>
<td>1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
analysing these two data sources in one model. The Laver and Hunt survey is much more similar to the Rohrschneider and Whitefield survey. The only difference is that the latter asks about the influence of members, whereas Laver and Hunt ask about the influence of activists. Activists are a subset of members who are actively involved in (trying to) setting the party’s agenda. Because activists are the most visible party members, it is likely that experts have these people in mind when evaluating the degree to which they influence policy. Therefore, we believe it is justified to treat Q4 and Q6 as similar questions. Another important remark is that the Janda (1980) and Harmel and Janda (1994b) expert surveys are based on one expert per country, whereas the other two expert surveys are mean scores of at least 10 experts per country. Given these similarities and differences in procedure and question wording, we analyse the Laver and Hunt and Rohrschneider and Whitefield surveys in one regression analysis, and the Harmel and Janda data in a separate regression analysis (note that the descriptive Figures 1–3 do contain both variables).

In sum, our data cover the period between the 1950s and the late 2000s and a varying number of countries. For the early period (1955–1989), we have information for 24 parties from 5 countries while for the later period (1990–2008) our empirical results are based on 72 parties located in 11 countries. Table A4 in the online Appendix provides detailed information on the countries and parties covered in the analyses.

Before continuing, we will first show some descriptive statistics of the scores of parties on the leadership domination index. Figure 1 visualises the means (dots) and standard errors (bars) of the leadership domination score by party family and by decade. There are some clear differences between types of parties. Especially, the Green party family is the least leader-dominated, which resonates well with existing beliefs on Green parties’ internal life (Kitschelt, 1988). Moreover, Christian Democratic, Conservative and especially right populist parties are more dominated by their leadership than Social Democratic, Socialist and Liberal parties. The ranking of party families is rather stable over time with Conservative and Christian Democratic parties always scoring high on leadership domination while the Green parties remain at the lower end of the scale.

Figure 2 shows the means (dots) and standard errors (bars) of leadership domination over time. Because of a low number of observations, we aggregated party observations before the 1980s in one category. The mean of leadership domination between 1950 and 1970 is slightly, but not significantly, higher than in the 1980s. Comparisons are further impeded by population differences: the relatively activist-dominated Green parties entered in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Still, there is a clear and significant positive difference between the degree of leadership domination in the last decade. The positive difference signifies that parties are more dominated by their leadership in the 2000s than in the 1990s. This quantitative evidence matches well with theoretical predictions and anecdotal descriptions of how parties have evolved over the last two decades.
does not mean that all parties move towards leadership domination as predicted by the iron law of oligarchy (Michels, 1915). About 32% of the parties in our sample are less leadership-dominated in 2007 than they have been previously. Note that we do not compare the 1980s to the 1990s because of the differences in question wording.

Figure 3 is our final descriptive and shows leadership domination scores for two parties per country, the main left-wing and main right-wing parties in 20 countries. Without going into specific details, Figure 3 already strikingly reveals the sparsity of the data in some countries. In some cases (Italy and Luxembourg), there was not even enough data to plot leadership domination scores for the two main parties. Also, Norway is left out of Figure 3 because we only have one time point for that country (1992). The data on the independent variables that we will present below are equally sparse. This causes listwise deletion of cases in Figure 3 in our regression analyses (see Table A4 in the online Appendix for an overview of all our cases in the regression analyses).
Membership Size. Generally, the membership/electorate ratio is used as a measurement for party size (Katz and Mair, 1992; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Poguntke, 2002). By dividing the membership numbers by the size of the electorate one can compare parties cross-nationally. However, the downside of this commonly used measure is that in a strict interpretation of the theory, size should be interpreted as absolute size. We therefore use the raw membership numbers as an alternative measure of membership size. We take membership data from the Members and Activists of Political Parties (MAPP) project (Van Haute et al., 2015) and take the log of the raw membership numbers to normalise the variable.7

Figure 3. Leadership Domination Scores of Main Left-Wing and Main Right-Wing Parties. Solid line is main left party; dashed line is main right party. Australia: Labor and Liberals; Austria: Social Democratic Party and Austrian People’s Party; Belgium: Socialist Party (W) and Liberal Party (F); Canada: Liberals and Conservatives; Denmark: Social Democratic Party and Liberals; Finland: Social Democratic Party and National Coalition; France: Socialist Party and Gaullist Party; Germany: Social Democratic Party and Christian Democratic Party; UK: Labour and Conservatives; Greece: PASOK and New Democracy; Iceland: Social Democratic Party and Independence Party; Ireland: Fine Gael and Fianna Fail; Italy: Democratic Party; Luxembourg: Democratic Party; Netherlands: Labour and Liberals; New Zealand: Labor and National Party; Portugal: Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party; Spain: Socialist Party and the People’s Party; Sweden: Social Democratic Party and the Moderates; United States: Democratic Party and the Republicans.
**Selectorate Type.** We use the Pilet and Cross (2014) coding of selectorate type. Country experts have coded this and have primarily used party constitutions to code selectorate type. We distinguish from inclusive to exclusive between one-member-one-vote, delegates, party council, parliamentary party and leadership. We also have a mixed category which describes parties that combine different selectorates.

**Controls.** We control for party age, to account for the prediction that parties over time become more dominated by their leaders (Michels, 1915) and for fractionalisation at the legislative level to control for party system differences. In particular, we take the Rae-Index provided by Armingeon et al. (2013). We also add party legislative size (again from Armingeon et al., 2013) and a variable indicating whether the party is in government or not (coded from parlgov.org (Döring and Manow, 2015)). A final control concerns the ideological position of the parties as there might be concerns that leadership domination is associated with left–right position. We take this data from parlgov.org as well (Döring and Manow, 2015).

Note that for all independent variables we take 5-year averages. This is because some of the variables are so sparse that otherwise we would lose many observations due to listwise deletion. Also, 5-year averages offer more balanced accounts of what type of party we are analysing.

**Method of Estimation.** For some parties, we have several observations, for others just one. To account for this, we perform an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors clustered at the party level. As noted, we perform two regressions: one analysing the period 1955–1989 and the other analysing the time points 1990 and 2008. We ran several tests to probe the robustness of our findings. The findings presented here are very similar if we cluster at the country-level or run a fixed-effects model. Also, the exclusion of single countries from the models does not alter substantively what is presented here. In other words, our results are not driven by single countries.

**Methods and Operationalisation Study 2**

**Change in Leadership Domination.** H4 speaks of change in the level of leadership domination and therefore we take the difference in leadership domination between 1992 and 2007 as dependent variable. Because for some parties we only have observations for either 1992 or 2007, they drop out of this analysis.9 This is why study 2 has less than half the number of observations as study 1.

**Selectorate Change.** We test selectorate change by coding 1 for a change in selectorate between 1990 and 2007 and 0 for no change. In almost all cases, change in selectorate meant a more inclusive selectorate. In the two cases when this was not the case we coded it 0.10

**Controls.** We control for changes in party membership size by subtracting the logged party’s membership in 1990 (approximately) by that of 2007. In addition, we again control for party age (logged) and legislative fractionalisation and the left–right position of parties (same data sources as in study 1). We also put in a lagged-level dependent variable to control for the fact that some parties change more because they are less leadership-dominated in 1990.
Method of Estimation. We now only have one observation per party, so we do not cluster by party and use OLS regression analysis. Again, the robustness tests revealed no substantial problems.

Empirical Results

Do Size and Selectorate Explain Party Leadership Domination? (Study 1)

In models 1 and 2 (see Table 4), we test the direct effects of membership size and the selectorate composition. In model 1, we use the Harmel and Janda data, which is restricted to the time period 1955–1989. The model shows an insignificant effect of membership on leadership domination. We also find that only parties in the mixed category are significantly less leadership-dominated than parties with other selectorate mechanisms. However, there are only two parties that use this method. The control variables age, electoral fractionalisation, government party and party size are insignificant, but our results indicate that more right-wing parties have a tendency to be more leadership-dominated.

In model 2, we use the data from Laver and Hunt and Rohrschneider and Whitefield which cover the more recent decades (1990s and 2000s). We find a positive effect of membership, which this time is significant. The difference in predicted leadership domination score between a party with few members (one standard deviation below the mean) and a party with many members (one standard deviation above the mean) is approximately 0.34. This is a little more than one standard deviation of the leadership domination variable. For the selectorate variable, we only find significant effects for the leader selectorate (1 observation) and the delegate selectorate (63 observations) compared to the membership selectorate. We also find a small, negative effect of party age. This means that older parties are

Table 4. OLS Regression of Leadership Domination.

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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members (log)</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectorate (members = ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party council</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.192</td>
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<td>Parl. Party</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
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<td>0.122*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (log)</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalisation</td>
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<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government party</td>
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<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party size</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological position</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OLS: ordinary least squares; SE: standard error.
Our sample comprises 24 parties for the early and 72 parties for the later period.
*p < 0.05; +p < 0.1, clustered standard errors at the party level.
less leadership-dominated than younger ones. Again, the positive coefficient of ideological position shows that right-wing parties are more leadership-dominated.

In sum, we reject H2 that more members means less leadership domination. Model 2 provides support for the hypothesis that the opposite is true: more members means more leadership domination. Although we do find some effects for various selectorate methods, there are too few observations in the significant categories to consider these results as very robust.

In Table A5 in the online Appendix, we show the results concerning the interaction between size and selectorate as posited by H5. In model 3, we find no significant interaction effect of these two factors (analysis of 1955–1989 data). In model 4, we do find a significant interaction effect (analysis of 1990 and 2008 data).

Interaction effects are difficult to interpret from regression tables and in fact, to evaluate these effects we should not look at the unconditional coefficients in the regression table but at the conditional effects (Brambor et al., 2006), that is the effect of membership size for different selectorates (members, delegates, council and parliamentary party). Therefore, we visualise the findings in Figure 4. This figure illustrates that the effect of membership is positive and significant in parties with a members-selectorate, a delegates-selectorate and a party council selectorate. For parties in which the parliamentary party decides on the leadership position, membership has no effect.

In relation to our hypotheses, we can state that for parties with membership selectorates, we do find that the more the members, the more leadership-dominated the party, which is in accordance with our hypothesis H5. But we observe similar relationships for parties with less inclusive selectorates. Thus, we need to reject H5.

Why do we have results for our analyses of 1990 and 2008 but not for the period 1955–1989? One explanation is simply that our variables do not explain the variation in leadership domination between 1955 and 1989. Another explanation is that the quality of the expert survey in the later studies is much better (more experts per party) and that the expert judgements between 1955 and 1989 are too unreliable to derive any meaningful structure or that the database is too restricted in terms of parties covered (24 parties) for the test at hand.

**Figure 4.** Marginal Effect of Members (Log) for Different Selectorates (Leadership Domination). This figure is based on model 4, Table A5 in the online Appendix. N per category is the following: Members: 23, Delegates: 63, Council: 9, and Parliamentary Party: 4.
Do Wider Selectorates Produce More or Less Leadership Domination? (Study 2)

To analyse whether a party becomes more leadership-dominated if it enlarges its selectorate (H4), we now look at changes in leadership domination between 1990 and 2007 as the dependent variable (Table 5). Clearly, the lagged level of the dependent variable is strongly significant. The negative sign suggests that parties with lower levels of leadership domination become more leadership-dominated over time. In other words, these parties caught up with the mean level of leadership domination. As for H4, we can report that the wider selectorate dummy is positive and significant. Thus, widening the selectorate increases leadership domination. However, we cannot exactly match cause and consequence here. Hence, the interpretation could be that parties became more leadership-dominated and to enforce that they widened the selectorate, or that by widening the selectorate parties became more leadership-dominated. What we can do is to reject the notion that widening the selectorate is correlated with less leadership domination.

We find no effect for changes in membership, a party’s government status and age in model 5. There is a small negative effect of legislative fractionalisation. This suggests that in more fractionalised systems (e.g. proportional systems) parties have become slightly less leadership-dominated than parties in less fractionalised systems (e.g. first-past-the-post systems). Also, larger parties and right-wing parties have changed slightly more in the direction of leadership domination.

Conclusion

Is there a trend towards leadership domination? And do efforts to counter leadership domination work? With our new time-series cross-sectional dataset we can for the first time address these questions systematically. Our findings suggest a rejection of a deterministic iron law of oligarchy: we still find substantial variation between parties in the degree to which they are considered to be leadership-dominated. Also, our findings indicate that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. OLS Regression Results of Change in Leadership Domination.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag. dependent variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in log (members)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wider selectorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age (log)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislative fractionalisation</td>
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<td>Change in party size</td>
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<td>Change in government party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideological position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OLS: ordinary least squares; SE: standard error.
*p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
making the selectorate more inclusive is associated with more leadership domination (Katz and Mair, 1995). The causal order may be unclear here, but at least we can reject the notion that a more inclusive selectorate is associated with less leadership domination. We also report that more members means more leadership domination. This finding is in line with the mechanism that in parties with more members, apathy is higher and participation lower (Scarrow, 2002; Tan, 1998; Weldon, 2006).

In addition to these specific findings, our study makes three more general contributions. First, in line with a few other, recent studies analysing different aspects of party organisation (Kölln, 2016, 2015; H. H. Pedersen, 2010a), our article demonstrates that there is more variance between parties than many general claims about party evolution acknowledge. Second, this study also demonstrates that formal rules do not explain much in terms of the distribution of power in a party. Analyses of effects or evolution of formal party rules are interesting in themselves (Bille, 2001; Katz and Mair, 1994; Lundell, 2004). But the absence of systematic correlations between leadership selectorate data and expert judgements of leadership domination in study 1 is striking and somewhat unexpected. Study 2 does demonstrate a link between formal institutions and expert judgements of leadership domination. Third, by mapping and explaining leadership domination our study contributes to analyses of the effects of leadership domination. For example, leadership domination affects parties’ goal orientation (H. H. Pedersen, 2012b), influences to which sub constituencies parties respond (Schumacher et al., 2013) and dictates the extent to which parties are willing to compromise on policy in coalition formation negotiations (H. H. Pedersen, 2010b, 2012a). The changes in leadership domination thus affect party goals and party behaviour, as predicted by the classics. In line with some of these findings, it must be noted that leadership domination is not necessarily bad for democracy (Sartori, 1976).

We end by noting that some alternative hypotheses have not been dealt with here. For example, we have not evaluated the effects of the type of party finance (for a review, see Scarrow, 2007), the degree of a party’s territorial coverage (Bolleyer, 2012) or party efforts to explore new ways to engage and activate members (Gauja, 2014). We are aware of this and we encourage future studies to pick this up and add to the expanding agenda that (1) considers aspects of party organisation on a scale, (2) seeks systematically to assess causes and consequences of party organisation and (3) takes the link between representation and organisation seriously.

Acknowledgements

This paper has been presented at the European Political Science Association Conference in Edinburgh 2014, the Danish Political Science Association 2013, the Politicologenetmaal in Maastricht 2014 and at a workshop at the University of Southern Denmark in May 2015. We want to thank all participants for their comments, in particular: Flemming Juul Christiansen, Michael Baggesen Klitgaard, Peter Munk Christiansen, Joop van Holsteyn, Kees van Kersbergen, Helene Helboe Pedersen and Barbara Vis. We would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers of this manuscript and the editor of Political Studies. Thanks also to Anna Walsdorff, Sophie Sindrup and Ane Johansen for assisting with the data collection.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The data collection was financed by (1) a grant from the Danish Council for Independent Research (the Sapere Aude Young Elite Researcher project), (2) the Reforming Welfare States fund at the University of Southern Denmark and (3) a grant from the European Research Council Project ‘Representation and Congruence in Europe’.
**Supplementary Information**

Additional supplementary information may be found with the online version of this article:

- Table A1. Descriptives of model variables study 1 – model 1.
- Table A2. Descriptives of model variables study 1 – model 2.
- Table A3. Descriptives of model variables study 2.
- Table A4. List of parties included in the analysis.
- Table A5. OLS Regression of Leadership Domination with Interaction Effects – models 3 and 4.

**Notes**

1. We will use the words leader or leadership interchangeably. Some parties have a clear omnipotent leader, other parties have a group of people – the leadership – in charge, and other parties have no clear leader or leadership. It is exactly our goal to map this variation.

2. In fact, empirical research demonstrates that membership ballots for the party leadership generally attract more candidates but less competitive elections than other selection methods (Kenig, 2009b).

3. The dataset (Giger and Schumacher, 2015) is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PE8TWP. A full list of parties included in this dataset is available from the dataverse. See the online Appendix for a list of the parties included in the analysis for this article.

4. In particular, the data cover Australia, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands for the period 1955–1989 and in addition also Austria, Belgium, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Spain for the later period.

5. Our sample is not biased towards large parties. All four surveys are pretty comprehensive and have included many small parties, for example, the Greens in Germany or the Socialist People’s Party in Denmark.

6. We are well aware of the far from optimal data quality for both measures. In particular, changing definitions of party membership over time cause problems for studying time trends. We are therefore very cautious when deriving conclusions from these models.

7. Also the membership/electorate ratio variable follows an abnormal distribution, which leads to estimation issues which can be resolved by using an additional squared term of membership/electorate ratio. This way one obtains similar results as for the logged membership variable.

8. Again due to the skewedness of this variable, we include the log of party age in our models.

9. This problem is even worse for the Janda data, where we have an insufficient number of observations to analyse change in leadership domination.

10. Only the Canadian Liberal Party and New Democratic Party had smaller selectorates in 2007 compared to 1990 (they have since changed it back to a wider selectorate).

**References**


Schumacher and Giger


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**Gijs Schumacher** is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He has published on party organisation, mass–elite linkages, party change, populist parties, social democratic parties, personality and welfare policies. His work has appeared in the *American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, European Journal of Political Research, Party Politics, West European Politics and Political Psychology*, among others.

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