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Introduction

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Introduction

Antiliberal internationalism in the twentieth century

Matthijs Lok, Marjet Brolsma, Robin de Bruin, Stefan Couperus, and Rachel McElroy White

Antiliberal genealogies

Since the turn of the millennium, new forms of international collaboration have surfaced all over the globe that explicitly position themselves against the liberal international order established after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Examples of these new border-crossing antiliberal mobilizations comprise the organizations of European ‘national conservatives’ (Natcon), the Conservative Political Action Conference, the Visegrád Group meetings which offer a platform for self-proclaimed ‘illiberal’ government leaders from East-Central Europe, and the nebulous network of far-right ‘traditionalist’ antiliberal intellectuals, including Alexandr Dugin and Steve Bannon.¹ Other examples include cross-border far-right protest movements such as the European Islamophobic social movement Pegida, the pan-European Identitarian Movement, the Russian–Chinese strategic alliance, and the ‘Buddhist international’ in Southeast Asia.² Such movements are not exclusively confined to the political right or far right, as the leftist anti-neoliberal and anti-austerity Greek–Spanish collaboration between Syriza and Podemos demonstrates.³

In scholarship and the media, these and other contemporary examples of antiliberalism across national boundaries are frequently explained as consequences of the alleged recent cultural backlash, rising authoritarianism, and the populist zeitgeist against the backdrop of globalizing societies. However, antiliberal internationalism is not a new phenomenon – nor can its current manifestations be understood without reference to historical precursors.⁴ In this volume, specialists from different historical periods, regions, and disciplines aim to uncover the longer twentieth-century trajectories and genealogies of antiliberal internationalism. One set of research questions is concerned with historicizing contemporary developments: to what extent do contemporary manifestations of antiliberal internationalism build on older patterns, traditions, ideas, or recurring antiliberal tropes or strategies? How might historical trajectories and genealogies of antiliberal internationalisms be qualified and conceptualized?

The second set of research questions addressed by this volume is concerned with developing a theoretical approach to antiliberal internationalism, grounded in a series of case studies: can we observe (non)ideological international variations of antiliberalism across time and space? And to what extent do these manifestations

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of antiliberism interrelate, overlap, or coincide? What historical and contingent circumstances help explain the particular nature of antiliber tropes in internationalism over time? By addressing these questions, the contributions in this volume align with recent trends in historiography in moving beyond deeply ingrained, Western-centric narratives about internationalism and liberalism. Without excluding well-known European sources of antiliber internationalism, the collection of essays decenter the European experience. They present cross-cultural and globalized transnational practices, taking on board the varying backdrops of, for instance, (de)coloniality, religious and racialized affect, and environmental concern, and how these inform distinct geographies of antiliberism over time and across the globe.⁵

This introductory chapter sketches the stakes of defining (anti)liberalism. We thus begin with a short overview of the existing literature on this theme, as well as on related ideologies such as illiberalism. Then, we will briefly explore scholarly debates on twentieth-century internationalism with a special focus on the interconnectedness of liberal and antiliber forms of internationalism, and foreground the importance of studying antiliberism as a global and transnational phenomenon. In the final part, the contributions of the various chapters to this debate will be briefly outlined.

Inventing antiliberism

The modern study of ‘antiliberism’ as a historical phenomenon and as an ‘ism’ no doubt begins with Stephen Holmes’s *The Anatomy of Antiliberism*, first published in 1993.⁶ In this seminal work, Holmes’s ambition was to chart the ‘historical pedigree’ of the critics of liberalism Holmes encountered at American universities in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Roberto Unger.⁷ These critics above all lamented secular rationalism and the individual and allegedly ‘atomized’ character of contemporary liberal societies. Holmes traces the origins of this antiliber tradition all the way back to the French Revolution of 1789, or more precisely the eighteenth-century Counter-Revolution embodied by the writings of the Sardinian diplomat Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821). De Maistre’s antiliber ideas were revived in the works of the German lawyer Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), and subsequently found their way into the writings of twentieth-century academics, such as Leo Strauss, MacIntyre, Lash, and Unger. According to Holmes, this newly revived antiliberism of the 1970s had replaced the critique of ‘modernity’ prevalent at American universities in the 1950s and 1960s.⁸

In the introduction of the book, Holmes makes a clear distinction between, on the one hand, left-wing Marxist antiliberism, and on the other hand, a right-wing critique of liberalism. Left-wing antiliberism, Holmes argues, is mainly secular and concerned with the economic and class inequalities which inevitably, according to Marxists, accompany a liberal and bourgeois system. Holmes’s study, however, is primarily concerned with the understudied critique of liberalism on the right of the political spectrum. This right-wing reproval, in Holmes’s view, was mainly defined in cultural terms. The essence of cultural antiliberism, according

to Holmes, was the idea of a cultural and moral crisis caused by the onset of liberal modernity, ‘a diagnostic of a pathology on a social scale’.⁹

More recently, Holmes has argued that, next to their shifting positions depending on varying historical contexts, antiliberals also possess certain ‘timeless features’. Underlying all antiliberal positions is the idea that the flaws of liberal societies are not caused by the failure to realize liberal ideas in practice but are rather the result of genetic defects in liberalism itself. Antiliberalism throughout its history, according to Holmes, has been characterized by its hostility to liberal individualism and its advocacy of a presumably redemptive community. Other permanent features are its rejection of the universalism, meritocracy, and secular reason that antiliberal thinkers and politicians associate with liberal ideas. Antiliberals, finally, have without exception criticized the liberal habits of tolerance, dissent, and debate.¹⁰

Holmes’s work can be considered a trailblazer in the academic study of antiliberalism, marking the topic as a field of scholarly enquiry. Since the publication of *The Anatomy of Antiliberalism*, an increasing stream of publications have appeared which detail case studies on historical antiliberalism from all over the world and diverse historical periods, no doubt reflecting political developments since the 1990s. Antiliberalism has to date been identified in settings ranging from medieval Spanish scholastic thought to twentieth-century American Evangelicalism.¹¹

At the same time, more than thirty years have passed since the publication of Holmes’s study, and particular aspects of the book now seem somewhat outdated. First of all, Holmes has mainly cherry-picked a few ‘great’ (male) minds from Europe and the United States, to a large extent ignoring the historical and intellectual context of their work, as advocated by the Cambridge school of political thought.¹² Secondly, he considers antiliberalism a homogeneous tradition with a permanent ideological core, clearly demarcated from liberalism and other ideological traditions. Thirdly, he mostly ignores the commonalities between left- and right-wing antiliberalism. Finally, Holmes has overlooked the global and transnational dimensions of the antiliberal tradition by only implicitly paying attention to processes of appropriation across borders and exclusively focusing on the West. Although Holmes’s work forms an important inspiration for our investigation of antiliberalism, we also aim to remedy some of its shortcomings in the present volume.

Defining (anti)liberalism

In recent years, much scholarly attention has been paid to how liberal projects and politics, despite their self-professed liberal ideological aims, often contain profoundly illiberal and antiliberal elements which previously have been overlooked. In doing so, scholars have demonstrated the difficulties in clearly defining a separate—and implied opposite—liberalism and antiliberalism. Tyler Stovall, for example, in his study of the concept of freedom has underscored the racial dimensions of the Western liberal idea of freedom, stating that in the past, liberal freedom was above all a virtue and ideal associated primarily with white people.¹³ Other scholars have pointed to the complexities of ‘liberalism’ in the context of

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European colonialism and shown that the government of extra-European colonies by self-styled liberal politicians was often brutal and violent, contradicting its purported liberal and enlightened ideological basis.¹⁴ Jennifer Pitts, for instance, has demonstrated that French and English liberal icons such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville did not object to the colonial project of European powers, and even defended their existence with an appeal to liberal principles.¹⁵ Fascinatingly, in some cases, it was paradoxically the counter-revolutionary authors who objected to European colonialism, although the topic needs further investigation.¹⁶ Other historical studies, such as the work of Arnout van der Meer on colonial Indonesia, have analysed how in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberal, progressive notions about the civilizing mission of colonial powers to modernize and Europeanize overseas territories provided a new hegemonic ideology to legitimize the colonial rule which was permeated by a strong sense of Western paternalism.¹⁷

Apart from these studies foregrounding the nonliberal elements of ‘liberalism’ and its entanglement with European imperialism, the notion of a clear dichotomy between liberalism and antiliberalism is also problematized by research delving into the diversity of liberal traditions. Michael Freeden for example underscores the conceptual ‘elusiveness’ of (anti)liberalism and the difficulty in making a clear ideological distinction between ‘liberalism’ and ‘antiliberalism’.¹⁸ According to him, there does not exist one clear liberal tradition, but many different ones. The notion of a plurality of liberal traditions has been vindicated by the many publications that have appeared on the history of liberalism. In particular, the notion that the core liberal tradition is rooted in Anglo-Saxon liberalism and the ideas of John Locke has faced growing scepticism. In her ‘lost’ history of liberalism, Helena Rosenblatt, for instance, has highlighted the importance of the French liberal tradition, which is less focused on individual liberty and adopts a more positive attitude towards the state.¹⁹ The diverse and unique liberal traditions in other parts of Europe have also been extensively charted.²⁰ However, an analysis of the paradoxical contribution of antiliberals to the making of liberal traditions is often missing in these studies.

In his groundbreaking *Recovering Liberties* (2012), Christopher Bayly examines the vagrancies of liberal ideas on the Indian subcontinent. He shows how British concepts were adapted to local contexts, for instance merging with Hindu-religious notions and South-Asian customs. He also contends that the Indians turned European notions of freedom against their British colonial overlords. Despite the fact that leaders of the struggle for independence did not define themselves as liberals, the legacy of the nineteenth-century Indian liberals continued into the twentieth-century building of the Indian nation state.²¹ Bayly convincingly demonstrates the difficulty in defining a clear dichotomy between a ‘liberal’ and ‘antiliberal tradition’ for the twentieth-century Indian context, an observation corroborated in the chapters by Bajjayanti Roy and Arnab Dutta in this volume. The diversity of liberal traditions around the world also raises the question of whether the idea of a singular ‘antiliberal tradition’ should be discarded and if we should instead speak about antiliberalism in the plural. The chapters in this volume definitively answer this question in the affirmative.

This new acknowledgement of liberalism's many forms has led scholars to attempt to identify a 'core ideology' of liberalism against which its diverse manifestations can be gauged. Edmund Fawcett, for instance, identifies four 'sources' of liberalism which in his view formed the kernel of liberalism since its origins in the early nineteenth century: acknowledgement of conflict's inescapability, distrust of power, faith in human progress, and civic respect.²² Freedon, by contrast, makes a distinction between the three timeless, decontested 'core concepts' of 'liberty', 'individualism' and 'progress', which are required for a political view to be named 'liberal', and so-called 'adjacent concepts' that could be added and subtracted depending on place and time. Democracy, for instance, was fused with liberalism at the end of the nineteenth century, but the concept of democracy itself is, according to Freedon, not sufficient to call an idea 'liberal'.²³ Duncan Bell has gone even further, denying that there exists any liberal ideological core whatsoever. All attempts to define a permanent liberal tradition he deems part of the realm of twentieth-century political myth-making and invented intellectual tradition. Liberalism can only be regarded in his view as 'the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognized as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, over time and space'.²⁴

What does all of this mean for the historical study of 'antiliberalism'? The insight that a homogeneous liberal tradition with a stable ideological core did not, and does not, exist, does not *ipso facto* render the study of antiliberalism as a historical topic impossible. It could be argued that the idea of an unchanging liberal ideology was in fact partly a creation of its enemies, who needed a clear ideological foe in order to define their own ideological positioning *ex negativo*.²⁵ This constitutes another reason why historians of liberalism should, by definition, study its adversaries when mapping varieties of modern liberalism.

At the same time, we should be very careful when applying a concept like 'antiliberalism' to a historical context. Just like liberalism, antiliberalism was and is not a clearly demarcated and homogeneous ideological tradition, as the chapters in this volume abundantly show. Different iterations of antiliberalism coexisted in various historical contexts. Liberal ideas and their critics, moreover, are conceptually linked in manifold ways, mutually influencing their evolution.²⁶ In this volume, we will therefore not articulate an ideological 'essence' of antiliberalism, but instead define antiliberalism as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as antiliberal, and recognized as such by other self-proclaimed antiliberals, over time and space. In doing so, we will focus on the perceptions and categorizations of historical actors (both advocates and enemies of antiliberalism) in their specific contexts, rather than applying (present-day) conceptualizations to characterize phenomena and ideas from the past.

Antiliberalism and illiberalism

In the 2020s, research into the origins of antiliberalism has increasingly been overshadowed by new publications on the phenomenon of 'illiberalism'. 'Illiberalism' has been defined as a 'set of social, political, cultural, legal, and mental phenomena

associated with the waning of individual liberty (personal freedom) as an everyday experience'.²⁷ The concept of an 'illiberal democracy' was coined by American journalist and writer Fareed Zakaria in 1997.²⁸ The label gained notoriety through a 2014 speech in which Victor Orban proudly proclaimed Hungary to be an 'illiberal democracy'.²⁹ Since, the term 'illiberalism' has become a somewhat fluid shibboleth for authoritarian, yet often elected leaders to endorse manipulations of liberal elements of the polity (e.g. reducing freedoms, questioning the independent judiciary, rejecting the protection of minority rights, pitting populist nativism against progressive cosmopolitanism), while upholding some procedural elements of electoral democracy.³⁰

In 2022, the *Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism* appeared, co-edited by Stephen Holmes. In this handbook, various aspects of illiberalism are discussed, including theory, practices, and institutions. As the *Handbook* makes clear, the concepts of illiberalism and antiliberalism show many similarities.³¹ Most notably, and as elucidated by others, both terms are fundamentally defined in opposition to, and with reference, to liberalism.³² However, how proponents of anti- and illiberalism understand liberalism is highly dependent on cultural and historical contexts. Twenty-first-century illiberals, for instance, often use the concept of '(national) conservatism' as a label to describe their own ideological outlook. By adopting the mantle of a respectable historical tradition, these antiliberals tend to downplay the radicalism of their policies and convictions.³³

Nevertheless, conceptual differences and nuances between anti- and illiberalism have been distinguished in the literature. Antiliberalism, to begin with, could be considered the result of conscious reflection, the domain of intellectual history.³⁴ Illiberalism, by contrast, foregrounds an ideologically laden contemporary backlash against the perceived hegemony of the Western liberal-democratic template for organizing the polity—and its concomitant cultural, geopolitical, and civilizational scripts. As Marlene Laruelle argues, it is a 'new ideological universe' primarily aimed against the liberal equation in democracy, which, the advocates of illiberalism argue, should be renegotiated, modified, manipulated, and sometimes outright abolished in favour of a 'majoritarian, nation-centric or sovereigntist' political culture.³⁵

Whereas the earliest ideological origins of antiliberalism as a(n) (invented) tradition can be dated to the early nineteenth century, when historical protagonists started to describe themselves as antiliberals, illiberalism is a more recent orientation that does not always boast an (invented) historical pedigree.³⁶ However, it should be pointed out that contemporary antiliberals differ fundamentally from older specimens by their usurpation of democratic and egalitarian ideas. In addition, the antiliberal tradition, according to Holmes, has strong associations with the 'Counter-Enlightenment', whereas illiberals—like liberals—position themselves as successors to the Enlightenment.³⁷ Finally, as the case of Orban shows, self-defined illiberals claim not merely to oppose contemporary forms of post 1989-liberalism altogether, but also eclectically and selectively use—and often manipulate—liberal values and institutions for their own purposes, whereas, following the *Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism*, self-defined antiliberals seek to do away with liberalism altogether.³⁸

These contradictions and contested definitions represent a key area of investigation for our volume. As Marlene Laruelle points out in her contribution, despite a ‘theoretical dividing line’ between anti- and illiberalism, these distinctions remain ‘empirically blurry’. This conceptual fluidity is, according to Laruelle, particularly evident when opting for an emic perspective (focusing on the perceptions of the actors under study—as we propose in our volume) rather than an etic perspective (focusing on the perceptions of external observers, such as researchers). The case studies of our chapters abundantly demonstrate that ‘liberalism’ and ‘anti-liberalism’ cannot be considered as fixed entities, as (anti) liberalism was and is as much defined by its enemies as by its advocates.

A forgotten transnational history

This blurred line between liberalism and anti- or illiberalism is especially apparent in the case of the international actors who are the focus of our volume. Depending on the context, they may present themselves as both liberal and antiliberal, a flexibility enabled by the fact that many do not reject liberalism in its entirety, as many chapters in this volume clearly show. For example, while they repudiate certain aspects (ranging from liberal support for open markets to global elites and institutions), other aspects (such as modern technology) are embraced.³⁹ This selective appropriation of liberal elements by antiliberal actors has been analysed by Philippa Hetherington and Glenda Sluga in a themed issue of the *Journal of World History* on ‘Liberal and Illiberal Internationalisms’.⁴⁰ Hetherington and Sluga argue that liberal and illiberal movements and actors have historically ‘cooperated, co-mingled and co-produced one another on an international plane’.⁴¹ Far from seeing illiberal and liberal as distinct, neatly separable or even entirely opposed ideologies, they demonstrate that the relationship between liberalism and its would-be challengers is one of ‘ideological liminality’, or what Laruelle terms in her chapter a ‘blending’ of liberal and illiberal grammars.

This entangled relation between liberalism and antiliberalism in the international sphere has long been overlooked by many scholars. It is only in recent years, for instance, that the topic of antiliberal internationalism has also come on the radar of scholars working on transnational history. Transnational history gained popularity in the 1990s as a result of historiographical debates, in particular in Germany and the United States, aimed at overcoming the dominance of the ‘nation’ in history writing. Its rise was informed by the process of globalization which seemed to call into question the self-evidence of the nation state as a ‘natural’ unit of analysis.⁴² In the last three decades, historians working from a transnational perspective have studied the “people, ideas, products, processes and patterns that operate over, across, beyond, above, under, or in-between polities and societies” and examined the foreign contributions to phenomena that are considered to be domestic as well as the “projection of domestic features” on phenomena from abroad.⁴³ In so doing, they have paid particular attention to the transformative character of transnational transfers, highlighting the agency of the receiving culture as well as processes of appropriation and de- and re-contextualization.⁴⁴

While transnational history has been a very fruitful field of studies, resulting in a stream of scholarly publications, including the *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* and the *Yearbook of Transnational History*, the ‘dark history’ of cross-border exchanges and the suppression or elimination of international entanglements still remain largely understudied. Kiran Klaus Patel and Jan R uger have pointed to the tenacious normative presupposition that “‘transnational’ and ‘international’ equals ‘liberal’ and anti-national”, which goes hand in hand with the assumption that inter-or transnational links by definition have “positive” or even “de-nationalizing” effects. Patel and R uger argue that nationalization and transnationalization or globalization are not mutually exclusive, but instead often intertwined. Moreover, they call for more scholarly attention to processes of disintegration, rather than integration, and to the transnational links and flows of nonliberal or nationalist ideas and practices, such as the cross-border cooperation of antisemites and racists or the transnational dimensions of conflicts and wars.⁴⁵

In 2020, G. John Ikenberry has interpreted the history of liberal internationalism, understood “as a set of ideas about how the world works [and] as a political project”, as one shaped by critical turning points (1918, 1945, 1991, and today) that have urged liberal internationalists “to rethink their understanding of modernity and recast their ambitions and goals”.⁴⁶ Mainly understood in the context of international relations, Ikenberry identifies a liberal internationalist tradition that is distinct from “closed and not rules-based” nonliberal international orders, as it is based on liberal characteristics such as ‘openness, the rule of law, and principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination’. However, as Ikenberry acknowledges, the liberal international order’s infrastructure ‘does not itself have liberal properties’, nor do liberal democracies refrain from ‘illiberal’ acts, as the projects of colonialism and imperialism have attested to.⁴⁷ Although Ikenberry provides inroads into and examples of the *nonliberal* variations of internationalism, his conception of the international too is ultimately informed by its liberal renditions.

Since the 2010s, various scholars have put this alternative agenda for transnational history into practice, for instance by studying topics such as the ‘transnational transfer of eugenics’.⁴⁸ Especially the global and international dimensions of fascism and mid-twentieth-century authoritarianism have received more coverage from historians.⁴⁹ Another subject that has attracted the interest of scholars working on transnational history are the antiliberal aspects of the European idea and project.⁵⁰ An important contribution to this trend is the volume *Antiliberal Europe* (2014).⁵¹ Editor Dieter Gosewinkel rightly argues that European integration is usually regarded as an exclusively liberal project. *Antiliberal Europe*, by contrast, explores the European ideals of anti-modernist Catholics, conservatives, right-wing radicals as well as communists, arguing that antiliberal concepts in twentieth-century Europe were not the counterpart to, but instead embedded within the process of European integration. However, apart from Fabian Klose’s chapter – which analyses colonial perspectives on Europe’s antiliberal, colonial project – the volume only discusses Europe as a world region.⁵² Thus antiliberal internationalism, as a transnational phenomenon with a long and global historical

pedigree, still needs a more comprehensive exploration beyond the traditional focus on Europe. This volume aims to partly fill this void.

Nineteenth-century precedents

Throughout modern history, the international sphere formed the institutional setting where liberalism and antiliberalism developed in dialogue. This joint evolution did not start in the twentieth century. The first to use the word ‘international’ was the English scholar Jeremy Bentham in the 1780s.⁵³ By then, a system of international law had been developed by legal scholars, as well as an enlightened theory of the European state system. In the eighteenth century, various proposals had also been formulated to attain ‘perpetual peace’ by the establishment of various forms of federations that could mediate in conflicts between states.⁵⁴ The French Revolution destroyed the old international order of the *Ancien Régime* and launched debates on the formation of a new international system and ways to incorporate the revolutionary republic into this new order.⁵⁵ The system of the revolutionary ‘Sister Republics’ loyal to the French original that came into being on the European continent after 1792 was replaced by the hierarchical and military Napoleonic Empire in 1804.

After the collapse of the Empire in 1814, a new international order was constructed during the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). On the one hand, the diplomats in 1814 tried to recreate the old balance of power that had existed in Europe before 1795, allegedly destroyed by the revolutionary and Napoleonic murderous despotism. The diversity of the European monarchical family was contrasted to the homogeneous rules and laws imposed upon all its subject populations by Napoleon and the revolutionaries. On the other hand, ‘Vienna’ was supposed to inaugurate a new era in which conflicts were no longer mediated by warfare but by skilled diplomats during conferences. The long European history of armed conflict was finally over, or so they believed.⁵⁶

It could be argued that the Vienna system was an early form of ‘antiliberal internationalism’. The aim of this new order was to make sure European states collaborated to prevent a new, destructive revolution. Beatrice de Graaf and others have argued that the Congress of Vienna established a ‘European security system’ with the aim of extinguishing rebellion and anarchy through the cooperation of the various states.⁵⁷ ‘Liberals’ were regarded with suspicion, as they were seen as the intellectual proponents of the revolutionary legacy.⁵⁸ At the same time, new research has shown that the Vienna statesmen were far from reactionary, at least in their own eyes. Metternich and others were convinced that they had succeeded in putting into practice the enlightened dream of attaining perpetual peace. For the most part, the Vienna statesmen described themselves as ‘moderates’, trying to preserve peace and stability, fighting against the radicalism of both the right and the left.⁵⁹

Notwithstanding these enlightened aims, it cannot be denied that the Vienna system acquired more repressive features after 1818, when the initial optimism and longing for peace receded. Moreover, the Vienna order was by definition a European and not a global system: other parts of the world were not seen as equal

partners in this new international order. In opposition to the allegedly ‘realistic’ political and legal systems of the post-Napoleonic order, in the middle of the nineteenth century, an international law tradition was redeveloped as ‘a gentle civilizer of nations’, which tried to find a middle way between the political realism of the Restoration diplomacy and the more idealistic concepts of natural law.⁶⁰

Phases of internationalism

In the late nineteenth century, the word ‘internationalism’ was first used. The concept was at first primarily associated with socialism and communism by both its proponents and detractors, unsurprising given that ‘internationalism’ was coined in relation to the Communist International.⁶¹ However, another expression of late nineteenth-century internationalism was the Peace Movement, with its ambition to install a world government to bring peace to a suffering humanity. According to Glenda Sluga, twentieth-century internationalism differed from these more utopian and antinational articulations of internationalism of the late nineteenth century, in the sense ‘that [it] was imagined through the same dominant lens of realism as nationalism, often with a similar defensiveness about its realist and idealist imperatives’.⁶²

This new nationally oriented twentieth-century internationalism, Sluga argues, went through five distinct phases. As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, this chronological evolution can be discerned for both liberal and antiliberal internationalism. The first phase was the era from the late nineteenth century until the First World War. The internationalism of the beginning of the twentieth century had a cosmopolitan outlook in line with the developments of the late nineteenth century. Nationalism and internationalism were perceived to be antithetical and even antagonistic. Various organizations around the world called for a ‘world federation’ that was supposed to replace the world of warring states. Characteristics of this cosmopolitan internationalism of the *Fin de siècle* were the peace movement, women’s organizations, and those advocating world solidarity of members of the same class or race. Religious organizations propagated a world community on the basis of faith, rather than socio-economic principles and class. Yet the ideological foundations of the postwar League of Nations were also built in these years, and for some, the reality of the nation state had first to be acknowledged in order to build a modern world community.⁶³

The second phase began with the outbreak of the First World War.⁶⁴ After the Armistice (1918) and Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920), the internationalism of the interbellum years above all took shape in the form of the League of Nations. Rather than replacing the nation state, the League was an international organization based on the principle of the nation state. Susan Pedersen and others have highlighted the deeply ambivalent character of the League. On the one hand, it was an instrument of great power politics, protecting the imperial ambitions of Britain and France. On the other, it also provided a forum for those critical of the European empires. Through the League, women and people of colour achieved a voice in the international system, without of course any semblance of equality.⁶⁵ In the 1930s,

antiliberals such as Italian fascists or representatives of authoritarian states such as Japan tried to influence the workings of the League, demonstrating that an international institution founded by liberals could also be mobilized for antiliberal agendas. And the League's weak enforcement mechanisms – exacerbated by American isolationism – underscored its inability to thwart antiliberal actors.⁶⁶ Moreover, as Tara Zahra has shown, the interbellum was also a period of antiglobalism, which was not confined to the antiliberal right.⁶⁷

The era after the end of the Second World War, the third phase, marked for Sluga the 'apogee of internationalism'.⁶⁸ The victory over Fascism and Nazism created a unique moment in the mid- and late 1940s for international governments and institutions, perhaps not unlike the years after the fall of the Napoleonic Empire.⁶⁹ Many blueprints were written for a new international order that would arise on the ashes of the old world which had been destroyed by global warfare.⁷⁰ The first of these blueprints was the new liberal international order constructed on the basis of the principles of the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Liberal democracy, controlled and directed by elites and coupled with a managed capitalist system and welfare state, formed the fundamentals of a new postwar consensus in the West.⁷¹

However, this short internationalist moment was soon overshadowed by the increasing divisions of the nascent Cold War and, in the West, by the virulent anti-communism of the 1950s, which undermined the liberal and progressive character of the United Nations. Soon the nation state, rather than a post-national world government, was again firmly at the heart of the international order. The United Nations (UN, 1945), the successor to the League, became a forum for superpower politics rather than the embodiment of the spirit of a new global age.⁷² Mark Mazower has pointed to the continuities between these two international organizations and, in his *No Enchanted Palace*, analysed how the founding of the United Nations, just like the League of Nations, was partly informed by imperial interests.⁷³ Western European countries responded to their loss of power in the new, bipolar world order of the Cold War by founding the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) followed by the EEC in 1957. This supranational organization fostered a progressive image of peace based upon economic cooperation. However, the reformist ideas behind it also drew from conservative traditions of thought, like technocratic corporatism and (neo)colonialism.⁷⁴

A similar ideological ambiguity applies to human rights, one of the apparent hallmarks of the liberal order that emerged after 1945. Often painted with the triumphalist narrative of nation states 'learning' from the Holocaust and the Second World War, human rights have recently come under scrutiny from scholars who point to the often overlooked conservative and Catholic agendas, and perhaps even fascist origins, of postwar human rights discourse.⁷⁵ Nor could the liberal West truly claim a monopoly on human rights, given the key role of the USSR in shaping the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).⁷⁶ Likewise, although the institutions of European integration clearly centered on human rights, as seen with the Council of Europe's adoption of a separate European Convention of Human Rights (1950) and the creation of a European Human Rights Commission (1954) and a European Court of Human Rights (1959), these institutions coexisted

with the ongoing imperialist ambitions of key members of the nascent European community. Thus, while Western Europeans positioned themselves as a unique authority on human rights questions, postwar ‘liberal’ human rights have rightly been critiqued for their Eurocentrism and inconsistencies when it came to violations of rights within the colonial sphere.⁷⁷

The 1970s formed the fourth phase in the evolution of twentieth-century internationalism. During this often-overlooked decade, the supremacy of the United States in international relations became increasingly questioned, even by American president Richard Nixon himself. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger became convinced that realism dictated that international relations must be based on a ‘balance of power’ rather than the hegemony of one state, an idea that had been key to the nineteenth-century Anglo-European international order. A handful of great powers, in his view, should decide jointly on global security rather than one (or two) superpowers.⁷⁸ The ‘global south’, consisting mainly of former colonized countries, demanded an even larger say in the running of international relations.⁷⁹ Topics like racial and gender equality were increasingly discussed in the international forum.⁸⁰ Human rights became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy under President Jimmy Carter, but its origins as a doctrine can also be found in Asia, Eastern Europe, and, above all, South America. Moreover, the seventies felt more global because the structural globalization that had stalled into economic deglobalization during the 1920s and 1930s suddenly restarted.⁸¹

The fifth and final phase of twentieth-century internationalism started with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the end of the Cold War after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. In many ways, according to Sluga, this moment constituted the end of a distinct form of internationalism based on the nation state. In the 1990s, a new language of post-nationalism was voiced, and experts articulated the view that nation states would be superseded by a new era of supranational sovereignty, with institutions such as the European Union inaugurating a world uniquely consisting of liberal democracies and a globally integrated market. Even the old ideal of cosmopolitanism was given a new life by intellectuals. In some ways, as Sluga observes, the post-nationalism of the 1990s meant a return to the *fin-de-siècle*, when the belief was voiced that the days of the nation state were finally over.⁸²

Chapter contributions

Although the mutually constitutive relationship between liberal and antiliberal internationalisms of the last two centuries has received some scholarly attention, as we have highlighted in the previous section, the historical trajectories and global reach of antiliberal internationalism still remain understudied. What is more: the progressive and liberal agendas of the proponents of international life continue to be taken for granted in the public mind. The aim of this volume is to problematize this self-evident association of ‘internationalism’ with ‘liberalism’ by partly filling this scholarly lacuna and presenting a wider and perhaps also less favourable

interpretation of international life in the twentieth century, building on the trailblazing works of Sluga, Hetherington and Jessica Reinisch among others. The various chapters in the volume chart the many-sided aspects of twentieth-century internationalism by focusing on specific case studies. The volume is divided into various parts more or less along the phases discerned by Sluga, with a theoretical part at the beginning and a reflective epilogue at the end of the volume.

The theoretical reflection in the first part starts with the chapter by Marlene Laruelle, who refines the uses of the concepts of illiberalism and antiliberalism. She briefly explores what she calls liberalism's "prefixes issue" in order to establish a basic typology of these concepts that derives from liberalism, and then challenge that same categorization by showing the fluidity in their emic use. The economic dimensions of the complex twentieth-century history of international political objectives comprise the topic of Glenda Sluga's chapter, precisely because of the evasiveness of the adjective *liberal*, whether added to 'international order' or 'internationalisms'. Her aim is not to argue that the liberal international order is, or has been, fundamentally illiberal. Rather, she takes a closer look at the character of the liberalism that has so fundamentally motivated and authorized ordering on an international scale.

António Costa Pinto's chapter deals with the first wave of autocratization that followed in response to the first wave of democratization at the turn of the twentieth century associated with globalization and economic liberalism. This first autocratization was marked by a double dynamic of an authoritarian alternative to political and economic liberalism, giving rise to dictatorships that projected and built politics, and State-led social and economic institutions aimed at combating liberal democracy, laissez-faire capitalism, and liberal internationalism. The hypothesis tested in this chapter is that authoritarian corporatism constitutes the political and institutional cement of this reverse wave of the so-called "Era of Fascism".

The second part of the book deals with the early twentieth century and the interbellum, i.e. the 1920s and 1930s. In their contribution, Saimaiti Maimaitiming and Klaus Weber discuss the intellectual transfers between, on the one hand, the Wilhelminian *Kaiserreich*, and, on the other hand, the late Qing and the late Ottoman Empires, in the last decades of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth centuries. They clearly show how the German Empire became a model for antiliberal modernization all over the world, and how antiliberal transfers of state officials and students between China, Turkey, and Europe took place. In his chapter on Kalidas Nag and the Oriental League of Nations, Arnab Dutta demonstrates the complexities of discerning between liberal and antiliberal internationalism in the case of British Bengal in India from the 1920s to the 1940s. Nag navigated and challenged the prevailing Eurocentric liberal internationalist order by proposing alternative visions like the 'Oriental League of Nations' and reimagining spatial boundaries. Jonathan Voges, finally, argues in his contribution on Gonzague de Reynold, Alfredo Rocco, and Hugo Andres Krüss in the International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation that antiliberals not only tried to resist international organizations but tried to shape them as well; by means of 'technical cooperation',

they aimed to counter liberal internationalism by denying any political surplus from cooperation in the international sphere.

In the third part of the volume, the contributions consider fascist internationalism and its legacies. The first chapter by Katy Hull deals with the transatlantic impact of fascism. Hull argues that ambivalence towards liberal individualism and representative democracy was widespread in the United States after the First World War. In studying the writings of Richard Washburn Child and Anne O'Hare Cormick, she shows how these observers' selective references to fascism led to reimagining the Italian example and thus understating the repressive elements of Mussolini's regime. Baijayanti Roy's topic in the next chapter is the "German Society" of the Aligarh Muslim University in North India as a vehicle for Nazi propaganda aimed at the Islamic World. By analysing how the society promoted various antiliberal ideas through its journals and activities, Roy highlights its selective appropriation of Nazi ideology to further its own ethno-religious and nationalist political agenda in late colonial India. Brandon Bloch in the third chapter in this part locates the surprising origins of international Refugee Law after the Second World War in the pan-German nationalism of the Habsburg Empire. Showing how Theodor Veiter consistently sought to recover Habsburg models of federalism and "national autonomy", Bloch argues that his ideas gained renewed relevance as postwar human rights accords failed to stop the problem of mass displacement, even as Veiter never repudiated his Nazi entanglements.

The fourth part of the volume treats the antiliberalism of the postwar world and the early Cold War. Sungik Yang's chapter interrogates South Korean scepticism towards Western Liberalism in the period from 1945 to 1960. Koreans rejected both American/Western and Soviet/Communist models, focusing instead on the primacy of national and ethnic identity over class or individual interests, in accordance with the doctrine of Ilch'eron or "One-Body-ism". This entailed a philosophical approach that combined the "half-philosophies" of materialism and idealism (manifested as communism and capitalist democracy) into a singular, cohesive ideology. It also reflected a persistent interest in association with other postcolonial and developing nations, despite close economic and military relations with the United States. Katherine Booska's subsequent chapter considers the American Catholic Traditionalism of Hungarian-born Thomas Molnar and its global ramifications. Her chapter explores how, in Molnar's writing, it is possible to see the full flourishing of a Catholic metaphysical critique of liberalism, and the antiliberal social thought it produces. It then re-situates Molnar as a thinker and observer of international relations, highlighting the oft-forgotten international consequences of domestic antiliberal politics. Siobhán Amelia Smith, finally, examines the paradoxical nature of how the Rhodesian Front contested fundamental liberal principles while its officials harnessed liberal internationalist language and ideas to generate international support for its antiliberal regime. Exploring British and American government responses to the Rhodesian 'pariah' state, this chapter also exemplifies the contradictions and inconsistencies of their liberal internationalism in practice and ultimately problematizes a clear demarcation between antiliberal and liberal internationalism.

In this volume too, the 1970s are regarded as a watershed as the fifth part of this volume attests to. Tomohito Baji's chapter seeks to enrich the study of post-colonial internationalism by drawing attention to Pacific indigenous projects for an international community. It specifically focuses on the efforts of Hau'ofa as he provided a distinctive and influential account of internationalism to secure sovereignty or complete autonomy for South Pacific islanders. He argues that analysing Hau'ofa's work can make an important contribution to this theme because his account of oceanic internationalism stemmed from his critical stance on forms of liberalism. Avital Sicron, subsequently, traces the roots of Israeli antiliberalism to the activities of New York-born Meir Kahane in the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter demonstrates that the main driving force behind Kahane's activities in Israel was his adoption of systemic racism, inspired by American ideas about 'white supremacy'. By using concepts taken from Judaism, particularly the notion of religious purity, Kahane rephrased antiliberal racism in a way that was more appealing to the Israeli public, thus promoting the diffusion of antiliberal systemic racism into Israeli society.

Chloe Kattar explores in her chapter the trajectory of the word "dhimmitude" in international far-right circles both in print and virtually with a particular attention given to internet media outlets and their ability to spread and multiply the uses and misuses, hybridizations, and deformations of foreign concepts into ad hoc slogans. Tracing the evolution of dhimmitude and its adaptation by and through different authors, we observe in this study a shift in focus from historical analysis to contemporary socio-political commentary, as well as a divergence in interpretations and implications of dhimmitude in a variety of Western contexts. The final chapter by Iason Zarikos and Georgios Giannakopoulos analyses the rise of left-wing anti-austerity movements in the European south during the apex of the debt crisis. By focusing on the precarious alliance between the Greek Syriza and the Spanish Podemos, the chapter discusses the political language of internationalism pursued by both political formations. It argues for the problematization of the distinction between liberal and antiliberal internationalism, as both movements articulated a version of internationalism that, despite its socialist lineage, borrowed crucial elements from the liberal political imagery.

The sixth and final part consists of the epilogue to this volume, written by Benjamin Teitelbaum. By examining the motivations and implications of studying antiliberal movements, Teitelbaum highlights the role of right-wing populist forces in reshaping societal norms and political structures. The chapter reveals how radical right movements, taking cues from Scandinavia, the United States, and Brazil, have disrupted traditional power balances and cultural norms, but are now facing a shift towards post-populism. This transition reflects the paradox of populists becoming part of the establishments they once opposed, leading to new forms of conservatism and institutional entrenchment. Additionally, the epilogue further investigates the implications of these changes for the future of social movements, proposing that the tech industry, with its unique demographic and ideological characteristics, may become the new frontier for right-wing innovation and antiliberal thought.

Conclusion: trajectories of antiliberal internationalism

Taken together, the chapters in this volume show that antiliberal discourse, thought, and mobilization, in defiance of their often nationalist aims, have to a large extent been shaped and determined in the international sphere in the twentieth century. In certain ways, these twentieth-century antiliberals could build on older networks of cosmopolitan counter-revolutionaries and conservatives in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁸³ Despite often drawing inspiration from nationalist movements and ideologies, antiliberalism is a phenomenon that transcends domestic contexts and settings in important ways. Historical and contemporary actors borrow concepts from varying ideological frameworks that cut across national (and cultural) boundaries and political traditions, prompting the question of whether the ideological left-right dichotomy is helpful in understanding antiliberal internationalism in the first place, and if not, whether more yielding analytical categories are available to scholars.

A common characteristic of these self-defined critics of liberalism is that they reject the cosmopolitanism and internationalism they associate with the liberal order. They see hybrid and post-national identities as a form of corruption by liberal elites. Instead, they champion national (or in some settings regional) sovereignty and firm religious and national boundaries. In many ways, mainstream media, politicians, and academics have adopted this worldview in their analysis, asserting that the political domain in the early twenty-first century is divided between ‘national conservatives’ on the one hand and liberal cosmopolitans on the other. However, as the chapters in this volume show, antiliberals were often as international in their outlook, network, and behaviour as their self-styled liberal counterparts.

Notes

- 1 Teitelbaum, *War for Eternity*.
- 2 O’Meara, *New Culture*; Nissen, *Europeanisation*; Berntzen and Weisskircher, “Anti-Islamic PEGIDA beyond Germany”; Lukin, “The Russia–China Entente and Its Future”; Jerryson, “Buddhism, Conflict, and Peace Building.”
- 3 Bortun, “‘SYRIZA and Podemos, We Shall Overcome?’” See also the chapter by Zarikos and Giannakopoulos in this volume.
- 4 See for older patterns of antiliberal internationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century: Lok, Pestel, and Reboul, eds., *Cosmopolitan Conservatism*.
- 5 On global history and the critique of Eurocentrist historiography: Conrad, *What Is Global History?*. Cf. Brolsma, De Bruin, and Lok, eds., *Eurocentrism in European History and Memory*.
- 6 The experience of totalitarianism and the Second World War of course prompted historians and philosophers to look for the intellectual origins of Nazism and Fascism (although they usually did not foreground the concept of antiliberalism): Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*; Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*; Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*; Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*; Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*.
- 7 Holmes, *The Anatomy*, xii.
- 8 Holmes, *The Anatomy*, xi.
- 9 Holmes, *The Anatomy*, xvi.
- 10 Holmes, “The Antiliberal Idea.”

- 11 D'Emic, "Market Liberalism and Antiliberalism"; Schäfer, *American Evangelicals*.
- 12 Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas."
- 13 Stovall, *White Freedom*.
- 14 Klose, "Europe as a Colonial Project"; Benton, *They Called It Peace*.
- 15 Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*.
- 16 Lok, *Europe against Revolution*, 263–70.
- 17 Van der Meer, *Performing Power*, 52–55.
- 18 Hence the suggestion that the semantic polarity between liberalism and some of the features of anti-liberalism is overstated. See Freeden, "The Elusiveness of European (Anti) Liberalism," 38.
- 19 Rosenblatt, *The Lost History of Liberalism*. For an alternative history of liberalism, see also De Dijn, *Freedom*.
- 20 Freeden, Fernández-Sebastián, and Leonhard, eds., *In Search of European Liberalisms*; Leonhard, *Liberalismus*.
- 21 Bayly, *Recovering Liberties*, in particular 311–42.
- 22 Fawcett, *Liberalism*, 2–4.
- 23 Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 141–65.
- 24 Bell, "What Is Liberalism?"
- 25 Bell unjustly discards in his article the contribution of the critics to the formation of twentieth century liberalism. Bell, "What Is Liberalism?" 691.
- 26 A parallel can be made with the study of the critics of the Enlightenment, which increasingly are regarded as part of the problem of studying the Enlightenment. See for instance McMahan, *Enemies of the Enlightenment*.
- 27 Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes, "Preface," xxi. See also the chapter by Marlene Laruelle in this volume.
- 28 Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy."
- 29 Viktor Orbán's speech at the XXV. Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Camp, 26th July, 2014.
- 30 Rosenmann, De Lange, and Couperus, "Editorial."
- 31 Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes, *Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism*. Cf. Laruelle, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism*.
- 32 Laruelle, "Illiberalism."
- 33 See more extensively: Lok, "Illiberal Ideas."
- 34 'Antiliberalism' is defined as 'a programmatic reaction to liberalism, and it comprises widely varied strains of thought and moral and ideological commitments.' Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes, "Preface," xxiii.
- 35 Laruelle, "Illiberalism," 304.
- 36 The concept of illiberalism has a history too: Rosenblatt, "The History of Illiberalism," 16–32.
- 37 Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes, "Preface," xxii. On the problem of Counter-Enlightenment, see McMahan, "What Is Counter-Enlightenment?"
- 38 Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes, "Preface," xxiii. For instance, see Viktor Orbán's speech at the XXV. Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Camp (2014). See for the concepts of illiberalism and antiliberalism also the chapter by Laruelle in this volume.
- 39 See the chapter by Sluga in this volume.
- 40 Themed issue on "Liberal and Illiberal Internationalisms." See also the chapter by Sluga in this volume as well as the volume *Internationalists in European History*, edited by David Brydon and Jessica Reinisch.
- 41 Hetherington and Sluga, "Introduction," 2.
- 42 For example: Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond." For an overview of the history of transnational history, see Saunier, *Transnational History*, 13–32.
- 43 Saunier, *Transnational History*, 3; Iriye and Saunier, "Introduction," xviii.
- 44 Adam, "Transnational History," 5.

- 45 Patel, "Transnational History"; Rüger, "OXO," 661.
- 46 Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy*, 7–8
- 47 Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy*, 16–19.
- 48 Adam, *Intercultural Transfers*, 60–76.
- 49 Herren, "Fascist Internationalism"; Bauerkämper and Rossolinski-Liebe, eds., *Fascism without Borders*; see also the chapter by Antonio Pinto da Costa in this volume.
- 50 For example: Duranti, "European Integration"; Klein, "Nazi Europeanism."
- 51 Gosewinkel, ed., *Anti-liberal Europe*.
- 52 Klose, "Europe as a Colonial project," 48.
- 53 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 3. On early conceptions of the 'international' Armitage, *Foundations*.
- 54 Ghervas, *Conquering Peace*.
- 55 Belissa, *Repenser l'Ordre*.
- 56 On the Congress of Vienna as the "invention of the international order" Sluga, *The Invention*; De Graaf, De Haan, and Vick, eds., *Securing*; Lok, *Europe against Revolution*.
- 57 De Graaf, *Fighting Terror after Napoleon*.
- 58 For instance by the authoritarian Minister of Justice of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, Cornelis Felix van Maanen (1769–1846). See Lok, *Windvanen*, 287.
- 59 For this revisionist view of Vienna see, among others, De Graaf, *Fighting Terror*; Sluga, *The Invention*; Lok, *Europe against Revolution*, and above all Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*.
- 60 Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*.
- 61 'The abstract noun "internationalism" was an innovation (in both English and French) of this mid-nineteenth century, intended to capture the fulcrum of a new class-based political imaginary that we associate with the First International, and the workers' anthem "The Internationale"; Sluga, *Internationalism*, 4.
- 62 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 2.
- 63 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 11–44.
- 64 Macmillan, *Paris 1919*. On the peace movement after WWII Hathaway and Shapiro, *The Internationalists*.
- 65 Pedersen, *The Guardians*.
- 66 Herren, "Fascist Internationalism."
- 67 Zahra, *Against the World*.
- 68 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 79–117. Cf. Mazower, *Governing the World*, 191–213.
- 69 Stråth, *Europe's Utopias*.
- 70 Mazower, "Blueprints for the Golden Age," 185–214; Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism*.
- 71 Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*.
- 72 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 97–117; Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 215–52; Mazower, *Governing the World*, 214–43.
- 73 Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*.
- 74 Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*; De Bruin, "Indonesian Decolonisation."
- 75 Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*; Duranti, *The Conservative Human Rights Revolution*; Moyn, *Christian Human Rights*; Wheatley, *The Life and Death of State*; Johnston-White, "A Moral Language for Our Time?"
- 76 Van Dijk, "The Great Humanitarian: 209–35.
- 77 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 115.
- 78 Sargent, "The United States."
- 79 Garavini, *After Empires*.
- 80 Hellema, *The Global 1970s*, 64–94.
- 81 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 120.
- 82 Sluga, *Internationalism*, 140–49. Tellingly, in the 1990s and early 2000s many new books were published on the topic of the history of internationalism.
- 83 Lok, Pestel and Reboul, eds., *Cosmopolitan Conservatism*.

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