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Practising what you preach: how cosmopolitanism promotes willingness to redistribute across the European Union

Theresa Kuhn, Hector Solaz and Erika J. van Elsas

ABSTRACT
The political fault lines surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis have underlined the political relevance and the fragile foundation of public support for international redistribution in the European Union. Against the backdrop of an emerging political integration-demarcation divide, this contribution examines how cosmopolitanism structures people’s willingness to redistribute internationally within the European Union. To this aim, we conducted laboratory experiments on redistributive behaviour towards other European citizens in the United Kingdom and Germany and analysed cross-national survey data on support for international redistribution covering the EU-28. Our findings suggest that cosmopolitanism increases generosity towards other Europeans and support for international redistribution even when controlling for self-interest, support for national redistribution, concern for others and political ideology.

KEYWORDS Cosmopolitanism; experiments; international redistribution; sovereign debt crisis

Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis has underlined the political relevance and the fragile foundation of public support for international redistribution in the European Union (EU). Amid unprecedented economic downturn, several member states have received financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (European Commission 2014). European policy makers are currently pushing for further social integration and risk sharing, as highlighted in the Five Presidents’ Report (European Commission 2015).

However, international redistribution is highly contentious, and sceptical public opinion makes it difficult to legitimize such actions (Hobolt 2015).
Citizens do not necessarily adapt their allegiances to the transnationalization of society. Globalization also triggers counter-reactions such as ethnocentrism and parochialism. West European democracies are witnessing the emergence of a new political divide that pits the proponents of globalization against its opponents (Hooghe and Marks 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008). The most salient issues of this conflict are immigration and European integration, and they are predominantly discussed in cultural rather than economic terms (Hooghe and Marks 2017; Teney et al. 2014; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Teney et al. (2014) show that this conflict is related to cosmopolitan and communitarian ideological dispositions. While cosmopolitans favour opening national boundaries and welcome immigration and European integration, communitarians oppose these developments.

It is less clear whether openness towards immigration and European integration is mere lip service or translates into support for international redistribution, especially as much of the current debate focuses on cultural rather than economic aspects. Moreover, while cosmopolitanism entails more open and global orientations, this may not translate into support for redistribution either at home or abroad. Cosmopolitans might be simply too élitist, mobile and detached from society to care for ‘ordinary’ people in need (Calhoun 2002; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Delhey et al. 2015). It is therefore not obvious that cosmopolitanism indeed breeds international solidarity within the European Union.

We ask the following question: are cosmopolitan individuals willing to practise what they preach and share resources with other Europeans? We analyse how cosmopolitanism structures people’s willingness to redistribute within the European Union using laboratory experiments in the United Kingdom and Germany and survey data from 28 EU member states (European Election Study [EES] 2014, see Schmitt et al. [2015]). By studying redistributive behaviour in the laboratory and preferences in a larger sample, we aim at maximizing both internal and external validity of our findings.

Our laboratory evidence suggests that while cosmopolitans do not discriminate between national and European recipients of redistribution, citizens with less cosmopolitan values give significantly less to European recipients compared to fellow nationals. Also in absolute terms, cosmopolitans give more to European recipients. Our cross-national analyses of EES data underscore the external validity of these results: across the EU, cosmopolitanism is strongly associated with support for international redistribution, even after controlling for self-interest, support for national redistribution, political ideology and other relevant covariates.

This study contributes to the debate about support for international redistribution in the EU (Bechtel et al. 2014; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2017) and to research on public support for European integration (for an overview, see Hobolt and de Vries [2016]). By studying
how support for redistribution depends on the recipient’s nationality, it also speaks to research on welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2013; Van der Waal et al. 2010). Our results have important implications for current policy debates, as highlighted in the controversy surrounding bailouts for countries like Greece. Public opinion plays an increasingly important role in shaping policy responses to the sovereign debt crisis (Copelovitch et al. 2016: 832).

What drives support for international redistribution in the European Union?

Research on national redistribution has emphasized the role of self-interest in structuring public opinion (Iversen and Soskice 2001). The central idea is that individuals support redistribution if they expect to benefit from it. Research finds little evidence in support of economic self-interest as a driver of support for international redistribution. Bechtel et al. (2014), for example, develop three mechanisms through which economic self-interest could structure support for international bailouts, but find little empirical support for their expectations. While welfare chauvinism, the preference of excluding foreigners from welfare benefits, is more pervasive among citizens with lower levels of education, Van der Waal et al. (2010) conclude that this is due to lower cultural capital rather than weaker economic positions of lower-educated people.

Partisanship and political ideology also play a role. Bechtel et al. (2014) find that voters of German mainstream parties are more supportive of international bailouts, while an experiment by Stoeckel and Kuhn (2017) shows that voters more generally follow party cues. A recent study finds that left-leaning individuals with higher socio-economic status are more supportive of international bailouts than are those on the right, whereas left-leaning citizens with low socio-economic status are opposed to international bailouts (Kleider and Stoeckel 2016).

Altruism, generally understood as a preference to increase the welfare of others even if this implies a personal loss, might be an alternative motivation for support for (international) redistribution. Fong (2007) shows that altruism drives charitable giving to welfare recipients in the United States, and Bechtel et al. (2014) demonstrate that more altruistic Europeans are more supportive of international economic bailouts.

Bernhard et al. (2006) have made the insightful observation, however, that many people are ‘parochially altruistic’, that is to say they behave altruistically towards their in-group, but less so towards their out-group. Shayo (2009) shows that competing group identifications influence support for redistribution. Group identity comes in many guises such as race, nation, language, gender or organizational and political affiliations, and which identification is most salient is likely context-dependent (Roccas et al. 2008; Shayo 2009).
The most relevant group boundary in the European context is the nation. Most citizens view their national community as the predominant reference point for social solidarity (Whelan and Maître 2009). This is partly due to nation-states having long been the main welfare providers and influencing people’s understanding of who should be in or out. Research on welfare chauvinism shows that some Europeans hold generally egalitarian values, but nonetheless think that foreigners should be excluded from welfare-state provisions (Mewes and Mau 2013). It is therefore possible that Europeans who are generally altruistic do not extend this altruism towards citizens of other countries. They might be concerned for fellow nationals, and might favour equality within their own national community, but not beyond.

More ‘cosmopolitan’ individuals are most likely to overcome these national boundaries of solidarity and do not discriminate against people from other EU member states. Cosmopolitanism has an institutional and a moral-psychological dimension (Zürn 2016). With respect to the latter, Merton (1968) describes cosmopolitans as individuals with a more open, global orientation and higher interest in, and awareness of, distant events, as opposed to ‘locals’ who have an inward-looking perspective. Following Vertovec and Cohen (2002), a cosmopolitan orientation means seeing oneself as citizen of the world and appreciating other human beings irrespective of their national origin. Institutional cosmopolitanism entails the legitimization of supranational authority and the awareness of the increased interconnectedness of political communities (Held 2002: 58).

Cosmopolitan orientations and institutions do not necessarily have a global scope (for a recent review, see Zürn [2016]). In Europe, European integration is an important reference category for cosmopolitanism. In institutional terms, Archibugi (1998: 215–19) sees the EU as the first cosmopolitan model of democracy. In psychological terms, European identity and a positive evaluation of European integration clearly entail a cosmopolitan dimension: by supporting European integration, voters legitimize a supranational polity and accept increased interaction and interdependence with other European countries (Risse 2010: 61).  

Research suggests that cosmopolitanism is indeed linked to international solidarity. Buchan et al. (2009) demonstrate in multilevel sequential co-operation experiments that people holding stronger cosmopolitan attitudes are more likely to co-operate internationally. Paxton and Knack (2012) show that individuals who see themselves as members of the world are more supportive of foreign aid. Cosmopolitanism has also been shown to be the main driver of support for international bailouts among Germans (Bechtel et al. 2014). On the basis of these insights, we formulate the hypothesis:

H1: Individuals with cosmopolitan values are less likely to discriminate against redistribution recipients from other EU member states.
Cosmopolitans, so critics maintain, may be open and global, but they do not necessarily show solidarity towards others, be it from their own country or from abroad. From this perspective, cosmopolitan individuals tend to belong to a privileged group of ‘frequent travellers’ that are increasingly detached from their surroundings, subscribe to neoliberal ideas and even consciously aim at distinguishing themselves from society at large (Calhoun 2002; Sklair 2001). Calhoun (2002) argues that cosmopolitanism has mainly been an élite concept that embraces economistic ideals, and that its understanding of belonging and social life is too thin and superficial to provide a basis for social solidarity. Delhey et al. (2015) argue that with growing economic prosperity, a transnational lifestyle becomes a form of social class distinction. Cosmopolitans might support open borders and common humanity, but still be very reluctant to share their resources with people in need. As Calhoun (2002: 106) puts it, ‘[i]f there is to be a major redistribution of wealth […] it is not likely to be guided by cosmopolitanism’. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H2: While not discriminating against foreigners, cosmopolitans are less generous towards redistribution recipients than individuals with more national orientations.

Measuring willingness to redistribute internationally

Capturing people’s willingness to redistribute internationally in empirical research is not straightforward. Considering that individuals generally tend to see and present themselves as more generous than they really are, analyses of public opinion surveys might suffer from social desirability bias (Cram and Patrikios 2015). Hence, a large body of research in experimental economics following the footsteps of Kahneman et al. (1986) relies on laboratory experiments to analyse which factors influence individuals’ sharing behaviour. By studying actual behaviour rather than stated preferences, laboratory experiments reduce the risk of social desirability bias. Moreover, random assignment to different treatments, a highly homogeneous participant pool and a controlled environment increase internal validity by isolating the causal relationships. This comes, however, at the potential loss of external validity: it is not clear whether the relationships found in the laboratory extend beyond this context and generally apply to a more heterogeneous population.

Hence, we combine laboratory experiments in Germany and the United Kingdom with cross-national survey data from the EES (Schmitt et al. 2015) on preferences for international redistribution. This enables us to see whether the redistributive behaviour in the laboratory – involving real costs – also holds in a more representative sample across the EU.
Laboratory experiment

We conducted laboratory experiments in four locations in Germany and the United Kingdom. These experiments were conducted in April and May 2013 in the midst of one of the deepest crises of the EU when questions of intra-EU solidarity and perceptions of national stereotypes were part and parcel of the media debate. This background lends our laboratory experiments more credibility and highlights the importance of measuring people’s willingness to redistribute in a more stylized way which is less prone to social desirability compared to survey responses. The experiments were designed to capture people’s redistributive behaviour and how this varies for national and international recipients. Hence, the experiments had to involve citizens from different countries and take place in different EU member states. Participants were linked to each other across locations. Only by doing so can we analyse people’s redistributive behaviour across countries without deceiving experimental participants. The experiments took place in experimental laboratories in four locations: Oxford ($n = 63$), Edinburgh ($n = 43$), Munich ($n = 43$) and Berlin ($n = 68$) using the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We opted for Germany and the United Kingdom because they differ with respect to public opinion towards European integration.

Experimental participants were recruited by the laboratories from a university student population. Only German and UK citizens were allowed to participate in the German and UK locations, respectively. Participants received an initial show-up fee and could keep the payoffs they had earned in the games. On average, participants earned €20 in Germany and £19 in the United Kingdom. Table A1 (appendix) shows the descriptive statistics. Not surprisingly for a university student sample, the mean and standard deviation of participants’ age is low.³ It is well documented that university students are very pro-EU, both due to their young age and their high level of education, which are important predictors of EU support (Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Kuhn 2012). Citizens with higher levels of education are also less opposed to immigration (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). This arguably stacks the odds against finding significant differences among a relatively homogeneous group of participants.

The experiments capture redistributive behaviour using so-called dictator games, but enriched with a design that reflects the multilevel politics in the EU. The first use of dictator games is attributed to Kahneman et al. (1986), and this strand of research has become standard in behavioural economics. Dictator games and similar decision games have also become increasingly popular among researchers interested in political behaviour (Landa and Duell 2015).

Each participant was confronted with three decisions. In each decision, participants received an initial endowment to be paid out in cash at the end of
the experiment. Participants decided whether to keep it or to allocate it to another anonymous and randomly chosen recipient. Participants received different informational cues about where the recipient was located: either the same town, the same country or another EU member state. The order of the decisions was randomized. The amount a donor sent to a recipient captures their redistributive behaviour. Each participant’s payoff depended on their own decisions and on other participants’ decisions. Participants were not informed about the decisions taken by their peers, nor did they know whom they were matched with. Following ethical standards in behavioural economics, all information given to participants was accurate. At the end, participants answered a short questionnaire.

Operationalizations

The unit of analysis refers to individual decisions. Decisions referred to redistributing locally, nationally or internationally. We present pooled analyses of decisions nested in participants (using a random effects model to account for the within-participant clustering of observations).

Table B1 (appendix) presents all operationalizations. Our dependent variable is measured through the number of tokens contributed per decision. As key independent variables, we use four measures to operationalize cosmopolitanism. First, participants were asked to indicate on a 0-to-10 scale to what extent they care about the living conditions of people in their city, people in their country, people in Europe and humankind. We constructed a cosmopolitanism scale by subtracting the (average) indicated concern for the well-being of people in one’s city and country from the (average) concern for people outside the country, namely people in Europe and humankind in general. Higher scores signify more cosmopolitan attitudes.

Next, as attitudes towards immigration and the EU have been identified as the main issues of the cosmopolitan dimension in Europe (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009), we use disagreement with the general statement that ‘Right now [country] is taking too many immigrants’ on a 0-to-10 scale (with higher scores indicating support for immigration) as an indicator of cosmopolitanism. As a third indicator of cosmopolitan attitudes, we include general EU support, which is measured as evaluations of one’s country’s EU membership as good, bad or neither good nor bad. Finally, cosmopolitan attitudes measured through respondents’ feelings of European identity, namely ‘Do you see yourself as [country national] only/[country national] and European/European and [country national]/European only?’ While membership support relates to the EU, European identity can entail orientations towards Europe as a continent and ethno-cultural community. Moreover, as collective identities are not easily malleable, this measure is likely to be more robust to short-term
changes in performance and output of European institutions than EU membership support (Kuhn 2015).

We control for political ideology, with an 11-point scale of self-placement on a left–right dimension to account for ideology. Given that in many member states citizens at the extremes of the left–right dimension are most Eurosceptic (Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2015), we also include a squared term. According to economic self-interest explanations, individuals with lower socioeconomic status should be less willing to redistribute. Consequently, we refer to participants’ self-reported class status, ranging from working class to upper class. Support for national redistribution is measured as follows: ‘Please indicate to what degree you personally agree with the following statements: right now, differences in incomes are too large in [country]’. Answer categories range from ‘absolutely disagree’ (0) to ‘absolutely agree’ (10). Concern for others (a measure of altruism) is captured through a scale combining two questions relating to how concerned respondents are about different groups of people. All models control for gender.

Results

We analyse the impact of cosmopolitanism on redistributive behaviour within the EU in two ways. First, we look at generosity towards European recipients in comparison to national recipients, in other words, discrimination of European recipients, and whether cosmopolitans discriminate less (H1). Next, it could be that cosmopolitans do not discriminate, but give equally little to both national and European recipients (H2). We therefore also analyse the absolute generosity towards European recipients.

In the first set of analyses, we use the total amount contributed per decision as a dependent variable. The independent variable is whether the contributions go to a local, national or European participant. Contributing less to Europeans compared to nationals is interpreted as evidence for discrimination against European recipients (H1).

Model 0 in Table 1 presents the direct effect of a European recipient cue versus a national recipient cue on the amount contributed, and is insignificant. This means that on average participants do not differentiate between giving to someone from their own country versus from another European member state. However, this does not mean that the origin of the recipient is irrelevant. As shown below, some people give more if they know that the recipient is in another member state. Contributions to local recipients are significantly higher than national contributions. This indicates that participants take the origin of the recipient into account and underscores the power of local ties.

Models 1–4 (Table 1) introduce interaction terms to test our hypothesis that more cosmopolitan participants are more generous towards other Europeans. The dummy ‘European recipient’ is interacted with our four measures of
**Table 1.** Treatment effects on contributions, interacted with participant characteristics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 0</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No interactions</td>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>European identity</td>
<td>EU support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local recipient (L)</td>
<td>17.62 (8.19)*</td>
<td>16.06 (8.24)*</td>
<td>10.90 (19.19)</td>
<td>-3.07 (14.18)</td>
<td>-58.08 (23.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European recipient (E)</td>
<td>-7.94 (8.19)</td>
<td>-6.03 (8.24)</td>
<td>-60.42 (19.19)**</td>
<td>-32.02 (14.18)*</td>
<td>-93.01 (23.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cosmopolitanism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism scale</td>
<td>17.44 (22.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.66 (6.31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU membership support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48.41 (28.80)*</td>
<td>15.16 (28.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions with recipient</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L*Cosmopolitanism scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.72 (10.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E*Cosmopolitanism scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.00* (10.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L*Support for immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E*Support for immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L*European identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E*European identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L*EU membership support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E*EU membership support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3.46 (3.51)</td>
<td>3.10 (3.56)</td>
<td>3.97 (3.52)</td>
<td>1.25 (3.60)</td>
<td>3.55 (4.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = male)</td>
<td>1.96 (33.50)</td>
<td>-1.03 (33.99)</td>
<td>3.48 (33.42)</td>
<td>15.80 (35.44)</td>
<td>12.38 (33.77)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>-36.92 (18.31)*</td>
<td>-41.48 (18.95)*</td>
<td>-40.24 (18.41)*</td>
<td>-50.36 (19.22)**</td>
<td>-38.60 (18.61)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left–right placement</td>
<td>-4.15 (12.00)</td>
<td>-1.48 (12.32)</td>
<td>1.70 (12.65)</td>
<td>2.54 (12.42)</td>
<td>0.50 (12.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left–right2</td>
<td>-4.51 (3.83)</td>
<td>-4.99 (3.86)</td>
<td>-4.98 (3.83)</td>
<td>-3.85 (3.93)</td>
<td>-3.81 (3.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality aversion</td>
<td>-2.19 (6.82)</td>
<td>-2.04 (7.01)</td>
<td>-2.43 (6.80)</td>
<td>-3.44 (7.29)</td>
<td>-3.84 (6.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for others</td>
<td>30.06 (20.13)</td>
<td>34.75 (20.71)</td>
<td>29.14 (20.08)</td>
<td>32.86 (20.89)</td>
<td>25.53 (20.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>317.70 (105.08)**</td>
<td>346.06 (116.93)**</td>
<td>291.59 (117.21)**</td>
<td>375.92 (115.98)**</td>
<td>304.73 (122.94)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (decisions/subjects)</td>
<td>546/182</td>
<td>534/178</td>
<td>546/182</td>
<td>513/171</td>
<td>537/179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, 1-tailed.

Source: own laboratory experiment. Panel data analysis, individual fixed effects.
cosmopolitanism. For our hypothesis to be supported, we should see significant interaction terms for all measures of cosmopolitanism. This is indeed what we find.

The effects of cosmopolitanism and European recipient cue are visualized in Figure 1. In the left panel, we see that participants scoring low on the cosmopolitanism scale give significantly less to European recipients compared to co-nationals, while cosmopolitans tend to give somewhat more to European recipients. It is noteworthy that the majority of participants have a medium score of cosmopolitanism and do not discriminate either way. Participants who oppose immigration to their country give significantly less to a European recipient compared to a national recipient, while participants in favour of immigration do not discriminate in their contributions (right panel).

If we look at the interaction terms of cosmopolitanism with the local recipient cue (Table 1), only the interaction term with EU membership support is significant. This indicates that cosmopolitanism matters for the distinction between national versus European recipients, but not for national versus local recipients. This supports our general argument that the greatest obstacle to solidarity is the national border. This being said, the finding that people in favour of EU membership give significantly more to locals than to nationals suggests that they are ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who have both ‘roots’ and ‘wings’, as Beck (2002: 19) put it, rather than opposing the global to the local.

We did not find any significant direct effects of the control variables, except for class, which runs in the opposite direction than expected: participants placing themselves in a higher class give significantly less per decision. We

Figure 1. Effect of European recipient as cosmopolitanism (left) and immigration support (right) increase.

Note: The solid line shows the marginal effect of the European recipient dummy on the contribution across levels of cosmopolitanism and immigration support; the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
interacted the origin cues with support for national redistribution, concern for others, social class and political ideology (Table C1, appendix). This failed to yield any significant results.

While our findings suggest that cosmopolitans do not discriminate against Europeans, we cannot rule out that cosmopolitans are overall less generous than people with less cosmopolitan outlooks (H2). Cosmopolitans are often portrayed as too detached to care for others (Calhoun 2002). We further analyse our data by looking at contributions to European recipients only (Table 2). This reduces the number of observations to roughly one-third, which makes it more difficult to detect significant relationships. All four measures of cosmopolitanism significantly increase contributions to European recipients. Hence, those who display higher levels of support for the EU and immigration not only fail to discriminate between European and national recipients, they are also more generous to European recipients in absolute terms compared to other donors.

Our results suggest that reported cosmopolitanism is indeed more than lip service: it translates into real behaviour and renders people more willing to decrease their material welfare for the sake of other Europeans.

As a robustness check, we included dummy variables for each experimental location to capture potential contextual effects (Table C2 in the appendix). While participants in Oxford contributed significantly less in some decisions, and contributions in Edinburgh and Berlin were significantly higher, these differences do not substantively change the individual effects.

Survey

To enhance generalizability, we harness the EES 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2015) conducted in all 28 EU member states. It includes a question on financial

Table 2. Total contributions to European recipient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Model 2 Immigration</th>
<th>Model 3 European identity</th>
<th>Model 4 EU support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>38.80 (21.22)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62.81** (26.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.62* (6.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74.69** (27.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU membership support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>2.10 (3.55)</td>
<td>3.04 (3.50)</td>
<td>−0.06 (3.60)</td>
<td>1.94 (4.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = male)</td>
<td>−6.84 (33.91)</td>
<td>1.70 (33.23)</td>
<td>13.74 (35.08)</td>
<td>10.97 (33.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>−32.58 (18.91)</td>
<td>−34.79 (18.30)</td>
<td>−42.56 (19.26)*</td>
<td>−30.48 (18.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left–right</td>
<td>−6.67 (12.29)</td>
<td>−2.28 (12.58)</td>
<td>−3.17 (12.45)</td>
<td>−5.42 (12.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left–right²</td>
<td>−6.30 (3.85)</td>
<td>−6.59 (3.81)</td>
<td>−5.04 (3.93)</td>
<td>−4.88 (3.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality aversion</td>
<td>−2.01 (6.99)</td>
<td>−1.74 (6.76)</td>
<td>−3.43 (7.30)</td>
<td>−3.46 (6.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for others</td>
<td>34.48 (20.67)</td>
<td>25.93 (19.98)</td>
<td>30.34 (20.94)</td>
<td>22.95 (20.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>339.06** (116.57)</td>
<td>237.27* (116.00)</td>
<td>352.04** (115.85)</td>
<td>230.93 (126.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (one-tailed).

Source: own laboratory experiment. Ordinary least squares regression analysis.
aid to other EU member states in economic difficulties. It is therefore highly suitable to further analyse whether the patterns found in the laboratory also hold for the entire European population.

Variables

The following question serves as dependent variable: ‘In times of crisis, it is desirable for [our country] to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties’. A 4-point scale is used to distinguish between strong and moderate (dis)agreement. Four percent of the respondents opted for the ‘don’t know’ option and were removed from the analysis. This item measures redistribution from one member state to another in the context of a crisis, while the experiment referred to individual redistributive behaviour towards other individuals. We are not aware of any cross-national survey that includes an item that is closer to our experimental dependent variable. Any difference in the wording of the dependent variables should decrease the probability of obtaining the same findings across data sources.

Three items operationalize cosmopolitanism. Attitudes towards immigration are measured by support for restrictive immigration policy. On an 11-point scale, answer categories range from ‘fully in favour of restrictive policy on immigration’ (0) to ‘fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration’ (10). While this operationalization is not exactly the same as in the experiment, both measures capture attitudes towards how the state should deal with immigration. General EU support is measured by the EU membership support statement (same wording as in experiment). European identity is measured by agreement with the statement that ‘You feel attached to Europe’ (from ‘not at all’ to ‘yes, definitely’, 1–4).

Turning to the control variables, support for national redistribution of wealth is measured on an 11-point scale ranging from fully opposed (0) to fully in favour of redistribution from the rich to the poor in [country] (10). The EES provides information on educational attainment by the age at which a respondent finished full-time education. The three categories – 15 or younger, 16–19, and 20 and older – roughly capture the step from mandatory education to secondary education and to higher education. The measure is not ideal, but widely used in cross-national survey research. To measure social class, respondents are asked to locate themselves on an 11-point scale, where 0 corresponds to the lowest and 10 to the highest level in society. The EES does not provide any measures of income. Political ideology is measured using the same 11-point left–right scale as in the laboratory experiment, and a squared term is included to account for higher Euroscepticism at the extremes. Additionally, the models control for age and gender. At the country level, we include a control variable for GDP per capita in 2013 and
for Eurozone membership. Table A2 (appendix) displays a descriptive overview.\(^3\)

The dependent variable is ordinal, and we therefore use ordered logistic regression analysis. To account for the clustered structure (individuals nested in countries), we estimate multilevel models with a random intercept at the country level.\(^3\) We standardized the political attitude scales to better compare effect sizes.

**Results**

Table 3 presents the full multivariate model. We included a stepwise build-up of the models in the appendix (Table E1). Each of the variables used to test our hypothesis has a significant correlation in the expected (positive) direction. The more citizens favour immigration \((b = .30)\), feel attached to Europe \((b = .35)\) and support EU membership \((b = .44)\), the more they favour international redistribution in the EU. As shown in appendix E, the coefficient of these variables remains strong and significant in all model specifications (Table E1, appendix). This suggests that similar relationships exist across the European population as found in the experiments.

Interestingly, support for national redistribution is not significantly related to support for international redistribution. The coefficients of the socio-structural control variables are in line with previous studies. Confirming existing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Multilevel ordered logistic model explaining support for financial help to other EU member states.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-structural factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class ((subjective, 1–10))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-educated ((ref: middle))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-educated ((ref: middle))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left–right ((z))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left–right squared ((z))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support redistribution ((z))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support immigration ((z))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment to EU ((z))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU membership support ((z))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurozone member ((0/1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 variance (country)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. \(* * * p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.\)  
\(n(\text{respondents}) = 20,633; n(\text{countries}) = 28.\)  
Source: EES 2014. Multilevel ordered logistic model with random intercept at country level.
research (Hakhverdian et al. 2013), citizens with higher education are significantly more in favour of international redistribution ($b = -0.12$ for lower-educated and $b = 0.22$ for higher-educated), and the same applies to those with a higher (perceived) social class ($b = 0.06$). Men are more supportive of international redistribution ($b = 0.12$). Right-wing citizens show significantly less solidarity across borders than do left-wing citizens ($b = -0.10$). The squared term is insignificant. Support for international redistribution is higher in countries with a higher GDP per capita. A possible interpretation is that citizens of less affluent EU member states feel that their country is less capable of aiding other countries. Eurozone member countries demonstrate clearly lower support for international redistribution. This relationship appears only when we control for GDP, indicating that when comparing two equally affluent EU member states, the one that is a Eurozone member is less supportive of international redistribution.

Tables E2a and E2b (appendix) present the model estimations for each country separately and show that cosmopolitanism is the principal and most consistent predictor of international solidarity in each country.

Figure 2 displays the effects of immigration attitudes for all four categories of the dependent variable. This gives a sense of the effect sizes. Going from

**Figure 2.** Predicted probability of support for transnational redistribution (1–4) by support for immigration. Source: EES 2014, based upon model 3 (Table E1, appendix).

Note: The solid line shows the predicted probability of support for transnational redistribution (1–4) by support for immigration; the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Average predicted change (from minimum to maximum) over the four categories of dependent variable is .13.
least to most in favour of immigration restriction, the predicted probability to 
fully agree with international redistribution to other EU member states 
increases from .08 to .21. A similar increase occurs for the likelihood of 
tending to agree. As we would expect, the inverse relationship exists for the 
lower two categories of the dependent variable: as support for immigration 
decreases, people become more likely to oppose international redistribution. 
On average, predicted probabilities change by .13 when immigration support 
increases from its minimum to its maximum.

Discussion and outlook

Against the backdrop of the European sovereign debt crisis and the turmoil 
surrounding financial bailouts of some member states, this study examines 
to what extent cosmopolitanism shapes international solidarity in the EU. 
Are European citizens that subscribe to cosmopolitan attitudes practise 
what they preach, and willing to redistribute within the EU?

By complementing laboratory experiments on redistribution in the United 
Kingdom and in Germany with existing survey data from the EES 2014, we 
show that various aspects of cosmopolitanism, most notably orientations 
towards immigrants and European integration, are powerful predictors of the 
willingness to redistribute internationally. Importantly, our findings suggest 
that cosmopolitanism matters more for people’s willingness to redistribute 
internationally compared to conventional economic and political variables, 
such as political ideology or attitudes towards income inequality. This dovetails 
with evidence by Bechtel et al. (2014) regarding bailout support and suggests 
that their findings for Germany might be applicable more generally.

Our study does come with some limitations. It is impossible to assess caus-
ality in cross-sectional surveys like the EES, and while the great strength of 
experimental research lies in random assignment to treatments, the fact 
that cosmopolitanism cannot be randomly assigned has limited our ability 
to make causal claims. That said, the fact that our findings regarding cosmo-
politanism and international redistribution preferences are similar across data 
Sources and methods used increases our overall confidence in their validity.

Bearing these limitations in mind, our findings suggest that preferences for 
national and European redistribution are two different beasts that are not 
necessarily related to each other. Important predictors of national redistribu-
tion, like self-interest or left–right ideology, do not play a big role in explaining 
support for international redistribution within the EU. These findings corrobo-
rate the statement by Noël and Thérien (2002: 649) that ‘[p]ublic opinion on 
international redistribution is not a simple extension of public attitudes 
about domestic redistribution’.

Our findings inform current scholarly debates on the sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe (Copelovitch et al. 2016). The jury is still out on whether Europeans
are ready to redistribute internationally. While Zürn (2016: 25) notes that ‘there is little sign of comprehensive transnational solidarity developing that would make it possible to shift redistributive policy in the sense of creating social rights to the global, or even European level’, Risse (2014) is more optimistic. He contends that the share of citizens who identify (also) as European is large enough, and their identification is strong enough, to provide public support for international redistribution (Risse 2014: 1208). Our results suggest that a considerable share of Europeans is indeed open towards international redistribution, even if this incurs some personal cost. Our evidence showing that cosmopolitans do not discriminate against recipients from other EU member states, and are overall more generous, challenges the critique that cosmopolitanism is too superficial and detached from society to provide a basis for social solidarity. On the contrary, it suggests that cosmopolitans are at the forefront of international solidarity in the EU.

Finally, our results speak to current policy debates in the EU. We show that support for redistribution within the EU is substantial, perhaps more so than the popular media lead us to believe. This is important information for policy makers. It renders some legitimacy to continuing efforts to financially assist member states in crisis. Moreover, the finding that cosmopolitanism rather than support for national redistribution motivates Europeans’ commitment to international solidarity has important implications for policy makers attempting to mobilize support for financial bailouts. Elites might not be able to frame policy programmes such as European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in the same way as those at the national level. If general preferences for redistribution played a larger role, elites could emphasize the neediness of particular member states, and point out the vast economic inequalities throughout the Union. However, our results suggest that these strategies are likely to be less fruitful than those aimed at downplaying national differences or appealing to collective European identity.

Notes

1. A growing body of research challenges the role of self-interest for national redistribution as well.
2. However, as any collective identity, European identity requires a common other, which is often defined in ethnic or cultural terms (Diez 2004; Kuhn 2015).
3. Three participants were older than 35; removing them did not alter the results.
4. No information about the exact member state was given.
5. For the exact wording of the instructions, see appendix (D).
6. A principal axis factor analysis (promax oblique rotation) shows that these four items load on two distinct factors. The first factor relates city- and country-level...
concerns (Eigenvalue 2.56, respective factor loadings .79 and .85, remaining loadings <.4), while the second factor underlies concerns with people in Europe and humankind (Eigenvalue 2.27, respective factor loadings .61 and .74, remaining loadings <.4).

7. Many university students are financially supported by their parents and the state; it is therefore not sensible to measure their income. Alternatively, we assessed the effect of parental socio-economic background by adding the father’s educational level to the models. This had no significant effect in any of the models, and did not alter the results substantively. As it reduced the sample by 30 participants, we did not include it in the main models.

8. Estimations with a dummy for member states that joined in 2004–2013 and a dummy for net contributor status did not change the effect of our independent variables. Due to high collinearity they are not included in the final models. Missing values were treated by list-wise deletion.

9. Ordered logistic random intercept models are estimated using Stata’s gllamm package.

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