

Violence against politicians drives support for political violence among (some) voters. Evidence from a natural experiment

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

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- B. SAMPLE COMPOSITION AND BATCHES
- C. FULL RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
- D. PREREGISTRATION
- E. DEVIATIONS FROM PREREGISTRATION

A. MEASURES

Table A1. Mock newspaper vignette, in-party political violence scenario

English version	Dutch version
<p>Please read the following short news item and answer the questions below.</p> <p><i>“Dutchman Arrested After Punching A Man at a Local Meeting of {Most disliked party} Voters</i></p> <p><i>Huub V., 45, was arrested for assault this afternoon in Tilburg. The Dutchman behaved aggressively towards a group of {Most disliked party} voters who were meeting in a neighboring house. Following a confrontation, Huub V. reportedly punched one of the attendees in the face. The victim had to be taken to the hospital for a check.</i></p> <p><i>Two witnesses reported that Huub V., allegedly a {Most liked party} voter, was upset that {Most disliked party} voters were gathering next to his house, because he really disagrees with that party.”</i></p> <p>After reading the text, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - I support what Huub V. did - What Huub V. did could under some circumstances be justified - Huub V. should face criminal charges - These things happen all the time in the Netherlands - Huub V. was likely provoked to react like that <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree moderately 3. Disagree a little 4. Neither agree nor disagree 5. Agree a little 6. Agree moderately 7. Agree strongly 	<p>Lees het volgende korte nieuwsbericht en beantwoord de onderstaande vragen.</p> <p><i>“Nederlander gearresteerd nadat hij een man had geslagen op een lokale bijeenkomst van {Most disliked party} kiezers</i></p> <p><i>Huub V., 45 jaar, werd vanmiddag in Tilburg gearresteerd voor mishandeling. De Nederlander gedroeg zich agressief tegenover een groep {Most disliked party} kiezers die in een naburig huis bijeen waren. Na een confrontatie sloeg Huub V. naar verluidt een van de aanwezigen in het gezicht. Het slachtoffer moest voor controle naar het ziekenhuis worden gebracht.</i></p> <p><i>Twee getuigen meldden dat Huub V., naar verluidt een {Most liked party} kiezer, boos was dat {Most disliked party} kiezers zich naast zijn huis verzamelden, omdat hij het echt niet eens is met die partij.”</i></p> <p>Geef na het lezen van de tekst aan in hoeverre u het eens of oneens bent met elke stelling.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ik sta achter wat Huub V. deed - Wat Huub V. deed zou onder bepaalde omstandigheden gerechtvaardigd kunnen zijn - Huub V. zou strafrechtelijk vervolgd moeten worden - Dit soort dingen gebeuren wel vaker in Nederland - Huub V. is waarschijnlijk uitgelokt <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sterk mee oneens 2. Enigszins oneens 3. Een beetje oneens 4. Noch mee eens, noch mee oneens 5. Een beetje mee eens 6. Enigszins mee eens 7. Sterk mee eens

Table A2. Partisan Schadenfreude

English version	Dutch version
<p>Now we would like to ask you to imagine a hypothetical situation.</p>	<p>Nu willen we u vragen om u een hypothetische situatie voor te stellen.</p>
<p>Pretend that you have a new neighbor who in the most recent election voted for {Most disliked party}.</p>	<p>Doe alsof u een nieuwe buur hebt die tijdens de meest recente verkiezingen gestemd heeft op {Most disliked party}.</p>
<p>You have just found out that this neighbor has recently lost their job and is experiencing financial difficulty.</p>	<p>U hebt net ontdekt dat deze buur onlangs zijn/haar baan verloren heeft en financiële problemen heeft.</p>
<p>Based on this new information, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.</p>	<p>Gebaseerd op deze nieuwe informatie, gelieve aan te geven in welke mate u het eens of oneens bent met elk van de volgende stellingen.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - I would be a little amused by what happened to them - I would be pleased by the misfortune that happened to them - I would find it difficult to resist a smile - I would feel sorry for them 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ik zou een beetje geamuseerd zijn door wat hen overkomen is - Ik zou blij zijn met het ongeluk dat hen overkomen is - Ik zou het moeilijk vinden om een glimlach te weerstaan - Ik zou medelijden met hen hebben
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree moderately 3. Disagree a little 4. Neither agree nor disagree 5. Agree a little 6. Agree moderately 7. Agree strongly 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sterk mee oneens 2. Enigszins oneens 3. Een beetje oneens 4. Noch mee eens, noch mee oneens 5. Een beetje mee eens 6. Enigszins mee eens 7. Sterk mee eens

B. SAMPLE COMPOSITION AND BATCHES

Table B1. Sample composition, by batch

Batch	N	Start date	End date	Female, %	Age, avg	Univ., %	Left-right, avg
#2	118	2023.10.04	2023.10.06	48.3	52.0	42.4	5.1
#3	139	2023.10.06	2023.10.08	42.3	55.8	40.9	5.5
#4	216	2023.10.08	2023.10.10	46.0	51.8	34.3	5.4
#5	134	2023.10.10	2023.10.12	50.4	54.1	41.4	5.3
#6	214	2023.10.12	2023.10.14	42.4	55.0	34.6	5.8
#7	235	2023.10.14	2023.10.17	41.9	54.4	38.6	5.7
#8	213	2023.10.16	2023.10.18	43.8	54.0	36.3	5.7
#9	162	2023.10.18	2023.10.20	49.7	53.0	37.1	5.7
#10	182	2023.10.20	2023.10.22	50.9	54.2	39.1	5.7
#11	186	2023.10.22	2023.10.24	47.3	54.7	41.5	5.7
#12	210	2023.10.24	2023.10.26	40.8	52.9	40.2	5.6
#13	195	2023.10.26	2023.10.28	47.6	54.1	42.9	5.4
#14	219	2023.10.28	2023.11.01	47.5	52.6	43.6	5.1
#16	205	2023.11.01	2023.11.03	47.8	55.7	44.8	5.4
#17	176	2023.11.03	2023.11.05	51.5	53.1	40.2	5.4
#18	233	2023.11.05	2023.11.07	46.1	52.9	45.7	5.6
#19	212	2023.11.07	2023.11.09	44.5	55.7	44.0	5.6
#20	199	2023.11.09	2023.11.11	46.7	54.4	44.4	5.7

Table B2. Rolling cross-section batches and natural experiment treatment

Batch	N	Start date	End date	Treat. 1: Short term	Treat. 2: Medium term	Treat. 3: Full span
#2	118	2023.10.04	2023.10.06			Control
#3	137	2023.10.06	2023.10.08			Control
#4	213	2023.10.08	2023.10.10			Control
#5	133	2023.10.10	2023.10.12			Control
#6	211	2023.10.12	2023.10.14			Control
#7	228	2023.10.14	2023.10.17			Control
#8	212	2023.10.16	2023.10.18			Control
#9	159	2023.10.18	2023.10.20		Control	Control
#10	179	2023.10.20	2023.10.22		Control	Control
#11	183	2023.10.22	2023.10.24	Control	Control	Control
#12	209	2023.10.24	2023.10.26	Control	Control	Control
#13	191	2023.10.26	2023.10.28			
#14	218	2023.10.28	2023.11.01	Treatment	Treatment	Treatment
#16	201	2023.11.01	2023.11.03		Treatment	Treatment
#17	174	2023.11.03	2023.11.05		Treatment	Treatment
#18	230	2023.11.05	2023.11.07			Treatment
#19	209	2023.11.07	2023.11.09			Treatment
#20	198	2023.11.09	2023.11.11			Treatment

Note. Batch #1 (October 2-4, 2023) excluded because it was used as soft launch. Batch #15 was not fielded due to a programming mistake by the polling company. Treatment occurred during batch #13, which is conservatively excluded from analyses.

Table B3. Simplified post-hoc power calculations

Comparison	Groups	Power calculation characteristics	Achieved power (1-β error probability)
Narrower bandwidth (A): ± 4 days	N(control) = 392 N(treatment) = 218	Linear multiple regression with .05 probability of type I error (two-tailed), two predictors, sample size N = 610, and small effect size ($f^2 = 0.015$)	$1-\beta = 0.86$
Intermediate bandwidth (B): ± 8 days	N(control) = 730 N(treatment) = 593	Linear multiple regression with .05 probability of type I error (two-tailed), two predictors, sample size N = 1323, and small effect size ($f^2 = 0.015$)	$1-\beta = 0.99$
Broader bandwidth (C): full span	N(control) = 1982 N(treatment) = 1230	Linear multiple regression with .05 probability of type I error (two-tailed), two predictors, sample size N = 3212, and small effect size ($f^2 = 0.015$)	$1-\beta = 0.999$

Note. Calculated with G*Power 3.1.

Table B4. Rolling cross-section batches, response rates

Batch	Contacted	Goal	Net achieved	%
#2	430	150	118	27%
#3	600	150	139	23%
#4	600	150	216	36%
#5	600	150	134	22%
#6	700	150	214	31%
#7	700	150	235	34%
#8	700	150	213	30%
#9	600	150	162	27%
#10	600	150	182	30%
#11	600	150	186	31%
#12	600	150	210	35%
#13	600	150	195	33%
#14	600	150	219	37%
#15	missing			
#16	600	150	205	34%
#17	600	150	176	29%
#18	600	150	233	39%
#19	600	150	212	35%
#20	600	150	199	33%

C. FULL RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

Table C1. Support for violence items; zero-order correlations

		1. Act could be justified	2. Was likely provoked	3. Could support the act	4. Should face charges
2. Was likely provoked	<i>r</i>	0.37	.		
	<i>p</i>	0.000			
3. Could support the act	<i>r</i>	0.67	0.32	.	
	<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000		
4. Should face charges	<i>r</i>	-0.33	-0.22	-0.35	.
	<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	
5. These things happen all the time	<i>r</i>	0.03	0.15	0.04	0.07
	<i>p</i>	0.045	0.000	0.032	0.000

N = 3403

Table C2. Effect of the attack on identifying FvD as most liked party

	M1			M2			M3		
	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p
Treatment (\pm 4 days)	-0.00	0.02	0.944						
Treatment (\pm 8 days)				0.01	0.01	0.539			
Treatment (full span)							-0.00	0.01	0.642
University							0.01	0.01	0.123
Constant	0.03	0.01	0.000	0.02	0.01	0.000	0.02	0.00	0.000
N	610			1,323			3,212		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C3. Effect of the attack on identifying FvD as most disliked party

	M1			M2			M3		
	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p
Treatment (\pm 4 days)	0.05	0.04	0.228						
Treatment (\pm 8 days)				0.02	0.03	0.495			
Treatment (full span)							0.02	0.02	0.232
University							0.10	0.02	0.000
Constant	0.49	0.03	0.000	0.49	0.02	0.000	0.45	0.01	0.000
N	610			1,323			3,212		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.01		

Table C4. Effect of the attack on propensity to vote (PTV) for the FvD

	M1			M2			M3		
	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p
Treatment (\pm 4 days)	0.12	0.20	0.554						
Treatment (\pm 8 days)				0.17	0.12	0.153			
Treatment (full span)							0.08	0.08	0.327
University							-0.10	0.08	0.222
Constant	0.84	0.12	0.000	0.71	0.08	0.000	0.79	0.06	0.000
N	602			1,300			3,140		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C5. Effect of the attack on evaluations of Baudet as a suitable leader

	M1			M2			M3		
	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p	Coef	se	p
Treatment (\pm 4 days)	0.01	0.19	0.963						
Treatment (\pm 8 days)				0.09	0.12	0.457			
Treatment (full span)							0.10	0.08	0.176
University							-0.10	0.08	0.206
Constant	1.08	0.11	0.000	0.91	0.08	0.000	0.95	0.06	0.000
N	593			1,290			3,100		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C6. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence (\pm 4 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.10	0.08	0.203	0.05	0.12	0.656	0.21	0.13	0.102
Constant	2.67	0.05	0.000	1.79	0.07	0.000	3.14	0.08	0.000
N	610			610			610		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C6. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.08	0.10	0.423	0.04	0.14	0.800	0.18	0.12	0.152
Constant	1.54	0.06	0.000	5.45	0.08	0.000	4.35	0.07	0.000
N	610			610			610		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C7. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence (± 8 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.04	0.05	0.418	-0.04	0.08	0.574	0.10	0.08	0.240
Constant	2.66	0.03	0.000	1.77	0.05	0.000	3.12	0.06	0.000
N	1,323			1,323			1,323		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C7. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.01	0.06	0.883	0.03	0.09	0.760	0.16	0.08	0.053
Constant	1.48	0.04	0.000	5.44	0.06	0.000	4.38	0.06	0.000
N	1,323			1,323			1,323		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C8. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence (full span)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	-0.02	0.03	0.570	-0.03	0.05	0.495	0.00	0.06	0.965
University	-0.21	0.03	0.000	0.00	0.05	0.923	-0.13	0.06	0.016
Constant	2.79	0.02	0.000	1.78	0.04	0.000	3.22	0.04	0.000
N	3,212			3,212			3,212		
R-squared	0.01			0.00			0.00		

Table C8. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.01	0.04	0.843	0.11	0.06	0.080	0.04	0.05	0.485
University	-0.23	0.04	0.000	0.36	0.06	0.000	-0.31	0.05	0.000
Constant	1.61	0.03	0.000	5.25	0.04	0.000	4.58	0.04	0.000
N	3,212			3,212			3,212		
R-squared	0.01			0.01			0.01		

Table C9. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with FvD most preferred party (0/1) (\pm 4 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.11	0.08	0.152	0.08	0.12	0.535	0.25	0.13	0.056
FvD preferred (FvD)	0.26	0.26	0.316	-0.02	0.40	0.966	0.57	0.43	0.186
Treatment * FvD	-0.44	0.43	0.316	-0.70	0.68	0.303	-1.23	0.72	0.091
Constant	2.66	0.05	0.000	1.79	0.07	0.000	3.12	0.08	0.000
N	610			610			610		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.01		

Table C9. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.06	0.11	0.556	0.03	0.14	0.855	0.20	0.13	0.117
FvD preferred (FvD)	-0.39	0.35	0.257	-0.62	0.46	0.182	0.51	0.42	0.216
Treatment * FvD	0.64	0.59	0.277	0.27	0.78	0.730	-0.62	0.70	0.380
Constant	1.55	0.06	0.000	5.47	0.08	0.000	4.33	0.08	0.000
N	610			610			610		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.01		

Table C10. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with FvD most preferred party (0/1) (\pm 8 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.04	0.05	0.438	-0.04	0.08	0.609	0.10	0.09	0.236
FvD preferred (FvD)	-0.02	0.22	0.934	-0.19	0.34	0.574	0.11	0.38	0.760
Treatment * FvD	0.04	0.31	0.888	-0.08	0.47	0.869	-0.10	0.53	0.848
Constant	2.67	0.03	0.000	1.78	0.05	0.000	3.12	0.06	0.000
N	1,323			1,323			1,323		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C10. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	-0.00	0.06	0.970	0.03	0.09	0.785	0.16	0.08	0.061
FvD preferred (FvD)	-0.38	0.28	0.172	-0.63	0.41	0.126	-0.27	0.37	0.473
Treatment * FvD	0.47	0.39	0.225	0.21	0.58	0.717	0.14	0.53	0.797
Constant	1.49	0.04	0.000	5.45	0.06	0.000	4.38	0.06	0.000
N	1,323			1,323			1,323		
R-squared	0.00			0.00			0.00		

Table C11. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with FvD most preferred party (0/1) (full span)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	-0.02	0.03	0.622	-0.02	0.05	0.645	0.00	0.06	0.999
University	-0.21	0.03	0.000	0.01	0.05	0.862	-0.14	0.06	0.013
FvD preferred (FvD)	0.21	0.13	0.093	0.24	0.20	0.221	0.18	0.22	0.408
Treatment * FvD	-0.07	0.21	0.729	-0.45	0.33	0.169	0.13	0.36	0.727
Constant	2.78	0.02	0.000	1.78	0.04	0.000	3.22	0.04	0.000
N	3,212			3,212			3,212		
R-squared	0.01			0.00			0.00		

Table C11. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.00	0.04	0.957	0.10	0.06	0.120	0.04	0.06	0.517
University	-0.24	0.04	0.000	0.36	0.06	0.000	-0.31	0.05	0.000
FvD preferred (FvD)	0.03	0.16	0.850	-0.83	0.24	0.000	-0.22	0.21	0.309
Treatment * FvD	0.27	0.27	0.327	0.39	0.40	0.324	0.08	0.35	0.825
Constant	1.61	0.03	0.000	5.27	0.04	0.000	4.59	0.04	0.000
N	3,212			3,212			3,212		
R-squared	0.01			0.02			0.01		

Table C12. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with propensity to vote for the FvD (± 4 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.13	0.08	0.126	0.09	0.13	0.486	0.26	0.14	0.065
PTV for FvD (PTV)	0.07	0.02	0.000	0.08	0.03	0.012	0.09	0.03	0.007
Treatment * PTV	-0.04	0.03	0.236	-0.05	0.05	0.344	-0.06	0.05	0.260
Constant	2.60	0.05	0.000	1.71	0.08	0.000	3.06	0.08	0.000
N	602			602			602		
R-squared	0.03			0.01			0.02		

Table C12. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.08	0.11	0.489	0.03	0.15	0.821	0.24	0.14	0.077
PTV for FvD (PTV)	0.05	0.03	0.068	-0.10	0.04	0.007	0.06	0.03	0.072
Treatment * PTV	0.01	0.04	0.875	0.02	0.06	0.707	-0.07	0.05	0.210
Constant	1.48	0.07	0.000	5.53	0.09	0.000	4.30	0.08	0.000
N	602			602			602		
R-squared	0.01			0.02			0.01		

Table C13. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with propensity to vote for the FvD (± 8 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.03	0.05	0.562	-0.05	0.08	0.507	0.08	0.09	0.391
PTV for FvD (PTV)	0.06	0.02	0.000	0.08	0.02	0.002	0.07	0.03	0.013
Treatment * PTV	-0.01	0.02	0.698	-0.01	0.04	0.746	-0.00	0.04	0.995
Constant	2.61	0.03	0.000	1.71	0.05	0.000	3.07	0.06	0.000
N	1,300			1,300			1,300		
R-squared	0.02			0.01			0.01		

Table C13. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	-0.03	0.07	0.675	0.02	0.10	0.839	0.17	0.09	0.054
PTV for FvD (PTV)	0.06	0.02	0.002	-0.09	0.03	0.003	0.02	0.03	0.429
Treatment * PTV	0.02	0.03	0.500	0.03	0.04	0.486	-0.02	0.04	0.579
Constant	1.43	0.04	0.000	5.51	0.07	0.000	4.36	0.06	0.000
N	1,300			1,300			1,300		
R-squared	0.02			0.01			0.00		

Table C14. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with propensity to vote for the FvD (full span)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	-0.02	0.03	0.482	-0.05	0.05	0.369	-0.03	0.06	0.670
University	-0.20	0.03	0.000	0.02	0.05	0.762	-0.13	0.06	0.022
PTV for FvD (PTV)	0.06	0.01	0.000	0.07	0.01	0.000	0.05	0.02	0.004
Treatment * PTV	0.00	0.01	0.905	0.01	0.02	0.590	0.03	0.03	0.251
Constant	2.73	0.02	0.000	1.71	0.04	0.000	3.17	0.04	0.000
N	3,140			3,140			3,140		
R-squared	0.03			0.01			0.01		

Table C14. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	0.01	0.04	0.876	0.10	0.07	0.134	0.04	0.06	0.460
University	-0.23	0.04	0.000	0.34	0.06	0.000	-0.31	0.05	0.000
PTV for FvD (PTV)	0.09	0.01	0.000	-0.09	0.02	0.000	0.01	0.02	0.636
Treatment * PTV	0.00	0.02	0.967	0.02	0.03	0.550	-0.02	0.03	0.501
Constant	1.52	0.03	0.000	5.33	0.05	0.000	4.58	0.04	0.000
N	3,140			3,140			3,140		
R-squared	0.04			0.02			0.01		

Table C15. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with partisan Schadenfreude (\pm 4 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment Schadenfreude (S)	-0.27	0.19	0.159	-0.66	0.33	0.043	-0.58	0.36	0.104
	0.23	0.05	0.000	0.20	0.08	0.012	0.27	0.09	0.002
Treatment * S	0.16	0.08	0.035	0.36	0.13	0.008	0.26	0.15	0.073
Constant	2.12	0.12	0.000	1.19	0.20	0.000	2.69	0.22	0.000
N	313			313			313		
R-squared	0.17			0.10			0.09		

Note. Models only run for voters who oppose the party of the politician targeted in the attack (FvD)

Table C15. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment Schadenfreude (S)	-0.21	0.25	0.414	0.52	0.41	0.199	0.63	0.37	0.090
	0.29	0.06	0.000	-0.22	0.10	0.024	0.14	0.09	0.123
Treatment * S	0.17	0.10	0.101	-0.20	0.17	0.229	-0.17	0.15	0.277
Constant	0.74	0.15	0.000	5.99	0.25	0.000	3.98	0.23	0.000
N	313			313			313		
R-squared	0.15			0.05			0.02		

Note. Models only run for voters who oppose the party of the politician targeted in the attack (FvD)

Table C16. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with partisan Schadenfreude (± 8 days)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment Schadenfreude (S)	-0.19	0.13	0.145	-0.33	0.23	0.149	-0.65	0.25	0.009
	0.15	0.03	0.000	0.18	0.06	0.002	0.14	0.07	0.033
Treatment * S	0.11	0.05	0.035	0.15	0.09	0.107	0.23	0.10	0.023
Constant	2.26	0.09	0.000	1.28	0.15	0.000	2.89	0.17	0.000
N	660			660			660		
R-squared	0.09			0.05			0.04		

Note. Models only run for voters who oppose the party of the politician targeted in the attack (FvD)

Table C16. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment Schadenfreude (S)	-0.16	0.16	0.313	0.45	0.27	0.100	0.63	0.26	0.016
	0.22	0.04	0.000	-0.18	0.07	0.012	0.03	0.07	0.709
Treatment * S	0.11	0.06	0.086	-0.22	0.11	0.050	-0.15	0.11	0.168
Constant	0.83	0.10	0.000	5.95	0.18	0.000	4.24	0.17	0.000
N	660			660			660		
R-squared	0.11			0.04			0.01		

Note. Models only run for voters who oppose the party of the politician targeted in the attack (FvD)

Table C17. Effect of the attack on support for partisan violence; interaction with partisan Schadenfreude (full span)

	Index of support for violence			Act could be justified			Was likely provoked		
	M1 Coef	se	p	M2 Coef	se	p	M3 Coef	se	p
Treatment	-0.09	0.09	0.299	-0.09	0.15	0.546	-0.30	0.16	0.062
University Schadenfreude (S)	-0.10	0.04	0.010	0.14	0.07	0.033	-0.04	0.07	0.609
	0.20	0.02	0.000	0.28	0.03	0.000	0.22	0.04	0.000
Treatment * S	0.03	0.03	0.360	0.04	0.06	0.484	0.07	0.06	0.246
Constant	2.23	0.06	0.000	1.02	0.10	0.000	2.70	0.11	0.000
N	1,597			1,597			1,597		
R-squared	0.10			0.07			0.04		

Note. Models only run for voters who oppose the party of the politician targeted in the attack (FvD)

Table C17. (continued)

	Could support the act			Should face charges			These things happen all the time		
	M4 Coef	se	p	M5 Coef	se	p	M6 Coef	se	p
Treatment	-0.04	0.11	0.721	0.30	0.18	0.094	0.28	0.17	0.097
University Schadenfreude (S)	-0.08	0.05	0.088	0.24	0.08	0.003	-0.30	0.08	0.000
	0.26	0.03	0.000	-0.22	0.04	0.000	0.02	0.04	0.566
Treatment * S	0.05	0.04	0.275	-0.09	0.07	0.180	-0.10	0.07	0.136
Constant	0.83	0.07	0.000	5.90	0.12	0.000	4.52	0.11	0.000
N	1,597			1,597			1,597		
R-squared	0.11			0.04			0.01		

Note. Models only run for voters who oppose the party of the politician targeted in the attack (FvD)

D. PREREGISTRATION

The study was pre-registered via OSF on 7 November 2023, using the aspredicted.org template. Below we provide the content of the preregistration for reviewers' perusal. The anonymous pre-registration can be found here:

https://osf.io/2b3r9/?view_only=e0abc3629a31484eaad9cc3c0cf4448f

**

Data collection

No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

Hypothesis

H1. Compared to before the attack, support for in-group political violence is lower after the attack in the whole sample (Condemnation hypothesis) H2. Compared to before the attack, support for in-group political violence is higher after the attack amongst respondents who identify with the party of the politician attacked (Partisan retaliation hypothesis) H3. Compared to before the attack, support for in-group political violence is higher after the attack amongst respondents who report high levels of partisan Schadenfreude towards the party of the politician attacked (Schadenfreude hypothesis) H4a. After the attack, the increase in support for in-group political violence is stronger amongst respondents who identify with the party of the politician attacked than amongst respondents who report high levels of partisan Schadenfreude towards the party of the politician attacked (Strength of the effect hypothesis). H4b. After the attack, the increase in support for in-group political violence is more persistent in time amongst respondents who identify with the party of the politician attacked than amongst respondents who report high levels of partisan Schadenfreude towards the party of the politician attacked (Persistence of the effect hypothesis).

Dependent variable

The dependent variable (DV) measures support for political violence committed by a person member of the in-party (i.e., a person whose party identification is the same as the respondent's) against voters of the out-party (i.e., voters identifying with the party that the respondent dislikes the most). Respondents are presented with a vignette in the form of a mock newspaper article, detailing a fictive violent incident that happened in the recent past in the Netherlands. In the article, an in-party person is described as going to a gathering of out-party voters, and severely hurting one attendee (by punching them in the face, so that they had to be brought to the hospital). Both in- and out-party names are automatically piped-in based on previous survey questions, so that the article is tailored to the partisan likes (and dislikes) of each respondent. For instance, a respondent that in previous question declares being very close to party A, and particularly disliking party B, will read an article in which a person close to party A (in-party) attacks a person from party B (out-party). After reading the article, respondents were asked whether (i) they support what the perpetrator did, (ii) what the perpetrator did could under some circumstances be justified, (iii) the perpetrator should face criminal charges, (iv) these things happen all the time in the Netherlands, (v) the perpetrator was likely provoked to react like that (from 1 "Disagree strongly" to 7 "Agree strongly"). These five statements will be averaged (after reversing of some items) into an index of support for the violent act. As the scale has not been validated prior to data collection, each indicator will also be used independently in testing the hypotheses. The question is asked both in waves 1 and 2.

Conditions

We leverage a real-world incident that happened during data collection, thus applying the framework of "Unexpected Event during Survey Design" (UESD; Muñoz et al., 2020). On October 26, 2023, Thierry Baudet, leader of the far-right Forum for Democracy party (FVD), was attacked by an angry

voter with an umbrella while at an event in Ghent, Belgium. The attack was politically motivated, as the attacker was allegedly shouting “anti-fascist messages” (Walker, 2023). The attack intervened approximately half-way in the data collection, which is set-up as the first wave of a longitudinal survey employing a rolling cross-section (RCS) component. Since early October, and until approximately mid-November, a new “batch” of respondents was invited to participate to the survey; respondents were randomly assigned in a specific batch (approximately 20 batches for the whole duration of the wave). Whether the batch was interviewed before or after the attack against Baudet is our experimental condition (natural experiment).

Analyses

Because of the rolling cross-section (RCS) nature of the survey, a major issue in natural experiments of this type – i.e., the treatment can lead to violations of the ignorability assumption – is not severe in our case (Muñoz et al., 2020): as respondents are randomly assigned to a batch, and these batches are thus randomly surveyed before or after the treatment (attack against Baudet), the timing of the interview is completely independent from the treatment. With this in mind, relatively simple estimation strategies (difference in means across the two groups on the main dependent variable, via simple independent samples t-tests) will be used to test for the direct hypothesis (H1). A series of checks are implemented to minimize/control the violation of a second assumption, excludability (i.e., the presence of other, unrelated events; Muñoz et al., 2020). These checks are, in our case (i) the inspection of pre-existing time trends (the control group should showcase a temporally stable outcome), and (ii) the absence of “placebo effects” in the control group when using other dates as treatment cutoff points (e.g., the empirical median of the time in the control group; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). A series of additional robustness checks will be implemented to ensure the absence of violations of the ignorability assumption (assumed as non-problematic in our case, due to the RCS nature of the data; Muñoz et al., 2020): balance tests, covariate adjustments, multiple bandwidths, and analysis of non-response. To test for the moderation hypotheses (H2 and H3), we will regress the dependent variable on the treatment interacted with each moderator (preferred party for H1, and Schadenfreude for H2). Due to the “natural” nature of the experiment, and the fact that no prior information at the respondent level exists (e.g., a prior longitudinal wave), there is the possibility that the heterogeneous effects (interaction terms between the moderator and the treatment) are affected by posttreatment biases (Montgomery et al., 2018). To reduce the potential effects of posttreatment bias, we will avoid adjusting for covariates that are also likely to have been affected by the treatment (Muñoz et al., 2020). In order to test for H4a we will use t-tests to investigate whether support for political violence after the attack is higher among supporters of the FvD than among voters who experience Schadenfreude towards that party. In order to test for H4b we will compare individual-level support for political violence in waves 1 (after the incident) and 2 (subtracting the former from the latter), and use t-tests to investigate whether the resulting score is higher among supporters of the FvD than among voters who experience Schadenfreude towards that party.

Outliers and Exclusions

We will exclude straightliners, measured as respondents who have a standard deviation of 0 on batteries of questions with reversed items (excluding respondents who score in the middle of all items), as well as speeders (1% faster respondents).

Sample Size

The sample includes approximately 3000 respondents, divided in approximately 20 batches of 150 respondents each (RCS).

Other

While data collection started before the incident (early October), we did not have yet access to any data at the voter level before submitting this preregistration. Data is currently in the hands of the polling institute (I&O), which will provide it to us at the end of the rolling cross-section wave. Party like and dislike are measured via two specific questions, that ask respondents, out of a list of the 18 parties which competed in the election, which one they “feel the closest to” (most liked party), and which one they “dislike the most” (most disliked party). It is likely that the number of voters that have

selected the FVD (party of Thierry Baudet, the attacked politician) as their most liked party is relatively small. The FVD was polling at around 3% on October 30 in POLITICO's "Poll of Polls" (<https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/netherlands/>); on a sample of 3000 respondents, this equates with 90 respondents approximately across the whole wave. Because of this, additional analyses will be conducted using instead a continuous measure of propensity to vote (PTV; "on a scale from 0 to 10 how probable it is that you will ever vote for each party?"), which we have asked for all parties. Partisan Schadenfreude is measured via a vignette. Respondents are presented the hypothetical situation that a new neighbour of theirs, who voted in the most recent election for the respondents' most disliked party, "recently lost their job and is experiencing financial difficulty." They are afterwards asked, based on this information, to what extent they agree or disagree with a series of four statements (from 1 "Disagree strongly" to 7 "Agree strongly"): - I would be a little amused by what happened to them - I would be pleased by the misfortune that happened to them - I would find it difficult to resist a smile - I would feel sorry for them (R) Partisan Schadenfreude is measured as the average score on these four statements (after reversing the fourth one) * References cited in the pre-registration Imbens, G. W., & Lemieux, T. (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142(2), 615-635. Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B., & Torres, M. (2018). How conditioning on posttreatment variables can ruin your experiment and what to do about it. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3), 760-775. Muñoz, J., Falcó-Gimeno, A., & Hernández, E. (2020). Unexpected event during survey design: Promise and pitfalls for causal inference. *Political Analysis*, 28(2), 186-206. Walker, A. (2023, October 26). Dutch far-right leader Thierry Baudet attacked with an umbrella. POLITICO. <https://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-far-right-leader-thierry-baudet-attacked-with-an-umbrella/>

Name

How attacks against politicians condition support for political violence

Type of Project

Experiment

Other

Natural experiment with rolling cross-section survey data

E. DEVIATIONS FROM PREREGISTRATION

The study was pre-registered prior to the authors receiving the data from the polling company (OSF repository).

The following deviations from the pre-registration have to be noted

Pre-registered	Deviation	Rationale
We will exclude straightliners, measured as respondents who have a standard deviation of 0 on batteries of questions with reversed items (excluding respondents who score in the middle of all items), as well as speeders (1% faster respondents).	No straightliners excluded	No adequate batteries with reversed items were included in the final version of the questionnaire
<p>H4a. After the attack, the increase in support for in-group political violence is stronger amongst respondents who identify with the party of the politician attacked than amongst respondents who report high levels of partisan Schadenfreude towards the party of the politician attacked (Strength of the effect hypothesis).</p> <p>H4b. After the attack, the increase in support for in-group political violence is more persistent in time amongst respondents who identify with the party of the politician attacked than amongst respondents who report high levels of partisan Schadenfreude towards the party of the politician attacked (Persistence of the effect hypothesis).</p>	Hypotheses not tested in this article	Given the absence of increased support for violence among respondents who identify with the party of the attacked politician (H2), both hypotheses are not relevant anymore. For the same reason, analyses that compare the same respondents in wave 1 and wave 2, to test for the persistence of the effects, were dropped.