The Shifting Meanings of Race in China: A Case Study of the African Diaspora Communities in Guangzhou

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Abstract

Based on archival research and multi-sited fieldwork among Chinese and migrants from Africa in Guangzhou, Yiwu (China), and Lagos (Nigeria), this research explores the contradictions and unevenness in the racialization of black African identity in South China. I argue that racism against black Africans in Guangzhou needs to be contextualized within larger contexts such as the rise of China as a global economic power, its changing relations with Africa under the Mao and post-Mao regimes, the intersection of internal and international migration in global cities such as Guangzhou, and the persistent influence of Western racial ideology in popular media. [African Migrants; China; Blackness; Race; Racism]

Introduction

In modern Chinese history, the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region has been notable for sending immigrants to other parts of the world. However, since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the enormous growth of Sino-African trade, Guangzhou, a mega-city in South China, has become a Promised Land for many African migrants seeking wealth and fortune in the global economy. Guangzhou’s African population started to increase in 1998, when the Asian financial crisis prompted African merchants to leave Indonesia and Thailand in search of new markets (Bodomo 2012; Osnos 2009). Unlike previous generations of African migrants, who were from elite backgrounds and traveled to China for higher education opportunities, this recent wave includes a large number of economic migrants from various social and economic backgrounds. Moreover, recent migration from Africa has been transforming Guangzhou’s urban landscape by forming the largest African diaspora communities in China, dubbed by local media as “Chocolate City” or “Little Africa” (Pang, Chen, and Yang 2008).

There are no available government statistics on the exact number of Africans in Guangzhou. According to some scholarly estimates, the number is probably around 20,000 (Li, Ma, and Xue 2009; Haugen 2012; Yang 2012). The African population in Guangzhou is extremely diverse and almost every country in Africa is represented. Castillo (2014) identifies three types of African traders in Guangzhou, depending on their migration trajectories: the more established, the itinerant and semi-
settled, and the newly-arrived. The first category includes those who have been doing business in Guangzhou for more than a decade and who have established important personal and business relations with local authorities and business partners. The last category refers mainly to fortune seekers who have no previous business experience or cultural knowledge about China. Unlike the first two groups who generally hold valid visas, these latecomers tend to have vulnerable legal status and must rely on ethnic community networks for survival. Nigerian Igbo are often identified by both researchers and Africans migrants from other countries as constituting the largest proportion of visa over-stayers (Haugen 2012; Yang 2012). Africans from other countries sometimes blame Nigerian Igbo for ruining the reputation of all Africans due to their involvement in drug-related crimes and several public protests in Guangzhou.

The increase of African migrants in Guangzhou has raised pressing questions on issues of race, immigration control, and cross-cultural communications in urban China. In July 2009, an undocumented African was severely injured after jumping from the second floor of a trade mall in order to evade a passport check by the Chinese police. Later that day, more than one hundred Africans launched a protest outside a local police station demanding justice (Tang and Gong 2009). The event drew worldwide attention to the presence of illegal African migrants in Guangzhou.

Three years later, the African community was in the spotlight again when open clashes broke out between African traders and the Chinese police on June 19, 2012 over the death of a Nigerian man in police custody (Beech 2012; Branigan 2012). While such dramatic events point to some of the hidden fault lines in China’s existing immigration policy, some Western media interpret them as evidence of anti-black racism in China (Osnos 2009; Beech 2012). Existing literature mainly focuses on African migrants’ business and community building strategies in the face of China’s stringent immigration control (Bodomo 2012; Castillo 2014; Haugen 2012; Li et al. 2012; Lyons et al. 2008, 2012; Yang 2009). Relatively little has been written on the racial implications of the Africa diaspora in China.

China provides an interesting case study for the shifting meaning of race in a non-Western context, due to its rise as a global economic power and its status as an emerging destination for international migrants (Pieke 2012). The African diaspora in the PRD area deserves special attention due to African migrants’ distinct structural position in China’s urban economy. Unlike in developed countries where immigrant workers can be readily absorbed into the second- and third-tier market, there are no labor-intensive jobs for unskilled Africans due to the presence of internal migrant labor in major Chinese cities. Consequently, the majority of African migrants in Guangzhou function as traders and middlemen between factories and suppliers in China and clients in Africa. As an example of South-South migration, the African diaspora in China is also mediated by changing political and economic relations between China and various African countries. From Mao’s political agenda of Third World Alliance in the 1950s to the tremendous growth of Sino-African
trade in recent years, the discourse of Sino-African friendship has dominated official Chinese propaganda and rendered African migration to China a politically sensitive issue (Strauss 2009).

Based on multi-sited fieldwork among Chinese and migrants from Africa in Guangzhou, Yiwu (China), and Lagos (Nigeria), this research explores the contradictions and unevenness in the racialization of black African identities in China. I adopt Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s (1986, 64) concept of racialization, “the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group,” in order to capture the dynamic and historically constructed nature of race in contemporary China. The data was gathered between April 2012 and December 2014 through archival research, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation in the Xiaobei and Sanyuanli markets in Guangzhou. Forty-two interviews were conducted with African migrants from various countries. Twenty-six interviews were conducted with Chinese who had various levels of interaction with Africans in Guangzhou. The paper also draws from informal interview data generated from short research trips to Lagos in July-August 2013 and Yiwu in November 2014.

To begin, I first provide a theoretical framework, followed by a historical account of Sino-African connections. I then examine the unevenness in the racialization of black Africans in Guangzhou at the personal and institutional levels. The article ends with a reflection on the triangular power relations between China, Africa, and the West, and the possibility of institutional racism in the near future.

Race, cultural contexts, and different types of racism

Existing literature on race in China is generally divided into two camps. The first believes that the discourse of race and racism has a long history in Chinese culture, while the second emphasizes distinctions between traditional Chinese ways of constructing difference and the Western pseudo-scientific notion of race. Dikötter (1992, 34) argues that the emergence of a racial discourse in China at the end of the nineteenth century was not due to China’s encounter with the Western world, but rather to the “internal development” of Chinese society. Dikötter’s book has often been cited as evidence for the existence of racism in Chinese society (Jacques 2009; Johnson 2007; Sautman 1994), yet it has also been criticized for its reductionist approach to race and its Western-centric interpretation of Chinese cultural constructs (Dirlik 1993; Stafford 1993). In response, Stafford (1993, 609) calls for an understanding of Chinese concepts “on their own terms,” while Dirlik (1993, 70) urges critical reflections on the “hegemonic power” of Euro-American imperialism in spreading the discourse of race globally.

Echoing Stafford and Dirlik’s attention to the complexity of the Chinese cultural context, other scholars argue that in ancient Chinese society, cultural rather than biological difference was the primary means of distinguishing between “self” and “other.” In classical Chinese writings, aliens who did not assimilate to the Chinese way were called yi or fan,
literally meaning “the barbarian.” David Y. F. Ho (1985, 224) attributes this prejudice against non-Chinese to “culturocentrism,” that is, “a conviction as to the pliable endurance and superiority of Chinese civilization (in its spiritual, but not material, aspects), and a tendency to apply Chinese values without question in judging other races.” In traditional Chinese society, skin color did not indicate any immutable biological characteristics, but class status. Fair skin was generally associated with higher social status while dark skin was associated with peasants and manual laborers (Yuan 1989, 9). Fair skin is also an important standard of female beauty. This can be found in the Chinese saying *yi bai zhe bai chou* (white skin can hide a hundred flaws) (Hooi 2009, 8). According to Fennell (2013), traditional Chinese society did not share the absolutist notions of skin color of the European Enlightenment. It was “civilizational attainment,” together with a spatial hierarchy based on geographical distance from the Chinese Empire, which determined the ranking of one’s skin color. In this traditional Chinese cosmology, “Europeans, coming from a place far from the civilizational core, were considered just as strange as Africans” (247).

In his classic work *Black Folk Here and There* St. Clair Drake (1987) exposes the limitations of using only the US context in theorizing race and racism by examining the multifaceted nature of blackness in non-Western cultures. Besides emphasizing the different varieties of racism, St. Clair Drake also makes a distinction between racism and color prejudice. He states, “racism can exist without the reinforcement of color prejudice, just as color prejudice can exist apart from racism (and does within many black communities)” (22). Following St. Clair Drake’s attention to the cultural construction of racial meanings, this article explores the specificity of the Chinese cultural context in generating a complex and ever-changing matrix of hierarchical rankings of different groups of foreigners. Meanwhile, it also attempts to move beyond the nation-state paradigm by examining the transnational flow of ideas in the power-laden contexts of Western colonialism, Sino-African relations, and China’s integration into the global economy. Stam and Shohat (2012, 281) note that in comparative studies of racism in different cultural contexts, the “which is worse?” question is the wrong question. Instead, they argue, “the globalized era of asymmetrical interdependencies requires a heightened sense of the (partially regulated) flow of ideas, of crisscrossing messages and multidirectional but still power-inflected channels of exchange, where nations and states are not necessarily coterminous” (295). This paper treats Guangzhou as a meeting ground or arena where various and contradictory racial ideologies compete and interact with each other.

Following scholars in Critical Race Studies, this research understands race to be a shaping force in structuring different groups’ social locations, as well as deeply embedded in daily life practices (Delgado and Stefancic 2000). It distinguishes three types of racism in analyzing African experiences in Guangzhou: individual, institutional, and epistemological.3 So far most of the accusations of anti-black racism in China are concentrated in the individual realm. However, as noted by Harrison (1995, 65),
racism cannot be understood as occurring only at the personal level, that is in beliefs, emotional convictions, and individual prejudices, and should be examined as “a nexus of material relations within which social and discursive practices perpetuate oppressive power relations between populations presumed to be essentially different.” Prashad (2000, 164) makes distinctions between individual racism, which is mainly based on stereotypes and personal feelings, and structural racism, which is embedded in institutional practices. Kubota and Lin (2006) call for attention to epistemological racism, that is, unequal power relations between the West and the Rest in terms of racial knowledge production. This article traces the relation between anti-black racism at the personal and institutional level. It also interrogates how Chinese knowledge about Africans and black people is and has been developed, contested, and mediated by China’s encounters with Africa and the West in different historical periods.

Sino-African connections in historical perspective

In premodern China, the Chinese understanding of blackness encompassed several groups of people with dark skins: the non-Han Chinese, South Asians, and black African slaves brought to Guangzhou by Arab traders (Wyatt 2010). Li (2015) holds that premodern Chinese prejudice was against all types of foreigners, not just Africans and blacks. Between 1405 and 1433, the famous Chinese navigator Zheng He made a series of seven naval expeditions to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Africa. Admiral Zheng was reported to have exchanged gifts with indigenous Africans and treated them with “courtesy and restraint” (Snow 1988, 27–29). From the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, Chinese knowledge about Africa was mainly acquired from Western traders and missionaries who arrived on the Chinese coast. In 1848, Xu Jiuyu, governor of Fujian province, published an influential book on world geography, largely based on “oral reports and writings of Western missionaries.” Xu’s depiction of Africa reproduces “the familiar Western picture of a continent lacking a history or culture of its own” (189). China’s defeat by Britain in the Opium War (1840-1842) marked the country’s forced opening to Euro-American powers and its gradual transformation into a semicolonial under Western military coercion. The Western notion of race found its way to China through three channels: missionary teachings, Chinese students who studied in the West, and Japanese translations of Western political and social philosophical texts (Fennell 2013, 248).

The spread of Western racial ideology in China in the late nineteenth century promoted ideas of the racial inferiority of blacks among elite Chinese, yet it also facilitated the development of an anti-colonial discourse concerning the competition for power between the white race and the yellow race. Yan Fu, who studied in England from 1877 to 1879 and played a key role in introducing Darwin and Spencer to Chinese readers, identified four major races on the earth: yellow, white, brown, and black. Tang Caichang and Liang Qichao, who had lived as political exiles in Japan, believed that mankind was divided into five races: yellow,
white, black, brown, and red (Dikötter 1992, 67, 77, 78). While adopting the Western racial classification system, Chinese reformers also challenged the Western racial hierarchy by placing the yellow race in equal rank with the white race or even superior to it. Tang Caichang wrote, “Yellow and white are wise, red and black are stupid; yellow and white are rulers, red and black are slaves; yellow and white are united, red and black are scattered” (quoted in Dikötter 1992, 81). Liang Qichao declared that the white race was arrogant and disliked hard work. The yellow race, on the contrary, was humble and diligent; they were the initiators of civilization, the descendants of the Yellow Emperor (Dikötter 1992, 83).

The rise of a discourse on the yellow race among Chinese reformers at the end of the nineteenth century is the result of complex interactions between indigenous and Western thought. Although the idea of the yellow race was initiated from the West, the Chinese reformers had significantly transformed its meaning such that it became an ideological weapon with which to contest white domination. Liang Qichao (1960, 123) used the term huang zu (yellow lineage) to emphasize the popular belief that all Chinese were the descendants of the Yellow Emperor. Instead of conveying any hereditary differences, the concept of lineage emphasized the historical construction of kinship and family ties in the specific Chinese context. The reformers’ choice of the color yellow was not based on skin pigment, but on the cultural understanding that yellow was the royal color in ancient China. Despite its resistance to white domination, the Chinese notion of yellow race-lineage failed to challenge the subordination of the “black,” “brown,” and “red” to the “white race.” By accepting the lower status of these groups in the Western racial hierarchy, Chinese reformers were simultaneously upholding the superiority of the yellow race-lineage. Kang Youwei, the leader of the 1898 reform, even proposed to whiten the darker races through dietary change, intermarriage, migration, and sterilization (Dikötter 1992, 89–90).

It is worth noting that elite Chinese knowledge of black Americans during the early twentieth century was complicated by the influence of abolitionist literature and personal trips to the United States. In 1901, Lin Shu published A Black Slave’s Cry to Heaven, the Chinese translation of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Lin worked with collaborators who knew foreign languages and translated over one hundred and fifty Western novels into Chinese, including many world classics. In the preface and afterword of the book, Lin pointed out parallels between the plight of blacks and early Chinese immigrant laborers in the United States. He also warned his compatriots of the prospect of enslavement in the absence of a strong Chinese state (Arkush and Lee 1989, 78–80). In his 1903 tour of the United States, Liang Qichao denounced lynchings as “cruel and inhuman acts” and expressed his disappointment at the hypocritical nature of American liberty (Arkush and Lee 1989, 91). Although Liang accepted what he learned in the US about the “despicable” behaviors of “blacks” as true, he still could not accept the dehumanization of black people by brutal punishments such as lynching.
After the founding of People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao aggressively pursued an anti-imperialist and anti-racist political agenda by supporting African Americans’ struggles for civil rights in the United States and by building coalitions with developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. Although Mao’s efforts to build solidarity with African countries emerged largely out of political concerns, the Chinese government did contribute large amounts of money and labor to improving the general infrastructure in Africa. In the two decades after Premier Zhou Enlai’s visits to Africa in 1963-1965, China delivered close to US $2 billion to that continent (Snow 1988, 146). Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Chinese government hosted visits by high-profile African American leaders such as W.E.B. Dubois (1959), Robert Williams (1965-1968), and Huey Newton (1971), who were treated with great honor and publicity. Fennell (2013) notes the key role of mainstream Chinese media, such as The People’s Daily, in promoting an official state discourse of transracial solidarity between the Chinese revolutionary masses, black Africans, and diasporic Africans in the United States. For Fennell, “race and racial identity became the answer for China’s foreign policy orientation” during 1949-1976 (262).

From late 1970s to late 1990s the Sino-African solidarity discourse subsided due to Deng’s Open Door Policy, which reconnected China with the Western world. China’s quest for wealth and strength in this period was accompanied by the infiltration of Western racial ideologies. Since the majority of foreigners in China in the 1980s and 1990s were white-skinned Westerners, many Chinese intellectuals understood the world according to an international racial hierarchy, with industrial nations at the top, Third World countries at the bottom, and China somewhere in between (Lufrano 1994). The publicity given to Chinese aid to Africa in the Mao era also backfired because it reinforced the stereotype that African countries are backward and always need help. China started offering scholarships to African students in the early 1960s and 1970s. Yet due to cultural differences, the political environment in China, and communication problems, periodic conflicts between Chinese and African students were reported in various Chinese cities. The 1988 anti-African student protest in Nanjing was the most publicized by Western media. Some scholars interpret the incident as anti-black racism in China (Sautman 1994; Dikötter 1994; Cheng 2011). Others read it as symptomatic of broader issues such as nationalism, increasing social inequality, and students’ quest for democracy (Lufrano 1994; Sullivan 1994; Crane 1994). However, due to the relatively small number of African students on Chinese campuses in the 1980s, the majority agree that these conflicts were limited to elite intellectuals and did not spread to the larger Chinese society.

China’s return to Africa in the late 1990s was marked by a shift from political motivations to economic interests. Since the opening of the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, bilateral trade between the two has grown 28% per year from 2001 to 2010. In 2011, China surpassed the US to become Africa’s largest trading partner. In
addition to state-sponsored companies, private Chinese investors and entrepreneurs are also increasingly drawn to Africa by its market potentials and business opportunities. Threatened by China's growing influence in Africa, some Western countries have accused China of practicing neocolonialism on the continent. Although the neocolonial thesis has been refuted by scholars as largely unfounded (Sautman and Yan 2007), China still needs to take seriously some of the challenges it has been facing in Africa, such as corporate responsibilities, cultural conflicts with local communities, and non-governmental trade relations. In response to this new historical situation, the Chinese state has revived the Maoist discourse of Sino-African solidarity and narrated current Chinese/African relations as “a continuation of an old friendship” based on Mao's anti-colonial and anti-racist agenda (Fennell 2013, 269). However, as noted by Fennell, “the CPC may have control over the message about race but it may have increasingly less control over those individuals and companies that represent China in Africa” (272-272). In my research on African migrants in Guangzhou, I observed a similar discrepancy between pro-African political ideology at the state level and anti-African sentiments and practices at the individual and local level.

Popular perceptions of Africans in Guangzhou

Since the early 2000s, with the increasing presence of Chinese migrants in Africa and African migrants in China, Chinese knowledge of Africans is no longer restricted to the elites. The Internet has played an important role in mediating popular perceptions of Africans in China. In addition, daily life interactions with African migrants in Guangzhou, mainly in spaces of trade, constitute another major source of knowledge formation. In neighborhoods where African traders are concentrated, Chinese petty entrepreneurs and migrant workers have formed mutually beneficial relations with Africans by providing them with various trade-related services. The intersection between internal and international migration in Guangzhou not only facilitates cross-cultural business relations, but gives rise to a grassroots perspective in constructing alternative knowledge about black people and Africans in China. Generally speaking, the Chinese understanding of Africans in Guangzhou is centered on Sub-Saharan black Africans. Arabic-speaking migrants from North Africa are usually identified by Chinese as whites or Arabs, not as Africans. This conflation of black and African identities is reflected in the fact that the Chinese term heiren (black person) is often used, in both popular media and daily life settings, as a generic term to refer to Africans from diverse backgrounds.

It goes beyond the scope of this paper to examine how knowledge about Africa and blackness is constructed and disseminated on the Chinese Internet. Here I identify three major themes in negative online representations of Africans: debates on Chinese aid to Africa, the stigmatization of black sexuality, and the African threat narrative in Guangzhou. Based on Internet debates on Chinese aid to Africa, Cheng
notes the emergence of cyber racism among Chinese with experience working in Africa. In the weblogs of Liu Zhirong, a French-educated businessman with ten years of experience working in Africa, Africans were constructed as racially inferior to Chinese and unworthy of Chinese aid due to their greedy nature and their discrimination against Chinese people in Africa. Based on online data between 2006 and 2008, Shen (2009) identifies a paradox in Chinese perceptions of China’s reentry into Africa. On the one hand, Africans were constructed as inferior Chinese partners and low priority financial recipients. On the other hand, the Chinese state’s continuous aid to Africa (on a reduced scale) was considered necessary in order to boost the image of a benevolent China to the world. Both Cheng and Shen rely heavily on elite Chinese perspectives and fail to reflect on the influence of Western racial ideology in shaping elite constructions of African “inferiority” in Chinese cyberspace.

The stigmatization of black sexuality is another contentious subject due to the increase in romances and marriages between Chinese women and black men. In August 2009, Lou Jing, a Chinese girl with black skin, entered the Shanghai-based Dragon TV’s Go Oriental Angel talent show. Born to a Chinese mother and an African American father, Lou Jing was a controversial contestant in the Chinese blogosphere. Chinese netizens used terms such as “little black devil” and “unwanted bastard” to describe her. The attack on her mother was even more vicious (she had had an extra-marital affair with an African American man and was later divorced by her Chinese husband). Ms. Lou was denounced as a “shameless whore,” who committed “adultery” with a black man because of his “big XX.” The racialization of black masculinity was salient in this case because Chinese women who engaged in illicit relations with white foreigners were never condemned in the same way as Ms. Lou. In the Guangzhou context, the demonization of black masculinity is manifested by the circulation of sensationalist news headlines such as “There are 200,000 blacks in Guangzhou and rape cases committed by blacks have been rapidly rising.” The perception of black men as hypersexual monsters preying on Chinese women reproduces Social Darwinist constructions of Africans as primitive and backward. It also helps promote the idea that blacks are promiscuous. Racist phrases such as the black invasion, the fifty-seventh ethnic group in China, and the AIDS threat can be found among online discussions of African migrants in Guangzhou (Cheng 2011).

Scholars have noted the key role of the local Guangzhou media in constructing a negative image of Africans as guilty of illegal immigration, drug dealing, sex offenses, and the spread of AIDS (Li et al. 2009). The media production of the African threat narrative is achieved in several ways. First is the exaggeration of the number of undocumented Africans in the city. In 2007, a report in Guangzhou Daily claimed that there were 200,000 Africans in the city and only about 20,000 were officially registered with the government (Ke and Du 2007). Since then, the number 200,000 has been frequently quoted by news reporters and Chinese
netizens as the most popular estimate of the African population in Guangzhou. The criminalization of Africans as drug dealers was supported by local media exposure of several high-profile drug-dealing cases involving undocumented Nigerians. Although several groups of foreigners are involved in drug-related crimes in Guangzhou, including Southeast Asians, Middle-Easterners, and overseas Chinese, Africans are often singled out as the most visible group (Liao and Du 2011; Qiu 2011). A third component of the African threat narrative is the so-called high fertility rate among Africans. Interracial marriages between Chinese women and African men are constructed as a threat not only to China’s population control policy, but to the racial purity of the Chinese nation.

While the Internet plays a key role in spreading negative stereotypes against Africans and black people in China, Internet representation of Africans in China is also a multilayered and contested process. For example, black Africans in China are not always constructed as an exclusively racialized category with clear-cut boundaries, but are sometimes conflated with foreigners, Muslims, and African Americans. In addition to the African threat narrative, the Sino-African friendship discourse is also resurfacing in online critiques of racial discrimination against African migrants in Guangzhou. Another mediating factor is the continuing influence of Western racial ideology. In the Chinese Internet discussions of the two African protest events in Guangzhou, some netizens cite examples of “violent blacks” in the United States and in France as a warning to the Chinese state for tougher immigration control. One widely circulated post contains an adapted Chinese translation of John Philippe Rushton’s controversial article “Brain size, IQ, and racial-group differences” as evidence for the “racial inferiority” of Africans in comparison to whites and Asians. While it is hard to estimate the influence of the Internet on different parts of the Chinese population, my research finds that people who have few or no daily interactions with Africans tend to rely more on the Internet for information concerning Africans. In contrast, Chinese migrants who have frequent encounters with Africans in business settings tend to display more diverse attitudes.

Due to their provincial/rural backgrounds and relatively lesser exposure to cosmopolitan values, internal Chinese migrants can be prejudiced against black Africans upon initial contact. However, their relative lack of exposure to Western racial ideology also renders them more open and receptive to multiple and shifting constructions of blackness. In my interviews with Africans in Guangzhou, many reported unpleasant experiences traveling on buses, where some Chinese covered their noses at the sight of them or avoided sitting beside them. One Nigerian informant told me the following story, “Once I went to a warehouse with my friend and his finger got cut. A Chinese working there said, ‘Hey, your blood is the same color as ours. I thought since your skin is black, your blood must be black as well.’ Then I realized how ignorant some Chinese can be.” Color prejudice has definitely contributed to the racialization of blackness as a stigmatized identity in Guangzhou. Yet some Chinese people change their attitudes as their knowledge about Africans grows. One
In contemporary Chinese society, skin color is not the only parameter in ranking different groups of foreigners. Nationality sometimes works together with economic status to complicate the color line. According to many of my African informants, blacks from the United States are generally treated much better in Guangzhou than black Africans. Some of my African informants managed to find teaching jobs in China by posing as African Americans. The perception that black people from the United States receive more respect shows that nationality and the economic status of one’s home country can be weighed more importantly in Chinese society than one’s skin color. Compared to other dark-skinned foreigners in China, black Africans suffer double discrimination due to their perceived position at the bottom of both the color hierarchy and the economic hierarchy. However, in neighborhoods where Africans are concentrated, such as Xiaobei and Sanyuanli, there is usually a conflation of “foreigner” and “black” identity among Chinese. Migrants from rural China generally make no distinction between white and black foreigners because the only foreigners they interact on a daily basis are black Africans. Some African traders fit the general Chinese perception that foreigners are rich because they can afford to travel to China by air, stay in good hotels, and buy goods in containers (Liao 2014). The overlap of “black” and “foreigner” also reflects class differences between Chinese migrant workers and some wealthy African traders, who are often addressed as laoban (boss) by Chinese migrant workers.

English language proficiency is another important factor that sometimes places Africans in a higher position than Chinese. Since English is the language of power in the global market, being able to speak English has helped a number of African men win the favor of young Chinese women. Despite the Chinese media’s stigmatization of black masculinity, it is fairly easy for an African man to find a Chinese girlfriend due to their foreigner status and their English language proficiency. For some female migrants from rural China, romance or marriage with an African trader may provide an alternative path for upward mobility, often in the form of joint business ventures (Lan 2015). However, language barriers between Chinese and African migrants also facilitate racism at the personal level. Due to the great variety of languages spoken in the African markets in Guangzhou, traders have to rely on Chinese-style English, body language, and calculators for business negotiations (Bodomo 2010; Han 2013). Communication problems, coupled with cultural misunderstandings, and the lack of legal regulation in the informal economy, often lead to mutual stereotypes between Chinese and Africans. For example, Chinese often accuse Africans of lacking “professional business ethics,” while Africans often complain that Chinese do not understand “the
African way of doing business.” Such cultural stereotypes may reinforce racism against black Africans at the personal level, yet they are also symptomatic of the shared structural marginalization of both groups in urban China.

In addition to English language proficiency, foreigners in China are also evaluated by their different levels of *suzhi*. *Suzhi* is a popular Chinese term which can be roughly translated as “quality,” but as noted by Kipnis (2006), its Chinese meaning actually blurs the nature/nurture divide by encompassing three aspects of individual qualities: the physical, educational, and moral. When the term is used to describe different groups of foreigners, the emphasis is laid on educational level, social behavior, and personal moral standards rather than on biological differences. In Guangzhou the general Chinese public is likely to view Africans as “low quality foreigners,” largely based on negative media representations of Africans as causing various social problems in the city (Haugen 2012). However, Chinese who had personal interactions with Africans usually hold more positive views towards them. One thirty-year-old female resident near Xiaobei told me, “Some blacks are high *suzhi* people. Once my mom’s purse was snatched near the bus stop by a Chinese guy and it was a black man who helped her catch the thief. All the Chinese there were just watching.” The behavior-oriented nature of *suzhi* is further illustrated by the fact that white foreigners who behaved rudely towards Chinese citizens in public places were also condemned by Chinese media as “low quality foreigners” or “foreign trash” (Hu and Shao 2012). The using of *suzhi* as another criterion to evaluate different groups of foreigners shows that in the specific context of Chinese culture, personal virtues and socially appropriate behaviors can sometimes outweigh skin color in the construction of group identity.

State regulation of undocumented Africans in Guangzhou

The Chinese state’s attitudes towards the recent African migration to China are mixed. On the one hand, official media still upholds the rhetoric of Sino-African friendship and is generally silent on the topic of anti-black racism. On the other hand, the state is also using the PRD region as an experimental field to test new measures of immigration control. China’s recent tightening of immigration control points to its effort to distinguish between different types of foreigners, yet it also runs the risk of reinforcing negative stereotypes against African migrants at the personal level. While the local state’s immigration control in Guangzhou claims to target all foreigners, in practice, the police tend to single out African migrants for visa and passport checks. Most of the immigration raids in Guangzhou occur in areas where African migrants are concentrated. The racialization of blackness in Guangzhou testifies to the limitation of the Sino-African friendship rhetoric in addressing new challenges faced by China’s expansion in Africa and the recent African migration to China. It also calls for critical reflection on the link between individual and structural racism in China.
Differing from local media’s exotic or negative portrayals of African migrants in the PRD, central state media tend to carry more positive reports which function to reaffirm the state political ideology of Sino-African friendship. For example, a three-part report in Guangming Daily, an influential newspaper operated by the Communist Party of China Central Committee, is entitled, “Friends from Africa, how are you doing in Guangzhou?” (Ma et al. 2012). The report presents a sanitized depiction of African life in Guangzhou with some success stories, but there is no discussion of undocumented migrants. Besides highlighting the long history of Sino-African friendship, the report also insists, through the words of a Tanzanian male trader, that there is no discrimination against Africans in China. The politically sensitive nature of African migration in Guangzhou can be seen in the changing terms local media use to describe Africans: from racially-coded language such as “blacks” in earlier reports to more neutral references such as “Africans” and “foreigners” in recent ones. I heard rumors that one reporter from Guangzhou Daily was fired due to misrepresentation of African experiences in Guangzhou. Personal communication with a staff from the Guangzhou Academy of Social Science revealed that one of the researchers had been warned by the Beijing government not to make public comments that may negatively impact Sino-African relations.

In reality, the Chinese state’s silence on issues of undocumented Africans runs the risk of following the race-blind rhetoric in the West and thus perpetuating anti-black prejudice among the Chinese public. For example, the lack of official statistics on the African population in Guangzhou has given rise to rumors and speculations in local media, which present an inflated image of a black invasion among ordinary Chinese. Due to its long history as an immigrant sending country, China has not yet developed “a clear legal and administrative framework and apparatus to deal with the entry, residence, and employment of foreigners” (Pieke 2012, 58). The pressing situation in Guangzhou prompted the Guangdong provincial government to implement the first local legislation concerning the administration of foreigners in China, namely, the Interim Provisions of Guangdong Province on Administration of and Services to Aliens. Designed to specifically target undocumented migrants in the PRD area, the Guangdong Act also contributed significantly to China’s new Exit and Entry Administrative Law in 2013, which contains tougher provisions for undocumented immigrants (Lan 2015a). Implemented in May 2011, the Guangdong Act promotes a reward and punishment scheme by encouraging ordinary Chinese to report undocumented foreigners to local authorities. It also expands the power of local police to stop foreigners for passport and visa verification.

Although undocumented foreigners come from a variety of countries, in the PRD context they are primarily associated with African migrants due to the latter’s visibility in both Chinese and international media. Based on my observations and my informants’ reports, Africans are more likely to be stopped by the police for passport checks than other foreigners and they are the most vulnerable group in the local government’s
anti-illegal-immigrants campaign. Stan, a twenty-eight-year-old undocumented Nigerian complained to me bitterly about police violence, “The police do not respect Africans. They beat us, handcuff us, and put us in those locked police cars. They treat us like animals.”

Linda, a twenty-four-year-old female trader from Cameroon told me, “The police give respect to whites but not to blacks. I know some white people from smaller European countries and some Arabs who overstay their visas, but they were never stopped and questioned when they go out. The police only stop blacks.” Stan and Linda’s testimonies are supported by the majority of my African informants, whose major complaints are against the discretionary power of the Chinese police and visa officers. Racial profiling practiced by some police officers in Guangzhou underscores the link between racism at the personal level and the institutional level. However, due to the many gaps and discrepancies in the implementation of the Guangdong Act at the community level, it is premature to argue that institutional racism against black Africans is well-developed in China.

In terms of implementation, the Guangdong Act represents a compromise between the local government’s concern with economic growth and the central state’s demand for more stringent immigration control. An interview with a city official who used to work in the Xiaobei area showed that the local government has been plagued with a lack of resources and various kinds of corruption. As a result, the government policy towards Africans is apparently stringent but actually relaxed. He said, “The police only make arrests before some major events. Most of the time, they turn a blind eye to the many undocumented Africans on the street. For those who got arrested, they were locked up for several days and then released. Repatriation costs money, so the only solution is to turn them loose again.” In reality, police racism against Africans is complicated by the uneven application of police power in different cities. Many Nigerian Igbo informants reported that the Guangzhou police are more “wicked” than police in other cities in the PRD area. While police in other cities also check African passports, their priority seems to be drug-related crimes. Several of my Igbo informants who live in Foshan had experiences of being arrested by the police. After examining their hands carefully and finding that they were not involved in the drug business, the police set them free despite the fact that their visa had expired. African traders in Yiwu also reported that they feel much safer walking in the street because nobody bothers to check their passport.

State regulation of Africans in Guangzhou is also complicated by the intersection of internal and international migration in the city. Collaboration with Chinese migrants enables undocumented African traders to bypass some of the constraints imposed on their physical mobility by police surveillance. As noted by Cvajner and Sciortino (2010, 398), “in economics, an irregular status is nearly always translated into the possibility of charging a higher price for goods and services.” Chinese migrants and some local Chinese regard the presence of undocumented Africans as a potential economic opportunity and
are generally willing to provide various kinds of trade-related services in exchange for financial gain. In contrast to the state’s categorization of Africans as “legal” and “illegal” immigrants, some Chinese migrants and petty entrepreneurs distinguish between “good” and “bad” Africans. While the bad ones are involved in criminal activities, the good ones have a genuine desire to do honest business in China regardless of their visa status. Most of the Chinese traders I interviewed expressed a desire for the state to operate a more lenient visa policy towards those good Africans. In reality, the state is not unaware of the contributions of African migrants to the local economy. However, since most of the China-Africa grassroots business transactions are in the informal sector, they cannot be fully reflected in official statistics. The local state is also too embarrassed to acknowledge its failure in containing copyright infringement issues in the informal economy.

Racial triangulation between China, Africa, and the West

China’s increasing presence in Africa and recent African migration to China are both highly controversial topics. Yet most of the discussions of Sino-African relations tend to ignore the persistent yet invisible influence of the West. Only a few scholars have noted the mediating effects of Western media on Chinese perceptions of Africans and African perceptions of Chinese (Johnson 2007; Sautman and Yan 2009). The uneven racialization of black Africans in China points to the fact that anti-black racism in China cannot be interpreted solely within the black and white binary and must be situated within the larger context of the triangular power relations between China, Africa, and the West. In Bitter Fruit, Claire Kim (2000) uses the term “racial triangulation” to describe the shifting racialization of Asian Americans as a model minority compared to African Americans, and as non-citizens and outsiders in relation to whites and African Americans. This research extends Kim’s theory of racial triangulation to the domain of transnational racial formation. I argue that in order to uncover the multilayered complexity in the racialization of black Africans in China one needs to take into account racial triangulation between China, Africa, and the West. Despite the heterogeneity within the Chinese and African communities, their perceptions of each other are often filtered through an implicit Western lens due to the globalization of Western racial ideology.

Within the African community in Guangzhou, opinions on racism in China are rather divided. Some claim racism in China is worse than in the West because there are no human rights in China. Others think racism in China is different from that in the West. In both cases, the West serves as an important reference point for Africans’ perception of their treatment in China. A middle-aged engineer from Niger who was on a business trip in Guangzhou told me, “I like China because here you are treated like a human being. People talk to you. In France, when they see you as a black person, they avoid talking to you. They try to keep a
distance from you. You can tell the horror on their faces.”

Linda, a twenty-four-year-old female trader from Cameroon, had a nuanced understanding of the position of Chinese people in the global racial hierarchy. She said, “Blacks treat Chinese as human beings. White people think Chinese are nobody. They don’t respect Chinese. However, Chinese are worse than whites in terms of viewing blacks. There are many blacks in leading positions in European countries, but there is no black in leading positions in China.” While Linda’s observation of white superiority over Chinese is valid, her comparison between the position of blacks in Europe and China is not fair due to the relatively short history of African migration and settlement in China. Kevin, who had stayed in China for three years, compared the situation of undocumented migrants in Europe and in China. He said, “In Europe, undocumented people can move around freely, but they don’t give you opportunities like in China. Life in China is not free, but I can still do my business if I live very cautiously here. The Chinese government allows us to stay and run our businesses, so it is not that wicked.” Kevin’s testimony points to the existence of a liminal space between mobility and immobility, which provides undocumented Africans some agency to survive in China.

With China’s rise in the global economy, Africa remains an important political and economic partner since China needs the support of many African countries in its quest for global hegemony against the West (Bodomo 2009). Meanwhile, as China attracts more international migrants from diverse backgrounds, the image of whites as privileged foreigners is gradually being eroded. It was abominable white behaviors against Chinese citizens which ignited the 100-day crackdown on undocumented foreigners in Beijing starting May 15, 2012. The Beijing campaign generated heated discussions in Chinese media on the “supranational treatment” of foreigners and appealed directly to popular nationalism among Chinese citizens. Nevertheless, the decline of white privilege in China does not mean the improved status of black Africans. Since China denies being an immigrant country, it still treats foreign immigrants as a temporary issue and there is no official effort to integrate them into Chinese society. Undocumented status has severely limited African migrants’ physical and social mobility in China. It also leads to difficulties in business and personal life. Due to the grassroots nature of their business activities, African migrants are providing business and job opportunities mainly for the marginalized and disadvantaged groups in China, such as migrant workers and individual petty entrepreneurs. Unlike various interest groups in Western countries, these people have little power to influence state immigration policy.

Frank Pieke (2012) notes that with the rapid diversification of the immigrant population in China, the socialist state will face similar challenges as more established immigrant countries in Europe and North America, such as ethnic and race relations, religious and cultural pluralism, nationality and political rights, and the rise of a second generation of mixed-heritage citizens. However, China’s unique historical relations with Africa and its recent transformation into a
global economic giant also highlight the specificity of the Chinese context in offering alternative interpretations and coping strategies concerning racial tensions. This research uncovers multiple levels of complication in the racialization of blackness in Guangzhou. Black Africans are sometimes constructed as inferior to Chinese, sometimes as occupying a higher status than Chinese due to the conflation of Africans and foreigners in some parts of Guangzhou. The differential treatment of black Americans and black Africans also gives rise to racism based not on skin color, but on nationality and economic status. Meanwhile, due to the intersection of internal and international migration, there are also notable examples of Chinese/African business partnerships and interracial marriages, which have the potential to change public perceptions of black Africans in China. However, the transformative nature of such grassroots cross-cultural interactions is also severely limited by language barriers, cultural differences, and the Chinese state’s stringent immigration control policies.

Conclusion

Racial discourses in China have been mediated by changing political and social contexts in different historical periods. From the yellow race discourse in late nineteenth century to the Sino-African friendship discourse in the Mao and post-Mao regimes, to the current African threat discourse in Guangzhou, the Chinese knowledge of blacks and Africans has been developed within larger contexts such as China’s anti-colonial struggles, the rise of nationalism and the pro-democracy movement, changing diplomatic and trade relations with African countries, and the intersection of internal and international migration in global cities such as Guangzhou. The popularization of the Internet facilitates the spread of anti-black sentiment from the elites to ordinary Chinese. The concentration of African migrants in the PRD area also provides opportunities for daily life interactions between Chinese migrants and African traders, with the potential to produce a more open and fluid interpretation of blackness in China. However, due to continuing influence of Western media and the Chinese state’s silence on issues of racial discrimination, racism against black Africans at the personal level and epistemological levels is likely to grow.

It is premature to argue for a fully developed institutional racism due to the regional variations of African experiences in China and the ambiguities and contradictions in state policy towards African migrants in Guangzhou (Bodomo 2012; Castillo 2014; Lan 2015a). Some of the predicaments of Africans in Guangzhou have to be attributed to China’s lack of a fully developed immigration system or the state’s unwillingness to reform its immigration policy. Africans are more vulnerable compared to other groups of foreigners partly because of their concentration in the informal economy, and partly because of increasing racism against blacks at the individual level. Nevertheless, it is important to identify the link
between individual racism practiced by some state officials and police officers, and potential institutional racism against black people in the future. If the Chinese state continues its race-blind ideology, there is the possibility for the development of more institutionalized racism in China in the near future.

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1 The English-language media carried a different version of the story, claiming that the African man died after jumping from the building. See Qiu 2009; Branigan 2009. Interviews with Africans who witnessed the 2009 incident revealed that the man was severely injured, but did not die.

2 I use “traditional Chinese ways” or “traditional Chinese society” to describe China before its encounter with the West.

3 The author interprets the division between these three types of racism as an analytical one because in reality there are important overlaps between them.

4 One major gain from China’s economic aid to Africa was that Mainland China replaced Taiwan as the sole representative government of China in the United Nations General Assembly in 1971, with the support of many African nations.

5 These programs were similar to the Soviet-era programs described by Bilaniuk (this issue) in the case of the Ukraine.


8 China currently has fifty-six ethnic groups.

9 Guangzhou Daily is the official newspaper of the Guangzhou municipal party committee and one of the highest circulating dailies in China.

10 “So many blacks are rushing to China, please do not marry blacks and have children with them,” http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-funinfo-3411384-1.shtml

11 “How long should we put up with blacks in Guangzhou?” http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-free-2598293-1.shtml

12 “The racial differences in intelligence, is race an effective construct of classification?” http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_49a6e5ec010007ln.html


14 Personal interview, July 23, 2013, Lagos.

15 Owen (this issue) similarly documents the positive effects of a colored South African woman engaging in a love relationship with a migrant black Congolese man.
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