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Emotional Dynamics in Conflict and Negotiation: Individual, Dyadic, and Group Processes

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Abstract

Conflict is an emotional enterprise. We provide an integrative synthesis of theory and research on emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation at three levels of analysis: the individual, the dyad, and the group. At the individual level, experienced moods and emotions shape negotiators’ cognition and behavior. At the dyadic level, emotional expressions influence counterparts’ cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses. At the group level, patterns of emotional experience and/or expression can instigate cooperation, coordination, and conformity, or competition, conflict, and deviance. Intrapersonal (individual-level) effects of diffuse moods can be explained by affect priming and affect-as-information models, whereas effects of discrete emotions are better explained by the appraisal-tendency framework. Interpersonal (dyadic- and group-level) effects of emotions are mediated by affective (e.g., emotional contagion) and inferential (e.g., reverse appraisal) responses, whose relative predictive power can be understood through the lens of emotions as social information (EASI) theory. We offer a critical assessment of the current literature, discuss practical implications for negotiation and conflict management, and sketch an agenda for future research.

Keywords

affect, competition, conflict, cooperation, emotion, negotiation
INTRODUCTION

Conflict is an intrinsic part of life. Whether we focus on exchanges between individuals, groups, organizations, or nations, conflicts are omnipresent. Salespersons disagree with potential buyers about the price of their merchandise; companies debate the terms of a merger; organizational departments argue about the distribution of company resources; unions wrestle with the government over new legislations; and employees barter with their employers about the terms of their contracts. The divergent interests that lie at the heart of such conflicts can give rise to intense emotions (Barry 1999), which may in turn influence conflict development (Barry & Oliver 1996, Morris & Keltner 2000, Van Kleef & Sinaceur 2013).

How conflicts develop can have far-reaching consequences for the parties involved. High-quality agreements foster mutual satisfaction, sustain enduring relationships, create order and stability, reduce chances of future conflict, and stimulate personal and economic growth; unsatisfactory agreements, by contrast, generate frustration and annoyance, breed continued conflict and disharmony, and undermine profit and productivity (Rubin et al. 1994). Given that conflicts often bring about emotional responses, attempts to resolve conflicts are also likely to be pervaded by emotional dynamics (Barry et al. 2004). Insight in such dynamics is therefore critical for understanding the trajectory of conflict and discovering ways to resolve it.

In this article we set out to illuminate the role of emotions in conflict and negotiation. We begin by defining the central concepts around which our review and analysis are organized. We then provide an integrative synthesis of theory and research, structured according to the three levels of analysis at which most research in the area is situated: the individual level, the dyadic level, and the group level. We briefly discuss theoretical models that are relevant for understanding emotional dynamics at each level, and we provide a selective review of empirical studies that illustrate the key mechanisms, outcomes, and contingencies associated with the experience and expression of emotions in conflict and negotiation. Finally, we provide a critical assessment of the current literature, offer suggestions for future research, and highlight practical implications.

SETTING THE STAGE: CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Our purpose with this article is to analyze the role of emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation. Conflict occurs when parties perceive that they hold different views, have incompatible goals and aspirations, and/or engage in incompatible behaviors (De Dreu 2010, Deutsch 1973, Rubin et al. 1994). Scholars have distinguished among different types of conflict (Druckman et al. 1977, Harinck et al. 2000, Jehn 1997, Rubin et al. 1994). Arguably the most prevalent and consequential forms are conflicts of interest (disagreements about the distribution of scarce resources such as money, time, products, or territory) and value conflicts (disagreements about personal norms, values, and beliefs about right or wrong).

The most common and constructive way of dealing with conflict is through negotiation (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993). Negotiation can be defined as the communication between two or more parties who exhibit divergent views, goals, or behaviors, with the aim of reaching an agreement (Pruitt 1998). Negotiations may take different forms depending on the characteristics of the situation, the issues at stake, and the number of parties involved. The simplest type of negotiation involves two parties discussing a single issue. More complex negotiations may involve multiple parties, multiple issues, and/or representatives negotiating on behalf of a constituency. Negotiations can be short-lasting or long-lasting, ranging from a single offer that may or may not be accepted by the recipient to negotiations that go on for decades, which usually involve an intricate combination of conflicts of interest and value conflicts.
Regardless of their specific form and time course, most negotiations are characterized by mixed-motive interdependence: Parties experience incentives both to compete to maximize their outcomes and to cooperate to secure an agreement (Deutsch 1973, Komorita & Parks 1995, Schelling 1960). Even though negotiation situations can vary in the degree to which they provide incentives for cooperation versus competition (De Dreu 2010, Kelley et al. 2003, Rusbult & Van Lange 2003, Weber et al. 2004), the fact that parties engage in negotiations implies, by definition, that they have (or perceive to have) at least partly incompatible goals or views, and that they experience at least some motivation to reach an agreement. The combination of cooperative and competitive incentives that characterizes mixed-motive interdependence is essential to understanding the social dynamics of conflict and negotiation in general, and the role of emotions in particular (Adam & Brett 2015, Van Kleef et al. 2010). As we shall see below, the tension between cooperative and competitive tendencies allows specific emotional experiences and expressions to steer the conflict’s trajectory in one direction or another by leading negotiating parties to adopt a more cooperative or more competitive stance.

Various (experimental) approaches have been developed to model different aspects of conflict and negotiation. These approaches differ, among other things, in the degree to which mutual communication and influence are possible. On one end of the continuum are simple economic games such as the Dictator game, in which one person (the “dictator”) divides an endowment between the self and another player, which the other player must accept. This game models a form of unilateral decision making that does not qualify as a negotiation, because the recipient has no means of influencing the outcome. On the other end of the continuum are negotiations that involve a sequence of offers and counteroffers, in which parties respond to and can mutually influence each other’s proposals. In between these two archetypes are experimental games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (in which there is no communication, but both parties’ choices jointly determine their respective outcomes) and the Ultimatum Bargaining game (in which one party makes a proposal that is only effectuated when approved by the other). The emphasis of the current review is on negotiation settings and economic games that model the final stage of a negotiation, in which the outcome depends on the decisions of all parties involved.

In conceptualizing the role of emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation, it is important to clarify the meaning of three important terms that are sometimes (mistakenly) used interchangeably to refer to emotional phenomena, namely affect, mood, and emotion. Affect is the most general term, referring to a subjective feeling state that can range from diffuse moods such as cheerfulness or depression to specific and acute emotions such as happiness or anger (Frijda 1994). The word “affect” is also used to refer to relatively stable individual dispositions (i.e., trait positive and negative affect; Watson et al. 1988). Emotion and mood are generally conceptualized as subtypes of affect. They are differentiated by the degree to which they are directed toward a specific stimulus—be it a person, an object, or an event (Ekman & Davidson 1994). Most emotion theories hold that discrete (specific) emotions arise as a result of an individual’s conscious or unconscious appraisal (interpretation) of some event or situation as positively or negatively relevant to a particular concern or goal (Frijda 1986, Lazarus 1991). Accordingly, emotions are directed toward something, or, more typically, someone (e.g., a colleague, a customer, a negotiation partner), whereas moods are not directed at anything in particular—one can feel cheerful or grumpy for no apparent reason. Emotions are also comparatively short-lived and intense, whereas moods tend to be more enduring and mild. Furthermore, unlike moods, emotions are characterized by distinct subjective experiences, physiological reactions, expressions, and action tendencies (Ekman & Davidson 1994). The majority of the research reviewed here speaks to the role of discrete emotions such as anger, happiness, sadness, disappointment, and guilt, although some studies involve more diffuse positive versus negative moods.
When analyzing the role of emotions in conflict and negotiation, it is further useful to distinguish between intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotions (Morris & Keltner 2000). Intrapersonal effects refer to the influence of an individual’s emotional experience on his or her cognition and behavior. Theoretically, there is no social interaction required for any intrapersonal effects of emotions to occur, because these effects take place within a single individual. In practice, however, the focal person’s emotions are commonly elicited by the behavior of others (e.g., a provoking remark or a disappointing offer). By contrast, interpersonal effects of emotions do require some form of social interaction, because they involve the influence of one person’s emotional expressions on the emotions, cognitions, and/or behaviors of one or more other individuals in the social context. In the ensuing review, we consider both intrapersonal (individual level of analysis) and interpersonal (dyadic and group levels of analysis) effects of emotions.

As noted above, emotions are characterized by a combination of appraisal patterns, subjective feelings, physiological reactions, outward expressions, and action tendencies (Ekman & Davidson 1994, Frijda 1986, Lazarus 1991). This means that emotional experience and expression can in principle be operationalized by any measure or manipulation that taps subjective feelings (e.g., pleasant versus unpleasant), physiological reactions (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, galvanic skin response, brain activation), outward expressions (e.g., facial displays, bodily postures, vocal expressions, written statements), and/or action tendencies (e.g., approach versus avoidance).

Finally, with regard to emotional expressions, it is important to realize that facial, vocal, postural, and textual expressions may or may not reflect the privately experienced feelings of the expresser. Some emotional expressions are spontaneous and unintentional, whereas others may be strategic in that they are voluntary and premeditated. For example, emotions may be strategically feigned, exaggerated, or suppressed in a calculated attempt to influence others (Côté & Hideg 2011, Kopelman et al. 2006, Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006, Van Kleef et al. 2011). The mixed-motive structure of many types of conflict and negotiation, in particular, may provide incentives for parties to misrepresent their feelings in order to deceive the opponent and gain a strategic advantage (Barry 1999, Van Kleef & Sinaceur 2013). This has implications for the perceived authenticity of emotional expressions in conflict and negotiation, an issue to which we return later.

We now begin our review of prominent theoretical approaches and empirical research on emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation, discussing individual-, dyadic-, and group-level effects in turn.

**EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS**

At the individual level of analysis, the central question is how the emotions a person experiences influence his or her cognitions and behavior during conflict and negotiation. We first discuss theoretical perspectives that are relevant to this question and then consider the empirical record.

**Theoretical Perspectives**

Since the late 1970s, various theoretical perspectives on the intrapersonal consequences of emotions and other affective states have emerged. Several of these are relevant for understanding individual-level emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation.

Affect priming models maintain that moods and emotions influence social thinking and behavior by selectively priming related ideas and memories that are part of an associative network, thereby facilitating their use when planning and executing behavior (Bower 1981, Bower & Forgas 2001, Isen et al. 1978). Such affect priming may occur via selective attention, selective encoding, and/or selective retrieval of affect-congruent information. Affect priming models postulate that positive
or negative associations with the object of judgment mediate affective influences on judgment. Thus, a good mood may temporarily activate positive cognitions that influence the evaluation of subsequent stimuli. Conversely, a bad mood may increase the accessibility of negative cognitions. For example, a negotiator in a positive mood may see his or her partner’s offer through rose-tinted glasses and focus on its favorable aspects, whereas a negotiator in a bad mood may focus on the unfavorable aspects of the other’s proposal.

Other perspectives suggest that people use their own affective experiences as a source of information when deciding how to respond to (social) stimuli. The affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore 1983) posits that individuals may misattribute their preexisting, unrelated mood state as pertaining to the target of their judgment. This implies that only moods that have not (yet) been attributed to a source (e.g., the weather) should have judgmental consequences. For example, an ill-tempered negotiator who is unaware of the cause of his or her bad temper may attribute the bad mood to the counterpart’s latest offer, which might result in a negative impression of the other and a bad feeling about the other’s proposal. Conversely, a negotiator who is in a good mood may be more easily satisfied with the counterpart’s offer. However, a negotiator who is aware that his or her mood was caused by the weather should be less likely to use this mood as input in the negotiation.

Extending this approach, the appraisal-tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner 2000, 2001) proposes that discrete emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt influence judgment and behavior based on a set of dimensions such as certainty and responsibility for events. This framework extends the affect-as-information model by positing that different emotions—including emotions of the same valence—have unique effects on judgments and behavior. Under this model, any emotion (including incidental emotions that were caused by unrelated events) may influence the negotiators’ decisions about their goals, evaluations of counterparts’ offers, and behaviors. For example, angry negotiators may feel more certain that their counterparts will accept their demands and, in turn, be more likely to make these demands compared to neutral negotiators (Lerner & Tiedens 2006). Given these proposed links between specific emotions and appraisals and action tendencies, the appraisal-tendency framework can inform predictions about how experienced emotions may influence behavior in conflict and negotiation. For instance, feelings of anger may be expected to fuel competitive behavior, whereas feelings of guilt may motivate cooperation.

Empirical Findings

Since the late 1980s, numerous studies have addressed the individual-level effects of moods and emotions in various types of conflict and negotiation. The first study on the intrapersonal effects of positive affect on negotiation behavior was conducted by Carnevale & Isen (1986). They manipulated negotiators’ moods by means of humorous cartoons and a small gift, and they found that participants in a positive mood exhibited more cooperation and problem solving than negotiators in a neutral mood. Replicating and extending these findings, Anderson & Thompson (2004) showed that trait positive affect predicted levels of trust, integrative behavior, and joint gains in negotiations, and that the quality of the negotiation processes and outcomes was influenced more strongly by the positive affect of more powerful negotiators.

In an early study on the effects of negative affect, Baron and colleagues (1990) confronted participants with an accomplice who expressed disagreement with the participant’s viewpoint in either a calm, reasonable, and nonprovocative manner (e.g., “I can see why you feel that way, but I guess I disagree…”) or in an arrogant, condescending, and provoking fashion (e.g., “Oh come on, you’ve got to be kidding!”) prior to a negotiation. The authors found that male (but not female) participants who had been provoked prior to the negotiation made significantly less
favorable initial offers to the accomplice than did those who had not been provoked. Similar links between negative affect and competition have been demonstrated in studies using various types of experimental games, including resource dilemmas (Knapp & Clark 1991) and Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Kassinove et al. 2002).

Other studies that involved a variety of different mood inductions yielded compatible findings (Baron 1990, Forgas 1998, Kramer et al. 1993). In one of these studies, Forgas (1998) used a false-feedback technique to manipulate participants’ moods. He found that participants who were led to believe that they had performed well on a verbal ability test (and who were therefore in a positive mood) planned and reported more cooperative and fewer competitive bargaining strategies than did those who received no feedback (neutral mood) or negative feedback (negative mood) on their performance.

Moving beyond the effects of diffuse positive or negative affect, Allred and colleagues (1997) examined the effects of anger and compassion on negotiation behavior. They observed that negotiators with high levels of anger and low levels of compassion had less concern for their counterpart’s interests, achieved lower joint gains, and had less desire to work with the other in the future than did negotiators who had more positive emotional regard for the other party. Another study found that negotiators with higher levels of anger adopted a more dominant and competitive stance in a negotiation than did those with lower levels of anger (Butt et al. 2005).

A compatible strand of research has documented the effects of discrete emotions on behavior in Ultimatum Bargaining games. In a classic investigation, Pillutla & Murnighan (1996) examined the role of anger in motivating rejection of unfair ultimatum offers. They found that participants were more likely to reject an offer if they were able to assess its unfairness, because greater perceived unfairness was associated with stronger feelings of anger. Later work also showed that anger (but not sadness) motivates rejection of unfair offers, and that this effect is attenuated when the recipient misattributes his or her anger to an unrelated cause (Srivastava et al. 2009)—a finding that is in keeping with the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore 1983). Other research has further shown that rejection rates of unfair offers are reduced when recipients can convey their negative feelings to the proposer by sending an (angry) message, which presumably reduces the desire to engage in costly punishment (Xiao & Houser 2005).

Switching to a different class of emotions, Ketelaar & Au (2003) examined the effects of guilt in repeated social bargaining games. In one experiment, they showed that participants who had been induced to feel guilty about their previous (uncooperative) behavior in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game displayed higher levels of cooperation in a subsequent round of the game than did those who had not been made to feel guilty. In another experiment, Ketelaar & Au (2003) demonstrated that self-reported feelings of guilt were similarly related to increased cooperation in an Ultimatum Bargaining game. These findings are consistent with theoretical arguments that emotions such as guilt can help overcome problems of commitment by motivating individuals to forego their immediate self-interest and to adopt behavioral strategies that are more conducive to successful long-term economic exchange (Frank 1988).

More recently researchers have begun to investigate the role of anxiety in negotiations. In a series of experiments, Brooks & Schweitzer (2011) manipulated feelings of anxiety or neutral affect in participants. Their experiments revealed that, compared to participants in a neutral state, those who felt anxious expected lower outcomes, made lower first offers, responded more quickly to their counterparts’ offers, exited the bargaining situation earlier, and ultimately obtained worse outcomes. Brooks and Schweitzer further found that the harmful effects of anxiety were mitigated by self-efficacy. In a related vein, O’Connor et al. (2010) found that negotiators who appraised an impending negotiation as a threat experienced more stress and reached lower-quality deals compared to those who appraised the prospective negotiation as a challenge (also see Brooks 2014).
Summary

This overview of studies on the individual-level effects of experienced moods and emotions in conflict and negotiation indicates that affective states can have a pervasive impact on negotiators’ cognitions and behaviors. Key findings from this literature are summarized in Table 1. The effects of general positive versus negative affect are straightforward and consistent with the predictions of affect priming perspectives and the affect-as-information model: Negotiators who experience positive affect are generally more cooperative than are those who experience negative affect. More recent studies on the effects of discrete emotions in negotiations, however, paint a somewhat more complicated picture: Negative emotions such as anger inspire competitive negotiation behavior, whereas negative emotions such as guilt and anxiety fuel cooperative behavior. These more fine-grained patterns cannot be readily explained in terms of the affect priming or affect-as-information perspectives and are better accounted for by the appraisal-tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner 2000, Lerner & Tiedens 2006).

EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS AT THE DYADIC LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

At the dyadic level of analysis, the central question is how the emotions that are expressed by one person influence the affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses of his or her counterpart in conflict and negotiation. Below we draw on the emerging theoretical perspective of emotions as social information (EASI) to illuminate the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions and to structure our subsequent review of the fast-growing empirical literature in this area.

Theoretical Perspectives

Building on the seminal work of Darwin (1872), researchers have increasingly come to acknowledge that emotions do not merely occur within individuals, but also between individuals. Although emotions can be experienced privately, they are often expressed in one way or another, whether deliberately or inadvertently. Such emotional expressions may be observed by others, who may in turn respond to them. This idea lies at the heart of social-functional approaches that highlight how emotional expressions coordinate social interaction by influencing those who observe them (Côté 2005, Fischer & Manstead 2016, Frijda & Mesquita 1994, Hareli & Rafaeli 2008, Keltner & Haidt 1999, Oatley & Jenkins 1992, Parkinson 1996, Van Kleef 2009).

Key elements of these approaches are integrated in the emotions as social information (EASI) theory (Van Kleef 2009, 2016). EASI theory postulates that emotional expressions shape behavior and regulate social life by triggering in observers a series of affective reactions (i.e., reciprocal and complementary emotions and sentiments about the expresser) and/or inferential processes (i.e., inferences about the source, meaning, and implications of the expresser’s emotion). Affective and inferential processes may inform similar behavioral responses, but they may also motivate different (and sometimes opposite) tendencies. Consider a person who tries to sell a secondhand car. After a sequence of offers and counteroffers with a potential buyer, the seller expresses anger about the buyer’s latest offer. This expression of anger could instigate two opposing sets of responses in the buyer. On the one hand, the anger may lead the buyer to infer, through a process of reverse appraisal (De Melo et al. 2014, Hareli & Hess 2010), that the seller has reached his or her limits and is not willing to make any further concessions, which may motivate the buyer to make a concession to meet the seller’s last demand. On the other hand, the seller’s anger may fuel reciprocal anger and animosity in the buyer, which may lead the buyer to cancel the negotiations and look for another opportunity.
Table 1  Summary of key effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation at three levels of analysis\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Individual level (intrapersonal effects of experienced emotions)</th>
<th>Dyadic level (interpersonal effects of expressed emotions)</th>
<th>Group level (intrapersonal effects of experienced emotions and interpersonal effects of expressed emotions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Positive affect | More cooperation  
More creative problem solving  
Higher joint gains, especially when focal negotiator’s power is high | Reduced likelihood of impasse | Spreading of positive affect to other team members  
More cooperation, better coordination, and less conflict among group members |
| Negative affect | More competition | Increased likelihood of impasse | Spreading of negative affect to other team members |
| Anger | More competition  
More competition, dominance, and assertiveness, especially when focal negotiator’s power is high  
Less concern for others’ interests  
More frequent rejection of unfair offers, except when anger is uncoupled from appraisal of unfairness | Reciprocal feelings of anger in counterparts, negative impressions of the expresser, and reduced satisfaction with the negotiation  
Inferences of toughness, high limits, and threat  
More cooperation by counterpart when counterpart engages in thorough information processing, for instance due to low need for closure, low time pressure, low power, a peripheral position within the group, or situational ambiguity | Negative impressions of angry parties in multiparty negotiation  
Concessions to angry parties in multiparty negotiation when there is no other option, but exclusion of angry parties when possible  
Feelings of rejection among deviant group members who are targets of anger, leading targets to conform when motivated to (re)gain approval and to leave the group when not |

(Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Individual level (intrapersonal effects of experienced emotions)</th>
<th>Dyadic level (interpersonal effects of expressed emotions)</th>
<th>Group level (intrapersonal effects of experienced emotions and interpersonal effects of expressed emotions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety/worry</td>
<td>Lower outcome expectancies, lower offers, and higher likelihood of exiting the negotiation, contributing to worse negotiation outcomes for the self</td>
<td>More cooperation by counterpart</td>
<td>Not applicable (NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness/disappointment</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Complementary feelings of guilt and empathy/compassion in counterpart, especially in situations that foster other-concern</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt/regret</td>
<td>More cooperation</td>
<td>More competition by counterpart, especially when counterpart trusts the veracity of the emotional expression</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Inferences of lenience Generally more competition by counterpart, but more cooperation by East-Asian counterparts who value humility and deference, and more cooperation when happiness is directed at the counterpart personally rather than at his or her offer</td>
<td>Feelings of acceptance among deviant group members who are targets of happiness, leading targets to remain deviant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note that for the sake of readability, literature references are not included in the table. These can be found under the respective sections in the main text.*

Given that affective and inferential processes may motivate different behavioral responses to emotional expressions, it is critical to understand when one or the other process takes precedence. EASI theory posits that the relative predictive strength of affective and inferential processes in shaping behavior depends on two classes of moderating variables (Van Kleef 2009). First, building on the basic assumption that emotional expressions are a source of information, EASI theory posits that the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions are modulated by the observer’s information-processing motivation and ability. Such information processing is jointly determined by personality factors (e.g., need for cognition, need for cognitive closure) and situational influences (e.g., accountability, time pressure; De Dreu & Carnevale 2003, Kruglanski & Webster...
1996, Van Kleef et al. 2010). EASI theory postulates that the deeper the information processing, the more likely individuals are to draw inferences based on other people’s emotional expressions; the shallower the information processing, the more likely individuals are to respond to others’ emotional expressions based on their own affective reactions.

Second, the relative predictive strength of affective reactions and inferential processes depends on social-contextual factors that influence the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expression (Van Kleef 2016). The perceived appropriateness of emotional expressions depends on characteristics of the situation (e.g., cultural or organizational norms regarding emotion expression; Ekman 1993), characteristics of the expression itself (e.g., its target, intensity, and authenticity; Rafaeli & Sutton 1987, Van Kleef et al. 2012), and characteristics of the expresser and the perceiver as well as the relationship between the two (e.g., relative status, group membership; Shields 2005, Tiedens et al. 2000). EASI theory posits that individuals are more likely to use others’ emotional expressions as information to guide their own behaviors to the degree that they perceive these expressions as appropriate for the context; when they perceive others’ emotional expressions as inappropriate, people are more likely to respond based on their (negative) affective reactions (Van Kleef 2016).

In sum, EASI theory distinguishes two mechanisms of interpersonal emotional influence that are relevant for understanding the emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation: inferential processes and affective reactions. The relative prominence of inferential processes (compared to affective reactions) in predicting behavioral responses to other people’s emotional expressions increases to the extent that the focal person is motivated and able to engage in thorough information processing and/or perceives the emotional expressions as appropriate; the relative predictive strength of affective reactions (compared to inferential processes) increases to the extent that the focal person’s information processing is reduced and/or he or she perceives the emotional expression as inappropriate. This general theory of the social effects of emotions helps to make sense of empirical research on the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions in conflict and negotiation, to which we turn now.

**Empirical Findings**

There is a rapidly growing literature on the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions in dyadic conflict and negotiation. We use the EASI framework to provide an integrative review of this work, discussing in turn how behavioral responses to a counterpart’s emotional expressions are driven by affective and inferential processes, and how the relative importance of these two mechanisms is shaped by information processing and perceived appropriateness.

**Affective reactions and their behavioral consequences.** Researchers have used a variety of correlational and experimental research methods to examine the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions in negotiations, employing computer-mediated negotiation simulations, observation and coding of actual face-to-face or online negotiations, pictures and videos of emotional expressions, and emotional expressions delivered by professional actors. Despite the diversity of research methods, these studies provide rather consistent evidence that emotional expressions in conflict and negotiation elicit affective reactions in negotiation partners, which may subsequently influence their behavior.

A first investigation of the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations focused on the effects of verbal expressions of anger and happiness in a computer-mediated negotiation task (Van Kleef et al. 2004a). During the negotiation, participants received emotional messages from their (simulated) opponents (e.g., “This negotiation pisses me off” or “I feel good about this
negotiation”). Participants who received angry messages from their opponents became angrier, whereas those who received happy messages became happier. Similarly, in a study of online dispute resolution negotiations, negotiators whose partners expressed anger in their written messages reported experiencing more anger compared to those whose partners sent emotionally neutral messages (Friedman et al. 2004).

Besides reciprocal emotional responses to emotional expressions, research has uncovered effects of emotional expressions on impression formation. Participants who were confronted with angry negotiation counterparts developed a more negative impression of their counterparts than did those who dealt with happy or nonemotional counterparts (Van Kleef et al. 2004a). Moreover, participants who interacted with an angry rather than a happy negotiation partner were less satisfied with the negotiation afterward and indicated less willingness to engage in future interactions with that partner (Kopelman et al. 2006, Van Kleef et al. 2004b).

Such affective reactions to emotional expressions can have important consequences for negotiation behavior. For instance, Friedman and colleagues (2004) found that electronically mediated dispute resolution negotiations were more likely to break down when negotiators expressed anger, especially when the other party had a strong negotiation position due to a favorable reputation. Similarly, Kopelman and colleagues (2006) showed that negotiators who expressed negative affect at the bargaining table were less likely to secure a deal than were those who expressed positive affect (see also Wilson et al. 2016). Yip & Schweinsberg (2017) found that negotiators with angry counterparts were more likely to exit the negotiation (resulting in an impasse) compared to those with nonemotional counterparts.

Other work has revealed that bargainers who expressed anger ran a greater risk of being deceived by their counterparts, an effect that was mediated by the participants’ reciprocal feelings of anger (Van Dijk et al. 2008). Finally, a series of experiments demonstrated that the negative affective reactions that are triggered by expressions of anger (in this case, feelings of mistreatment) may lead negotiators to sabotage their angry counterparts in ways that may only become apparent after the negotiation is over (Wang et al. 2012). Specifically, participants in these experiments exhibited greater overt concessionary behaviors when a trained actor who posed as their negotiation partner expressed anger rather than no emotion during the negotiation; however, after the negotiation they sabotaged their angry counterparts by secretly assigning more unappealing tasks to them in an ostensibly unrelated study.

A few studies have begun to examine the role of complementary (as opposed to reciprocal) affective reactions to emotional expressions in conflict and negotiation (e.g., fearful responses to anger expressions). A series of computer-mediated bargaining experiments by Lelieveld and colleagues (2012) showed that angry messages emitted by high-power negotiators evoked complementary fear in targets (which in turn led them to make larger concessions), whereas angry messages by low-power negotiators evoked reciprocal anger in targets (which led them to make smaller concessions).

Relatively little is known about the types of affective reactions that may be evoked by emotions other than anger and happiness, but a few studies have begun to consider the effects of expressions of disappointment and sadness. The aforementioned experiments by Lelieveld and colleagues (2012) revealed that the counterparts’ expressions of disappointment elicited complementary guilt in participants, which in turn led them to make more generous offers—consistent with previous research on the intrapersonal effects of guilt on cooperation in social dilemmas discussed above (Ketelaar & Au 2003). Finally, there is evidence that the elicitation of complementary feelings of guilt in observers may be a necessary ingredient for the beneficial effects of expressions of disappointment to emerge. In four experiments involving verbal as well as nonverbal manipulations of emotional expression, Lelieveld and colleagues (2013) found that a counterpart’s expressions
of disappointment only led participants to make more generous offers under conditions that were conducive to eliciting guilt (e.g., when the expresser was an ingroup rather than an outgroup member; see also Thompson et al. 1995).

Compatible findings were obtained in a recent series of experiments by Sinaceur and colleagues (2015) on the interpersonal effects of sadness in negotiations. These authors argued that displays of sadness can be effective in negotiations because they may evoke complementary feelings of empathy and compassion in targets, which in turn may lead them to adopt a more cooperative stance with the expresser. In three experiments involving face-to-face interaction, the authors found that displays of sadness were indeed effective, but only when they elicited empathy and compassion in the target. Such affective reactions only arose when features of the social situation provided reasons for the target to experience other-concern, for instance when recipients perceived the expresser as having low power, when they anticipated a future interaction with the expresser, or when they construed their relationship with the expresser as collaborative. In all three experiments, the positive effect of the expression of sadness was mediated by the recipients’ complementary feelings of empathy and compassion.

**Inferential processes and their behavioral consequences.** Besides providing evidence for the occurrence and downstream consequences of affective reactions, research has corroborated the role of inferential processes in shaping behavioral responses to emotional expressions in conflict and negotiation. Early studies using the computer-mediated negotiation paradigm described previously uncovered reliable effects of opponents’ expressions of anger versus happiness on the inferences drawn by the receiving negotiator. Participants who received angry messages generally inferred that the opponent had an ambitious negotiation limit, and to avoid costly impasse they made relatively large concessions; conversely, negotiators who received happy messages inferred that the opponent’s limit was low, felt less need to concede to avoid impasse, and therefore made smaller concessions (Van Dijk et al. 2008; Van Kleef et al. 2004a,b). Behavioral responses to the emotional expressions of the counterpart in these studies were consistently mediated by inferences regarding the counterpart’s limits. Later work further revealed that the inferences that a negotiator draws from the counterpart’s emotions may continue to influence behavior in later encounters with the same person. In a second encounter with an opponent who had previously expressed anger, participants in two negotiation experiments conceded again because they believed that the other had ambitious limits, even when that person expressed no emotion during the second encounter (Van Kleef & De Dreu 2010).

Sinaceur & Tiedens (2006) reported additional evidence for the role of inferential processes. In a scenario study and a face-to-face negotiation experiment (in which one of the negotiators was instructed to display either anger or no emotion), they found that participants conceded more to angry as opposed to nonemotional counterparts. Furthermore, Sinaceur and Tiedens demonstrated that the effect of anger was mediated by the focal negotiator’s appraisal of the opponent’s toughness, with angry opponents appearing tougher and therefore eliciting larger concessions than nonemotional counterparts. Later work by Sinaceur and colleagues (2011) similarly revealed that the effects of anger expressions on concession making are mediated by threat perceptions. Participants construed expressions of anger as conveying an implicit threat, which explained why participants conceded more to angry as opposed to nonemotional opponents.

The impact of emotional expressions on inferences and behavior extends beyond distributive negotiation situations in which one person’s gain equals the other person’s loss. Pietroni and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that the inferences negotiators draw from their counterparts’ emotional expressions can result in better joint outcomes in an integrative negotiation task (i.e., a negotiation that allows for win-win solutions that satisfy both parties’ wishes beyond the value of
a mere compromise; Pruitt & Carnevale 1993). In a computer-mediated negotiation simulation, negotiators inferred that their counterpart attached high or low value to a particular issue based on whether the other expressed anger or happiness, respectively. These inferences led participants to stand firm on their high-value issue and to give in on the issue that appeared to be more important for the counterpart, thereby arriving at mutually satisfying win-win solutions (Pietroni et al. 2008).

Extending these findings, Adam & Shirako (2013) investigated how the cultural background of the expresser modulates the inferences of toughness and threat that observers draw from expressions of anger. Based on the stereotype that East Asian individuals are less emotionally expressive than European Americans, Adam and Shirako argued and showed that expressions of anger by East Asian negotiators trigger stronger inferences than the same expressions by European American negotiators. As in previous research, these inferences of toughness and threat were in turn positively associated with concession making. These findings suggest that emotional expressions of people who are believed to be relatively inexpressive are perceived as more diagnostic and informative about those individuals’ intentions, resulting in stronger inferences and downstream consequences for behavior.

Most research on the effects of emotional expressions in dyadic conflict and negotiation has been limited to either one-shot emotional expressions or sequences of expressions of the same emotion. However, a few studies have begun to examine the social consequences of changing emotions in negotiations. In a series of computer-mediated and face-to-face negotiation experiments, Filipowicz and colleagues (2011) found that participants made larger concessions to counterparts who first expressed happiness and later expressed anger than to counterparts who consistently expressed anger. This effect could be explained in terms of inferential processes: The emotional transition from happiness to anger elicited greater situational attributions (i.e., participants inferred that the expressed emotion was a response to their actions), whereas steady-state anger elicited greater dispositional attributions (i.e., participants inferred that the expressed emotion was a result of the counterpart’s personality). These findings highlight that emotions derive part of their meaning and informational value from the fact that they change, and that such changes in and of themselves have a signaling function (Frijda 1986, Kuppens et al. 2010, Scherer 2009).

Along related lines, Sinaceur and colleagues (2013) investigated the effects of emotional inconsistency and unpredictability in negotiations. In a computer-mediated negotiation simulation and a face-to-face negotiation study, they found that participants made larger concessions to counterparts who exhibited emotional inconsistency (i.e., alternating several times between expressing anger and happiness) than to counterparts who consistently showed anger or happiness. This happened because participants who were confronted with an emotionally inconsistent counterpart experienced a sense of unpredictability and lack of control over their outcomes that led them to give in to the counterpart’s demands.

A few studies have examined what inferences negotiators draw from emotional expressions of emotions other than anger and happiness. In the first of these studies, Thompson and colleagues (1995) investigated how an opponent’s signs of disappointment versus happiness influenced a focal negotiator’s judgments of negotiation success. The authors found that, regardless of the objective negotiation performance, participants inferred that they had been more successful when their opponent expressed disappointment rather than happiness. This finding indicates that negotiators take their counterpart’s disappointment as a signal that the other was hoping for more, suggesting that they did a good job in extracting concessions.

Extending this work, Van Kleef et al. (2006a) examined the interpersonal effects of emotions that may arise as a result of the appraisal that one has taken too much or received too little in a negotiation. Specifically, a series of experiments examined the effects of disappointment, worry,
guilt, and regret on inferences and behavior. In a first experiment, participants made smaller concessions to opponents who expressed appeasement emotions (guilt or regret) than to opponents who expressed supplication emotions (disappointment or worry). Additional experiments revealed that participants interpreted the other’s expressions of disappointment as a signal that the other had received too little, whereas they took expressions of guilt as a sign that the other had claimed too much. These studies indicate that different negative emotional expressions may give rise to different inferences, which in turn motivate different behavior.

Lastly, Rothman (2011) examined the effects of expressions of emotional ambivalence, that is, the feelings of tension that arise from the simultaneous experience of positive and negative affect in complex situations. In a series of studies, Rothman demonstrated that expressions of emotional ambivalence invite more dominant behavior from opponents than expressions of happiness, anger, or no emotion, because expressions of emotional ambivalence trigger inferences of submissiveness. Together, these studies indicate that the inferences drawn from a counterpart’s emotional expressions play an important role in shaping behavior in conflict and negotiation.

Affective reactions versus inferential processes. It is clear from the literature discussed so far that emotional expressions in conflict and negotiation can elicit affective and/or inferential processes in observers, which in turn influence their behavior. In some cases, affective and inferential processes inform similar behavioral responses. For instance, expressions of disappointment or sadness may elicit complementary feelings of guilt and compassion in negotiation partners (Lelieveld et al. 2012, 2013; Sinaceur et al. 2015) as well as inferences that the expresser’s current outcomes are below expectations (Van Kleef et al. 2006a), and both of these reactions may fuel cooperation. In other cases, however, affective and inferential processes drive opposite behavioral tendencies. For instance, the negative affective reactions that are evoked by expressions of anger (e.g., reciprocal anger, negative impressions) motivate competitive behavior (Friedman et al. 2004, Kopelman et al. 2006, Van Dijk et al. 2008, Wang et al. 2012), whereas inferences of toughness and ambitious limits motivate strategic cooperation to secure an agreement (Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006, Van Dijk et al. 2008, Van Kleef et al. 2004a). Conversely, the positive affective reactions that are elicited by expressions of happiness (e.g., reciprocal happiness, increased liking) fuel cooperative behavior (Kopelman et al. 2006), whereas inferences of leniency and low limits invite exploitation (Van Kleef et al. 2004a).

Given that inferential processes and affective reactions may motivate opposite behaviors in conflict and negotiation, it is critical to understand when one process takes precedence over the other. As noted above, EASI theory postulates that the relative predictive strength of affective and inferential processes triggered by emotional expressions depends on the perceiver’s information-processing ability and motivation as well as social-contextual factors that determine the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expression.

The role of information processing. Several studies speak to the moderating role of information processing in shaping the relative influence of affective versus inferential processes on behavior. In a series of experiments, negotiators who had a low need for cognitive closure, who were under low time pressure, and who depended strongly on their counterpart (conditions that increase information processing) were more likely to infer from their counterpart’s expressions of anger versus happiness that the counterpart was tough or lenient, respectively, and to adjust their behavior accordingly by making larger or smaller concessions (Van Kleef et al. 2004b). In contrast, negotiators who had a high need for closure, who were under high time pressure, and who did not depend on their counterpart (conditions that decrease information processing) did not draw such inferences and did not adapt their behavior to the counterpart’s emotional expressions.
Other studies indicate that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness are similarly moderated by power. Relative power influences the degree to which people are motivated to pay attention to each other, with lower-power people generally being more motivated to pay careful attention to others than higher-power people (Fiske 1993). Accordingly, several studies found that negotiators with relatively low levels of power were more likely to give in when their counterparts expressed anger rather than happiness or no emotion, compared to those with higher levels of power (Overbeck et al. 2010, Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006, Van Dijk et al. 2008, Van Kleef & Côté 2007, Van Kleef et al. 2006b). Compatible effects were found for conceptually related variables such as reputation (Friedman et al. 2004) and centrality in the group (Van Kleef et al. 2013). Some of these studies further provided evidence that the differential responsiveness of low- versus high-power negotiators to their opponents’ emotional expressions was mediated by inferences regarding the opponents’ limits and toughness (Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006, Van Dijk et al. 2008).

Information processing can also vary as a function of the negotiation setting: Uncertain and ambiguous situations prompt more systematic information processing than certain and unambiguous situations do (Chaiken 1980, Tiedens & Linton 2001). Compared to exclusively cooperative and exclusively competitive situations, mixed-motive situations are ambiguous in the sense that both the self and the counterpart are motivated by cooperative as well as competitive incentives (Schelling 1960), which makes predicting the counterpart’s behavior difficult (Van Kleef et al. 2010). Adam & Brett (2015) argued that this ambiguity should motivate more systematic information processing, which in turn should increase the relative strength of inferential processes relative to affective reactions. In support of this reasoning, they found in two computer-mediated negotiation experiments that expressions of anger elicited larger concessions than neutral expressions in mixed-motive negotiations, but not in unambiguously cooperative or competitive negotiations. Moreover, the beneficial effects of anger expressions in mixed-motive negotiations were mediated by inferences of toughness, whereas the adverse effects in unambiguously cooperative or competitive settings were mediated by negative affective reactions (i.e., feelings of hostility).

Again, only few studies have addressed the role of information processing in relation to emotions other than anger and happiness. Moreover, the available evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive. One study revealed that participants with a more selfish, calculating, and strategizing personality were more responsive to their counterpart’s expressions of disappointment (Van Kleef & Van Lange 2008). These individuals were more motivated to take the other’s emotions into account because they feared that failing to do so might endanger their desired outcomes (i.e., the other might reject their offer). As a result, they conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a nonemotional one. In other experiments, the differential effects of expressions of disappointment versus guilt on concessions were moderated by trait as well as state trust (Van Kleef et al. 2006a). Participants with higher levels of trust used their counterpart’s emotional expressions to guide their own negotiation strategy, offering larger concessions to disappointed counterparts than to guilty ones. Participants with lower levels of trust, in contrast, discounted the opponent’s emotional expressions and did not behave differently toward disappointed versus guilty opponents.

The role of appropriateness. Besides information processing, the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions are modulated by the perceived appropriateness of those expressions in light of the social context. A growing body of research illuminates how the perceived appropriateness of emotional expressions is shaped by characteristics of the situation, the perceiver, and the expression itself.

Regarding characteristics of the situation, several studies indicate that aspects of the negotiation setting and/or the broader social context shape the perceived appropriateness of expressions of
anger in negotiations. For instance, Van Kleef & Côté (2007) examined the effects of anger in the presence or absence of an explicit display rule that prohibited expressions of anger. In the absence of such a rule, participants deemed expressions of anger to be relatively appropriate. When there was an explicit norm prohibiting expressions of anger, however, participants perceived their counterpart’s expressions of anger as inappropriate, which fueled strong negative affective reactions (i.e., a desire to retaliate). Accordingly, participants in the display rule condition adopted a more competitive stance when their opponent expressed anger, but only when they felt sufficiently powerful to strike back at their opponent.

Another relevant situational characteristic is the type of issue that is being negotiated. Studies have shown that people are relatively willing to give in on issues that involve interests such as money or time, but that they are more resistant to compromising on issues that are related to their personal values about what is right and wrong (Bazerman et al. 2008, Druckman et al. 1988, Harinck et al. 2000, Wade-Benzoni et al. 2002). Accordingly, Harinck & Van Kleef (2012) found that people deemed expressions of anger by a counterpart to be more inappropriate in the context of a value conflict than in a conflict of interests. As a result, participants who were confronted with expressions of anger in a value conflict expressed less willingness to make concessions and a greater desire to retaliate against their opponent. Another study similarly showed that displays of anger resulted in reduced concession making among negotiators who attached moral significance to the negotiation issue at hand (Dehghani et al. 2014).

Regarding the characteristics of the perceiver, several studies speak to the role of the perceiver’s cultural background. Kopelman & Rosette (2008) found that East Asian negotiators, who generally value humility and deference, were more likely to accept an offer from a counterpart who displayed positive emotions and less likely to accept an offer from a counterpart who expressed negative emotions, as compared to Israeli negotiators, who hold humility and deference in comparatively lower regard. Along related lines, Adam and colleagues (2010) found in a series of computer-mediated negotiation experiments that European American participants conceded more to angry than to neutral opponents, whereas Asian American participants conceded less to angry than to neutral opponents. They further demonstrated that this effect occurred because Asian American participants deemed expressions of anger more inappropriate than did European American participants.

There is also some evidence for a moderating influence of various characteristics of the emotional expression itself. Steinel and colleagues (2008) differentiated between emotions that are directed toward a negotiator’s offer and emotions that are directed toward the negotiator as a person. When emotional messages were directed at the participant’s offer, participants in their study conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one, because they interpreted the anger as a sign of high limits. However, when the emotions were directed at the negotiator as a person, participants conceded less to an angry opponent than to a happy one, presumably because they felt affronted by the opponent’s angry remarks.

Other work shows that the effects of emotional expressions in negotiations depend on the perceived authenticity of the expressions (Côté et al. 2013, Hideg & Van Kleef 2017, Tng & Au 2014). Emotional expressions resulting from antecedent-focused regulation or “deep acting” match one’s actual emotional experience and are therefore perceived as authentic; in contrast, emotional expressions resulting from response-focused regulation or “surface acting” do not match one’s internal emotional state and are therefore perceived as less authentic (Côté 2005, Grandey 2003, Gross 1998). In two studies in which trained actors played the role of negotiation counterparts, Côté and colleagues (2013) found that deep-acted expressions of anger elicited larger concessions than neutral expressions, whereas surface-acted expressions of anger elicited smaller concessions due to reduced trust. Similarly, Tng & Au (2014) found that negotiators conceded
more to an angry counterpart than to a happy one when they perceived the counterpart’s emotion as authentic, and they conceded less to an angry counterpart than to a happy one when they perceived the counterpart’s emotion as inauthentic. Hideg & Van Kleef (2017) found that such negative reactions to inauthentic emotional expressions are attenuated in individuals who exhibit higher levels of dialectical thinking and are therefore more tolerant of apparent discrepancies between experienced and expressed emotions.

Finally, there is evidence that the perceived appropriateness of emotional expressions in negotiations depends on the timing of the expressions. Yip & Schweinsberg (2017) found that expressions of anger were more likely to result in impasses when the anger was expressed earlier rather than later in the negotiation, because early expressions of anger were perceived as more inappropriate.

Summary
A fast-growing literature attests to the pervasive interpersonal effects of emotional expressions in dyadic negotiations, which are summarized in Table 1. Consistent with EASI theory (Van Kleef 2016), interpersonal effects are driven by both affective reactions and inferential processes. The relative predictive strength of these two mechanisms depends on the perceiver’s information processing (which is shaped by personality characteristics, such as need for cognitive closure, and situational characteristics, such as power) and on the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expressions (which is shaped by characteristics of the situation, the perceiver, and the expression).

EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS AT THE GROUP LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
At the group level of analysis, the central question is how the emotions that arise during group interactions shape the affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses of group members and thereby the emergence, escalation, or resolution of group conflict.

Theoretical Perspectives
The research questions we have considered so far could be parsimoniously analyzed in terms of the effects of one person’s emotional experience on his or her own cognition and behavior (intrapersonal effects) or the effects of one person’s emotional expression on another person’s affect, cognition, and behavior (interpersonal effects). At the group level of analysis, intrapersonal and interpersonal effects are more difficult to isolate than at the dyadic level (especially as group size increases), because each group member may be influenced by his or her own emotions as well as those of one or more others in the group. This means that all of the theoretical perspectives discussed previously are relevant at the group level of analysis. In particular, affect priming perspectives, the affect-as-information model, and the appraisal-tendency framework are useful for understanding the intrapersonal effects of emotions in groups, whereas EASI theory is useful for understanding the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions in groups.

Empirical Findings
Compared to the individual and dyadic levels of analysis, research on the role of emotions in conflict and negotiation at the group level is scarce. This research also shows a comparatively stronger focus on the emergence and experience of conflict as opposed to conflict resolution. Nevertheless,
several studies have begun to document the intra- and interpersonal effects of emotions in various types of group conflict.

Initial evidence for a link between emotional dynamics and conflict in groups came from a study on top management teams of large corporations (Barsade et al. 2000). Although the primary focus of this study was on the effects of affective diversity in teams, auxiliary analyses revealed that affectively diverse groups that scored low on mean group positive trait affectivity experienced particularly high levels of conflict and low levels of cooperation. This pattern can be understood in terms of affect priming and affect-as-information models that describe the intrapersonal effects of experienced moods and emotions on cognition and behavior.

Shifting attention from dispositional affectivity to expressed emotions, Barsade (2002) examined the downstream effects of emotional contagion on group conflict and cooperation in an experiment involving ad-hoc laboratory groups. Barsade found that participants in groups that included a member who displayed “cheerful enthusiasm” or “serene warmth” reported experiencing more positive emotions, whereas group members who were exposed to a member who expressed “hostile irritability” or “depressed sluggishness” reported feeling more negative emotions. Moreover, the extent to which the member’s emotions spread to other group participants predicted levels of cooperation and conflict, with dispersion of positive emotions leading to greater cooperation and reduced conflict in the group.

Along related lines, Sy and colleagues (2005) examined the effects of a leader’s emotional expressions on group dynamics. In a laboratory study involving ad-hoc groups, they found that group leaders who had undergone a positive mood manipulation prior to their interaction with a task group induced a more positive affective tone in the group members, whereas leaders who had been put in a negative mood instilled a more negative affective tone in the group. Positive group affective tone, in turn, was associated with better group coordination. Later work revealed that emotions can also spread in groups in the absence of direct access to nonverbal emotional displays (i.e., via text messages), suggesting that the downstream effects of emotional expressions for conflict and cooperation are not limited to face-to-face interactions but extend to virtual teams (Cheshin et al. 2011).

Whereas early studies focused primarily on the role of emotions in the emergence of group conflict, in later work the focus has shifted to the role of emotions in conflict resolution. In a series of experiments on multiparty negotiations, Van Beest and colleagues (2008) examined how emotional expressions influence coalition formation. Using a computer-mediated coalition game, Van Beest and colleagues demonstrated that expressions of anger during coalition negotiations are a double-edged sword. When participants had to form a coalition with a partner, they made larger concessions when that partner expressed anger as opposed to no emotion. However, when participants had the opportunity to make a deal with another partner, they often chose to exclude angry parties from the coalition. In keeping with EASI theory, these negative effects of anger expressions were mediated by negative affective reactions to the anger expresser (i.e., negative impressions).

Other work has examined how emotional expressions in groups shape the trajectory of conflicts about nonmonetary issues, such as matters of taste or how best to approach a task. Resolving such conflicts may require that group members with deviant preferences conform to the majority to enable the group to progress with the task at hand. In five studies involving hypothetical scenarios, experiential recall methods, computer-mediated group tasks, and face-to-face interaction, Heerdink and colleagues (2013) examined the effects of emotional expressions on conformity versus deviance in groups. They found that expressions of anger by the majority led to greater inferences of rejection on the part of the deviant than did expressions of enthusiasm, with neutral expressions falling in between. These rejection inferences in turn motivated participants to conform when
no alternative group was available, whereas they motivated participants to leave the group when such an alternative was available. Heerdink and colleagues further found that group members who were insecure about their standing in the group were more likely to conform to an angry majority than were group members whose status in the group was secure. These interpersonal effects of emotional expressions in groups can be understood through the lens of EASI theory.

Summary

Several studies have begun to illuminate how emotions in groups shape the emergence of conflict as well as attempts to resolve it (see Table 1 for a summary of key findings). The results of these studies allow for two general conclusions. First, emotions can spread from one group member to the next, and the resulting group emotions can have important consequences for group functioning. A particularly robust finding in this regard is that the dispersal of positive emotions is associated with increased cooperation and reduced conflict. Second, emotional expressions in groups can influence how group members attempt to resolve conflicts. In particular, expressions of anger can force dissenting group members back in line, provided that they are motivated to be accepted by their fellow group members and no alternative groups are available.

CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

It is clear from our review that emotional experience and expression have a pervasive impact on the emergence, development, and resolution of conflict. Research has yielded numerous robust and replicable findings that enhance our understanding of the emotional dynamics of conflict and negotiation, as summarized in Table 1. Despite this clear progress, however, there are critical lacunae in the current literature, and several important issues remain to be addressed. In this section, we identify what we believe to be the most important limitations of this literature. We summarize these in the first column of Table 2. In the second column of Table 2, we describe the future research directions that stem from these limitations.

One limitation is that the vast majority of the studies on the role of emotions in conflict resolution were conducted in the laboratory or classroom with hypothetical scenarios. The findings of the few studies examining real negotiations have generally been consistent with the findings of studies employing hypothetical scenarios. For instance, analyses of data from an online dispute resolution firm (Friedman et al. 2004) and laboratory studies involving hypothetical negotiations (Kopelman et al. 2006) converge in showing that negotiations are more likely to break down when negotiators express negative emotions. Even so, the methods used in most studies in this area invite questions about the generalizability of the findings to real rather than hypothetical negotiations. For the field to move forward, it will be important to conduct more studies of actual negotiations.

We also find that the literature has examined a rather narrow set of constructs. The behaviors and outcomes examined so far—cooperative versus competitive behavior, intentions to negotiate again with the partner in the future, and value created and claimed—are certainly important, but relatively little attention has been paid to understanding other criteria. For example, we know little about how tendencies to express emotions during negotiation and conflict resolution influence one’s reputation and long-term professional outcomes, and about the role of emotions in restoring communication after an impasse between negotiators. These criteria matter in organizational settings and should be the focus of more research.

In addition, most research so far has focused on relatively short-lived negotiations, approximating negotiations such as car and home sales or salary discussions. Other negotiations unfold
Table 2  Limitations of the literature and suggested future directions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation</th>
<th>Suggested future direction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The vast majority of studies on the effects of emotions on conflict resolution behavior and outcomes consist of hypothetical negotiations conducted in the laboratory or classroom.</td>
<td>Test the generalizability of findings in negotiations that have real consequences for participants outside of the laboratory and the classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The literature focuses on an important yet limited set of behaviors and outcomes (i.e., demands, concessions, impasses) in certain types of negotiations (i.e., dyadic deal making).</td>
<td>Study how emotions influence (a) whether negotiators maintain or dissolve their relationship in the long-term, (b) the extent to which negotiators forgive their counterparts for being unfair or deceitful, (c) negotiators’ reputations in social networks and other neglected criteria. Study and compare the effects of emotions across different types of conflict (e.g., deal making, dispute resolution, intractable conflict, conflicts of interest, value conflicts, dyadic versus multi-party negotiation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most research so far has focused on relatively short-lived negotiations.</td>
<td>Consider the temporal dimension in the study of emotion in conflict and negotiation (e.g., longer-term consequences of emotional expressions, effects of sporadic versus repeated expressions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The literature emphasizes facial emotional expressions and emotions expressed through words.</td>
<td>Examine the effects of emotions expressed via other channels, including vocal expressions during phone conversations, bodily postures and touch during live interactions, and symbols such as emoticons in text messages and on chat interfaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The literature emphasizes a limited number of emotions, particularly anger, disappointment, and happiness.</td>
<td>Investigate the effects of other emotions individuals may experience and express during conflict and negotiation, including discrete negative emotions such as disgust, contempt, and envy, and discrete positive emotions such as gratitude, pride, and relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a paucity of research on the impact of emotions on collective outcomes.</td>
<td>Conduct studies on how emotions influence the outcomes of negotiations at the dyad and team level of analysis. Study the role of emotions in intergroup conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We know little about the role of culture in shaping the effects of emotions at various levels of analysis.</td>
<td>Examine the role of the cultural background of individuals who experience or express emotions or perceive emotional expressions as well as (dis)similarities between the cultural backgrounds of counterparts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We know little about potential interventions for individuals and teams to achieve better conflict resolution outcomes through emotional dynamics.</td>
<td>Design and test interventions in which individuals and teams leverage the effects of emotions to achieve better outcomes.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

over longer periods of time—for example, an employee and management might discuss the timing and terms of a promotion over several years. The role of emotions in longer-term negotiations is unclear. For example, do employees who show anger when requesting a promotion end up waiting longer for it than do employees who show disappointment?

A limitation of the broader literature on the social effects of emotions is that it emphasizes facial expressions of emotion at the expense of other expressive modalities. Research on emotions in conflict and negotiation, in particular, has relied heavily on facial and/or text-based expressions of emotion, without paying systematic attention to the role of other expressive channels such as voice (Scherer 2003), body postures (Aviezer et al. 2012), and touch (Hertenstein et al. 2009). The generalizability of the effects that we reviewed beyond facial and textual expressions of emotion is therefore largely unknown. EASI theory postulates that the direction (but not necessarily
the magnitude) of the social effects of emotional expressions is similar regardless of the expressive modalities involved (Van Kleef 2016). Evidence to date is consistent with this proposition (Van Kleef 2017), but further empirical scrutiny is needed. In particular, research could focus on expressive modalities that have so far received little attention. For instance, do counterparts concede more when anger is expressed via bodily postures or touch?

As our review and Table 1 clearly reveal, the literature has emphasized anger and, to a lesser extent, happiness and disappointment. By contrast, some emotions (e.g., guilt, regret, anxiety) have only rarely been examined, and other emotions (e.g., disgust, contempt, envy, gratitude, pride, relief) have received no attention whatsoever in the context of conflict and negotiation. Certainly anger is one of the emotions that negotiators are most likely to feel, given the potential for deceit and unfair treatment in this context, but future research should examine a broader range of emotions to develop a more complete picture of the emotional dynamics of conflict and negotiation.

There is a paucity of research on the impact of emotions on collective outcomes. Even though studies have begun to illuminate the effects of emotions on the emergence and resolution of conflict in small groups, the influence of emotions in larger collectives such as organizations (e.g., affective organizational culture; Barsade & Knight 2015) and societies (Bar-Tal et al. 2007) remains poorly understood and requires further investigation. In addition, there is a need for more research on emotional dynamics in intergroup conflict. Many intergroup conflicts are more complex and difficult to resolve than interpersonal conflicts (consider the intractable Israeli-Palestine conflict; Halperin et al. 2013), and the associated emotions may also be more intense (Halperin 2008). Interestingly, there is suggestive evidence that feelings (Halperin et al. 2011) and expressions (De Vos et al. 2013, Van Kleef et al. 2013) of anger can elicit concessions and acceptance of compromises in intergroup conflict, as long as parties experience no hatred (Halperin et al. 2011) and express no contempt (De Vos et al. 2013) toward the outgroup. Other work points to the role of feelings (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014) and expressions (Cohen-Chen et al. 2017) of hope in motivating constructive conflict resolution strategies, such as accepting a peace agreement. These preliminary findings indicate that there is great promise in conducting systematic investigations of the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of discrete emotions in intergroup conflict.

Because most research on emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation has been conducted in Western societies, the role of culture in shaping the effects of emotions at various levels of analysis remains imperfectly understood. The few studies that have examined culture suggest important boundary conditions to the effects that we have reviewed here. For example, displays of anger were found to have counterproductive effects in negotiations with East Asian counterparts, because displays of anger are not normative in East Asian cultures (Adam et al. 2010). Many of the effects uncovered so far may be attenuated, or even reversed, in different cultures. There is thus an urgent need to examine the effects of emotions outside of North America and Western Europe.

Finally, we know little about interventions that may help negotiators and parties in conflict to achieve better outcomes through emotional dynamics. Are negotiators with better knowledge of how emotions influence negotiation behavior more successful? Are negotiators with better emotion regulation abilities more effective? It stands to reason that individuals who know how emotions influence behavior in conflict and negotiation and how to manage their own and their counterpart’s emotions should be more successful and work in teams that are more collaborative and productive (Côté 2014). However, systematic research on these possibilities is lacking. Future efforts could focus on designing interventions to enhance negotiation skills based on the research described here.
Table 3  Best practices for conflict resolution based on research on emotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Best practices for negotiators and managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual level</td>
<td>Be aware of how your emotions influence your thoughts and behaviors in conflict and negotiation. Anger may make you overly competitive, happiness may make you gullible, and guilt may lead you to appease your counterpart and lose track of your own interests. Reduce your anxiety. If you are anxious, you will concede more, react more quickly and with less deliberation, exit negotiations more often than you should, and achieve worse outcomes. To reduce anxiety, try to think of the negotiation as a challenge rather than a threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic level</td>
<td>Expect your emotions to influence how others behave toward you. To get more in distributive negotiations, express anger you genuinely feel: Your counterpart will infer that you have ambitious goals and, in turn, concede more. Do not fake anger, because your counterpart will likely detect that it is inauthentic, lose trust in you, and demand more. Do not show anger if your counterpart has more power or better alternatives than you. When showing anger to elicit concessions from your counterpart, be mindful that an impasse is more likely. If the negotiation is breaking down, suppress your anger to avoid an impasse. Avoid appearing too happy in distributive negotiations. Your counterpart will infer that you are satisfied and do not need more than what you currently have and, in turn, will concede less. Consider the cultural dynamics that govern the effects of emotional expressions when using emotions as a tool. Emotions that are effective in one culture may be counterproductive in other cultures. For example, showing anger may backfire if your counterpart is from an East Asian culture where anger displays are not normative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group level</td>
<td>When managing a team, expect members’ emotions to influence cooperation within the team. Promote a positive climate among team members to enhance cooperation, for example through fun team activities or by displaying positive emotions. Use visible signs of emotion in groups as a diagnostic tool to gauge momentary group processes and determine the likelihood that a group will experience conflict. Positive emotional expressions suggest a greater likelihood of cooperation, whereas negative emotional expressions (particularly anger) point to the likelihood of competition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The above caveats notwithstanding, we believe the conclusions emerging from our review have notable practical implications. Research at all three levels of analysis considered here points to potential strategies for negotiators to increase the likelihood that they and their counterparts will achieve settlements and to improve the outcomes that negotiators can achieve for themselves. We highlight a number of strategies for each level of analysis in Table 3.

The first set of strategies concerns the effects of emotions at the individual level of analysis. Negotiators should keep in mind that their emotions have a direct and systematic impact on how they behave during negotiations. At a general level, negotiators should know that their emotions influence whether they adopt a more cooperative or competitive stance with their counterparts. In addition, negotiators’ emotions influence how quickly they respond to their counterparts’ decisions, and how likely they are to reject one-time offers and to exit negotiations. This implies that negotiators should closely monitor the emotions they feel and that they should regulate their emotions as needed to support beneficial behaviors.

The second set of strategies concerns the effects of emotions at the dyadic level of analysis. Negotiators should know that the emotions they display send signals to their counterparts about their states of mind and likely future behavior, and that counterparts respond to these signals in systematic ways. Emotional expressions direct counterparts to either cooperate or compete more, and they shape the counterparts’ willingness to negotiate again in the future. Importantly, emotional expressions have different effects in different contexts. For instance, expressions of anger can be effective in eliciting concessions in Western cultural contexts and when the expresser has
more power than the counterpart, but not in East Asian cultural contexts and when the counterpart has more power than the expresser (Adam et al. 2010, Overbeck et al. 2010, Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006, Van Kleef et al. 2006b). This means that negotiators should closely monitor the emotions they display so that they elicit behaviors from their counterparts that are most helpful to them.

A third set of strategies is available to managers and leaders to promote cooperation and decrease competition within teams. The affective climate in a team influences the general level of cooperation among team members (Barsade 2002, Sy et al. 2005). Not surprisingly, positive emotions such as happiness foster cooperation, whereas negative emotions such as anger foster competition. This suggests that managers and leaders can use affective cues to predict levels of cooperation and competition in their teams (Homan et al. 2016). Moreover, managers could improve the functioning of individuals, teams, and departments by regulating employees' emotions so as to prevent or resolve conflict and enhance coordination and effectiveness.

**CONCLUSION**

Successful negotiation and conflict resolution are vital to the performance of individuals, teams, organizations, and nations. We have demonstrated that emotional dynamics play a crucial role in shaping the emergence, development, and resolution of social conflict. Through intrapersonal processes, the emotions that are experienced by parties in conflict influence their own cognitions and behaviors. Through interpersonal processes, the emotions that are expressed by parties in conflict influence their counterparts’ affect, cognitions, and behaviors. As the literature on emotion in conflict and negotiation matures, the field should move toward the development of evidence-based interventions that capitalize on emotional dynamics to improve negotiation success and enhance conflict resolution.

**DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

**LITERATURE CITED**


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Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior articles may be found at http://www.annualreviews.org/errata/orgpsych