

APPENDICES

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Appendix 1 – Comparative Interest Group Survey

The project's objective is to develop systematic knowledge about the organizational development as well as the political strategies of civil society organizations, interest groups, lobby groups and advocacy organizations. The aim is to achieve a better understanding of the daily operations of civil society organizations across different national settings. For this purpose, the project involves various surveys and the systematic mapping of the interest group populations in different European countries, including the EU-level. At this moment large surveys are conducted in Slovenia, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Italy, and the EU-level in the first phase. In the second stage Poland and Spain were included, and additional surveys are planned for the Czech Republic, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Table A1. Distribution among group types across countries (in %)

Type	BE	LT	NL	POL	POR	SLO	SWE
Business	218	80	138	91	162	42	100
Professional	181	106	145	16	155	154	84
Union	19	23	12	11	82	36	20
Identity	142	51	192	27	36	69	42
Public	196	32	120	148	75	39	301
Leisure	137	29	115	9	13	112	75
Institutional	35	20	141	2	8	9	12
Rest	29	24	3	14	4	12	12
N	957	365	866	318	535	473	646

In all countries, samples of organizations were collected in the same rigorous manner. That is, the mapping was done based on at least two sources. One focusing on registries not necessarily related to lobbying, such as a register of all public affairs officials in a country. The second source is a list of lobbyists of which we know that they were lobbying, such as parliament registry files. In combination they provide us the most accurate set of actors which have a (potential) interest in lobbying. Moreover, it allowed to compare the data sources across countries.

The distribution across group type is listed in Table A1. Overall, the distribution among group type reflects other mapping studies, whereby business groups are the largest set of interest groups (ranging between 33 to 51 percent), followed by NGOs (identity and public interest groups). Moreover, we also see that the percentage of business groups in the EU is at 56 percent which is line with other studies highlighting that business groups dominate interest group communities more at the EU level than at the national level. This is a first indication that any biases in the selection and/or response rates of group types should not be present.

Another indication that our results (see results control variables) are not (too) biased is because our data is on key elements in line with other research, using different datasets. That is, most studies now find that there is not much variation in access between business groups and NGOs (see Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2017) and that more resourceful and professionalized organizations gain more access (Dür and Mateo 2016). This strengthens our believe that we have a valid sample. *In short*, the samples are certainly not perfect, but the best available. All country teams spend many resources in generating a random sample and have response rate reflected in the overall sample. For instance, respondents were called in case they did not respond to our request to motivate them to fill in the survey anyhow. Hereby certain underrepresented groups were prioritized to make sure the sample is as valid as possible. Moreover, based on the results we have no indication that there is a systematic bias in our data to invalidate our claims made in this paper compared to findings in other projects. We are therefore confident that the claims we make in this paper can be generalized to the populations of the respective countries under study.

Appendix 2 – Summary research design

Table A2.1. Research design and question wording

<i>Research question</i>	Why interest groups network with organizations that have conflicting interests to their organization (in Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden)?
<i>Dependent variable</i>	Ordinal variable on the basis of the responses to the following question: ‘ <i>How often do you network with organizations that have conflicting interests to your organization?</i> ’. Respondents could indicate whether they did this ‘never’ (1), ‘once a year’ (2), ‘once every three months’ (3), ‘once every month’ (4), or ‘once every week’ (5).
<i>Countries under scrutiny</i>	Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden
<i>Unity of analysis</i>	Individual interest organization
<i>Methodological approach</i>	Large-N quantitative analysis
<i>Source(s) for data collection</i>	Online survey to around 2,000 interest groups in seven European countries
<i>Insider hypothesis</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • H1: A higher focus on inside lobbying increases an interest group’s propensity to network with political opponents.
<i>Issue breadth hypothesis</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • H2: Broader issue orientation increases an interest group’s propensity to network with political opponents.
<i>Membership hypothesis</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • H3: Higher levels of member-orientation decrease an interest group’s propensity to network with political opponents.
<i>Reputation hypothesis</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • H4: Citizen groups are less likely to network with political opponents compared to business organizations.
<i>Control variables</i>	Coalescing with like-minded organizations; operating budget; professionalization; perceived competition for organizational funding; percentage of funding from operating budget via government; country.

Table A2.2. Summary of Variables

Variables	Operationalization	Mean	Min	Max
DV: Opponents	Networking with organizations with opposing views	1.71	1	5
<i>Hypotheses</i>				
Lobbying organization	Lobbying organization (n=1,152); Other (n=844)	N.A.	0	1
Issue breadth	Number of policy areas	3.9	1	19
Membership influence	Member influence on policy focus	1.8	1	4
Group type	Business (n=852); Citizen group (n=720); Rest (n=424)	N.A.	1	3
<i>Controls</i>				
Allies	Networking with likeminded organizations	2.5	1	5
Resources	Operating budget	3.47	1	8
Professionalization	Additive score organizational structure	4.1	0	6
Competition	Competition for organizational funding	2.5	1	5
Funding	Percentage of budget from government	15	0	100
Country	BE (n=366); LIT (n=288); NL (n=409); POL (n=146); POR (n=247); SLO (n=205); SWE (n=335).	N.A.	1	7

Table A2.3. Correlation Matrix

	Opponents	Insider	Breath	Member influence	Group type	Allies	Resources	Professionalization	Competition	Funding
Opponents	1.000									
Insider	0.2773	1.000								
Breath	0.2371	0.2826	1.000							
Member influence	-0.0894	-0.0848	-0.1036	1.000						
Group type	-0.0695	-0.1079	0.0704	0.0813	1.000					
Allies	0.4005	0.3477	0.3196	-0.0649	0.0536	1.000				
Resources	0.2353	0.2260	0.2963	0.0374	0.1497	0.3721	1.000			
Professionalization	0.2223	0.2318	0.2365	-0.0012	0.0309	0.3294	0.4024	1.000		
Competition	0.0567	-0.0009	0.1282	0.0825	0.1539	0.1544	0.1802	0.0948	1.000	
Funding	-0.0250	0.0009	0.1117	0.0675	0.1937	0.1187	0.1633	0.0257	0.1948	1.000

Table A2.4. Average level of networking with opponents across countries

Frequency	BEL	LIT	NL	POL	POR	SLO	SWE
Not	65%	42%	75%	53%	77%	51%	51%
Yearly	23%	26%	18%	30%	17%	27%	27%
Quarterly	8%	20%	6%	11%	3%	14%	14%
Monthly	4%	9%	1%	5%	2%	6%	6%
Weekly	0%	3%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%

Note: distribution of networking with opponents in percentages

Appendix 3 – Regression tables and robustness checks

Table A3.1. Multivariate regression predicting the level of cooperation with policy opponents: Ologit and Logit,

	Ologit	Logit
Hypotheses		
Lobbying insiders	0.635*** (0.110)	0.629*** (0.115)
Issue breadth	0.061*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.017)
Membership ties	-0.098 (0.060)	-0.051 (0.064)
Group type		
<i>Business (ref.)</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.412*** (0.117)	-0.458*** (0.127)
<i>Other</i>	-0.424*** (0.129)	-0.370*** (0.139)
Control variables		
Allies	0.644*** (0.049)	0.568*** (0.053)
Budget	0.100*** (0.025)	0.097*** (0.027)
Professionalization	0.054 (0.045)	0.018 (0.047)
Competition	0.075* (0.041)	0.085* (0.044)
Funding	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Diagnostics		
Cut1	2.478 (0.335)	
Cut2	4.116 (0.344)	
Cut3	5.425 (0.357)	
Cut4	7.214 (0.404)	
Constant		-2.265 (0.333)
Chi ²	391.18	270.68
Prob.>Chi ²	0.00	0.00
N-countries	7	7
N-organizations	1,996	1,996

Note: Country level fixed effects included; Significance: *=<0.01;

=<0.05; *=<0.1

Table A3.2. Multivariate regression predicting the level of cooperation with policy opponents: alternative measure of lobby insiders (percentage inside lobbying/total)

	Ologit	Logit
Hypotheses		
Lobbying insiders	0.387** (0.165)	0.349** (0.175)
Issue breadth	0.063*** (0.015)	0.064*** (0.017)
Membership ties	-0.083 (0.062)	-0.034 (0.066)
Group type		
<i>Business (ref.)</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.420*** (0.119)	-0.447*** (0.129)
<i>Other</i>	-0.482*** (0.130)	-0.422*** (0.140)
Control variables		
Allies	0.672*** (0.049)	0.591*** (0.053)
Budget	0.111*** (0.026)	0.108*** (0.028)
Professionalization	0.034 (0.045)	-0.030 (0.048)
Competition	0.075 (0.065)	0.071 (0.045)
Funding	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Diagnostics		
Cut1	2.237 (0.351)	
Cut2	3.844 (0.360)	
Cut3	5.152 (0.372)	
Cut4	6.953 (0.404)	
Constant		-1.999 (0.354)
Chi ²	329.75	219.84
Prob.>Chi ²	0.00	0.00
N-countries	7	7
N-organizations	1,868	1,868

Note: Country level fixed effects included; Significance:

*=<0.01; **=<0.05; ***=<0.1

Table A3.3. Multivariate regression predicting the level of cooperation with policy opponents: alternative measure of membership ties¹

	Ologit	Logit
Lobbying insiders	0.619*** (0.112)	0.609*** (0.116)
Issue breadth	0.054*** (0.015)	0.048*** (0.017)
Membership ties	0.034 (0.044)	0.035 (0.047)
Group type		
<i>Business (ref.)</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.408*** (0.117)	-0.429*** (0.127)
<i>Other</i>	-0.390*** (0.131)	-0.320*** (0.141)
Control variables		
Allies	0.623*** (0.049)	0.552*** (0.054)
Budget	0.097*** (0.025)	0.097*** (0.027)
Professionalization	0.062 (0.049)	0.032 (0.048)
Competition	0.044 (0.041)	0.052 (0.044)
Funding	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Diagnostics		
Cut1	2.614 (0.323)	
Cut2	4.215 (0.333)	
Cut3	5.564 (0.347)	
Cut4	7.330 (0.397)	
Constant		-2.356 (0.324)
Chi ²	351.18	244.81
Prob.>Chi ²	0.00	0.00
N-countries	7	7

¹ For this question respondents were asked to balance the importance of senior staff *vis-à-vis* members. Exact question: ‘Organizations like yours can make decisions in different ways, such as consensus among individual members or board members or by voting procedures. For establishing your organization’s position on policy issues, can you please indicate below how your organization primarily makes decisions in the following areas?’. Respondents could choose from 5 categories: ‘Consensus among members’; ‘Voting among members’; ‘Consensus in board’; ‘Voting in board’; ‘Senior staff takes these decisions’.

N-organizations	1,952	1,952
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Note: Country level fixed effects included; Significance: *= <0.01 ; **= <0.05 ; ***= <0.1

Table A3.4. Multivariate regression predicting the level of cooperation with policy opponents: alternative measure of group type

	Ologit	Logit
Lobbying insiders	0.608*** (0.111)	0.609*** (0.116)
Issue breadth	0.055*** (0.015)	0.048*** (0.017)
Membership ties	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.035 (0.047)
Group type		
<i>Business (ref.)</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.146 (0.144)	-0.166 (0.158)
<i>Union</i>	-0.152 (0.223)	-0.165 (0.258)
<i>Identity</i>	-0.575*** (0.177)	-0.630*** (0.191)
<i>Public</i>	-0.455*** (0.145)	-0.501*** (0.159)
<i>Leisure</i>	-0.776*** (0.194)	-0.704*** (0.205)
<i>Institutional</i>	-0.193 (0.286)	-0.203 (0.310)
<i>Other</i>	-0.636 (0.304)	-0.386 (0.324)
Control variables		
Allies	0.640*** (0.049)	0.561*** (0.054)
Budget	0.092*** (0.026)	0.087*** (0.028)
Professionalization	0.064 (0.045)	0.028 (0.048)
Competition	0.074* (0.041)	0.086* (0.045)
Funding	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
Diagnostics		
Cut1	2.436 (0.341)	
Cut2	4.080 (0.350)	
Cut3	5.392 (0.362)	
Cut4	7.184 (0.409)	
Constant		-2.219 (0.340)
Chi ²	395.67	273.71
Prob.>Chi ²	0.00	0.00
N-countries	7	7
N-organizations	1,996	1,996

Note: Country level fixed effects included; Significance:

*=<0.01; **=<0.05; ***=<0.1

Table A3.5. Multivariate regression predicting the level of cooperation with policy opponents: controlling for level of corporatism and social policy field

	Corporatism	Social
Hypotheses		
Lobbying insiders	0.633** (0.110)	0.635** (0.110)
Issue breadth	0.061*** (0.015)	0.057*** (0.016)
Membership ties	-0.099 (0.060)	-0.097 (0.060)
Group type		
<i>Business (ref.)</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.413*** (0.117)	-0.419*** (0.118)
<i>Other</i>	-0.425*** (0.129)	-0.425*** (0.129)
Control variables		
Allies	0.644*** (0.049)	0.642*** (0.049)
Budget	0.100*** (0.025)	0.100*** (0.025)
Professionalization	0.052 (0.045)	0.054 (0.045)
Competition	0.075* (0.040)	0.073* (0.041)
Funding	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)
Corporatism	-0.091 (0.224)	
Social		-0.052 (0.115)
Diagnostics		
Cut1	2.249 (0.337)	2.488 (0.336)
Cut2	4.131 (0.340)	4.345 (0.360)
Cut3	5.441 (0.358)	5.435 (0.357)
Cut4	7.230 (0.405)	7.225 (0.404)
Chi ²	390.57	391.06
Prob.>Chi ²	0.00	0.00
N-organizations	1,868	1,868

*Note: Model is an ordered logit regression with country fixed effects; Significance: *=<0.01; **=<0.05; ***=<0.1*

Table A3.6. Multivariate regression predicting the level of cooperation with policy opponents: different policy fields

	Social	Economic	Environment
Hypotheses			
Lobbying insiders	0.561*** (0.139)	0.528*** (0.173)	0.655*** (0.204)
Issue breath	0.0554*** (0.0181)	0.0414** (0.0187)	0.0405* (0.0232)
Mmebership ties	-0.0504 (0.0759)	-0.0272 (0.0879)	0.00882 (0.108)
Group type			
<i>Business (ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.449*** (0.146)	-0.286* (0.169)	-0.388* (0.205)
<i>Other</i>	-0.378** (0.166)	-0.503*** (0.188)	-0.618*** (0.238)
Control variables			
Allies	0.604*** (0.0612)	0.676*** (0.0709)	0.676*** (0.0863)
Budget	0.0828*** (0.0314)	0.167*** (0.0390)	0.220*** (0.0492)
Professionalisation	0.127** (0.0574)	0.0816 (0.0627)	0.0131 (0.0793)
Competition	0.0678 (0.0496)	0.0846 (0.0563)	0.0944 (0.0734)
Funding	-0.00420* (0.00221)	-0.00700** (0.00295)	-0.00965*** (0.00373)
Cut 1	2.653*** (0.418)	2.571*** (0.434)	2.265*** (0.514)
Cut 2	4.265*** (0.430)	4.213*** (0.449)	4.032*** (0.535)
Cut 3	5.521*** (0.444)	5.584*** (0.466)	5.569*** (0.561)
Cut 4	7.265*** (0.491)	7.801*** (0.550)	8.099*** (0.712)
Chi ²	31.25	15.40	5.23
Prob.>Chi ²	0.00	0.00	0.01
Observations	1,208	1,208	1,208
Number of Country	6	6	6

*Note: Model is an ordered logit regression with country fixed effects; Significance: *=<0.01; **=<0.05; ***=<0.1*

Table A3.7. Multivariate regression predicting the level of cooperation with policy opponents: high vs low corporatist countries

	Corporatist High	Corporatist low
Hypotheses		
Lobbying insiders	0.574*** (0.138)	0.684*** (0.192)
Issue breath	0.0461** (0.0188)	0.0760*** (0.0252)
Mmembersh ties	-0.0927 (0.0736)	-0.133 (0.108)
Group type		
<i>Business (ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.567*** (0.142)	-0.168 (0.215)
<i>Other</i>	-0.685*** -0.567***	-0.0784 -0.168
Control variables		
Allies	0.620*** (0.0595)	0.652*** (0.0930)
Budget	0.158*** (0.0331)	0.0238 (0.0414)
Professionalisation	0.0229 (0.0573)	0.112 (0.0743)
Competition	0.0848* (0.0489)	0.0474 (0.0761)
Funding	-0.00218 (0.00214)	-0.00887** (0.00406)
Cut 1	2.165*** (0.351)	2.728*** (0.609)
Cut 2	3.761*** (0.362)	4.492*** (0.628)
Cut 3	5.042*** (0.377)	5.903*** (0.656)
Cut 4	6.780*** (0.433)	7.893*** (0.780)
Chi ²		
Prob.>Chi ²	3.43	31.47
Observations	0.03	0.00
Number of Country	1,306	690

*Note: Model is an ordered logit regression with country fixed effects; Significance: *=<0.01; **=<0.05; ***=<0.1*