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van Ree, E.

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The concept of 'National Bolshevism': an interpretative essay

ERIK VAN REE

*Institute of Russian and East European Studies, University of Amsterdam, O.Z.
Achterburgwal 237, Amsterdam, 1012 DL, The Netherlands*

ABSTRACT *The concept of 'National Bolshevism' is mainly used in studies of twentieth-century German and Russian political radicalism. It has been subject to considerable inflation. The present article presents a case for a restrictive definition. National Bolshevism can most properly be defined as that radical tendency which combines a commitment to class struggle and total nationalization of the means of production with extreme state chauvinism. Definitional strictness is not only justified by the historical sources of the term in Germany and Russia. A further advantage of a narrow definition is that it helps us get important distinctions among nationalist and communist movements and states into focus. It is also helpful in bringing out a remarkable asymmetry between the propensity of nationalists and communists to adopt each other's programme.*

The concept of 'National Bolshevism' is mainly used in studies of German and Russian political radicalism of the 1920s and 1930s. Recently, it gained new prominence in discussions of the radical right and of the attempts at a 'red-brown' coalition in Russia. However, the concept has been subject to considerable inflation. Many nationalist politicians treated as National Bolsheviks have in fact little in common with this tendency in its original sense. The present article presents a case for a restrictive definition of National Bolshevism. It can most properly be defined as that radical tendency which combines a commitment to class struggle and total nationalization of the means of production with extreme state chauvinism.

This strict approach, which elaborates on Louis Dupeux's meticulous treatment of the subject, can be justified on two grounds. First, a restrictive definition preserves the original connotations of the National Bolshevik tendency of the German nationalist Paul Eltzbacher and the Hamburg communists Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz Wolffheim. Applying the strict definition will show that, among present-day Russian nationalists, authentic National Bolshevism remains just as scarce an article as it was among the German nationalists of the 1920s and 1930s, the era treated in Dupeux's work. Secondly, a restrictive definition is helpful in bringing out a remarkable asymmetry between the propensity of

nationalists and communists to adopt the other's programme. Whereas twentieth-century history has observed only very few Eltzbachers, it teems with Laufenberg and Wolffheims. The present article should be read as an interpretative essay. It is not an empirical study of historical 'national bolshevisms', but makes its point through a critical discussion of the way various scholars have approached the question.

Some preliminary observations

Even in the abstract one notes at a glance that National Bolshevism is a potentially problematic phenomenon. To begin with, the term refers beyond itself, containing as it does an implicit characterization of bolshevism as such. For the term National Bolshevism logically presupposes that there exist other, non-national varieties of bolshevism—varieties of an international or, perhaps, even of a cosmopolitan type, that deny the very reality or relevance of the nation. For it to make any sense to speak of National Bolshevism, one should first agree on the flexible nature of bolshevism's standpoint on the national question. This lands us immediately in a minefield. One of the most important works on National Bolshevism, Mikhail Agursky's *The Third Rome*, sins against the above logic. He provides us with the following definition, often quoted in studies on the subject:

National Bolshevism is the Russian etatist ideology that legitimizes the Soviet political system from the Russian etatist point of view Etatism can be distinguished from cultural nationalism Nevertheless, I would like to define etatism as a powerful form of nationalism National Bolshevism does not reject Communist ideology, though it strives to minimize its importance to the level necessary for legitimacy. However, its objectives are different from those of Communist ideology. National Bolshevism in its original form strove for world domination, conceived as the universal Russian empire. It is not excluded that in some circumstances National Bolshevism might limit itself to the etatist concept of a Russian superpower.¹

In essence this defines National Bolshevism as an extreme form of etatism, namely as a cult of the superpower; which is a properly restrictive approach. The term National Bolshevism further presupposes that there should be other, non-etatist varieties of bolshevism. That is however not Agursky's opinion. He is emphatic that the founder of bolshevism, V. I. Lenin, adhered to a 'purely etatist' nationalism and even to a geopolitically inspired Russian expansionism. It was not Stalin but he who 'achieved the far-reaching etatist nationalization of the Soviet system'. As a matter of fact, Lenin was something of a National Bolshevik. Agursky insists that bolshevism as such was 'intensely nationalized long before the revolution'.² We can only conclude that, in this author's work, the nationalism is contained in the bolshevism. The claim that bolshevism as such was an etatist cult carries an easy implication of turning the whole of twentieth century communism, as far as it was in power, into a compact National Bolshevik phenomenon.

Agursky's approach contains yet another problem. In his definition he reduces the role of the communist ideology in National Bolshevism to one of providing an element of legitimacy. It does not provide the movement with its objectives. Agursky supports Ortega y Gasset's claim that, for the Russian bolsheviks, Marxism was merely a 'screen'—'historical camouflage'. He doubts whether Lenin was a Marxist at all, and does not hesitate to call bolshevism a 'Russian movement dressed up as Marxism'.³ In other words, National Bolshevism, in which category Leninism is counted, is a specific variety of etatist nationalism, namely that one which uses the language of Marxism—for tactical purposes and for such purposes only.

The question remains of what might have convinced Agursky that Lenin was a true Marxist after all. Which objectives on Lenin's part might have convinced him that the former's ideology was no mere screen? The answer to this question can only be a sustained effort by Lenin to liquidate private property of the means of production and the social classes embodying this property with it. If he did work towards that goal, one could still hold that he was an etatist nationalist, but one could no longer deny that his socialism, too, was more than camouflage. And the fact is, of course, that this was the case. Lenin did everything in his power to contribute to the destruction of the landowning and capitalist classes. His Marxism was therefore more than a screen. It determined part of his objectives.

More important than Agursky's failure to believe in the reality of Lenin's commitment to Marxism, is his inclusion of the lack of Marxist commitment in the definition of National Bolshevism. Thereby Agursky allows into the category all radical nationalists who are prepared to make some kind of tactical use of bolshevism. That they are in reality uninterested in the question of the expropriation of private property crucial to socialism is irrelevant. National Bolsheviks need not have any serious bolshevik commitment.

But could it be otherwise? Wouldn't a real fusion of nationalism with bolshevism be an incoherent and impossible project? Bolshevism might be defined as that radical tendency that hopes to place society and the state under the dictatorship of one political party, with the overriding aim of destroying all private property of the means of production. Nationalism is a more fluid concept, notoriously hard to define. For my present purposes, I will take it to refer to that ideology which upholds the national state as the main focus of allegiance. To reduce the complexities of the problem, I will admit that under the circumstances of a multinational country like Russia, constructing a truly *multinational* (but not a *supranational*) state may conveniently be taken as a variety of nationalism.

According to these definitions, any authentic National Bolshevism would be a paradoxical ideology, for it would have two principal goals, namely the construction of a national or multinational superpower and the destruction of the propertied classes. In itself this would be a feasible project. If the expropriating agency were to be the state, which is typically the case under bolshevik conditions, the two goals might neatly coincide. To strengthen the state politi-

cally would satisfy etatist aspirations; and by strengthening it economically—by concentrating all means of production in its hands—the goals of bolshevism would be served.

Nevertheless, there remain insoluble problems. Bolsheviks who embrace National Bolshevism and commit themselves to the construction of a powerful state, would at the same time remain internationalists. They could not limit their goals to their own state. They aim for a world revolution, in order to root out the propertied classes worldwide. Moreover, according to bolshevik tenets, at some point in the world revolutionary process the state itself will disappear, creating a nationless, unified world system. Even Stalin, for all his chauvinist extremism, remained a bolshevik in these intentions. On the other hand, nationalist converts to National Bolshevism would be uninterested in the global overthrow of capitalism. Their acceptance of state property of the means of production was motivated exclusively by the hope that this would strengthen their own national state. By this logic they would even have to *oppose* the world revolution, in order to prevent other states from being similarly strengthened, producing a rival to their own. And they could, of course, never agree to the abolition of the national state, even in the long run.

This leads us to conclude that something like an authentic National Bolshevism might conceivably exist; a movement constructing a strong state, aiming in the process for its own political and military aggrandisement as well as for the expropriation and absorption of all economic property in the country. But it would always remain an unstable mixture. In the short run the question of the world revolution must divide any National Bolshevik camp; and the long-term perspectives of the ultimate fate of the state would prevent any solid ideological unity. On abstract grounds we may therefore expect National Bolshevism to be and remain a fragile movement, always ready to disintegrate into its component parts in times of crisis.

Early National Bolshevism

The best study to my knowledge of the original German National Bolshevism is Louis Dupeux's '*Nationalbolschewismus*' in *Deutschland*, originally published in French in 1976. Germany's defeat in the First World War, its subsequent humiliation by the Entente powers, the remarkable tenacity of the Soviet-Russian regime and, finally, the power of the organized workers' movement in Germany, combined to convince a number of German conservatives that only an alliance with Soviet Russia and co-operation with the socialist working class at home, could return Germany to greatness. Among these conservatives were a very small number who went further, arguing as they did that to be reinvigorated, Germany could not do without a bolshevik revolution of her own. In April 1919 Paul Eltzbacher, a member of parliament for the German-National Party, set the tone, when he argued for the introduction of 'bolshevism' in Germany, for the council system and the socialization of the means of production without

compensation. The rich should make this sacrifice of their capital for the fatherland. In May the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* was the first to call this 'nationaler Bolschewismus'.⁴

The term gained in significance when the bolsheviks took it up, though in another context. In June 1919 two communist leaders from Hamburg, Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz Wolffheim, began to propagate what they called a 'national communism'. They declared the restoration of the German fatherland to be their main goal, and called for a new war against the Entente powers—in a coalition with Soviet Russia. However, the proletarian revolution, to be carried out in close co-operation with the petty-bourgeois though not with the bourgeois classes, remained a precondition for this military *renaissance*. Only a proletarian, council-run Germany could weld together the powerfully integrated national organism capable of waging war successfully. In November 1919 Karl Radek accused the two men of being 'national *Bolsheviki*'.⁵ Lenin joined Radek in 1920, when he wrote scathingly about the 'crying absurdities of "national bolshevism" (Laufenberg and others)', which he accused of aiming for a war coalition with the German bourgeoisie.⁶

Typically, neither Eltzbacher nor the Hamburg circle called themselves National Bolsheviks. As conservatives and communists respectively, they did not consider themselves to be part of one movement. Nevertheless, their work defined the tendency. Despite the vast differences in long-term ideological perspective, their strategy rested on a common basis, namely a conviction that the restoration of a great German state was the main immediate goal, to be achieved through a communist programme of proletarian power and the expropriation of the capitalist classes. But almost immediately after it originated the term National Bolshevism became, as it were, diluted. It began to be used in the German press in a much looser sense, to refer to all those who hoped to unify rightist and leftist extremism on a nationalist platform. It came to denote, indiscriminately, all those conservatives and communists who hoped for a coalition of Soviet Russia and the workers' movement with German nationalist and army circles against the Entente.

Meanwhile, Russians joined the debate. A central role was played by the right-wing Constitutional Democrat Nikolai Ustrialov, who fought the bolsheviks during the civil war and had subsequently fled to Harbin in Manchuria. The development of his thought has been described in Hilde Hardeman's *Coming to Terms with the Soviet Regime*. Ustrialov's main ideal was the strengthening and expansion of the Russian state. Taking a new look at the bolshevik regime, he concluded in the course of 1920 that it was serving this very ideal. Referring to German 'National-Bolshevism' in a letter to Petr Struve in October of that year, he insisted that true patriots should co-operate with the bolsheviks, though he hoped that the latter would overcome their primitive anti-capitalism.⁷ Ustrialov's motives were similar to those of the German conservatives whom he admired. The strength of bolshevik state policy so impressed these people, that they saw no other option but to co-operate with red Russia—in the German case in order to find a partner for a new, great Germany,

in the Russian to support the process of the strengthening and expansion of the Russian state itself. But, like most of the German conservatives, Ustrialov was in fact no National Bolshevik in the precise sense of the word. In contrast to Eltzbacher, he did not support expropriation.

Initially Ustrialov's position remained unchanged. In his contribution, 'Patriotica', to the famous 1921 collection of nationalist essays *Smena vekh* he explained hopefully that, with the New Economic Policy, Russia was heading for its own version of Thermidor. The strong state would remain, but resting on private property.⁸ Even the group of leftist nationalists behind the Moscow journal *Novaia Rossiia*, edited by I. G. Lezhnev, was only in favour of a mixed economy, not of the bolshevik 'real thing' of complete expropriation. Lezhnev accepted Marxism during the 1930s. And in 1934, having absorbed the shock of collectivization, Ustrialov too decided to go all the way. He acknowledged the model of the new 'classless Soviet nation'.⁹ It was only at this moment that such people became National Bolsheviks in a more authentic sense, though they still failed to denote themselves as such.

Dupeux emphasizes that among German conservatives of the 1920s and early 1930s most of those often called National Bolsheviks only favoured a Russian orientation of German foreign policy. They believed in a strong state which intervened in the economic life of the country, but not, like Eltzbacher, in the abolition of private property of the means of production. The alleged anti-capitalism of these conservatives was mainly political and cultural in orientation. Economically their point was to limit 'free enterprise', i.e., to bring the capitalists under the control of the state, not to expropriate them.¹⁰ Dupeux refuses to acknowledge national revolutionaries such as Ernst Jünger and left-wing Nazis like Otto Strasser as National Bolsheviks. Only a limited group of diehards—notably Hans von Hentig, Ernst Niekisch, Werner Lass, Harro Schulze-Boysen, Hans Ebeling and Karl Otto Paetel—were faithful to the original idea. Niekisch called his own programme 'German bolshevism'. The journals of Paetel and Lass were the only ones to admit explicitly to being 'national bolshevik'.¹¹ According to Dupeux's criterion German National Bolshevism always remained an extremely small movement.

The same goes for the Russians. Perhaps Ustrialov and Lezhnev were finally converted to the real thing during the 1930s. With some effort we may tentatively identify others. For example, Konstantin Rodzaevskii, leader of the Russian Fascist Party, admitted in 1945: 'Stalinism is exactly what we mistakenly called "Russian fascism". It is our Russian fascism cleansed of extremes, illusions and errors'. Thus he accepted Stalin's fusion of nationalism and bolshevism in the end, and thereby became some sort of National Bolshevik—but only in defeat. Other fascist groups such as the Young Russians of Aleksandr Kazem Bek, though admiring Stalin's regime, remained monarchists. They were interested in a great Russia, not in the bolshevik socio-economic programme. The relatively well-known National Union of Toilers of the New Generation—NTS—never broke out of the fascist framework. It propagated 'solidarism', which was the opposite of the principle of class struggle. All classes should

co-operate harmoniously within the framework of a strong, dictatorial state owning only key industries.¹²

For those moving towards National Bolshevism from the right, the hesitations to take the final step are understandable in terms of their ideological background. From the perspective of liberalism, the conservative revolutionaries and bolsheviks had much in common. Both hoped to subject the individual to the larger whole of the state. But for the conservative revolutionaries, Marxism was merely a particularly obnoxious variety of liberalism. From their perspective, liberalism denied the organic harmony and dependence of the nation, plunging the state into chaos and a struggle of all against all. The Marxist principle of class struggle was merely a variant of this divisive concept. To make the classes clash was even more dangerous than the fruitless struggle between individual citizens provoked by the liberals. Marxism destroyed national solidarity even more thoroughly.

The roots of the ideological *milieu* from which the German National Bolsheviks emerged, lay in the thinking of men like Fichte and List. Its prominent heroes were Oswald Spengler and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, who called themselves 'socialists', but represented the so-called 'conservative revolution' against rationalism and universalism. Believing in the unique national spirit, the *Volksgeist*, their political ideal was the *Volksgemeinschaft*, the 'popular community', which welded all social classes together into a strong state of 'Prussian' authoritarian culture. Their ideal was the committed hero—soldier or civil servant—not the satisfied *bourgeois*, the private citizen minding his own business. The economy should be an autarkic, planned whole, closely serving the military purposes of the state. There was no ideal of equality behind all this. Quite the contrary. This was no national community of citizens with equal rights, but a rigidly stratified one with its professional groups organized as separate estates and led by a new aristocracy.¹³

The notions of state planning and autarky, and the abhorrence of the profit spirit, might deceive one into thinking that the conservative revolutionaries were close to bolshevism. But that was not how they saw it themselves. For them the bolshevik state was built on false foundations. For by expropriating the landowners, the peasantry and the business community, it set the classes against each other. To accept the principle of class struggle, which any authentic National Bolshevik should do, was almost impossible for people believing in sacred class harmony. The same obstacles existed among Russian conservatives. Ustrialov admired the nineteenth century conservative Konstantin Leont'ev and the panslavist Nikolai Danilevskii, as well as the nationalist Struve. He was also inspired by Hegel, as, I should add, German conservatives were for a part inspired by Russian thinkers, in particular by Dostoevskii. There was no room for the class struggle in all this.¹⁴

Perhaps because of the disappointingly small numbers of 'real' National Bolsheviks, scholarly literature treating the subject has shown a marked tendency to widen the scope of the concept. In her *Stalin and German Communism* (1948), Ruth Fischer distinguishes various forms of National Bolshevism. To

begin with, there is the genuine Hamburg-communist variety which took the reconstruction of a militarily powerful German state as its main goal and the proletarian dictatorship as the means. But she also attaches the label to the policy propagated by Radek in his famous 'Schlageter speech' of June 1923. Radek proposed German communist co-operation with nationalist army circles against the 'yoke of Entente capital' and in a coalition with Soviet Russia. But though he wanted the German revolution to be postponed in favour of a prior united front with 'patriotic circles', Radek did not embrace the Hamburg strategy of war against the Entente and the restoration of a great German state as the prime goal of policy.

Fischer further describes an 'other version' of National Bolshevism, of conservative German generals who hoped to rouse the people to a new war by acceptance of a social-democratic dictatorship. She also mentions in this connection Moeller van den Bruck's thesis that the nations of the world were divided into haves and have-nots; the latter, among which was Germany, to be described as some kind of proletarian nation.¹⁵ Fischer follows the practice of the German press of the 1920s to expand the concept of National Bolshevism to embrace all extreme nationalists and bolsheviks who hoped to co-operate with each other on a nationalist platform.

Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf's *Linke Leute von Rechts*, published in 1960 and a monumental study of national-revolutionaries in the Weimar Republic, also treats National Bolshevism as a combination of nationalist etatism and socialism, aiming for a coalition between the extremists of both camps and between Germany and Russia. One looks in vain for a clear definition. Schüddekopf comes closest to one when he finds the following formula applicable to National Bolshevism: 'the social form of a very deep national desperation after a lost war'. This again implicitly includes all desperate nationalism which translates into some sort of 'social' terms, however vaguely.¹⁶ Only Dupeux's 1976 work dug up the original connotations of the political tendency, and insisted that it had included a serious communist commitment.¹⁷

A new National Bolshevism?

The most important area where the label National Bolshevism has recently reappeared as a tool to analyse contemporary developments is Russia. And what was true for interbellum German and Russian nationalism remains true today: authentic National Bolsheviks are hard to find among the new Russian nationalists. In the 1974 collection of essays *Iz-pod Glyb*, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn discusses a faction of the dissident movement that defended the '*Russian idea*', and which he himself derogatorily called 'national-bolshevism'. He describes their standpoint as follows:

neither the ancient nor the modern history [of the Russian people] is stained by anything; it is unacceptable to reproach either tsarism or bolshevism with anything ... communism is even unthinkable without patriotism; the perspectives of Russia-USSR are radiant; only

blood defines whether one belongs to the Russians or not; as far as the spirit is concerned, any tendency can be accepted. Even Orthodoxy is not in any sense more Russian than Marxism.¹⁸

The reference to 'blood' is somewhat confusing. Solzhenitsyn does not want to suggest that National Bolsheviks are necessarily racists, but that, for them, one automatically belongs to Russia if one is of Russian nationality. Whether one follows Orthodoxy or Marxism is, then, irrelevant. The point which particularly bothers the writer about this, is that Marxism too is considered an authentically Russian phenomenon. He refers implicitly to the so-called 'single stream' interpretation of Russian history, which sees this history as an unbroken whole. In particular this scheme does not consider the rule of Peter and the October Revolution as cut-off points but as mere episodes in one glorious national epic. The focus of this interpretation, which accepts Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Stalin on equal terms, is the strong, centralized state, allegedly the main characteristic of Russian history.¹⁹ Solzhenitsyn effectively defined National Bolshevism as that faction of the Russian patriots that embraced communism in the name of the fatherland. But he left it in the dark as to how far this commitment went.

In 1983 John Dunlop divided the spectrum of contemporary Russian nationalism into two main tendencies, one which he called the *vozhrozhdenitsy* and which was powerfully influenced by nineteenth-century slavophilism, and the other the National Bolsheviks. Among the latter category he counted A. Fetisov, Viktor Chalmaev, Mikhail Antonov, Sergei Semanov and Nikolai Iakovlev. They believed in the strong military-industrial state and the principle of order, embodied in leaders such as Hitler and Stalin—against the Jewish principle of chaos. They equally admired the tsarist generals Suvorov and Kutuzov and the communist generals Frunze and Zhukov. The mistakes made by the Soviet regime were not Lenin's and Stalin's but committed by the Jews Trotsky and Kaganovich. Dunlop lists the characteristics of the new National Bolshevism, the main ones being a cult of the Russian people, bordering on the racist; a cult of militaristic discipline and heroism; and a strong hatred of the West and the Jews. He concludes that National Bolshevism is a variety of fascism.

Typically, among Dunlop's eight distinguishing marks of the National Bolsheviks none concerns their economic programme. But the author surmises that they would probably favour the decollectivization of agriculture, and he notes that, whereas for National Bolsheviks of the 1930s such as Aleksei Tolstoi the communist element became overriding, those of the 1970s emphasized the nationalist aspect. He further observes that they favour the concept of the 'people' instead of that of class, and are not hostile towards Orthodoxy. In summing up he characterizes their position as a willingness for 'tactical compromises' with Marxism-Leninism, to 'achieve at least a temporary *modus vivendi*' with it.²⁰ All this clearly suggests that these so-called National Bolsheviks were in fact no principled anti-capitalists, but nationalist etatists prepared for an understanding with communism—but no more than that.

In his 1990 *Russian Nationalism*, Stephen Carter mentions Iurii Bondarev, Petr Proskurin, Mikhail Alekseev and Anatolii Ivanov as present-day National Bolsheviks. Noting that they have allied themselves with the neo-Stalinists and express support for the Orthodox Church, he describes them as people who, 'while being relatively indifferent to Communism, are ready to use the language of Marxism-Leninism, and have close links with the Soviet military'.²¹ Walter Laqueur too notes the revival of Russian nationalism during the 1960s. One tendency was National Bolshevism, a 'new synthesis between traditional Russian nationalism and Leninism-Stalinism'. Anti-bourgeois critique of American cosmopolitanism and the 'single stream' interpretation of Russian history were defining marks. Both Nicholas II and Lenin were heroes; both the Reds and the Whites had a good cause in the civil war. After all, both parties were for a strong state, which was the essential point.²²

Many recent authors have taken a preoccupation with the formation of a coalition between the communists and the Orthodox Church as the main criterion for defining Russian rightists as National Bolsheviks. In 1993 Assen Ignatow discussed the tendency under the heading 'From Red Star to the Cross'. He mentions R. Kosolapov and Ivan Vasil'ev as its main representatives. They recognize as fundamental the 'Russian' principles of *sobornost*, collectivity as opposed to class; *dukhovnost*, spirituality; *narodnost*, 'popularity'; and *gosudarstvennost*, etatism. These principles were best embodied in the doctrines of Jesus Christ and Lenin. To bring about a *rapprochement* between the church and the communist party on the lines of this platform was the main strategic mission of the moment.²³

Marina Fuchs noted that the new National Bolsheviks were more interested in 'social justice' than in 'socialism'. Their enemy was unbridled capitalism, not capitalism. Claiming to find their roots in Christianity, they further swapped the 'cosmopolitan principle of internationalism' for a wide patriotic bloc embracing the church and the communist party. The leader of the latter party, Gennadii Ziuganov, was among the National Bolsheviks.²⁴ Another author to include Ziuganov in our category, indeed to make him Russia's most prominent present-day National Bolshevik, is Wayne Allensworth. In his 1998 *The Russian Question* he presents the following definition:

National Bolshevism thus attempts to reconcile the two 'streams' of Russian national greatness, 'white' and 'red', merging them into a 'single stream' mythonoteur that proclaims Soviet collectivism the fulfillment of Orthodox sobornost. National Bolshevism, evolving from Black Hundredism and Stalinism, has often manifested itself as a uniquely Russian fascism, a modernist ideology that has channeled the human urge for community into the collectivist, statist project.

This definition turns again around the concepts of collectivism and etatism. The class struggle and principled hostility towards private property are not among the defining marks. Among those answering to the description during the past decades Allensworth further mentions Chalmaev, Ivanov and Gennadii Shimanov. The author emphasizes that Ziuganov, though the leader of the

communist party, saw as his main task the consolidation of all 'patriotic forces', including the Orthodox Church, in order to save the fatherland. Instead of class he embraced *sobornost*, and he endorsed a mixed economy. He even analysed the October Revolution as the result of a plot by evil people who perverted the struggle of honest Russians against rapacious capitalists to establish their own dictatorship. His main aim is the creation of a new great power, *derzhava*, to recreate the Soviet state from the Baltic to the Chinese border, but on new economic and ideological principles. Allensworth calls National Bolshevism 'fascism with a communist face'.²⁵ Ziuganov admits to being an admirer of Danilevskii, Leont'ev and Spengler.²⁶ Thus, ironically, even the leader of the communist party has now abandoned the fundamental goal of communism—expropriation of all private property of the means of production—in favour of a transition to a 'revolutionary conservative' position.

Meanwhile, one of the leaders of the conservative-revolutionary 'New Right', Aleksandr Dugin, has joined Edvard Limonov's National-Bolshevik Party.²⁷ Leonid Luks noted recently that in Dugin's journal *Elementy* much attention is paid to the *Smena vekh* group and to the German conservative revolutionaries. *Elementy* asserts that National Bolshevism has been the most interesting ideology of the twentieth century, summing up the most fruitful elements of fascism and bolshevism. As a patriotic ideology, it rejects the cosmopolitan and individualistic West, the force behind the secret 'liberal world government'. Paying particular tribute to the common, toiling masses, National Bolshevism hopes to put them nevertheless under the leadership of a new 'aristocracy' with a Prussian mentality. According to Luks, the self-styled National Bolsheviks around Dugin were mainly inspired by Carl Schmitt, Moeller van den Bruck and Jünger, none of whom were National Bolsheviks according to Dupeux's original criteria.²⁸

Based on this survey of the work of students of the Russian nationalism of the past decades, we may tentatively conclude that history is indeed repeating itself. Most of those who are called National Bolsheviks by Western scholars are in fact nationalist etatists without any serious intention of urging on the class struggle or of proceeding towards a new 'expropriation of the expropriators'. The reason they are being styled as National Bolsheviks is either that, like Dugin, they address themselves with that name, or, like Ziuganov, call themselves communists. Furthermore, they hope to organize a nationalist-communist coalition. Particularly this latter fact, so reminiscent of the situation in Germany and Russia in the 1920s and 1930s, keeps the term National Bolshevism alive.

All this is not to suggest that it would be impossible for a radical nationalist to integrate communism. Eltzbacher's and other examples show that it can be done. One might even argue that, for nationalism to be complete, it *must* make the transition to communism; if the national community is really the highest focus of loyalty, then it is entitled to all property. The very term 'nationalization' refers to production being laid directly in the hands of the nation. Communism represents the highest form of nationally integrated community. With only one class of state servants remaining, what firmer national unity can one hope for?

However, to achieve this goal, one must first unleash a civil war and lead the country through years of bloodshed; for one cannot expect the rich to accept their losses quietly. To abolish classes, an attractive goal for a consistent nationalist, the classes must first be made to fight each other to the death. And for most conservative revolutionaries this is unthinkable. The price is too high, the outcome too insecure. As a result, only very few German and Russian conservatives of the interbellum, as well as of the present day, have turned into authentic National Bolsheviks.

Communist National Bolshevism

But is it as hard for communists to embrace nationalism as it is for nationalists to turn communist? Communist National Bolshevism provides a tougher analytical problem than the conservative-revolutionary brand. The point is that Marxism is not anarchism. According to Marx, the working class will take power simultaneously in the main European states. But the victorious proletariat must preserve a state until all private capital has been expropriated. Only then will the state wither away and the respective nations fuse into one whole. In other words, even Marx predicted the temporary survival of a national-proletarian state. On a more pragmatic level, any communist party in power must embrace some form of etatist patriotism, for the simple reason that it must protect the state which it has captured. And, as all communist regimes will thus be found to contain a nationalist component, aren't all of them National Bolshevik?

Historically, however, this would again be a problematic conclusion. The original German National Bolsheviks were not simply nationalist in a general sense. They were inspired by a definite chauvinism and hoped to rebuild their state as a great superpower. If we stick to the original connotation of the concept, as we set out to do, then we must take a closer look at the various kinds of nationalism communism accommodates.

Robert Tucker is probably the most prominent scholar to have recently made National Bolshevism central in his analysis of Stalinism.²⁹ Tucker distinguishes between internationalist bolsheviks such as Lenin and Trotsky on the one hand, and 'Russian national Bolshevism' on the other. The principle of 'socialism in one country'—the question of whether socialism can exist in an isolated state—served as the dividing line between the two tendencies. The second camp was again divided into two subtendencies:

As an attitude of national self-esteem, nationalism comes in two main varieties: patriotic devotion to one's people and their positive national attributes; and chauvinism, an overweening national pride and sense of superiority over other nations. The national Bolshevism of the Right [represented by Aleksei Rykov and Nikolai Bukharin, E.v.R.] was nationalist in the first way. Stalin's in the second. His was a radical version of Russian national Bolshevism, a blend of Bolshevik revolutionism with the Great Russian chauvinism that Lenin correctly perceived in him in 1922.

Like Rykov and Bukharin, Stalin made Russia the focus of his efforts; but,

unlike them, he believed that, to make Soviet Russia militarily secure, it was absolutely essential to rule out any possibility of foreign capitalist intervention. One should therefore not abandon the world revolution but organize it as a military campaign. Stalin embarked on an expansionist foreign policy, for which purpose he transformed Russia into a mighty military-industrial power able to expand its borders as opportunity allowed. Stalinist National Bolshevism was of the chauvinist variety.³⁰

Tucker's analysis raises a number of questions. To begin with, the empirical accuracy of the dividing lines among his diverging bolshevisms is open to doubt. It can, for example, be argued that the 'internationalists' Lenin and Trotsky also aimed for a strong state, and that the 'Rightists' Bukharin and Rykov did not lose interest in the world revolution. More importantly for our purpose, in Tucker's definition, National Bolshevism becomes, once again, a very broad concept. Chauvinist, extreme etatism is only one particular variety of it. It can also accommodate tendencies which are nationalist in a loose sense, aiming to preserve the state rather than to make it great and expand. Though contrary to Tucker's own intention, his approach opens the way to define communism, which contains a nationalist note most of the time, as a form of National Bolshevism.

Except to discuss developments in Germany and Russia, National Bolshevism has never become a popular concept in the general study of communism. To my knowledge it has not been applied to the disintegration of the world communist movement occurring from the late 1940s onwards through the 1970s. To describe this complex process, the term 'national communism' was introduced. That this term was preferred to National Bolshevism is understandable enough, because breakaway communist states were often not inspired by Stalinist chauvinism but by a simple aiming for autonomy. The neutral term 'national communism' is fitting, as it leaves the policy content of autonomous communisms in the dark.

One of the first authors to apply it systematically was Zbigniew Brzezinski in his *The Soviet Bloc*. According to him, Gomulka's early post-war 'Polish way to socialism' was the first case of 'national Communism—that is, the explicit assignment of priority to internal considerations even if openly challenged by those who consider themselves to be central spokesmen of international Communism'. National communism puts the interests of the particular state above those of the bloc as a whole. For Brzezinski it was another word for 'independent socialism'.³¹ The context of Brzezinski's discussion was the struggles of Eastern European states against Soviet interference. National communism did therefore not imply chauvinist expansionism but national independence. In 1967 Robert McNeal defined national communism somewhat differently, namely as the recognition that there were 'separate paths' to communism.³²

After the concept of 'national communism' had been introduced, there began a search for its roots, to be found among the Soviet Muslim and Ukrainian communists of the 1920s. Alexandre Bennigsen and Enders Wimbush's 1979 *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union* was pioneering. This work

mainly concerns the doctrine developed by the Volga Tatar communist Mir-Said Sultan Galiev, which it characterizes as a 'synthesis of socialism, nationalism, and Islam into a new, dynamic ideology—national communism'. Central to this was the notion of Muslim nations as 'proletarian nations', engaged in compact national revolutions against imperialism, while indefinitely postponing the internal class struggle. Only the few wealthy landlords and agents of imperialism should be expropriated. The national identity of the Muslim peoples, as well as their Islamic culture and way of life, should be preserved under socialism. Pride was taken in the empires of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, and it was hoped to establish a great Muslim republic.³³ Sultan Galiev's doctrine hardly seems, in fact, to have been genuinely communist. Everything is focused on national liberation and the creation of a great state. Islam is incorporated and the class struggle is for all practical purposes abandoned. This is more reminiscent of a Muslim variety of the 'conservative revolution' than of a Marxist nationalism.

In his study of *National Communism in the Soviet Union, 1918–28* (1980), Baruch Gurevitz defines the doctrine as a compromise between nationalism and communism. Calling it 'the communism of the oppressed nations', Gurevitz recognizes two forms. One, most suited to colonial peoples, again sees compact 'proletarian nations' engaged in a struggle for liberation, with an indefinite postponement of the class struggle. The other type, in principle applicable to all nations and countries but exemplified by the Ukrainian Borot'bisty and the Zionist-Socialists, represents a more genuine combination of nationalism and communism. Though state independence is the main goal, the class struggle is not forgotten. But then again, it is insisted upon that all nations produce their own socialist models.³⁴

The main study dedicated exclusively to the subject is to my knowledge Peter Zwick's *National Communism* (1983). Zwick emphasizes that from its very conception communism has been national. *All* communism is 'national communism'. The point is that Marx was an internationalist, not a cosmopolitan. He did not deny national variety, and the ultimate communist world order would be preceded by a stage of proletarian nation-states. Zwick further remarks acutely:

The issue under investigation is national communism—the assertion of the right of communist parties to develop policies appropriate to national conditions as they perceive them. The problem is that this issue of national independence can be easily confused with such concurrent trends of the post-Stalin era as liberalization, economic reform, democratization, and destalinization. The essence of national communism, however, is not the content of a policy, but who made that policy.

National communism simply means communism in a national form—what that form is, is immaterial. Zwick distinguishes two principal types: that of the Eastern European parties confirming their independence towards Moscow; and that of the Marxist national liberation movements throughout Asia. According to Zwick, there is also the phenomenon of a communism not of national independence (in either European or Asian style), but of national domination. Stalin's

was, for example, an 'extreme form of national communism', one declared to be of universal validity.

Stalin, Mao, and Castro each adapted Marxism to national conditions, and in so doing practiced national communism. But then each attempted to transform his national variation into a communist model, and in so doing practiced communist national chauvinism.³⁵

In summing up, the minimum definition of 'national communism' concerns the right of each communist party to a 'national road'. This can either take the form of developing a communist model in national colours or of putting national independence at the top of the agenda. In addition, Zwick distinguishes a communist chauvinism: an extreme representative of the general category of national communism. In that case, nationalism turns into a hegemonic effort towards other nations.

The original concept of National Bolshevism did not concern mere efforts to 'liberate' Germany or Russia, but to recreate them as expansionist Great Powers inspired by a superior culture. It referred to movements of *extreme* etatism. Zwick's introduction of the subcategory of 'communist chauvinism' is to the point in this context. It suggests that the concept of National Bolshevism can after all be fruitfully applied in studying the history of the world communist movement and its disintegration. Simply put, some national communisms were National Bolshevik.

The question arises, of course, which regimes qualify and which don't. Zwick mentions Stalin, Mao and Castro, but any schematic distinction is problematic. The point is that the claim of some sort of leading role in relation to other communist parties is quite a common one. And not only the Russians, Chinese and Cubans; the Vietnamese, for example, follow this practice too. Most ruling communist parties have to a certain degree been chauvinist in their relation to brother parties, regionally or globally. Nevertheless, we can follow Zwick in dividing communist leaders and parties roughly into two categories when it comes to the question of chauvinism.

The respective communisms of the Stalin and Brezhnev eras serve as a good example. Under both leaders the regime claimed a leading role for the Soviet party, and Eastern Europe fell under Soviet hegemony. But, over and above this, Stalin promoted an ideology and practice of extreme patriotism that was lost after his death. Like the Hamburg communists, the ageing dictator concluded that the national-popular community and not class represented the highest focus of allegiance. As in the Hamburg case, this did not cause him to abandon the class approach. He rather integrated it into the national cause, insisting as he did that the system of nationalized production represented the national interest best, whereas the capitalists were a stratum of national traitors.³⁶ This late-Stalinist doctrine resulted in a rabid cult of the nation and the fatherland, centring firstly on principles of national autarky and state self-reliance, which were promoted to the point of xenophobia; and, secondly, on a chauvinist cult of the Russian and Soviet state and its culture as superior forces in world history. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev this kind of extremism was abandoned.

One can single out a number of communist regimes—at all events those of Mao, Kim Il Sung, Ceausescu, and Pol Pot—which closely followed the Stalinist archetype. In the case of small nations like North Korea, Romania, and Kampuchea there was, of course, no claim for world leadership; but the chauvinist megalomania was nevertheless of the same type. Other regimes, however, such as most of the East European ones during the 1960s and later decades, lacked such ultra-patriotism and were similar to the Brezhnev example.

Interestingly, in the former case we are dealing with chauvinist regimes which at the same time did not shed their communist character. Most of the extreme German and Russian nationalists at most flirt with bolshevism, but in fact abhor the class struggle and communist expropriation programmes. However, in the case of leaders like Stalin and Mao we have genuine chauvinist extremists who remained committed to the total liquidation of private property of the means of production and the communist goal of worldwide liquidation of the capitalist classes. What is more, taken together, the regimes of Stalin, Mao and others make up a substantial segment of historical communism. Thus, in sharp contrast to the situation among the conservative revolutionaries, who produced not even one National Bolshevik regime, we do find the syndrome to have been influential in the history of communism.

Apparently, it is easier for communists to embrace extreme nationalism than for extreme nationalists to take the converse step. The reason may be that the risks involved for the latter are in general more substantial than for the former. For a communist regime to turn National Bolshevik means that it closes itself off to an important degree, fortifying itself even in relation to the comrades and friendly states abroad. The world revolution is never completely abandoned, but because of the insistence on self-reliance and the superiority of one's own state and culture, such a regime is in danger of alienating potential support from abroad. National Bolshevism never comes without a price. But, in terms of power politics, to reduce foreign support is in most circumstances less immediately threatening, than to throw away the support of the most powerful stratum of one's own population, the political and economic elite, and to risk civil war—the price nationalists pay, should they turn to a radical strategy of class struggle and nationalization.

Conclusion

In this essay I have taken as my point of departure Dupeux's approach of sticking to the original 1919 connotation of the concept of National Bolshevism, to include among its ranks only movements with a serious commitment to socialism in its extreme form, i.e., to communism, as well as to the chauvinist variety of nationalism. In much of the scholarly literature the scope of the term has been broadened far beyond this. National Bolshevism is most typically defined as the brand of nationalist etatism which uses, partly or wholly, the language of Marxism and aims for a nationalist coalition of the extreme right or religious groups on the one hand and communism on the other. In the works of

Fischer, Schüddekopf and Agursky the German and Russian conservative nationalists of the 1920s and 1930s who hoped for co-operation with the Soviet state are accepted as National Bolsheviks, irrespective of their standpoints on the question of expropriation. Dupeux's careful approach has not been taken into account in the study of the new Russian Right of the 1960s to the present day. Authors like Dunlop, Carter, Laqueur and Allensworth have in their discussions of National Bolshevism, again, not sufficiently appreciated the question of property, the *ultimate* question in bolshevik doctrine.

Definitional strictness is not only justified by the historical sources of the term in Germany and Russia. A further advantage of the (at first sight) artificially stringent demand of a narrow definition is that it helps us get important distinctions among radical movements and states into clear focus. It allows to distinguish, first, between those like Eltzbacher and Paetel with a real interest in the communist programme and the much larger group of followers of Spengler and Moeller van den Bruck, of which the former were only a part; and, secondly, between communist states that absorbed a moderate nationalism and regimes like Stalin's and Mao's in which nationalism was driven to chauvinist extremes.

The latter distinction among types of communism is admittedly more problematic than the former among the nationalist camp. In principle it can be established in a straightforward way whether a nationalist movement beats the drum of either class struggle or class harmony. Mostly it presents little problem to establish whether a movement sets itself the goal of total nationalization of the economy or not. The borderline between moderate nationalism and chauvinism is, however, less clear. But in the course of this article I have mentioned the ways in which communist chauvinism has characteristically expressed itself. First, there is a tendency to expansionism and superpower ambitions. Secondly, there is a programme of autarky and self-reliance, shading off into xenophobia. And, thirdly, there is the conviction of one's own cultural superiority. In their combination, these criteria seem sufficiently sharp to mark off the two types of communist regimes, the ones converted to an authentic form of National Bolshevism and the others not going to that length.

The above distinctions among nationalist and communist regimes have, again, alerted us to the interesting phenomenon that it is much more common for communists to adopt a chauvinist position than for nationalists to embrace communism. I have suggested a power-political explanation of this fact. As a final observation, if this general analysis is correct we should conclude that the chances of National Bolshevism growing into an important factor in the world are slim. Though it originated, in April 1919, among 'conservative revolutionists' and remained most prominent among German and Russian adherents of that tendency during the 1920s and 1930s, it never became really influential in that *milieu*. By contrast, with Stalinism gradually transforming into a National Bolshevism during the 1930s and 1940s, it became immediately influential, for the simple reason that it controlled a great state. What is more, the Soviet dictator set a precedent. When Khrushchev retreated from extremism, new Stalins emerged in the communist world, mainly in China, Korea, Romania and

Kampuchea. However by now, with communism probably heading towards its end, this well is drying up. Only one regime which might aptly be called National Bolshevik is still alive—that of Kim Jong-Il. But its prospects are less than radiant. It looks, then, as if National Bolshevism has outlived its days. If it is not revived under as yet unforeseen circumstances, it will remain of interest mainly to historians of twentieth-century radicalism.

Notes and references

1. Mikhail Agursky, *The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR* (London/Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. xv.
2. Agursky, *ibid.*, pp. 72–73, 295; see also pp. 32–33, 76.
3. Agursky, *ibid.*, pp. xii–xiii, 74, 80.
4. Louis Dupeux, 'Nationalbolschewismus' in *Deutschland, 1919–1933* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1985), pp. 53–63.
5. Dupeux, *ibid.*, pp. 82–111.
6. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 41, *mai–noiabr' 1920* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1963), p. 60.
7. Hilde Hardeman, *Coming to Terms with the Soviet Regime: The 'Changing Signposts' Movement among Russian Emigrés in the Early 1920s* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), pp. 29–42; Agursky, *op. cit.*, Ref. 1, pp. 240–248.
8. N. Ustrialov, 'Patriotica', in *Smena vekh* (Prague: Tipografiia 'Politika' v Prage, 1921), pp. 52–71.
9. Hardeman, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7, pp. 47–57; see also Agursky, *op. cit.*, Ref. 1, pp. 283–286.
10. Dupeux, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, p. 22.
11. Dupeux, *ibid.*, pp. 300–302, 333, 379.
12. See Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), pp. 72–85.
13. Dupeux, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, pp. 18–29; see also Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London/New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 91–92; Roger Griffin (Ed.), *Fascism* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 105–106, 112–114, 351–557.
14. Hardeman, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7, pp. 31–33.
15. Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins of the State Party* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 92, 94, 199, 268–273, 279–284.
16. Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, *Linke Leute von rechts. Die nationalrevolutionären Minderheiten und der Kommunismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960), pp. 77, 313.
17. In recent studies of historical fascism the term has, wisely, been used sparingly, but Fischer's and Schüddekopf's approach has not disappeared. In his *The Nature of Fascism*, Roger Griffin (*op. cit.*, Ref. 13, p. 92) treats National Bolshevism as a particularly radical form of pre-war ultra-nationalism. Its followers, Niekisch and others, saw the key to the renewal of Germany in a *rapprochement* with revolutionary Russia, which was considered by them to be a dramatically rejuvenated culture. Though Griffin does not draw this conclusion himself, his approach theoretically allows the inclusion of right-wing extremists who had nothing bolshevik about them, but were only prepared for alliance with the Soviet Union. See also Griffin, *op. cit.*, Ref. 13 (*Fascism*), p. 318.
18. M. S. Agurskii *et al.*, *Iz-pod glyb. Sbornik statei* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1974), pp. 128–129.
19. See John B. Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 219, 259; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 92; Wayne Allensworth, *The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist Russia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 146.
20. Dunlop, *op. cit.*, Ref. 19, pp. 41–42, 203–204, 218–221, 254–264.
21. Stephen K. Carter, *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 47, 125–126.
22. Laqueur, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, pp. 65, 91–92.
23. Assen Ignatow, 'Das postkommunistische vakuum und die neuen ideologien. Zur gegenwärtigen geistigen situation in Russland', *Osteuropa*, 43/4 (1993), pp. 316–320.
24. Marina Fuchs, 'Die russische nationalidee als faktor im politischen kampf für reformen (I)', *Osteuropa*, 43/4 (1993), pp. 334–336.
25. Allensworth, *op. cit.*, Ref. 19, pp. 145–174.

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26. See Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 98.
27. Allensworth, *op. cit.*, Ref. 19, pp. 261–262.
28. Leonid Luks, 'Der "dritte weg" der "neo-Eurasischen" zeitschrift "Elementy"—zurück ins Dritte Reich?', *Studies in East European Thought*, 52 (2000), pp. 55–57, 62–63.
29. One of the first to brand Stalinism as National Bolshevism was the oppositional Soviet communist Martem'ian Riutin, who wrote in 1932 that, whereas Lenin approached the question of the Brest Peace as a 'bolshevik-internationalist', Stalin did it as a 'national-bolshevik'. The difference was that Lenin continued to consider Soviet Russia as the point of departure of the world revolution, whereas Stalin allegedly proposed to ignore the latter. See: 'Platforma "Soiuz marksistov-lenintsev" ("Gruppa Riutina"). Stalin i krizis proletarskoi diktatury (Prodolzhenie)', *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, 9 (1990), p. 174.
30. Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941* (London/New York: W. W. Norton & Company), 1990, pp. xiv–xv, 5–6, 35–42. See also D. L. Brandenberger and A. M. Dubrovsky, "'The people need a Tsar': the emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist ideology, 1931–1941", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50/5 (1998), pp. 873–874, 883.
31. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 58, 62, 234, 262.
32. According to McNeal, Stalin's 'socialism in one country' was a forerunner of this idea. That is however doubtful, because this doctrine did not concern the question of specific national forms of communism. See Robert H. McNeal (Ed.), *International Relations among Communists* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 10. See also Edmund Demaitre, 'The origins of National Communism', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 2/1 (1969), pp. 1–20.
33. Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. xx, 41–51; see also Baruch Gurevitz, *National Communism in the Soviet Union, 1918–28* (Pittsburg, KS: University of Pittsburg, 1980), p. 12.
34. Gurevitz, *op. cit.*, Ref. 33, pp. xii–xiii, 9–10, 14–19. For a study of Ukrainian national communism of the 1920s, see James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
35. Peter Zwick, *National Communism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 13, 20–21, 29, 34, 69–70, 89, 121, 145–146, 156, 161, 167–168, 222.
36. For the Hamburg doctrine, see Dupeux, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, pp. 82ff, in particular 85, 100.