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The Russian tsars through Stalin's eyes*

Robert Tucker and Moshe Lewin have argued that Stalin let himself be inspired by Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The Soviet dictator was attracted to their policy of state centralisation against the forces of 'feudalism' and of military fortification of the country. And he copied their policy of using the centralised state apparatus to carry through a programme of economic and cultural modernisation from above. According to Tucker, Stalin found out that 'in earlier times revolutionary Russia and the Russian state were not the antipodes they became in the later eighteenth and nineteenth century. Rather, the state itself had acted as a revolutionary force'. Stalin's biographer goes so far as to claim that for Stalin, 'the Muscovite and Petrine Russia of the autocratic state and the revolutionary Russia were one and the same.'¹ In other words, there was more than a parallel between the Stalinist model of development and that of the early Russian monarchs. There was an essential identity. From this understanding of Stalin's programme it could be easily explained why, in Tucker's words, the Soviet dictator wanted 'to exalt the forgers of Russian statehood'. His glorification of figures such as Vladimir the Saint, Aleksandr Nevskii and Dmitrii Donskii, Ivan and Peter was motivated by his identification with them.²

However, Maureen Perrie has shown that this analysis contains at least an element of simplification. Stalin's praise for Peter was never unqualified, and he expressed admiration for Ivan only after the Second World War. She therefore questions how far these tsars could have served as models for Stalin's political practice of the mid-1930s onwards.³ Perrie also points out that in Stalinist writings the multinational character of Ivan's Russia was strongly emphasized. The tsar was shown not so much as a Russian prince but, as it were, as a *proto-Soviet* ruler.⁴ Now if Stalin's praise for Ivan and Peter was indeed qualified, and if, furthermore, he adapted their image to his own standards, then we must ask ourselves how close his identification with them really was. Which aspects of the rule of these monarchs did Stalin agree with and which did he find objectionable? Did he really feel himself to be in one class with them as a statesman?

This question is the more urgent in the light of a fact which Tucker and Lewin themselves emphasize, namely that the Soviet dictator's sympathies lay only with the early Russian rulers. Stalin did not nurture any warm feelings for, for example, the work of Nicholas I or Alexander III. So, we can broaden the time frame of the question, and ask ourselves what was Stalin's view of the system of tsarist rule in general and of the policies carried out in that whole era. That is the question I will treat in the present article. In some cases when there is insufficient evidence available of Stalin's own views, I will use comments made by his close collaborators such as Andrei Zhdanov, or the writings in publications such as *Bol'shevik*, which expressed the official standpoints of the party.

As our point of departure we may take the views of national historical development held by the young Stalin, in the years before he became the leader of Soviet Russia. In the early writings one finds, first of all, a pronounced dislike for the tradition of clans in his native land, Georgia. In 1904 he accused the mensheviks of having worked out 'some sort of family traditions, like old acquaintances'. They defended each other in an unprincipled way, like 'the members of a clan of the patriarchal tribes defended each other, without examining the guilt or innocence of their relative'.⁵ The next year he compared the menshevik concept of the party again to that of a 'hospitable patriarchal family'.⁶ Traditional Georgian families and clans protected their members against the central authorities and the other clans. Stalin apparently found this sort of tribalism to be a harmful tradition. It prevented the smooth integration of parties and states. But he had a more positive view of the Russian tradition. In a June 1906 issue of *Akhali tskhovreba* he accused those who demanded Transcaucasian autonomy of separating 'the fate of our country from Russian culture and linking it to Asian barbarism'. And he explained:

'In comparison to the Turks and the nationalities of the Transcaucasus, Russia is indeed a civilised country. That is the reason why we consider such "farsighted" politicians like you, who demand Transcaucasian autonomy, to be reactionaries.'⁷

Russian culture should be supported against local, Transcaucasian culture because it was further evolved on the ladder to modernity. The question is then what were Stalin's criteria for this. In a 1907 article he wrote that the share of Georgians and Jews was large among the mensheviks, while Russians predominated among the bolsheviks. He attributed this to the fact that bolshevism was mainly strong in districts with large-scale industry, which were mostly Russian, while the predominantly Georgian and Jewish districts, where the mensheviks could count on natural sympathy, were those of 'small production'.⁸ In other words, industrialisation was one important mark of modernity.

In his *Marxism and the national question* of 1913 Stalin described the Abkhasians, Jews and Tatars as 'primitive' nationalities who might as well assimilate into the more developed Russian nation. He was particularly scathing when he discussed Tatar habits like ritual self-flagellation and the 'right to revenge'. Nor did he have a good word for those Jews who wanted to celebrate the sabbath or to have their 'jargon' recognised. As opposed to these backward nations, he praised the Russians, who, like the Germans and Magyars in Central Europe, had played a historical role of 'unifier of nationalities'. The Russians were 'most suited to organising a state'. Stalin added that in Eastern Europe centralised states had formed before feudalism was liquidated, and under the conditions of a weakly developed capitalism. But capitalism had begun to develop in these areas too. 'Trade and the means of communication are being developed. Large cities are emerging. The nations consolidate themselves economically.' And finally, Eastern Europe saw the customary development of the press, the theatre and even some kind of parliamentary institutions.⁹

This ideal of centralistic modernisation remained Stalin's general perspective. In December 1919 he typically attributed the communist victories in the Civil War to the superiority of Russia over the other areas of the former empire. The point was that Russia, the basis of the Reds, was more developed than the border regions, in which the Whites based themselves. Not only did it have more significant 'industrial and cultural-political centres' such as Moscow and Petrograd, its population was also more 'nationally homogeneous' than that of the southern and eastern borderlands.¹⁰ At the party congress of 1921 he confirmed that the non-Russian nations of the empire 'lagged behind central Russia in developing their own statehood'. He also noted again that in contrast to the situation in Western Europe, in Hungary, Austria and Russia 'centralised states' had been formed at a time when capitalism was still relatively underdeveloped and the 'process of formation of nations and of the liquidation of feudal fragmentation' was not yet complete. In Eastern Europe social modernisation followed political modernisation, instead of the other way around."

To sum up, the young Stalin perceived the history of the past centuries from an angle of the gradual overcoming of feudalism, as a process of modernisation, understood as a kind of drawing together of people and institutions on various levels. The hallmarks of feudalism were a low degree of political and social integration, expressed in tribalist and clan traditions, and a culture rooted in religion. By contrast, the modern age was ushered in by the formation of strong, strictly centralised states and the drawing together of diverse populations in a process of national homogenisation. Modern states rested further on a capitalist market, and set themselves the goals of industrialisation and urbanisation. In time they also developed a modern cultural life of press and theatre as well as parliamentary institutions. In the years of his rule the question of their contribution to this process of centralistically understood modernisation remained an important standard from which Stalin judged the historical role of the tsars and emperors.

The nineteen-twenties and -thirties

Stalin's first public reference to Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great dates from April 1926. It was not a positive one. The General-Secretary noted that it would be foolish to credit either of these monarchs with the honour of being the first industrialiser. Their efforts in this field had not been worth much. Industrialisation was not a matter of enlarging the share of industry in the national product, but of increasing in particular those sectors (such as fuel, metal and machine-building) which strengthened the economic independence of a country.¹² In November 1928 he was more positive, when he explained to the Central Committee:

'When Peter the Great, having to deal with the more developed countries of the West, feverishly built mills and factories to supply the army and to strengthen the defence of the country, then that was a

special kind of attempt to leap from the context of backwardness. It is completely understandable, however, that not one of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy, nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the task of eradicating the backwardness of our country.¹³

Stalin's well-known speech of February 1931 can also be understood as a comment on the policies followed by his imperial predecessors. He argued for upholding the ambitious 'bolshevik tempos'. The point was not to repeat the mistakes of 'old Russia', which was 'constantly beaten because of its backwardness'. Russia had been beaten by the Mongols, the Poles, the Swedes and many others for its lack of military, cultural, state and economic development.¹⁴ At the end of that year Stalin again denied that there existed any parallel between him and Peter the Great. When Emil Ludwig pointed out that the emperor had aimed for the development and Westernisation of Russia, Stalin recognised that Peter had done much for the 'elevation of the class of the landlords and the development of the beginning merchant class', for the 'creation and strengthening of the national state of landlords and merchants'. But that was accomplished over the back of the peasantry. He, Stalin, set himself the task of the 'elevation of another class, to be precise – the working class'. He also refused to see an 'analogy' between himself and old peasant rebels like Razin and Pugachev. Their uprisings had been futile because a modern working class was still lacking. With their hopes for a 'good tsar' they were prisoners of the autocratic system against which they rebelled.¹⁵

These remarks suggest that Stalin believed that, as representatives of the old classes, Ivan and Peter could not have been successful on their own terms. They desired Russian national development and modernisation, but their class limitations prevented them from being effective. The official view on Russian history began to shift in 1934. Under the influence of the deceased historian M.N. Pokrovskii, history as a separate specialism had tended to be dissolved into sociology and economics. But in March 1934 Stalin said the following at a meeting of the Communist Academy:

'sociology is substituted for history [...] What generally results is some kind of odd scenario for Marxists – a sort of bashful relationship – [in which] they attempt not to mention tsars and attempt not to mention prominent representatives of the bourgeoisie [...] We cannot write history in this way! Peter was Peter, Catherine was Catherine. They relied on specific classes and represented their mood and interests, but all the same they took action – these were historical individuals – they were not ours, but we must give an impression of this epoch [...] Without this, we won't have any sort of civil history.'¹⁶

In the same month Stalin took up the issue again in the Politbureau. According to the diary of one historian present, he said:

'What the heck is "the feudal epoch", "the epoch of industrial capitalism", "the epoch of formations" – it's all epochs and no facts, no events, no people, no concrete information, not a name, not a title, and not even any content itself. It isn't good for anything. [...] History must be history.'

Textbooks should furthermore present the history of the USSR as a united whole.

‘The Russian people in the past gathered other peoples together and have begun that sort of gathering again now.’¹⁷ In May 1934, the Council of People’s Commissars and the party Central Committee adopted a resolution to the effect that history was too often taught using abstract schemes. Henceforth events should be presented in their chronological order, with a characterisation of historical personalities.¹⁸ But this did not yet imply a more positive treatment of the tsars, only that they should be treated as historical actors. Initially Stalin’s views of the tsars did not clearly move in a positive direction. In August 1934 he and his colleagues Zhdanov and Sergei Kirov wrote a comment on the manuscript of a new textbook on the history of the USSR. One of their points of critique was that the difference between ‘the autocratic system of the state and the feudal system, when Russia had been divided up into a multitude of semi-states’, had not been duly noted. This did undoubtedly express Stalin’s positive assessment of the centralising efforts of the early tsars against the boyars. It was furthermore noted with dissatisfaction that the manuscript treated only *Rus*’ and not the history of other peoples such as the Ukrainians, Finns and Tatars.

But, interestingly, this latter fact was bothersome not because it insulted Russian imperial sensitivities, but for the opposite reason. Old Russia had been made to look too good. ‘No stress is laid in the draft on the annexationist-colonial role of Russian tsarism, together with the Russian bourgeoisie and landlords (“tsarism was a prison of peoples”).’ And the draft had also failed to discuss the ‘national-liberation struggle of the peoples of Russia subjected by tsarism’. The manuscript was also blamed for the fact that the ‘counter-revolutionary role of Russian tsarism in foreign policy from the time of Ekaterina II until the 1850s and onwards’, the concept of ‘tsarism as an international gendarme’, had received insufficient stress. And it had, finally, failed to note the role of tsarism in the First World War as a ‘reserve for the Western-European imperialist powers’, and the ‘dependent role of Russian tsarism as well as of Russian capitalism in relation to Western-European capital’. As a consequence of this failure, the significance of the October Revolution as the ‘liberator of Russia from a semi-colonial status’ had remained in the dark.¹⁹ Thus Stalin felt that the tsarist past had been treated too *positively*.

In the note Stalin seemed to distinguish three stages in Russian foreign policy. First, it was suggested that before Catherine the Great Russian foreign policy was not especially counter-revolutionary. We must assume that he felt that in that period, Russia was mainly engaged in collecting those territories that were due to her, or in any case necessary for her security. Second, from Catherine’s reign onwards until the Crimean War Russia served as the reactionary policeman of Europe. And, third, after the 1850s Russian foreign policy remained counter-revolutionary, but in another sense. The emperors forgot about their own country and turned it into a mere assistant of Western European imperialism. Thus, while in the second stage Russia’s rulers had been overly assertive, they had afterwards forgotten their own national interests.

The latter point, the critique of the tsars that they failed to defend Russian interests properly, had been made by Stalin before. In 1921 he noted that the 1905 revolution

had weakened Russian imperialism to such a degree that it could no longer play the role of 'gendarme of Europe'.²⁰ In July 1934 he famously commented on an article by Engels on tsarist foreign policy. In a letter to the Politbureau he criticised it for suggesting that a dirty policy of conquest had been a Russian monopoly, whereas it had been characteristic of 'the kings and diplomats of all countries of Europe'. Engels had also forgotten that, after the Crimean War, the independent role of tsarism in Europe decreased significantly. By the time of the First World War Russia had turned into a mere 'reserve of the main powers of Europe'. And Engels had also been mistaken when he had explained the policy of conquest of Russian tsarism as the work of foreign adventurers at the Russian court. In reality it was the product of a clear "need" of the military-feudal-trading elite of Russia for exits to the seas' and of their wish 'to expand foreign trade and occupy strategic points'.²¹ The latter references to Russian interests suggested that to pursue such goals was a legitimate ambition, but it was not denied that, in pursuing it, the tsars had served the interests of the feudalists and capitalists.

An explicit if partial rehabilitation of Peter the Great took place only in the second half of the nineteen-thirties. On 27 January 1936 *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* published a new resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, this time openly accusing the Pokrovskii school of 'attempts to liquidate history as a science'. Further articles attacked 'abstract schematism' in the presentation of history. Among these articles there was one in *Izvestiia* by Nikolai Bukharin, which accused Pokrovskii of not having recognised 'the relatively progressive historical activity' of Peter the Great.²² Pokrovskii was also accused of simplifying the bolshevik principle of partiality in historiography by applying present-day standards to the past.²³ That critique finally opened the way to a more positive assessment of historical figures.

In March 1936 it was decided to organise a competition for the best new textbook of the history of the USSR. In late 1936 and early 1937 A.S. Bubnov, who was involved in this work, criticised the progress of the respective historians. Referring to directives of Stalin and Zhdanov, he noted that these historians continued to watch historical events through a narrow class prism. Among their mistakes were a failure to acknowledge that the introduction of Christianity into Russia had opened up the country to the higher Byzantine culture; and a lack of understanding for the 'progressive side' of the consolidation of the Muscovite state, of the unification of the Russian lands and of the later Petrine reforms. The establishment of a Russian protectorate over Ukraine in the seventeenth century had not been recognised for what it was, namely a 'lesser evil' for the Ukrainian people. The only alternative had been Catholic-Polish or Turkish rule. The Georgian annexation by Russia had also been the best thing under the circumstances. Zhdanov mentioned 'the progressive meaning of the centralisation of state power', and he called the critique of the annexation of Ukraine and Georgia 'ahistorical'.²⁴

The 'lesser evil' formula was authoritatively laid down by the jury decision of August 1937.²⁵ And in November of that year Stalin followed this up with a comment of

his own, when he noted in an important speech that the Soviet state was a 'colossal' one, and politically and economically even more 'closely integrated' than the tsarist state had ever been. He explained:

'The Russian tsars did many bad things. They plundered and subjected the people. They waged wars and conquered territories in the interests of the landlords. But they did one good thing – they collected a huge state, up to Kamchatka. We received this state as a heritage. And for the first time we, bolsheviks, collected and strengthened this state, as a unified, indivisible state, not in the interests of the landlords and capitalists but for the benefit of the toilers, of all great peoples making up this state.'²⁶

This did still contain an obviously negative note. Though the tsars did the right thing in enlarging the state and bringing other nations under Russian dominance, their actions nevertheless represented instances of plunder and oppression of those nations in the interest of the Russian landlords and capitalists. But by now Stalin insisted that tsars could no longer be condemned merely for having been tsars and representatives of the old classes. Their actions should be judged in the light of their times. What was reactionary now, might have been progressive in the past. In another important speech in October 1938 he said:

'History must be truthful, you must write it as it is, without adding anything to it. With us it has reached the point when the world of 500 years back is being criticised from the point of view of the present. Is that the way to judge the past? Religion had a positive significance in the times of Vladimir the Saint. Then you had paganism, and Christianity was a step forward. Now our wise men say from the point of view of the new situation, in the twentieth century, that Vladimir was a crook and the pagans were crooks, and religion was a matter for crooks, i.e. they don't want to evaluate events dialectically. Everything has its time and its place.'²⁷

Ivan the Terrible was also made the subject of public reappraisal, though Stalin did not yet speak up for him. A 1937 history of the USSR held that, with his *oprichnina*, the tsar had managed to strengthen 'autocratic power in the Russian state by destroying the privileges of the boyars'. He completed the work begun by Ivan Kalita, of gathering together the scattered appanage principalities into one strong state.²⁸ In the new 1939 *History of the USSR* Ivan and Peter were both given a positive reading for having fought feudal fragmentation and for consolidating central power.²⁹ In the same year there appeared a collection of articles against Pokrovskii. In the introduction Anna Pankratova mentioned Peter's 'progressive role'. And in another article it was noted that the creation of a big state in a territory where there existed dozens of small ones until recently would be impossible 'without strengthening the central political power, which at that time could only be an autocratic power'. Though still representing the interests of the 'nobility', Ivan IV had waged a just struggle to create a 'homogeneous order' throughout the country.³⁰

It became the official line in the Soviet press to recognise that the early tsars had served the emerging Russian nation and the fortification of its position in the world. During the late nineteen-thirties Ivan's policy of Baltic conquest was defended as necessary

as a defence strategy and from an economic point of view. Minin and Pozharskii, seventeenth century defenders of Russia against the Polish intervention, were also praised for their love of the motherland. And Peter the Great was lauded for his military victories. Furthermore, defensive actions of the Russian state were approved of in retrospect, even if they had taken place in the period when, according to the Stalinist assessment, Russian foreign policy was already counter-revolutionary. For example, the defeat of the Napoleonic invader was presented as a great patriotic achievement.³¹

To sum up, prior to the Great Patriotic War, Stalin's appreciation of the tsarist past went through different stages. At first he believed that even the most formidable monarchs Ivan and Peter had done little that was commendable. But in 1934 he demanded a concrete reappraisal of their actions. And two years later he concluded that some of those actions should be seen in a favourable light, most notably their project of creating a centralised, extended and militarily secure state. However, fundamentally all tsars and emperors remained in the Stalinist perspective representatives of the classes of the landlords and bourgeoisie. Despite positive activities for Russia, they remained exploiters of the toilers and oppressors of nations.

The Great Patriotic War

When in the second half of the nineteen-thirties some Russian statesmen began to be treated more positively, public pride in great Russian artists increased also. During the Pushkin celebrations of 1937 the poet was hailed as Russia's national pride. He should be honoured together with other 'talented sons of the people' like the scientists Lomonosov and Mendeleev. But the Soviet newspapers and periodicals did *not* turn Pushkin into a representative of the great tsarist past. On the contrary. It was emphasized that he had been hated by the autocracy and the reactionary circles for his anti-aristocratic sentiments.³² When people were eulogised who had been part of the imperial elite, a 'popular' tone remained audible. Generalissimus Suvorov is a good example. In September 1940 Stalin noted:

'He was a monarchist, a feudalist, a nobleman, a count, but practice suggested to him the need to demolish some principles, and he promoted people who had distinguished themselves in battle. [...] he violated the traditions of narrow professionalism. [...] Suvorov promoted little-known people [...] They didn't like him for that, but he created a group of capable people, good generals, around him.'³³

Thus Suvorov was praised for ignoring the existing system with its feudal principle of status. He was honoured for challenging old Russia rather than for belonging to it. In those cases when he honoured personalities from the past, Stalin always took care to accompany this with a condemnation of the old system. That continued to be the case during the Great Patriotic War. In his speeches in July and November 1941 he praised the 'great Russian nation', and mentioned, besides revolutionaries like Belinskii, Chernyshevskii, Plekhanov and Lenin, heroes like Pushkin and Tolstoi, Glinka and

Chaikovskii, Chekhov and Repin, as well as Aleksandr Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Suvorov and Kutuzov.³⁴ But he also called the Hitler regime a 'copy of that reactionary regime which existed in Russia under tsarism'.³⁵ This was the worst imaginable condemnation of tsarism in the circumstances of the day. Stalin, as it were, singled out heroes of the past from that past, he 'annexed' them in the name of the present. They represented the Russian 'people', the Russian 'nation', but not the autocratic and feudal-bourgeois system.

The same conclusion can be drawn from an important historical debate at the end of the war. During the war the non-Russian nations were provided with more space to express an appreciation of their own national history. In 1943 there appeared a *History of the Kazakh SSR*, in which the tsarist conquest of that country was condemned as colonialist. National rebellions against Russian rule were hailed as a 'progressive factor'.³⁶ From May to July 1944 a conference of historians was called by the Central Committee. The immediate cause was a letter to the party secretariat by Pankratova, one of the editors of the Kazakhstan history, who accused a group of historians headed by Evgenii Tarle of having broken with the 'class approach to questions of history'.³⁷ Shortly before the conference the Central Committee apparatus produced a note with a summary of the 'correct' views on the problem. Counter to Pankratova's assertion, it was held that in the eighteenth century the Kazakhs had been threatened by Chinese 'barbarian conquerors'. It concluded:

'the union of Kazakhstan with Russia, a country incomparably more civilized than the Asian states and with a developed, strong, centralised state, represented the lesser evil for Kazakhstan and salvation for the Kazakh people.'

But it was also acknowledged that annexation took the form of 'subjection of all peoples of Russia to the ruling class of the Russian nation'. The national liberation movements had been progressive insofar as they were 'oriented against national oppression and fused with the struggle of the toiling masses of the Russian people against the system of autocracy and serfdom.' Tarle was accused of 'Great-Power chauvinism', of defending the 'reactionary policy of the tsarist autocracy' and of slandering the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Russia. His crime was to apply the concept of the 'unity of state and people' to old Russia.

The note further held that in the history of Russia the 'progressive forces' had steadily gained in strength. There had been many 'eminent representatives [*deiateli*] of the Russian people', among whom were counted Dmitrii Donskii, Aleksandr Nevskii, Ivan the Terrible, Minin and Pozharskii, and Suvorov and Kutuzov. It would be wrong to assume that the face of old Russia had been exclusively determined by reactionaries. But contrary to Tarle's views the 'well-known thesis of Marxism-Leninism that tsarist Russia was the gendarme of Europe' was confirmed. Alexander I and Nicholas I had been reactionary monarchs. The suppression of the Poles in 1830-31 had been an evil deed. Men like Arakcheev and Pobedonostsev had been arch-reactionaries. Even Peter the Great had undoubtedly been of a 'feudal-landlord essence'.³⁸

During the conference the party leaders remained silent and let the historians fight it out. No conclusions were drawn.³⁹ But in March 1945 *Bol'shevik* argued that the Russian conquest of Kazakhstan had opened the road for the overcoming of nomadism and the transition to capitalism. Patriarchal isolation had been uprooted. But despite the 'progressive significance' of the annexation of Kazakhstan, the 'national-liberation movements of the Kazakhs against the autocratic-exploitative system' had also been progressive.⁴⁰ In August the Central Committee of the Kazakh communist party adopted a critique of Pankratova's book in this spirit.⁴¹

The Stalinist view of Russian colonialism was not one of unmitigated defence. Russia was seen as more developed as a state and in its economy than most non-Russian nations. Therefore Russian colonialism played a civilising role. And, all told, annexation by Russia had therefore been the best option for the peoples involved. It made them part of the modern world. But fundamentally the Stalinists remained hostile towards the tsarist autocracy, which they saw as oppressive and exploitative. And that was not just a hollow phrase. For it was concluded that, though separatist popular movements had been objectively reactionary, revolutionary liberation movements that had sought co-operation with Russian democrats should still be praised in the history books as having been progressive.

The final years

In the last years of the war Stalin became attentive to the 'Slav' factor in international politics. But here again he was critical of what the tsars had accomplished. In an April 1944 discussion with an American-Polish priest he mentioned as a historical model to be emulated the fifteenth century battle of Grunwald, 'in which there took place a unification of the Slav peoples against the German Swordbearers'.⁴² In November 1944 he insisted to a group of representatives of a Warsaw district that the Slav peoples should stick together. But he emphasized that there existed a 'fundamental difference between the pan-Slavism of tsarist Russia, of which we are accused, and the union of Slav peoples, as we understand it'. Unlike the tsars he, Stalin, would respect the equality between these peoples. In the course of four hundred years Russians and Poles had 'carried out a foolish policy of struggle and mistrust, to their own harm and to the benefit of this third party – the age-old enemy of the Slavs – the Germans'.⁴³ At the signing of a treaty between the two countries in April 1945 the Soviet dictator repeated this.⁴⁴

That Stalin wanted equality between Soviet Russia and Poland was, of course, a lie. Russia would be the hegemonic power. But there was a grain of sincerity in his critique of tsarist policies. Except for its Ukrainian and White-Russian territories, Stalin did not follow the tsars in annexing Poland. He apparently felt that this would be too extreme and needlessly provoke hatred against the Russians. In August 1946 he told a Polish delegation:

- 'Poles' mistrust of Russians and the other way around is still there, and this is completely understandable. [...] The ruling circles of tsarist Russia are of course more guilty than the Polish ruling circles. They did not only participate in the divisions of Poland, but were sometimes even the initiators of these divisions. But you must take into account that the advanced democratic, revolutionary circles of Russia, beginning with Chernyshevskii [...] and then Plekhanov and Lenin considered the independence of Poland an inalienable right of the Poles.'⁴⁵

In May 1948 Stalin likewise told a Hungarian government delegation: 'The Russia of the tsars was guilty. In 1848 the Russian tsar assisted the Hapsburg monarchy in suppressing the Hungarian revolution. We remember that.'⁴⁶ And in 1951 he included on his own initiative a reference in the draft of the new Polish constitution to the Polish 'national enslavement imposed by the Prussian, Austrian and Russian conquerors and colonizers'.⁴⁷

At the same time Stalin also continued to believe that in their last period the tsars had held back too much. That is at least how we might interpret his answer to Milovan Djilas who criticised the tsars' lack of interest in the South Slav cause: 'Yes, the Russian tsars lacked horizons.'⁴⁸ The last emperors had in any case been too weak for Stalin's taste. They had led the state into a dangerous loss of power. In September 1945 the triumphant dictator made his famous statement about the Japanese attack on the Russian fleet in 1904. Using 'the weakness of the tsarist government', Japan had succeeded in closing Russia's eastern exits to the ocean. But now Soviet Russia had vanquished the Japanese foe. 'We, people of the old generation, have waited for this day for forty years.'⁴⁹ In concluding it seems that in his final years Stalin upheld the perspective of eighteenth and nineteenth century foreign policy as, at first, counter-revolutionary and expansionist in a foolish, counter-productive way and, subsequently, weak and treacherous from a national point of view.

Meanwhile Stalin's admiration for Ivan the Terrible grew. It came to surpass that for Peter the Great. In September 1943 he commented positively on Eisenstein's scenario of the film *Ivan Groznyi*: 'Ivan the Terrible as a progressive force of his time, and the *oprichnina* as his effective instrument'.⁵⁰ Unfortunately for Eisenstein, in September 1946 the Central Committee condemned the second part of his film.⁵¹ The decision had been taken after a speech by Stalin at the Orgbureau in August. According to the leader, Eisenstein had

'completely deviated from history. He showed the *oprichniki* as the worst lice, degenerates, something like the American Ku Klux Klan. [Eisenstein] hasn't understood that the forces of the *oprichnina* were progressive forces, on which Ivan the Terrible relied in order to collect Russia into one centralised state against the feudal princes, who wanted to fragment and weaken it [...] Russia [...] had to unite in order to avoid falling under the Tatar yoke a second time.'⁵²

In February 1947 Stalin repeated personally to Eisenstein that the *oprichnina* had been a 'royal troop. As opposed to a feudal army, which could fold its tents any time and leave the battlefield – a regular army, a progressive army.' Ivan had been a 'great and

wise ruler'. He was in a 'much higher class' than Louis XI, who prepared absolutism for Louis XIV. The tsar had only not been ruthless enough. Had he wiped out more 'large feudal families', there would have been no Time of Troubles. And when the producer told him that his film would show Ivan IV, standing by the Baltic shores, saying: 'We stand on the seas, and stand we shall', Stalin commented: 'That's how it happened. And even a little more.' He further noted:

'When we moved the Monument to Minin and Pozharsky closer to St. Basil's Cathedral, Demyan Bedny protested and wrote me [...] that monuments should be thrown out and we must forget all about Minin and Pozharsky. In reply to this letter, I called him "Ivan who doesn't remember his kith and kin". We cannot throw out history.'

Stalin had now fully come round to treating these early Russian heroes as progressive instruments of history. They were founders of the Russian nation as a viable political and military entity. And in the same talk he also touched upon a relatively new theme. The dictator repeated that the Christianising of Russia had been a progressive event 'because it marked Russia's shift toward the West, instead of toward the East'. But, in an apparent paradox, he also suggested that Westernisation, desirable as it was, might be enforced by a country only independently, relying on its own forces. It could not be imported. That was precisely where the true greatness of Ivan lay, who, as 'a more national, more prudent tsar', had after all greater merits than Peter:

'Ivan the Terrible's wisdom was that he championed the national point of view. He did not let foreigners in – he safeguarded the country against penetration by foreign influences. [...] Peter I was also a great sovereign, but he was too liberal in relation to foreigners, opened the gates too wide and let foreign influence into the country, having allowed Russia to become Germanized. Catherine allowed this to an even greater extent. Was Alexander I's court a Russian court? Was Nicholas I's court a Russian court? No. Those were German courts.'⁵³

In the year 1947 Stalin's ideal of self-reliant modernisation turned into a xenophobic caricature. The immediate cause was the so-called 'case of Kliueva and Roskin'. It concerned two medical researchers who had provided American colleagues with information on a new cancer therapy they had developed. This was considered a treasonous act by the party leadership.⁵⁴ But the interesting fact is that the upsurge of patriotism was accompanied by an increasingly passionate rejection of the tsarist tradition. In February 1947 Zhdanov and Stalin discussed the matter with the two unfortunate scientists. Zhdanov's notes, of either his own or Stalin's comments, contained the following points: 'From [the time of] Peter Germans, French. The peasant has more dignity and spirit than Kliueva. One's own dignity is lacking. Lack of understanding of the role which Russia played.'⁵⁵ In May 1947 Stalin commented to the writers Simonov and Fadeev on the case:

'our average [*sredniaia*] intelligentsia [...] have an unjustified adoration of foreign culture. They still feel themselves inferiors, not one hundred per cent, they've got used to considering themselves in a situ-

ation of being eternal pupils. This is a backward tradition, it goes back to Peter. Peter had good ideas, but soon there were too many Germans [...] Look, how difficult it was to breathe, how difficult it was to work for Lomonosov, for instance. First the Germans, then the French, there was an adoration of foreigners.'

In Stalin's opinion the socialist system had aroused Russia from its position of subjection to the West, but the intellectuals still felt that nothing had changed. They were as slavish as ever.⁵⁶ In July 1947 the Central Committee explained the case in a secret letter to the party membership. It observed an attitude of 'national self-humiliation' among part of the Soviet intelligentsia, a trend of 'crawling and servility towards the world abroad and towards the present-day reactionary culture of the bourgeois West'. The revolution had made Russia a 'free and independent state for the first time', but the shameful anti-patriotic attitudes persisted, as rudiments of the 'accursed past of tsarist Russia'. The old ruling classes had 'inculcated a consciousness of inferiority of our people [...] into the heads of the Russian intelligentsia'. They refused to believe that Russia could shake off its backwardness unaided. The reason for their lack of self-confidence was that these ruling classes had been cut off from the people. From the eighteenth century onwards the Russian nobility had lost its 'national mentality and traditions' to such a degree, that it even forgot the Russian language and began to speak French. Science in particular had suffered. Discoveries made by Lomonosov and Popov had been ignored and attributed to foreigners like Lavoisier and Marconi.⁵⁷

So here we have the interesting paradox that the nationalist campaign of late Stalinism against 'crawling' was indirectly spearheaded against the ideological tradition of tsarism, which was held responsible for the spirit of self-belittlement. Under the tsars even the greatest geniuses of the Russian people had been misunderstood and despised. The feudal-bourgeois system had not honoured them properly, but resisted their efforts and made their lives miserable. Therefore, reasons of patriotism did not call for the glorification of the tsars (except for a singular monarch such as Ivan) but for rooting out their memory.

From now on the Stalinist press insisted that even pre-revolutionary Russia had played a leading role in the development of world science and culture. Already in 1942 a textbook on philosophy had claimed that the views of such luminaries as Belinskii, Herzen, Chernyshevskii, Ogarev and Dobroliubov, i.e. the 'philosophy of revolutionary democracy', represented the 'highest form of pre-Marxist philosophical materialism'.⁵⁸ In other words, Russia had produced the greatest philosophy prior to Marx and Engels. For another example, in February 1948 the Central Committee published a resolution, accusing Muradeli's opera *Great Friendship* of imitating the 'modernistic bourgeois music of Europe and America'. The resolution made the additional point that, because of its broad accessibility, the nineteenth century Russian opera had been the best in the world.⁵⁹ And in 1948 *Bol'shevik* claimed that even in pre-revolutionary times the Russian contribution to world science had been 'unusually broad, significant, and important'. The special 'Russian genius', which had grown from the 'great creative abilities of the Russian people', had produced numerous geniuses like Lomonosov and

Lobachevskii.⁶⁰ But, typically, the superior character of the products of traditional Russia was explained in the Soviet press not as a straightforward product of the old system, but as a product of opposition to it. In July 1947 the leader of the Writers' Union A.A. Fadeev explained the alleged superiority of nineteenth century Russian realist art over its Western-European counterpart by pointing out the sharp polarisation of old Russia into a tsarist and a revolutionary camp and the resulting unusual strength of the popular movements, which again inspired artists.⁶¹ Likewise a 1948 editorial of *Voprosy filosofii* noted that the Russian materialist philosophy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had been so superior because of the unusually strong development of the 'revolutionary struggle of the popular masses of Russia against the monarchy and serfdom'. The advanced philosophers had been closely linked to that 'revolutionary-democratic movement'.⁶² In the same issue of the journal M.T. Iovchuk explained the world primacy of early Russian 'democratic' philosophy from the lack of Russian capitalist development in the respective period.

'Having turned onto the road of capitalist development later than other countries, Russia gave birth to the most advanced ideology of the democratic revolution in the age of the break-up of the old feudal relations. As opposed to the pre-Marxist materialists of Western Europe, the bearers of this ideology did not reflect the interests of the bourgeoisie, but the interests of the toiling peasantry and other oppressed strata of feudal society.'

In other words, the cause of the superior cultural and scientific production of old Russia was not to be found in the superiority of that Russia but, paradoxically, in its exceptionally backward and reactionary character. The horrors of autocracy and serfdom produced a violent movement of resistance that inspired science and culture, and capitalism had not made great progress which prevented the spoiling of science and culture by the ideology of that system. Thus the understanding of historical Russian superiority rested crucially on a negative characterisation of the pre-revolutionary system. In this light it also stands to reason that Iovchuk found it unacceptable to 'present ideologists of the exploiting classes, who were hostile towards the revolutionary movement and materialist philosophy, as "national thinkers", "enlighteners" and "patriots"':

'some of our theoretical workers praised the Russian idealists, considered them a legitimate and inalienable branch of Russian philosophy and culture, declared the mystical idealist Vladimir Solov'ev a "representative of Russian national self-consciousness", praised the slavophiles and without any justification attributed patriotism to them. [...] They covered up the reactionary, mystical aspects of the ideology of Lev Tolstoi.'⁶³

Stalin agreed that only progressive thinkers from the old times should be praised. In his memoirs D.T. Shepilov recalls a meeting with Zhdanov a few years after the war. The latter informed him that, according to Stalin, the 'sociological views of F.M. Dostoevskii' were not treated correctly in Soviet publications. He quoted the leader to the effect that the latter's writings had served

'to blacken the revolution, to portray the people of the revolution in an angry and dirty way as criminals, tyrants, murderers; to extol double-tongued people, traitors, provocators. According to Dostoevskii, there is a "demon" in every person, the principle of "Sodom". And if a person is a materialist, if he doesn't believe in God, if he is (terrible!) a socialist, then the demonic principle in him becomes dominant, and he turns into a criminal. What a horrible and mean philosophy!'⁶⁴

And as to the slavophiles, it was admitted that they had rightly condemned the blind imitation of the West prevalent among the Russian elite. That was their great merit. Nevertheless, the Stalinists rejected their doctrine of the "'originality" of the historical development of Russia' as fundamentally reactionary. The slavophiles had hailed a 'mystical "spirit of the people"', which they saw embodied in the 'patriarchal, "originally-Russian" relations of pre-Petrine Russia'. But that obsolete ideal was at odds with the goals of the modernising revolutionary movement. The so-called 'Westernisers' had been right in claiming that 'industrialism' and 'rationalism' were universally valid, and should be applied in Russia too. Their mistake had only been that they hoped to repeat the Western capitalist development in Russia instead of heading for socialism.⁶⁵

To sum up, the Stalinist celebration of the cultural and scientific achievements of pre-revolutionary Russia was heavily qualified. To begin, it was extremely selective. Most of the thinkers who had been considered reactionaries under Lenin continued to be seen in that light. Stalin did not carry through a more or less wholesale rehabilitation of pre-revolutionary Russian thought. Furthermore, the scientists and artists of old Russia whom he extolled were presented as forces of opposition. They represented the healthy national, popular forces that were suppressed by the reactionary autocratic system which did not even take patriotic pride in the work of its own artists and researchers. And, finally, in his last and most patriotic years Stalin's appreciation of the tsars themselves, surprisingly, only became less. Precisely his pumping up of the ideal of national self-reliance to xenophobic extremes now made even Peter the Great suspect. Only Ivan the Terrible remained as a lone 'progressive' tsar. But he was the one striking exception to the rule.

Concluding remarks

At first sight Stalin's positive views of some aspects of the tsarist past suggest that he indeed identified with it. But on closer inspection this identification evaporates. To begin with, the Soviet dictator never abandoned the perspective of the pre-revolutionary Russian state as representative of the interests of the feudal and bourgeois classes. We may quarrel over the question of the sincerity of Stalin's self-image as the representative of the 'toilers', but there is no doubt about his genuine hostility to the old privileged strata, which he after all destroyed. Furthermore, Stalin's own private ideology, a unique mixture of Marxism and radical nationalism, though at least as rigidly centralistic as tsarism, was incompatible with the 'feudal' forms of inequality upon

which the old system had rested, in particular with the two pillars of hereditary monarchy and serfdom. Correspondingly, the tsarist system continued to be condemned during Stalin's rule, and so were most of the individual tsars and emperors. Those artists and the few philosophers who received a mark of approval were presented as popular forces opposed to the old regime.

There were only two elements in Stalin's thinking which prevented him from taking his conclusions to a logical end and condemning all Russian rulers equally.

Firstly, he was obsessed with the process of the overcoming of feudalism, which he associated with 'fragmentation', and of the formation of integrated nations and states in the early modern period. Therefore he admired the early Russian tsars and military men who consolidated the Russian state in the face of opposition from the boyars and the enemies abroad. Ivan the Terrible was the most prominent among them. Stalin found that, from a historical perspective, it was of secondary importance that this tsar continued to represent the feudal classes. But, then again, looking at the period after Peter the Great, when the job of constructing a strong centralistic state had been completed, there was not much left for Stalin to appreciate in Russia's rulers. For instead of continuing the attack on feudalism by dismantling its other elements such as autocracy and serfdom, these rulers clung to such archaic forms. Therefore from Stalin's perspective they turned into mere defenders of a reactionary system.

Secondly, Stalin's focus on the process of modernisation made him unusually sensitive to the differences between advanced and backward nations, as he perceived them. Therefore, despite the reactionary nature of the Russian system, the eighteenth and nineteenth century expansion into the Caucasian and Central-Asian regions had, in relative terms, been a healthy process. It furthered the break up of the local 'feudal' systems, and contributed to modern state building and capitalist development. Nevertheless, Stalin continued to look favourably upon those rebellious movements that had opposed the Russian rulers but had not aimed for separation. And that was only natural from his perspective, for the popular masses represented the embryo of a yet more advanced system than that dominant in the Russia of the day. Naturally, Stalin also rejected Russia's meddling in European affairs in these same two centuries, opposed as that had been to the revolutionary process that was occurring in Europe at the time. In the light of all this it was only to be expected that the rehabilitation of the tsarist past under Stalin remained a strictly limited affair. Of the whole historical record of tsarism, only the state building efforts of the earliest monarchs and the later colonial expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia received positive treatment. And even that was qualified by objections against the political and economic system which created these policies.

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Notes:

- * Het onderzoek voor de artikel werd verricht in een studieperiode gefinancierd door de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.
- 1 See Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin in power. The revolutionary from above, 1928-1941*, New York, London 1990, 50-65, especially 64; Moshe Lewin, *The making of the Soviet system*, New York 1985, 272-73, 307.
- 2 Tucker, 568f.
- 3 Maureen Perrie, 'The tsar, the emperor, the leader: Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Anatolii Rybakov's Stalin', in :Nick Lampert and Gábor T. Rittersporn (eds.), *Stalinism: its nature and aftermath. Essays in honour of Moshe Lewin*, Houndmills etc. 1992, 77-100.
- 4 Maureen Perrie, 'Nationalism and history: the cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin's Russia', in :Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service (eds.), *Russian nationalism past and present*, Houndmills etc. 1998, 107-28.
- 5 I.V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol.1, 1901-1907, Moscow 1946, 59-61 [*Sochineniia*].
- 6 *Ibid.*, 67.
- 7 *Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern History*, f.71, op.10, d.183, ll.106-8. For Stalin's probable authorship see: ll.109-14 [*RCPSDMH*].
- 8 *Sochineniia*, vol.2, 49-51.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 292, 303-4, 310, 329, 350.
- 10 *Ibid.*, vol.4, 285-86.
- 11 *Ibid.*, vol.5, 34, 46. See also 265, 277.
- 12 *Ibid.*, vol.8, 120-21.
- 13 *Ibid.*, vol.11, 248-249.
- 14 *Ibid.*, vol.13, 38-40.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 104-5, 112-13.
- 16 This is according to A.I. Stetskii's paraphrase. Cit. in :Brandenberger/Dubrovsky, "'The people need a tsar": the emergence of national bolshevism as Stalinist ideology, 1931-1941', in: *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 50, no. 5, 1998, 873-92.
- 17 Cit. in: *Ibid.*, 875.
- 18 *Izvestiia*, 16 May 1934; see also: A.N. Artizov, 'Kritika M.N. Pokrovskogo i ego shkoly (K istorii voprosa)', in :*Istoriia SSSR*, 1991, no.1, 106.
- 19 I.V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol.1[XIV], 1934-1940, Stanford, California 1967, 37-39 [*Sochineniia*].
- 20 *Ibid.*, vol.5, 72-73.
- 21 *Ibid.*, vol.1[XIV], 3, 5, 8, 10. See also John Barber, *Soviet historians in crisis, 1928-1932*, London, Basingstoke 1981, 78-79.
- 22 All of these articles, as well as the resolution, were corrected by Stalin and Zhdanov before publication. See: Artizov, 'Kritika M.N. Pokrovskogo...', 102-3; A.N. Artizov, 'V ugodu vzgliadam vozhdia', in :*Kentaur*, October-December 1991, 129, 131. See also: B. Grekov *et al.* (eds.), *Protiv istoricheskoi kontseptsii M.N. Pokrovskogo. Sbornik statei*, vol.1, Moscow, Leningrad 1939, 8; Perrie, 'The tsar, ...', 82.
- 23 Barber, 24-25; Artizov, 'Kritika M.N. Pokrovskogo...', 106. In November 1938 the Central Committee made this point part of a resolution on history. See *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo soiuzna v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, vol.2, 1925-1953, Moscow 1953, 860-61.
- 24 See: Artizov, 'V ugodu vzgliadam...', 125, 129-31; Brandenberger/Dubrovsky, 878-79.
- 25 A.L. Khoroshkevich, 'Oprichnina i kharakter russkogo gosudarstva v sovetskoi istoriografii 20-kh-serediny 50-kh godov', in :*Istoriia SSSR*, 1991, no.6, 88-89; I.V. Il'ina, 'Novye dokumenty o soveshchanii istorikov v TsKVKP(b) (1944 g.)', in :*Voprosy istorii*, 1991, no.1, 197-98.
- 26 Anatolii Latyshev, 'Kak Stalin Engel'sa svergal', in :*Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 22 December 1992. See also: Tucker, 482. In a 1937 Russian history textbook in his own library Stalin proposed replacing the story of peasant uprisings 'against Moscow' by 'against the boyars'. He criticised a passage where the *streltsy* seemed to be supported in their conflict with Peter the Great. He also deleted passages to the effect that Razin and Pugachev were positively remembered by the people. See: *RCPSDMH*, f.558, op.3, d.63, 88, 107, 116, 138-39. In another elementary course on Russian history of 1937 he deleted a painting of Ivan IV killing his son. See *ibid.*, d.374, 198.
- 27 N.N. Maslov, 'I.V. Stalin o "Kratkom kurse istorii VKP(b)"', in :*Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1994, no.5, 14.
- 28 Cit. in :Tucker, 282.

- 29 See Perrie, 'The tsar...', 85-86.
- 30 Grekov *et al.*, 55, 155.
- 31 See Perrie, 'Nationalism and history...', 108-09; Khoroshkevich, 89.
- 32 V.Kirpotin, 'Genial'nyi poet russkogo naroda', in :*Bol'shevik*, 1937, no.3, 57-60, 63; 'Pushkinskie dni- smotr sovetskikh kul'turnikh sil', in :*Bol'shevik*, 1937, no.4, 3-5.
- 33 Iu.P. Senokosov (ed.), *Surovaia drama naroda*, Moscow 1989, 502.
- 34 Belinskii, Vissarion (1811-1848): literatuurcriticus en politiek denker van de 'westerse' stroming.
Chernyshevskii, Nikolai (1828-1889): publicist en revolutionair denker.
Glinka, M.I. (1804-1857): Russische klassieke componist.
Repin, Il'ia (1844-1930): schilder van de kritisch-realistische school.
Nevskii, Alexandr (1220-1263): grootvorst van Vladimir.
Donskoi, Dmitrii (1350-1389): grootvorst van Moskou.
Suvorov, A.M. (1730-1800): generaal.
- 35 *Sochineniia*, vol.2[XV], 5-6, 22, 24, 35.
- 36 See: Gerhard Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion*, Baden-Baden, 1986, 14, 209; Il'ina, 197.
- 37 Iu. F. Ivanov, 'Pis'ma Anny Mikhailovny Pankratovoi', in :*Voprosy istorii*, 1988 no.11, 54-55.
- 38 Il'ina, 194-95, 198-200, 202-03. Kutuzov, M.I. (1745-1813): generaal, opperbevelhebber 1812-1813.
Minin, Kuz'ma (?-1616) en Pozharskii, Dmitrii (1578-1642): leiders van het anti-Poolse verzet.
Arakcheev, A.A. (1769-1834): feitelijk regeringsleider onder keizer Aleksandr I.
Pobedonostev, K.P. (1827-1907): Oberprokurator van de Allerheiligste Synode.
- 39 See Ivanov; Il'ina; Iu.N. Amiantov and Z.N. Tikhonova, 'Stenogramma soveshchaniia po voprosam istorii SSSR v TsK VKP(b) v 1944 godu', in :*Voprosy istorii*, 1996, nos.2-7, 9.
- 40 M. Morozov, 'Ob "Istorii Kazakhskoi SSR"', in :*Bol'shevik*, 1945, no.6, 74, 79-80.
- 41 See: Il'ina, 189. After the war the 'lesser evil' formula was dropped as too abstract and pointless. Annexation to Russia was in retrospect held to have been of exclusively beneficial significance for the peoples concerned. But those who made this new claim continued to emphasize that tsarist colonial policies had been reactionary. See for example the speech of Azerbaidzhan party secretary M.A. Bagirov at the XIXth Party Congress. *Pravda*, 7 October 1952.
- 42 See G.P. Murashko *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh Rossiiskikh arkhivov. 1944-1953 gg.*, vol. 1, 1944-1948 gg., Moscow, Novosibirsk 1997, 38-39.
- 43 *RCPSDMH*, f.558, op.4, d.612, ll.4-6.
- 44 *Sochineniia*, vol.2[XV], 184-86.
- 45 Murashko *et al.*, 512
- 46 *RCPSDMH*, f.558, op.1, d.5325, l.32. In October 1945 he told a Finnish delegation that he understood the 'anti-Soviet moods' of the intelligentsia of that country as, partly, a product of the 'policy of the tsarist autocracy towards Finland'. See: *ibid.*, d.5379, l.2.
- 47 Krzysztof Persak, 'Stalin as editor: the Soviet dictator's secret changes to the Polish Constitution of 1952', in :*Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 1998, no.11, 151.
- 48 Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, Harmondworth 1969, 65.
- 49 *Sochineniia*, vol.2[XV], 213-14.
- 50 Leonid Kozlov, 'Ten' Groznogo', in :*Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 29 April 1992. In his library there is a 1944 copy of Aleksei Tolstoi's *Ivan Groznyi*, in which Stalin underlined many passages, for instance one in which Ivan himself speaks and complains about those who 'want to live in the old way - each one sitting on his own patrimony, with his own army, as under the Tatar yoke'. Such 'princes and boyars' were 'enemies of the state', for if one were to continue to live in the old way Russia would soon be trampled by the foreign powers surrounding it. See *RCPSDMH*, f.558, op.3, d.351, 57. A concise analysis of Ivan IV as a progressive, anti-feudal ruler was given by A.S. Shcherbakov in a letter to Stalin in April 1942. See: 'Istoriia- oruzhie bor'by', in: *Glasnost'*, no.48, 28 November-4 December 1991, 7.
- 51 'O kinofil'me "Bol'shaia zhizn"', in :*Bol'shevik*, 1946, no.16, 52.
- 52 *RCPSDMH*, f.558, op.1, d.5325, l.60. See also: Kozlov.
- 53 'Formidable shadows of 1947', in :*Moscow News*, 1988, no.32, 8-9.
- 54 See: V.D. Esakov and E.S. Levina, 'Delo "KR"', in :*Kentavr*, 1994, no.2, 56-61; Nikolai Kremmentsov, *Stalinist*

- science*, Princeton, New Jersey 1997, 131f.
- 55 Ia. Rapoport, 'Delo "KR"', in : *Nauka i zhizn'*, 1988, no.1, 103-4, Esakov, Levina, 62-63.
 - 56 Konstantin Simonov, 'Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia', in : *Znamia*, 1988, no.3, 59-61; see also 51, 57.
 - 57 Esakov, Levina, 66-69.
 - 58 See Evert van der Zweerde, *Soviet Philosophy – the ideology and the handmaid*, Nijmegen 1994, 359-61.
 - 59 'Ob opere "Velikaia družba" V. Muradeli', in : *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1948, no.1, 3-5.
 - 60 A. Zvorykin, 'O sovetskom prioritete v nauke', in : *Bol'shevik*, 1948, no.22, 24, 40. A. Fadeev, 'O literaturnoi kritike', in *Bol'shevik*, 15 July 1947, no 13, 20-35.
 - 61 A. Fadeev, 'O literaturnoi kritike', in: *Bol'shevik*, 15 July 1947, no. 13, 20-35.
 - 62 'Za bol'shevistskuiu partiinost' v filosofii', in : *Voprosy filosofii*, 1948, no.3(5), 3-4, 6.
 - 63 M.T. Iovchuk, 'O samostoiatel'nosti russkoi materialisticheskoi filosofii, ee traditsiakh i ikh preemstvennosti', in : *Voprosy filosofii*, 1948, no.3(5), 193-95, 197-98, 200-1, 204-6.
 - 64 D.T. Shepilov, 'Vospominaniia', in : *Voprosy istorii*, 1998, no.5, 13-14.
 - 65 V.E. Illeritskii, *Istoricheskie vzgliady V.G. Belitskogo*, Moscow 1953, 56-58, 60, 62; P. Pavelkin (ed.), *Iz istorii russkoi filosofii. Sbornik stat'ei*, Leningrad 1951, 254-55, 298.