Cryptology and statecraft in the Dutch Republic

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THE BLACK CHAMBER IN THE DUTCH REPUBLIC DURING THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1707–1715*

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ABSTRACT. This article reveals the existence of a hitherto unknown Black Chamber in the Dutch Republic and the identity of its principal codebreaker, Abel Tasien d'Alonne (1646–1723), acting also as private secretary to Grand Pensionary Heinsius. On the basis of an analysis of a number of previously unidentified worksheets, three cases are put together that merited d'Alonne's attention, one related to a French diplomat at the court of the Bavarian Elector during the years 1707–9, one related to an undercover agent of the Bavarian Elector in the Dutch Republic during the years 1711–12 and one related to a French emissary to the state council in Brussels during the period 1714–15. The emergence of a Black Chamber in The Hague is remarkable because the Dutch could always call upon the Black Chamber of Hanover for the solution of any intercepted, coded documents. This indicates that the development of inter-allied relations during the war played a more important role in the rise of the Dutch Black Chamber than one would expect.

The history of cryptography has been vividly described in David Kahn's book *The codebreakers* (1967). There he shows how the basic principles of secret writing were already developed during the Italian Renaissance and how they subsequently were applied in various fields such as diplomacy and warfare. Kahn devotes a separate chapter to the ancient predecessors of the modern 'signal intelligence units': the so-called 'Black Chambers'. During the early modern period these Black Chambers were usually located in a separate quarter of the general post office in order to open, copy, and decode letters of foreign diplomats. They consisted of a small team of clerks with superior language skills, professional forgers of seals, and skilled cryptanalysts who more often than not transferred their arcane knowledge from one generation to the next.1

* I should like to express my gratitude to H. J. Hardy, Hans van der Meer and A. J. Veenendaal jr, who all yielded in their own way a vital contribution to the writing of this article.

The topic is probably best served by treating it as an aspect of the development of the European state system that began during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries in Italy and reached its full maturity only after the beginning of diplomatic ties between Protestant and Roman Catholic courts after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The use of cryptography is there right from the beginning, but the rise of the Black Chambers is basically an eighteenth-century phenomenon.

In his book on the British post office, for example, Kenneth Ellis makes it clear that this practice was only established in 1715 after the arrival of the first Hanoverian king in London. This Black Chamber was not without precedents in British history, but its full and systematic exploitation was only introduced by George I who brought with him a team of professionals of his own that had gained its experience during the War of the Spanish Succession on the continent; a team subsequently enlarged with new, British members, some of them extremely talented. In Vienna and Paris similar developments took place and the enterprise was organized everywhere along the same lines.

The history of these Black Chambers has still in large measure to be written. The impact of these bodies has never been treated in general works of the political history of the period or only in a marginal way, nor has there ever been any explanation sought for their rise. It seems likely, however, that the smaller states such as Denmark and Bavaria and the states on the fringes of Europe such as Sweden or Russia acquired a Black Chamber at some point in their development as well, but this has never been investigated thoroughly. Particularly interesting in this respect is the question of the way in which the emergence of a Black Chamber in one country influenced a similar development in another. The nature of the enterprise probably prohibited any direct exchange or sharing of information, but it seems unlikely that these parallel developments in so many countries at the same time could have occurred by chance.

The only way one can hope to tackle the problem is by undertaking a number of case studies and trying to establish to what extent these cases were interrelated. In this article I shall concentrate on the example of the Dutch Republic during the War of the Spanish Succession. Mail interception was an important dimension of the war inasmuch as it was fought in the Low Countries and the Dutch were regularly confronted with intercepted, coded documents. They collaborated in this respect closely with the British and the

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4 Fairly typical is Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, *The rise of the great powers (1648–1815)* (London, 1983), p. 203, which only mentions the topic, but does not go any further. The only book that explicitly deals with the issue is J. W. Thompson and S. K. Padover, *Secret diplomacy: espionage and cryptography, 1500–1815* (New York, 1965), which contains many amusing anecdotes, but is too superficial to be of any use.
Hanoverian Black Chambers but in 1707 they decided nevertheless that they needed a Black Chamber of their own. The Dutch example may show how the emergence of a Black Chamber here benefited from the existence of Black Chambers elsewhere without making it superfluous.

In the first section I give a broad outline of the war and its background. In the second section I give an outline of the British and Hanoverian practices in the field of mail interception and codebreaking during the years directly preceding the war. In the third section I examine the changes that occurred in the field of mail interception as a consequence of the hostilities. In the last section I investigate the activities of the Black Chamber in The Hague on the basis of three cases that could be reconstructed the most comprehensively. In the conclusion I try to find an explanation for its emergence after the conquest of Brussels in 1706.

This research was highly complicated by a scarcity of material. In Dutch archives one will look in vain for any clues on the activity of a Black Chamber during this period with the exception of a number of intercepts in the archives of the Grand Pensionary Heinsius and a number of worksheets by a Dutch codebreaker that were accidentally stored in the archives of the Dutch legation in Turkey. The identity of this codebreaker had to be established through an analysis of his handwriting in the worksheets by an expert in this field and can be said to be one of the best-kept secrets in Dutch history. It proved to be Heinsius’s private secretary Abel Tasien d’Alonne: an illegitimate brother of the stadholder-king and a former secretary of Queen Mary. It makes clear how difficult the treatment of a subject like this can become if any references in other sources are lacking. It may put the historian of espionage in the eighteenth century in a position similar to the historian of antiquity who, most of the time, is left with only little bits and pieces: too much to ignore, but too little to give an account that is fully satisfying for one’s curiosity.

The outbreak of the war in 1702 came hardly as a surprise. It was fought between France, Spain, and some smaller allies on the one side and Austria, England, and the Dutch Republic on the other, over two related questions. The first was who was to inherit the vacant throne of Spain: Philip of Anjou, a son of the French king or the Austrian candidate Charles of Habsburg. The other question was the succession in England: was it to go to the Stuart Pretender, ‘James III’, backed by France, or to the nearest Protestant relative of Queen Anne, Georg Ludwig of Hanover.

The war had been anticipated since the failure of the negotiations between France and England over the partitioning of the Spanish possessions in 1698. In many ways it was the last of the great coalition wars the British King William III had instigated to curb French expansion on the continent. This not only threatened William’s country of origin, the Dutch Republic, but it also
affected the German Empire where France controlled an increasing number of client-states, the foremost being Bavaria.6

England’s principal allies in Germany were the duchies of Celle and Hanover. The ties between England and both duchies in northern Germany were already forged by William III during the 1690s in order to find a counterweight against the increasing French influence in Denmark and, particularly, Sweden.6 In 1700, the matter of the British succession added a new dimension. By then it was already clear for some years that the marriage between William and Mary would continue without children. After the king died, the throne would be inherited by Mary’s sister Anne, who remained without an heir after the death of her only son the duke of Gloucester in 1700. To make sure that the British throne would remain in Protestant hands, parliament decided on the Stuart’s nearest Protestant relative, Georg Ludwig of Hanover, as successor to Queen Anne. William brought this whole arrangement about and it was clear from the start that it would not work without the support of the Dutch Republic because the British did not possess enough troops themselves to counter a possible French invasion.7

William III did not live long enough to see the outbreak of hostilities in 1702 but he was the driving force behind the conclusion of the Grand Alliance in 1701: the coalition that was to fight it. The actual conduct of the war was left on the allied side to the Austrian military commander Eugene of Savoy and to the British military commander John Churchill, duke of Marlborough. They were both authorized to conduct political negotiations as far as necessary to coordinate the war effort. On the Dutch side the negotiating was done by the grand pensionary of Holland, Anthony Heinsius, assisted by the secretary of the Dutch state council, Simon van Slingelandt, and the Greffier of the states-general, François Fagel. They met frequently in The Hague during the winter and the spring to set the aims for the forthcoming campaign. In effect, Marlborough was the chief commander of the Dutch troops as well, but he was permanently supervised by representatives of the states-general, the so-called ‘Gedeputeerden te Velde’ who could interfere with anything they saw fit.8

At first the war did not go well for the allies. The Bavarians conquered large parts of Austria, the French were extremely successful in Germany and in Italy,
While most of Spain favoured spontaneously the Bourbon Pretender. Moreover, the Austrians were threatened by an uprising in Hungary as well and they lacked the money to pay their troops. In 1704 the tables turned due to a well co-ordinated allied campaign in Germany pushing the French back behind the Rhine and resulting in the occupation of most Bavarian territory. From 1705 onwards fighting was concentrated in the southern Netherlands. The battles of Ramillies in 1706, Oudenarde in 1708, and Malplaquet in 1709 gradually brought the Spanish Netherlands under allied control. The French now became increasingly worried. The allied offensive carried the war into northern France with the possibility of reaching Paris. They tried, by opening secret negotiations through various channels, to reach a separate agreement with the Dutch Republic that carried the main burden of the war. They offered generous terms, in particular the control to the Dutch of a number of fortified cities along their northern border, the so-called ‘Barrier’. The Dutch declined, because they could not face peace without an all-comprising settlement that secured a role for Great Britain as a Protestant power and a staunch ally of the Dutch Republic on the continent as well.\(^9\) As a result of these initiatives, however, preliminary peace talks were held in Geertruydenberg in 1710 which included the British and the Austrians. These talks were not successful, because Louis XIV lacked credibility as a negotiator on behalf of his grandson, and – according to Trevelyan – the allies failed to see that the war had only been won in one theatre and not in the other. In Spain it was lost due to a massive support for Philip V.\(^10\)

In the following years two new developments prepared the ground for a settlement. First, in England the elections of 1710 were won by the Tories who were far more worried by the prospect of an economic annexation of the southern Netherlands by the Dutch Republic than by the succession of a Bourbon king in Spain. Secondly, in 1711, the German emperor Joseph I unexpectedly died of smallpox, leaving his younger brother Charles as his sole heir. The war now suddenly seemed to have been fought for a revival of the global empire of Charles V: a prospect nobody particularly liked except the Habsburgs themselves. This last development made the Dutch ready to cooperate with the British in the preparation of a peace deal without informing the Austrians.\(^11\) The result proved highly unsatisfactory to the Dutch Republic. The Peace of Utrecht, signed in 1712, left the matter of the Dutch Barrier unresolved. It had to be decided in bilateral talks between the Austrians and the Dutch which could only be held after the conclusion of a separate peace between Austria and France. This treaty was finally signed in Rastatt in December 1713, but it left the matter of the Barrier undecided. In 1715, the

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matter was finally settled in Antwerp with the help of the British government, now again under the control of the Whigs and more desperate than ever to secure Dutch military support for the accession of George I as king of England against a Jacobite uprising in Scotland.  

The Barrier became much more modest than originally intended and thirty-two years later it proved to be useless against a new French attack because the Dutch had been unable to maintain it. The Dutch may have won the war from one perspective, but they most definitely had lost the peace.

II

The Black Chambers in London and the principalities of Celle and Hanover both owed their existence to King William III and the outbreak of the war with France that accompanied his seizure of power in England in 1688. In England, William's interest in cryptography had already revealed itself shortly after his arrival in 1689 when he called upon John Wallis to solve a number of letters captured from the French and Jacobite forces in Ireland. Wallis, an Oxford mathematician and one of the founders of the Royal Society, owed his reputation as a codebreaker to the work he had done for parliament during the Civil War and the Interregnum. Wallis had always been a clear, albeit moderate, supporter of the parliamentary cause, but he had been hostile to the death sentence for Charles I. During the Restoration period, Wallis was allowed to continue working as a chaplain and a mathematician, but he was considered politically too unreliable to be of any use as a cryptographer, particularly under James II. The accession of William and Mary, however, put him back in business. Notwithstanding his old age and ill health, he received intercepts almost on a daily basis and occasionally the courier who brought them would be ordered to wait for their solution in front of his study. The king took a personal interest in Wallis's efforts and well-being and a letter to Heinsius shows that he was deeply impressed by his abilities. It is clear that already at this time William understood the value of a Black Chamber, but his

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13 *Calendar of state papers domestic (CSPD)*, 1689, pp. 147, 205, 219, 227, Wallis to Nottingham on 1 and 10 Aug.


15 Ellis, *Post office*, p. 128.


main problem was that he lacked access to the major post offices on the continent on a regular basis. Some intercepts were obtained by bribing postmasters in Hamburg or Danzig, others were obtained simply by chance or by robbing enemy vessels. Occasionally, they would be a gift of an ally without its own Black Chamber, for instance Brandenburg. The use William III made of these findings was remarkable in the light of later developments, because he made no effort whatsoever to hide his sources. The letters intercepted by the Elector of Brandenburg were applied by the stadholder-king to provoke a political crisis between Poland and France. The contribution John Wallis made during this crisis was a fact of common knowledge. He was even publicly rewarded for it by the ambassador of Brandenburg in London: much to Wallis's dismay because he feared the French might find out and take precautions.

The stadholder-king's main source of intelligence, however, was the Black Chamber of Duke Georg Wilhelm of Braunschweig-Lüneburg in Celle. This had been the case since 1693 on request of the stadholder-king who needed the information in order to conduct his policies concerning Sweden and Denmark and who was a close friend of the duke long before he became king of England. The key role of this principality was largely due to the fact that all mail from France for the Scandinavian countries and eastern Germany and Poland had to pass through its territory. It was received out of the hands of the employees of the prince of Thurn und Taxis who held a monopoly for mail delivery in most parts of the Holy Roman Empire with the exception of the north: Hamburg, Brandenburg-Prussia and the duchies of Celle and Hanover. Thurn und Taxis received all mail from France already in the Spanish Netherlands where it had a monopoly as well. The mail was transported through Brussels, Cologne, and Frankfurt to Nuremberg where it was divided into two parts: one for northern Europe and the other for Prague and beyond. In Nuremberg all mail was opened and copied by the Imperial authorities with the full co-operation of the prince of Thurn und Taxis. The Black Chamber in Nuremberg originated from the beginning of the Nine Years War and was

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19 CSPD, 1690-1, 488, Sidney to Wallis, 16 Aug. 1691; British Library, Add. MSS 32499, fo. 170, Béthune to Croissy, 1 Dec. 1689, and fos. 257-60, copy of a letter by Castagnères de Chatauneuf, French ambassador at Constantinople to the French king, found in a captured, French vessel in the Mediterranean.


there to monitor French diplomatic activity in Germany and eastern Europe. In Celle, these letters were copied for the second time on the authority of Duke Georg Wilhelm and passed on to the British. The interception of mail at Celle had the tremendous advantage for the stadholder-king of laying bare the framework of French diplomacy in northern Europe over a long period of time and it compensated for the fact that in London or the Dutch Republic nothing similar could be done.

The duke of Celle had at least two cryptanalysts at his disposal who knew how to deal with intercepted, French code material: Ludwig Ernst Neubourg (d. 1713) and Johann Philip Schlemm (1672–1733). Schlemm was married to a daughter of Johann Albrecht Zachariae, a Hanoverian civil servant who had apparently already some experience in this field. He trained both Neubourg and Schlemm and may have been one of those rare people with an immediate understanding of cryptology. There is no evidence that much mail interception or codebreaking was going on in Celle or Hanover prior to 1693 and it is astonishing that these small principalities produced a band of codebreakers of their own precisely at the moment when it was needed. The explanation might be found in the presence of Wilhelm Leibniz who combined, just like Wallis, a strong analytical mind with an interest in language and grammar in particular. Leibniz did not consider himself to be a great codebreaker but he might have helped to develop an analytical framework for people who were more gifted as cryptanalysts than he was himself.

The Black Chamber in Celle did not restrict itself to matters of interest to the British or the Dutch. It intercepted also the letters of the Danish representatives in the nearby duchy of Wolfenbüttel that constituted a continuing threat to the dukes of Celle and Hanover, as well as the letters of the representatives of Wolfenbüttel and Denmark in Paris, Berlin, and Dresden. The main goal for both dukes was to safeguard any interest the House of Brunswick had in northern Germany. The stadholder-king was only informed as far as both dukes saw fit to do so and this did not happen on an exclusive basis either. Occasionally Georg Wilhelm or his brother would send copies of intercepted letters to the Emperor in Vienna as well.

The activities of the Black Chamber in Celle hardly could be called a secret. Already in February 1694 the French ambassador in Stockholm wrote to Paris that he had the impression that his letters were opened. In 1696 the representative of the prince of Thurn und Taxis filed a complaint at the

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Imperial diet in Regensburg. The representative of the duke of Celle did not even bother to deny. He boldly stated that the duke could hardly be expected to behave differently with a war going on in Europe that threatened the existence of his master.²⁷

The French, nevertheless, continued to send their mail through Germany. The explanation may have been that the French had too much confidence in their own cryptography, known to be the best in the world. Their codebooks were frequently changed and they were used according to strict rules. Moreover, the numerical order of the codegroups did not correspond to the alphabetical order of their meanings, as was mostly the case in other countries. Therefore, their codes consisted of two parts: one following the alphabetical order and being used to transform a plaintext into code and one following the numerical order to do the reverse. These were all novelties and it made French diplomats believe that their codes could only be broken by treason.²⁸

III

The War of the Spanish Succession limited the role of mail interception in Germany drastically. The number of intercepts that were made in Celle gradually decreased after 1702 until none were made at all in 1707 and after. During the early years of the war the Hanoverian Black Chamber focused on intercepts that were made by capturing enemy couriers. These letters, usually containing orders to the military commanders in the field, could contain extremely important information on the strength and intentions of enemy forces: information that could decide the outcome of a battle which rapidly would lose significance if the process of decoding took too long. The work had to be done very fast, but usually it was complicated by the fact that sufficient code material to work on was lacking.²⁹

The diminishing importance of mail interception in Germany can partly be explained by developments in the Low Countries. In 1700, the control of the post office in the southern Netherlands was transferred from the prince of Thurn und Taxis to the farmer of the French post office: Léon Pajot. This happened as a direct consequence of the, at first, uncontested accession of Philip of Anjou to the Spanish throne in 1700. The prince of Thurn und Taxis, however, proved to be a bad loser. He refused to pay Pajot a single penny for any mail delivered from the southern Netherlands. This led Pajot to separate all mail for northern Europe from the rest and to send it through Amsterdam and Hamburg, where private companies took care of it.³⁰ The French were

²⁷ Oakley, 'Interception of posts', pp. 105-7.
thus provided, almost by accident, with an alternative route for their communications with northern and eastern Europe: one that was not subject to the curiosity of the Hanoverians or the Austrians or both.

The Hanoverians, needless to say, were not too happy about this new development. Already as early as April 1704, they approached the town council of Amsterdam with the request to single out the letters for Leipzig and Poland and hand them over to the Hanoverian mail coach at Wilshuysen, thus avoiding Bremen. This would at least restore their access to all mail for eastern Europe and to part of the mail from Scandinavia as well, as far as it was sent through Danzig. The town council, however, refused resolutely, stating that it would only make the mail delivery slower and more expensive.31 The answer of the town council made it clear that in the Dutch Republic it was more difficult than anywhere else to coerce the mail service in the war effort. Therefore the post office in Amsterdam seemed much more reliable to the French than its counterparts in Germany, with the exception of the post office in Hamburg that was relatively independent as well.32

The allied advance in the southern Netherlands opened up new possibilities. After the occupation of Brussels the post office came into the hands of François Jaupain, a staunch supporter of the allied cause who had worked at the post office a number of years.33 Already in 1704, when Brussels was still under control of the French, he had been sending copies of letters of the Bavarian Elector's secretary, Malknecht, to the Dutch military commander Nassau Ouwerkerk.34 On 31 December 1706 he offered his services to the new English secretary of state, Sunderland, and the duke of Marlborough.35 It marked the beginning of a long period of collaboration which went far beyond Jaupain's responsibilities as a post master. In the summer of 1707 and the spring of 1708, he even joined Marlborough on his military campaigns, running an intelligence unit which collected information on enemy troop movements and provisioning.36

Jaupain's main contribution to the war effort, however, lay on a different level. He managed to get control of all mail delivery between the part of the country still under Bavarian or French control and the north of Europe. Pajot remained responsible for the mail delivery in those parts of the country that were still under the control of the French army. He was based in Namur, close to the court of the Bavarian Elector who acted as a governor for Philip V. Pajot,

32 Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, p. 162.
33 Paul S. Fritz, The English ministers and Jacobitism between the rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto and Buffalo, 1975), p. 115.
34 A. J. Veenendaal jr, De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius, 1702-1720 (17 vols., The Hague, 1976-97), iii, letter 1047 by Ouwerkerk, 13 Oct. 1704 in the camp at Borgloon. Jaupain is not mentioned here by name, but who else could have been meant by 'our man at the post office in Brussels'?
36 Ibid., Add. MSS 61568, fos. 91-113.
less inclined to fight a losing battle than the prince of Thurn und Taxis, was ready to make a deal with Jaupain to secure the exchange of mail between the occupied and the liberated territories. Jaupain had to pay the French a large sum of money for this and the agreement had to be updated regularly as the map of the Low Countries had to be redrawn after every military campaign.\(^{37}\)

This meant that he had access to all letters that originated from the court of the Bavarian Elector at Namur that were sent by mail. Many of them were written by the Elector’s secretary, Malknecht, to French or Bavarian agents and emissaries in Breslau, Danzig, Dresden, and Leipzig, or by the French emissary at the Bavarian court, Rouillé, to his colleagues in Danzig and Sweden.\(^{38}\) Occasionally, it would involve letters from the court of the Stuart Pretender in Saint-Germain destined for the Pretender’s adherents in Scotland. This mail was being sent under cover through the merchant houses of Chaumon in Brussels and Hachet in Rotterdam or through friendly Jesuit cloisters in Douai and Antwerp. Ironically, some of the letters reveal a genuine fear of interception in London by the British government and give precise information on the ways to avoid detection. Apparently, the Jacobites had no idea of the risks their letters were exposed to on the continent.\(^{39}\)

Jaupain made sure that his work remained unnoticed by using a special technique of opening letters without damaging them. First he would remove the seal from the envelope by heating it around the edge, careful not to harm the imprint. Then he would cover the seal with a paste mainly consisting of liquid silver to make a copy. The seal could then be reproduced at will, but the image of the forgery was slightly more vague than the original. Moreover, the paper around it might show by its colouring that it had been heated.\(^{40}\) This would only be seen, however, by someone who was already familiar with the procedure: anybody else would be fooled.

The intercepts were sent to the Black Chamber in London where they were analysed by William Blencowe, John Wallis’s grandson and successor since 1702.\(^{41}\) Blencowe was well prepared by his grandfather who trained him personally, but he was not either as talented or as successful. During the early years of the war, his work was complicated by the fact that he usually had too little code material to work on. In fact, his main achievement seemed to have been the recovery of the attack plans of the French commander Chamillard, intercepted by Marlborough during one of his campaigns on the Rhine, but it took him too long to be of any use.\(^{42}\) The regular flow of intercepts from

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\(^{38}\) British Library, Blenheim papers, Add. MSS 61567, for instance Jaupain’s letters to Sunderland from Brussels on 14 and 19 Jan., 24 and 28 Feb., 12, 24, 28, and 31 Mar. 1707, accompanying intercepts from Malknecht and Rouillé and similar intercepts from later dates in Add. MSS 61568.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., Add. MSS 61568, fos. 22–3, intercept from 26 Feb. 1707.

\(^{40}\) London, Public Record Office (PRO), State Papers 107/1c, D. van Heck to Tilson, Leiden, 25 Oct. 1723.

\(^{41}\) Kahn, Codebreakers, p. 169.

\(^{42}\) B. van het Hoff, ed., The correspondence of John Churchill, 1st duke of Marlborough and Anthonie Heinsius (Utrecht, 1951), letter 174, Marlborough to Heinsius, 27 May 1704, from the camp of
Brussels, starting in 1707, greatly facilitated Blencowe's work. The 'French Ministers Letterbook' in the British Library, wholly consisting of solutions by Blencowe, includes only three letters that were intercepted prior to 1707, all others are from Jaupain.43

There is no evidence that the duke of Marlborough was ready to share the fruits of Blencowe's labour with the Dutch, notwithstanding the fact that he had to share the exercise of authority in the southern Netherlands with the representatives of the Dutch government. Apparently, there was an atmosphere of mutual distrust right from the start, perhaps as a consequence of the Dutch resistance to Marlborough's appointment as governor by Charles III, or perhaps as a result of the policy of the British government to limit the influence of the Dutch Republic on the affairs of the southern Netherlands.44 Whatever the reason may have been, the Black Chamber in London proved an important weapon in the hands of the British not only against their enemies but also against their friends. This is the lesson that can be learned from the interception of the letters of the emissary of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp at The Hague, Herman Petkum, by Marlborough's men in the southern Netherlands. Through Blencowe's solution of these letters the duke found out everything he wanted to know about the secret negotiations that were going on in 1709 between Heinsius and the French minister Torcy. As a consequence the negotiations failed.45

The main sources of information on the French court itself, however, were the post offices in the Dutch Republic. Since 1669, France had an agreement with the post office in Amsterdam to exchange all mail directly at Cuyperveer without interference of the Thurn und Taxis people in the southern Netherlands. The mail was transported in locked and sealed cases over the territory still under the control of the Spaniards and it was to be handled by French officials only. The outbreak of the Nine Years War in 1688 apparently did not terminate this agreement and it remained to be effective during the War of the Spanish Succession as well.46 Previously, the French had not shown any interest in using this route for their communications with northern and eastern Europe, but now this all changed, probably because they considered...
the post offices in the Dutch Republic to be badly policed. In this respect they were terribly wrong, mainly due to excellent contacts between Grand Pensionary Heinsius and the postmasters in his country, as part of the upkeep of an intelligence network that encompassed most of western Europe.47

The first enemy letters for northern Europe were intercepted in the Dutch Republic during the early spring of 1706. The letters were written by the secretary of the French ambassador in Sweden, Bonnac, who was sent on a special mission in Leipzig and they were addressed to the Torcy. The missives were ciphered and Heinsius passed them on to the Hanoverian ambassador in The Hague, Bothmer, who, in his turn, sent them on to the Black Chamber in Hanover.48 Naturally, Heinsius was well aware of the exceptional qualities of the Hanoverian cryptanalysts Neubourg and Schlemm. When the stadholder-king was still alive, Heinsius had received several copies of letters that were intercepted at Nienburg and the exchange did not end with William’s unfortunate riding accident in 1702.49 He probably knew Neubourg personally and was well acquainted with his supervisor, Jean de Robethon, who worked as William’s private secretary before entering the service of the Hanoverian Elector.50

The new situation called for some adjustment on both sides. Neubourg had asked Heinsius for copies that left more space above the lines and between the codegroups, so that he could fill in their meanings more easily.51 The Hanoverians now had to accept that they could not withhold any information at will, because they had to account for every single letter that was intercepted by Heinsius’s men. It did mean, however, that the Hanoverian Black Chamber was back in business.

It is not certain where these first intercepts were made but it was probably in Amsterdam. This was beyond any doubt the case with a second series of intercepts made at the end of the same year by Ferdinand van Collen, a sheriff for Amsterdam. These letters, too, were intended for Bonnac or for one of his collaborators and they were passed on right away by Heinsius to Hanover.52 From January 1707 onwards more intercepts were made, all belonging to

51 Veenendaal, ed., Briefwisseling, v, letter 335, Bothmer to Heinsius on 12 Apr. 1706 from The Hague.
Bonnac's collaborators. The diplomats involved were Count Solar, a brother of the Bavarian emissary in Paris, Count Monasterole, and Philip Grofey, an emissary of the leader of the Hungarian revolt Count Rákóczi at the court of Sweden, and Johann Besenval, who acted as a French emissary in Leipzig. They were all engaged in an effort to get a Polish nobleman placed as a French puppet on the throne of Poland. The codes they used were different from the one used by Bonnac himself and they were unknown to the Hanoverian Black Chamber. For that reason it took the Hanoverian cryptanalysts some time to solve them.\(^{53}\)

In October of the same year a number of letters were intercepted from Torcy to Jean-Baptiste Maron, secretary to the French emissary Du Heron in Warschau. He, too, used a code of his own that took some time to break.\(^{54}\) In the summer of 1708, a circular letter from the French court to its emissaries abroad concerning the battle of Oudenarde was decoded.\(^{55}\) In the years 1710 and 1711 more letters followed from the French court to Besenval and vice versa and from a few others.\(^{56}\) Occasionally something went wrong. The letters from the French court to Besenval were hidden among other letters to Besenval of a more private nature. Incidentally, the postmaster would copy the private letters instead of the official ones.\(^{57}\)

The services of the Black Chamber in Hanover did not come for free. From 1707 until 1711 Neubourg received from Heinsius an annual gratuity of 1,000 guilders. 'This will greatly enhance my enthusiasm', Neubourg wrote gratefully, and it marked the start of a small correspondence between him and the grand pensionary that lasted until the latter year.\(^{58}\) But Neubourg's masters were not as pleased as the cryptanalyst himself.

The strong participation of the Dutch entailed risks of its own, particularly in the field of secrecy. The grand pensionary, formally only a minister of the States of Holland, became in effect the principal political leader of the Dutch Republic after the demise of the king-stadholder in 1702. Heinsius conducted its foreign policy on a daily basis, but he had to account for it in the secret committee of the states-general, consisting of representatives of all provinces who could only act in important matters after consultation with the States of their provinces. This meant, in effect, that in the Dutch Republic more people were involved in the making of foreign policy than anywhere in the world and that it was extremely difficult to conduct any form of secret diplomacy.\(^{59}\)


\(^{55}\) Ibid., vii, letter 884, Neubourg to Heinsius, Hanover, 27 July, 1708.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., vii, letters 206, 251, 282, 296, and 369, Neubourg to Heinsius, Hanover, 2, 9, 16, 19, 30 Sept., 1710.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., xi, letter 866, Neubourg to Heinsius, Hanover, 30 Sept., 1711.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., vii, letter 775, Neubourg to Heinsius, Hanover, 6 July, 1708; ibid., x, letter 751, Neubourg to Heinsius, 27 May, 1710; ibid., xi, letter 380, Neubourg to Heinsius, Hanover, 21 July, 1711.

The case of the interception of an extremely important letter from the French court to Besenvail in 1711 makes clear what the consequences were. The intercept contained a well-defined and elaborate scheme to promote the election of the duke of Hanover as head of the Holy Roman Empire. The purpose was of course to cause dissension among the allies but the early detection rendered the project harmless. In June 1711, during a long stay at The Hague, Robethon found out that rumours were circulating about this matter in governing circles. He was told by the tory negotiator, Lord Raby, who was not supposed to know at all. ‘It is out of the question that these rumours originate from the grand pensionary’, Robethon wrote to Georg Ludwig ‘but one cannot be sure of the deputies of the secret committee of the states-general, who get the intercepts to read as well, after our people have decoded them’. The statement shows a distrust of the Dutch political system that was well justified.

IV

The existence of a separate Black Chamber in The Hague can be inferred from a number of worksheets clearly belonging to a cryptanalyst. These sheets are contained in a folder bearing the heading ‘fourteen cipherkeys 1707–1712’, and they consist largely of large sheets with numbers, obviously codegroups, neatly organized in rows and columns, running up to 1,000. Scattered among the columns are letters, syllables, and words written to be attributed to the codegroups preceding them. Many spaces were left blank, some words or syllables were crossed through and replaced by others. The sheets are clearly reconstructions of enemy codes, and not codebooks made for the codemaker’s own use (as one might think at first glance), because of the many deficiencies and the arbitrary way they occur. The handwriting on the sheets can be identified as belonging to Heinsius’s private secretary, Abel Tasien d’Alonne (1646–1723). D’Alonne was presumed to be an illegitimate son of Stadholder William II and Jeanne de Bommert Silvercroon, the daughter of a Swedish diplomat in the republic, who married, after her escapade with the Prince of Orange, a Walloon officer called d’Alonne serving in the army of the republic. Abel Tasien became a private secretary to Princess Mary when she married Stadholder William III in 1677 and he never left her side until her death in 1694. After the demise of Constantijn Huygens the younger in 1698, he took his place as the private secretary of the stadholder-king. In 1702, after William’s...
fatal accident, leaving d’Alonne without a pension, he was engaged by Grand Pensionary Heinsius. Although never appearing in the foreground d’Alonne was considered to be a man of influence and he knew much better what was going on at court than, for instance, Huygens. In 1684, for example, he was one of the very few people to know about the intimate feelings of Elizabeth of Villiers, a lady-in-waiting to Princess Mary, who attracted the attention of the stadholder.

During his years as a secretary to Princess Mary, d’Alonne had already been engaged in the interception of letters. In a letter to the stadholder from Bevil Skelton on 28 October 1685, d’Alonne was mentioned as having uncovered a letter of Mary’s chaplain John Covell who was suspected of wanting to abduct the princess to bring her back to her father James II. His role become even more marked when the family went to England. His main task was the gathering of information on the Jacobite court in France and their correspondents on the British Isles. In 1689 he was, probably for that reason, nominated to become the head of the general post office in London. The position finally went to Major John Wildham, who had held this office already under Cromwell. In 1690 we find d’Alonne none the less occupied with the interception of mail of the French and Jacobite army in Ireland.

These examples do not prove that d’Alonne was already active at this time as a cryptanalyst, but he seems to be a likely candidate for the work done on one of those rare codebreaking cases that reached the contemporary press. In January 1684 the French ambassador in the Dutch Republic, Count d’Avaux, entered direct negotiations with the city council of Amsterdam. The goal was to prevent them from raising money for troops to be put at the disposal of the stadholder in order to fight the French in the southern Netherlands. This could easily be constructed as a direct interference in the internal affairs of the Dutch state, but it was not uncommon for a French ambassador to do a thing like that. The stadholder, however, wanted to make a point of it and had the ambassador’s messenger shadowed at a time when he was likely to be carrying

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69 John Macky, Mémoirs du Sieur Jean Macky...publiés sur le manuscrit original de l’auteur (Rotterdam, 1735), pp. 3–7.

70 Journalen van Constantijn Huygens, den Zoon (2 vols., Utrecht, 1881–8), 1, p. 98 (22 Mar. 1689) and p. 329 (8 Sept. 1690); CSPD, 1689, 12 Apr., warrant to Major John Wildman to take possession of the general post office; on Wildman, see Alan Marshall, Intelligence and espionage in the reign of Charles II, 1660–1685 (Cambridge, 1994), p. 79, and Maurice Ashley, John Wildman, plotter and postmaster (London, 1947).
a letter on the negotiations to the king. The courier was captured just after he crossed the border near Maastricht, by horsemen, clearly belonging to the Maastricht garrison. The courier, being robbed of all his belongings except his boots and his jacket, returned to his master with the story. The affair caused much distress to the members of the Amsterdam town council, but d'Avaux tried to reassure them with the statement that the letter was fully coded and that nobody could read it without a key. On 16 February 1684, however, the stadholder entered a meeting of the council with a decoded copy of the letter, accusing its senior members, Hooft and Hop, of treason. William, claiming that he had received the copy from the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, de Grana, only made d'Avaux laugh. The only thing d'Avaux could still do to help his friends at the town council was to pretend that William's cryptanalyst had interpreted the letter wrongly. To support his claim he brought a 'genuine' copy into circulation. This provoked a release of a copy on William's part too, at first leaving out many unsolved code groups and somewhat later a version wholly in plaintext, accompanied by the solutions of other letters that were intercepted at the same time which were even more compromising.

The identity of the codebreaker, however, has never been disclosed. The eighteenth-century historian Wagenaar only remarks: 'it was widely believed that the letter was decoded by a servant of the Spanish Governor de Grana'.

This may be the case, but it is not certain that de Grana was involved at all and it is difficult to believe at any rate that all of the work should have been done in Brussels, because there they lacked the inside information about Dutch politics that would allow them to identify names and so on. It seems more appropriate to presume that at least part of the work was done in The Hague by a close collaborator of the stadholder, perhaps helped by an initial breakthrough made in Brussels. In that case d'Alonne is a convincing candidate and, what is more, the only person at hand. This would imply that he discovered his qualities as a codebreaker already when he was in his late thirties.

Unfortunately, this question cannot be resolved, because no further information is available. There can be no doubt, however, about d'Alonne's

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72 Apparently, the Spanish governor in Brussels had someone at his disposal who could do the job. See J. P. Devos and H. Seeligman, eds., L'art de deschiffer: traité de déchiffrement du XVIIe siècle de la secrétairerie d'état et de Guerre Espagnol (Louvain, 1967), p. vi.
73 The alternative would be that the letter had been decoded in Celle or Hanover. This possibility cannot be ruled out either, as there were regular contacts between William and Georg Wilhelm at the time concerning the delivery of troops to fight in the southern Netherlands. There is no evidence, however, that any codebreaking was done in Celle or Hanover prior to 1693. Moreover, in the archives of the Dutch royal family, a fully coded copy of the letter can still be found. This is difficult to explain if the work had been done elsewhere. See The Hague, Royal Archives, Stadholder William III, inv. nr xiii-1.
involvement during the War of the Spanish Succession. The oldest worksheet corroborates the title indicated on the folder. It turns out to be related to a number of intercepted letters written in 1707 by the French emissary at the Bavarian court, Rouillé, to Bonnac, the French ambassador in Sweden. The letters were intercepted by Jaupain in Brussels and passed on to the president of the state council in The Hague, Slingelandt, and in that capacity, the highest authority in the Dutch army. A slightly differently organized copy of this code was found in the archives of the grand pensionary. This copy was drafted hastily and it seems likely that it was done in order to report to Heinsius the first breakthrough or to illustrate the difficulties that might be encountered during the codebreaking process.

Oddly enough, exactly the same letters can be found in the archives of the duke of Marlborough. Apparently Jaupain made two copies: one for the Dutch and one for the British. In London Rouillé’s code was solved, as might have been expected, by Blencowe. A comparison between the work done by d’Alonne and the work done by Blencowe reveals a number of differences. The code is of a relatively simple nature. The numerical order of the codegroups follows the alphabetical order of their meanings, so it is clearly a one-part nomenclature, not exceeding 900 items. It begins with a segment of 50 codegroups without significance, leaving the rest to be subdivided into 25 parts, each beginning with a letter of the alphabet, followed by syllables and frequently occurring words, all in perfect alphabetical order. The individual letters can be found most easily through frequency analysis, that is by comparing the number of times certain codegroups occur with the number of times certain letters can be expected to occur in a given language. Subsequently, guesses can be made at certain letter combinations. For example, the most frequent vowel occurring in the Dutch language is the ‘e’, often followed by an ‘n’ at the ending of a plural verb or noun. If the words are clearly separated, this combination is certainly among the first that should be checked. In the reconstruction of a one-part code, the letters thus found would serve, so to speak, as ‘anchorpoints’ for the rest, helping to establish the size of each alphabetical chapter and hinting at its internal order if thus maintained. Significantly, d’Alonne and Blencowe, while in agreement on these anchorpoints, are not always in agreement as to the codegroups in between. For example, 339 is attributed in both cases to ‘i’ or ‘j’, 340 to ‘ja’, 343 to ‘je’; ‘intelligence’, however, is in d’Alonne’s solution connected to 361 and in Blencowe’s solution to 363. Or, to give an example from another range:

74 Veenendaal, Briefwisseling, vi, letter 564, Sicco van Goslinga to Heinsius on 23 May 1707 from the Camp de Hal.
75 ARA, Antonie Heinsius, inv. nr 2315, sheet beginning with the remark ‘tous ces nombres signifient des nulls’.
76 British Library, Blenheim papers, Add. MSS 61567, fos. 26(b)—27(a).
140 would, by both cryptanalysts, be identified as ‘c’; 145, however, would mean, according to Blencowe, ‘cas’ and, according to d’Alonne, ‘cause’.

These differences may seem small, but they do prove that the codebreaking in London and The Hague was done independently, or, to put it differently, that the reconstruction in The Hague was not a copy of the one in London or vice versa. The only possible explanation can be that Jaupain gave copies to the Dutch without notifying the British and the Dutch wanted to protect their source. This would explain, too, why Rouillé’s letters were not sent to Hanover in the first place. From one point of view, this seemed the obvious thing to do. The Hanoverians were experienced in the breaking of these kind of codes and they were even paid by Heinsius to do so, when the intercepts were made in the Dutch Republic itself. Probably the Dutch did not send Rouillé’s letters as well because they were afraid Marlborough would find out what was going on right under his nose.

The same argument, however, does not apply to a number of intercepted letters still surviving in the archives of the grand pensionary, written by the secretary of the Bavarian Elector, Malknecht, to a David van Putten, ‘merchant at Rotterdam’ during the last months of 1711 and the first months of 1712: the period directly preceding the peace talks of Utrecht. Apparently, Malknecht was extremely worried that his letters might be opened, because they were coded in full and not even the place of origin was indicated in plaintext. The codegroups were solved above the lines in the handwriting of d’Alonne. Malknecht’s letters consisted mainly of information on developments and feelings at the Bavarian and, to a lesser degree, French courts and one wonders why it should be of interest to a simple businessman. Probably, much was intended for the new British ambassador in The Hague who was particularly hostile towards the Austrians. In fact, occasionally the letters would accompany packets for the queen and her government in London.78 There can be no question that van Putten was the Elector’s agent in the Dutch Republic, but he was not officially taking part in the peace negotiations.78 The name, however, may be a pseudonym for Johann Konrad Norff, the emissary in The Hague of the bishop of Liège who was a brother of the Bavarian Elector.80 After the failure of the peace talks at Geertruydenberg in 1710 the

78 ARA, Anthonie Heinsius, inv. nr 1649, letters from Namur on 2 Oct., 1, 4, 8, 14, 18, 25, 27, 29 Nov., 6, 13, 16, 19, 23, 30 Dec., and inv. nr 1737, letters from Namur on 10, 19, 23, 27Jan., 2, 6, 9, 16 Feb. 1712. The remark on the packets for the queen and Strafford is contained in a letter dated 27 Dec. 1711.

79 The name David van Putten does not occur in O. Schutte, Repertorium der buitenlandse vertegenwoordigers, residerende in Nederland 1584–1810 (The Hague, 1983). The name is likely to be false, because no David van Putten can be found in the well-kept notarial records at the municipal archive of Rotterdam either, as would certainly have been the case if he really had been active as a businessman in that city.

80 Stadarchiv Hannover, inv. nr 16694, fo. 478, Robetho n to Bernstorff, The Hague, 13 June 1711; on Norff, see Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (3 vols., Oldenburg, Zürich, and Graz, 1950-76), 1, pp. 278 and 343.
Dutch tried to reach a preliminary agreement with the Bavarian Elector, Max Emanuel, to strengthen their bargaining position in the southern Netherlands. They tried to convince Max Emanuel that he should take effective control of the remaining part of the southern Netherlands and hand them over in return for a restoration of his former position in Bavaria. The British and the Austrians did not like what was going on, but the Hanoverians were particularly opposed to this idea, because it involved the return of Max Emanuel to the Electoral body.

The whole matter shows once more that the exchange of intercepted material was not without consequences for the understanding between the allies themselves. Heinsius no longer had to fear that the Hanoverians would disclose their sources to the British, primarily because of the breakdown of the coalition as a result of the tory victory. Therefore he had some letters, intercepted in Brussels, sent to Hanover, perhaps without notifying them where they came from. This, however, provoked a long sermon by Georg Ludwig about the impertinence of the Dutch attitude towards the Bavarians and only by pretending that his cryptanalysts could not solve certain codegroups was he able to avoid a direct attack on the grand pensionary. This incident probably was sufficient to convince Heinsius that he had better not make use of the services of the Hanoverian Black Chamber any longer. From this moment onwards, all exchange of intercepted material between Hanover and The Hague ceased.

Malknecht’s letters, too, were copied twice and sent to London as well as The Hague. The code used in this correspondence was smaller than the one used by Rouillé – it consisted of roughly 400 items – but it was much more complicated, because there was not a parallel in the alphabetical and numerical order; in fact, it was difficult to find any pattern at all. The code shows that the Bavarians were not ignorant in the field of cryptography, and its solution by d’Alonne proves that he was up to the difficult task of breaking a two-part nomenclature. In fact, the comparison shows that he was in certain respects more successful than Blencowe, because he was able to identify more codegroups, and was better prepared to guess the real meaning of repeatedly mentioned codenames like ‘Antoine Vivarier’ and ‘Van der Starke’, signifying respectively the count of Monasterol (the Bavarian ambassador at the French court) and the Bavarian Elector: a conclusion Blencowe was never able to draw. Probably, d’Alonne, living in one of the political centres of Europe,

82 Niedersächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Cal. Br. 24/3155, fos. 61-3, Georg Ludwig to Bothmer on 14 Mar. 1710 from Hanover. I should like to thank Dr Cristoph Gieschen of the Lower-Saxonian State Archive for his help and for the making of a transcript of this letter in particular.
profited from the fact that he knew more about what was going on than Blencowe who had to perform his task in almost total seclusion.\footnote{D’Alonne’s worksheet on this code in the Archive of the Dutch Legation in Turkey bears the heading ‘Chiffre de Malknecht a Van Putten, agt. de l’Elect. de Bavière’ which was crossed out. The codenames Vivarier and van der Starke are added at the end of the list.}

The remaining worksheets seem to refer to codes that were solved elsewhere. The names in the headings are only given in a shortened form, but they seem to refer to Maron, Besenval, Bonac, and Grossy: all French diplomats active in northern Europe whose codes are known to have been broken in Hanover and whose names frequently occur in the notes exchanged between Heinsius and Bothmer, Robethon or Neubourg, accompanying the solutions of intercepted letters.\footnote{What else can one make of ‘Nouv. chif de Bon avec L. & T.’ or ‘Chiffre de Besl. avec L. & T.’ or ‘Chiffre de L. & T. avec Bal.’ or ‘Chiffre de Bnc. et Grsyy avec Bnrpx’. There is no way to be sure, however, because the archives of the Black Chamber in Hanover are lost and the same goes for the intercepted letters in the Heinsius archives.}

It seems likely that d’Alonne made compilations of the codegroups in the letters that were sent back from Hanover with the plaintext written above the lines to facilitate his own work on the intercepted letters the Hanoverians were not meant to see.\footnote{The compilations could be based on solutions, sent back from Hanover, with the originals (see n. 50).} This probably means that the Hanoverians did not know that d’Alonne was active as a codebreaker as well. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that in the correspondence between d’Alonne and Robethon, who had been good friends ever since their trip with the duke of Portland to Paris in 1698, not one clue had been given as one would expect if Robethon had known.\footnote{British Library, Stowe MS 222, fos. 142, 162-9, 178, 180, 186, 200, 312, 364, and MS 224, fos. 148, 237, and MS 230, fos. 147, 154, 272.}

The Dutch Black Chamber continued to work after the Peace of Utrecht. The explanation is clear. After the conclusion of the treaty the Dutch found themselves politically isolated. The war was over for everybody except for them and the Austrians and they had almost more to fear from former allies than from their former enemies. One case from this period deserves special attention, because it illustrates very clearly the difficulty of operating a Black Chamber in the Dutch Republic. It occurred during the aftermath of the war in Brussels in 1715 and it involved the correspondence of the French emissary in the southern Netherlands, Chevalier Rossi with the French principal minister Torcy. Rossi was sent to Brussels in December 1714 or early January 1715 to monitor the negotiations that were soon to start in Antwerp between Austria, England, and the Dutch Republic to set the conditions for the withdrawal of the Dutch army and to establish the size of the Barrier of fortified cities along the French border to remain under Dutch control. The folder with d’Alonne’s worksheets contains twelve coded letters from or to Rossi, or rather excerpts from them, in the handwriting of Jaupain, all made during the first four months of 1715.\footnote{The letters by Rossi to Torcy from Brussels are dated: 30 Jan., 16 and 26 Feb, 8, 19, and 29 Mar., and 2 and 5 Apr. 1715 and by Torcy to Rossi from Versailles 31 Jan. and 11 Apr. 1715. The}
is no evidence that Rossi's code was successfully broken, but there can be no
doubt that an attempt had been made. Two sheets with frequency counts were
found in the folder, tallying the codegroups in the first two letters.

In all other respects, however, this case is well documented. Rossi was well
known to the Dutch authorities. He visited the Dutch Republic in 1712 as a
member of the French delegation to the peace talks and he was quickly noted
for his direct approach to certain members of the Dutch town councils whom he
tried to convince that the Dutch had lost the war and that they should settle
for any offer that was made. Naturally, the grand pensionary and his
 collaborators watched Rossi's return to the Low Countries with great suspicion.
They were afraid that he might stir up the opposition among the native elite in
the southern Netherlands against any diminishing of their territory. For that
reason Heinsius asked the representative of the Dutch government in Brussels,
Johan van der Bergh, to keep an eye on him. Van den Bergh had Rossi
shadowed and he asked Cadogan as well as the temporary Austrian governor
Königsegg what Rossi was up to. Königsegg's answer was evasive and he tried
to hide the fact that he had already met Rossi twice. Finally, van den Bergh
visited Jaupain and made him promise that he would copy any letters Rossi
might send or receive. During the following weeks van den Bergh obtained a
number of intercepts that he passed on to the grand pensionary. Van den Bergh
was particularly worried, however, that in The Hague, there was nobody who
could break the code. 'Do you have anyone at home who could help you in this
respect?' and, later on, he wrote: 'Jaupain asked me, if there is anyone in The
Hague who can deal with code material like this. Is there?'.

Van den Bergh's straightforward behaviour, however, aroused suspicion.
Already in January, Königsegg asked Jaupain if he had opened any letters on
the request of the Dutch. The postmaster denied vehemently the suggestion,
but apparently he failed to convince the Austrian governor. From that moment
onwards the count had all his mail for the French court taken by courier across
the border to Valenciennes. Jaupain was highly embarrassed. On 15 April
1715 he wrote to d'Alonne that the confusion was not his fault: he would have
sent Rossi's letters straight away if van den Bergh had not intervened.

\[\textit{\textsuperscript{90}}\] Veenendaal, ed., \textit{Briefwisseling}, volume forthcoming, letter 691, Johan van de Bergh to
Heinsius from Brussels on 31 Dec. 1714; letter 708, Heinsius's answer on 3 Jan. 1715 from The
Hague; letter 723, van den Bergh to Heinsius on 7 Jan. 1715 from Brussels; letter 729, B. van der
Dussen to Heinsius on 8 Jan. 1715 from Antwerp; letter 736, idem to idem on 10 Jan. 1715; letter
760, van den Bergh on 17 Jan. 1715 from Antwerp.
\[\textit{\textsuperscript{91}}\] ARA, Heinsius, inv. nr 1889, van den Bergh to Heinsius from Brussels on 7 Feb. and 11 and
18 Mar. 1715.
\[\textit{\textsuperscript{92}}\] ARA, Heinsius, inv. nr 1899, van der Dussen to Heinsius from Antwerp on 24 Jan. 1715.
Moreover, van den Bergh's careless behaviour put Jaupain's position needlessly at risk.  

The whole matter shows that not even van den Bergh, probably the most powerful man in the Dutch Republic and second only to Heinsius, knew the secret of the Dutch Black Chamber and it also shows why. Nothing van den Bergh did or knew would stay a secret for long, because every move he made in the southern Netherlands would be watched closely by his enemies and if something would escape them, it would almost definitely be leaked from The Hague. In the very same letter van den Bergh inquired about the codebreaker, he complained that it was almost impossible to achieve anything at all in the southern Netherlands, if nothing could be kept a secret in The Hague.

V

From 1706 onwards Hanover and Celle lost much of their importance as centres of mail interception and intelligence regarding French war aims and diplomacy. They had to yield this role increasingly to Amsterdam for all communications between the French court and Sweden and Poland, and to Brussels for the activities of the Bavarian Elector who was still in control of a large part of the southern Netherlands.

This shift remained not without consequences for the understanding between the allies. The Hanoverians still had access to the information that was collected in Amsterdam, because the Dutch needed the expertise of the Hanoverian Black Chamber to deal with intercepted, coded letters, but they no longer had the possibility of withholding information at will and they had to accept that the intercepted letters were discussed, as soon as they were solved, in the secret committee of the states-general, a body notorious for its total incapacity to keep anything from the public. In Brussels, the benefits went to the British. They could send all intercepted code material to a Black Chamber of their own in London and they had very little need to share any information with their allies, neither the Dutch nor the Hanoverians. In fact, one of the main advantages of the interception of the correspondence of the Bavarian court for the British was that it yielded information about possible contact between the Bavarians or the French and the Dutch who had objectives of their own in the southern Netherlands which did not always coincide with those of their allies.

The Dutch discovered at their cost that they could not pursue an independent policy in the southern Netherlands without access to the intelligence on the Bavarians collected in Brussels and without their own means to process this information, that is a Black Chamber. Fortunately, the Dutch found the postmaster in Brussels ready to give them copies of all intercepted code material that was sent to London on a regular basis, without notifying

ARA, Heinsius, inv. nr 1931, Jaupain to d’Alonne on 15 Apr. 1715 from Brussels.
ARA The Hague, Heinsius, inv. nr 1889, van den Bergh to Heinsius on 28 Feb. 1715.
their British allies. They were sent to the grand pensionary's private secretary Abel Tasien d'Alonne in The Hague who had already gained experience as a codebreaker some thirty years earlier, while serving as a private secretary to Princess Mary. The choice of d'Alonne was a very happy one, not only because of his capacities and his reliability, but also because of his position as Heinsius's secretary. He was always there, so to speak, as the grand pensionary's shadow, without attracting any attention. The intercepted letters and their solutions and the related worksheets did not even have to leave Heinsius's quarters, because they worked at opposite desks.

The scope of d'Alonne's activities could not be fully established, but from the cases that were investigated it becomes clear that he was active between 1707 and 1715 on, at least, three different occasions, all related to the southern Netherlands. He seems to have limited himself to cases that could not be solved elsewhere, not for technical, but for political reasons. The rivalry with the British in the southern Netherlands was not the only factor to reckon with in that respect. In 1711 the Hanoverians caused much more trouble than the British, because they opposed any Dutch efforts to reach a separate agreement with the Bavarians that involved a return of the Bavarian Elector to the Electoral body. In fact, it was a solution of an intercepted letter from the Bavarian court about negotiations between the Dutch and the Bavarians that caused a diplomatic crisis between the Dutch and the Hanoverians, ending all collaboration between the two countries in the field of mail interception and codebreaking. From that moment onwards the Dutch were on their own.

It is of course not so easy to reach a conclusion from this one case about the rise of the Black Chambers in general, but two points must be made. First of all, one may say that the Black Chambers owe much of their existence to the efforts of the stadholder-king to counteract French expansion in Europe, not only in a general way, but also because the stadholder-king stimulated the use of codebreaking as a tool of foreign policy personally. Secondly, the case of the Black Chamber in The Hague indicates that inter-allied relations played a more important role in its development than the need for intelligence on the enemy itself. Both the British and the Hanoverians had Black Chambers that could, and would, occasionally render services to their allies, but only in as much as it seemed to be to their own advantage and there seems to have been a conscious effort to hide the techniques of codebreaking, so to speak, as 'business secrets'. This did not mean that the Black Chambers in all these countries worked in total isolation. D'Alonne seems to have used the results of work done by the codebreakers in Hanover to compile vocabularies of his own and to get a general idea about the way enemy codes were built, without ever informing them. In the atmosphere of mutual distrust among the allies, which was so characteristic of much of the war, this can hardly be called surprising.