The modular security toolbox
Assembling state and citizenship in Jerusalem
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer days of 2014, East Jerusalem erupted in violence. Decades of gradual loss of land and denial of rights came to a head in July of that year, when Mohammed Abu Khdeir, a 16-year-old Palestinian boy from Jerusalem, was kidnapped and burned alive by Jewish-Israeli extremists. Then came the holy month of Ramadan; instead of the usual festive meals and family visits, the days and nights of Palestinian Jerusalemites were accompanied by television sets blaring news of the ongoing Israeli air-strikes and shelling of the Gaza Strip, where over 1500 Palestinian civilians were killed (Human Rights Watch 2015). East Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents responded with defiance, on a scale unmatched by their West Bank compatriots: with large-scale protests and stone throwing, damaging Jerusalem’s controversial tramline and directing firecrackers at police personnel (Hasson 2014). A few Palestinian ‘lone wolves’ took to stabbing and car-ramming attacks, in which several Israeli security agents and citizens were killed. The images from Jerusalem reverberated throughout the world, unmistakably showing how the Israeli vision of a ‘united’ Jerusalem had failed, highlighting instead how Israel’s self-proclaimed capital city remains divided and unequal, half a century after the Israeli occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem. While smoke billowed over the Palestinian neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities were faced with a dilemma: how to pacify East Jerusalem without resorting to extensive lethal violence, drawing international condemnation or restoring direct military rule?

This was neither the first nor the last time that the Israeli authorities faced such a predicament in occupied East Jerusalem. The Israeli authorities’ largest challenges in East Jerusalem are located in the field of security governance, where two contrasting dynamics can be traced. The first is the colonial dynamic. The Israeli authorities’ position and aims in East Jerusalem are similar to the rest of the Occupied Palestinian territories – to contain Palestinian presence and growth (Fenster and Shlomo 2011), to
prevent the establishment of a future Palestinian state and the division of Jerusalem (Pullan 2011: 17), to Judaize strategic locations within the city, and to enable the prioritized mobility of Israeli citizens (particularly settlers) throughout the territory. To achieve these aims, the Israeli authorities follow a pattern of transplanting military strategies and technologies from the ‘periphery’ into metropolitan areas (cf. Coaffee 2003), in this case from the occupied West Bank into East Jerusalem. All the hallmarks of the Israeli occupation can be found in East Jerusalem: the construction of Jewish-Israeli settlements on expropriated Palestinian land, placing a separation wall on a route intended to maximize Jewish-Israeli space and minimalize Palestinian presence, quashing Palestinian political and cultural leadership, and enhancing the mobility of Jewish-Israeli settlers through the construction of dedicated highways and bypass roads (Pullan et al. 2007). These colonial policies, practices, technologies and materialities are aimed at reinforcing the Israeli administration of the city and its Jewish majority population, and preventing a possible permanent division of the city in the future.

The second salient dynamic within Jerusalem’s security governance is the incorporation dynamic. Unlike other parts of the West Bank, East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel in 1967, and the Israeli authorities give particular significance to the pledged full incorporation of East Jerusalem into the Israeli legal and bureaucratic fold. While this pledge is far from guaranteeing any sort of equality – the Israeli legislature has already enacted over 50 laws that formally discriminate against the country’s Palestinian citizens (Adalah 2013) – it does place legal and political limitations on the Israeli authorities’ security interventions in East Jerusalem. The Israeli military, with a few exceptions, is not allowed to operate within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries. Israeli civil law, unlike the West Bank’s military law, constrains the police’s ability to arrest individuals or conduct searches without due process, holds state actors to a degree of accountability to-
wards residents, and provides a degree of protection for children and other vulnerable populations. The Israeli policy of a ‘united’ and ‘undivided’ Jerusalem requires the continuous assertion of democratic state sovereignty across the urban territory, claims that involve the performance of legally and politically bounded security provision. Successive Israeli governments have sought to perform a ‘normal’ civilian administration in the face of the scrutinizing gaze of the international community, from which they seek affirmation, and a veneer of security and stability toward the domestic Israeli audience, from which they seek re-election.

The annexation of East Jerusalem, then, has confronted the Israeli authorities with a particularly difficult conundrum: how to reconcile the colonial and the incorporation dynamics - or, in other words, how to govern an occupied territory while remaining nominally within the boundaries of a normative civilian rule of law. This dilemma mirrors that faced by other authorities worldwide. State security provision is bounded: by law, by operational capacities, and by domestic and international public perception. Security threats, on the other hand, are increasingly unbounded: these include not only the phenomena of crime and terrorism, but a growing number of societal and political transformations that are re-constituted as threats in a general climate of fear and suspicion (Bigo 2002; Goldstein 2010). To overcome the gap between the high demands for security solutions to unbounded threats, and the straitjacket of constrained legal authority and limited operational capacities, state security actors increasingly turn to security privatization and pluralization in their quest to mitigate security threats. The former involves the transfer of security roles and authority to commercial actors, while the latter refers to the delegation of security, policing or punitive roles and responsibilities to additional state actors – such as administrative, environmental, educational or regulatory institutions - generally not associated with security provision.
In Jerusalem, where the Israeli authorities consider Palestinians’ spatial and demographic presence as a security threat, security pluralization and privatization are in full swing, with significant implications to how governance is pursued, and to the daily lives of the city’s residents.

The conjunction of the contradiction between bounded security provision and unbounded threats, together with a global transformed security landscape, is where the questions of this dissertation are located. I ask *how, and to what end, do state security actors pursue security pluralization and privatization in Jerusalem?— and subsequently — What are the implications of these processes for the (re)production of differentiated citizenship and its negotiation in Jerusalem?* I seek to answer these questions based on qualitative data that I collected during eleven months of ethnographic fieldwork in Jerusalem, using several data collection methods including participant observation, semi-structured interviews and participatory transects (see Chapter 2).

The main argument I posit in this dissertation is directly related to the contradiction between bounded security provision and unbounded security threats that I described above. I argue that state security actors increasingly seek to re-equip their security toolbox through the privatization and pluralization of security provision, by enlisting a range of additional private and public actors, technologies and materialities to enhance their capacity to pursue controversial security policies that they would be unable, or unwilling, to pursue otherwise. I understand the transformed Israeli security provision in East Jerusalem as an important example of the assembling of a modular security toolbox, in which different security ‘modules’ are enlisted into a state-led security provision. While East Jerusalem might seem to be a unique or extreme case, in the global context of an increasingly pluralized and privatized security landscape, other cases come to mind. From the outsourced British deportation regime, to the privately operated Australian detention centers in Papua New Guinea; from the pluralized
anti-radicalization programmes in the UK, through to privately-run prisons in the US and public-private policing partnerships in South Africa – state security actors worldwide increasingly assemble additional public and private actors, technologies and materialities to prevent or mitigate perceived security threats.

SECURITY PLURALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION

There is a scholarly consensus that the security landscape worldwide is undergoing a transformation in recent decades. The protection of people and property, in many parts of the world, is decreasingly an exclusive function of state organs, including the police, and is instead maintained by a plethora of public and private bodies (Loader 1999). While the liberal ideational conception of the state as producing an equal rendering of security has been repeatedly contested following controversial and partisan public security interventions (Graham 2012, Somers 2008), the widespread perception of the state as an actor representing the public good remains significant.

The pluralization and privatization of security cannot be isolated from the larger changes that modern states undergo in light of the interconnected growth of globalization and neoliberal governance. The re-making of the state is a global phenomenon with a wide variety of local manifestations: facing simultaneous claims from both transnational capital and citizens, governance is increasingly pursued through interposing additional facets, interfaces and institutions to replace and complement core authorities and responsibilities of the state. This is particularly the case in the field of secu-
rity provision, where security roles, authorities and capacities are no longer found exclusively with traditional police and military bodies, but are instead pluralized and privatized into a jigsaw of interconnected public and private security actors. These transformations and their societal implications did not go unnoticed in the literature, with different scholars interpreting these in line with prevailing discussions on the growth of unbounded security threats, and on the transformation of the state in the era of neoliberal adjustments.

Critical scholars of policing and security studies have long emphasized that the provision of security\(^1\) to some can engender insecurity to others (Jones 1995: 310). The increasingly pluralized and privatized security landscape, in which different public and private actors take on security roles previously considered within the exclusive domain of the police and military, raises question as to how (in)security is distributed when state security actors are no longer exclusively in charge. This debate is situated at the within a larger scholarly discussion on the transformation of the state in the age of neoliberal governance, examining how the state is reconfigured, weakened or in retreat as it is battered by the waves of privatization (Ong 2006) and incorporation in global governance structures. Sassen (2006) argues that different parts of the state are continuously disassembled and reassembled following a global organizing logic that is ‘opening up countries to global firms, markets, flows, and standards of all sorts and […] replacing specific components of the state’s logic’ (Sassen 2006: 408). The end result of these transformations, she suggests, is a new format of the state — a dynamic governance assemblage populated by both public and private actors (Sassen 2006). In the context of this debate, scholars have explored extensively how state security providers, and the police in particular, engage and cooperate with other state and non-state actors. Jensen (2010), for instance, examines security plu-

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\(^1\) The normative usage of ‘security’ in this dissertation does not imply a silent acquiescence to the perception of security as ‘inherently good’, nor an attempt to obfuscate the social processes embedded within security provision. Instead, I use security here as a way of reflecting on the inner world of the people, policies, technologies and practices enlisted in the name of security. I chose to adopt these professionals’ own term to describe what they do and why they do it, seeking to highlight without prejudice what is done in the name of the ‘security fetish’ (Neocleous 2008: 144-156) engulfing the world.
ralization in his observation of the cooperation between Cape Town’s police, municipal government and township community boards in combatting crime and strengthening trust in the police. Dupont (2006) maps the partnerships between American metropolitan police agencies and other public policing stakeholders – private security companies, public transport authorities, airlines and professional associations. Berndtsson and Stern (2011) explore the emergence of a security assemblage in Stockholm Arlanda airport, encompassing the police, a private security company, the Swedish transport authority and other state institutions – and how such an assemblage is continuously contested and transformed.

The pluralization and privatization of security provision has led to a re-imagination of what is policing, extending our understanding of policing and security beyond the state. Loader (2000) approaches policing as a wide field with a plethora of different actors beyond the police itself. He observes how policing has extended, and now includes not only policing by government (regular police and its supervisory role), but also policing through government (public security provision outsourced to private companies), above government (international or supranational policing agencies), beyond government (commercial security) and below government (citizens’ initiatives and vigilantism). Private security companies, in particular, have been growing continuously both in number and in the scope of their operation: augmenting weak states’ sovereignty (Hansen 2008), providing security to vulnerable communities in dispute with the authorities (Goldstein 2016) or providing securitized humanitarian solutions in foreign interventions (Spearin 2008).

These transformations in the security landscape can be a cause for concern, with various authors pointing out how security pluralization and privatization may lead to the erosion of citizens’ rights, access to resources and of state accountability towards its citizens. Some scholars lament this prospect, seeing the diffusion of a clear state function – security provision – to a wide array of public and private actors as a threat to democracy and the state’s
commitment to provide equal protection to its citizens (Loader 2000; Lofstrand et al. 2017). Yet these concerns, justified as they are, may not be sufficient in capturing the political implications of the diffusion of security provision to public and private actors, specifically in terms of the state-led differential (re)distribution of rights, resources and privileges in contemporary societies.

In this dissertation I go beyond the existing discussion on the transformed security landscape and its implications for different citizens. I argue that the differentiated reallocation of rights and resources is not merely a by-product of security privatization and pluralization, but can instead be its desired goal. State security actors can assemble private and plural ‘modules’ – public and private actors, and a range of technologies, and materialities – in order to distance themselves from controversial state-led security policies. This deliberate entanglement with additional public and private actors and actants enables state security actors to reinforce their legal and operational capacities, enhance their manoeuvrability, and pursue a form of security provision that distinguishes between those deemed worthy of enhanced protection, and those designated as a security threat. My approach extends the scholarly discussion beyond a reading of neoliberalism as the organizing logic (Sassen 2006) of stratification and the re-assembling of the state, highlighting instead an intersection with other organizing logics at play – such as those of ethnocracy and colonialism – whose role in shaping the emergence of public-private security assemblages requires further inquiry.
ASSEMBLAGE AND THE MODULAR SECURITY TOOLBOX

I explore the coalescing public and private security landscape in Jerusalem through an assemblage approach, which highlights the relations – hierarchical, reciprocal and rhizomatic – that emerge and dissolve between different actors and actants in an ever-changing assemblage. An extended reading of policing as an assemblage has been suggested by Ryan (2014), who examines the changing role of military actors in a customary civil domain, arguing that ‘to police … is a process of assemblage, a decentred gathering of elements necessary for the governance of a particular space’ (Ryan 2014: 147). Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) advocate a focus on security assemblages, in which a wide array of actors, materialities and technologies come together in line with the increasingly transnational mobility of capital, people and practices. Security assemblages are not merely a way of describing how security configurations are arrange; security assemblages can also be understood as a form of governance. Schouten (2014), in his endeavour towards mapping airport security provision, proposes to view security assemblage as a form of processual governance, in which controversies emerge as salient moments in which security arrangements are defined and contested. These arrangements are not stable configurations: instead, as Adey and Anderson (2012) suggest, they often take on a life of their own, bringing together diverse (and unexpected) security actors, materialities, and technologies.

Assemblage theory, which has its roots in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1998) seminal work, has extended in multiple directions in recent decades. My approach in explaining security pluralization and privatization follows Delanda’s (2006a) assertion that assemblage theory implies particular relations of exteriority – an understanding that assemblages are not organic
totalities, but rather arrays whose individual components can be detached from one assemblage and ‘plugged’ into another (Delanda 2006b: 253). Correspondingly, one component never represents, defines or delimits an assemblage; when a component is plugged in, or out, the structure of the assemblage can adapt and adopt (Delanda 2006a: 10-11), either by enlisting additional components or by an internal re-shuffling. The concept of the modular security toolbox that I propose in this dissertation similarly involves a plurality of actors, technologies and materialities that never remain in a stable stasis: certain modules are sought and ‘plugged in’ while others are discarded and ‘plugged out’, their instructions changed and order re-shuffled, yet the assemblage remains largely cohesive despite continuous reconfiguration. A modular formation is thus an assemblage encompassing different independent units, which together compose a coherent, distinct body. This composite formation is in constant flux, since the distinct and independently functional units can be separated and re-combined by design.

While pluralized and privatized security can be explored as an assemblage, security assemblages are not all alike. I focus on a modular security toolbox in order to reflect on a specific type of security assemblages - local, place-based and of an actively crafted relational design. Scholarship on security assemblages has thus far focused primarily on transnational forms of security assemblages, which operate across boundaries while mobilizing global forms of capital (e.g. Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Loader and Walker 2007). While global circulations of capital or goods (Cowen 2014) have indeed helped to shape global security arrangements, security is more often than not pursued to protect specific sites: business districts (Samara 2011), airports (Schouten 2014), even entire cities. In this dissertation I emphasize that security is commonly pursued in direct relation to a territorially delimited locale, following national-level security prioritization and (re)distribution.

In adopting Li’s (2007) assertion that assemblages never emerge out of thin air, but always require someone (or something) to bring together di-
verse elements and to produce relations between them, I emphasize that some nodes within the assemblage (security actors, but also manifold materialities and technologies) are more centrally positioned through their relations than others. In many cases, state security agencies are paramount within security assemblages. Many approaches to assemblage theory do not sufficiently account for the question of intentionality and power relations within assemblages (Brenner et al. 2011: 236), highlighting instead how agency is diffused into the ether, or is found with non-human actants. My interest lays in the act of assembling and reassembling security, in intentionality, in the craft of bringing diverse elements together. Modular security provides a way of attending to actively-crafted assemblages, in which state security actors plug-in and plug-out, like bricks in a large lego set, public and private security modules. The questions that subsequently arise mirror the main research questions I pose in this dissertation: How is security assembled, to what end, and with which implications? In observing how a modular security toolbox is assembled, the relations embedded in the enlistment of additional modules come to the fore; and the process of assembling and leveraging security illustrates how security assemblages are both situated within specific power relations and simultaneously (re)produce them. Security assemblages thus have important political, social and economic contexts and consequences.

SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP

A growing number of scholars note the differential treatment of citizens by public (Neocleous 2007) and private (Goldstein 2016) security actors. This leads to an all-familiar narrative: that the attempts to prevent and mitigate threats by security actors, whether public or private, results in the unequal (re)distribution of rights, access to resources, and participation in political decision-making.
In this section I take this assertion a step further. As suggested previously, I argue that this differential allocation is not only a side-product of different security arrangements, but can instead be the organizing logic behind state security actors’ assembling of a plurality of public and private security actors, technologies and materialities. To best capture these transformations of state-citizen relations and interfaces, I suggest to turn our attention towards the question of citizenship.

Citizenship can be approached as a clear formal incorporation of a person into a political community, a merit granted by and dependent upon the state. Yet such a definition may not be sufficient to address the construction of citizenship in mobile, transnational or conflict settings, such as in Jerusalem, where Palestinian Jerusalemites are a stateless minority of non-citizens, afforded only revocable Israeli residency permits. I turn instead to a conceptualization of citizenship as substantive citizenship, a qualified distinction dependent upon the provision of rights, resources and political decision-making to individuals or collectives as part of an incorporated political, civil or social community (Holston 2008; Gordon and Stack 2007). Such an approach enables us to examine citizenship through the practices associated with individuals’ inclusion or exclusion within the aforementioned community – and to observe the alternating gradations of citizenship, which entail the unequal distribution of resources and rights within a polity (Holston 2008).

Somers (2008) extends such a conceptualization of substantive citizenship by contending that a defining feature of citizenship is the right to have rights: the recognition of individuals’ entitlement to protection and consideration from their peers, and in extension from the
state. She argues that while a normative perception of citizenship\(^2\) implies the dignity of social inclusion and recognition as a full member of a political and social community (Somers 2008: 67), it is in fact the entitlement to reciprocal but non-equivalent rights and obligations between citizens of equal standing that comprises contemporary citizenship. Substantive citizenship thus, she argues, serves a crucial role in enabling political communities to be established, demarcated, and therefore governed. Holston and Appadurai (1996: 190) suggest that a ‘formal membership […] is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship’. In other words, substantive citizenship, more so than formal citizenship, relates to processes of inclusion and exclusion. It can be claimed and denied, continuously negotiated and granted; it is never complete and always in flux.

The market-oriented economic and political restructuring of modern societies under the banner of neoliberalism has brought a new organizing logic of the state into play (Sassen 2006: 408), highlighting the unstable nature of state-citizen relation, Somers (2008: 77-83) posits that neoliberalism (which she dubs ‘market fundamentalism’) is contractualizing the relations between the government and the people, that is, placing free-market contracts as mediators between citizens and the polity of which they are nominally members. It is, she suggests, a formidable ideological project, one which aims to eliminate other sources of authority other than the markets, including citizens’ rights and agency to affect change in their political system.

Such a reflection on the practices of citizenship allocation is shared by Ong (2006), who argues that citizenship should be seen as conceptual-

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\(^2\) Somers (2008) model lays a low threshold to what is citizenship and who is a citizen, moving away from normative conceptualizations of liberal citizenship, in that citizenship is not seen as a guarantor for social, economic and political rights. On the questionable inclusion of political rights within a conceptualization of differentiated citizenship, see Jamal (2002).
ly deterritorialized, with new topographies of differentiated citizenship emerging in which zones of political entitlement and disenfranchisement are conjured as part of the seemingly ‘neutral’ joint flow of neoliberalism and human-rights discourse. This flow serves to rearticulate, and at times remove altogether, the political capacity of citizens to participate in policy-making, including towards their own security.

The ‘free’ market thus emerges as an important impetus of differential citizenship allocation; but it is not the only one. Chatterjee (2004) introduces his theory on a differential management logic in the governance of (urban) populations, in which state actors conduct a cost-benefit analysis, factoring in profit and stability, in addressing the needs and wants of different population segments. Yet what if we broaden our reading of ‘profit’ to extend from that of capital accumulation, to denote instead the accumulation by dispossession inherent in the organizing logic of settler colonial (Veracini 2015) and ethnocratic (Yiftachal 2006) regimes? Such a perspective highlights how rights, resources and privileges are carefully negotiated and distributed following a consideration in which the balance between colonial or ethnocratic advances and the regime’s stability would be assessed and maintained. Or, with East Jerusalem in mind, such a perspective directs our attention to how substantive citizenship may be (re)distributed following a cost-benefit analysis based on a balancing of the colonial and incorporation dynamics.

In this dissertation I inquire what are the implications of security pluralization and privatization for the (re)production of differentiated citizenship and its negotiation in Jerusalem. I highlight how the Israeli security governance of East Jerusalem has been re-assembled following a colonial and ethnocratic organizing logic that aims to favor the rights and resources afforded to Jewish-Israeli residents of the city at the expanse of its Palestinian population, while maintaining external stability under the guise of a
democratic rule of law. While other scholars (Sassen 2006, Somers 2008, Ong 2006) have noted how a neoliberal organizing logic permeates different scales of governance, I emphasize that alternative organizing logics, such as the colonial and ethnocratic, can be at play too in the privatization and pluralization of governance.

The analysis I put forward in this dissertation illustrates how security provision is inextricably linked to the (re)production of differentiated citizenship – whether the latter is an inadvertent result, a deliberate goal, or something in-between these two polarities. The resulting unequal distribution of rights, resources and political decision-making is facilitated by the active assembling of a modular security toolbox that encompasses public and private security components, as I demonstrate in the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

NEGOTIATING URBAN CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is not (re)produced in a vacuum: the allocation and negotiation of rights, resources and privileges takes place primarily in cities, in urban spaces - arenas of political, social and economic relations. These spaces are not neutral. The contours of the city are designed and planned, their material and technological development subject to state and non-state directives and interventions. Many of those interventions are security-oriented, with a history that can be traced back to Haussmann’s re-design of Paris in the 19th century. Different times call for different measures: the accelerated technological advances of recent decades have enabled an unprecedented degree of security interventions in the everyday urban fabric. While urban policies are often developed in response to local needs and wants, many
security interventions are developed in line with national policies or supranational directives, such as anti-terrorism measures or the protection of critical infrastructure (Aradau 2010). Graham’s (2012) work on urban militarism highlights the role of security and surveillance technologies in re-shaping cities worldwide, warning of a ‘paradigmatic shift that renders cities’ communal and private spaces, as well as their infrastructure – along with their civilian populations – a source of targets and threats’ (Graham 2012: XIII). Whether due to fear of crime (Melgaço 2011), or due to the long shadow cast by terrorism (Coaffee 2016), security interventions increasingly define and delimit the city, with significant implications for the different residents who populate it.

Yet the differential (re)distribution of substantive citizenship is not merely a top-down process: state policies are constrained by political, social, legal and economic considerations, while citizens seek to negotiate their rights, resources and privileges, making claims vis-à-vis both state and non-state actors. Many of these interactions take place in the city, where ‘everyday practices both feed into, and are informed by, imaginations of urban rule and political belonging’ (Jaffe 2018: 2). Through representative politics, cultural expressions, and the everyday practices of dwelling in the city (Müller 2017), residents are able to navigate their positionality vis-à-vis the state, the city authorities, and other urban powerbrokers. The complexity and intricacies of the urban material and political environment contribute to how rights, resources and privileges are claimed, negotiated, and ultimately distributed between different city dwellers.

Holston (2008), in his work on Brazil’s differential citizenship regime, proposes that the urban is an arena of citizenship claims and counter-claims – it is where ‘entrenched regimes of legalized inequality’ (2008: 33) were developed, and it is where insurgent marginalized populations make claims towards redistributive inclusion. These urban claims can take many shapes: claims are made and rights are negotiated not only in established political
sites such as the parliament or the courthouse, but often through the materialities, technologies and practices of everyday life. Such an approach suggests understanding political agency as a wide field that involves both highly visible political actions and quotidian practices of habitation, including people’s interactions with technologies and materialities, and even allocating an agentive role to non-human actants. Such a perspective on urban politics requires delving into the political dimension of how the city is built, inhabited, moved through or contested in the context of material inequality and technological advancements. Some scholars focused on the role of housing and infrastructure in allocating negotiating rights and resources. In his exploration of the politics of the water-supply network in Mumbai, Anand (2011) illustrates how infrastructure can be leveraged by marginalized urban residents in claiming rights and resources from state authorities. Similarly, Müller’s (2017) exploration of the performativity of urban informality suggests that unplanned, ‘irregular’ or ad-hoc urban formations become more than geographical phenomena or an administrative question, representing instead social practices ‘in which social positions are taken, ascribed, and contested’ (Müller 2017: 495). In other words, the urban space simultaneously reproduces, and is reproduced by, differentiated citizenship.

Urban citizenship claims and counter-claims are not made only through political organizing or the material organization of the city, but also through the quotidian practices of those who inhabit it. Lefebvre (1996) suggests that the city as a space of urban spatial inclusion or exclusion should not be understood through the lens of formal citizenship rights, imposed or guaranteed by the state, but rather through everyday urban practices that facilitate or constrain the free flow of people, including both mobility practices and the prominence of places of encounter, sites that enable citizens to ‘rightfully’ partake in the city (Davis 2011). While Lefebvre (1996: 158) notes the prominence of positive encounters of het-
heterogeneous residents and transient passengers in the spaces ‘surrounding politically-drawn jurisdictional borders’, others have explored how urban space can be curated to facilitate the participation of some residents at the expense of others. Nagle (2009), for instance, proposes a focus on the performativity of encounter in ‘divided cities’ dominated by ethno-national boundaries, while Flint (2003) attends to urban ‘spaces of hate’, denoting geographical segregation and political marginalization. The city is a site of both top-down design and bottom-up initiatives; of coincidental encounters and communal animosity, of public and private security interventions and their negotiation, of the re-making of citizenship and the differential allocation of rights, resources and political decision-making. Jerusalem, a city carrying a heavy political and historical burden, is not an exception.

Dissertation Outline

In this dissertation I seek to advance knowledge on the parallel processes of security privatization and security pluralization, by addressing the governance logic articulated in their emergence, and exploring the differential implications to different residents of the city. The city explored in this dissertation is Jerusalem: a holy city, a sprawling city, a city of worship and devotion, violence and occupation, a city that a major part of humanity has looked up to throughout the years. The next chapter, ‘Researching Jerusalem’, discusses the historical and political developments in Jerusalem. This chapter also sets out the methodological tools used in this research, including their scope and limitations, followed by a discussion of the ethical considerations that research on such a politically charged topic in such a contested city entails.
The four empirical chapters that follow each make their own contribution to my elaboration of the assembling of a modular security toolbox, the associated differential (re)production of substantive citizenship, and the negotiation of these processes. Each of these chapters focuses on a case at a different scale, and delves into different spaces. Some of these chapters present a more conceptual and theoretical discussion, while others delve into the lived experience of Jerusalemites through a thick ethnographic account. Combined, the empirical chapters of this dissertation suggest an answer to the questions I pose: the how and why of the security pluralization and privatization, and an outline of the differential implications of these processes to the residents of the city.

I begin by foregrounding my intervention through a conceptualization of modular security, a mode of governance I present in Chapter 3, ‘Governance through Pluralization’, the first empirical chapter of this dissertation. This chapter delves into the emergence of a modular governance logic in security provision, exploring how urban security in East Jerusalem is increasingly diffused into modules that entail different security actors, performances, technologies and materialities. This chapter develops the concept of modular security provision with a particular focus on security pluralization: the delegation of security roles to other social, administrative and regulatory state bodies. I identify four features of modular security provision: first, the heterogeneity of its public and private components; second, the development of reserved capacities; third, the differential multifacetedness of its performances and practices; and fourth, the ubiquity of informal knowledge and information transfer between different actors. This chapter concludes that the modular assembling of security governance complements and replaces traditional policing institutions with other informal disciplinary, punitive, statecrafting and dispossessing powers, in a manner that unequally distributes rights and resources to different categories of urban residents.

In Chapter 4, ‘Crafting and Reinforcing the State through Security Privatization’, I take this exploration a step further, discussing in detail how and
why state authorities pursue security privatization. This chapter, with a focus on the spaces of Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds in East Jerusalem, explores the emergence of a public-private security assemblage at these compounds, where security provision has been outsourced to private security companies. Using this case study, I argue that the privatization of security provision can reinforce, rather than erode, state capacity by contributing to state actors’ ability to pursue the territorialization of areas beyond the full grasp of the state. I posit that state authority and responsibility can be diffused into multiple nodes of private authority in the operation, performance, and supervision of security and violence, while at the same time keeping the state monopoly over legitimate violence intact. I suggest that such an outcome can be desirable to state security actors, as outsourcing security provision enables them to differentially distribute (in)security while evading accountability and deflecting public and legal challenges to controversial state-led projects.

Chapter 5 moves to discuss the differential implications of both security pluralization and privatization, focusing on checkpoints in and around Jerusalem and analyzing the material, affective and temporal dimensions of Israeli security interventions at these key political sites through the lens of (un)certainty. This chapter, ‘Outsourced Security and the Politics of Uncertainty’ suggests that (un)certainty can be employed as a mode of governance. I propose that uncertainty can be strategically employed and adjusted by public and private security actors through irregular operation; managerial obfuscation; lack of accountability; and contradictory or oft-altered directives and regulatory frameworks. I explore how Israeli security actors enlist a plurality of actors, technologies and materialities to differentially produce (un)certainty at the checkpoints, facilitating the mobility of some residents while hindering the movement of others. The chapter concludes that under the banner of security provision, the possibility, reliability and predictability of residents’ entrance and exit from the city serve to shape different patterns of (im)mobility, economic dependency, and social and political fragmentation.
Chapter 6, ‘Negotiating Citizenship and Countering Jerusalem’s Residency Revocation Policy’, attends to the home as a site of citizenship (re)production, discussing how residents negotiate security pluralization and privatization through a focus on domestic space. In this chapter, I explore the Israeli policy of residency revocation in Jerusalem and how the city’s Palestinian residents encounter and negotiate this policy. While this Israeli policy is pursued through a plurality of public and private modules within the Israeli security toolbox, this chapter focuses on Palestinian residents, exploring how people can respond to a reinforced pluralized and privatized security provision by assembling their own toolbox of negotiation strategies, albeit with a limited scope. I suggest that Palestinian Jerusalemites do this through a performance of the home, which I explore along the distinct dimensions of socio-material practices, the mobilization of social relations and the procurement of bureaucratic documentation. They do so, I suggest, as a citizenship enactment aimed at maintaining limited rights, resources and mobility in the face of urban exclusion and demographic engineering.

In Chapter 7, the conclusion to this dissertation, I bring together my findings from the empirical chapters, and highlight their significance to ongoing debates on privatized and pluralized security provision, on citizenship, and on the political, spatial and social developments in Jerusalem. I suggest different pathways for future research, which might extend the scope of this dissertation, and highlight the applicability of this dissertation’s findings to other cases in which security assemblages emerge, and are negotiated and resisted by (urban) citizens.