The modular security toolbox
Assembling state and citizenship in Jerusalem
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RESEARCHING JERUSALEM
I arrived to Jerusalem to commence my fieldwork on a chilly day in February 2015. Patches of snow dotted the streets, contributing to the amusement of children and the consternation of commuters. The city’s streets were quiet, but that calm was deceiving: the anger and discontent that had fueled the violent clashes in the summer of 2014 still bubbled beneath the city’s surface. Visible signs of Israeli security agents and technologies were everywhere: special police forces cruising the streets on their motorcycles, surveillance cameras on every corner, border policewomen patrolling the city’s commercial pedestrian zone, trying to identify Palestinians and demanding their identity documents, and bored security guards checking the bags of shoppers while tapping on their smartphones. This was the start of the eleven months of fieldwork I conducted in Jerusalem: from February to September 2015 and September to November 2016. My months in Jerusalem would help me understand the ubiquity and diversity of Israeli security interventions in Jerusalem, and how Palestinian Jerusalemites negotiate and resist them. My fieldwork findings, however, must be contextualized in relation to the longer history of Jerusalem and how it became the city it is today.

In this chapter I discuss Jerusalem’s historical and political developments, highlighting its transformation from a small city dominated by its holy sites and the co-existence of multiple religious and ethnic communities, to a sprawling city characterized by spatial segregation, vast inequalities and violent dispossession. I place a particular emphasis on the Israeli re-making of the city after the occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967. Following this necessarily condensed historical overview, I discuss the methodology employed in this research: I present why, how, where and with whom I conducted my fieldwork, elaborating the different methods and data sources. I then proceed to discuss the limitations and difficulties I faced during this research, and reflect on my own positionality as a Jewish-Israeli researcher in the field. Lastly, I consider some of the ethical
dilemmas that this research entailed, including the difficulties of protect-
ing and representing the individual interlocutors and larger communities
I worked with over the course of this research.

JERUSALEM AND ITS HISTORIES

History is an exercise in controversy: it is something we teach, study, tell
to one another and inevitably argue over. This is certainly the case with
the history of Israel/Palestine, where contrasting narratives – ‘social con-
structions that coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and current
events’ (Bar-Tal and Salomon 2006: 3) – often curtail discussion and mu-
tual understanding. A large number of historians have examined the events
that unfolded in Israel/Palestine over the past century; each did so from a
different ideological and historiographical perspective. While listing them
all here would be a daunting task, a range of notable narrations are offered
by Shapira (2012); Caplan (2011); Pappe (2014); and Abu-Sitta (2016).
The brief historical overview I present here is neither a comprehensive nor
a neutral account; it is a summary of what I propose readers should know
in order to understand the discussion that ensues on contemporary plural-
ized and privatized security provision in Jerusalem, and the implications
for the city’s different residents.

As for myself, like for many others natives of Israel, Jerusalem was a city
that I both knew well, and did not know at all. In school, I was taught ex-
tensively of some of the city’s historical tales – King David, the Kingdom
of Judea, the Maccabean revolt, and how the city was rescued from Arab
invaders by Israeli forces in 1948, before it was fully liberated and united
in 1967. This partial historical narrative does not do justice to the myriad
transformations and re-births the city has undergone during its history, or
to its current predicament as a city divided between those deemed worthy
of enhanced protection, and those designated as a security threat.

Violence, discrimination and insecurity were not always prominent features
of Jerusalem. In earlier eras, Jerusalem was a heterogeneous city of mul-
tiple communities and religions, who were largely able to ‘triage conflict
through commerce and the civic’ (Sassen 2017). Archeological findings
testify to an ‘earlier era of co-existence’ (Greenberg 2009: 47) in the city,
with close relations between the different urban constituencies, including
the Christian, Muslim and Jewish communities. These relations continued
largely peacefully throughout the period of Ottoman rule, which spanned
400 years (1517-1917). The late 19th century brought about a new dy-
namic: with the advent of Zionism, a trickle of mostly European Jewish
migrants began arriving in Palestine, some of them settling in Jerusalem.
Unlike the city’s preexisting Jewish communities, many of the new arriv-
als had formidable financial reserves, complemented by political privileges
and diplomatic protection granted on the basis of their foreign citizenship
(Jacobson 2011: 10). During these years the city expanded rapidly, extend-
ing into neighborhoods beyond the walls of the Old City, and benefited
from improved infrastructure, including a rail line to the port city of Jaffa.

Towards the end of the First World War, the British army invaded Pal-
estine, ending Ottoman imperial rule and annexing Palestine to the
British Empire. In December 1917, the British army occupied Jeru-
salem. Their rule was not an easy one. Cajoled by the Balfour declara-
tion, in which the British government committed itself to enabling the
establishment of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’, thousands of
new Jewish migrants arrived in Jerusalem. The city continued to devel-
op (unequally), with new Jewish neighborhoods built en masse (Pappe
2004: 49-61). At the same time, Palestinian dissent – from both Mus-
lim and Christian Palestinians – was growing beneath the surface, fed by fears of a loss of land and sovereignty under British rule. Violence ensued: riots in 1920, 1929, and especially during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 (Swedenburg 2014). Jerusalem's Haram-al-Sharif, the site of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Golden Dome, became a national symbol, and a rallying cry, for nascent Palestinian nationalism. The fragile co-existence between the religious communities that had characterized the city for generations was gone, replaced by spatial segregation, parallel institutions and unequal service provision between Jewish-Israelis3 and Palestinians (of both Muslim and Christian denominations) – features of Jerusalem until this very day.

The Second World War, and the horrors of the Holocaust, reverberated throughout Palestine, and particularly in Jerusalem. New European Jewish migrants arrived on the shores of Palestine, escaping the German plan of extermination and its aftermath. Some Jewish residents of Palestine joined the British army in order to support the Allies' war effort. After the war, support for the establishment of a Jewish state grew among the international community. The UN partition resolution of 1947 envisaged Jerusalem as part of an international corpus separatum, a multilaterally administrated region stretching to include Bethlehem in the south, and a large tract of the Judean desert in the east, which would guarantee the freedom of worship at the city's holy sites. Yet that plan never materialized, with Jerusalem instead becoming the site of protracted battles between Zionist militias (later the Israeli army), the Jordanian army and local Palestinian militias during the 1948 war.

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3 I use the term 'Jewish-Israelis' to describe citizens of Israel who are affiliated with the national Jewish collective developed in Israel/Palestine after 1948. I use the term 'Palestinians' broadly, to include the Arab-speaking residents of Israel/Palestine, of any religious denomination, including their descendants in exile. Later in this dissertation, I differentiate between Palestinians based on their residency: West Bank residents, Jerusalemites, Gazans, etc.
These battles scarred the city, with thousands of Palestinians uprooted from their homes in what became West Jerusalem (Cohen 2007: 27), and Jewish-Israelis forced to leave the Jewish quarter of the Old City. At the end of the 1948 war, the city was divided between a newly-formed Israel, and Jordan. West Jerusalem was unilaterally declared the capital of Israel, while East Jerusalem remained a frontier city under Jordanian rule, a city waiting to reassume its role as the Palestinian capital city. The division of the city elicited new imaginaries of national claims over the city, with Jewish-Israelis grieving over the loss of the Old City and its holy Jewish sites, such as the Wailing Wall, while the dispersed Palestinians considered Jerusalem a near-singular symbol of endurance and steadfastness following the Nakba, the uprooting of the majority of Palestinians from their homeland in 1948-1949 (Pappe 2004: 129-135).

This all changed in June 1967, when the Israeli army occupied the entire West Bank, including East Jerusalem, during the Six Days War. After the Israeli army rolled into the city, an area of 70 km$^2$ surrounding the Old City of Jerusalem (Jordanian East Jerusalem included only six km$^2$) was separated from the rest of the West Bank and declared a part of a ‘united Jerusalem’. The Green Line, which represented the sovereign national boundary of Israel established in 1948, was ignored; instead, the Israeli government drew a new municipal line on the map, demarcating the borders of Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem (Hasson 2017: 44-48). Several dozen Palestinian villages, hamlets, neighborhoods and even a refugee camp were now brought together into a motley collection with Israeli West Jerusalem, to be a part of a new city under Israeli rule. It is in this ‘reunited’ city that my research takes place, focusing on the area known as East Jerusalem, occupied and annexed by Israel in 1967.

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4 East Jerusalem was de facto annexed by the Israeli government in June 1967, when the municipal line was re-drawn. In 1980, the annexation of East Jerusalem was completed de jure, following the passing of the Jerusalem Basic Law in the Israeli Knesset. The annexation has never been recognized by the international community (Cohen 2007: 30-32).
GOVERNING JERUSALEM, RE-MAKING JERUSALEM

‘East Jerusalem is neither here [Israel] nor there [the West Bank]’, an Israeli former policymaker told me in a conversation discussing municipal policies in East Jerusalem. ‘It’s stuck in our throat but we refuse to swallow’, he added. His comments reflect the conundrum that defines the Israeli approach to East Jerusalem. As in other parts of the Occupied Palestinian territories, the Israeli administration in Jerusalem is torn between the application of brute military force and rule through bureaucratic and legal machinations (Azoulay and Ophir 2007). In this section I discuss the development of the Israeli system of governance in East Jerusalem following its occupation and subsequent annexation in 1967. I go on to discuss the re-making of the city in light of the Israeli ideology of a ‘united’ Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Jewish state, and the myriad security intervention that accompanied this process.

The occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem did not bring about the full incorporation of Palestinian East Jerusalem and its residents into Israel. Palestinian Jerusalemites might reside in an Israeli-annexed city, but the Israeli authorities deem them stateless. Issued with Israeli residency ID cards, they are legally considered foreigners with a permanent residency permit. The Israeli authorities seek to make them ‘disappear’ (as I detail in Chapter 6, on the Israeli residency revocation policy), while simultaneously rendering them ‘subjects of the state’s bureaucratic machine’ (Tawil-Souri 2011a: 90). Contrary to Israeli political and legal claims that Jerusalem’s Palestinian community is entitled to equal services with equal rights, there is little doubt as to the discrimination and marginalization of the city’s Palestinians, who are involved in a continuous struggle to access the most fundamental rights and services. Palestinian East Jerusalem is
serviced by parallel and unequal systems of public transport, utilities, educational facilities and public health institutions, which join other markers of segregation to produce countless visible and invisible boundaries within Jerusalem (Dumper 2014).

Shortly after the city’s occupation in 1967, the Israeli government began the large-scale expropriation of Palestinian land and property, enabling the construction of large Jewish-only settlements at strategic positions in and around Jerusalem. Many of the new settlements have been populated with Orthodox-Jewish Israelis, whose numbers have risen dramatically in recent decades (Hasson 2017: 194), and with newly arrived Jewish migrants to Israel. The settlements’ spatial location, in the empty spaces between Palestinian localities, was not planned according to an urban logic of connectivity and conviviality, but as part of a political and military apparatus aimed at preventing a possible future division of the city (Pullan 2011: 17). In fact, the location of these settlements served to sever Palestinian urban continuity, fragmenting the sections of the West Bank north and south of the city and limiting the relations between Palestinian communities (see Figure 1 for a map of Greater Jerusalem). The result is a parallel city of enclaves, with Jewish-Israeli settlements built on hilltops, looking towards but never at their Palestinian neighbors. The settlements, bland suburbs with thin Jerusalem-stone facades covering buildings of cement and bricks, were often built by the same Palestinian laborers whose land was expropriated for their construction.

Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighborhoods and villages have been encroached upon by the expropriation of land for Jewish-Israeli settlements, but also by Israeli-declared national parks (Volinz 2018), and more recently by the Israeli separation wall. At the same time, since 1967, the Palestinian population of Jerusalem has grown more than fourfold. The result has
Figure 1. Map of Greater Jerusalem.
Source: Ir Amim (2018)
been the dense growth of Palestinian localities, many of which have been transformed from rural villages into urban neighborhoods with narrow alleys and limited infrastructure. As the Israeli authorities rarely provide Palestinian Jerusalemites with building permits (Braverman 2007), most of the new houses and extensions have been built without a permit, serving as a justification for the Jerusalem municipality to demolish hundreds of Palestinian houses over the decades since 1967 (Braverman 2007: 334).

Palestinian Jerusalemites continue to play an important role in Palestinian political and economic life. Strong ties exist between Jerusalem and the Palestinian communities of the West Bank, which consider Jerusalem not only as their prospective state capital, but also as an economic, social, cultural and transport hub. These ties have continued to prosper after the 1967 Israeli occupation of the city (Chiodelli 2013: 417). The Oslo peace process in the 1990s prompted both Israelis and Palestinians to envisage the actual division of Jerusalem, as was discussed at the negotiation table. Over the last two decades, however, as negotiations stalled, the Israeli authorities have sought to further sever and dispel the relations between Jerusalem and the West Bank.5 First, Israeli authorities began to severely limit access of West Bank Palestinians to Jerusalem through a complex system of checkpoints, roadblocks and bypass roads (Tawil-Souri 2011b). Secondly, since the uprising of the Second Intifada in 2000, Israeli security services proceeded to violently suppress Palestinian political, social and cultural life in Jerusalem, including closing down the Palestinian Authority offices in the city (Cohen 2007: 110-111). Yet it is the construction of the Israeli Separation Wall, built around and within Jerusalem, coupled with the intensification of the residency revocation policy, which has effected

5 The relations between Palestinian East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip were severed much earlier: first in 1948, and again when the Israeli authorities began to isolate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank and East Jerusalem in the early 1990s. At the time of writing, the Gaza Strip has been under Israeli-imposed siege for over a decade. For further reading on the historical ties between the Gaza region and Jerusalem, see Abu-Sitta (2016).
a more definitive detachment, politically and spatially, of Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, and the increased confinement of its Palestinian residents.

Construction of the Israeli Separation Wall around and within Jerusalem began in 2003, and was finalized in its current configuration in 2009 (see Amir 2011). The wall’s route, both in and outside of Jerusalem, runs deep within the Occupied Palestinian territories, and serves to annex large swathes of land, including Israeli Jewish-only settlements, to the ‘Israeli’ side of the wall (Chiodelli 2013: 420). Yet, rather than being planned to segregate Jewish-Israelis from Palestinians, as the wall does elsewhere (Amir 2011: 768-770), the separation wall’s route in East Jerusalem (See Figure 1) serves to separate the city’s Palestinian residents from the rest of the West Bank; it separates Palestinian neighborhoods, towns, villages and refugee camps from one another. Palestinians feel the implications of this separation acutely, from a major reduction in trade, social and political ties (Cohen 2007: 186), to the further dependency of the Palestinian workforce in Jerusalem on Israeli employers (Shtern 2017: 7), to – contrary to Israeli plans – the return to Jerusalem of thousands of Palestinians who had previously relocated to other parts of the West Bank (see Chapter 6).

The lack of meaningful negotiations on the city’s future, the demise of Palestinian Jerusalemites’ recognized leadership due to internal divisions and Israeli arrests (Cohen 2007), and the separation of Jerusalem from the West Bank mean that Palestinian East Jerusalem is stuck between a rock and a hard place. With mostly rhetorical support from the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority and from parts of the international community (Bicchi 2016), Palestinian Jerusalemites are mostly left to fend for themselves. Their predicament has led to repeated escalations in recent years: violent outbursts including large-scale protests, unorganized riots, and solitary attacks directed against Israeli security agents and Jewish-Israeli settlers.
Israeli security actors make use of a plurality of enlisted capacities from public and private actors (See Chapter 4), and of different forms of lethal and non-lethal violence, to suppress Palestinian dissent. In the absence of a peaceful political solution on the horizon, the US decision to break with international consensus and move its embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018 has only exacerbated the risk of future outbursts of violence.

In light of Israel’s security interventions in East Jerusalem and its differentiating policies and practices towards the city’s residents, scholars have struggled to find the correct term to describe Jerusalem. Some call it a ‘frontier’ city (Bollens 2001), many others a ‘divided’ (Calame and Charlesworth 2011) or a ‘contested’ city (Pullan 2011), and recently it has been dubbed a neo-Apartheid city (Yacobi 2015). All of these labels hold truth, and capture different perspectives on the city’s political, spatial and social configuration. Yet above all else, the Jerusalem I stepped into was a broken city. I use the term broken deliberately, to denote that someone, or something, broke it. The territory and its people are fractured. Israeli actors continuously re-make the city in attempts to address the disjuncture between the façade of united city under democratic Israeli rule, and the multitude of Israeli security interventions employed to subdue the city’s Palestinian residents and their aspirations to recognition, equality and statehood. Jerusalem, as seen through the pages of this dissertation, is an amalgam of such contradictions. It is a city of segregation and discrimination, but also a city of encounters and dialogue. A city whose history is simultaneously denied and celebrated. It is a city of unparalleled cruelty and abundant charity, of spiritual enlightenment and bureaucratic torture, a city that its inhabitants and visitors, myself certainly included, continuously struggle to understand.
**METHODOLOGY**

The best way to understand the lived reality of the transformed Israeli security provision in Jerusalem, and its implications for different urban residents, is to be there, partaking in the city’s life, spending time with the people who provide security, with those whose lives they affect, and observing, posing questions, and especially, listening. This calls for an ethnographic approach, a research design that can scratch beneath the surface, unearthing how security is produced or misused in different spaces and vis-à-vis different residents. Ethnography is not just an additional method of data collection, but implies a way of seeing, of becoming simultaneously an outsider and an insider (Wolcott 1999: 137), of gaining insights through your entanglement with others, and of reflecting on the your own experiences in the context of the relations you form with others (Cerwonka 2008: 28-32). During my eleven months of fieldwork, I drew on a variety of ethnographic and other qualitative research methods, which I discuss in this section, before reflecting on the limitations and ethical considerations that my research design has entailed.

As I arrived in Jerusalem in February 2015, I already had identified where – in which spaces, and social and professional networks – I would be able to do empirical research on Israeli security provision and its differentiated (re) production of rights, allocation of resources and political decision-making. For the larger part of my fieldwork, I spent time in locations where pluralized and privatized Israeli security provision takes place and affects residents of the city. This included long hours spent in Palestinian residential neighborhoods throughout East Jerusalem, in or near Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds, at the checkpoints limiting movement between East Jerusalem and others parts of the occupied West Bank, and at or near the ‘seam line’, the series of unofficial frontiers between Jewish-Israeli and
Palestinian spaces in Jerusalem (see Pullan 2011). Didn’t only observe and note: I actively sought to make new contacts with different residents of Jerusalem – both Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis – as well as with Israeli security agents. Together with my pre-existing contacts, I quickly got acquainted with different Jerusalemites and security agents who would willingly share with me their stories and perspective. Often, I would visit proceed to visit interlocutors, residents of Jerusalem, in their home or place of business; at other times I would accompany them on their travel and commute around Jerusalem. On these occasions and beyond I drew on the key ethnographic method of participant observation, which involves researchers seeking to become embedded within the groups and spaces that are the focus of their research. My role varied between active participation and observation, between deliberate immersion and being a silent listener, and involved corresponding types of notetaking (Emerson et al. 2011). Specifically, I sought to experience myself parts of what Jerusalemites, and those who should provide them with security, go through in their daily lives, focusing on particular security practices and interactions, and spending as much time as possible with security agents and those residents affected by their work.

In addition, I conducted interviews with numerous interlocutors. In total, I conducted 92 semi-structured interviews in the course of my fieldwork, which involved preparing questions and topics of discussion in advance according to scope of my research. This total included interviews with 45 Palestinian and 18 Jewish-Israeli residents of Jerusalem from different socio-economic backgrounds and neighborhoods, twelve interviews with Israeli security personnel and policymakers, and 17 interviews with employees or activists at different NGOs and advocacy groups in Jerusalem. These interviews varied in length, and were mostly recorded through jotted notes rather than audio recordings (for a discussion on language, gender and recording, see below). Of the 45 interviews with Palestinian Jerusalemite residents, 28 interviewees were male (62.3%) and 17 interviewees were fe-
male (37.7%). Of the Jewish-Israeli residents I interviewed, ten were male (55.6%) and eight were female (44.4%). All the Israeli security agents I interviewed were male.6

Sixteen of my interviews with residents were accompanied by participatory transects, a technique of systematically ‘travelling together’ through a delimited area (Bernard 2012), during which I asked my interlocutor for commentary on every house, institution or business we passed along the way. On several occasions, my respondents initiated a walking transect spontaneously, while at other times I prompted them to chart a path for us to explore. In both cases, the data elicited during the transects required the full participation of the respondents, who were often enthused by the prospect of speaking of their neighborhood and the security encounters they had witnessed there in the past. During transects, my respondents would often introduce me to new interlocutors, whom I would then be able to meet and interview later.

These ethnographic methods were complemented with secondary data analysis, drawing on a range of documents related to Israeli security provision in Jerusalem. Some of these are public documents available online, while others were presented to me by research participants. These documents include public tenders, commercial contracts, court and parliamentary protocols, as well as media reports in textual, video and audio formats. Drawing on this range of methods and data, I was to obtain valuable insights into the state-led assembling of public and private security actors, technologies and materialities, and its implications for different residents of the city. However, considering the contested nature of researching security provision in Jerusalem, these methods had obvious limitations and involved a number of ethical dilemmas.

6 On how I gained access to different interviewees, see below. This break-down does not cover the class and socio-economic distribution of my interviewees. See the section on language and access for further discussion.
ACCESS AND POSITIONALITY, OR ON DOING RESEARCH IN DIFFICULT SETTINGS

Every researcher brings much more baggage to their fieldwork than fits in a suitcase: we bring with us our own perceptions, expectations and misconceptions. We bring our own positionality – who we are in terms of gender, ethnicity, educational background and socio-economic status. We usually also bring along some necessary skills, a short list of initial contacts and a fair amount of optimism. Yet ethnographic research is often difficult. Reality rarely cooperates with the habit of assuming that ‘the world is a laboratory from which [we] pick and choose sites for fieldwork’ (Navaro-Yashin 2012: xi); people seldom long to be researched, certainly not by outsiders, and aspiring ethnographers often struggle with the challenge of gaining access and navigating the social, political, linguistic and financial hurdles that complicate their research design. The feasibility of our research, to a large degree, is the result of who we are when we enter the field: our capacities and how we relate to the phenomena we research.

When I arrived to start my fieldwork in Jerusalem, I felt a sense of both familiarity and estrangement: as a Jewish-Israeli researcher, Jerusalem was a place I had visited frequently before, the topic of many discussions, marked by a predicament familiar from my prior political engagements. At the same time, I was not entirely at home: with the prospect of working extensively on Palestinian East Jerusalem, I knew I had to work hard to forge the social necessary connections to gain access to its various spaces and groups of residents. I was yet to encounter many of the political, social and linguistic intricacies that would prove challenging later during my research stay.
I decided early on not to request official permission from Israeli security actors to conduct research on their management of security operations, or on their coordination with other state and non-state bodies. This was a conscious decision taken after much deliberation, in order to avoid the risks of limiting my research through strict confidentiality agreements, or of associating my research with the Israeli authorities, thereby damaging the reputation of my Palestinian research participants and pre-emptively hindering my access to other, informal interlocutors. Instead, I was able to gather data by spending many hours ‘on the ground’, particularly at sites of enhanced Israeli security presence. My arrival as a Hebrew-speaking man of Jewish-Israeli background rarely caused alarm on the part of security agents. In fact, security guards and street-level policemen often welcomed the opportunity to alleviate their boredom and talk to me at length on their work and experiences. Sometimes a superior officer would come along, questioning my presence; usually, the truthful reassurance on my part that ‘I’m a PhD candidate conducting research’ would quell their concerns. I was further able, through references from other interlocutors, to arrange for interviews with former security agents, who were often disgruntled with their former employers and thus more inclined to reflect critically about their own work.

My introductions to Jewish-Israeli residents and security guards were often facilitated by the cultural and ethnic affinity I shared with some of my interlocutors. In a national context where intra-Jewish ethno-class affiliation plays a major role in housing, education and employment (Tzfadia 2000), my own background as a Jewish-Israeli researcher of mixed European and Middle Eastern descent presented me with a wide leeway in building rapport with different interlocutors. In a settler colonial society encumbered by endless questions of identity, belonging and marginalization, my background allowed me to perform a versatile version of myself as I met, talked to, and sometimes became friends with my interlocutors in the field.
I found it easy to make contact with Jewish-Israeli Jerusalemites invested in ideological projects, both right-wing settlers and liberal and left-wing peace and human rights activists. These varied groups were glad to share their perspectives and allow me a glimpse into their work, and they often opened up their homes to me during my repeated visits. While they might be far from a representative sample of Jewish-Israeli Jerusalemites, I found that both right-wing settlers, and left-wing or liberal activists, had an above-average familiarity with Israeli security provision in the city, and were often able to direct me, through a ‘snowball’ sampling, to additional interlocutors.

Unsurprisingly perhaps, research with and among Palestinian Jerusalemites confronted me with more difficulties. There is an inherent difficulty in having a Jewish-Israeli researcher conduct research into Palestinian residents’ experiences with, and perceptions of, Israeli security provision. Why would the occupied wish to cooperate (or collaborate) with a member of the occupier group? As a population under decades of Israeli occupation, it is no wonder that suspicion is rife, and fears abound over the danger of disclosing private information to the Israeli authorities, or of being designated as a potential informant by other Palestinians. Furthermore, research techniques perceived as mundane elsewhere – such as map-making, diagram drawing, measuring, surveilling and photographing – are all potential threats to Palestinian residents fearful of police incursions, house demolitions and property expropriation. These suspicions remained difficult to overcome, particularly in light of my own background as a Jewish-Israeli researcher. I would often face either polite rejection or a deliberate avoidance of my requests to meet with potential interlocutors.

I sought to overcome these hurdles by highlighting my own political engagements, which included prior work with Palestinian activists in Jerusalem and elsewhere; having positive references from Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli...
raeli and international contacts often enabled initial access. I then focused on gaining the trust of specific Palestinian informal gatekeepers, men and women who were engaged in various local and national political projects, and who could then vouch for my trustworthiness to other Palestinian residents. Many of these were members of neighborhood committees, which are informal, multi-partisan and non-religious associations, and their interventions in the governance of everyday life in East Jerusalem contributed to the facilitation of my research within their neighborhoods. Many of my Palestinian interlocutors were well aware of my own political inclinations, often due to the circumstances of our initial introduction, and saw my research interest as an opportunity to share their perspectives with a wider international audience. My affiliation with a foreign university had a role in this as well.

My research was not left unaffected by the political reality in Jerusalem. During and following periods of violent escalations in the city, particularly during my follow-up fieldwork in late 2016, I faced further difficulties making contact with both existing and new Palestinian interlocutors, who were too afraid, busy or angry to devote time to my research endeavors. These waves of tension ebbed and flowed throughout my fieldwork, changing by the day in response to the latest events in the city. By staying for a longer period in Jerusalem, by making contacts with Palestinian residents from diverse backgrounds and from different parts of the city, each facing their own distinct difficulties, I was able to continue my research even in times of heightened tension.

To both Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian interlocutors I had to repeatedly make clear that while my research indeed has a political dimension, in its critical approach to political questions regarding security, rights and the state, I could not promise a definite contribution to changing Jerusalem’s political predicament. That does not negate the ‘expression of solidarity’
(Rasch and van Drunen 2017: 26-27) embedded in my collaboration with research participants, expressed in the production of alternative knowledge and its analysis, the proposition of new directions of research, and in the dissemination of their stories in this dissertation. Solidarity does not preclude a critical distance: the stories I was told are, of course, not facts but varied representations of a difficult reality. Often these are narratives told from memory of past events, sometimes with confusion or disjunctions, or in an attempt to please the listener. Nordstrom (2007: 251-252) helpfully comments on the difficulties of ascertaining the value of a story when conducting research in a conflict context, suggesting that ‘everyone has a story, complete with vested interests, and all the stories collide into contentious assemblages of partial truths, political fictions, personal foibles, military propaganda, and cultural lore. [...] In the midst of wars of propaganda and justification, the most silenced stories [...] are generally the most authentic’. This assertion rings true in Jerusalem, where the most basic knowledge on the city’s political and social power imbalance is often lost, or ignored, when claims of complexity are used to negate demands for change.

My own linguistic capacities posed some limitations in the context of this research. I speak fluent Hebrew and English, with only a basic understanding of Arabic. With Jewish-Israeli interlocutors, I had no problem communicating freely, in terms of both language and cultural nuances. With Palestinian Jerusalemites, the question of language remained relevant throughout my fieldwork. I conducted most of my research with Palestinian Jerusalemites in Hebrew, which is spoken well by the many Palestinians, often those from a lower socio-economic background, who work in the Israeli labour market (Shtern 2017). The conversations in Hebrew allowed many of my interlocutors to provide an in-depth account of their encounters with Israeli security agents, with whom they usually communicate in Hebrew.
However, conducting research in Hebrew confronted me with two particular challenges. First, my Palestinian interlocutors would often replace expressions and terms they would use in Arabic with vastly different ones in Hebrew. For example, while in Arabic the Israeli police would often be called ‘the occupation police’ or even plainly ‘the occupation’, in Hebrew many Palestinians would use the term ‘the security forces’, Israeli newspeak for the wide array of Israeli security agencies. Once I learned the corresponding phrases in Arabic, I could inquire better to whom or what such terms referred. Second, the language I used in conducting research had implications in terms of gender: Palestinian Jerusalemite men are much more likely to speak Hebrew than women, therefore limiting my access. I sought to overcome this imbalance by deliberately seeking female interlocutors, particularly in the later stages of my fieldwork. Yet as a male, foreign researcher in a largely conservative community, this proved difficult. I was slowly able to extend my research to female Palestinian interlocutors, either through their connections to academic or educational and political NGOs, or through references from male interlocutors, often their husbands or brothers. Despite the inherent limitations of these sampling tactics, this allowed me to make initial contact or conduct productive interviews either in Hebrew, or English, or in Arabic with translation offered by another interlocutor.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethnographic research entails significant ethical considerations, with which researchers can engage explicitly or implicitly. Questions of ethics do not disappear following pre-approval from an ethical board; rather, they accompanied my research from its inception until after publication, from
pre-fieldwork preparations, and during the months in the field, and later, during the data analysis and writing stages. When conducting research on security and rights, in an area fraught with conflict and violence, ethical considerations become particularly acute, as the research can pose real risks to researchers, their interlocutors and the communities with which they work. In this section I discuss several ethical dilemmas, including the safety of my interlocutors and the larger communities with which I worked; and reflect on the representation and dissemination of my research findings.

Residents of Jerusalem, and of East Jerusalem in particular, are not afforded safety from political violence in their city. Yet this risk is distributed far from evenly. Jewish-Israeli residents, including settlers and security agents, are rarely the victims of sporadic Palestinian violence, and are almost never on the receiving end of politically-motivated Israeli state violence. Palestinian Jerusalemites, on the other hand, are subjected to violence, sometimes on a daily basis, by a wide range of state and non-state Israeli security agents. During the course of this research, some of my interlocutors suffered from shootings, beatings, sexual harassment and violent interrogations by Israeli security agents. Others were arrested, imprisoned without trial, or deported from their home city without due process. There was little I could do to protect them from the violence inflicted by the Israeli authorities. However, there was, and still is, much I could do to prevent negative consequences to their willing participation in my research.

The first step is consent, or more specifically, informed consent. I presented my own role, and briefly my research, to all my interlocutors. When

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7 There are exceptions. On two occasions I witnessed politically motivated attacks by Israeli security agents against Jewish-Israeli citizens: the first during protests by the Israeli Ethiopian community against police brutality in April 2015, and the second time during protests by Jewish extremists calling for the destruction of the al-Aqsa mosque and the reconstruction of the biblical Jewish temple. Certain Jewish-Orthodox groups are also known to be occasionally subjected to police violence.
making significant contact with a Palestinian commuter at a checkpoint, or with an Israeli security guard at a settlement compound, I made sure to state my research interest, affiliation and a concise description of my research. Yet as Hodgson (1999: 202) noted, ‘much of our “data” is collected through informal conversations, casual observations, and other unobtrusive interactions for which it is impossible to request “informed consent” at every turn’. Researchers’ responsibility does not end with consent, but instead extends to other forms of accountability towards the communities under inquiry, and the people who voluntarily agree to share their knowledge with an outsider.

I sought to mitigate the risks to my interlocutors in several ways. First, I have sought to fully anonymize all personal details in the pages of this dissertation. I use pseudonyms throughout, and have further anonymized places of work, specific political affiliation and other details which might disclose their identity. I rarely anonymize place of residence or civil status, as in most cases I judged those to pose minimal risk to my interlocutors, while potentially providing valuable contextual information. I informed all of my interlocutors of how and where I will use the data I collected during our meetings; even in cases where my interlocutors pointedly asked that I share their name and affiliation, such as with some political activists, I have still anonymized their identifying information. Furthermore, I respected interviewees’ wishes regarding recordings. While I brought with me to the field a sturdy yet discreet recording device, in many cases interviewees requested not to be recorded, fearing a possible leak and potential reprisals from the Israeli authorities (in case of Palestinians interviewees) or from their (former) employers, in the case of Israeli security agents. I later understood that interviews without a recording device might often be more conducive to building rapport with interlocutors, replacing formalities with a more relaxed discussion. Peabody et al. (1990: 454) suggest that ‘the more sensitive and personalized the information, the less appropriate
is the usage of a tape recorder’; their assertion proved relevant in many of the interviews I conducted. When I was asked not to record or decided not to do so myself, I attempted to produce as detailed jottings of the interviews as possible. In those cases where I did record the interviews, I kept the recordings in a safe, encrypted digital storage, from which I later transcribed the interviews in full myself.

The research I conducted on the Israeli residency revocation policy in Jerusalem and its negotiation by Palestinian Jerusalemites, presented in Chapter 6, posed particular ethical dilemmas. There are few issues as sensitive in East Jerusalem as the residency revocation issue, and particularly the negotiation and performance of residency by Palestinian Jerusalemites. Many of my interlocutors in Jerusalem were happy to share at length their experiences and opinions on any other urban or national issue, only to fall silent when I asked them about the threat of residency revocation. This was hardly surprising; I could see in their expressions the fear that divulging personal information could endanger their own legal status. These fears highlighted the ethical concerns I encountered. I have sought to address these by limiting the exposure of both individual interviewees (through anonymization), and of the particular practices used by Palestinian Jerusalemites to maintain their legal status. In this case, a fully detailed discussion of Palestinians’ negotiation practices could jeopardize the capacity of other Palestinian Jerusalemites to evade residency revocation, and to maintain their right to live and work in their home city. I thus chose to include in this chapter only negotiation practices that are already a matter of public record: the different performances of residency highlighted in this chapter have all been discussed previously either in court proceedings, in parliamentary protocols or in the media.

Researchers’ ethical obligations towards their interlocutors are not limited to the immediate safety of those who directly contributed to the research,
but extend to the research’s implications for the wider community with whom and among which our ethnographic research takes place. Despite working with different groups and communities, I recognize that the largest potential threat to lives, livelihoods and recognition from the publication of this research is faced by Jerusalem’s Palestinian community, and to a much lesser extent by Jewish-Israeli settlers and security agents. With this in mind, I omitted several sections from interviews, photographs and observation notes that could compromise Palestinian residents’ safety due to their actions, or expression of opinions, in opposition to the Israeli authorities. Yet this research could also provide beneficial results to the community: I aim to disseminate the findings of this research among Palestinian institutions, organizations and committees, who might find relevant my attempts at unveiling the myriad components involved in the controversial Israeli security provision.

A different question is that of representation. As Kovats-Bernat (2002: 214) argues, ‘by the very fact that we are participating in research that investigates, considers, or at least is engaged amid violence or terror or the threat thereof, we are inviting the possibility of victimization on ourselves and on our informants’. The Palestinians I met in the course of this research were never voiceless victims devoid of agency, but rather displayed great talent, each in their own way, in navigating, negotiating and resisting Israeli security actors, policies and technologies. This is reflected in the progression of this dissertation – from chapters detailing the configuration of the Israeli modular security toolbox and its public-private components, through a discussion of the material, affective and temporal security interventions at checkpoints, to an exploration of the negotiation practices and tactics employed by Palestinian Jerusalemites to claim their place in their city. Together, these can shed light on the dispersed pieces of a broken city, and on who, or what, might be able to mend it.